



C. IULIUS CÆSAR



THE  
COMMENTARIES  
OF

C. Julius Cæsar,

Of His WARS in

GALLIA;

And the CIVIL WARS betwixt him and

POMPEY.

*With many Excellent and Judicious Observations thereupon.*

As also the ART of our

Modern Training.

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By CLEMENT EDMONDS Esquire.

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To this Edition is now added, at the end of every Book, those *Excellent Remarks* of the Duke of Rohan.

Also the Commentaries of the *Alexandrian* and *African* WARS,  
Written by *Aulus Hirtius*; now first made *English*.

With a Geographical Nomenclatour of the Ancient and Modern  
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Together with the LIFE of CÆSAR.

And an Account of his Medals;

REVISED, CORRECTED, and ENLARGED.

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In the SAVOY,

Printed by Edward Jones, for Thomas Chapman at the Angel in the Pall-mall. MDCXCV.



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To my Friend Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

EPIGRAMME.

**N**Ot *Cæsar's* deeds, nor all his honours won  
In these West-parts; nor, when that war was done,  
The name of *Pompey* for an Enemy;  
*Cato* to boot; *Rome*, and her liberty;  
All yielding to his fortune: nor, the while,  
To have ingrav'd these Acts with his own stile;  
And that so strong, and deep, as might be thought  
He wrote with the same spirit that he fought;  
Nor that his Work liv'd, in the hands of foes,  
Un-argu'd then; and (yet) hath fame from those;  
Not all these, *Edmonds*, or what else put to,  
Can so speak *Cæsar*, as thy Labours do.  
For, where his person liv'd scarce one just age,  
And that 'midst envy and Parts; then, fell by rage;  
His deeds too dying, save in Books: (whose good  
How few have read! how fewer understood!)  
Thy learned hand, and true Promethean Art,  
As by a new creation, part by part,  
In every Counsel, Stratagem, Design,  
Action, or Engine, worth a Note of thine,  
T'all future time not only doth restore  
His Life, but makes that he can die no more.

*Ben. Johnson.*

---

Another of the same.

**W**HO, *Edmonds*, reads thy Book, and doth not see  
What th'antique Soldiers were, the Modern be?  
Wherein thou shew'st, how much the later are  
Beholden to this Master of the War:  
And that in Action there is nothing new,  
More then to vary what our Elders knew.  
Which all but ignorant Captains will confess:  
Not to give *Cæsar* this makes ours the less.  
Yet thou, perhaps, shalt meet some Tongues will grutch  
That to the World thou shouldst reveal so much;  
And thence deprave thee, and thy Work. To those  
*Cæsar* stands up, as from his Urn late rose  
By that great Art; and doth proclaim by me,  
They murder him again, that envy thee.

*Ben. Johnson.*



---

# CÆSARIS ELOGIUM.

## C. Julius Cæsar.

**L**ucii Cæsaris F. Lux Cæsarum & Pater,  
Romanus Alexander, Terræ Mars :  
Omnibus tam metuendus, quam mitis ;  
Pretium fecit servituti.  
Victo orbe Urbem victricem orbis vicit.  
Defuere illi hostes, hostem habuit Patriam,  
Ne deesset unquam quod vinceret.  
Ingratam Patriam patriis armis punit.  
Eam vicit invitus, qua vixit invita.  
Qui Romæ propugnator non regnavit, regnavit expugnator ;  
Pro Roma triumpharat, de Roma triumphavit :  
Amavit tamen inimicam, nolenti profuit.  
Sæpe a fulmine lauro servatus regia,  
Quem inermem timuerunt arma, armata necavit toga.  
Cessit Civibus Cæsar Cæsus :  
Sero cognitum luxit Patria ;  
Viventem hostem, mortuum vocavit Patrem,  
Parricidium confessa tum patrem dixit.  
Disce lector :  
Melius sæpe quæ non habes vides, quam quæ habes.



T O T H E  
P R I N C E.

S I R,

**H**AVING ended this task of Observations, and according to Your Gracious Pleasure and Command, supplied such parts as were wanting to make up the Total of these Commentaries: it doth return again, by the lowest steps of Humbleness, to implore the high Patronage of Your Princely Favour; emboldened especially because it carrieth Cæsar and his Fortunes, as they come related from the same Author: which, in the deep Judgment of His Most Excellent MAJESTY, is preferred above all other profane Histories; and so commended, by His Sacred Authority, to Your Reading, as a chief Pattern and Master-piece of the Art of War. And herein Your admired Wisdom may happily the rather deem it capable of freer Passage, in that it is not altogether unproper for these happy days; as knowing, That War is never so well handled, as when it is made an Argument of Discourse in times of sweet and plenteous Peace. The Blessings whereof may ever Crown Your Years; as the Sovereign Good of this Temporary Life, and the chiefest Ornaments of Princely Condition.

The humblest

of Your Highness's Servants,

CLEMENT EDMONDS.



In Clementis Edmōndi De Re Militari ad *Jul. Cæ-*  
*saris* Commentarios Observationes.

**C**UR creperos motus, & aperto prælia Marte  
Edmondus nobis pace vigente refert?  
Cur sensus mentesq; Ducum rimatur, & effert?  
Diserteq; Anglos bellica multa docet?  
Scilicet, ut media meditetur prælia pace  
Anglia belli potens, nec moriatur bonos.  
Providas hæc certe patriæ depromit in usus;  
Ut patriæ pacem qui cupit, arma parat.

Guil. Camdenus, *cl.*

---

To my Friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

**W**HO thus extracts, with more than Chymick Art,  
The Spirit of Books, shews the true way to find  
Th'Elixir that our leaden Parts convert  
Into the golden Metal of the Mind.  
Who thus observes in such material kind  
The certain Motions of his Practices,  
Knows on what Centre th'Actions of Mankind  
Turn in their Course, and sees their fatalness.  
And he that can make these Observances,  
Must be above his Book more than his Pen.  
For, we may be assur'd, he men can guess,  
That thus doth CÆSAR know, the Man of Men.  
Whose Works, improv'd here to our greater gain,  
Makes CÆSAR more than CÆSAR to contain.

Sam. Daniel.

---

To his worthy Friend, Master CLEMENT EDMONDS.

**O**bserving well what Thou hast well Observ'd  
In CÆSAR's Works, his Wars and Discipline;  
Whether His Pen hath earn'd more Praise, or Thine,  
My shallow Censure doubtfully hath swerv'd.  
If strange it were, if wonder it deserv'd,  
That what He wrought so fair, He wrote so fine;  
Me thinks, it's stranger, That Thy learned Line  
Should our best Leaders lead, not having serv'd.  
But hereby (Clement) hast thou made thee known  
Able to counsell, aptest to record  
The Conquests of a CÆSAR of our own;  
HENRY, thy Patron, and my Princely Lord.  
Whom (O!) Heav'n prosper, and protect from harms,  
In glorious Peace, and in victorious Arms.

Joshua Silvester.



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# THE CONSTITUTION

of the United States of America

As amended by the

Seventeenth Amendment

and the

Twenty-First Amendment

and the

Twenty-Second Amendment

and the

Twenty-Third Amendment

and the

Twenty-Fourth Amendment


and the

Twenty-Fifth Amendment

and the

Twenty-Sixth Amendment









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
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# THE L I F E O F

## C. Julius Cæsar ;

With certain *Historical Observations* upon His Medals.

**T**H E excessive Lustre of a Million of Gallant Atchievements successfully performed by *Cæsar* (the most illustrious and celebrated Favourite of Fortune) hath through all Ages so dazzled the greatest part of Mankind, especially those, both Ancient and Modern, who made it their business to describe the great Transactions either of their own, or former Ages ; that they have not only parallel'd him with the Greatest Heroes of the first Ages, but have ballanc'd him with *Alexander*, the most Generous and the most Glorious of all Monarchs. Nay, in their account *Cæsar* far outweighs him, since that all that may be call'd Great or Illustrious, either as to *Virtue*, *Valour*, true *Magnanimity*, or *Clemency*, is more Conspicuous in him than in all the *Roman* Emperors, who after him sat at the Helm of that Monarchy. Those who made difficulty to assign him the first place among the *Roman* Emperors, considered not certainly that the Designation of a Building is the Master-piece of the Architect, and that the Superstructure may require no eminency of Perfection. For having consummated those innumerable Trophies he had erected amongst the *Galls* by those about *Pharsalia*, he laid the Foundation of that Eternal Fame, the World hath deservedly honoured him with since : Nay, to that height of Adoration had he rais'd the minds of Posterity, that his very Successors thought it their greatest glory to wear the Livery of his Name, and after him to be called *Cæsar*.

To offer at a perfect Anatomy of this great Man's Actions, were to quote most Authors and Writers that have been, and consequently a Work of too long a breath. It shall therefore suffice to trace him out in those great designs, whereby he laid the foundations of the *Roman* greatness.

The first thing worthy, not only notice, but admiration, is the strange Judgment of *Sylla* of him : who reflecting on the great perfections of *Cæsar* when yet a Youth, and the strange vivacity and conduct of his first actions, made that Inhumane proposition that he might be killed, (as if even *Virtue* may be excessive and a Crime) as he had caus'd divers of the Kindred and Party of *Marius*, who had married *Julia* an Aunt of *Cæsar*'s by the mother side. Nor doth Envy want pretences, since as he conjectur'd, one *Cæsar* contain'd many *Marius*'s, and should, if suffer'd to live, prove the *Viper* of the *Commonwealth*. But this may be easily pass'd by, since that they are indeed the greatest actions that must expect Censure. But it must in the mean time denote a strange transcendency of Courage and Confidence, to think to Conquer that People who had conquer'd the *Universe* ; it must be the effect of an ambition more than Humane, for this is commonly fetter'd to probabilities. The Emperor *Julian*, though he hath made it his business to Satyrize against his Predecessors, yet having to do with *Cæsar*, he by a strange fiction discovers the greatness of his designations. *Cæsar* says he, a Person of a Gallant and Graceful Presence, being entered the place, where *Romulus* was to entertain the Gods, and *Roman* Emperors at the *Saturnalian* Feasts, came in with such an Insolent Deportment, that the Gods were of opinion, he was not come thither unless it were to manage some ambitious Plots against the Majesty of Heaven, whereof *Jupiter* being very



## The LIFE of JULIUS CÆSAR.

jealous, he was thrust by, till at last *Mars* and *Venus* made him place. The ingenuity of this *Satyr* amounts only to thus much, to paint over that great *Virtue*, that great indulgence of *Nature* and *Fortune*, in the colours of an insatiable ambition, which had not this Censor been excessively guilty of, might have prov'd somewhat.

But the endowments of *Nature*, the constant presence of *Fortune*, and the surprizing *Glory* consequential to his Actions, were the Genius's that rais'd him to such high adventures, as the sudden change of the *Democratical* State of *Rome* into a *Monarchical*, to pretend a title to the great conquests of a valorous People for 700 years; and to assume to himself an Empire far greater than the *Affyrian*, *Persian*, or *Macedonian*, both in extent of time, greatness, and power. For not to descend to the acquisitions of the later Emperors, we shall only take a view of the *Roman* Empire as it stood, before *Cæsar* seiz'd the Reins of Government. In *Europe* they were Masters of all *Italy* and *Gallia Cisalpina*, or *Lombardy*, *Austria*, and *Illiricum* now call'd *Sclavonia*, reaching as far as *Danubius*. They had reduc'd all *Greece*, the States of *Athens*, *Lacedæmon*, *Thebes*, *Corinth*, and all *Peloponnesus* now call'd *Morea*; *Macedon*, and *Epire*, now call'd *Albania* and *Thrace*. They had the Islands of *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, *Creet*, *Cyprus*, *Rhodes*, and *Negropont*, and divers others in the *Mediterranean* Sea. They had taken in all *Spain*, and (which was *Cæsar*'s own work) all *France*, that part of *Germany* lying on the *Rhine*, call'd *Gallia Belgica*, and *Great Britain*. They were Masters of all *Africk*, (the third part of the World then) even to pull down the pride of *Carthage*. The best Provinces of *Asia* were Tributaries, as *Syria*, *Phœnicia*, *Palestina*, *Judæa*, *Phrygia*, *Caria*, *Cilicia*, and *Bithynia*. *Egypt* and *Cappadocia* were Confederates. In *Armenia* and *Colchos* they had forces. *Albania*, *Iberia*, and some other Countries, paid Contributions and did Homage. In fine, they were so great, that they were Unconquerable, unless by their own strength, that so they might have this satisfaction and glory in their Conquest, that they Triumph'd over themselves.

It is easie to attribute to Ambition and Discord what is the Design of Fate. Greatness must expect a period; and to be successful presumes a happy Conjunction of Men and Affairs. Some differences there were between *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, (the most eminent and the most powerful in *Rome*) rak'd up in the Embers of the Civil War between *Sylla* and *Marius*; wherein the later being slain, the other made himself Dictator, and seiz'd *Rome*, but quitted both before his death. *Pompey* had sided with *Sylla*, *Cæsar* with *Marius*, as being his Kinsman. But to ascend a little higher in these Broils, we are to note, That *Sylla* having dispower'd himself, *Pompey* and *Crassus* came into repute. The later was the more recommended by his Wisdom, Eloquence, Nobility, and excessive Riches; the other had gain'd the popular Esteem by his Victories and great Actions in War, even in *Sylla*'s time. While the differences of these two encreased with their greatness, *Cæsar* returns to *Rome*, from his Prætorship in *Spain*, bringing that Reputation with him, that swell'd the Greatness and Ambition of his Thoughts. He had gone through most Charges, civil and military; he had been *Quæstor*, *Tribune* of the Soldiers, *Ædile*, *High-priest*, and *Prætor*. All which, with other Accomplishments he was furnish'd with, which we shall mention elsewhere, though they brought him into much Esteem, yet was he not yet arrived to near the Authority and Reputation of either *Crassus* or *Pompey*.

*Cæsar*, though he were come to *Rome*, yet stifled all thoughts of aspiring for a while; so that both *Crassus* and *Pompey* applyed themselves to him, hoping by his accession to ruin one the other. But *Cæsar* declin'd both, and carried himself with circumspection, that he endeavour'd to reconcile them, so hoping by his Neutrality to undermine them both; which was, as *Plutarch* says, observed only by *Cato*. At length he so order'd things, that he made an Agreement between them, and so obliged both; which caused that, retaining some jealousies of each other, they equally courted *Cæsar*'s Friendship, by which means he became equal to either: So that the Power which before was between two, became now tripartite. Things being thus appeas'd, *Cæsar* demands the Consulship; which obtain'd, he carried himself in it with that Reputation, that his Co-Consul *Bibulus* left all to his Management. To maintain the Authority he had got, he himself took to Wife *Calpurnia*, the Daughter of *Lucius Piso*, who was to succeed him in the Consulate, and bestows his own Daughter *Julia* on *Pompey*; and so taking in *Crassus*, they make a League, and being equally ambitious, conspire to invade the Common-wealth. *Cæsar* chuses for his Province the *Gauls*, or *France*; *Crassus*, *Asia*; *Pompey*, *Spain*; whither they went with three puissant Armies, as if the World had been to be trichotomiz'd among these three. What *Cæsar* did in his Province, what Battels he fought, what People he subdued, what Valour, Policy, Success, follow'd him every where, may be seen in his own *Commentaries* of that War, approv'd by his very Enemies as modest and impartial, and attested by *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Lucan*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Florus*, *Eutropius*; too great a testimony against one censorious *Asinius Pollio*. By this War *Cæsar* got the Reputation of the greatest Captain that ever was, subduing all *France*, from the *Pyrenean Hills* the *Alps*, and so to the *Rhine*. But to forbear particular instances, as that he conquer'd the *Suscians* and *Tigurins*, (who were according to *Plutarch* 300000 men, whereof 19000 were well disciplin'd) this is most worth our Remark, That during these so great Wars, he omitted not, both by Intelligence and Presents, to endear his Friends, both at *Rome* and elsewhere, doing



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doing many things without the Senate's leave, upon the score of the League with *Pompey* and *Crassus*. Nay, his courting of all sorts of People, both Soldier and Citizen, was none of his least Master-pieces; by which means he had supplanted *Pompey* in matter of Esteem, before he perceived it. To this purpose hath *Pliny* observed, *Lib. 33. Cap. 3.* That in the time of his *Edility*, that is to say, his *Sbrievedom*, he was so prodigal, that the Utensils and Arms that he made use of at publick Sports and Combats, were all of Silver, which yet afterwards were bestow'd among the People; and that he was the first that ever brought forth the Beasts in Chariots and Cages of Silver. This it was made some suspect him guilty of Rapine, and that he plundered Temples and Cities *sæpius ob prædam quam ob delictum*.

But this Reputation of *Cæsar* begat Jealousie in *Pompey*, which (the tye of their Correspondence being loos'd by the death of *Julia*) was easily seen to break forth into a flame, especially now that *Crassus*, the third Man, was, together with divers stout Roman Legions, buried with infamy in *Parthia*. Thus the foundations of Friendship and Alliance in great ones being once taken away, the Superstructures fall down immediately. Nothing could decide the Emulation of two so great Persons as *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, (the one desying superiority, the other equality) but as great a War. It could not but be universal, when Senate, Armies, Kingdoms, Cities, Allies, all were some way or other embarqu'd in the quarrel. There was on one side 11 Legions, on the other 18. The seat of the War was *Italy*, *France*, *Epirus*, *Theffaly*, *Aegypt*, *Asia*, and *Africk*; through all which, after it had ravag'd five years, the Controversie was decided in *Spain*. That Ambition (the imperfection only of the greatest minds) might have been the occasion of so inveterate a War, hath been the opinion of divers others, who charge not *Pompey* with so great discoveries of it as *Cæsar*, to whom they assign a greater than the Empire; as if their mutual distrust and jealousy of one another, should be able to cause so many Tragedies through so many Countries. Besides, *Cæsar* had his Enemies at *Rome*, and among others *Cato*, who threatned to impeach him when he was once out of Command. What bandying there was against him, we find somewhat in the latter end of the eighth *Commentary* to this purpose. *Lentulus* and *Marcellus*, both of *Pompey's* Faction, being Consuls, it is mov'd in the Senate, That *Cæsar* might be called home, and another sent to supply his Command of the Army then in *Gallia*; since that he, having written for the Consulship, should according to Law have been personally in *Rome*. *Cæsar* demands to be continued in Commission and Government, and that he might demand the Consulship absent. This *Pompey* opposes, though he himself, as much contrary to Law, had had the Consulship and other Dignities before he was at full Age.

This deny'd, *Cæsar* proposes, That he would come to *Rome* as a private man, and give over his Command, so that *Pompey* quitted his Employment in *Spain*. About this the Senate was much divided. *Cicero* proposes a mediation: but *Pompey's* Party prevailing, it was decreed, That *Cæsar* should by a certain time quit his Command, and should not pass his Army over the River *Rubicon*, which bounded his Province; declaring him an Enemy to the Roman State in case of Refusal. *C. Curio* and *M. Antonius*, the Tribunes of the People, out of their affection to *Cæsar*, endeavouring to oppose this Decree, were thrust disgracefully out of the Senate, which occasion'd them to repair to *Cæsar*; whereby they endear'd the affections of the Soldiery to him, the Office of the Tribunes being ever held sacred and unviolable.

*Cæsar* understanding how things stood at *Rome*, marches with 5000 Foot and 300 Horse to *Ravenna*, having commanded the Legions to follow. Coming to the fatal Passage of *Rubicon*, he enter'd into a deep Deliberation, considering the Importance and Miseries that might ensue that Passage. At last, in the midst of his anxiety, he was animated to a prosecution of his designs, by the Apparition of a Man of an extraordinary Stature and Shape, sitting near unto his Army, piping upon a Reed. The Soldiers went down to the River side to hear him, and approach'd so near, that he caught one of their Trumpets, and leaping into the River, began with a mighty blast to sound, and so went to the Bank of the other side. This resolves *Cæsar*, who cryed out, *Let us go whither the Gods and the injurious dealings of our Enemies call us*. With which he set Spurs to his Horse, and past the River, the Army following. Who would be more particularly inform'd, may be satisfi'd out of *Appianus Alexandrinus*, *Suetonius*, *Plutarch*, in the lives of *Cæsar*, *Cato*, and *Cicero*, *St. Augustine*, l. 3. de c. d. *Cæsar* himself in his *Commentaries*, *Florus*, *Livy*, *Paulus Orosius*, *Eutropius*, *Lucan*, *Pliny de viris illustribus*, *Valerius Maximus*, &c.

Having pass'd the River, and drawn the Army together, the Tribunes came to him in those dishonourable garments wherein they had fled from *Rome*. Whereupon he made an excellent Oration to the Soldiery, opening to them his Cause: which was answer'd with general Acclamations, and promises of Duty and Obedience to all Commands.

This done, he seizes *Ariminum*, and divers other Towns and Castles as he past, till he came to *Corfinium*: where *Domitius*, who was to succeed him in his Command, was garrison'd with 30 Cohorts.

*Cæsar's* Advance and Intentions astonished *Rome*, Senate and People; nay, so surpriz'd *Pompey*, that he could not believe *Cæsar* would thrust himself into so much danger, or that



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his Forces were so considerable. But though *Pompey* was impower'd by the Senate to levy Forces, recall the Legions, and provide for the defence of *Italy*, yet all could make nothing against *Cæsar*. The rumour of his Advance spreading, *Pompey* and the Senate leave *Rome*, and repair to *Capua*, from thence to *Brundisium*; from whence the Consuls were dispatch'd to *Dyrrachium*, to unite what Forces they could, since they despair'd of resisting *Cæsar* in *Italy*: who hearing the Consuls and *Pompey* were at *Brundisium*, march'd thither; and having invested the Town, *Pompey* in the night time embarks for *Dyrrachium*, where the Consul expected him: so that *Cæsar* became absolute Master of *Italy*. Having not Shipping to pursue him, he resolv'd for *Spain*, which held for *Pompey*, where his best Legions were, and two Captains, *Petreius* and *Afranius*.

Returning from *Brundisium*, he in 60 days master'd all *Italy* without any Bloodshed, and coming to *Rome*, the memory of the Devastations of *Sylla's* days frightened the people extremly. But *Cæsar's* Clemency, and his attributing the cause of all the Distractions to *Pompey*, quieted all things. He so far justified his own Cause, that he mov'd that Ambassadors might be sent to *Pompey* for Peace, and causing himself to be chosen Consul, he opened the *Roman* Treasury, and made a Dividend of it among the Soldiery. This done, he provides for *Spain*, having taken care for the Civil as well as Military Government. *Brundisium*, *Otranto*, and other maritime places, he fortifies against *Pompey's* entring into *Italy*, in case he should attempt it. *Hortensius* and *Dolabella* were to provide Shipping for him at *Brundisium*, against his return. *Quintus Valerius* he sends with a Legion into *Sardinia*, against *Marcus Cotta*, who held it for *Pompey*. To *Sicily* he sends *Curius* against *Marcus Cato*: which when he had taken in, he was to march into *Africk*. He leaves *Lepidus* to govern at *Rome*, and *Antonius* for all *Italy*. Thus intending to leave *Licinius Crassus* in *France*, he, with his wonted celerity, went on his Journey, meeting with no resistance, but at *Marseilles*; which leaving *D. Brutus* and *C. Trebonius* with sufficient Forces to besiege, he went forward towards *Spain*, where he was expected by *Petreius* and *Afranius*: with whom, though he met with no Inconveniencies of the Winter and high Rivers, he had divers skirmishes; yet at length he carried his business so, that the Enemies were forc'd by hunger to a Composition, the Legions and Captains, such as would not remain with *Cæsar*, having leave to depart whither they pleas'd.

The spring now coming on, (to leave nothing unsubdu'd) he marches into *Bætica*, now called *Andaluzia*, where quarter'd *Marcus Varro*, with one Legion of Soldiers, as *Pompey's* Lieutenant; who conceiving himself unable to make opposition, resign'd both the Country and Legion to *Cæsar*, whereby all was quieted.

Thence he marched to *Cordova*, where assembling the Estates of the Provinces, he acknowledg'd their Affection and Devoirs, and so went to *Cales*; where he took such Ships and Gallies as *Marcus Varro* had there, with what others he could get, and embarked. Having left *Q. Cassius* with four Legions in that Province, he marches to *Narbona*, and so to *Marseilles*, which having suffered great Miseries during the Siege, at length surrendred; yet he protected it from any Violence, preferring the consideration of the Antiquity of the place, before the Affronts he had received from it: and so having sufficiently garrison'd it, he marches into *Italy*, and so to *Rome*, all things succeeding prosperously to him, though not so to his Captains. For *Antonius* (who was joynt General at Sea with *Dolabella*) was overthrown and taken Prisoner by *Octavius*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, in the Gulf of *Venice*, and that by a strange Stratagem. *Antonius* being forced, for want of Ships, to put his men into Long-boats, the *Pompeians* ty'd Ropes under the water, by which means one of them, which carried a thousand *Opitergins*, stout young men, was surprized, and assaulted by the whole Army; yet making resistance from morning till night, they at last seeing all their efforts ineffectual, did, by the instigation of their Commander *Vulteius*, kill one another. *Dolabella* was also overcome; as also *Curio*, who was ordered to go into *Africa*, was overthrown by *Pompey's* Friend *Juba*, King of *Mauritania*.

While *Cæsar* was at *Rome*, busy in causing himself to be made Dictator, and then, putting off that, Consul, that so he might send Prætors into the Provinces, as *Marcus Lepidus* into *Spain*, *A. Albinus* into *Sicily*, *Sextus Peduceius* into *Sardinia*, and *Decius Brutus* into *France*; and taking such farther Order as he thought fit: *Pompey* was as busy in *Macedonia*, raising of Men and Money, and providing Ships in order to his return into *Italy*. What his Forces might amount unto, may be judg'd from the almost infinite assistances came into him from divers Kingdoms and Provinces of *Asia* and *Greece*, from *Syria*, *Pontus*, *Bythinia*, *Cilicia*, *Phœnicia*, *Cappadocia*, *Pamphilia*, *Armenia* the less, *Egypt*, *Greece*, *Thessaly*, *Bœotia*, *Achaia*, *Epire*, *Athens*, *Lacedæmon*, the Isles of *Crete* and *Rhodes*, and divers other places; there coming to his assistance in person the Kings *Deiotarus* and *Ariobarzanes*. These certainly, with those he had brought with him out of *Italy*, must needs make up a vast Army by land; nor could the number of Ships and Gallies but be proportionable. However, *Cæsar* knowing all this, leaves *Rome* in *December*, and so marches to *Brundisium*, whence he was to embark for *Macedonia*, out of this consideration, that his Victory consisted in expedition; though *Pompey* in the mean time, upon intelligence of *Cæsar's* being at *Rome*, had scattered his People into *Macedonia* and *Thessaly*; conceiving the inconveniencies of the Winter would have deterred him from crossing the Seas. But *Cæsar* being come to *Brundisium*,



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*dusum*, (now called *Brindex*) he imbarques seven Legions of his choicest men in the beginning of *January*; leaving Order to those that were coming, to make hast and joyn with those which remained behind, all whom he would speedily send for.

Three days after, he arrives upon the Coast of *Macedonia*, before *Pompey* had so much as heard of his imbarquing, and lands in spite of *Pompey's* Captains, and presently commands the Ships to return for the remainder of his Army; which done, he takes in by storm *Apollonia*, (now called *Bellona*) and *Oricum*, two Cities kept by *L. Torquatus* and *L. Straberius*, for *Pompey*; who allarm'd by this, sends for such Troops as were nearest, and marches to *Dyrrachium*, where all his Ammunition and Provision lay, to secure it from being surpriz'd by *Cæsar*: which indeed he had attempted, but, by reason of the natural strength of the place, to no purpose.

*Pompey* being come, both Armies lodg'd not many Furlongs from one another, only they were divided by a River. Which Post, as it gave occasion of divers Skirmishes, so it begat many Overtures of Peace from *Cæsar*; which *Pompey*, presuming upon his strength, would not hear of. This Proposition of *Cæsar's*, though it proceeded from his meekness, which was not the least of his Virtues, yet argued some conscience of his own weakness at this time. For he was extreamly perplex'd, that the other part of his Army was not come, in so much that he imbarqued in a *Brigandine* disguised to fetch them. Having pass'd down the River, the Sea was so tempestuous, that the Master of the Vessel would not adventure out: whereupon, as it is laid, *Cæsar* discovered himself, and said to him, *Friend, thou carriest Cæsar and his Fortune*. Whereat the Master being encouraged, ventured out into the Sea; but the Tempest was so violent, that it brought *Cæsar* back again. This action of his was like to have rais'd a mutiny in his Army, as a thing, which though it spoke Courage, yet was a stranger to Discretion: Which it may be is the reason that *Cæsar* hath made no mention of it in his Commentaries.

But some few days after, *Antonius* arrives with four Legions of the remaining part of the Army, and sends back the Ships for the rest. These joyning with *Cæsar*, there past divers skirmishes and pickeerings (being so nearly lodged) between both Armies: But that which was most remarkable was near the City of *Dyrrachium*, wherein *Cæsar's* Troops were so routed, that no Threats or Entreaties could stay them from running to their Camp; which though fortified, yet was abandoned by some. *Pompey* in the mean time, either out of fear that the flight might be feigned, and in order to some ambush, or that he thought *Cæsar* sufficiently conquered, doth not prosecute the Victory. Which weakness in him *Cæsar* dissembled not, when afterwards he said to his Men, *That that day had ended the War, if the Enemy had had a Captain that knew how to overcome*. But *Cæsar*, as no Prosperity disorder'd him, so in Adversity he had a Courage, and such a Confidence of Fortune, that he was nothing cast down. He lost in that Engagement, besides the common Soldiery, 400 *Roman* Knights, 10 Tribunes, and 32 Centurions, with as many Colours. This Success obtained, *Pompey* sends the News of it into all parts of the world, so advantagiously to himself, as if *Cæsar* were utterly routed; who though he did not decline fighting, yet thought it not Policy to engage his Men lately worsted, (though indeed exasperated with shame and indignation at their loss) with those that were animated and flesh'd with a Victory. He therefore disposes his maimed Men into *Apollonia*, and in the night takes his way towards *Thessaly*, both to hearten and refresh his Army; as also to draw the Enemy farther from the Sea-coast, where his main Force and all his Provisions lay: or at least to meet with *Scipio*, who, he had intelligence, was to joyn with *Pompey*.

This unexpected departure of *Cæsar's* brought *Pompey* almost to a Resolution to return into *Italy*, to recover that, with *France* and *Spain*, and afterwards to meet with *Cæsar*. But the *Roman* Lords that were about him (a sort of proud, insolent, indisciplinable people, who indeed proved his ruine,) dissuaded him, and caused him to alter his design; and so he fell upon the hot Pursuit of *Cæsar*, who, making a stay in the Fields of *Pharjalia*, till that his Men had reassumed their Courage and Resolution, was now willing and eager to fight. But *Pompey* perceiving this readiness of *Cæsar* to proceed from want of Provision, and a fear his Army should diminish, purposely avoided Fighting, and would have prolonged the War, and so have defeated his Enemy without hazarding his own Army. But the Murmurings, Mutinies, and Importunity of those that were about him, had such a prevailing Influence over him, (as *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Cæsar* himself acknowledgeth) that they forced him, contrary to his Intentions and Policy, to give Battle; which was such, that all the flower and force of *Rome* was engaged in it. *Cæsar's* Army (according to the computation of most Writers) amounted to half *Pompey's*: but in compensation his Men were more active and versed in War, and knew their advantages; whereas the other's was a tumultuary sort of people raked together, besides what *Romans* he had. The exact number of both these Armies is not agreed on by Authors: Some raise them to 300000. of which opinion was *Florus*; others bring them down to 70000. But if we agree with *Appianus*, we must conceive, that so many Countreys and Nations having sent in their Assistances on either side, there must needs be vast Armies on both sides: And therefore those who pitched upon the lesser number, meant only the number of *Romans*, who were the main force and hope of both Generals: But here we may make a strange Remark upon the



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the uncertain Events of War. We have two of the greatest Captains that ever were, the stoutest Armies that ever met, such as Experience, Force, and Valour was equally divided between, and, to be short, the most exasperated Parties that could be; and yet it proved but a very short Fight: So weak is the confidence and assurance that is only placed in number. We may farther note the strange Influence of Religion upon Mankind in general, in that it enforces Man in the greatest Exigencies to Consultation. For *Pompey* met with divers things that might somewhat have informed him of the Success of that famous Battel. The running away of the Beasts destin'd for Sacrifice, the swarming of Bees, the Sky darkened, and his own fatal Dream of being in mourning in the Theatre, seconded by his appearance in the head of his main Battel the next day in a black Robe, which might signify he mourned for the Liberty of *Rome* beforehand.

Being both resolved to give Battel, they put their Armies into such Order as they thought fit, and harrangued their Soldiers according to their several Pretences. In the beginning, *Pompey's* Horse, consisting most of the *Roman* Gentry and Nobility, prevailed over *Cæsar's*, and made them give ground: which he perceiving, causes a Battalion, set apart for that purpose, to charge them; with order to aim altogether at the face: Which *Pompey's* Horse not able, or not willing to endure, began to retreat, and so made way for the total Overthrow; by which means the Foot being discouraged, and seeing *Cæsar's* Horse falling on, the Victory was soon decided on *Cæsar's* side, *Pompey* flying to his Camp, and leaving the Field to his Adversary. Here was the greatest misfortune of *Pompey*, to out-live the Liberty of his Country, (which he pretended so much to fight for) and his own Glory, in this Battel, being forc'd to a dishonourable flight, and to deliberate whither he should retire, whether into *Parthia*, *Africk*, or *Egypt*.

*Cæsar* being thus Master of the Field, and meeting with no opposition, falls upon *Pompey's* Camp, which, without any great difficulty, he enter'd. Whereupon *Pompey* disguising himself, takes up the first Horse he met, and with four more (his own Son *Sextus Pompeius*, the two *Lentuli*, and *Favonius*) makes his Escape, and stays not till he came to *Larissa*: where meeting with some of his own Horse, who were in the same condition of running away, he continued his flight till he came to the shore of the *Ægean* Sea; where meeting accidentally with a certain Merchant's Ship of *Rome*, he embarques himself in her, and sails to *Mitylene*, where his Wife and Family were. Having taken them with him, and got together what Men and Ships a shatter'd Fortune could furnish him with, he departed thence in very great doubt and perplexity, not able to resolve whither to dispose of himself. He was advis'd by some to march into *Africa*, and shelter himself with *Juba*, whose Friendship and Affection towards him he had received testimony of but very lately: others were of opinion, his best course was to retire among the *Parthians*. But at last, by his own wilfulness, it was voted he should go into *Egypt*; which he was the more inclin'd to, out of a consideration of the Friendship and Correspondence which he had had with King *Ptolomy*, Father to him who then reign'd: and so touching at *Cyprus*, he sails towards *Egypt*, and arrives at *Alexandria*.

Thus was the Controversy, for no less than the known World, decided in one day, *Cæsar* being Master of the Field and Victory. Of *Pompey's* side there were slain fifteen thousand, if you will take it upon *Cæsar's* Credit; and of his own, not two thousand. *Cæsar* having Intelligence of *Pompey's* flight, pursues him without any stay, with the swiftest and lightest of his Army, so to give him as little breath as he could afford, that he might not meet with any means or opportunity to recover or repair himself. Reducing all Cities as he passed, he comes to the Sea-side, and taking up all the Ships and Gallies he could meet with, and such as *Cassius* (who was received into his favour) could furnish him with, he embarques such Troops as he could, and passed into *Asia the less*: where understanding that *Pompey* had been at *Cyprus*, he easily presumed that he was gone for *Egypt*. He thereupon resolves to take the same course; and taking with him only two Legions of his old Soldiers, he safely arrives at *Alexandria*; where he soon understood that *Pompey* was arriv'd, upon a confidence (as was said before) there might have remained some sence and memory in young *Ptolomy*, of the Entertainment and Favours he had done his Father. But he was as much mistaken in this, as he had been eluded by Fortune in the War: For he finds that the Friendship of great Men and Princes seldom outlives their Prosperity, and that Adversity makes them the greatest Strangers that may be. Being by this King *Ptolomy* invited into Protection, and upon that confidence coming towards the shore in a small Boat, he was, ere he could reach the land, murdered, by the same King's Commandment, by *Septimius* and *Achillas*, who thought by that means to purchase *Cæsar's* Favour. This was done by the contrivance of *Photinus*, an Eunuch, whose Authority both with King and Court was very great. *Cæsar* receives also news, That *Cornelia*, *Pompey's* Wife, and his Son *Sextus Pompeius*, were fled from that Port in the same Vessel wherein they came. Being landed and received into the City, he was soon presented with the head of the Great *Pompey*; which, out of a consideration of the horridness of the fact, he would not by any means see. His Ring also, and his Seal with his Coat of Arms upon it, were presented to him; which causing him to reflect on the great Successes, Adventures, and Prosperities of that great and glorious Man, (besides that he was to look on him as his

Son



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Son in Law) it drew tears from him, to compare them with his unfortunate end. Thus is he who had three times triumph'd, been so many times Consul, been the most eminent and the most concerned person that *Rome* had for so many years together, one who had been acquainted with all the Dignities so great a Common-wealth could conferr upon a deserving Citizen, most inhumanly and perfidiously assassinated, to the greatest Regret of him who was look'd on as most desirous of it. This in the mean time concludes that opinion erroneous, that *Cæsar* was so extreemly over-joyed at the news of *Pompey's* death, that he caused, upon that very place where he had order'd his head to be interr'd, a Temple to be built to the Goddess *Nemesis*; which some interpret a most unnatural Revengesfulness, a horrid Insultation over a calamitous Virtue, and a Prophanation of divine Worship, to abuse the name of a Goddess to immortalize the memory of his Vengeance, and to authorize the Injustice of it. But it is as easie to give the title of Barbarism and Cruelty to Magnanimity and height of Courage, as to say the contrary: and therefore *Cæsar* certainly could not be guilty of so great an Hypocrisie, as to shed tears over his Enemy's head, when he was inwardly surpriz'd with joy.

*Cæsar*, upon his arrival in *Egypt*, finds it embroiled in Civil Wars, arising from some differences between young *Ptolomy* and his Sister *Cleopatra*, about the Division and Inheritance of the Kingdom; wherein *Cæsar* (as Consul of *Rome*) thought fit to be a Mediator. *Photinus* and *Achillas*, the Plotters and Practicers of *Pompey's* Death, fearing from *Cæsar* a Reward of Vengeance proportion'd to so horrid a Crime, and perceiving his Inclination to favour *Cleopatra*, take such order, by their great influence over King and Court, that they brought what Army the King had near the City, which consisted of about 20000 able Men: And this they did out of a Design to entrap *Cæsar*, and act the same perfidious Butchery upon him, as they had done upon *Pompey*. By this means there began, between what Forces *Cæsar* had brought with him, and those of the *Egyptians* within and about the City, as also between the Ships and Gallies in Harbour, the hottest Disputes and sharpest Encounters he ever met with; which we shall not particularize here, because it is the proper work of a compleat History. One thing our Observation cannot baulk in these hot and occasional Engagements, that *Cæsar* himself was personally engaged in most Disputes, both within the City, and among the Ships, and that to the great hazard of his Person; as may appear by that one Adventure, when he was forc'd to leap out of the Boat wherein he was, into the Sea, and by swimming to recover one of his Gallies: and being in this great extremity, (if you will believe *Suetonius*) he carried his *Commentaries* in one hand above the Water, and his Robe in his Teeth, that it might not fall into the Enemy's hands. In these Conflicts were there nine Months spent; at which time *Cæsar* receiving his Forces out of *Asia*, made an end of the Controversie, with the same attendance of *Fortune* and *Victory* which had waited on him every where else. Had *Cæsar* been acquainted with no other War but this, he might justly challenge the Title of the greatest Captain in the world, for much personal Valour, Wisdom, Conduct, Circumspection and Policy, did he exprets in all passages thereof, though encompassed with all the Inconveniencies and disadvantages imaginable.

*Egypt* being thus quieted, the Murderers of *Pompey* punished, and *Cleopatra* (by whom *Cæsar* had a Son called *Cæsario*) established Queen, *Cæsar* takes his march towards *Asia*, through *Syria*, having received Intelligence, that, while he was engaged in the Wars of *Egypt*, King *Pharnaces*, the Son of the mighty *Mitbridates*, taking his advantage of the Dissensions among the *Romans*, entertained some hopes of recovering what his Father had lost; having, in order thereto, overthrown *Domitius*, whom *Cæsar* had left Governour in those parts, and taken in by force the Provinces of *Bithynia* and *Cappadocia*, expelling thence *Ariobarzanes*, a Friend and Subject of *Rome*. The like he intended to have done with *Armenia* the less, which King *Dejotarus* had made subject to the *Romans*. But *Cæsar* coming upon *Pharnaces* before he expected him, they in a few days came to a Battle, which in a few hours was dispatched, to the overthrow of the King, and the infinite slaughter of his People, which he himself escaped by flight. This Victory gave *Cæsar* more satisfaction than any of his former, because of the great desire he had to return to *Rome*, where he was informed many Scandals were spread, and Insolencies committed by the encouragement of his absence. He had also understood that *Pompey's* eldest Son had seized a great part of *Spain*, and, out of those that *M. Varro* had left there, and some Gleanings of his Father's Troops, had gotten together some considerable Force. He also knew that most of the principal *Romans*, who had escaped the Battle at *Pharsalia*, were gathered together in *Africk*, and headed by *M. Cato*, (surnamed *Uticensis*, for having kill'd himself at *Utica*) and *Scipio*, *Pompey's* Father-in-Law; that they had a great part of *Pompey's* Navy; that with the assistance of *Juba*, King of *Mauritania*, they had subdued all that Country, and had a great Army in readiness against *Cæsar*, having chosen *Scipio* for their General, because that name had been fortunate in *Africk*. *Cæsar*, upon Intelligence of all these Transactions, with his wonted Celerity and Diligence recovers all that *Pharnaces* had usurped, and chasing him from *Pontus*, regained all those Countries, which he recommended to the Government of *Cælius Minucius*, with two Legions; where having reconciled Differences, decided all Controversies, and settled all things, by rewarding and gratifying those Kings and Te-

trarchs



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trarchs who had continued firm to the Common-wealth and Interest of *Rome*, he made no longer aboad in *Asia*, but passing with all expedition into *Italy*, he came to *Rome* within a little more than a year after he had departed thence; wherewith if we compare his great Expeditions and Adventures, it would prove matter of Faith and Astonishment, to consider how such vast Armies should pass through so many Countries in so short a time.

Some few days after his coming to *Rome*, he is created the third time Consul, and, as far as time and the exigencies of his affairs permitted, studied the Reformation of what disorders there then were. For that his Enemies before-mentioned should be Masters of *Africk*, was a thing he could not easily digest. Therefore with his ordinary expedition he marches thitherward, and commands his Forces to follow. He took Shipping in *Sicily*, and so passed into *Africk*, having no great Force with him: However, such was his confidence of his Fortune, that he staid not the arrival of either his Army or Navy. Being landed with his small Forces near unto to City of *Adrumetum*, he marches unto another called *Leptis*; where he was received, and where he took occasion by some Conflicts to keep the Enemy in Action, so to divert them from augmenting their Forces. In fine, his Legions being arrived, he very earnestly set himself to the prosecution of the War; in which, though it lasted but four Months, (from the beginning of *January* to the end of *April*) there happened many Encounters and Battles. For having dispatched what work *Petreibus* and *Labienus* found him, he came to deal with *Scipio* and King *Juba*, who had brought an Assistance of 8000 men, whereof one half were Cavalry; *Africa* at that time being very abundant in Horse, as may appear partly in that *Cæsar's* Enemies had, among them, raised in that Country, besides eight Legions of Foot, 20000 Horse. *Hirtius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Florus*, have written at large of this War, and tell you that *Cæsar* was many times in very great danger as to his own Person; yet at last, by the assistance of his Forces, and the Compliance of his great Fortune, he put a period to that War by one signal Battle, wherein there being slain of the Enemies side 10000, they were utterly defeated; *Cæsar* remained Master of the Field, and shortly after, of all the Country. The principal Captains of the adverse Party, though they escaped death at the Fight, died most of them miserably and unfortunately. King *Juba* himself being for want of refuge brought to that despair, that fighting with *Afranius*, and killing him, he commanded one of his own Slaves to dispatch himself. *Marcus Cato*, being in *Utica*, hearing of *Cæsar's* approach, though confident not only of his Pardon, but his particular Favour, yet either out of an indignation to be obliged by his Enemy, or an extravagant zeal to Liberty, laid violent hands on himself. *Cicero* wrote a Book in commendation of *Cato*, to justify that action, which *Cæsar* answer'd with another, which he called *Anti-Cato*, both which are lost. The Ceremony of his death was very remarkable; for upon hearing of the miscarriage of most of his Partners, he embraces his Son and Friends, and bids them good night, pretending to go to bed. Resting upon his bed, he took into his hand *Plato's* Book of the Immortality of the Soul; wherein having satisfied himself, he, about the relieving of the Watch, with a *Roman* Resolution, drew his sword, and ran himself into the Body. Being not quite dispatch'd, Physicians came in and apply'd something to the wound, which he suffer'd while they stay'd with him, but as soon as they were departed, he pull'd all off, and thrust his dying hand into the wound. *Scipio*, the General in this War, having escaped, and shipp'd himself in certain Gallies, was met by *Cæsar's* Navy; but to avoid being taken by them, he gave himself some wounds, and leap'd over-board, and so was drown'd.

*Cæsar* being by this means absolute Victor, spends some time in ordering the Provinces of *Africk*: Which done, and reducing *Juba's* Kingdom into a Province, he comes to *Utica*, whence he embarked the third of *June* for *Sardinia*; where having staid some few days, he arrives at *Rome*, *July* 25, whither as soon as he was come, there were granted unto him four Triumphs. The first was for his Conquest and Victories in *France*, wherein were set forth the Rivers of *Rhodanus* and the *Rhine*, wrought in Gold. In the second, which was for *Egypt* and King *Ptolomy*, were represented the River *Nile*, and the *Pharos* of *Alexandria* burning. The third was for his Victory over King *Pharnaces*, wherein a certain Writing represented the Celerity he used in the prosecution of that Victory, which only contain'd three words, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, I came, I saw, I overcame. The fourth was for his Reduction of *Africk*; wherein was placed *Juba's* Son as a Captive. As for the Battle against *Pompey*, *Cæsar* would not triumph for it, because it was against *Roman* Citizens.

These Triumphs ended, and great Rewards scatter'd among the Soldiery, who had been assistant in so great Transactions, the People being also entertained with Feasts, Sports, and Presents, *Cæsar* is chosen the fourth time Consul. But there yet remain'd some sword-work to do: For *Gneius Pompeius*, Great *Pompey's* Son, had got together most of the Remainder of the *African* Army, and was gone into *Spain*, to joyn with his Brother *Sextus*, who (as was hinted before) was there, and had possessed himself of a great part of *Spain*, with the Cities of *Sevil* and *Cordova*, the *Spaniards* being ready enough to come in to their assistance. *Cæsar* takes with him his most experienced veterane Soldiers, and with extraordinary speed arrives in *Spain* within a few days, being accompanied with his Nephew *Octavius*, who was about sixteen years of Age.

Being



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Being come into *Bætica*, (now *Andaluzia*) where the two *Pompeys* were with such Legions as they had got together, he soon began a hot and bloody War; whereof, to be short, the issue was this. *Cæsar* and *Gneius* (*Sextus* being in *Cordova*) near *Munda*, joyn Battle, which proves the sharpest and most obstinate that ever was: It lasted almost a whole day, and that with such indifference as to point of Victory, that it was adjudg'd sometimes to one side, sometimes to another. *Suetonius* and *Eutropius* tell us that *Cæsar* one time, upon his mens giving ground, was in such a plunge, that he was almost resolved to have killed himself, so to have avoided the shame and dishonour of being conquer'd; and that in that heat of Indignation and Despair he snatched a Target from one of his Soldiers, saying with a loud voice (as *Plutarch* relates) *If you are not ashamed, leave me, or deliver me into the hands of these Boys, for this shall be the last day of my Life and your Honour.* With which words the Soldiers being animated, and heighten'd by his example, regain their lost ground, turn, by degrees, the scales of the Battle; and, towards the Evening, the Enemy fainting and flying, became apparent Victors. The Enemy lost in this field 30000 Men; *Cæsar*, beside the common Soldiery, 1000, all Persons of Quality. This did *Cæsar* account the most glorious of all his Victories, (the commemoration of hazzards and suffering being to some the greatest satisfaction conceivable) for he would often say afterwards, That at other times he fought for *Fame* and *Victory*, but that that day he fought for his *Life*, which he had never fought for before. *Pompey*, who had perform'd all that a wise and stout Captain could, persecuted by a malicious Fortune, and seeing there was no other Remedy, escaped by flight: But being hopeless and refugeless, he was at last surpriz'd by some of *Cæsar's* Friends, kill'd, and his head brought to him; which was also the Fate of *Labe-nus*. *Sextus* upon this quits *Cordova*, and shortly after, *Spain*, leaving all to *Cæsar*, who in a short time reduc'd and settl'd the whole Country. Which done, he returns to *Rome*, and triumphs for the Wars of *Spain*; which was his fifth and last Triumph.

Having thus conquer'd the greatest part of the World, and by consequence gain'd the Reputation of the most famous and most powerful man in it, it was at least a pardonable Ambition, if he thought no Title, Name, or Dignity too great for him. It requires some faith to believe that such vast Bodies as *Roman Armies*, consisting of many Legions, could at an ordinary rate march through so many Countries, and cross so many Seas, had they had no Enemy to engage; but to conquer them, transcends it, and must be attributed to Miracle: For within less than five years, through infinite Conquests and Victories, he consummated the *Roman Monarchy*, making himself *Perpetual Dictator*, Sovereign Lord or Emperor. Which later Title, though it had not that height of signification which his Successors have rais'd it to, yet was it the greatest Attribution of Honour which that, or afterwards have acknowledg'd.

But if his Thoughts were so high, and his Ambition so exorbitant, as to deserve a severer censure, certainly it may prove so much the more excusable, by how much it was inflam'd by the general Acclamations and Acknowledgments. For both the Senate and People of *Rome*, some out of fear, some out of affection, some out of dissimulation, were forward enough to invent those Appellations of Honour and Preheminence, and afterwards to elevate them to the height of his ambitious mind. Hence was he called *Emperor*, *Father*, *Restorer*, and *Preserver* of his Country; hence created *Perpetual Dictator*, and *Consul* for ten years, and perpetual *Censor* of their Customs; his Statue erected among the *Kings of Rome*: hence he had his Thrones and Chairs of State in the Theatre and Temples, which, as also publick places, were filled with his Pictures and Images. Nay, their Adoration ascended to that point, that from these humane honours they attributed to him divine; finding Marble little enough for Temples and statues for him, (which were dedicated to him with the same veneration as to their Gods) and Metal little enough to represent his high and almost incredible Adventures.

But all the Power and Command of so many Nations as he had conquer'd, was inconsiderable as to the extent of his mind; whereby we may see what small acquaintance there is between Ambition and Acquiescence. It was not sufficient to have been personally engaged in fifty signal Battles, and to have laid with their Bellies to the Sun a Million ninety and odd thousand Men, (abating all those that fell in the Civil Wars) but there yet remains something to do greater than all this. The fierce *Parthians* break his sleep, they are yet unconquer'd, which once done, 'twere easie, like Lightning, to pass through *Hyrkania* and other Countries to the *Caspian Sea*, and so scour the Provinces of *Scythia Asiatica*, and so passing over the River *Tanais*, to come into *Europe*, and bring in *Germany* and the bordering Provinces under the Wings of the *Roman Eagle*. In order to this expedition had he in sundry places rais'd 10000 Horse and 15 Legions of choice Foot. But another greater Power thought fit he should leave some work for his Successors.

Nay, some things he aim'd at, beyond Man's attempt, correcting even nature it self. As that design of making *Peloponnesus* an Island, by cutting off that neck of Land which is between the *Aegean* and *Ionian Seas*. He thought to have altered the Courses of the Rivers *Tiber* and *Anien*, and made them navigable for Ships of the greatest burthen. He had begun to level divers Hills and Mountains in *Italy*, and to dry up Lakes and Fens. He re-edified and re-peopled the once famous *Carthage* and *Corinth*. These and many other things



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he had done without doubt, had not an unexpected and barbarous Death surprized him in the midst of his Designations. Which, because it is the tragical part of this Relation, we shall refer to the last place, while in the mean time we shall divert our thoughts with a short entertainment of his personal Excellencies and Endowments, his Extraction, Birth, Deification, and Names; as we have already satisfied our selves with the consideration of his Actions: And so pass to that part of our undertaking, wherein we presume to promise the curious and critical Reader no less Content than he hath found in what he hath already reflected on, that is to say, the description and dilucidation of what MEDALS have been snatch'd out of the Jaws of hungry Time, that have had any relation to the great Name of CÆSAR.

**C**æsar was of a full and handsom Composure of Body, of a graceful Carriage and Deportment, of a whitish Complexion, his Eyes were somewhat big, black, quick and piercing, his nose streight and large enough, but his mouth was more than ordinary wide, his Cheeks lean. In his later days, he became bald towards the fore-part of his head, and, through his continual hazzards and hardships, much wrinkled in the Forehead. These last Imperfections are easily discernable in his Medals, as also in some graven Stones and Marbles; and this made him seem somewhat older than he was, his baldness, wrinkles, and wide mouth taking away much of the gracefulness of his Countenance, and causing him to have a rustick Physiognomy. This gave occasion to *Silenus*, the oldest among the *Satyrs*, very pleasantly (in the CÆSARS of the Emperor *Julian*) to boast that, besides other similitudes between them, he had a head like *Julius Cæsar's*. But as to the baldness, it is no more to be objected to him as indecent, than to divers other great Personages of Antiquity, as may be frequently seen in Medals and Marbles, *Hercules* himself being one of the Tribe. They are the highest and sublimest things, nay, the more divine, as approaching the Sky, that are freed from all superfluities. The highest Mountains are bald on their tops, though in other places they are perriwig'd with Woods, and have fertile Descents. *Cæsar* was much troubled at the loss of his hair, insomuch as, having effected his Designs, he always wore a Crown of Lawrel, the better to cover the nakedness, thrusting up the hair he had towards the hinder part of his head as much as he could, as may be remarked out of his Effigies in the Medals. He had a strong and vigorous body, able to endure any thing of Labour or Hardship; an active and lively mind, capable of any undertaking; his Judgment and common Sense most exquisite. He was furnished with a strange Fore-sight and Vigilance, a Dexterity and Presence of Mind above ordinary, and an incredible Resolution and Courage in all Exigencies and Emergencies. In the Wars of *Asia*, under the Prætor *Marcus Termo*, he obtained a Civical Crown. He was admirable for his Eloquence and incomparable Memory. He was well versed in *Astrology*, and by the assistance thereof foreknew many things. It was by that that he was jealous of the *Ides* of the Months, as being fatal to him. Nay, he writ Books of the motion of the Stars, regulated the Year, and reduc'd it to the Course of the Sun; which Science he learned from the *Egyptians*. From his Skill in that Science he rais'd himself to attempt that great Change and Alteration which he brought about, from the strange Prodigies which had happened not long before, as you have them elegantly described by *Petronius* and *Lucan*; the Heavens, Earth, Sea, nay the very Mountains and Rivers, intimating that great Vicissitude.

But in the whole Constellation of his Virtues and Perfections, none shines brighter than his Clemency and Generosity. His Propensity to pardon his Enemies, when conquer'd, whether Barbarians or Citizens, was exemplary: And it is much to be questioned whether his Lenity rais'd him more Friends or Enemies. When he had passed the *Rubicon*, he takes the City *Corfinium*, and in it *Domitius*, whom the Senate had designed to succeed him in his Command in *France*; yet, though all were at his mercy, he dismissed *Domitius*, with what part of the Legions would go with him, to repair to *Pompey*. Nor was his Clemency and Liberality less remarkable at the Battle of *Pharsalia*, where he not only pardoned his Enemies, but received some of the most inveterate into Favour and Familiarity, and engaged them into the Government of Provinces and Countries: Not to mention the confidence in him of *Cato Uticensis*, and his severe punishing of the Murderers of *Pompey*. Much more might be said of him; but since it is not our business to write any *Panegyrics* on him, we come to his Extraction.

As for his Extraction, we find that those of the *Julian* Family boasted that they were originally descended from *Julus*, the Son of *Aeneas*, the Son of *Anchises* and *Venus*, which was a common and yet no criminal Ambition in those times. The Poets, above all other, those that lived in the times of *Cæsar* and *Augustus*, strove who should most celebrate this Genealogie, and that by very remarkable Calts of their inherent Flattery. To omit what may be gathered out of *Lucan*, *Petronius*, and others, we shall content our selves with what we have from *Manilius*, *Astron. lib. 1.*

—————*Venerisq; ab origine Proles  
Julia descendit cælo, cælumq; replevit.*

And



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And Propertius, lib. 4. Eleg. 1.

*Tunc animi venere Decii, Brutiq; secures,  
Vexit & ipsa sui Cæsaris arma Venus,  
Arma resurgens portans victricia Trojæ:  
Felix terra tuos cepit, Iule, deos.*

But that which Cæsar suffers in this business, is, That it was objected to him as a great Vanity, to derive himself from this Goddess, as being so far guilty of it, that he recommended to her the Success and Conduct of his most signal Enterprizes, trusting her with all his good Fortune. We mention not his Dalliances with Cleopatra, because the Temptation on her side was more than ordinary; not only that of her Beauty, but her strange Prostitution of her self, even to that point, that before she had seen Cæsar, she caused herself to be put up into a Basket, and, as if it had been some Present, to be brought to him; fearing, if she had come without this surprize, she might not have access. But if it be a Vanity, 'tis easily discover'd in his Coins, being furnish'd with several shapes of this *Venus Genetrix*, this Goddess of Generation, sometimes sitting on the Prow of a ship, sometimes standing, bearing a Victory in her right hand, to represent a *Venus Victrix*, such as whereof *Hypermetria* dedicated a Figure in the City of Argos, calling it Νικηφόρον, bearing a Victory, which was the Word Cæsar gave at the Battle of Pharsalia, wherein he was afterwards imitated by Augustus at the Fight of Actium. The same reason may be given for his placing a *Venus Victrix* upon the other side of his own Effigies in his Medals, with a Globe, as conceiving she owed him the Conquest of the Universe. Besides, at the Battle of Pharsalia, he made a Vow to build her a Temple, (as Appianus records, l. 2.) and afterwards caused his Statue to be placed next to that of this Goddess of Generation. To which Monuments seem to relate those antique Inscriptions which Gruterus mentions, forasmuch as concerns the Worship of this *Venus*, observed by the Romans out of their Veneration of her and the Julian Family.

DIVO JULIO  
LIB. JULIA EBORA  
OB ILLIUS IMMUN. ET MUN.  
LIBERALITATEM  
QUOIUS DEDICATIONE  
VENERI GENETRICI  
CESTUM MATRONÆ  
DOMUM TULERUNT.

VENERI GENETRICI  
D....JULI  
IN MEMORIAM GENT.  
JULIÆ  
STATUAM CUM...  
JUNIUS VIRBIUS ATTICUS  
FLAM. DIVI JULI  
D. S. P. D

But we shall have more to say of this Goddess when we come to the Medals; we therefore proceed to his Nativity.

Cæsar was born under Sagitary, that is to say, upon the twelfth day of July, which denoted to him great Victories, and many famous Triumphs in his own Country, according to Manilius, lib. 4. in these Verses,

*Nec non arcitenens prima cum veste resurgit,  
Pectora clara dabit bello, magnisq; triumphis  
Conspicuum patrias Victorem ducit in arces;  
Sed nimium indulgens rebus Fortuna secundis,  
Invidet in facie, jævitq; asperissima fronti, &c.*

but the end should be dismal and unfortunate; as indeed it happen'd. But Apollinaris Stodionius, in his Panegyrick of Antbemiis, ver. 120. makes another observation, wherein of all Authors he is singular, saying that Cæsar was born at the same time when a Crown of Lawrel was burning.

*Julius in lucem venit dum Laureæ flagrat.*

What presage could arise hence to signify his innumerable Victories, we have only this Author to inform us. But indeed there is one other discovers this mystery, but another way: For when they would presage the fertility or sterility of the ensuing year, they were wont to cast a Crown of Lawrel into the fire, and according to the crackling of the leaves, they gave their judgment. This is Tibullus, l. 2. Eleg. 5.

*Ut succensa sacris crepitet bene Laureæ flammis,  
Omne quo felix & sacer annus eat.  
At Laurus bona signa dedit, gaudete coloni,  
Distendet spicis aurea plena Ceres;*



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Therefore at *Cæsar's* Birth it may be thought some one, out of Superstition, bethought him of this Ceremony, or it happen'd by chance. But in fine, those that were assistant at the Birth, were by that accident raised to a certain confidence that the Child then born should prove a most fortunate Man, and should arrive to great Fame and Wealth.

As concerning his *Deification*, there is not much to be said. In the first place, we suppose it a thing not so miraculous, That the *Romans* should believe that one who had done such great and transcendent actions as *Cæsar* did, might be thought somewhat more than a Man, and had in him something divine; besides that he was one acknowledged to have descended from *Venus Genitrix*, the Mother of the Universe. Other Nations had that custom of adoring and invoking their Kings as Gods, after their Death; as the *Egyptians*, *Persians*, and the *Moors*, who in *Cæsar's* time put *Juba* into the number of the Gods. In the second place, we meet with two censorious Remarks upon this Deification. First, how that *Genius* of Virtue and Generosity which was wont to animate the *Roman* People, was so metamorphosed into that of Flattery and Vanity, as to deifie one who, by the greatest, if not the most, was look'd on as the greatest Oppressor of the *Roman* Liberty, and only the most fortunate Malefactor that ever was, when they had not vouchsafed that honour to *Numa Pompilius*, who had been the *Moses*, the Law-giver, the most just and the most pious among the *Roman* Princes. Secondly, whether, if he had miscarried at the Battle of *Pharsalia*, he had not been the most infamous Person among the *Romans* that ever was, and more abominable than *Catiline*; and on the contrary, whether Rocks, Mountains, Seas, and the Cabinets of conquered Kings and Citizens, had furnished Marble, Porphyry, Jasper, and Precious stones enough, to erect Pillars, Statues and Temples, to celebrate the Glory of the Great *Pompey*, who was so zealous for the Liberty of *Rome*. But *Divine Providence* was pleas'd to make use of *Cæsar* as an Instrument to change that *Common-wealth* into a *Monarchy*, that the *Prince of Peace* and *Saviour* of the World should be born under the peaceable Reign of one sole Monarch.

As for the Name of *Julius*, since, as is before noted, the *Julian* *Gens* derived it self from *Julus* the Son of *Aeneas*, the Son of *Anchises*, by a prodigious Coition with *Venus*, it must be granted *Iulus* was the Author of this Family,

*Julius à magno deductum nomen Iulo.*

as *Virgil* says. This *Julius* was also called *Ilus*, and more frequently *Ascanius*, from a place in *Phrygia* called *Ascanium*, or from a River named *Ascanius*. That of *Ilus* was in memory of *Ilus*, the most renowned King of the *Trojans*, from whom *Troy* was called *Ilium*. But to be yet more critical, the Name *Julius*, or *Iulus*, was given him, because of his hairiness about the Cheeks sooner than his age required: according to the same, *Virgil*,

*At puer Ascanius, cui nunc cognomen Iulo  
Additur, Ilus erat dum res stetit Ilia regno.*

Upon which place *Servius* tells us, That the Name was given after the Battle that *Ascanius* gain'd against *Mezentius*, *ob barbæ lanuginem (quam ἰὺλῳ Græci) quæ ei tempore victoriæ nascebatur*. So that ἰὺλῳ signifies τὴν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, the soft hair which first appears upon the Cheeks.

The Name *Cæsar* seems to have some relation to the other, for that *Καισαρία*, in *Hesychius*, signifies περιφαλαία, that is to say, a certain thick and clotted hairiness, such as Women's, when they plat and twist their hair about their heads; and he that either naturally or artificially had such an one, had first the honour of that Name, which likely was some one of the Posterity of *Iulus*, the Son of *Aeneas*; unless we would rather trust *Spartianus*, who would have the first of this Family to be so called, *Quod cum magnis crinibus sit utero parentis effusus*, because he was born with abundance of hair. In fine, however it came, it was so venerable during the long Reign of *Augustus*, that of *Tiberius*, and three more of the Family, that it alone designed the Emperor, and became a Name of Invocation upon any accident of hast, surprize, or admiration.

We might here bring in what *Suetonius* delivers in the Life of *Augustus*, That the first letter of the Name *Cæsar*, which is C, being dash'd out by a Thunderbolt, it was predicted that he should die within a hundred days, because that letter stands for that number; and that after his Decease he should be received into the number of the Gods, because *ÆSAR* signified in the *Ettruscan* tongue GOD. This gave occasion to all that have commented on that Author, to criticize and puzzle themselves about the signification of the Word *CÆSAR*. But all being trivial and imaginary, we forbear farther Disquisition, and pass to our Observations upon his MEDALS.

Observations



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## Observations upon CÆSAR'S MEDALS.

### Upon the First Medal.

THE Effigies of *Venus Genitrix*, with a Globe or World before her, without any Inscription; though *Occo* and *Ursinus* mention one inscrib'd with L. BUCA: The other Side hath *Venus* giving *Anchises* a Meeting, near Mount *Ida*. This it should seem *Cæsar* caused to be done out of Flattery to himself, in that it served both to make his Original more illustrious, and as a Monument of that Happiness and good Fortune which this Goddess had procured him in all his Enterprizes. For it was his Ambition to have descended in a right Line from *Anchises* and *Venus*, by whose Indulgence he had conquered the Universe, as being his Directrix in all his Designs, as is represented by the Globe or World; whereof this Goddess was thought to be in some sort the Protectress, as being esteem'd the Sovereign Genius of Generation, according to *Solinus*,

————— Tu facibus auges  
Cuncta suis, totus pariter tibi parturit orbis.

And her Worship was, questionless, very ancient; for it was the Head of *Venus Genitrix* that the *Saracens* and *Ishmaelites* worshipped, alledging that *Abraham* had by the means of it enjoyed *Hagar*, from whom proceeded a great Generation; as *Enthymius Zigabenus*, in his Table of the Opinions of that Nation, and the Anonymous Greek Author of the *Saracen* History, have observed. So have we here the same Goddess accosting that great Hero, to have Issue by him. The *Genius* destin'd to further the Establishment of the *Roman* Greatness, hath a Sceptre in his Hand, to signify the future Majesty of that Monarchy.

### The Second Medal.

L SEPULIUS MACER. *Venus* standing with a Victory in her Right Hand, and a Pike in the other; being the other Side of that which bore the Effigies of *Cæsar*, and the Star of this Goddess. *Servius*, quoting an Observation of *Varro*, lays upon the first of the *Æneids*, that when this Hero left *Troy*, looking up into the Sky, he presently perceives *Venus* in the Day-time; she shining then purposely to direct him to *Laurentum*, the place for which the Destinies had designed him. The *Egyptians* represented this Star by the Figure of a most beautiful Woman, it being thought the brightest in the Firmament; whence it was called *Καλλις*, *pulcherrima*; being named in the Morning *Phosphorus* or *Lucifer*, in the Evening *Vesper*. This Star therefore, that was *Aeneas's* Conductress, was no other than that Midwife of the Light, *Venus*; being the same which the *Saracens* call *Cubar*, or *Kabar*; which Word signifies, Great; being also otherwise called *Astarte*, *Urania*, or *Cælestis*: By all which Names is meant no other but this *Genitrix*, under which Epithet the *Lacedæmonians* ador'd and invok'd her as an Advancer of Generation. The *Romans*, in the *Circensian* Games, brought forth the Statue of *Cæsar* in Pomp, having the Planet *Venus* on his Head. Now this *Urania* (because of her procreative Influence) was held in particular Devotion by the Women, as divers Medals of the Empress's discover, being commonly inscrib'd *Veneri cælesti*, and having that Star. *Gualterus* furnishes us with an Inscription of a certain Priestess of hers, out of the ancient Monuments of *Sicily*.

ΔΙΟΔΩΤΟΣ ΤΙΤΙΕΛΟΥ ΑΠΠΕΙΡΑΙΟΥ  
ΤΑΝ ΑΔΕΛΦΑΝ ΑΤΤΟΥ ΤΑΝ  
ΜΙΝΤΡΑΝ ΑΡΤΕΜΟΝΟΣ ΙΕΡΑΤΕΟΥΣΑΝ  
ΑΦΡΟΔΙΤΑΙ ΟΤΡΑΝΙΑΙ.

*Diodotus Titieli filius Appeiræus sororem suam Minyram Artemonis filiam Sacerdotem Veneris Cælestis.*

She was also inscribed *Venus Cælestis Augusta*, (possibly, in favour of some Empress;) as also, *Invicta Cælestis*.

The



# The LIFE of JULIUS CÆSAR.

## The Third Medal.

CÆSAR DICT. PERP. *Cæsar perpetual Dictator.* A *Venus Victrix* naked, holding an Helmet and a Buckler. There is before her a Pillar, upon which is placed an Eagle, and behind a Military Ensign. The meaning is this: We have *Venus* here naked, with an Helmet in her Hand; to signify her victorious over *Mars*, by her charming Attractions, as if that God had quite lost all Courage, delivering up his Arms, and rendring himself her Prisoner. Thus *Menelaus* casts away his Pike, Sword and Buckler, having had but a Glimpse of the delicate Breast of the fair *Hellen*. But in this Medal *Venus* denotes, that she had so fortunately assisted *Cæsar* (the Minion of her Progeny) in all his War-like Enterprizes, that he had obtained absolute Victory over all his Enemies; whereof the Helmet, Buckler, and military Ensign, being the marks, *Cæsar* had consecrated them to her in acknowledgment of her Favours. The Eagle pitched upon a Pillar signifies, That his Victories have assured him the *Roman* Empire, which should be his eternally. The Eagle denotes Empire and Royalty, and presages and signifies absolute Victory. It signifies also that the Empire shall be assured to him, maugre all the Force and opposition of the *Galls* and *Germans*, or any other whatsoever, whom he should despise, as this Bird doth Thunder; for that of all Creatures it can ascend above the Clouds; where it can suffer no Injury.

## The Fourth Medal.

GERMAN. INDUTI. III. A River lying by a Mountain side pours out his Water, having a Boat or Bark near him. This Medal seems to have been stamp'd purposely to exercise our Divinations. We conceive it should be read GERMANA INDUTIA, and that the number three stands for nothing else but the year, taking the word INDUTIA to signify a Colony of *Germans* disposed into that place by *Cæsar's* Order. This Name indeed is not found among the Geographers, only *Pliny* mentions a Town called INDUSTRIA, situated along the *Apennine*, upon the famous River of *Po*. Now there is a great conformity between the situation of this Town and the Medal, and possibly it may be an Erratum in *Pliny*, and that it should be read INDUTIA instead of INDUSTRIA, which is not so likely to be the name of a City. For the three points III. they may signify the Year of the Establishment of that Colony, or of the Foundation of the City. There is another Medal hath four IIII. denoting the fourth Year; but it hath withal the Device of an Ox with his head stooping and his knee bent, which Posture implies the Establishment and Foundation of a City. In this posture doth *Nonnus* describe the Ox of *Cadmus*. Upon both these Medals there is a *Venus Victrix* on one side, and what is before recited on the other: Whence it is inferr'd, That the planting of this Colony happened after *Cæsar's* most remarkable Victories against the *Germans*.

## The Fifth and Sixth Medals.

WE have these two Medals from *Goltzius*; whereof one in *Greek* hath a Tripod and two Stars: The Inscription of the Head and the other side is, ΚΑΙΣΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΑΡΧΙΕΡ. ΜΕΤ. ΘΙΟΝΙΕΤΗΣ. *Cæsar Imperator, Pontifex maximus, Augur.* This Tripod of *Apollo* hath something in it more particular. *Apollo*, *Augur*, or ☿♂♂♂, who is here designed by one of the Stars which accompanies that of *Venus Genetrix* or *Cælestis*, shews that *Cæsar* was assisted in his Charge of *Augur*, and his Study of Astrology and Presaging, (whereof the *Lituus* and the Tripod were the marks) by these two Divinities. For *Phæbus* or ☿♂♂♂ hath two significations, which relate much to his Star and Tripod, that is to say, *splendid* and *luminous*, so that he is both Foreteller and *Augur*. But to return to the Star of *Venus*, or *Phosphorus*, or (as *Philo Judæus* calls it) *Eosphorus*, and to this Sun or Star of *Phæbus Apollo*: It may be conjectured they are placed above this Tripod, to give us to understand, That these Gods should promise the *Roman Augur Cæsar*, by a continual Success in all his Enterprizes, the absolute Conquest of both East and West.



## Observations upon CÆSAR'S MEDALS.

### The Seventh Medal.

**CÆSAR.** An Elephant with a Serpent betwixt his legs. On the other side, the Utensils and Instruments that belonged to sacrificing, with the Head-Ornament of the High-Priest. Divers Antiquaries have so commented upon this Medal, as to make the word *Cæsar* signifie an Elephant. But in my opinion, this Device signifies altogether as much as if he had this Inscription about it, IMP. CÆSAR, or CÆSAR DICTATOR PER P. on one side, and PONTIF. MAX. on the other. For as the one shews the Royal Quality, the other supposes the Pontifical to have been in those times joyned with it in the Person of *Cæsar*. An Elephant in *Italy* (according to *Artemidorus*) signifies a Royal, Imperial, or Supream Power. But *Achmet*, in his *Oneirocriticks*, Chap. 271, tells us that this Creature had the same signification in the *Indies* and *Egypt*; therefore *Artemidorus* hath not done well to restrain it to *Italy*. But it may be the *Moors*, imitating other Nations herein, took an Elephant to signifie a Monarch; and because *Cæsar* was the most famous Man that ever was, one that commanded Kings and Monarchs, would make his Name stand for an Elephant; for this word is little less than *African*. The same *Artemidorus* says, That a Dragon seen in a Dream signifies a King and a supream Magistrate; which agreeing with what he says of the Elephant, and both these Creatures being on the other side, I conceive my Interpretation the more receiveable.

### The Eighth Medal.

**CÆSAR DICTATOR.** *Cæsar* with the Augural Stick. In the Reverse there is **L. LIVINEIUS REGULUS**, a Bull furiously running with his head stooping. It is conceived this was stamp'd by *Regulus*, in *Cæsar's* Favour, when *Cæsar* was created Dictator, or shortly after. This Bull is brought in as an Emblem of Principality, as *Dion Chrysostome* says, who hath made an excellent Parallel between this Creature, and a King and his Kingdom. But before him, *St. Denys*, in the 15 Chap. of his *Hierarchy*, said that the strength of a Bull represents the Force necessary for a Prince, and that his horns signifie *Servatricem atq; invictam vim*. *Stephanus* observes upon the word *ταύρος*, that the Antients called *ταύρος* all things that were excessive for Greatness or Strength. The Intention therefore of *Regulus* was to let *Cæsar* understand, that having overthrown *Pompey*, and become Perpetual Dictator, he was in effect the most powerful and most redoubted Monarch that ever was, and was in a condition to pursue and accomplish the utter ruine of his Enemies, and protect his Friends.

There is a Reverse among the Medals of *Augustus*, where there is also a Bull in a different Figure and Posture from this, bending his knee, to represent (as is conceived) the *Taurus Cælestis*, which is under the Dominion of *Venus*, which signified the Invincibility of *Augustus*. It may be also considered, that this Bull may signifie *Italy*, subdued and subject to the Laws of *Augustus*, as being, now the Civil Wars were over, ready to receive the Yoke. For that Province took its Name from a Bull, which the *Tyrrhenians* called *Ἰαλόν*; so that *Italy* submitted its neck to receive the Yoke of the new Government, as the Bull

Summittit aratris  
Colla, jugumq; suis poscit cervicibus ipse.

### The Ninth Medal.

**DIVO JULIO.** The Effigies of *Cæsar* deified, the Star of *Venus* before him, or if you will, *Cæsar's* own. On the other side *Mars* upon an Altar, or rather *Cæsar* representing *Mars*, before whom sits a Figure, which hath a *Cornucopia* or horn of abundance under the left Arm, in the right, holds a Victory, which presents a Crown to him. This Medal seems to have been made shortly after *Cæsar's* Death, to keep his Memory in veneration, and nourish that belief of the People, That he was, while living, a God transformed into a Man. It was indeed an excellent artifice of *Augustus* and his party, to make the superstitious Vulgar believe, That *Julius Cæsar* was become a Fellow-Commoner among the Gods, to make his Succession the more plausible. For being already persuaded that no other than a Demy-God could have arrived to that Glory which *Cæsar* had, having baffled the Universe; it was not very hard to persuade them that the Comet which appeared in the North after his Death, was his deified Soul. But the cheat was, that this Soul must appear there to render *Augustus* more illustrious; who to retri-  
bute



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bute the glory, and make the business more authentick, must erect *Cæsar's* Statue in the Capitol, representing upon the head of it that Star in Gold, and giving it this bold Inscription, ΚΑΙΣΑΡΙ ΗΜΙΘΕΩ, to *Cæsar the Demi-God*. To make any long Discourse upon Comets from hence, were superfluous, since all that can be said is, That they signify Changes and Revolutions of States and Empires, and sometimes favourably. This signified, in all likelihood, the War then kindling against *Augustus*; after which, a general Peace ensuing, the Prince of Peace should be born; the Comet at whose Birth denoted the universal change of Religion that afterward happened. To be short, all that the Poets, those fine Cooks of Fictions and Inventions, could dress, that would be any way digestible with the credulous Vulgar, was serv'd up at this time, to raise the Memory of *Julius Cæsar* to the greatest Reputation that might be: But it will be to no purpose to repeat their Adulations in this place.

On the Reverse of this Medal, we find *Mars*, who receives the Crown which *Victory* presented him with, represented with a Dart. The *Victory* is *Venus Victrix*, or the Victorious City of *Rome*, and the *Mars*, *Julius Cæsar* himself, in the posture of that God. The Statue is conceived to be the same with that of *Mars*, erected by the *Romans* in the Temple of *Quirinus*, with this magnificent Title, ΘΕΩ ΙΑΝΙΚΗΤΩ, *Deo invicto*. This supposition is confirmed by the Dart; for *Mars* was ordinarily represented with a Spear, as divers Medals discover. But in this Statue he hath a Dart, which is that piece of Arms which is capable of farthest casting, and that indeed which the *Romans* most used, and at the Fight of *Pharsalia* was one main cause of the Victory, *Cæsar* having given his Men Order that they should aim at the Faces of the raw *Roman* Nobility they had to deal with; as divers Historians have delivered. Yet this argues not, but that *Cæsar* sometimes made use of a Javelin or Pike as well as *Mars*; but it is to be conceived this was more for the convenience of his travelling, which was afoot, (and that many times in the Winter, haply over the *Alps*) according to the custom of most of the great Captains and Generals of *Rome*, as *Livy* and *Plutarch* abundantly attest.

### The Tenth Medal.

Γ. ΙΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΔΟΤΚΤΑΤΟΡΟΣ. *Cai Julii Cæsaris Imperatoris Dictatoris*. The Effigies of *Cæsar* crowned with a thick Crown of Lawrel, which closed before, the better to cover his Baldness, the hair being thrust forward to help it. The Reverse hath ΙΑΙΩΝ ΒΙΞ ΝΕΟΚΟΡΩΝ *Iliensium bis Neocororum*; *Aeneas* carrying his Father and the *Palladium* at their quitting of *Troy*, the little *Iulus* going before with his hat in his hand. That which in this falls under question, is, first, to know the situation of this *Ilium*; wherein *Strabo* hath spent more sweat than all the Geographers; affirming it was not the *Ilium* of his time, a Town well known, nor any thing built upon the ruins of the old one so ill treated by the *Greeks*, as being distant from this thirty *stadia*; That in that place there was only a small Village bearing up the Name; that it was built up by *Alexander*, from a small Town that it was before, having a little Temple of *Minerva* much ruined, and received from him divers Privileges and Immunities, with a promise, after his Victory over *Darius*, of a magnificent Temple, and the toleration and setting up of Games and Exercises. This was partly executed after his Death by *Lyfimachus*, who enlarged the City by a Wall of forty *stadia*, disposing thither many out of the neighbouring Cities that were ruined. After which it was ruined and restored divers times; but lastly it received great favours from *Sylla*, which is conceived to be the reason that it declared against *Cæsar* in the Civil Wars: Whence it may be inferred that those of that City knew not at that time that *Cæsar* pretended to be of the Race of *Venus* and *Anchises*, which was only found out after his Victory. But at length *Cæsar* receives them into favour, restores and confirms their antient Privileges and Immunities, and, imitating *Alexander*, did them many Courtesies.

In the second place, the understanding of these words, ΙΑΙΩΝ, or ΙΑΙΕΩΝ ΝΕΟΚΟΡΩΝ, *Iliensium Neocororum*. The word Νεωκόρων is translated commonly *Ædituorum*; which we cannot render properly in English, but by *Overseers*, *Supervisors*, and those that are entrusted with the Charge of the Temples, and dispose of all things sacred; or in some sort, they were such as we call *Church-wardens* in our Churches. But they are not those *Neocori* of the Temples that this Medal and divers others represent unto us, but the word was analogically applied to whole Nations, as also to Cities and Bodies Corporate, to whom the Kings, and afterwards the Emperors gave Commissions, to make Panegyricks and Encomiastick Orations upon their Statues, Pomps, Religious Worships, publick Re-creations and Exercises, to the Honour of their Gods and Princes; which was done out of the publick Stock, or by the Contribution of the Corporations. As therefore the *Neocori* that belonged to the Temples, were Disposers and Guardians of the things sacred, that were in their Sanctuaries, nay, haply entertained the people or strangers with the

Rarities



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Rarities and Antiquities of their Worship and Myſteries; ſo theſe National *Neocori* had the Superintendency over the Poms and Solemnities, Panegyric Celebrations, Exercices, Sacrifices, and Cereſmonies, which were to be obſerved upon the more feſtival days, whereof they had the abſolute diſpoſal. This I build upon the Conjecture of the great and learned *Selden*, who was the firſt cut this Gordian knot, upon a paſſage of the *Acts* of the Apoſtles, Chap. 19. There we have *Demetrius* and thoſe of his Profeſſion raiſing a Tumult, and accusing *St. Paul* and others for preaching that the Statues made with the hands of men were not Gods. The *Town-Clerk* or *Church-warden* having appeaſed the Tumult, tells them that it was well known the City of *Ephesus* was then *Neocore* ( in the Engliſh Tranſlation *worshipper* ) of the great Goddeſs *Diana*, and of the Image fallen from *Jupiter*, and that therefore, there being no contradiction in that, they ought not to do any thing raſhly. For theſe men, ſaith he, are neither ſacrilegious nor blaſphemous perſons, and therefore have done nothing againſt the Maſteſty of *Diana*. But if they had any matter againſt any man, the Law was open: But in caſe it were ſomething elſe relating to their Goddeſs, whether by Blaſphemy, Impiety, or Sacrilege, ( the Cognizance whereof did of right belong to the *Ephesians* in Body, as being then *Neocori* ) they ſhould have ſatisfaction in a full Aſſembly, convocaed for things of that nature. Now thoſe Silver Shrines which *Demetrius* is ſaid to make, are conceived to be Models of that magnificent Temple, which the *Ephesians* being *Neocori*, cauſed out of Magnificence to be made of that rich Metal. Had this Controverſie between the Apoſtles and the Goldſmiths come to a Deciſion, they had proceeded thus; They would have had ſome to make publick Panegyricks of their Goddeſs in the firſt place; then, if *Paul* and his Companions ſhould not reſt ſatisfied, this *Neocorean* people would have puniſhed them according to their manner. Now, that the *Neocori* of the Temples were uſed to commend to all Comers ( eſpecially Travellers ) the greatneſs and power of their Gods, and that the *Neocori* of Cities imitated them, but did it with great Pomp, employing perſons eminent for Learning and Eloquence, as Poets and Orators, for the Honour of their Gods, as alſo their Kings, Monarchs, Emperors, Founders, and that upon days inſtituted and ordain'd for that purpoſe, may be learn'd from *Horace*, who, *Lib. 2. Ep. 1.* writing to *Auguſtus*, calls thoſe Poets *Aedituos*, who ſhould immortalize the Virtue of that Emperor, or rather thoſe who were charg'd to chooſe ſuch as ſhould do it, in theſe Verſes;

*Sed tamen eſt operæ pretium cognoscere quales  
Aedituos, belli ſpectata domiq;  
Virtus, indigno non committenda Poetæ,*

But beſides, *Selden* hath well obſerved, that there were none of theſe Medals in the time of the Common-wealth; for that the Cities of *Greece* were not yet arrived to that eſteem of the *Roman* Greatneſs, by the Fabrick of their Monies and other ſigns of Veneration, which they have come to ſince it became a Monarchy. This is the opinion of that great judicious Man, which yet is not abſolutely true; for there were found the marks of this Magnificence, under the Title of *Neocori*, abundantly among the Medals of *Alexander* the Great; whereof *Goltzius* reckons above twenty with this Inſcription, ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΟΝ ΝΕΟΚΟΡΟΝ. Whence may be obſerved, That the people of *Macedonia* being generally *Neocori*, had cauſed theſe Coins to be ſtamp'd in the Honour of *Alexander*, having upon the Reverse the Figures of Statues, Chariots, Temples, Columns, &c. Nay, the *Maroneans* in *Philip's* time, though but the People of a particular City, were honour'd with the Charge of *Neocori*; there being a Medal, which hath on one ſide the Effigies of *Bacchus*, crown'd with Vine-branches, inſcrib'd, ΔΙΟΝΙΣΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ; on the Reverse, that of *Philip*, thus, ΜΑΡΟΝΕΙΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΚΟΡΟΝ. In fine, the Inhabitants of *Ilium* obtained leave of *Cæſar* to make ſome Magnificence under the Title of *Neocori*, to honour him and the *Julian* Family; having erected, in memory of his Extraction from *Anchiſes*, *Aeneas*, and *Iulus*, ſome Coloſſus, repreſenting the Poſture of *Aeneas* when he left *Troy*, doing a ſignal Act of Piety both towards the Gods and Men, having the *Palladium* in his hand, and carrying the old Man his Father in his right Arm, as Women carry Children, the little *Iulus* marching before, having his hat in one hand, and aſking his Father the way with the other. The wdor ΒΙΣ ſignifies that this was the ſecond time they had been honoured with the Quality and Commiſſion of being *Neocori*, and that they had celebrated the ſolemn days with Panegyricks, Poms, Exercices, and other Magnificences beſitting the Grandeur of *Cæſar*.



# Observations upon CÆSAR'S MEDALS.

## The Wives of Cæsar.

**H**IS first Wife was COSSUTIA, whom he married in his Youth, but divorc'd her at the seventeenth Year of his Age, before he had lived with her, though she was rich, and descended of a Family of the Roman Knights.

The second was CORNELIA, the Daughter of Cornelius Cinna, one who had been four times Consul; by whom he had only one Daughter, named Julia, afterwards first Wife to Pompey. He took her Death very heavily, and publicly commended her in a most elegant Funeral Oration.

The third was POMPEIA, the Daughter of Q. Pompeius, who had gotten that evil Report, as if Publius Claudius had been somewhat too familiar with her, which was the reason that Cæsar divorc'd her.

The fourth and last was CALPHURNIA, who out-lived him, and was the Daughter of Lucius Pliso; a Woman of a generous Spirit and well spoken, and had that Honour and Affection for Cæsar, that after his Death she herself made a most elegant Funeral Oration to his Honour, and afterward retir'd to Mark Anthony.

## The Medal of the

# T R I U M V I R I.

**T**HIS Medal is of Copper, small, of the Greek fashion: It represents the three Effigies of Cæsar, Antonius, and Lepidus, done side-ways one upon another on the same side, without Inscription. On the Reverse it represents an *Hermathena*; before which Image there is an Altar, out of which issues a Serpent that lifts it self above it; behind there is a Legionary Eagle: Time hath worn out the Inscription to this half word, APXIEP. This Figure represents Mercury and Minerva joyn'd in one Statue; that is to say, the upper part is of that Goddess, arm'd with a Helmet, Buckler, and Javeline; the lower part is a *Terminus* or *Hermes*. For the Interpretation of this Device; this *Hermathena*, comprehending in it the God *Terminus*, with *Minerva* and *Mercury*, denotes an excellent union, as to Affection, Interest, and good Understanding, among the *Triumviri*, as well for the management and conduct of Civil Affairs, as Military. Which being so, the Invention must needs be ingenious, denoting that, though their Employments were several, yet there was such a Concurrence between their Counsels and Intentions, as that they jump'd into the same Resolution for to carry on the Interest of the Common-wealth. As for the Altar and Serpent, they signify certain Sacrifices performed by that people, for the Well-fare, Union, and Concord of those three Powers; as also either to obtain some Victory, or to give Thanks to the Gods for one received. For a Serpent issuing from under a Table, was taken by Sylla to presage Victory, as the Historian Sifenna observes upon Cicero, lib. 4. de Divinatione. See also Val Maximus, lib. 1. ch. 6. and Plutarch in his Life. 'Tis therefore the Symbole of Health, Victory, and Felicity. Of which opinion is also Theophrastus, who giving the marks of a superstitious Man, says, That if he surprize a Serpent in any place, he presently raises a Chapel or an Altar in that place, as it were to thank the Gods for so good an Adventure. There may this further reason be given of this Juncture in the *Hermathena*, That as *Minerva* hath a Dominion over Wrestling, as well as *Mercury*, so were they also both equally Patrons of Traffick and Merchandise.

We shall divert a little to speak of another kind of Statues, called *Hermheracles*, consisting, the lower part of *Hermes*, the upper of *Hercules*. Both these, and the *Hermathena's*, were placed in the places of Publick Exercises, *Mercury* and *Hercules* implying strength and flight. The reason why *Mercury* was so often joyn'd with the other Gods, was, That he could conform to any, and was one with all, as Iamblichus affirms; *Isq;* (says he) *de Divinæ scientiæ præsidium ac tutelam tenens, unus erat idem in universis*; for which reason, the Antients dedicated all their Works under his only Name. *Hercules* was held in such Veneration for the God and Genius of all Gymnick Engagements, that they came to be called (*angustiori vocabulo*) *Herculeæ certamina*. He was the Institutor of the Olympick Games, wherein having had the Honour to wrestle with Jupiter, he was thought fit to be the Patron of them: Whence Lycophron calls him Παλαστής, the Wrestler.



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## The Second Medal.

**M** ANTONIUS IMP. AUG. IIIVIR. R. P. C. *Marcus Antonius Imperator Augur Triumvir Reipublicæ constituendæ.* A sacrificing Vessel called *præfericulum*; and the augural stick called *Lituus*. On the Reverse there is L. PLANCUS IMP. COS. An Urn between a Thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*. It is to be noted, first, That there is a Vessel on either side of this Medal; and therefore it is not enough to say, That that on one side, with the *Lituus*, is the mark of an Augural Dignity, which *Antonius* obtained from his Favourite *L. Plancus*, being Consul; but something must be said of this Urn, so honourably placed between a Thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*, on the other. *Appianus Alexandrinus*, in his Book of the Wars against the *Parthians*, speaking of the design which *Mark Antony* had, being at *Athens*, to undertake the War against them, and to partake of the Glory might follow the ruining so great and powerful a Nation, says, That, to satisfy the admonition of a certain Oracle, he carried with him a Vessel full of Water, taken out of the Sacred Fountain which was in that City, called *Clepsydra*. *Et ut oraculo cuidam satisfaceret, etiam è Clepsydra fonte vas repletum aqua secum asportavit.* This Fountain *Hesychius* says was within the Cittadel of *Athens*. Now this is the representation of that Vessel, and a Monument of the Transportation of that Water by *Mark Anthony*, which must needs be of great Concernment to him, since he was advised to do it by the Oracle, and specified the Fountain. As for the Thunderbolt and *Caduceus*, they signify that *Mark Anthony* should in that Expedition make a thundring and dismal War against the *Parthians*, with a great number of old experienced Legions, who should tread under foot the *Parthian* Greatness, elevated against the *Romans* by the Miscarriage of *Crassus* and his flourishing Legions; or those Barbarians should buy their Peace very dear, which the Heralds of *Mark Anthony* should offer them with the *Caduceus* in their hands, that being the Emblem of an assured Reconciliation.

## ATILIUS CIMBER.

**W**E should have no more to say of this *Cimber*, than we have of *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and the other Massacrers of *Cæsar*, were it not that his Medal serves to correct divers passages in History, (which it hath been the main Design of these our Observations to clear up) wherein his Name is corrupted.

All who have mentioned this Man, have been mistaken in his Name, except *Appianus Alexandrinus*, and that in one place only; for in some others he calls him ΤΙΜΩ. Others call him *Tillius*, others *Tullius*, or *Annius*. *Seneca*, Epist. 83. *Cai Cæsaris cæde (illius dico qui, superato Pompeio, Rempublicam tenuit) tam creditum est Tillio Cimbro quam Cassio: Cassius tota vita aquam bibit, Tillius Cimber & nimius erat in vino & scordalus. In hanc rem jocatus est ipse; Ego, inquit, quenquam feram, qui vinum ferre non possum?* Upon which passage, (which gives a strange Intimation of the vicious qualities of this Man) *Pintianus* says it ought to be read *Tullius Cimber*, as the same *Seneca* elsewhere calls him, and as he is called in *Plutarch* and *Suetonius*. But it is doubtless he should be called *Atilius Cimber*, and that *Suetonius*, *Quintilian*, and the other later Authors, should be corrected, as having trusted the corrupt Manuscripts, and not seen this Medal.

But to come to the Device on the Reverse first. The Cap signifies (as is obvious to any one) the Liberty obtained by the means of the Ponyard wherewith *Cæsar*, who oppressed the Common-wealth, was dispatched. The Wings, or Talaries of *Mercury*, with the Serpents and the Rod, which was ceremonious at the manumission of Slaves, or rather the Wand which *Mercury* made use of to conduct the Souls delivered out of the Miseries of this Life to their expected Rest, signify that the Diligence, Dexterity, and Prudence, which *Atilius Cimber* had used in this Execution, had restored the Universe to its Liberty, the *Romans* from the Tyranny of *Cæsar*, and had established a Peace and Tranquility in all Families. The conduct and assistance of *Mercury* to the departed Souls, with this Wand, is expressed by *Statius* in these Verses,

*Summa pedum propere plantaribus illigat alas,  
Obnubitq; comas, & temperat astra galero;  
Tum dextræ virgam inferit qua pellere dulces,  
Aut suadere iterum somnos, qua nigra subire  
Tartara, & exsangues animare adsueverat umbras.*

There is yet another thing, whence it may be inferred that *Mercury* was a God very antiently esteemed well-affected to Liberty; which is, That in the Isle of *Greet*, (now *Candia*) they



## Observations upon the

they celebrated an Anniversary, which they called Εἰμασίον, to the Honour of this God; wherein, after the manner of the *Saturnals* at *Rome*, Slaves and Servants had all manner of Liberty, and were magnificently waited on at Table by their Masters, as *Athenæus* affirms, *l.* 14.

On the other side we have this Inscription, *ATILIUS CIMBER*, a Man beyond middle-aged, with a great Beard, and a rustick Countenance, with a long Poniard before him. That which may be more particularly deduced hence is, That he was more than ordinarily desirous the Conspiracy should prosper, though before, he had been a great Creature of *Cæsar's*, (as *Seneca* affirms in his Book *de Ira*.) Nay, under Pretence of presenting a Petition to him, he was so importunate with him, and held him in Discourse with such eagerness till he came into the Senate, that he had not the time to read a Note which was presented to him, wherein the whole Conspiracy was discovered. This Poniard therefore stands to signify the great Zeal he had to this Execution, wherein he thought the Liberty of his Country was concerned: to vindicate which, as it was his ambition to appear the most eager and the most resolute of all the Gang, so he thought it his Glory to give *Cæsar* the first Wound. Which consideration leads us by the hand to what we had designed for the last part of this Discourse, namely, the tragical Catastrophe of this miraculous person,

For Motives to the Conspiracy, we may lay down partly the irreconcilable hatred that some bare, in others, the aversion they had from Tyranny, in others, a kind of zeal to publick Liberty; the Encouragements, *Cæsar's* own Carelessness of himself, according to that *Apothegme* of his, when advised to take a Guard about his Person, *That it was better to die once, than live in continual fear*; his not humouring that people, who, if courted with Majesty, (as they had been wont in the time of the Common-wealth) had suffered any thing; his derisory Expressions of the Common-wealth, saying, *That it was a Shadow, and an imaginary Notion*; *Antonius* his profering him a Crown, which though (seeing the acclamations of the people backward) he accepted not, yet was his Design easily discovered; the Report that he was to be declared *King*, and would translate the Seat of the Empire to *Troy*, whence he pretended to descend, or to *Alexandria*, to spend his days with *Cleopatra*; the Tribunes shewing a certain Law to a Friend of his in Writing, whereby it was lawful to take as many Wives as one would, the better to people the Common-wealth. These and such like passages gave occasion to Libels and Placards, which were set up at every Corner, whereof divers particularly addressed to *Brutus*, who by his Influence over the chiefest Citizens, got together above 60. who under the Conduct of *Brutus*, (whose very Name they thought to be fatal to Tyrants) would prefer the Liberty of their Country before Lives, Fortunes, or Relations. Some time before his Death, so many Signs and Prodigies happened, that it was become the general belief that *Cæsar's* Death was near at hand. Among other things, his Soothsayer *Spurina* bid him beware of the Ides of *March*. All which put together, somewhat startled him, insomuch that he was once resolved to defer the Senate for that day, had not *Brutus* advised him in no case to betray so much fear; whereupon he went.

Going therefore in his Litter towards the Senate the fifteenth day of *March*, it could not be but divers would be presenting Petitions, and discoursing with him; but the Conspirators kept some of them so close to him, that he had not the leisure to peruse any thing he had taken; which if he had, he had in an Epistle given him by *Artemidorus*, or some other, discovered the whole Plot. Meeting by the way with *Spurina*, he told him the Ides of *March* were come; to which he answered, *'tis true, but they are not past*. Being come to the Temple, where the Senate was to sit that day, and Sacrifice done according to the custom, he took his Chair in the Senate. The first came up to him was one *Celer*, who while he was entreating him to release a Brother of his that was in Captivity, the rest came up to him: Whereat he suspecting some Violence, cried out, *What Force is this?* To which the above-mentioned *Atilius Cimber* answered him with a wound in the Throat, which the rest of the Conspirators seconded with others. But that which amazed him above all, was to see *Brutus* among them, one whose Authority was great, and one whom he had obliged beyond all expression of Gratitude, when a conquer'd Enemy; upon which he could not but break forth into these words, *And thou, Son Brutus, art thou one?* Whereupon seeing there was no possibility of escaping, he remembered to keep the honour of his Person, covering his Head with part of his Robe, and with his left hand settling his Cloaths about him; and so having received 23 Wounds, he fell to the ground a Sacrifice to the publick Liberty, near the Base of *Pompey's* Statue, which was noted as a Judgment of the Gods.

*Cæsar* having neither Son nor Daughter legitimate at his Death, had by his Will before adopted his Nephew *Octavius Cæsar*, who was afterwards called *Octavianus Augustus*, who studied in *Apollonia* at the time of this Murther of *Cæsar*, and expected to go with him to the War against the *Parthians*, being then about 17 years of age.

This Death (as all extraordinary accidents) must needs beget Tumult and Confusion in the City; all Offices ceased, the Temples and Courts of Justice were shut up; *Cæsar's* Friends were afraid of the Conspirators and they reciprocally of them. This Tumult some-



## Death of JULIUS CÆSAR.

somewhat startled the Conspirators, who seeing the Design took not with the people as they expected, to secure themselves, seized the Capitol, crying as they went, *Liberty, Liberty, Liberty*. Whereupon, *Antonius* and *Lepidus* being all this while in Arms, divers Treaties of Accommodation passed between them; whereby it was at last agreed the Senate should sit, whither *Brutus* and *Cassius* came, *Antonius's* Sons being Hostages for their Return. The Senate approves the Fact; the People dissemble their Satisfaction: For as the Authority of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, with the name of *Liberty*, was very charming on one side; so the horror of the Fact, and the love some bare *Cæsar*, exasperated them against the Murtherers. But *Mark Antony*, endeavouring to trouble the Waters as much as he could, among other things got *Cæsar's* Testament to be opened, wherein he had bequeath'd to the People of *Rome* certain Gardens and Heritages near the River *Tiber*, and to every Citizen of *Rome* a certain Sum of Money: Which being known, it re-inflamed their old affection to *Cæsar*, and raised a Compassion and a Regret for his Death. The day appointed for his Funeral, (the Ceremony whereof was to burn his Body in the Field of *Mars*) *Antonius* being to make the Oration, brought with him the Robe wherein *Cæsar* was assassinated, which being all bloody he shewed to the people, using some Expressions which raised in them both Indignation and Pity; insomuch as, before the solemnity of the Funeral was ended, they all departed in great fury, with the Brands of the same Fire, to set afire the Houses of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and the rest of the Conspirators, whom they sought running up and down the Streets. In which Fury they killed *Ælius Cinna*, mistaking him for *Cornelius Cinna*, who indeed was one of them. This Tumult forced *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and all who conceived themselves guilty of *Cæsar's* Death, to depart from *Rome*; whereupon *Antonius* took occasion to dispense with the Decree of the Senate, and assuming *Cæsar's* Power and Authority, persecuted them all he could. *Brutus* and *Cassius* went into *Greece*, to govern those Provinces which *Cæsar* (whom they had murther'd had conferred on them, which were *Macedonia* and *Syria*; and in like manner were all the rest dispersed, and that so unfortunately, that within the space of three years they all came to violent Deaths.

He was slain in the 56th year of his Age, somewhat above four years after the Death of *Pompey*, 700 years after the Foundation of *Rome*, 3010 years after the *Creation*, but according to the 70 Interp. 5157. in the 184th Olympiad, and 42 years before the Birth of *Christ*. Having made himself *Perpetual Dictator*, he enjoyed it three years, four months, and six days.

Thus have we traced this transcendent Personage through all his great and incomparable Actions and Atchievements; we have viewed him in his Distresses and Extremities, and we have also seen him in his Victories and Triumphs, expressing the same Greatness, that is, the same Equality of Mind in both; we have surveyed him in all his Excellencies and Abilities both of Mind and Body; we have considered the Invincibility of his Spirit, his incomparable Courage, his Clemency and Magnanimity, his Policy, Vigilance, Prudence, Conduct; we have, as near as we can, enumerated the many Battles he fought, the many Victories obtained, the many People and Provinces reduced, the many Kings and Countries subdued, so to figure a Person imitable in all things that may be called great or virtuous, not exceedable in any; we have described and dilucidated his *Medals*, wherein if we have committed any offence, it hath been in studying brevity, purposely omitting many things that might have been said, and forbearing the multitude and particularity of Citations, lest it might be thought a vanity: Lastly, we have accompanied him to his Funeral Pile, the fire whereof consumed his Murtherers and Enemies, while he himself is carried up by the same Element, to shine eternally a Star of the first magnitude, in the Firmament of famous and heroick Spirits. And there we leave him, recommending the Reader to see and find him haply far greater than our Commendations, in his own everlasting COMMENTARIES.



*Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a Soldier perfect in the Art Military, how great soever his Knowledge may be, which long Experience and much Practice of Arms hath gained.*

**W**Hen I consider the weakness of Man's Judgment in centuring things best known unto it self, and the disability of his Discourse in discovering the nature of unacquainted Objects; choosing rather to hold any sensible Impression, which custom hath by long practice inured, than to hearken to some other more reasonable persuasion: I do not marvel that such Soldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience, and consisteth in the Rules of their own practice, are hardly persuaded that History and speculative Learning are of any use in perfecting of their Art; being so different in nature from the Principles of their Cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of Action, wherein the use of Arms and Achievements of War seem to have their chiefest being. But those purer Spirits, embellished with Learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other Mens Fortunes, wherein variety of Accidents affordeth variety of Instructions, and the mutual conference of things happened, begetteth both Similitudes and Differences, contrary Natures, but yet joyntly concurring to season our Judgment with Discretion, and to entall Wisdom in the Government of the Mind: These Men, I say, mounting aloft with the wings of Contemplation, do easily discover the ignorance of such Martialists as are only trained up in the School of Practice, and taught their Rudiments under a few years Experience, which serveth to interpret no Author but it self, nor can approve his Maxims, but by his own Authority; and are rather moved to pity their hard Fortune, having learned only to be ignorant, than to envy their skill in matter of War, when they oppose themselves against so manifest a Truth as this, *That a meer practical Knowledge cannot make a perfect Soldier.* Which Proposition that I may the better confirm, give me leave to reason a little of the grounds of Learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and Sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that individuality, the intellectual Power frameth general Notions and Maxims of Rule, uniting terms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diversities by differences of Properties; aptly dividing the whole Body into his greatest and smallest Branches, and fitting each part with his Descriptions, Duties, Cautions and Exceptions. For unless the Understanding be in this sort qualified, and able by logistical Discourse to ascend by way of composition from Singularity to Catholick Conceptions, and return again the same way to the lowest order of his Partitions, the Mind cannot be said to have the perfection of that Art, nor to be instructed in the true use of that Knowledge; but guiding her self by some broken Precepts, feeleth more want by that she hath not, than benefit by that she hath. Whereby it followeth that a Science divided into many Branches, and consisting in the multiplicity of divers Members, being all so interested in the Bulk, that a maim of the smallest part causeth either debility or deformity in the Body, cannot be said to be thoroughly attained, nor conceived with such a profiting Apprehension as stealeth the Mind with true Judgment, and maketh the Scholar Master in his Art, unless the nature of these particularities be first had and obtained.

And forasmuch as no one Science or Faculty what soever, in multitude and plurality of parts, may any way be comparable to the Art Military, wherein every small and unrespected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparity and difference, that the resemblance of their equal participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing parts; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular Occurrences, and best knoweth the variety of Chances in the course of War, must needs be thought a more perfect Soldier, and deserveth a Title of greater Dignity in the profession of Arms, than such as content themselves with a few common Precepts and over-worn Rules: Without which, as they cannot be said at all to be Soldiers; so with them and no more, they no way deserve the name of skilful and perfect Men of War. Now, whether meer Experience, or Experience joyn'd with Reading and Discourse, do feast the mind with more variety and choice of Matter, or entertain Knowledge with greater plenty of Novelties, incident to Expeditions and use of Armies. I will use no other reason to determine of this Question, than that which *Franciscus Patricius* alledgeth in his *Parallels*, where he handleth this Argument which I intreat of.

*He that followeth a War (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only. If his knowledge extend no farther than a part, he hath learned less than he that saw the whole: But admit he hath seen and learned the Instructions of one whole War, he hath notwithstanding learned less than he that hath seen the Proceedings of two such Wars: And he again hath not seen so much as another that hath served in three several Wars: And so by degrees, a Soldier that hath served ten years, must needs know more than one that hath not served so long. And to conclude, he that hath received 22 years Stipend, (which was the just time of Service amongst the Romans, before a Soldier could be dismiss'd) hath greater means of Experience than another, that hath not so long a time followed the Camp, and cannot challenge a Discharge by Order and Custom. And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one or more or all these Wars, there have happened few or no Actions of Service, which might teach a Soldier the practice of Arms; that then his learning doth not countervail his labour. And if the War, through the Negligence or Ignorance of the chief Commanders, have been ill carried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of Military Discipline: If the part which he followed were defeated and overthrown, he knoweth by experience how to lose, but not how to gain. And therefore it is not only Experience and Practice which make a Soldier worthy of his Name, but the knowledge of the manifold Accidents which rise from the variety of human Actions; wherein Reason and Error, like Merchants in Traffick, interchange contrary Events of Fortune; giving sometimes Copper for Silver, and Balm for Poyson; and repaying again the like Commodity as time and circumstances do answer their Directions. And this knowledge is only to be learn'd in the Registers of Antiquity, & in Histories recording the Motions of former Ages.*

*Caius Julius Caesar* (whose Actions are the Subject of these Discourses) after his famous Victories in France, and that he had gotten the Provinces of Spain, and broken the strength of the Roman Empire at *Pharsalia*,



*Pharsalia*, was held a Soldier surmounting Envy and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this, the Battle he had with *Pharnaces*, King of *Pontus*, was like to have buried the Glory of his former Conquests in the dishonourable memory of a wilful Overthrow. For having possessed himself of a hill of great advantage, he began to encamp himself in the top thereof: Which *Pharnaces* perceiving, (being lodged likewise with his Camp upon a Mountain confronting the Romans) imbattled his Men, marched down from his Camp into the Valley, and mounted his Forces up the hill, where the Romans were busied about their Intrenchments, to give them Battle. All which *Cæsar* took but for a *Bravado*; and, measuring the Enemy by himself, could not be persuaded that any such Fool-hardiness could carry Men headlong into so dangerous an Adventure, until they were come so near, that he had scarce any time to call the Legions from their Work, and to give Order for the Battle: Which so amazed the Romans, that unless, as *Cæsar* himself saith, the advantage of the Place, and the benignity of the Gods had greatly favoured them, *Pharnaces* had at that time reveng'd the Overthrow of *Pompey* and the Senate, and restor'd the Roman Empire to Liberty. Which may learn us how necessary it is (besides Experience, which in *Cæsar* was infinite) to perfect our Knowledge with variety of Chances; and to meditate upon the effects of other Mens Adventures, that their Harms may be our Warnings, and their happy Proceedings our fortunate Directions.

And albeit, among so many Decads of History, which pregnant Wits have presented to these latter Ages, we seldom or never meet with any one accident which jumpeth in all points with another of the like nature that shall happen to fall out in managing a War, or setting forth of an Army; and so do seem to reap little Benefit by that we read, and make small use of our great Travel; yet we must understand, That in the *Audit of Reason* there are many Offices, which through the sovereign Power of the discursive Faculty, receive great Commodities by whatsoever falleth under their Jurisdiction, and suffer no action to pass without due trial of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the Judgment may not be defrauded of her Revenues, nor the Mind of her Learning. For notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of forms, which seem to cut off the privilege of Imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we have obtained by reading; the intellectual Faculty hath authority to examine the use, and look into the inconveniencies of these wants and diversities, and by the help of Reason to turn it to her advantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in Trial and Execution it shall not appear any Disadvantage. For as in all other Sciences, and namely in *Geometry*, of certain bare Elements, and common Sentences, which Sense admitteth to the Apprehension, the Powers of the Soul frame admirable Theorems and Problems of infinite use, proceeding with certainty of Demonstration from Proposition to Proposition, and from Conclusion to Conclusion, and still make new Wonders as they go, besides the strangeness of their Architecture, that upon such plain and easie Foundations, they should erect such curious and beautiful Buildings: So in the Art Military, these Examples which are taken from Histories are but plain kind of Principles, on which the Mind worketh to her best advantage, and useth Reason with such dexterity, that of Inequalities she concludeth an Equality, and of Dissimilarities, most sweet Resemblances; and so she worketh out her own Perfection by Discourse, and in time groweth so absolute in Knowledge, that her Sufficiency needeth no further directions. But as *Lomazzo* the Milanese, in that excellent Work which he writ of Picturing, saith of a

skilful Painter, That being to draw a Portraiture of graceful Lineaments, he will never stand to take the Symmetry by Scale, nor mark it out according to Rule; but having his Judgment habituated by Knowledge, and perfected with the variety of Shapes and Proportions, his Knowledge guideth his Eye, and his Eye directeth his Hand, and his Hand followeth both with such facility of cunning, that each of them serves for a Rule whereby the true Measures of Nature are exactly expressed. The like may I say of a skilful Soldier, or any Artizan in his Faculty, when Knowledge hath once purified his Judgment, and turned it to the key of true Apprehension.

And although there are many that will easily admit a Reconciliation of this Disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the Arbitrement of a well-temper'd Spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable Examples of Valour and Magnanimity, (whereof Antiquity is prodigal, and spendeth as thō Time should never want such Treasure) can any way avail the manners of these days; which, if they were as they ought to be, would appear but counterfeit to the lustre of a Golden Age, nor yet comparable to Silver or Brass, or the strength of Iron, but deserve no better Title than Earth or Clay, whereof the frame of this Age consisteth. For what Resemblance (say they) is between the Customs of our Times, and the Actions of those antient Heroes? They observed Equity as well in War as in Peace; for Virtue rather flourished by the natural disposition of Men, than by Law and Authority; the greatest Treasure which they esteemed, were the Deeds of Arms which they had atchieved for their Country, adorning the Temples of their Gods with Piety, and their private Houses with Glory, pardoning rather than persecuting a Wrong, and taking nothing from the Vanquished but ability of doing injury: But the Course of our Times hath another Bias; for Covetousness hath subverted both Faith and Equity, and our Valour affecteth nothing but Ambition; Pride and Cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and Subtlety teacheth us to carry rather a fair Countenance than a good Nature: Our means of getting are by Fraud and Extortion, and our manner of spending is by Waste and Prodigality, not esteeming what we have of our own, but coveting that which is not ours; Men effeminated, and Women impudent, using Riches as Servants to Wickedness, and preventing Nature's Appetite with wanton Luxury; supplanting Virtue with Treachery, and using Victory with such Impiety, as though *injuriā facere*, were *imperio uti*: And therefore the exemplary Patterns of former Times, wherein true Honour is expressed, may serve to be gazed upon, but no way to be imitated by this Age; being too subtil to deal with Honesty, and wanting Courage to encounter Valour. I must needs confess, that he that compareth the History of *Livy* with that of *Guichardine*, shall find great difference in the subjects which they handle; for *Livy* triumpheth in the Conquests of Virtue, and in every Page erecteth Trophies unto Valour, making his Discourse like *Cleantes's* Table, wherein Virtue is described in her entire Majesty, and so sweetened with the Presence and Service of the Graces, that all they which behold her are wrapt with admiration of her Excellency, and charmed with the love of her Perfection: But *Guichardine* hath more than *Thesew's* Task to perform, being to wind through the Labyrinths of Subtlety, and discover the quaint Practices of Politicians, wherein publick and open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret Projects; and these again serve as Foils to more eminent Intentions; being also discoloured with Diffimulation, and so ensnared in the flights of Subtlety, that when you look for War, you shall find Peace; and expecting

Peace,



Peace, you shall fall into Troubles, Dissentions, and Wars. So crabbed and crooked is his Argument in respect of *Livy's* Fortune; and such Art is required to unfold the truth of those Mysteries.

But to answer this Objection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth; I say, those immortal Memories of Virtue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be known, than any Stratagems of subtler Ages: For Equity and Valour being truly apprehended to season the motions of the Soul, that albeit in so corrupt a course they cannot peradventure stir up imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious Practices, and devilish Devices, when Evil is reprov'd by the knowledge of Good, and condemned by the Authority of better Ages. And if we will needs follow those steps which the present course of the World hath traced, and play the Cretian with the Cretian; this Objection hindreth nothing, but that History, especially these of later times, affordeth sufficient Instructions to make a Soldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore any Man despise the sound Instructions which Learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that History doth offer to perfect the Weakness of a short Experience, especially when no Worth can countervail the Weight of so great a business: For I take the Office of a chief Commander to be a Subject capable of the greatest Wisdom that may be apprehended by natural means; being to manage a multitude of disagreeing Minds, as a fit Instrument to execute a Design of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualify both their Affections and Apprehensions according to the Accidents which rise in the course of his Directions; besides the true Judgment which he ought to have of such Circumstances as are most important to a fortunate End, wherein our Providence cannot have enough either from Learning or Experience, to prevent Disadvantages, or to take hold of Opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this Knowledge addeth Perfection to our Judgment, so it serveth also as a Spur to Glory, and encreaseth the desire of Honour in such as behold the Achievements of Virtue commended to a perpetual Posterity, having themselves the like means to consecrate their Memory to succeeding Ages, wherein they may serve for Examples of Valour, and reap the Reward of true Honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our own Fortune, and long to foresee the end of that Race which we have taken, which is the chiefest matter of consequence in the use of Arms; what better Conjecture can be made, than to look into the Courie of former times, which have proceeded from like Beginnings, and were continued with like Means, and therefore not unlikely to sort unto like Ends.

And now if it be demanded whether Reading or Practice have the first place in this Art, and serveth as a Foundation to the rest of the Buildings; let *Marius* answer this Question, who envying at the Nobility of *Rome*, saith thus, *Qui postquam Consules facti sunt, acta Majorum & Græcorum militaria præcepta legere ceperint: homines præposterî, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est. Whereas* (saith he) Reading ought to go before Practice, (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no Reading,

but of something practised before) *these preposterous Men, after they are made Consuls, and placed at the helm of Government, begin to read, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiency of knowledge, by using out of time that which in time is most necessary.* This Testimony gave *Marius* of Reading and Book-learning, being himself an Enemy to the same, forasmuch as all his knowledge came by meer experience. But howsoever his Judgment was good in this point: For since that all Motion and Action proceedeth from the Soul, and cannot well be produced, untill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the Mind, according to which Pattern the outward Being and sensible Resemblance is duly fashioned; how is it possible that any Action can be well expressed, when the Mind is not directed by Knowledge, to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the Occurrents of such Natures as are necessarily interested both in the Means and in the End thereof? And therefore Speculative Knowledge, as the *Tramontane* to direct the course of all Practice, is first to be respected.

But that I may not seem partial in this Controversie, but carry an equal hand between two so necessary yoke-fellows, give me leave to conclude in a word the Benefit of Practice, and define the Good which cometh from Experience; that so nothing that hath been spoken may seem to come from Affection, or proceed from the Forge of unjust Partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that Practice giveth Boldness and Assurance in Action, and maketh Men expert in such things as they take in hand: For no Man can rest upon such certainty through the Theorick of Knowledge, as he that hath seen his Learning verified by Practice, and acknowledged by the Testimony of assured Proof. Besides, there are many other Accomplishments gotten only by Practice, which grace the Presence of Knowledge, and give Credit to that which we have read: As first to learn the use and advantage of the Arms which we bear; secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terrour, to learn to fear nothing but Dishonour; to make no difference between Heat and Cold, Summer and Winter; to sleep in all places as on a Bed, and at the same time to take pains and suffer Penury; with many other Difficulties which Custom maketh easie, and cannot be gotten but by Use and Practice.

And thus at length I have brought a shallow Discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater Zeal of Affection, than I am able with manifest Proof of Reason, to demonstrate the Necessity that both these parts were by our Soldiers so regarded, that neither Practice might march in obstinate blindness without learned Knowledge; nor this again be entertained with an idle apprehension without Practice: But that both of them may be respected as necessary parts to make a compleat Nature; wherein Knowledge, as the Intellectual part, giveth Life and Spirit to the Action; and Practice, as the material Substance, maketh it of a sensible Being, and like a skilful Workman expresseth the Excellency which Knowledge hath fore-conceived: Wishing no Man to despair of effecting that by Practice which the Theorick of Knowledge commendeth. For *Cur desperes nunc posse fieri, quod jam toties factum est?*

*Salust. de bello Jugur.*

*sunt, acta Majorum & Græcorum militaria præcepta legere ceperint: homines præposterî, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est. Whereas* (saith he) Reading ought to go before Practice, (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no Reading,



# A Geographical INDEX

O F

All such Places in *Germany, France* and  
*Britain*, as are mentioned by *Cæsar*.

Collected chiefly from *Ortelius* his *Thesaurus Geographi-*  
*cus*, and now very much enlarged and amended.

A.



**Albaldubis**: So 'tis read by *Ful. Ursinus* upon *Cæsar*, though other Copies in the same place have *Aldu-*  
*asubis* and *Alduasdalis*. In *Ptolemy* is *Dubis*, and so it ought to be read in the Epistles of *Julian* the Emperour, instead of *Danubis*. 'Tis a River of *France* in *Lionnois*, now call'd *le Doux*, say *Poldus* and *Marlianus*.

**Atuatici, or Atuatici**: Whose Metropolis (according to *Cæsar*) was *Atuatuca*; though *Ἀττάκιον* is found in *Ptolemy*, a City of the *Tungri*, and a Bishop's See; afterwards translated to *Maestricht* on the *Meuse*, from thence to *Liege*. Therefore the *Atuatici* are the *Leodienses*, or inhabitants of the Bishoprick of *Liege*.

**Hedui, or Pedui**, a People of *Gallia Celtica*, who dwelt about the River *Loire*, and were possess'd of the greatest part of the Dukedom of *Burgundy*. Their chief Town was *Augustodunum*, now *Autun*.

**Agendicum**, a City of the *Senones*, now call'd *Sens*. The Scholiasts upon *Cæsar* have blundr'd extremly in their Exposition hereof. 'Tis an Archbishop's See.

**Alexia**, a Town of the *Mandubij* in *Gallia Celtica*, call'd *Alesia* by *Paterculus*. By *Diodorus* and *Polyen*. l. 8. *Strateg.* 'tis call'd *l' Aussois en Burgogne*. But *Paradin* says there is now nothing remaining of it, save a faint resemblance of the Name, *Alize*; with whom agrees *Vigenerius*.

**Allobroges**; Their chief Town was *Vienne*. The greater part of 'em are now subject to the Duke of *Savoy*. Tho' formerly the *Savoyards*, were within the *Maritime Alpes*, as appears by the *Notitia Imperij*.

**Alpes**, a long tract of Mountains, that divide *Italy* from *Germany* and *France*, as it were with a Wall. *Strabo* says, they were anciently called *Alpia*, and *Alpionia*, *Stephanus* styles them *Alpeia* and *Alpeioi*; *Phavorinus*, *Olpiæ*; and in many places of *Germany* they are still call'd *Alpen*. In *Lycophron* they seem to be called *Salpij*, as *Isacius* upon him thinks. The Poets sometimes use *Alpis* in the Singular Number. *Serapio Cap. de Refina* calls 'em *Abax*. For further Satisfaction consult *Alciatus*, in his Commentaries upon *Tacitus De Morib. Germ.* and *Josias Simler. De Alpibus*.

**Amagetobzia**: See *Magetobzia*.

**Ambarri**, a People of *Gallia Celtica*, a part of the *Hedui* in the Dukedom of *Burgundy*, says *Vigenerius*.

**Ambiani**, the inhabitants of *Amiens* in *Picardy* so called. *Ambianum* or *Amiens*, according to *Sigelbert* was first called *Sommonobria*, which we must not confound with *Samarobriua*, which is a different City, as appears out of *Cæsar* and *Antoninus*.

**Ambibarri**, supposed by *Ortelius* to be a People of *Aquitain*. *Baudrand* says, they were a People of *Gallia Celtica*.

**Ambilates, or Ambialites**: They dwelt amongst the *Celta*, in the lesser *Bretany*, where is now the Diocess of *St. Brieu*. *Baudrand*.

**Ambibariti**, a People of *Gallia Belgica* near *Antwerp* says *Ortelius*, which is contradicted by *Cluverius*.

**Anartes** a People mentioned by *Cæsar*, bordering on the *Daci*. *Blasius Vigenerius*, says they are the *Walachians*, *Servians* and *Bulgarians*.

**Ancalites**, a People of the Isle of *Britain*. The Inhabitants of a Place call'd *Ankelut*, by *Glareanus*; and by *Cambden*, *The Hundred of Henley*.

**Andes**, the inhabitants of the Dutchy of *Anjou*, so nam'd from a place call'd *Andegavi*, or *Angiers*, a Bishops See.

**Antuates**: See *Plantuates*.

**Aquitain**: *Augustus* divided it into three great Provinces. *Prima Aquitania*, whose Metropolis is *Bourges*; *Secunda*, whose Metropolis is *Bordeaux*; and *Tertia*, named also *Novempopulania*, whose chief Town is *Aix en Guienne*, the same that *Cæsar* calls *Aquitania*, circumscribed by the *Garonne*, the *Pyrenees* and the *Ocean*: Now, even by those of *Aquitain*, call'd *Gascoigne*, to distinguish it from the rest of the Province. The Limits therefore of the *Aquitania* of *Cæsar* are not so spacious as to make a third part of *Gallia*.

**Arar**, a River of *Gallia Narbonensis*, by *Pliny* and *Virgil* nam'd *Araris*. *Paradin* says, That it is call'd *Sangona*, in *Ammianus Marcellinus*, and there is also found in him *Sauconna*. The *Scoras* of *Polybius* seems to be the same. 'Tis now call'd the *Saone*. The Author of a Book *De fluminibus*, says, 'twas anciēly call'd *Brigulus*, the Truth whereof depends upon the Credit of the Author.

**Arduenna**, a very Large Wood, or Forest in *Gallia Belgica*, which still retains the Name of *Ardenne*.  
\* D Irenicus.



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*Irenicus* calls it *Achterwalt*, and *Rhenanus* *Lutticherwalt*, i. e. the Wood of the People of *Liege*.  
**Arecomici.** They were of two sorts; *Volca Arecomici*, possessed of that Tract of Ground where now stand *Nemours* and *Narbonne*; and *Arecomici Teffosages*, of that where now stands *Tholouse*.  
**Armorica.** *Cæsar* places the Cities thereof, in that part call'd *Britannia Minor* by *Sigebert*; nam'd also *Hermiona*, by *Rob. Canalis*, and vulgarly *Bretaigne*. *Leland* says that *Armorica* signifies upon the Sea in the Language of the *Britains*. *Armorica* was also named *Letavia*.  
**Arverni.** A People of the *Celta*, called *Aroerni* by *Stephanus*. From them *Auvergne* takes its Name.  
**Atrebatæ.** Whose Chief Town was *Orgiacum*, or *Arras*, in the Dukedom of *Artois*.  
**Avaricum.** 'Tis madness to suppose it any other than *Bourges*. 'Tis, as we said before, the Metropolis of *Aquitania Prima*.  
**Aulerci.** They are of four sorts; *Aulerci Eburonices* from whence *Eureux* in *Normandy* takes its Name; *Aulerci Diablintes*; *Aulerci Cenomanni*, whence *Mans* takes its Name; and *Aulerci Brannovices*.  
**Ausci.** Whose chief Town, *Aix en Guenne*, the Metropolis of *Novempopulania* or *Gascoigne*, is a Bishop's See.  
**Arona.** A noted River, now call'd *Aisne*, which rising in the Dukedom of *Berry*, runs a long winding course, and at last falls into the River *l'Oise*, above *Compiègne*.

### B.

**Bacenis.** A Wood in *Germany*, which, according to *Cæsar*, divides the *Cherusci* from the *Sweeds*. *Althamerus* thinks 'tis *Thuringerwalt*. Some confound it with *Sylva Hircynia* and *Martiana*, i. e. *Schwartz-walt*.  
**Batabia.** By *Ptolemy*, *Tacitus* and *Cæsar*, 'tis a Country of *Lower Germany*, at the Mouth of the *Rhine*, now improperly call'd *Holland*: For that part of *Holland*, which stretches it self like two Arms from *Lobicum* to the Ocean, between the *Rhine* and the *Waal*, was anciently called *Batavia*, which still retains something of its old name; being call'd *Betaw* by the Natives. *Pliny*, *Dion*, *Cæsar* and *Tacitus* call it an Island of the *Batavi*. 'Tis call'd *Battua* and *Badua*, by *Aimoinus*.  
**Belgæ.** A People made mention of by *Cæsar* in the beginning of his Commentaries, inhabiting *Gallia Belgica*, near to the Sea Coasts.  
**Belgium.** The Name of the Country of the *Belgæ*, and not a City, as the Scholiasts foolishly imagine. See a large description hereof in *Baudrand*, and others.  
**Bellocassæ, Velocassæ, and Bajocassæ,** an ancient People of the Country of *Bayonne*, whose chief Town is *Bayeux*, a Bishop's See.  
**Bellocassi, or Bellecassæ,** The same with the *Verocassæ* or *Velocassæ*. Again, some will have 'em to be the *Virgassins* whose chief Town is *Gisors*. Some place them in the farthest Parts of *Gallia Armorica*. And *Marlianus* makes a distinction, and says that the *Bellocassi* were of *Gallia Celtica*, and are now call'd *Bajocenses*: *Velocassæ* were of *Gallia Belgica*, and are those that now live about *Cassel* in *Flanders*.  
**Bellovaci.** They dwelt in *Gallia Belgica*, whence *Beauvais*.  
**Bibracte.** The largest and most Populous Town of the *Heduns*, call'd *Beaulne* by *Orontius* in his *Tabula Gallie*, and by *Vigenerus*; and *Marlianus* says it retains the Name still. 'Twas sometimes called *Julia*, except it be a fault in *Constantine's* Panegyrick, where towards the End, are these Words, *Bibraſte quidem huc usque dicta est Julia*. *Petrus Sancto-Julianus* in his *Burgundia*, will have *Bibraſte*, and *Augustodunum* to be the same Place. *Bevray a' Autun*.  
**Bibrax.** A Town of *Gallia Belgica*, bordering upon the *Suessones*, now call'd *Brayne* a little Town in *Compagnia*.

**Bibzoci,** (or which some read *Bibrocassi*) a People of *Britain*. *Glareanus* calls the place where they dwelt *Bibrogger*; *Cambden*, *The Hundred of Bray*.  
**Bigerones.** Inhabitants of that part of *Aquitain*, call'd *Novempopulania*: whence *Bigorre* their chief Town, now a Bishop's See.  
**Bituriges.** There are two Sorts; The *Cubi Bituriges*, now call'd *Berri*, in the Duchy of *Berry*; and the *Bituriges Vibisci* in the Balywick of the *Bourdellois*. *Cæsar* mentions only the *Cubi* whose chief Town was *Avaricum*, or *Bourges*.  
**Boii,** A People on the further side the *Rhine*: A part of those that together with the *Helvetians* invaded *Gaul*, and placed themselves in the Territories of the *Ædui* by main Force, and are thought to have lived in that part now call'd *Bourbonnois*. *Cæsar* makes mention of *Boia*, the name of a Town.  
**Brannovices.** An ancient People of *Gallia Narbonensis*, inhabiting the Country call'd *la Maurienne*, in the Dukedom of *Savoy*.  
**Bzatuspantium, or Bzatuspantium;** A Town in the Borders, between the *Bellovaci*, and the *Ambiani*, afterwards call'd *Cæsaromagus*, now *Beauvais* as most think, says *Baudrand*.  
**Britain.** If we may give credit to other Writers, 'twas little known in *Cæsar's* time, notwithstanding he describes it pretty exactly. Hence some have doubted whether those Commentaries which give a Description thereof were writ by him. Be it as it will, under the Name *Britain*, the Ancients comprehended all this great Island; and the lesser circumjacent ones, which are now divided into the Kingdoms of *England* and *Scotland*.

### C.

**Cabillonum.** A Town of the *Æduans*, according to *Marlianus*. Now *Chalons sur Saone*.  
**Cadetes:** A People of *Gallia Celtica*.  
**Cadurci:** Ancient Inhabitants of *Querci*; their chief Town *Cahors*, a Bishop's See, which retains something of their Name.  
**Cæressi, or Cæreti:** A People of *Gallia Belgica*; a part of the *Treviri*, in the South part of the Duchy of *Luxembourg*, in the Bishoprick of *Triers*.  
**Caletes:** A People of *Gallia Belgica*. *Strabo* makes their Country extend as far as the Mouth of the *Seyne*. *Divus* makes their Country to have been that we now call *Le Pais de Caulx*. *Turnebus* says they possessed that part about *Diep* and *Honfleur*, and that they were called *Caletenses*.  
**Cantium:** An Eastern Promontory of *Britain*, according to *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; now call'd *Northfore-land*. *Cæsar* calls all that part of the Island which extends it self towards the East, *Cantium*; *Beda*, *Cantiam*; now *Kent*. In the *Notitia Imperii*, 'tis nam'd *Litus Saxonicum*.  
**Carnutes.** Inhabitants of that Tract, now call'd *Le pais de Chartrain*, the chief Town whereof is *Chartres*, a Bishop's See.  
**Cassii:** a People of the Isle of *Britain*: Whence *Casserer* in *Glareanus*, and *Caislow* in *Cambden*.  
**Catuaci,** a part of the *Belgæ* so call'd, near *Namur*, about the meeting of the *Save* and the *Maeze*.  
**Caturiges:** A People inhabiting the *Alpes*, in the Country of *Ambrun*. Their chief Town is *Ambrun*, an Archbishop's See.  
**Celta:** Who these were is plain from the beginning of *Cæsar's* First Book. Their Name I shall have occasion to speak of more largely in another place. Under this Name the *Greeks* comprehended both the *Germans* and *Gauls*.  
**Cenimagni,** a People of *Britain*, called *Cenman* by *Glareanus*. *Cambden* will have 'em to be the same with the *Iceni*.  
**Cenomanni,** a People in the Princedom of *Main*, whose chief Town is *Mans*, a Bishop's See.  
**Centrones,** Neighbours to the *Nervii*, but we rather suspect it to be a false reading. *Baudrand* says they



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they dwelt in *Gallia Belgica*, and were comprehended amongst the *Morini*.

**Centrones**, Inhabitants of the *Alpes*, in *le Pais de Tarantais*, whose chief Town is *Tarentum*, an Archbishop's See.

**Cherusci**, so called by *Tacitus*, *Paterculus* and *Strabo*; *Cherusici* by *Ptolemy*, and *Cervicii* by *Vib. Sequester*. A People of *Germany* divided from the *Sweeds*, by the Forest of *Thuringerwald*. Supposed to be the *Mansfelders* by *Scaliger*: But *H. Junius* thinks they are the *Lunenburghers*. See *Althamerus* upon *Tacitus*.

**Cimbri**, a People in the farthest Northern Parts of *Germany*, by us call'd *Futlanders*, the same that *Strabo* calls *Cimmerii*. *Becanus* also says they are called *Cerberii* by the Scholiast upon *Aristophanes*.

**Cocostates**, (or *Cocostates Sexignani* as *Pliny* calls 'em) a People of *Aquitain*, in that part now call'd *le Bazadois*.

**Condrusii**, (and *Condrusones* according to *Vigenerus*) a People of *Germany*, or rather *Brabant*; whence *Condrutz*, in the Bishoprick of *Liege*, whose Capital is *Huy*, upon the *Maes*. *Molanus* in the Life of *S. Bergevis* calls it *Condostrum Austrasie*.

**Confluentes**, or the Meetings of the *Meuse* and the *Rhine*, in *Gallia Belgica*, not far from *Bommel*.

**Curiosolitæ**, Inhabitants of *Armorica*, now *Bretaigne* near the Sea. *Marlianus* says they are call'd by many *Corisopetenses*.

### D.

**Decetia**, a City upon the *Loyre* with a Bridge, now nam'd *Decise sur Loire*.

**Diablintes**, or *Diablintres*. They were a part of the *Celta* so call'd. *Ursinus* makes them the same with the *Diablinde* of *Pliny*. *Villonovanus* supposes them to be the *Deaulite* of *Ptolemy*. *Marlianus* says *Leonoul* belonged to them, which *Becanus* in his *Atmatici* calls *Linter*. 'Tis a Village of *Brabant*, upon the River *Gete*.

**Durocottozum**, now *Rheims*, an Archbishop's See; the Metropolis of the *Rhemi*, or People of *Rheims*.

**Duranius**, a River. This River is not mention'd in the Eighth Commentary, *De Bell. Gall.* though pointed at in speaking of *Uxellodunum*, which is built upon a high broken Rock adjoining to the same, now call'd *la Dordonne*. Anciently 'twas call'd *Duranius* by *Ausonius* and *Sidonius*, but afterwards *Dordonia* by *Gregory Turonensis*. The largest and most noble River of *Aquitain*, near the *Garonne*.

### E.

**Eburones**, call'd also *Auleri Eburones*. They were a part of the *Belge*, and Tributaries of the *Treviri*. *Dion* names them *Eburi*. Their chief City was that which is now commonly call'd *Liege*. The *Germans* call it *Lnck* and *Lutrich*.

**Eburobices**. Their chief Town was that now called *Eureux*. A People of *Gallia Celtica*, in the middle between the *Velocasses*, *Lexovii*, *Auleri Diablintres*, and *Carnutes*.

**Elaver**. A River of the *Celta* in *Auvergne*, which *Marlianus* calls *Allier*, and *Sidonius* *Eleat*. See *Gabriel Simeonius*, in his *Dialogus pius & speculativus*.

**Eleutheri**. The Word in the Greek imports these to have been a Free People: and hence it is that in *Caesar* we meet with *Eleutheri Sueffones*, and *Eleutheri Cadurci*.

**Elusates**: Anciently their Bishop's See was *Elusa*, now *Le pais de Euse* in *Gascoigne*. See the *Lectiones Ausoniana* of *Joseph Scaliger*, where the Opinion of those, who make the *Elusates* and *Foxenses* the same, is rejected.

**Elui**. *Baudrand* says they were a part of the *Celta*, in the Dukedom of *Normandy*, and their chief Town was that which is now call'd *Seez*.

### G.

**Gabali**. Ancient inhabitants of *Givaudan*, whose chief Town is now call'd *Mende*. 'Tis an Episcopal Sec; attributed to the Province of the *Bituriges*. They trifle who say they are now subject to the Bishoprick of *Arles*.

**Galli**. Who it is *Caesar* means by 'em, is apparent from the Beginning of his first Book of his Commentaries *De Bell. Gall.*

**Garites**, in *Novempopulania*, the *Aquitania Tertia* of *Caesar*; in that part now call'd *le Pais de Gavre*.

**Garoceli**, a People within the *Alpes*. *Marlianus* and *Paradin* place them in Mount *Cenis*; *Vigenerus* in the Valley of *Maurienne*.

**Garumna**. A River dividing the *Celta* from those of *Aquitain*, in *Ptolemy* nam'd *Garyna*, now *Garonne*. *Caesar* calls such as dwelt near it *Garumni*.

**Garumni**, in *Caesar* are such as dwelt along the River *Garonne*.

**Gebenna**, and *Gebennici Montes*, are those that divide those of *Auvergne* from the *Helvii*. *Ptolemy* mentions *Cemennus Mons*, now Mount *Cevennes*.

**Genabum**: An Episcopal City of the *Aurelianois*, in *Caesar's* time attributed to the *Carnutes*, now call'd *Orleans*.

**Geneva**: A City of the *Allobroges* near the Lake, *Lemanum*, or *Lemans*; by the Natives call'd *Geneve*, and by the *Helvetians* and *Germans*, *Genff*.

**Gergovia**. Distant about an hour from *Clermont*, a Bishop's See in *Auvergne*, where some Ruines, and other Marks of the Ancient City still remain. The place is commonly call'd *Gergovia*, as I am inform'd by Friends.

**Gergovia Boiozum**, is plainly supposititious, in the Seventh Commentary, *De Bell. Gall.* For the Town of the *Boii* is not named, that *Vercingetorix* determined to demolish: and there are other places in *Caesar* besides this which are rather hinted at, than named. Therefore the *Boii* had no Town nam'd *Gergovia*.

**Germania**: By the Natives nam'd *Teutschland*, and by the *French* *Allemagne*. By the *English*, *Germany*.

**Gorduni**: A Branch also of the *Belge*. *Ortelius* is of Opinion that they dwelt about *Ghent* in *Flanders*.

**Gudii**: A Branch of the *Belge*, amongst the *Morini*, in that part now call'd *Le Quartier de Bruges* in *Flanders*.

**Gudii**: Tributaries of the *Nervii*. Inhabitants of *Launois* says *Marlianus*, of *Bruges* in *Flanders* says *Becanus*, of *Lovain* say others.

### H.

**Harudes**: People beyond the *Rhine*, brought by *Ariovistus*, into the Territories of the *Hadui* and *Sequani*.

**Helvetii**, who, sufficiently described by *Caesar*. By the Natives call'd *Schweitzers*, and by the *French* *Suisses*.

**Helvii**, or rather *Elvii*, People on the further side the *Rhine*, whose chief Town, being a Bishop's See, is call'd *Castrum* by *Vivarius*, now *Viviers*, the Metropolis of the Principedom of *Vivarez*.

**Hercynia**: A vast Wood in *Germany*, the *Orcynia* of *Eratosthenes*, says the Scholiast upon *Apollonius*. 'Tis call'd *Orcynium* by *Ptolemy*, *Hercynius Saltus*, and *Hercynium Nemus* by *Pliny*. *Rhellicanus* in his Notes upon *Caesar* (and *Althamerus* upon *Tacitus* to the same effect) speaks thus of it: *Unam eandemque esse sylvam veterum Bacenim, Martianam, Gabritam, Sermanam & Hercyniam*. Now it goes by several Names; as about *Fribourg* 'tis call'd *Schattzwalt*; about *Heidelberg*, *Odenwalt*; about *Wirtzburg*, *Steygerwalt*; about the River *Lonne*, near *Coblentz*, *Westervalt*; about *Franckfort*, *Spehsart*; in the Confines of *Saxony*, within the Territories of *Mansfeld*, *Auffdem*.



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*Auffdem-Hartz*: Lastly by the *Thuringians*, 'tis call'd *Thuringerwalt*, and by the *Bohemians*, *Behemerwalt*.

*Hibernia*, an Island in the Main Ocean, by the Natives call'd *Erin*, by the *Germans* *Irlandt*.

*Hibernia*, or rather *Ibernia*, *Ivernia*, or *Juverna*, by the *English* *Ireland*. Subject to the King of *England*.

## I.

*Iccius Portus*. *Strabo* says 'tis a Port of the *Morini*, an ancient People inhabiting the Sea Coasts of *Belgium*, but he has also *Itius*; as it is in several Manuscript Copies of *Caesar's* Commentaries. *Lloyd* makes it appear to be the same with that now call'd *Calais*; which City (as says *P. Oudegerst* in his *Annals of Flanders*) is sometimes in the Common Dialect call'd *Petresse*. Some there are who think *St. Omers* to have been the *Portus Iccius* of Old; led thereto partly from the situation of the place, which being very low, yet the Shore rose very high about it, and it had anciently a very Capacious Harbour; and partly from the Ancient Name thereof, *Sithieu*, as much as to say, *Sinus Ithii*. Add to these the Distance, which is, to the nearest part of the *British* Continent from this Town, exactly *CCCXX Stadia*, which is the Distance *Strabo* attributes to it: For *CCCXX Stadia* make just *XIII French* Leagues, which is the Computed Distance. *Caesar* makes it Thirty Thousand Paces, *Pliny* Forty, and *Dio* increases it to Forty Six Thousand in his Thirty Ninth Book. *Pliny* in another place seems to call this Port *Portus Britannicus Morinorum*. For further Satisfaction see the Learned Mr. *Edmund Gibson's* *Portus Iccius Illustratus*, lately Published.

*Jura*, and *Jurassus Mons*, now *Le Mont Jura*, in the Confines of *Burgundy*.

## L.

*Latobriges*, Borders upon the *Helvetians*. Inhabitants of that part now called *Le Brisgaw*, beyond the *Rhine*.

*Lemanus*, A Lake of the *Helvetians*, by *Ptolemy* call'd *Limene*, and in the Itinerary of *Antoninus* 'tis nam'd *Lausonius*. The *French* now call it *Lac de Losanne*, and *de Geneve*, and the *Germans* *Genfer-see*.

*Lemobices*: In the *Prima Aquitania* of *Caesar* now call'd *Limosin*, whose chief Town, being a Bishop's See, is called in Latin *Ratiastum*, now *Limoges*.

*Lepontii*, a People of *Rhetia* of the *Helvetians* according to *Strabo*, in whose Country *Caesar* says the *Rhine* begins its Course. In *Scudus*, *Rhinwalder* are those that dwell on the very Top of the *Alpes*. *Pliny* the *Vibici* who live about the Head of the *Rhofne*, *Lepontii*. *Marlianus* thinks they may perhaps be those now called *Suitenses*.

*Lebaci*: Among the *Belga* or *Low-Dutch*, in *Brabant*, in the Bishoprick of *Liege*, Four Miles from *Louvain*, about *Leewe*.

*Leuci*, *Low-Dutchmen*. *Ptolemy* calls their City *Tullum*, as does also *Antoninus* in his Itinerary; which is the *Toul* in the Dukedom of *Lorraine*, of *Marlianus* and *Divus*.

*Lexobii*, or *Lexobii*: A Branch of the *Celtae*, Inhabitants of *Lisieux*, in the Dutchy of *Normandy*, according to *Marlianus* and *Vinetus*.

*Ligeris* and *Liger*, a great River of the *Celtae*, now called *Loire*.

*Limonum*, a Town between *Xaindes* and *Poitou* mention'd in the Eighth Book of *Caesar's* Commen-

taries *De Bell. Gall.* Unknown both to *Ptolemy* and *Antoninus*.

*Lingones*, a part of the *Celtae*, in *Ptolemy* called *Langones*. *Gregory Turonensis* calls their chief Town *Urbs Lingonica*, now *Langres*.

*Lutetia*, A Town of the *Parisians* in the Isle of *Paris*, now the Royal Seat. In *Ptolemy* 'tis *Lucotecia*, and in *Julianus* his *Misopogonus*, *Leucetia*.

## M.

*Magetrobis*, a City of the *Celtae*: Unknown, says *Scal.* But *Elisha Cole* renders it *Mont Belliard*, which is very likely.

*Mandubii*, a part of the *Celtae*, whose chief Town was *Alexia*, now *Alise*, in the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, as *Marlianus* thinks.

*Marcomanni*, a people of *Germany*, who invaded *Gaul* under *Arionistus*. Their chief Town is now called *Merbern* by *Dubravus* and others.

*Matisco*, a City of the *Heduns*, upon the *Saone*, now *Majcon*.

*Matrona*, a River of *France*, which divides the *Celtae* from the *Belga*, now called *Marne*.

*Mediomatriges*, a part of the *Belga*, whom *Rhenanus* calls *Westreicher*. Their Metropolis is *Metz*, in the Dukedom of *Lorraine*.

*Menapii*, a Maritime People in *Brabant*. Their chief Town is now called *Kessel* upon the *Maese*.

*Metiodunum*, thrice so called by *Caesar*; afterwards named *Melodunum*, now *Melun*.

*Metiodunum*, or *Josedum*, near *Sequana*; which *Marlianus* interprets *Corbeil*.

*Mona*, an Island between *England* and *Ireland*. 'Tis doubted whether it be that in the mid-way between 'em (where *Caesar* also places it) which the Natives call *Menau*, and the *English*, *Man*: Or that which is near *England*, and was called *Mon*, by the *English* now called *Anglesey*.

*Mozini*. Their chief Town was *Taroana*, a Bishop's See, levell'd with the Ground: But *Teroane* holds up the Name.

*Mozini*, *Belgians*, whom *Marlianus* and others point at in *Teroanne*, and *Bovillus* in *Monstrevil*.

*Mosa*, a famous River of *Gallia Belgica*, by the *French* now called *Meuse*, and by the *Germans*, *Maes*, or *Maase*.

## N.

*Nannetes*, or *Namnetes*: *Namnetas* in *Ptolemy*: Whose chief Town being a Bishop's See, was *Condiviennum*, now *Nants*.

*Nantuates*, a People amongst the *Veragri*, and in the Confines of the Territory of *Geneva*, upon the Banks of the Lake *Lemani*. They blunder woefully, who take the Monastery of *Nantua* between *Lyons* and *Geneva*, to be the place of the *Nantuates*; for they are different Countries. Nor ought we from a little Similitude of Names, presently, hand over head, declare in favour of our own Opinion.

*Narbo*, the chief City of a *Roman* Province, whence *Gallia Narbonensis*; now *Narbonne*.

*Nemetes*, a people upon the *Rhine*, whom *Rhenanus* and others take to be those of *Spiers*, where is an Imperial Chamber.

*Nemetocenna*, a Town of the *Belga*, the same with *Nemetocerna* of *Baudrand*, which he from *Cluverius*, *Sanfon*, and others, takes to be *Arras*.

*Nervii*. Some take 'em to be the Inhabitants of *Tournay*; though *Caesar* seems to place 'em beyond their Confines. *Baudrand* and others take 'em to have been the Inhabitants of *Bavay* in *Hainault*.



## A Geographical INDEX.

**Bitubriges**, People of the *Secunda Aquitania*, whose Bishop's See is *Aginnum*, now *Agen*. All have been hitherto most abominably mistaken who took 'em for those of *Montpelier*, as if *Caesar* had ever made War upon the Province of *Narbonne*: They are only mistaken about seven Days Journey, which cannot be less than 140 Miles, reckoning but 20 Mile a day.

**Norices**, and **Norica Urbs**, in *Germany*; perhaps the same we now call *Norinberg*, and *Noringers*, the Inhabitants whereof might anciently be call'd *Norices*.

**Robiodunum** of the *Heduns*, a City of the *Nivernois*, as it is in the *M. S. Notitia*. 'Tis a Bishop's See, now call'd *Nevers*.

**Robiodunum** of the *Belga*, a Bishop's See, now named *Noyon*, in Latin *Noviomagus*. In the Synods and *Gesta Francorum* 'tis styl'd *Noviomum*, whence the new French name is hammer'd. As from *Rigomagus*, *Riomum*, now *Riom*; and from *Rosomagus*, *Rotomum*, and now *Roien*.

**Robiodunum**, *Bituricum*, a City in *Gallia Aquitania*, the same, as *Vigenerus* supposes, with that we now call *Neufuy sous Baranjon*, fifteen Miles from *Bourges*.

### O.

**Ocelum**: *Caesar* and *Strabo* make it to be a Town in the *Alpes*, which *Villanovanus* and *Varrerius* call *Onlx*; the *Italians*; *Ours Simlerus*, *Iselles*; *Vigenerus*, *Eselles*; *Marlianus*, *Novalesia*, and *Castilioneus*, *Chielano*, tho' falsely, says *Varrerius*. *Scudus* learnedly shows, that 'tis not the same with the *Oscella* of *Ptolemy*, which he places among the *Lepontii*.

**Otodoxus**, a Town of the *Veragri*, call'd *St. Maurice*: Now, says *Marlianus*, *Martenach*.

**Ofisii**, or rather *Ofismii*, the same that *Pitheus* upon *Strabo* calls *Timii* and *Sismii*, a People upon the *British Coast*, Inhabitants of a place call'd *Landrignet*, says *Cenalis*.

### P.

**Pemani**, a branch of the *Belga*, who dwelt towards the *Maese* amongst the *Eburones*.

**Parisi**, a People upon the *Seyne*, in the *Isle of France*, whose chief Town is *Paris*.

**Petrogozii**, in the *Secunda Aquitania*, Inhabitants of *Perigord*. Their City is Episcopal, divided into two Parts, the City and Town, anciently call'd *Vesuna*. The City takes its Name from the People, and is call'd *Perigueux*.

**Pitones**, in the *Secunda Aquitania*, now call'd the Country of *Poitou*, which extends it self a long way, and has a City which is a Bishop's See, anciently call'd *Augustoritum*, now *Poitiers*, a very large and most flourishing City.

**Pleumofii**, a branch of the *Belga*, between the *Nervii*, *Attrebates*, and *Gorduni*, in the Diocess of *Tournay* in French *Flanders*.

**Preciani**, in *Novempopulania*, or *Gascoign*, about *Pre-cins*.

**Provincia Romanorum**, or the *Roman Province*, is that part of *France* call'd *Gallia Narbonensis*, and in part retains the old Name, being still call'd *Provence*.

**Pyrenæi**, and *Pyrenæus Saltus*, very high Mountains which separate *France* from *Spain*, by the *Spaniards* commonly call'd *Los Pyreneos*. But they have divers names in divers places.

### R.

**Rauraci**, a People upon the *Rhine*, Neighbours to the *Helvetians*, in *Scudus* call'd *Basler*, i. e. Inhabitants of the Territories of *Basil*.

**Rhedones**, a part of the *Aquitani* or *Britons*. Their chief Town being Episcopal, was anciently call'd *Condate*, now *Rennes*.

**Rhemi**: Their chief Town is an Archbishop's See; anciently call'd *Durocortorum*, now *Rheims*.

**Rhenus**, *Rhene*, or *Rhine*, a most famous River which separates *Gallia* from *Germany*: In the German Dialect *Rhyn*.

**Rhodanus**, or vulgarly *Rhofne*, a noted River of *France*, dividing the *Provincia Romanorum*, or *Provence*, from the *Celta*.

**Ruteni**, in the *Prima Aquitania*, about *Rouergne*, whose chief Town was anciently call'd *Segodunum* now *Rhodes*.

### S.

**Sabis**, a River of *Gallia Belgica*, which runs into the *Maes*; now call'd the *Sambre*.

**Samarobriga**, now *Amiens*, an Episcopal City of the *Ambiani*. Many have made a great sputter about this Word to no purpose.

**Santones**, in the *Secunda Aquitania* in the Government of *Xaintonge*; whose chief Town being a Bishop's See, was anciently call'd *Mediolanum*, now *Xaindes*.

**Scaldis**, the *Tabda* of *Ptolemy*; a River of *Gallia Belgica*, which still retains its Latin Name. The Germans call it *Schelt*, and the French, *L'Escault*.

**Seduni**, a People of *France* bordering upon the *Alpes*; the upper *Vallois*. Their Metropolis was call'd *Sedunum*, in the *Savoy Dialect* *Sion*, in the German, *Sitten*.

**Seduci**, a People amongst the Germans, in *Franconia*.

**Segni**, a People of the *Belga*, between the *Eburones* and *Treviri*, in the Bishoprick of *Liege*.

**Segontiaci**, A People of *Bretaign*, says *Glareanus*, placing them at a place call'd *Sengerer*. But *Camden* thinks they dwelt amongst the *Belga* in that part now call'd *Holesebot*.

**Segusiani**, Inhabitants of the Country now call'd *Le pais de Fores*. They had two chief Towns; one named *Forum Segusianorum*, now *Fours en Fores*, or vulgarly *Fores*, as much as to say *Foreses*, that is *Forenses*: The other was *Rodumna*, now *Rouan*, a very famous Town upon the *Loyre*. *Ptolemy* places, very ill, *Lyons* among the *Segusiani*.

**Senones**. See *Agendicum*.

**Sequana**, in *Strabo Sequanus*, a great River dividing the *Celta* from the *Belga*; now call'd *Seyne*.

**Sequani**, Inhabitants of the *Franche Comté*, whose Metropolis was call'd *Visontio*, now *Besançon*, a Royal City beyond the Territories of the Dutchy of *Burgundy*.

**Sesubii**, Ancient Inhabitants of *Bretaigne*.

**Sibutzates**, in *Baudrand Sibuzates*, ancient Inhabitants of *Novempopulania*, or *Gascoigne*.

**Sicambri**, a People of *Gallia Belgica*. They seem to have been the ancient Inhabitants of the Dukedom of *Guelderland* (says *Marlianus*) between the *Maes* and the *Rhine*. But in *Ptolemy* (who calls them *Syngambri*) they are placed on the further side of the *Rhine*, with whom agrees *Suetonius* in the *Life of Augustus*. Some will have them to have been the Inhabitants of the Earldom of *Zurphen*. *Strabo* calls them *Sugambri*.

### E.



## A Geographical INDEX.

**Sigis**, as do several ancient Copies. *Junius* in his *Batavia* thinks that the Town *Sigis*, the Castle of *Sigenburch*, and the Monastery of *Sigenberch* in the County of *Bergen*, retain something of their Name.

**Sotiates**, Inhabitants of *Gascoigne*, now called *Sots*. Their chief Town is built upon a high Hill in the Patrimony of the Metropolitcal Church of *Aquitain*.

**Succiones**, Inhabitants of *Soissons*. Their City being Episcopal, is in Latin called *Augusta Suesonum*.

**Suevi**, Possessors anciently of the greatest part of *Germany*; yet their Country was but little known in *Cesar's* time. And those that now inhabit *Swaben*, are without doubt a branch of the ancient *Suevi*.

### T.

**Thamesis**, the *Jamissa* of *Ptolemy*; a very large and commodious River of *England*; which the Natives write *Thames*, but pronounce *Tems*: 'Tis the Port of *London*.

**Tarbelli**, a People in the furthest part of *Gascoigne* upon the Banks of the *Aturus*. They have two Episcopal Cities, *Aqs*, in Latin *Aqua Tarbellica*, which is not to be confounded with *Tarba* in the Government of *Bigorre* in *Gascoigne*; and *Bayonne*. See the *Lectioes Ausoniana* of *Joseph Scaliger*.

**Tarusates**, Inhabitants of the *Aquitania Caesaris*: Some take them to have inhabited about *Tursa*, a Bishop's See in the Province of the *Auscii*: Though there really be no such place, nor any Bishoprick of that name in all *Gascoigne*. *Tursan* indeed is a Town in the Territories of the *Labretii*: But how they will infer that it took name from the *Tarusates*, I cannot see.

**Taurinum**, a Town in the *Secunda Provincia Narbonensis*, of which we have nothing certain. They that take it for *Telonum* or *Toulon* have not considered the Antiquity thereof.

**Tectosages**: These were a People of *Germany*, according to *Cesar* (though there were a People of this Name in *Gaul*) about that place which is now called the Forest of *Schwarzwald*. *Rhenanus* thinks they dwelt on the Banks of the *Neckar*, where there still remains an old Castle named *Teck*. *Ursinus* upon *Cesar* reads *Volca* for *Tectosages*: And others, not without ground, *Volca Tectosages*.

**Thentheri**; by others *Thenchteri*; by *Appian*, *Tanchari*; by *Plutarch*, *Tenterides*; and by *Ptolemy*, *Tingri*, a People of *Germany*. *Witichius* takes them to be those that now inhabit along the *Rhine* and the *Lon*, where there are abundance of *Fassians*, and some *French*. *H. Junius* takes them to be those in and about *Drenna*, from the Similitude of Names.

**Tigurinus Pagus**: The chief Town and City whereof was *Aventicum*, now *Avenches*, as appears by an old Inscription at *Avenches*, viz. *G E N P A G T I G O R*. i. e. *Genio Pagi Tigorini*: And in another Inscription the City is called *Aventicum Helvetiorum*.

**Tholosates**, the People in *Narbonnois*, who still retain the Name of *Tholousians*, or People of *Tholouse*.

**Trebiri** in *Cesar*, *Tribori* in *Ptolemy*, and *Triberi* in the Book *De Notis. Imp.* a People of *Gallia Belgica*, which you may now call *Trierische*, from their Metropolis *Triers*.

**Triboces**: So *Cesar*: *Ptolemy*, *Tribocci*. A People of *Germany*, whom *Rhenanus* calls *Straibourghers* from their Metropolis. In *Oswald the Miller* there is men-

tion of *Zun dreyen Buchen*, which seems to have some Affinity with the Word *Tribocci*.

**Trinobantes**, or *Trinobantes*, a People of *England*, are those, according to *Leland* and *Lloyd*, that dwell now about *London*. *Nevillius* ascribes to them *Essex* and *Middlesex*.

**Tulingi**, those of the *Celte* that bordered upon the *Helvetii*. *Marlianus* and *Rhellicanus* think they are those by the *Germans* called *Lothringers*, and by the *French*, *Lorrainois*. *Scudus* makes mention of *Stulingen* and *Nellenburg*, as taking name from them.

**Turones**: Whose chief City, being Archiepiscopal, is *Tours*. In *Ptolemy* there is a false reading of *Turēnos* for *Turōnos*.

### V.

**Vangiones**, a People of *Germany* upon the *Rhine*. By *Rhenanus* and *Litchenavius*, called *Wormischer Bisthumb*; which *Pirchaymerus* gainsays, supposing them to be the Inhabitants of *Spier*, and the *Nemetes*, those of *Worms*. But *Sigebertus Gemblacensis*, who writ above a hundred Years ago, calls *Worms* the City of the *Vangiones*; and *Joannes Heroldus* gathers from an old Inscription there, that *Worms* was anciently called *Specula Vangionum*.

**Ubii**, a People of *Germany*, called also by *Tacitus*, *Agrippinenses*, from the place now called *Colonia Agrippina*. *Ubich* a Village in the Country of *Juliers* perhaps still retains their Name.

**Uelami**, and *Pagus Velannus*, now *le pais de Velai*: Their chief Town is now called *Le Puy*.

**Uellaunodunum**, a Town of the *Senones*. If we may believe *Cænalis*, 'tis that we now call *Auxerre*. *Vigenerus*, thinks 'tis *Chasteaulandon*, and others that 'tis *Villeneuf* in *Lorrain*.

**Uelocasses**. See *Bellocasses*.

**Ueneti**, a part of the ancient *Britons*, whence *Vannes* in the lesser *Bretany*.

**Ueragri**, whose chief Town was *Ostodorus*, now *Martenach*, as some think, a People between the *Rhine* and the *Alpes*.

**Uerbigenus**, a Village of the *Helvetians*, in *Gallia Lugdunensis*, called also *Urbigenus*, and *Urba*, by *Antoninus*.

**Ueromandui**. *Ptolemy* in his *Martyrologium* calls their chief Town *Augusta Veromandunorum*, now *St. Quirin* in *Vermandois*.

**Uesontio**: The chief Town of the *Sequani*. See *Sequani*.

**Vienna**, a City of the *Allobroges*, upon the *Rhine*, subject to the *Meduli*, a People of *Aquitain*: Now *Vienne*.

**Virelli**, a People of *Gallia Cæltica*, about *le Contantin* in lower *Normandy*.

**Vocates**, an ancient People of *Aquitain* in that part now called *le Capitular de Bruch*, says *Briefius*.

**Vocontii**. They had two Episcopal Towns; the one named *Dia Vocontiorum*, now *Die* in *Dauphine*; the other *Vasio Vocontiorum*, now *Vaison* in *Provence*.

**Vogelus**, a Mountain upon the Confines of the Territory of *Langres*, where is the Head of the *Maes*. *Vinerus* calls it *Mont de Paucille*.

**Volca**. See *Arecomici*.

**Visipetes**, a People of *Germany*, which *Plutarch* in the Life of *Julius* calls *Hufipos*. *Rhellicanus* places them between the *Rhine* and the Mountains of *Hesse* in that place now called *Hochrug*. *Witichius* thinks these *Visipetes* are the same with the *Uspii* of *Tacitus*, the *Uspii* of *Ptolemy*, and the *Sysipetes* of *Appian*. Yet *Uspii* and *Visipetes* in *Tacitus* are different People. The *Nuspi* of *Strabo*, *H. Junius* in his *Batavia*, *volens volens*, will have to be the Inhabitants of the place we now call *Zutphen*. He shows in his Tables, that the *Uspii* of *Ptolemy* differ from these.

**Uahalig**,



## A Geographical INDEX.

W.

**Wahalis, or Ualis,** a River of the *Batavi*, a Branch of the *Rhine*, now called *Waal*. *Tacitus* speaks of a River named *Nabalia*, but some Copies read *Vahalis* in that very place.

**Uxellodunum,** a Town situate on a ragged Rock which hangs over the *Derdome* in the Territories of the *Cadurci*, a People of the *Prima Aquitania*. The Natives still call it *la Puech d'Ussoldun*, that is,

*Pedium Uxelloduni*. There are many pieces of old Coyns daily dug up there, and some Monuments of great Antiquity are still remaining. The Spring or Well that is mentioned by *Cæsar* in the Eighth Book of his Commentaries in the Siege of this place, is still shown by the Country People, being remarkable for the Town's holding out so long by means thereof, against the utmost Efforts of *Cæsar's* Army. The Opinion of those is to be rejected as ridiculous, who take it for *Cadenac*. See *Duranium*.

## The Ancient Names of some Cities and Places in Spain, with the Modern Names thereof.

**A** Nas fl. *Guadiana*.  
Astures, *Asturia*.  
Bætica, *El reyno de Granada*.  
Bætis fl. *Guadalquivir*.  
Balears, *major, & minor*.  
Barcinon, *Barcelona*.  
Cæsarea Augusta, *Saragosa*.  
Castilon, *Castiglia*.  
Calpe, *Gibraltar*.  
Cinga fl. *Ringa*.  
Carthæia, *Tariffa*.  
Corduba, *Cordova*.  
Carpentani montes, *I monti de Segovia*.  
Calleci, *Gallecia*.  
Derthosa, *Tortosa*.  
Duriis fl. *El Duero*.  
Emporiz, *Emporiz*.  
Ebusus, *Eiviza*.  
Girunda, *Girona*.

Hiberus fl. *Hibero*.  
Hispalis, *Sibilia*.  
Hlerda, *Lerida*.  
Malaca, *Malaca*.  
Numantia, *Sora*.  
Nerium promontorium, *S. Maria de finibus terra*.  
Oscenses, *Osca*.  
Olisippo, *Lisbona*.  
Ophiusa, *Fruentara*.  
Pompeopolis, *Pampeluna en Navarra*.  
Rhoda, *Roses*.  
Saguntum, *Mon vedro*.  
Sicoris, fl. *El Segro*.  
Setebam, *Sativa*.  
Sacrum promontorium, *Capo S. Vincentio*.  
Tartaco, *Aragon*.  
Tagus fl. *El Tago*.  
Turdetani, *Andalusia*.  
Valentia, *Valenza*.

A D.



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The



# The Summ of the First Book of Cæsar's Commentaries; with Observations upon the same, discovering the excellency of Cæsar's Militia.

## The Argument.

**I**N this First Book are contained the specialities of two great Wars, begun and ended both in a Summer: The first, between Cæsar and the Helvetii: The second between him and Ariovistus King of the Germans. The History of the Helvetians may be reduced to three principal Heads: Under the first, are the reasons that moved the Helvetians to entertain so desperate an Expedition, and the Preparation which they made for the same. The second containeth their Defeat by Cæsar: And the third, their return into their Country. That of Ariovistus divideth it self into two Parts: The first giveth the Causes that induced Cæsar to undertake that War: The second intreateth of the War it self, and particularly describeth Ariovistus's Overthrow.

### CHAP. I.

Gallia described: The Helvetians dislike their Native Seat, and propound to themselves larger Territories in the Continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this Humour, for his own advantage.

**G**ALLIA is all divided into three Parts; whereof the Belges do Inhabit one, the Aquitanes another, and those which they call Celtes, and we Galls a third: All these do differ each from others in Manners, Language, and in Laws. The River Garun doth separate the Galls from the Aquitanes, and Marne and Seine do bound them from the Belges. Of these the Belges are most Warlike; as furthest off the civility and politure of the Province, and less frequented with Merchants, or acquainted with such things as are by them imported to effeminate Mens Minds; as likewise being sited next to the Germans beyond the Rhine, with whom they have continual Wars. For which cause also the Helvetians do excel the rest of the Galls in Deeds of Arms, being in daily Conflicts with the Germans, for defence of their own Territories, or by invading theirs. The part inhabited by the Galls, beginneth at the River Rhone, and is bounded with Garun, the Ocean, and the confines of the Belges; and reaching also to the Rhine, as a Limit from the Sequans and Helvetians, it stretched Northward. The Belges take their beginning at the extreme Confines of Gallia, and Inhabit the Country which lieth along the lower part of the Rhine, trindling to the North, and to the East. Aquitania spreadeth it self between the River Garun and the Pyrenean Hills, and butteth upon the Spanish Ocean, between the West and the North.

Amongst the Helvetians, Orgetorix did far exceed all others, both for Noble Descent and store of Treasure: And when M. Messala, and M. Piso were

Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a Kingdom, he moved the Nobility to a Commotion; persuading the State to go out of their Confines with their whole Power: As an easie matter for them, that excelled all other in Valour and Prowess, to seize upon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather persuade them, for that the Helvetians were on every side shut up, by the Strength and Nature of the Place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the River Rhine, which divideth their Country from the Germans; on the other side, with the high ridge of the Hill Jura, which runneth between them and the Sequans; and on the third part they were flanked with the Lake Lemanus, and the River Rhone, parting their Territories from our Province.

Hence it happened, that being thus straightned, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make War upon the bordering Countries: And thereupon, being Men wholly bent to Arms and War, were much grieved, as having too little Elbow-Room for their multitude of People, and the renown they had got of their Valour; their whole Country containing but 240 Miles in length, and 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these Inducements, and moved specially with the Authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to make Provision of such things as were requisite for their Expedition, bought great numbers of Carrs and Horses, for Carriages; sowed much Tillage, that they might have plenty of Corn in their Journey; made Peace and Amity with the confining Countries. For the perfecting and supply of which things, they took Two Years to be sufficient; and in the third, enacted their setting forward by a solemn Law, assigning Orgetorix to give order for that which remained.

Curandum  
vicinis popu-  
lis ut pax in-  
ter vicinos  
populos col-  
tur.

### The First OBSERVATION.

**H**E that will examine this Expedition of the Helvetians, by the transigrations and flittings of other Nations, shall find some unexam-  
E



## Observations upon CÆSAR'S

pled Particularities in the course of their proceeding: For, first it hath never been heard, that any People utterly abandoned that Country which Nature or Providence had allotted them, unless they were driven thereunto by a general Calamity, as the Infection of the Air, the Cruelty and Oppression of a Neighbour Nation, as were the *Suevians*, who thought it great Honour to suffer no Man to border upon their Confines; or some other universal, which made the place Inhabitable, and the People willing to undertake a voluntary Exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the Inhabitants of a Country were so multiplied, that the place was over-charged with multitudes of off-spring, and like a poor Father, had more Children than it was able to sustain, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new Fortunes in Foreign Countries, and to possess themselves of a Resting-seat, which might recompence the wants of their Native Country, with a plenteous Revenue of necessary Supplements. And in this sort we read that *Rome* sent out many Colonies into divers parts of her Empire. And in this manner the ancient *Galls* disburthened themselves of their superfluity, and sent them into *Asia*. The *Goths* came from the Islands of the *Baltick-Sea*, and in *Sulla's* Time swarmed over *Germany*: Besides many other Nations, whose transmigrations are particularly described by *Lazius*. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsook their Country, but there remained some behind to Inhabit the same; from whence, as from a Fountain, succeeding Ages might derive the stream of that over-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the Causes, which moved them unto it. For their manner was in all such Expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to divide themselves into two or three Parts, equal both in equality and number: For after they had parted their common People into even Companies, they divided their Nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former Partitions: And then casting Lots, that part which went out to seek new Adventures, left their Lands and Possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by Industry they supplied that defect which continuance of Time had drawn upon them. And this was the means which the first Inhabitants of the Earth found out after the Flood, to People the uninhabited Places, and to keep off the Inconveniences of Scarcity and Famine.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

**H**E that would prognosticate by the course of these several Proceedings, whether of the two betokened better Success, hath greater reason to foretel happiness to these which I last spake of, then to the *Helvetians*; unless their Valour were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and envy would cast upon them: For an action which savoureth of Necessity (which was always understood in sending out a Colony) hath a more plausible Passport amongst Men, than that which proceedeth from a proud voluntary motion. For, as Men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concern not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gain to punish Pride with Shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

### The Third OBSERVATION.

**O**rgetorix, thirsting after Princely Dignity, discovereth the humour of Vain-glory. For, not contented with the substance of Honour, being already of greatest Power amongst the *Helvetians*, and ordering the Affairs of the State by his

own direction, thought it nothing without the Marks and Title of Dignity, unto which the inconveniences of Majesty are annexed: Not considering that the best Honour fitteth not always in Imperial Thrones, nor weareth the Diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it self in meaner Places, and shineth better with obscurer Titles.

For proof whereof, to omit Antiquity, take the Family of the *Medices* in *Florence*, and particularly *Cosimo* and *Lorenzo*, whose vertue raised them to that height of Honour, that they were nothing Inferiour to the greatest Potentates of their Time, being themselves but private Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper Names as their greatest Titles. But howsoever, the opportunity of changing their Soil was well observed by *Orgetorix*, as the fittest means to attempt an Innovation: but the success depended much upon the fortunate proceeding of their Expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature can be content to attribute a great part of their happiness, wherein every Man thinketh himself particularly interested, to an eminent Leader; and in that universal extasie of Joy, will easily admit an alteration of their State: so, if the issue be in any respect unfortunate, no Man will acknowledge himself Faulty, but every one desiring to discharge his Passion upon some Object, a chief director is likeliest to be the Mark, at which the Darts of their Discontent will be thrown; and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

## C H A P. II.

*Orgetorix's Practices are discovered: His Death.*

The *Helvetians* continue the resolution of their Expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.

**O**rgetorix thereupon undertook Employment to the adjoining States; and first persuaded *Casticus*, the Son of *Catamantelides* a *Sequan* (whose Father had for many Years Reigned in that place, and was by the Senate and People of *Rome* stiled with the Title of a Friend) to possess himself with the Signiory of that State which his Father formerly enjoyed; and in like manner dealt with *Dumnorix* the *Heduan*, *Divitiacus's* Brother (who at that time was the only Man of that Province, and very well beloved of the Commons) to endeavour the like there; and withal, gave him his Daughter in Marriage; skewing them by lively reasons, that it was an easie matter to effect their Designs; for that he being sure of the sovereignty of his State, there was no doubt but the *Helvetians* would do much throughout all *Gallia*, and so made no question to settle them in those Kingdoms, with his Power and Forces. Drawn on with these Inducements, they gave Faith and Oath each to other, hoping with the support of the sovereignty of three mighty Nations, to possess themselves of all *Gallia*.

This thing being discovered, the *Helvetians* (according to their Customs) caused *Orgetorix* to answer the matter in durance: whose Punishment upon the Attaint, was to be burned alive. Against the day of Tryal, *Orgetorix* had got together all his Family, to the number of Ten Thousand Men, besides divers Followers, and others far indebted, which were many; by whose means he escaped a judicial hearing. The People thereupon being much incensed, agreed the Magistrate should execute their Laws with force of Arms, and to that end should raise the Country:

Caesar.



try: But in the mean time Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceived) that he himself was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his Death, the Helvetians did pursue their former design of leaving their Country: And when they thought themselves ready prepared, they set Fire on all their Towns (which were in number Twelve) together with four hundred Villages, besides private Houses, and burnt likewise all the Corn, save that they carried with them; that all hope of return being taken away, they might be the readier to undergo all hazards: And commanded that every Man should carry so much Meal with him as would serve for three Months.

Moreover also they persuaded the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and Latobrigi, their Neighbour Borderers, that putting on the same Resolution, they would set Fire on all their Habitations, and go along with them. And likewise took unto them the Boii, which had dwelt beyond the Rhine, but were now seated in the Territories of the Norici, and had taken the Capital Town of that Country. There were only two ways which gave them Passage out of their Country; the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, between the Hill Jura, and the River Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce pass; and had a high Hill hanging over, that a small Force might easily hinder them. The other was through our Province, far easier and readier; forasmuch as the River Rhone, running between the Helvetians and the

\* Savoyards.

\* Allobroges (who were lately brought in obedience to the People of Rome) did give passage in divers places by Fords.

The utmost Town belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth upon the Helvetians is Geneva; whereunto adjoyneth a Bridge leading to the Helvetians; who doubted not but to persuade the Allobroges (that seemed as yet to carry no great affection to the People of Rome) or at least to force them to give them passage. Things being now ready for their Journey, they assigned a day when all should meet together upon the Banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinus.

#### OBSERVATION.

The omission in the Helvetian Expedition.

AS these Provifo's were all requisite; so one thing was omitted, which might have furthered their good Fortune more than any thing thought of: which was, to have concealed by all means the time of their departure. For all the Beasts of the Wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lyons roused themselves out of their Dens; and be then very watchful of their safety, when they knew the instant of Time, when some of their Spoils must needs be offered to appease their Fury. Or at the least it behoved them so to have dealt by Hostages and Treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to cross their Designs might have been no hindrance of their Proceedings: Considering there were but two ways out of their Country by which they might go; The one narrow and difficult, between the Hill Jura and the River Rhone, by the Country of the Sequani; the other through Provence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever, their Error was, that after two Years Provision to go, and having made an exterminating Decree, which enjoined them to go, when they came to the point, they knew not what way to go.

#### CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Helvetians Passage through the Roman Province: He Fortifieth the Passage between the Hill Jura, and the Lake of Geneva.

AS soon as Cæsar was advertised that their purpose was to pass through our Province, he hastened to leave the \* City, and posting by great Journeys into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And inrolling great Forces throughout all the Province, for that there was but one Legion in those Parts, he brake down the Bridge at Geneva.

Cæsar.

\* Rome.

The Helvetians having intelligence of Cæsar's arrival, sent divers of the best of their Nobility Embassadors unto him, whereof Numeius and Verdoctius were the Chief, to give him notice, that they had a purpose to pass peaceably through the Province, having no other way to go: and therein to pray his sufferance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembering how Lu. Cassius the Consul was slain, his Army beaten, and the Soldiers put under the Yoke, did not hold it convenient to grant their Request. Neither did he think that Men so ill-affected could forbear to offer Wrongs and Insultencies, if leave were given them as were required. Howbeit, for the better gaining of Time, and getting such Forces together as were caused to be Inrolled, he answered the Commissioners that he would take a time of Deliberation; and to that end willed them to return again by the Ides of April. And, in the mean time, with that Legion he had ready, and the Soldiers that came out of the Province, he made a Ditch, and a Wall of sixteen Foot in height, from the Lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the Hill Jura, that divideth the Sequans from the Helvetians, being in length nineteen Miles; and disposed Garisons and Fortresses along the Work, the better to impeach them, if happily they went about to break out by Force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadors returned for a Resolution, he utterly denied to give any leave to pass through the Province; having neither Custom nor President from the People of Rome to warrant him in that kind. And if they should endeavour it by Force of Arms, he would oppugn them.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

THIS manner of prolonging of time to reinforce the Troops, or get some other advantage, as it was then of great use to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practised to good purpose; so doth it discover to a circumspect Enemy, by the directions in the mean time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay, and so inviteth him with greater Courage to take the opportunity of that present Advantage; especially if tract of Time may strengthen the one, and not further the other; which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the Action.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE Request of the Helvetians seemed to deserve a facile Answer; being in effect no more than Nature had given to the River Rhone: which was to pass through the Province, with as much speed and as little hurt as they could. But Cæsar looking further into the matter, and comparing things already past with Occurrences that were to follow after, found the Majesty of the Roman Empire to be interested in the answer; being either to maintain her Greatness by resisting her Enemies, or to de-



generate from ancient Vertue by gratifying such as sought her Ruine: Which in matter of State are things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an unsafe course to suffer an Enemy to have means of doing hurt; considering that the nature of Man is always prone to load him with further wrongs whom he had once injured: Not but that he could peradventure be content to end the Quarrel upon that advantage; but fearing the other whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunity of Revenge, he gets what advantage he can beforehand, and so cealeth not until he have added a bloody end to an injurious beginning

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning this marvellous Fortification between the Hill and the Lake, how serviceable such works were unto him in all his Wars, in what fort, and in how small a time they were made; I will defer the Treatise of them until I come to the height of *Alesia*, where he gave some ground of that hyperbolical Speech, *An me deleto, non animadvertetis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quæ non solum vobis obsistere, sed etiam cælum diruere possent?*

#### CHAP. IV.

The Helvetians failing to pass the Rhone, take the way through the Country of the Sequani. Cæsar hasteth into Italy, and there Inrolleth more Legions: And returning, overthroweth part of them at the River Arar.

Cæsar.

**T**HE Helvetians frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with Boats coupled together, others with Flats (whereof they made great store) the rest by Fords and Places where the River was shallow, sometimes in the Day, and oftentimes in the Night to break out: But being beaten back by the help of the Fortification, and the concourse of Soldiers, and multitude of Weapons, they desisted from that attempt.

There was only another way left through the Sequans, which they could not take by reason of the narrowness thereof, but by the favour of the Country. And forasmuch as of themselves they were able to prevail little therein, they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his mediation they might obtain so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through favour and bounteous Carriage, was of great Power in his Country, much affecting the Helvetians by reason of his Marriage with Orgetorix's Daughter; and drawn on with a desire of a Kingdom, gave his Mind to new Projects; labouring to gratifie many States, to tie them the rather to favour his courses. And thereupon undertaking the business, got the Sequans to give the Helvetians leave to pass through their Confines; giving each other Pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Helvetians in their Journey, nor they offer any injury to the Country.

It was told Cæsar that the Helvetians were determined to pass through the Territories of the Sequans and Heduans, on the confines of the Santons, who are not far from the borders of the Tholosans, a People of the Province; which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be to have a Warlike Nation, and such as were Enemies to the People of Rome to come so near them, and to have the advantage of an open and plenteous Country.

For which causes he left T. Labienus a Legate to command those Works, and he himself made great Journeys to get into Italy; where he Inrolled two Legions, and took three more out of their Wintering

Camps near about Aquileia: And with these five Legions went the next way over the Alps into the further Gallia. Where, by the way, the Centrons, Garoceli, and Caturiges taking advantage of the open Ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage: But being beaten and put off by many Skirmishes, they came in seven days from Ocellum, a Town in the furthest Parts of the nearer Province, into the Confines of the Vocontii, a People of the further Province: From whence he led them into the Territories of the Allobroges, and so unto the Sabusians, that are the first beyond the Rhone, bordering upon the Province.

By that time the Helvetians had carried their Forces through the Streights and Frontiers of the Sequans, into the Dominions of the Heduans, and began to Forage and Pillage their Country. Who finding themselves unable to make Resistance, sent Messengers to Cæsar to require Aid; shewing their deserts to be such from time to time of the People of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect than to have their Country spoiled, their Children led into Captivity, their Towns Assaulted and Taken, as it were in the sight of the Roman Army. At the same instant likewise the Ambarri, that had dependency and alliance with the Heduans, advised Cæsar that their Country was utterly wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their Towns. In like manner also the Allobroges that had Farms and Possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Cæsar, complaining that there was nothing left them but the Soil of their Country.

With which advertisements Cæsar was so moved, that he thought it not convenient to linger further, or expect until the Fortunes of their Allies were all wasted, and that the Helvetians were come unto the Santones. The River \* Arar, that runneth through the confines of the Heduans and Sequans into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stillness, that by view of the Eye it can hardly be discerned which way the Water taketh. This River did the Helvetians pass over by Flotes and Bridges of Boats. When Cæsar was advertised by his Discoverers that three parts of their Forces were already past the Water, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the River; About the third Watch of the Night he went out of the Camp with three Legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet got over the River, slew a great part of them: The rest fled into the next Woods.

\* Soane.

This part was the Tigurine Canton: And the Helvetians being all parted into four divisions, this Canton alone in the Memory of our Fathers slew L. Cassius the Consul, and put his Army under the Yoke. So whether it were by chance, or the Providence of the Gods, that part of the Helvetian State which gave so great a Blow to the Roman People, was the first that did Penance for the same. Wherein Cæsar took Revenge not only of the Publick, but of his particular Loss too; forasmuch as the Tigurines had in that Battel with Cassius slain L. Piso, the Grandfather of L. Piso, his Father-in-law.

Zurick.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**T**HIS Defeat being chiefly a service of execution upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which Men call unaware, containeth these two Advisoes. First, Not to neglect that advantage which Sertorius by the Hairs of his Horse-Tail hath proved to be very Important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to overcome the whole. Secondly, It may serve for a Caveat, so to transport an Army over a Water, where the Enemy is within a reasonable March, that no part may be so severed from



from the Body of the Army, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most Honourable way to transport an Army over a River, is by a Bridge, placing at each end sufficient Troops of Horse and Foot, to defend the Army from suddain Assaults as they pass over the Water. And thus went Caesar over the Rhine into Germany two several times.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

The manner  
of their  
Watch.

Concerning the circumstance of Time, when Caesar went out of his Camp, which is noted to be in the third Watch, we must understand that the Romans divided the whole Night into four Watches, every Watch containing three hours: And these Watches were distinguished by several Notes and Sounds of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diversity thereof it might easily be known what Watch was sounded. The charge and office of sounding the Watches belonged to the chiefest Centurion of a Legion, whom they called *Primipilus*, or *Primus Centurio*; at whose Pavilion the Trumpeters attended, to be directed by his Hour-Glafs.

The first Watch began always at Sun-setting, and continued three hours (I understand such hours as the Night contained, being divided into Twelve: For the Romans divided their Night as well as their Day into twelve equal spaces, which they called hours:) The second Watch continued until Midnight; and then the third Watch began, and contained likewise three hours: The fourth was equal to the rest, and continued until Sun-rising. So that by his Phrase *de tertia vigilia*, we understand that Caesar went out of his Camp in the third Watch, which was after Midnight: And so we must conceive of the rest of the Watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in History.

#### CHAP. V.

Caesar passeth over the River Arar: His Horsemen Encounter with the Helvetians, and are much worsted.

Caesar.

After this Overthrow he caused a Bridge to be made over the River Arar, and carried over his Army to pursue the rest of the Helvetian Forces. The Helvetians much daunted at his suddain coming, that had got over the River in one day, which they could scarce do in twenty, sent Embassadors unto him, of whom Divico was Chief, that Commanded the Helvetians in the War against Cassius: Who dealt with Caesar to this effect; That if the People of Rome would make Peace with the Helvetians, they would go into any part which Caesar should appoint them: But if otherwise he would prosecute War, that he should remember the Overthrow which the People of Rome received by their Valour; and not to attribute it to their own Worth, that they had surprized at unawares a part of their Army, when such as had passed the River could not come to succour them. They had learned of their Forefathers, to contend rather by Valour, than by Craft and Devices; and therefore let him beware that the place wherein they now were did not get a Name, or carry the Mark to all future Ages of an eminent Calamity to the People of Rome, and of the utter destruction of his Army.

To this Caesar answered; That he made the less doubt of the Success of these businesses, in that he well remembred, and knew those things which the

Helvetian Commissioners had related: And was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it happened without any cause or desert of the People of Rome; who, if he were guilty of any wrong done unto them, it were a matter of no difficulty to beware of their Practices: but therein was his Error, that he could think of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to fear; neither could he fear without occasion. And if he would let pass former Insolencies, could he forget those late and fresh Injuries? for, that they had attempted to pass through the Province by force of Arms, sacked and pillaged the Hedunians, Ambari, and Allobrogiens that did so insolently vaunt of their Victory, admiring that these Injuries were suffered so long time to rest unrevenged, came all in the end to one pass. For the Immortal Gods were wont sometimes to give happiness and long Impunity to Men, that by the greater alteration of things, the Punishment should be the more grievous for their Offences. Howbeit if they would give Hostages for the Performance of those things which were to be agreed upon, and satisfy the Hedunians and Allobrogiens, together with their Allies, for the Injuries they had done unto them, he would be content to make Peace with them.

Divico replied, That they were taught by their Ancestors to take Hostages rather than to give them, whereof the People of Rome were Witnesses: And thereupon departed. The next day they removed the Camp, and the like did Caesar, sending all his Horse before, to the number of Four Thousand (which he had raised in the Province, and drawn from the Hedunians and their Associates) to understand which way the Enemy took; who, prosecuting the Reward over-hotly, were forced to undertake the Helvetian Cavalry in a place of disadvantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The Enemy made Proud with that Encounter, having with Five Hundred Horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head with more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to fall out of the Reward and assault our Party. Caesar kept back his Men from Fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keep the Enemy from spoiling and harrying the Country: And went on for fifteen days together in such manner, as there were but five or six Miles between the first Troops of our Army, and the Reward of theirs.

#### OBSERVATION.

This example of the Helvetians may lessen a Commander, not to wax insolent upon every Overthrow which the Enemy taketh, but duly to weigh the true causes of a Victory gotten, or an Overthrow taken; that apprehending the right current of the Action, he may neither vaunt of a blind Victory, nor be dismayed at a casual mishap.

And herein let a heedful wariness so moderate the sequels of Victory in a triumphing Spirit, that the care and jealousy to keep still that sweet-sounding fame on foot, may as far surpass the Industry which he first used to obtain it, as the continuance of happiness doth exceed the beginning of good Fortunes. For such is the nature of our Soul, that although from her Infancy, even to the Manhood of her Age, she never found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she meeteth with a counterbasse to check her Appetite, and restrain her Affections from their satisfaction, she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had never received any Contentment at all: For our Will to every object which it seeketh after, begetteth always a new Appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, but either seeketh present



present Payment, or returneth discontentment unto the Mind.

And as our Soul is of an everlasting Being, and cannot think of an end to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetual continuance of such things as she lusteth after: Which he that meaneth to hold Fortune his Friend, will endeavour to maintain.

#### C H A P. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the advantage of a Hill, and so to give the Helvetians Battel: But is put off by false Intelligence. The opportunity being lost he intendeth Provision of Corn.

Cæsar.

**I**N the mean time Cæsar pressed the Hedians from day to day to bring in Corn, according to their promise: For by reason of the cold Temperature of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it happened not only that the Corn was far from being ripe, but also that there was scarce Forrage for the horses. And the Provisions which were brought along the River Arar stood him in small stead at that time, forasmuch as the Helvetians had taken their Journey clean from the River, and he would by no means forsake them.

The Hedians putting it off from one day to another, gave out still it was upon coming. But when Cæsar found the matter so long delayed, and that the day of meting out Corn to the Souldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Hedians, of whom he had great numbers in his Camp, and amongst them Divitiacus and Liscus, who for that time were the sovereign Magistrates (which they call Vergobret, being yearly created, and having power of life and death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corn from them, the Enemy being so near, and in so needful a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields: Especially when for their sake, and at their request he had undertook that War. Whereat he was the rather grieved, because he found himself forsaken of them.

At length Liscus, moved with Cæsars Speech, discovered (which before he had kept secret) that there were some of great Authority amongst the Commons, that could do more being private persons, than they could do being Magistrates. These by seditious and bad Speeches, did deferr the people from bringing Corn: shewing it better for them, since they could not attain to the Empire of Gallia, to undergo the Sovereignty of the Galls, than the Romans: For they were not to doubt but if the Romans vanquished the Helvetians, they would bereave the Hedians of their liberty, with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsels, or whatsoever else is done in the Camp, made known to the Enemy. That they were not able to keep them in obedience. That he knew well withall what danger he fell into by acquainting Cæsar with these things; which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix (Divitiacus Brother) was shot at by this Speech of Liscus: but forasmuch as he would not have those things handled in the presence of so many, he speedily brake off the Council, and retaining Liscus, asked privately after those things which he had delivered in the Assembly; whereunto he spake more freely and boldly than before. And enquiring secretly of others, he found it to be true, that Dumnorix was of great Courage and singularly favoured for his Liberality of the Common People, desirous of Novelties and Changes, and for many years had kept at a low rate the Taxes and Impositions of the Hedians, forasmuch as no man durst contradict what he would have done. By which courses he had increased his private Estate, and got great Means to be li-

beral: For a great number of Horsemen did only live upon his Entertainment, and were continually about him, being not only powerful at home, but abroad also amongst divers of the neighbour States; and for this cause had married his Mother to a great rich Man, and of a noble House, in the Country of the Bituriges, himself had took a wife of the Helvetians, had matched his Sister by his Mother, and others of his Kin, into other States. For that Affinity he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians: and on the other side hated the Romans, and specially Cæsar of all others; for that by their coming into Gallia his power was weakened and Divitiacus his Brother restored to his ancient Honour and Dignity. If any mischance happened to the Romans, his hope was to obtain the Principality by the favour of the Helvetians: whereas the Sovereignty of the Romans made him not only despair of the Kingdom, but also of the Favour, or what other thing soever he now enjoyed. And Cæsar had found out by inquiry, that the beginning of the Flight, when the Cavalry was routed, came from Dumnorix and his Horsemen; for he commanded those Troops which the Hedians had sent to aid Cæsar; and out of that disorder the rest of the Cavalry took a fright.

Which things being discovered, forasmuch as these suspicions were seconded with matters of certainty, in that he had brought the Helvetians through the Confines of the Sequans, had caused Hostages to be given on either side, and done all those things not only without warrant from the State, but without acquainting them therewith, and lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the Hedians, he thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to command the State to do Justice upon him. One thing there was which might seem to oppugn all this; the singular Affection of Divitiacus his Brother to the People of Rome; the great love he bare particularly to Cæsar, his Loyalty, Justice and Temperance; and therefore he feared least his Punishment might any way alienate or offend Divitiacus sincere Affection. And therefore before he did any thing, he called Divitiacus, and putting aside the ordinary Interpreters, he spake to him by M. Valerius Proculus, one of the principal Men of the Province of Gallia, his familiar Friend, and whom he specially trusted in matters of importance, and took notice what Dumnorix had uttered in his presence, at a Council of the Galls, shewing also what informations he had privately received concerning him: and therefore by way of advice desired, that without any offence to him, either he himself might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

Divitiacus embracing Cæsar with many tears, besought him not to take any severe Course with his Brother; he knew well that all those things were true, neither was there any Man more grieved thereat than himself. For whereas he had Credit and Reputation, both at home and amongst other States of Gallia, and his Brother being of small Power by reason of his Youth, was by his Aid and Assistance grown into Favour and Authority, he used those means as an advantage not only to weaken his Authority, but to bring him to Ruine: And yet nevertheless he found himself overruled through brotherly Affection, and the opinion of the Common People. And if Cæsar should take any strict Account of these Offences, there was no man but would think it was done with his Privy, considering the place he held in his Favour; whereupon would consequently follow on his behalf, a general alienation and distast of all Gallia.

As he uttered these things, with many other words accompanied with Tears, Cæsar taking his Right-hand, comforted him, and desired him to entreat no further: For such was the respect he had unto him, that for his sake, and at his request he forgave both the Injury done to the Common-wealth, and the Displeasure which he had justly conceived for the same.

And



And thereupon called Dumnorix before him, and in the presence of his Brother shewed him wherein he had deserved much blame and reproof; told him what he had understood, and what the State complained on; advised him to avoid all occasions of dislike for the future; that which was past he had forgiven him, at Divitiacus his Brothers Entreaty. Howbeit he set Espials upon him, to observe his courses, that he might be informed what he did, and with whom he conversed.

The same day, understanding by the Discoverers that the Enemy was lodged under a Hill, about eight Miles from his Camp, he sent some to take a view of the Hill, and of the Ascent from about the same. Which was found, and accordingly reported unto him to be very easie. In the third Watch of the Night he sent away T. Labienus the Legat with two Legions, and those Guides that knew the way; commanding him to possess himself of the top of that Hill. Himself, about the fourth Watch, marched on after the Enemy, the same way they had gone, sending all his Horsemen before.

P. Causidius, that was held for a great Souldier first in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards with M. Crassus, was sent before with the Discoverers. At the breaking of the day, when Labienus had got the top of the Hill, and himself was come within a Mile and half of the Helvetian Camp, without any notice to the Enemy either of his or Labienus's Approach (as was afterwards found by the Captives) Causidius came running as fast as his Horse could drive, and told him that the Hill which Labienus should have taken, was held by the Galls; which he perceived plainly by the Armes and Ensigns of the Helvetians. Whereupon Cæsar drew his Forces to the next Hill and embattelled the Army.

Labienus (according to the directions he had from Cæsar, not to fight, unless he saw his Forces near the Enemies Camp, that they might both at the same time assault them from divers Parts at once) when he had took the Hill, kept his Men from Battel, expecting our Army.

At length when it was far in the day, Cæsar understood by the Discoverers that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also that the Enemy was dislodged, and that Causidius was so astonished with fear, that he reported to have seen that which he saw not. The same day he followed the Enemy at the distance he had formerly used, and encamped himself three Miles from them. The day following, forasmuch as the Army was to be paid in Corn within two days next after, and that he was but eighteen Miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Heduians, he turned aside from the Helvetians, and made towards Bibract.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Places of advantage in the Roman Wars.

THE getting of this Hill as a place of advantage, was marvellous important to the happy success of the Battel: for the advantage of the place is not only noted as an especial cause of easie Victory throughout this History, but in all their Wars, from the very Cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremities soever they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their Darts and Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heavy deadly Weapon, could not any way be so available being cast countermount, or in a plain level, as when the declivity and downfal of a swelling Bank did naturally second their violent impression. Neither can the shock at handy-blows be any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their Battels) when the Soldiers spent their Strength in franchising the Injury of a rising Mountain, as when the

place by a natural Inclination did further their course.

And to conclude, if the Battel succeeded not according to their desire, the favour of the place afforded them means of a strong Retreat, in the highest part whereof they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all Chances. If it be demanded, whether the upper Ground be of like use in regard of our Weapons; I answer, that in a Skirmish of Shot I take the advantage to lie in the lower Ground rather than on the Hill; for the Pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first Volley, if the Bullet chance to lie loose, when the Nose of the Piece is lower than the Breech, it must needs fly at Random, and be altogether uneffectual: but when the Nose shall be raised upward to the side of a Hill, the Bullet being rammed in with its own Weight, shall fly with greater certainty and fury: Considering the nature of the Powder to be such, that the more it is stopt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge its room, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other Weapons, I take the upper Ground in the Shock and Encounter to be advantageous, as well for the Sword as the Pike, and would deserve as great respect, if the Controversie were decided by these Weapons, as seldom times it is.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

BY Causidius his demeanour we see that verified which Physitians affirm, that nothing will sooner carry our Judgment out of her proper Seat, than the passion of Fear; and that amongst Souldiers themselves, whom custom hath made familiarly acquainted with Horror and Death, it is able to turn a Flock of Sheep into a Squadron of Corselets, and a few Canes or Officers into Pikes and Lancers. Which may serve to advise a discreet General not easily to credit a Relation of that Nature, when a Man of Reputation in so perfect a discipline, and so experienced in the service of three famous Chiefs, was so surprized with Fear, that he could not discern his Friends from his Enemies. But I will speak more of this Passion in the War with Ariovistus.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

IN every Relation throughout the whole course of this History, the first words are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparata*, as the Foundation and Strength of every Expedition, without which no Man can mannage a War according to the true Maxims and Rules of the Art Military, but must be forced to relieve that inconvenience with the loss of many other Advantages of great Consequence. Which gave occasion to Gasper de Coligni, that famous Admiral of France, amongst other Oracles of Truth wherewith his mind was marvelously enriched, often to use this saying, that he that will shape that Beast (meaning War) must begin with the Belly. And this Rule was diligently observed by Cæsar, who best knew how to expreis the true Portraiture of that Beast in due proportion and lively resemblance.

The Order of the Romans was at the day of measuring, to give Corn to every particular Souldier for a certain time, which was commonly defined by Circumstances: And by the measure which was given them, they knew the day of the next Paiment; for every Footman received after the rate of a Bushel a Week, which was thought sufficient for him and his Servant. For if they had payed them

Their manner of Vidualling.



them their whole Stipend in Money, it might have been wasted in unnecessary Expences: But by this means they were sure of Provision for the time determined; and the Sequel of the War was providently cared for by the General.

The Corn being delivered out, was husbanded, ground with Hand-mills, which they carried always with them, and made into hasty Cakes, dainty enough for a Soldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their Servants. Neither could they sell it or exchange it for Bread; for *Salust* reckoneth this up amongst other dishonours of the Discipline corrupted, that the Souldiers sold away their Corn which was given them by the Treasurer, and bought their bread by the day. And this manner of provision had many special Commodities, which are not incident to our Custom of Victualling: For it is impossible that Victuallers should follow an Army upon a Service in the Enemies Country, twenty or thirty Days together, with sufficient Provision for an Army: And by that means the General cannot attend Advantages and fittest Opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole upon unequal Terms, or to sound an unwilling Retreat.

And whereas the Victuallers are for the most part voluntary, respecting nothing but their gain, and the Souldiers on the other side careless of the morrow, and prodigal of the present; in that turbulent Marr-market, where the Seller hath an Eye only to his particular, and the Buyer respecteth neither the publick Good nor his private Commodity, there is nothing to be looked for but Famine and Confusion. Whereas the *Romans* by their manner of Provision, imposed the general care of the publick Good upon the Chief Commander, whose duty it was to provide Stores of Corn for his Army; and the particular care upon every private Soldier, whom it especially concerned to see that the Allowance which the Commonweal had in plentiful manner given him for his Maintenance, might not be wasted through Negligence or Prodigality; Which excellent Order the nature of our Victuals will no way admit. Their Provinces, and the next Confederate States, furnished their Armies continually with Corn; as it appeareth by this place, that for Provision of Grain he depended altogether upon the *Hedui*: And when they were in the Enemies Country, in the time of Harvest, the Soldiers went out to Reap and gather Corn, and delivered it threshed and cleaned to the Treasurer, that it might be kept until the day of Payment.

But to leave this frugal and provident manner of Provision, as impossible to be imitated by this Age, let us return to our History, and see how the *Helvetians* were led, by a probable Error, to their last overthrow,

#### C H A P. VII.

The *Helvetians* follow after *Cæsar*, and overtake the Rereward. He Embattelleth his Legions upon the side of a Hill; and giveth order for the Battel.

*Cæsar.*

**W** Hereof the Enemy being advertised by certain Fugitives of the Troop of Horse Commanded by *L. Emilius*, presently, whether it were that they thought the Romans did turn away for fear, (and the rather, for that the day before, having the advantage of the upper Ground, they refused to Fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from Provision of Corn, they altered their purpose, and turning back

again, began to attack our Men in the Rere. Which *Cæsar* perceiving, drew his Forces to the next Hill, and sent the Cavalry to sustain the Charge of the Enemy: And in the mean time, in the midst of the Hill made a Triple Battel, of four Legions of old Soldiers; and upon the highest ridge thereof he placed the two Legions which he had lately Inrolled in the hither Gallia, together with the associate Forces, filling the whole Front of the Hill with Men, and stowing the Carriages in one place, which he commanded to be fenced and guarded by those that were in the uppermost Battalions.

The *Helvetians* on the other side conveyed their Carriages and Impediments into one place; and having beaten back *Cæsar's* Horsemen with a thick thronged Squadron, they put themselves into a Phalanx, and so pressed under the first Battel of the Roman Legions.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**C** Concerning the true sense of this Triple Battel which *Cæsar* made upon the side of the Hill, I understand it according to the ancient Custom of the *Romans*, who, in the Infancy of their Military Discipline divided their Army into three sorts of Soldiers, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; for I omit the *Velites*, as no part of their standing Battels: And of these they made three several Battels, from Front to back. In the first Battel were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole Front of the Army, and were called *Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes* in like sort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*. And lastly, in a like correspondent distance were the *Triarii* Imbattelled, and made *Aciem tertiam*. The manner of their Imbattelling.

Their Legion consisted of Ten Companies, which they called Cohorts, and every Cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a Manipule of the *Hastati*, a Manipule of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarii*, as I will more particularly set down in the Second Book. And as these three kinds of Soldiers were separated by distance of place from Front to back: so was every Battel divided into his Maniples; and these were divided by little Allies and Ways one from another, which were used to this purpose: The *Hastati*, being in Front, did ever begin the Battel: And if they found themselves too weak to repel the Enemy, or were happily forced to a Retreat, they drew themselves through these Allies or Distances, which were in the second Battel, between the Maniples of the *Principes*, into the space which was between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and there they rested themselves, whilst the Princes took their Place and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise, if the Commanders found it needful, they fill'd up those distances of the *Principes*; and so united with them into one Body, they charged the Enemy all in gross; and then if they prevailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarii*, and so they gave the last Assault, all the three Bodies being joyned into one. By triplex Acies.

Now, if we examine by the current of the History whether *Cæsar* observed the same order and division in his Wars, we shall find little or no alteration at all: For first, this *triplex Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the division of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, according to the manner of the first Institution. And least any Man should dream of that ordinary division, which is likewise threefold, the two Cornets and the Battel, and in that sense he might say to have made *triplicem Aciem*, let him understand that the



the circumstances of the Division have no coherence with that Division: For in that he saith of the *Helvetians*, *Successerunt sub Aciem primam*, they pressed near the first Battel or Vanguard, he maketh it clear that the Army was divided into a triple Battel from the Front to the Rere: For otherwise he would have said, *Successerunt sub dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*; for so were the parts of that Division termed. Again, in the retreat which the *Helvetians* made to the Hill, when he saith that the first and second Battel followed close upon the Enemy, and the third opposed it self against the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, and stood ready at the foot of the Hill to charge the Legions in the Flank and in the Rere; it is manifest that no other Division can so fitly be applied to this Circumstance, as that from Front to Rere.

But that place in the first of the Civil Wars taketh away all scruple of Controversie, where he useth the very same terms of *prima, secunda, and tertia Acies*: For being to Encamp himself near unto *Afranius*, and fearing lest his Soldiers should be interrupted in their Work, he caused the first and second Battel to stand in Arms, and keep their distance, to the end they might shroud and cover the third Battel (which was imployed in making a Ditch behind them) from the view of the Enemy: And this kind of Imbattelling *Cæsar* observed in most of his Fights: By which it appeareth that he used the very same Order and Discipline for Imbattelling, as was instituted by the old *Romans*.

Concerning the ancient Names of *Hastati, Principes*, and *Triarii*, which *Ramus* in his *Militia Julii Cæsaris* urgeth to be omitted throughout the whole History, I grant they are seldom used in these Commentaries in the sense of their first Institution: For the *Hastati*, when the Discipline was first erected, were the youngest, poorest of the Legionary Soldiers; and the *Principes* were the lusty and able-bodied Men; and the *Triarii* the eldest and best Experienced. But in *Cæsar's* Camp there was little or no difference either of Valour or Years between the *Hastati, Principes* and *Triarii*; which he nameth *Prima, Secunda, and Tertia Acies*; and therefore they were never termed by those Names in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding, in regard of Order and Degrees of Discipline, that Virtue might be rewarded with Honour, and that Time might challenge the privilege of a more worthy place, the said distinctions and terms were Religiously observed. For in the Battel with *Petreius* at *Ilerda* in Spain, he mentioneth the Death of *Q. Fulginius, ex primo Hastato legionis quartædecimæ*: And in the Overthrow at *Dyrachium*, he saith that the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, commended the safety of his Ensign to the Horsemen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, *Præter Principem priorem*. And for the *Triarii*, there is no term more frequent in *Cæsar* than *Primipilus*; which name, by the rules of the ancient Discipline, was given to none but to the chiefeſt Centurion of the first Maniple of the *Triarii*: Whereby it appeareth that the Maniples kept the same Names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the *Hastati* were as good Soldiers as either the *Principes* or the *Triarii*.

As touching the spaces between the Maniples, whereunto the first Battel did retire it self if occasion urged them, I never found any mention of them in *Cæsar*: excepting once here in England, where, in a Skirmish, the *Britains* so urged the Court of Guard, which kept Watch before

the Roman Camp, that *Cæsar* sent out two other Cohorts to succour them; who making distance between them as they stood, the Court of Guard retired it self in safety through that space into the Camp. Otherwise we never find that the first Battel made any Retreat into the Allies, between the Maniples of the second Battel; but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them; as appeareth in the Battel following with *Ariovistus*, and in divers others.

Concerning the use of this triple Battel, what can be said more than *Lipſius* hath done? where he layeth open the particular Commodities thereof, as far forth as a speculative Judgment can discern of things so far remote from the use of this Age, which never imitateth this triple Battel but only in a March: For then commonly they make three Companies, a Vanguard, a Battel, and a Rereward: But in Imbattelling they draw these three Companies all in Front, making two Corners and the Battel, without any other Troops to second them.

But let this suffice concerning *Cæsar* his manner of Imbattelling, and his *triplex Acies*, until I come to the Second Book; where I will handle more particularly the parts of a Legion, and the Usefulness of their small Battalions.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE *Macedonian Phalanx* is described by *Polybius* to be a square Battel of Pikemen, consisting of sixteen in Flank, and five hundred in Front; the Soldiers standing so close together, that the Pikes of the fifth Rank were extended three Foot beyond the Front of the Battel: The rest, whose Pikes were not serviceable by reason of their distance from the Front, couched them upon the Shoulders of those that stood before them; and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward, to hold up the sway, or giving back of the former Ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and irresistible.

The *Græcians* were very skilful in this part of the Art Military, which containeth Order and Disposition in Imbattelling: For they maintained publick Professors, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach and instruct their Youth the Practice and Art of all Forms convenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici* found by experience that sixteen in Flank, so ordered as they were in a *Phalanx*, were able to bear any shock, how violent so ever it charged upon them. Which number of sixteen they made to consist of four doubles: As first Unity maketh no Order, for Order consisteth in number and plurality; but Unity doubled maketh Two, the least of all Orders, and this is the double; which doubled again maketh the second Order, of four Soldiers in a File; which doubled the third time maketh eight; and this doubled maketh sixteen, which is the fourth doubling from an Unit; and in it they stayed, as in an absolute number and square, whose Root is four, the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes. For every one of these places the *Tactici* had several Names, by which they were distinctly known. But the particular description requireth a larger Discourse than can be comprehended in these short observations. He that desireth further knowledge of them, may read *Ælianus*, that lived in the time of *Adrian* the Emperour; and *Arianus* in his History of *Alexander* the Great, with *Mauritius*, and *Leo*, Imperator; where he shall have the divisions of *Tetrachalantia, Diphalangia, and Phalangia*, unto an Unit, with all the Discipline of the *Græcians*.



The chiefest thing to be observed is, that the Grecians having such Skill in embattelling, preferred a *Phalanx* before all other Forms whatsoever; either because the Figure in it self was very strong; or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their Weapons, which were long Pikes and Targets. But whether *Cæsar* termed the Battel of the *Helvetians* a *Phalanx*, in regard of their thick manner of embattelling only, or otherwise forasmuch as besides the Form, they used the natural Weapon of a *Phalanx* which was the Pike, it remaineth doubtful. *Brancatio* in his discourses upon this Place, maketh it no Controversie but that every Soldier carried a Pike and a Target. The Target is particularly named in this History: But it cannot so easily be gathered by the same that their offensive Weapons were Pikes. In the Fight at the Baggage it is said, that many of the legionary Soldiers were wounded through the Cart-wheels, with *tragula* and *materea*, which are commonly interpreted Spears and Javelins: And I take them to be Weapons longer than common Darts; but whether they were so long as the *Sarissa's* of the *Macedonians* I cannot tell. However this is certain, that the *Helvetians* have ever been reputed for the true *Phalangite*, next unto the *Macedonians*; and that in their thick and close embattelling, they failed not at this time of the Form of a *Phalanx*: For they roofed it so thick with Targets, that *Cæsar* saith they were sore troubled, because many of their Targets were fastened and tied together with Piles darted through them. Which argueth that their *Phalanx* was very thick thronged, whatsoever their Weapon was.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Cæsar* sendeth away all the Horses of Ease; exhorteth his Men; and beginneth the Battel.

*Cæsar.*

**C**æsar, to take away all hope of Safety by flight, first caused his own, and then all the private Horses of Ease to be carried out of sight; and so using some motives of Courage, began the Battel. The Soldiers casting their Piles, with the advantage of the Hill, did easily break the *Helvetians* *Phalanx*, and then with their Swords betook themselves to a furious Close.

## The First OBSERVATION.

Speeches of encouragement before they gave Battel.

**T**he ancient Sages found it necessary to a faithful and serious Execution of such an Action, to prepare the Minds of their Men with words of Encouragement, and to take away all Scruple out of their Conceits, either of the unlawfulness of the cause, or disadvantage against the Enemy: For if at any time that saying be true, that *Oratio plus potest quam Pecunia*, it is here more powerful and of greater Effect. For a Donative or Gift can but procure a mercenary Endeavour, ever yielding to a better offer, and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, even amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their Service with Loyalty, yea, oftentimes of Friends to become Enemies. But inasmuch as Speech discloseth the secrets of the Soul, and discovereth the intent and drift of every Action, a few good Words laying open the Injury which is offered to Innocency, how Equity is controlled with Wrong, and Justice controlled by Iniquity (for it is necessary that a Commander approve his Cause, and settle an opinion of Right in the Mind of his Soldiers, as it is easie to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their Blood; when indeed every man relieth upon

another's Knowledge, and respecteth nothing less than the right;) a few good Words I say, will so stir their minds in the ferventness of the Cause, that every man will take himself particularly engaged in the Action by the Title of Equity; and the rather, for that it jumpeth with the necessity of their Condition. For Men are willing to do well, when well-doing agreeth with that they would do: Otherwise the Act may happily be effected, but the Mind never approveth it by assent.

And this manner of Exhortation or Speech of Encouragement was never omitted by *Cæsar* in any Conflict mentioned in this History: But he still used it as a necessary Instrument to set Vertue on foot, and the only means to stir up alacrity. Or if it happened that his Men were at any time discouraged by disaster or cross Accident, as they were at *Gergobia*, and at the two Overthrows he had at *Dyrrachium*, he never would adventure to give Battel until he had encouraged them again, and confirmed their Minds in Valour and Resolution. But this Age hath put on so scornful a humour, that it cannot hear a Speech in this Case, sound it never so gravely, without scoffing and derision: And on the other side discontinuance of so necessary a part hath bred at length such an *Inutilem Pudorem* in our Chief Commanders, that they had rather lose the gain of a great advantage, than buy it with words to be delivered in publick.

Lib. 7. de bello Gallico.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**N this Chapter we may further observe the violence of the *Roman* Pile, which being a heavy deadly Weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a *Phalanx*, or any other thick and close Battel, or wheresoever else the Stroak was certain, or could hardly deceive the aim of the Caster: For in such Encounters it so galled the Enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answer the Assault with a stout resistance. By which it appeareth that the only remedy against the Pile was to make the Ranks thin; allowing to every Soldier a large Place to stand in, that so the Stroak might of it self fall without hurt, or by fore-sight be prevented; as it shall plainly appear by the Sequel of this History, which I will not omit to note, as the Places shall offer themselves to the Examination of this Discourse.

But as touching the Pile, which is so often mentioned in the *Roman* History, *Polybius* describeth it in this manner; A Pile, saith he, is a casting Weapon, the Staff whereof is almost three Cubits long, and it hath *Palmarem Diametrum*, a Hand-breadth in Thickness. The Staves were armed with a head of Iron, equal in length to the Staff it self: But in that sort, that half the head was fastened up to the middle of the Staff, with Plates of Iron like the head of a Halbert; and the other half stuck out at the end of the Staff like a Pike, containing a finger's breadth in thickness, and so decreasing less and less unto the point, which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the weight of the Staff would bend it as it stuck, as it appeareth in this Battel of the *Helvetians*. This Weapon was peculiar to the *Romans*, and was called *Pilum*, as *Varron* noteth, of *Pilum* a Pestel, *Quod Hostes feriret ut pilum*. *Lipsius* finding that *Palmarem diametrum* was too great a thickness to be managed by any Man's hand, interpreteth it to be four Inches in Circuit, if the Staff were either round or square, for they had of both sorts, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description

The Roman Pile described.

Lib. 3. de militia Romana.



on by Polybius, either in Form or Weight. *Patricius* in his *Paralleli*, maketh the Staff to have *Palmarem diametrum* in the butt-end, but the rest of the Staff he maketh to decrease taper-wise, unto the head of Iron, where it hath the thickness of a Man's Finger; and so it answereth both in form and weight to a Pestel, as may be seen by the Figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. *Patricius* in that place setteth down four Discommodities of the Pile. First, a furious and hot spirited Enemy will easily prevent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and speedy close. And so we read that in the Battel which *Cæsar* had with *Ariovistus*, the Germans came so violently upon them, that the Soldiers cast away their Piles and betook them to their Swords. And likewise in that worthy Battel between *Cataline* and *Marcus Petreius*, they cast away their Piles on either part. The second Discommodity was, that the Piles being so heavy could not be cast any distance, but were only serviceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aim, or as they say, point-blank. And lastly, The Soldiers were to take advantage of Ground backward when they threw them: Which might easily disorder their Troops, if they were not very well experienced.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

THE last thing which I observe in this speciality is, That the Legionary Soldiers had no other offensive Weapon but one Pile or two at the most, and their Swords. By which it may be gathered that all their Victories came by buckling at handy-blows; For they came always so near before they cast their Pile, that they left themselves no more time than might conveniently serve them to draw their Swords: Neither would their Arms of defence, which was compleat, besides a large Target which they carried on their Left Arm, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase, whensoever a light-armed Enemy did make any speedy Retreat; as will more plainly appear by that which followeth.

### CHAP. IX.

The *Helvetians* fainting in the Battel, retire to a Hill: The *Romans* follow after, and the Battel is continued.

*Cæsar.* IT was a great hindrance to the Galls in their Fight, that many of their Targets were struck through, and tied together with one fall of a Pile: For so it happened that it could neither be pulled out, by reason of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they use their Left-hand for the defence of themselves. Whereby it fell out that many of them (after a wearisome Toil) did cast away their Targets, and fought naked and unarmed. At length, fainting with Wounds, they began to give place, and retreated to a Hill a Mile off.

The Hill being taken, and the Legions following on to drive them from thence, the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, to the number of Fifteen Thousand, being in the Rere of the Enemy, to guard the lag of their Army, setting on our Men as they were in pursuit of the rest, did charge them upon the open side, and began to inclose them about: Which the *Helvetians* that had got the Hill perceiving, began again to fall upon our Men, and renewed the Battel. The *Romans* dividing themselves, turned their Ensigns two ways; the first and second Army fought against the *Helvetians* that returned from the Hill; and the third

Battel took Charge of them that stood ready to enclose them about. And here the Fight was doubtful and furious for a long time; until at length they were no longer able to endure the violence of the Legionary Soldiers: And so one part betook themselves as at the first to the Hill; and the other, to the place where their Carts and Baggage were lodged.

And hitherto there was not one Man seen to have turned his back in all this Conflict; although the Fight continued from the seventh hour until the Evening.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Concerning the Ensigns of the *Romans*, we are The Ensigns of the Romans. to understand that the chiefeft Ensign of every Legion was an Eagle, which always attended upon the Primipile or chief Centurion of the said Legion. The Ensign of a Maniple was either a Hand or a Dragon, a Wolf or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the Testimony of History) by the Column of *Trajan* in *Rome*, wherein the Ensigns are figured with such Pourtraictures: So that these Ensigns resembling the proportions of living Creatures, had their Fore-parts always carried that way which the Legions were to March, or where they were to Fight. And therefore in this History, by the aspect and carrying of the Ensigns, the Front of the Army was commonly noted; as in this place it is said, that the Ensigns of the first and second Battel were carried towards the Hill, whither the *Helvetians* had made their Retreat; and the Ensigns of the third Battel looked another way, towards the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, which stood on the foot of the Hill. By which is signified how the Legions were divided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning the time of the day, we are to understand that the *Romans* used not the same division of the day as we commonly do: For they divided their artificial (which is the space between Sun-rising and setting) into twelve equal parts, which the Astronomers called unequal or Planetary hours. The first hour of the day began always at Sun-rising; the sixth hour was always high Noon; and the twelfth hour was Sun-setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these hours were either greater or less: Neither did they agree with equal or equinoctial hours, such as are now used, but only at the *Æquinoctium*: So that by this manner of reckoning, *Ab hora septima ad vespertum* is meant, the Battel began about one of the Clock, according to our Computation, and continued until the Evening. The like we must understand throughout this whole History, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

The division of their Day.

### CHAP. X.

The *Helvetians* continue their Fight at the Carriages: But at length they leave the Field, and march towards *Langres*.

IN like manner the Fight was kept on Foot at the Carriages, until it was far in the Night; the place being fortified with Carts instead of a Rampier: And the Enemy casting their Weapons from the upper ground, and with Darts and Javelins under the Waggon, and from between the Wheels, did wound and gall many of our Men. After a long Conflict our Soldiers took their Carriages and

*Cæsar.*



Langres.

and their Camp; wherein Orgetorix's Daughter and one of his Sons were taken. There were saved out of that Battel about one hundred and thirty thousand Persons; who marching continually all that Night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the Confines of the Lingones: for by reason of the Soldiers Hurts, and the Burial of the Slain, wherein there was, spent three days, there was no pursuit after them.

## OBSERVATION.

IF we consider the nature of the Action, and look into the true cause of their Overthrow, as far as the right sense of the History shall direct our Judgment, we shall find Valour not to be wanting in the Helvetians, but rather superlatively abounding in the Romans. For that vehement Opinion of their Valour and Manhood, which carried them out of the straits of the Country to seek larger Fortunes in other Kingdoms, was not so abated with the loss of the fourth part of their Army at the River Arar, nor with the terrible Fury of those Veterane Legions; but it yielded this effect, which Cæsar in his estimate of Valour thought memorable, that for five hours space or more there was not one Man seen to have turned his back. Their manner of Imbattelling, had not the Romans been the Enemy, was unresistable. For being cast into a Phalanx, which in the Plains of Asia had made Alexander the Great and the Macedonians famous, they did as far surpass any other Form of embattelling (supposing that the Conveniency of the Place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is divided into many particulars, as the Violence of a great Body exceedeth the Force and Motion of his Parts, when it is divided into smaller Cantons. For as in a Phalanx many particular Souldiers are by a close and compact Order incorporated into one entire Body; so their several Vertues are gathered into one Head, and are as parts united into one general Force; which easily swalloweth up the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally divided.

The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the Romans, both in Front and Flank, was able, in an indifferent Conflict to have made Fortune fugitive, and bear Arms on their side; or at the least so to have stemmed the swelling Tide of Victory, which carried the Romans so violently in the chase, that they might have been equal sharers in the Honour of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of Valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, until it came to that height which true Valour and unexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this Courage could not so allay the heat of the Helvetians Fury, but it brake forth into dangerous Flames, when it came to the place where their Carriages were laid, and cost much Blood and many Mens Lives before they quitted the Place: For they fought with that Spirit and Industry, as though they meant to make Tryal whether their Fortune would prove no better in the Night, than it had done in the day.

Periculum  
semper ab  
hostibus gra-  
vissimum su-  
binet divisus  
& inordinatus  
exercitus.

The Overthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the River Arar proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the less to be marvelled at, considering they had no chief Commander as we read of) than from any defect of Valour: For the Rules of Military Government require especial care in passing over a Water; For then especially an Army is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and divided. And therefore the Romans

achieved this Victory by the horrible vigilancy (as Tully calleth it) of their Commander, who always watched *opportunitates rei bene gerende*, as necessary and speedy means to overcome in all his Wars.

## CHAP. XI.

Cæsar, after three days respite, followeth after the Helvetians: He taketh them to Mercy, and sendeth them back again to their Country.

Cæsar sent Letters and Messengers to the Lingones, forbidding to supply them either with Corn or any other thing; which if they did, he would esteem of them as of the Helvetians. Himself, after three days respite, followed after with all his Forces. The Helvetians, pressed with the want of all necessary Provisions, sent Commissioners unto him to treat of their Rendition. Who meeting him on the way, cast themselves at his Feet, and with humble Words and Tears desired Peace. Being commanded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obeyed. Cæsar being come up unto them, required Hostages, together with their Arms and Servants; as also the Fugitives that were fled unto them.

Cæsar.

While those things were sought out and brought, in the Night time, six Thousand Men, or thereabouts of the Canton called Verbigene, whether moved through fear of being executed after their Arms were given up, or induced with hope of escaping (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of People that were there to be rendred, their flight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the Night leave the Helvetian Camp, and made towards the Rhine, and the Confines of the Germans.

Cæsar understanding through whose Territories they passed, Commanded them to seek them out, and bring them back again, if they would be blameless in that behalf: And being brought back, dealt with them as Enemies. All the rest, after Hostages, Arms, and Fugitives were given in, he received to Mercy; and commanded the Helvetians, Tulinges, and Latobriges to return into their Country, from whence they came. And forasmuch as having lost all their Provision of Corn, there remained nothing at home to satisfy Hunger, he gave order to the Allobroges to supply them with Corn; and willed the Helvetians to re-edifie their Towns and Cities, that they had before destroyed and forsaken. Which he did specially for this cause; that the Germans inhabiting beyond the Rhine might not be invited with the richness of that Soil, to seat themselves so near Neighbours to the Province of Gallia, and the Allobroges. The Boii, at the Mediation of the Hedunians, as knowing them to be Men of great Valour, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gave Lands and Possessions, and received them into the same Liberties and Immunities as they themselves enjoyed.

In the Helvetian Camp was found a List, or Register, writ in Greek, and brought to Cæsar, containing by Pole the whole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to bear Arms: And in like manner the Boys, Old Men and Women were enrolled apart by themselves, the Summary whereof was, that the whole number of the Helvetians amounted to Two Hundred Sixty Three Thousand, the Tulinges to Thirty Six Thousand, the Latobriges to Fourteen, the Rauracks to Twenty Three, the Boii to Thirty Two. Of these there were that bare Arms One Hundred Ninety Two Thousand. The total of all were three Hundred sixty eight Thousand. A view being taken by Cæsar's appointment of those that returned home, there were found one Hundred and ten Thousand.

O B-



## OBSERVATION.

**T**He directions concerning their rendry and return were very sound, and of good consequence. For first, in that he commanded them to attend his coming in the place where they were, he took away all motions of new Trouble, which often removes might have caused, by the opportunity of some Accident which might have happened: Assuring himself that their Abode in that Place would increase their Miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of Peace which they made shew of; considering that the *Lingones*, in whose Territories they were, durst not for fear of *Cæsars* displeasure furnish them with any Necessaries in that Extremity. Touching the security which the *Romans* required of the Loyalty of such People as they conquered, their manner was to take as Hostages a sufficient number of the Men-Children of the chiefest Men of that Nation; whose Lives depended upon their Parents Fidelity, and ended with the first suspicion of their Rebellion. Which Custom, besides the present good, promised the like or better Security to the next Age; when as those Children by Conversation and Acquaintance should be so affected to the *Roman* Empire, that returning to their own Country, their Actions might rather tend to the Advancement thereof, than any way be prejudicial to the same. And lest the love of Liberty and Freedom should prevail more with them, than that Affection which Nature had enjoined them to bear to their Children; he did what he could to take away the Means and Instruments of their Rebellion, by causing them to deliver up such Arms and Weapons as were there present: And so to become suitable to that Petition of Peace which they had made.

The sum of all is this; he corrected the Insolency of a furious People, and reduced them to a feeling of their own Madnes. He kept them from sacking the Possessions of many Thousands in the Continent of *Gallia*, and sent them back again to continue their Name and Nation in the place where they first inhabited; which continueth unto this day. And thus we see that there is no humour so head-strong, nor so backt with strength of Circumstances, but it may meet with a Remedy to qualifie the insolency thereof, and make it subject to Correction and Controulment.

## C H A P. XII

The States of *Gallia* congratulate *Cæsar's* Victory: they call a Council, and discover their inward Grief concerning *Ariovistus* and his Forces.

*Cæsar.*

**T**He Helvetian War being thus ended, the Princes and chief Men of all the States of *Gallia* came to *Cæsar*, to congratulate the happiness of this Victory; insomuch as they well understood, that albeit the People of *Rome* had by the course of this War revenged the injuries which heretofore they had done unto them: Yet nevertheless the Issue thereof did redound no less profitable to the peace of *Gallia*, than to the *Roman* Empire; forasmuch as the *Helvetians* left their Houses and Country abounding with all plenty and prosperity, for no other purpose but to invade the whole Country of *Gallia*, and to bring it in Subjection to themselves; and choosing out of that large Continent some fit and fruitful Place of Habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries. They required further, that with his good leave they might call a general Assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of *Gallia*, foras-

much as they had matters of great Importance to be handled, which they desired (with a common consent) to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by Oath not to reveal the causes of their Assembly, but to such as should be designed by common Council.

The Parliament being broken up, the same Princes returned to *Cæsar*, and desired that they might in secret treat with him of the safety of themselves, and all the rest: which being granted, they cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feet, contending with a great earnestness, that those things which they delivered might not be revealed, as they did to have their petition granted: Forasmuch as they saw that the discovery of such Declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull upon them most grievous Afflictions.

*Divitiacus* the *Heduan*, in the name of the rest, delivered, That *Gallia* was divided into two Factions: The *Hedui* were the Head of the One, and the *Arveni* of the Other. These two States contending many years for the Principality, the *Arveni* with the *Sequans* their Clients, hired the *Germans* to take their part; of whom at first there passed over the *Rhine* some Fifteen Thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous People having tasted the Plenty and Civility of the *Galls*, drew over many more, that now there were no less than One Hundred and Twenty Thousand. With these the *Hedui* and their Clients had once or oftener fought; but the Success sorted to their own Calamity, and the utter Overthrow of their Nobility and Senate: With which Losses they were so broken and decayed, that whereas heretofore as well by their own Credit, as by the Favour of the People of *Rome*, they struck a great Stroke throughout all *Gallia*; they were now driven to deliver the chiefest of their State as Pledges to the *Sequans*, and to bind themselves by Oath never to seek their release or freedom, nor to implore the Aid of the People of *Rome*, nor to seek means to free themselves from their Sovereignty; only himself of all the *Heduians* could not be brought to take that Oath, or to give his Children as Hostages: For which cause he fled to *Rome*, and besought help of the Senate, being no way obliged to the contrary either by Oath or Hostages.

But it so fell out, that the Victory became more grievous to the *Sequans* than to the *Heduians*: For that *Ariovistus* King of the *Germans* was planted in their Territories; and being already possessor of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all *Gallia*, did now require the *Sequans* to forego another third Part, for that a few Months before there were come unto him Twenty Four Thousand *Harudes*, to whom Lands and Possessions were to be allotted. Whereby it would come to pass within a few Years that all the *Galls* would be driven out of their Dwellings, and all the *Germans* would come over the *Rhine*; for there was no comparison between *Gallia* and *Germany*, either in richness of Soil or fashion of Life.

Concerning *Ariovistus*, after he had once defeated the *Galls* in a Battel near *Amagetobrig*, he carried himself very cruelly and insolently, requiring the Children of all the Nobility for Hostages, and shewing strange Examples of torture upon them. If any thing were done not according to his Command or Desire, he would easily shew himself to be a barbarous, fierce, and hasty Man, whose Tyranny they could no longer endure: And unless there were help to be found in *Cæsar* and the People of *Rome*, all the *Galls* must, as the *Helvetians* did, forsake their Country, and seek new houses and seats of Habitation, far remote from the *Germans*, and try their Fortunes, whatever besel them. If these things should haply be discovered to *Ariovistus*, he would doubtless take a severe Revenge of all the Pledges in his Custody. *Cæsar* might by his own Authority, or the Presence of his Army, or by the Re-

nown



nown of his late Victory, or by the Countenance of the People of Rome, keep the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the Injuries of Ariovistus. This Speech being delivered by Divitiacus, all that were present with much weeping besought Cæsar to give them Relief.

Cæsar observed that only the Sequans of all the rest did no such matter, or were so affected as the others were; but with their heads hanging down, looked mournfully upon the Ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorrow. And having oftentimes iterated his demand, without gaining any word of answer; Divitiacus the Heduan replied, That the state of the Sequans was herein more miserable and grievous than the rest; that they of all others durst not complain, or implore aid, although it were in secret, as having before their Eyes the Cruelty of Ariovistus being absent, no less than if he were present. And the rather, for that other Men had safe means of flying away; but the Sequans, having received Ariovistus into their Country, and made him Master of their Towns, were necessarily to undergo all Miseries.

These things being known, Cæsar encouraged the Galls with good words, and promised them to have a care of that matter, as having great hope that by his means and power Ariovistus should be forced to offer no further Injuries. And thereupon dismissed the Council.

## OBSERVATIONS.

IN this Relation there are divers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such as are willing to be directed by other Mens Misadventures. As first, into what Extremities Ambition doth drive her thirsty Favourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the Soul, and setting such unbridled Motions on foot, as carry Men headlong into most desperate Attempts. For as it had deserved Commendation in either Faction, so to have carried their Emulation, that by their own means and strength applied to the Rule of good Government, their Authority might wholly have swayed the Inclination of the weaker States; so was it most odious in the *Sequani* to call in foreign Forces, to satisfy the Appetite of their untempered humour; and in the end they were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is to make a Stranger a Stickler in a Quarrel which civil Dissention hath broached, when the Party that called him in shall not be able to refuse his assistance upon occasion, as he was willing to entertain it for advantage.

Lastly, the often discontents of these States shew the force of a present Evil, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the Soul, that any other Calamity, either already past, or yet to come, how great soever, seemeth tolerable and easie, in regard of that smart which the present Grief inflicteth.

So the *Sequani* chose rather to captivate their liberty to the Barbarism of a savage Nation, than to endure the *Hedui* to take the hand of them. And again to make themselves Vassals to the *Romans*, rather than endure the usurping Cruelty of the *Germans*. And finally (as the Sequel of the History will discover) to hazard the loss of Life and Country, than to suffer the Taxes and Impositions of the *Romans*. So predominant is the present Evil in Mens Affections, and so it prevaileth at the Seat of our Judgment.

## C H A P. XIII.

The Reasons that moved Cæsar to undertake this War.

Many were the inducements which moved him to take that business to Heart. As first, That the *Heduns*, who were oftentimes stiled by the Senate with the Title of Brethren, Cousins and Allies, were in the servitude and thraldome of the Germans, and that their Hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequans: Which in so great a sovereignty of the People of Rome, he took to be very dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. As also for that he saw it very dangerous for the Roman Empire, that the Germans should accustom by little and little to flock in such multitudes into Gallia. Neither did he think he could moderate or restrain such fierce and barbarous People; but that having possessed all the Continent of Gallia, they would, as the *Cimbri* and *Teutons* had done before, break out into the Province, and so into Italy: especially the Sequans, being divided from the Province but with the River Rhone.

These things he thought fit with all speed to prevent: And the rather, for that Ariovistus was grown to that Pride and Arrogancy, as was not to be suffered. For which respect he thought it expedient to send Embassadors unto him, to appoint some indifferent place for Parlee; for that he had to treat with him concerning publick Affairs, and some matters that did much import both of them.

## OBSERVATIONS.

I May here take an occasion to speak somewhat concerning the Authority of the Roman Generals, which we see to be very large; considering that Cæsar of himself, without any further leave of the Senate and People of Rome (for what may be gathered by this History) did undertake a War of that consequence, and put in Jeopardy the Legions, the Province, or what other interest the *Romans* had in Gallia.

The authority of the Roman Generals.

Wherein we are to understand, that when the State of Rome did allot the Government of any Province to a Pro-consul, they did likewise recommend unto him the careful managing of such Accidents as might any way concern the good of that Regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well-ordered Government, are as well external and foreign, as internal and bred within the Bounds of that Empire: It had been to small purpose to have given him only Authority to maintain a course of wholesom Government at home, and no means to take away such Oppositions which foreign Accident might set up against him. And so we see that Cæsar undertook the *Helvetian* War, in regard of the safety of the Province: And this again with Ariovistus, lest the Germans should so multiply in Gallia, that the Province it self might at length be endangered, Neither had their Generals authority only to undertake these Wars; but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to Treat, Capitulate, Compound, or what else they thought convenient for the advancement of the Commonwealth, did wholly rest upon their direction; *republica bene gesta* being the stile of the Warrant for all their Actions.

Neither may we think that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerful in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commandeth without Controlment, and proceedeth according to the opportunity of Time and Occasion,



Liv. lib. 8.

sion, further than either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman Affairs were distressed, and driven to an exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute Command, that whatsoever Power rested either in the Consuls or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the People, it gave way to the greatness of that Magistrate; that there might be no lett or retracting Power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute Command could establish for the good of the Commonwealth. And yet notwithstanding this absolute Government, they attributed such Power to the course of humane Actions, that by the Punishment which they inflicted upon dissolute and unfortunate Leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no Man, how circumspect soever, could promise more than likelihoods or probabilities of good Fortune, as far forth as his means and industry could achieve it. For old M. Fabius pleading for the Life of his gallant Son, and opposing the rigour of Papirius the Dictator with examples of Antiquity, saith, *Populi quidam, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem unquam atrociorē fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam ut pecunia eos multaret: Capite acquisitum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse.* The People, saith he, in whom the sovereign Power of things consisteth, never shewed greater displeasure against such as had lost an Army either by rashness or unskilfulness, than imposing a fine upon them: But to bring the Life of a General in question for failing in his Endeavours, was never heard of to that day.

Lib. 3. de bello Civili.

The condition of the inferiour Officers of their Camp was far otherwise in regard of Military Discipline: For prescription guided them in all their Services, and the chiefest part of their duty was Obedience; although they saw evident reason to the contrary, and found their directions imperfect in that behalf: And therefore Caesar saith upon that occasion, *Alia sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad prescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a Legate or Lieutenant differeth from that of a General: The one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoever may concern the cause. And this course the Romans held concerning the authority of their Generals.

## C H A P. XIV.

*Ariovistus's Answer.* A second Embassage, with the success thereof.

Caesar.

**T**O that Embassage Ariovistus answered; That if his occasions had required Caesar's Assistance, he would have furthered them with his own Presence: And he thought it as reasonable, that if it were in his hand to pleasure the Romans, Caesar ought not to think much of the like labour. For his own part, he durst not come into those Parts of Gallia which Caesar possessed, without an Army; nor could he draw an Army to a head without great Trouble and Expence. The thing that he most wondered at was, That the Romans or Caesar had to do in that part of Gallia, which the law of Arms had made his Inheritance.

Upon the return of this answer Caesar framed a second Embassage, the purport whereof was; Forasmuch as he thus requited the Honour wherewith the People of Rome had beautified his best Dignity (for in Caesar's Consulship the authority of their Empire

had vouchsafed to esteem of him as a King in his Dominions, and as a Friend unto their State) and that he disdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the common Good; let him know that these were the things that he required to be performed by him: First, That he should not suffer any more Troops of Germans to be Transported over the Rhine into Gallia. Secondly, That he should deliver up those Hostages which he had of the Heduians and Sequans, and should cease to molest them further with War or other Injuries. These things, if he did perform, Caesar would assure him of a grateful acceptance on the behalf of the People of Rome: Otherwise, forasmuch as in the Consulships of M. Messala and L. Piso the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtain the Government of the Province, should, as near as it would stand with the good of the Commonwealth, endeavour the defence of their Associates and Friends, he would not neglect the Injuries done unto the Heduians.

To these Mandates Ariovistus replied: The Law of Arms kept this tenure amongst all Nations, That a Conqueror might Govern a subdued People according as he thought best for his own safety. The People of Rome did not direct the course of their Government by another Man's prescript, but by their own Arbitrement: And as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The Heduians having tried the fortune of War, were by right become his Stipendaries; wherein Caesar offered great Wrong, for that his coming thither had made their Tribute much less unto him than before. Touching their Hostages, his purpose was still to retain them. Neither would he make any unjust War upon any of their Associates, if they observed the Articles of Agreement, and paid their yearly Tribute: But if they failed in that, the Fraternity of the Romans would come too late to their succour. If Caesar would needs undertake their Quarrel, he was to let him know, that no Man ever contended with Ariovistus but to his own destruction. Try when he would, he should find what Valour consisted in the Germans, that for fourteen Years space never were covered with other Roof than the Heavens.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**A**ND thus far proceeded Caesar with Ariovistus, in debating the Wrongs and Grievances of the Hedui. Wherein appeareth the difference between a matter handled according to Moral Civility, in terms of Mildness and pleasing Accent, and that which is rudely delivered, and dependeth rather upon the plainness of the Project, than suited with words fit for perswasion. For that which Ariovistus alledged to make good his Interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason as any thing to the contrary urged by Caesar.

But as the Lacedaemonians said of one, That he spake the Truth otherwise than it should be spoken: So it may be said of Ariovistus's Answer, that it wanted that sweetning Humanity which giveth credit to verity it self, forasmuch as it proceedeth from a well-tempered Spirit, wherein no turbulent Passion seemeth to controul the force of Reason, nor hinder the Sentence of true Judgment; but rather seasoning her Conceptions with Humility, doth covertly complain of open wrong, and strengthen her Assertions with a pleasing delivery. And therefore how great soever the Controversie be, that Party which exceedeth not the bounds of Modesty, but maketh Mildness his chiefest Advocate, will so prevail in any Auditory, that albeit Equity doth disallow her Title, yet the



the manner of his Carriage will clear him from offering wrong, in that he useth the sequels of Innocency to prove his Interest in that which he demandeth. But to leave this Circumstance, as only to be noted, let us proceed to the War it self, which I made the second part of this History.

### CHAP. XV.

The Treviri bring News of one hundred Townships of the Suevi that were come to the Rhine. Cæsar taketh in Besançon: His Soldiers are surpris'd with an extream fear of the Germans.

Cæsar.

**A**T the same time that this answer was returned to Cæsar, there came likewise Embassadors from the Heduians and Trevires. The Heduians complained that the Harudes lately transported into Gallia, did depopulate and waste their Borders, and that they could not buy their peace of Ariovistus with giving of Hostages for their Allegiance. The Trevires brought News of one hundred Townships of the Suevi that were come to the River Rhine, to seek a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimberius, two Brethren. Whereat Cæsar being exceedingly moved, thought his best means of prevention to consist in Celerity, lest the difficulty of resisting should grow greater, when those new Forces of the Suevi were joyned with the Power which was already with Ariovistus. And therefore having provided Corn, he made hast to seek the Germans. And having gone three days Journey on his way, he had Intelligence that Ariovistus with all his Forces was gone to take in Besançon, the greatest Town of the Sequans; and that he was three days Journey on his way already.

Le Doux.

Cæsar knowing how much it imported him to prevent that disadvantage (forasmuch as the Town abounded with all necessary Provisions for War; and was so situate that he that commanded it might prolong the War at his own pleasure; being encircled with the River Alduabis, excepting a small space of six hundred Foot, which was Fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foot whereof did at each end joyn unto the River, and the Hill strengthened with a Wall, and so joyned to the Town) made all the hast he could to take the Town, and there left a Garrison. And as he rested there a few days, to make Provision of Corn and other Necessaries, the Romans enquiring of the Gauls and Merchants concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were Men of a huge Stature, of Courage invincible, and of great Practice and Experience in Feats of Arms; whereof the Gauls had oftentimes made Trial: For when they encountred them, they were not able to endure so much as the Sternness of their Countenance or the fierceness of their Looks. The whole Army conceived such a fear thereat, that all Mens Minds were wonderfully appalled. This fear began first amongst the Tribunes and Commanders of Horse, and such others as for friendship sake followed Cæsar from Rome, and had small or no skill in matter of War. These Men feigning some one excuse and some another, of very earnest business which called them home, desired leave to depart. Some others, whom shame would not suffer to forsake the Camp, bewrayed the like Passion in their Countenances and Behaviour: for hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their Destiny secretly to themselves, or otherwise with their Acquaintance and familiar Friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into; so that throughout the whole Camp there was nothing but making and signing

of Testaments. And through the talk and fearfulness of these Men, the old Soldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Camp, began by little and little to apprehend the terror wherewith the rest were amazed: And those that would seem to be less fearful, said, they feared not the Enemy, but the narrowness of the Ways, and the greatness of the Woods that were between them and Ariovistus; or otherwise they cast doubts where they might have Provision of Corn. And many stuck not to tell Cæsar, that whensoever he should give Commandment to march forward, or advance the Standards, the Soldiers would refuse to do it.

### OBSERVATION.

**W**Herein for that we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that Courage which a late-gotten Victory doth usually breed in noble Spirits; it will not be amiss a little to insist upon the quality of the accident, and to gather such brief Instructions from their Weakness, as may best serve to qualifie the amazement of horror, and mitigate the phrensie of so violent a Passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature cannot promise any such Learning, as may discover the true means and secret motions whereby a fore-conceived fear doth trouble the Senses, and astonish the Mind; yet since the History offereth it to our scanning, give me leave only to note the strangeness of the circumstance, and rudely to delineate the Portraicture of a Beast oftener seen than well known, using the unweildy Pile for my Pencil, and suiting my Speech to a Warlike Auditory. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the Senses receive Intelligence of an eminent Evil, which may either dispossess the Soul of this Earthly Mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth, the Spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their Sovereign Mistress, retire themselves into the inner Cabinets and more secret Pavilions of the Body, where the chiefest part of the Soul is most resident; and so they leave the Frontier Quarters of her Kingdom naked and ungarrisoned, the better to strengthen that Capital City of the Heart, out of which the Life cannot fly, but to the utter ruine and destruction of the whole Body. For fear is not only a perturbation of the Soul proceeding from the opinion it hath of some Evil to come; but it is also a contraction and closing up of the Heart, when the Blood and the Spirits are recalled from the outward Parts to assist that place which giveth Life and Motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of Humours and Spirits when the multiplicity of Faculties (which otherwise require an orderly distinction in their Service, and by the order of nature should be disposed into several Instruments, and be dilated throughout the Body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the Mind which presently rise from these advertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many several Properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our Judgment, or examined by reason, for want of that orderly uniformity of place which nature requireth in the powers of the Mind. And hence proceedeth that amazement and astonishment, which so daunteth the Hearts of Men, when they are taken with this Passion, that because the Soul giveth no Counsel, the Body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremity of the Perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the Spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour, in an Overthrow which he had given him by



by the *Hagarens*, was stricken with such an excessive Fear, that he could not betake himself to flight (*Adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat*) until One of his chief Commanders shaking him by the Shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep Sleep, threatened him with present Death, if he would not prevent the Ruin of the Empire, by using that means which was only left for his Safety.

Again if in that turbulent Consistory the Spirits chance distinctly to receive any Apprehension proceeding from the forging Faculty of the Soul, they carry it presently to Execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the Action with such Vehemency, that they leave no Place for better Advice and Consideration. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremity of Fear, to avoid one Evil, we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater Danger in the means we use to avoid a less; because Reason did not first try the Apprehension, before it was delivered to external Agents. And so we find in the Battel between *Germanicus* and the *Almans*, that two gross Troops of Soldiers were driven into such an Ecstasie of Fear, that taking contrary Courses to avoid one and the same Danger, they either of them fled to that place which the other had quitted: Neither could they be advised by each others flight, that the Places which they sought after afforded them no Remedy.

And albeit Reason be called to Counsel when a Parley is summoned of Composition, yet it beareth so small a Sway in the Consultation, that the Will of it self concludeth to betray Vertue to Dishonour, and so to purchase Peace with the Loss of the Soul's chiefeft Treasure: Which ought ever to be estimated at a higher rate than any other Happiness which can betide the Mind. For among all the sensible things of this World, there is no Creature that hath such a confused Fear, or is more amazed therewith, than Man is: Neither is there any Misery greater, or any Bondage more shameful, servile or vile, than this, which maketh Men very Abjects of all other Creatures, to redeem the Evil which the Danger threateneth: And then doth Shame follow after so base a Part, and aggravate the Burthen of the Sin with loathsom Disgrace, and penitent Discontentment; adding oftentimes Aloes to Wormwood, and making the End more grievous than the Beginning. And thus doth Danger breed Fear, and Fear yieldeth to Dishonour, and Dishonour bringeth Shame, and Shame being always mingled with Wrath and Anger, revengeth it self upon it self, and bringeth more Peril than the first Danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth that as the Affections of the Mind are bred one of another; so on the contrary part some are bridled and restrained by others: For as Envy, Hatred and Anger rise oftentimes of Love; so is Joy lessened with Grief, Envy with Mercy, and Fear with Shame.

But forasmuch as all such Perturbations proceed of Ignorance and Inconsiderateness, whereby we think that the Evil is greater than indeed it is; let us consider what disposition of our Judgment best moderateth the violent Heat of these Affections. And first, touching the Passages whereby the Soul receiveth her Advertisements, as they are of divers Natures, the chiefeft whereof are the Eye and the Ear, so are their avisoes different in Quality, and require a severall Consideration to be rightly discerned. The Intelligence by the Eye is more certain than that which cometh by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the Eye is a Witness it self of every Action whereof it taketh Notice, neither is it deceived in its proper Object: And therefore

the Judgment is not much troubled to determine definitively how great or how small the Danger is, when the Relations carry always that certainty. And albeit the Ear in like manner be not deceived in her proper Object, for it faithfully giveth up that Sence which Sound hath delivered unto it; yet forasmuch as the Fantasie hath greater Scope to coin her vain Conceptions, in regard of the absence of the Action, it is necessary that the discourfing Faculty be called for an Assistant, before the Judgment can truly determine: And then it will appear that the Truth doth not always answer the Report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased Spirits will not stick to dilate or qualifie Relations, according to the Key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore this first cometh to be considered of in all such violent Commotions, by which of these two Senses the first Intelligence was received. But concerning the Judgment it self this is most certain, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the Flesh, the more violent are the Affections of the Soul. And again, the purer the Judgment is, and the higher it is lifted up from Earthly Natures, being no further interested therein than to hold a Resolution of well-doing, the fewer and lighter are the Affections which trouble and molest it: For then it better discerneth the Truth and Falsehood, good or evil that is in things.

To redress this Inconvenience, *Cæsar* betook himself to the fittest and most proper Remedy; which was by the Authority of his Speech to restore reason to her former Dignity, and by Discourse, which Fear had interrupted in them, to put down an usurping Passion, which had so troubled the Government of the Soul, recalling it to the mean of true Resolution, which was to moderate Audacity with Wariness, but not to choak Valour with beastly Cowardice: For these Oratory Inducing Perswasions were not the least Point of their Discipline; considering how they framed the inward Habit of the Mind (being the Fountain and Beginning of all Motion) to give Life and Force to those Actions, which the Severity of outward Discipline commanded. For as Laws and Constitutions of Men enforce Obedience of the Body: so Reason and Perswasions must win the Souls Consent according to that Saying, *Homines duci volunt, non cogi.*

#### C H A P. XVI.

*Cæsar's Speech to the Army concerning this Fear.*

**C**Æsar being informed of these things, called a *Cæsar* Council of War, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees or orders soever, unto the same. And being thus assembled, he greatly blamed them, First, that any should be so inquisitive, as to imagine to themselves whither, and upon what Service they were carried. Concerning *Ariovistus*, he had in the time of *Cæsar's* Consulship most earnestly sued for the Friendship of the People of Rome: And why then should any Man misdeem that he should so unadvisedly go back from his Duty? For his own part he was verily perswaded, that if *Ariovistus* once knew his Demands, and understood the reasonable Offers that he would make him, he would not easily reject his Friendship, or the Favour of the People of Rome. But if he were so mad as to make War upon them, why should they fear him? Or why should they despair either of their own Prowess, or of *Cæsar's* diligence? For if it came to that Point, the Enemy that they were to encounter had been tried what he could do twice before; first in the Memory of their Fathers,



Fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army merited no less Honour than the General: And now of late again in Italy, at the Insurrection of the Bondmen; who were not a little furthered through the Practice and Discipline they had learned of the Romans. Whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute; insomuch as whom for a time they feared without cause, being naked and unarmed, the same Men afterwards (although well armed and Conquerors withal) they nobly overcame. And to be short, these were no other Germans than those whom the Helvetians had vanquished in divers Conflicts; and not only in their own Country, where the Helvetians dwelt themselves, but also even at home at their own doors: And yet the same Helvetians were not able to make their Party good against our Armies.

If any Man were moved at the Flight and overthrow of the Gauls, upon inquiry he should find, that being wearied with continual Wars (after that Ariovistus had for many Months together kept himself within his Camp, in a Boggy and Fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of Battel, he suddenly set upon them as they were dispersed, and so overcame them, rather by Policy than by Force. Which although it took place against savage and unskilfull People, yet was not Ariovistus so simple as to think that he could ensnare our Armies with the like Subtilties. As for those that feigned the cause of their Fear to be the Difficulty of Provision of Corn, and the Dangerousness of the Way, they seemed very arrogant in their Conceits, in presuming to direct their General, as if he had not known what pertained to his Duty. The Sequans and Lingons had undertook that Charge; besides that Corn was almost ripe every where in the Fields: And what the Ways were should shortly be seen.

Whereas it was given out that the Soldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor advance their Standards, he little valued it; for he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their General, it was either because he was thought to be unfortunate in his Enterprizes, or else for that he was notoriously convicted of Avarice: But the whole Course of his life should witness his Innocency, and the Overthrow of the Helvetians his Happiness. And therefore that which he was minded to have put off for a longer time, he would now put in Execution out of Hand: For the Night following at the fourth Watch he would dislodge from thence; that without further delay he might understand, whether shame and respect of their Duty would prevail more with them, than Fear or Cowardice. And though he knew that no Man else would follow him, yet notwithstanding he would go with the tenth Legion alone, of whom he had no Doubt or Suspicion, and would take them as a Guard to his Person.

Cæsar had chiefly favoured this Legion, and put much trust in them for their Valour.

Upon the making of this Speech the Minds of all Men were wonderfully changed; for it bred in every one a great Alacrity and Desire to fight: Neither did the tenth Legion forget to give him thanks by their Tribunes for the good Opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readiness to set forward to the War. And then likewise the rest of the Legions made means by the Tribunes of the Soldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to give Cæsar satisfaction; protesting they neither doubted nor feared, nor gave any Censure of the Issue of that War, but always left it to the Wisdom of the General.

Their Satisfaction being taken, and a View being made of the Ways by Divitiacus (whom of all the Gauls he best trusted) and Report being by him made, that in fetching a Compass of fifty Miles he might carry his Army in open and Champaign Countries; in the fourth Watch of the Night, according to his former Saying, he set forward.

IN the Speech itself are presented many Remarkables, both concerning their Discipline and Military Instructions, which deserve Examination: amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Council; *Omnium Ordinum ad id Consilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: Whereas there were usually no more admitted to their Council of War but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first Orders; which I understand to be the first *Hastate*, the first *Princeps*, and the first *Pilum* of every Legion. And this is manifestly proved out of the fifth Commentary, where Cicero was besieged by *Ambiorix*: In which, amongst other, there were two valiant Centurions, *Pulsio* and *Varenius*, between whom there was every Year great Emulation for place of Preferment; *Et jam primis Ordinibus appropinquabant*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by Degrees through the lower orders of the Legion, and were very near the Dignity of the first Cohort, wherein, as in all the rest, there were three Maniples, and in every Manipule two Orders.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

THE first Motive which he useth to recall their exiled Judgment, discovered their Breach of Discipline: For contrary to the course of Military Government, they had presumed not only to make Inquiry, but to give out whether, and upon what Service they were carried; which in the Rigour of Camp-policy could not pass without due Punishment. For what can more contradict the Fortunate Success of an Expedition, than to suffer it to be measured with the vulgar Conceit, or weighed in the Balance of such false Judgments? Especially when those weak Censors are to be Actors and Executioners of the Design: For then every Man, will sute the Nature of the Action according to his own humour; although his humour be led with Blindness, and have no other Direction than an uncertain Apprehension of Profit or Disadvantage.

And in this case there cannot be a better president than Nature hath prescribed: For as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a Work of absolute Perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look upon, but yield themselves to be guided by a Moderator of infinite Knowledge: so ought a Multitude to submit their Ability to the Direction of some wise and prudent Captain, that beholdeth the Action in true Honour, and balanceth the loss of many Particulars with the Health and Safety of the publick Good. For if every Man should prescribe, who should obey? *Tam nescire quædam Milites, quam scire oportet*, saith Orho in Tacitus, upon the like Disorder: And again, *Parendo potius quam imperia Ducum sciscitando, Res militares continentur*. Which proveth that the greatest Vertue which is required in a Soldier is Obedience; as a thing wherein the Force of all Discipline consisteth.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

IN the reason which he useth to prove their disparity of Valour in regard of the Romans, who were superiour to the Helvetians that had oftentimes overthrown the Germans, he strengtheneth the Argument with the advantage of the Place, and saith that the Helvetians had worsted them, not only where the Helvetians dwelt themselves, but even in their own Country, and at home at their own doors: As though an Enemy were charged with greater Fury in the presence of a Mans own Coun-

Whether Men have greater Courage in their own or in a Strangers Country.



Country and dearest Friends; than in a strange and unknown Land.

This Question was handled in the *Roman* Senate by *Fabius Maximus*, and *Scipio* surnamed *Africanus*, when they sat in Counsel how to rid their Country of that subtle *Carthaginian*, that for Sixteen Years Space had fretted like a Canker the Beauty of *Italy*, wasted the Land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their Confederates, or alienated them from their Duty, overthrown their Armies, slain their Consuls, and threatned their imperial City with Ruin and Destruction. *Fabius*, upon the motion to make War in *Africk*, thought it agreeable to nature first to defend that which was their own, before they attempted other Mens Possessions: When Peace was established in *Italy*, then let War be set on foot in *Africk*; and first let them be without fear themselves, before they went about to terrifie others: For those Forces afforded little hope of Victory in another Kingdom, that were not able to free their own Country from so dangerous an Enemy. *Alcibiades* overthrew the *Athenian* Common-wealth with the like Counsel: And concerning *Hannibal*, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a forer Enemy in his own Country than in another Kingdom.

*Scipio* on the other side, carried on with the honour of so glorious an Enterprize, wanted neither Reasons nor Example to impugn *Fabius's* Authority: For he shewed that *Agathocles* the *Syracusan* King, being a long time afflicted with the *Punick* War, averted the *Carthaginian* from *Sicily* by transporting his Forces into *Africk*. But how powerful it was to take away fear by retorting danger upon the Oppressor, could there be a present Example than *Hannibal*? There was great difference in the nature of the Action, between the Spoil and Wast of a Stranger's Country, and to see their own native Country wasted with Sword and Destruction: *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti*. For he that invadeth another's Kingdom easily discovereth both the advantage which may be taken against the Enemy, and the Strength whereupon he resteth. And amongst the variable Events of War, many unexpected Occasions arise, which present Victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange Chances so alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these and the like Remonstrances this Question of no less doubt than importance was handled by two famous and worthy Captains, whose minds (as it seemed) were intangled with such particular Affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their own humour, than to determine in sincerity of Judgment upon what specialities the truth was grounded in the contrariety of their Positions. But to leave other Commodities or Disadvantages which were annexed unto either part, I will only set down some Reasons, to prove how Valour and Courage may either grow or be abated by the Accidents which rise in a War of that Nature. And first this cannot be denied, the Testimony of an infallible Truth being grounded upon the Property of Man's nature, that as advantage bringeth hope of Victory, and hope conceiveth such Spirits as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for is effected, and thereby the Courage becometh hardy and resolute in Victory: So on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed fear, and fear so checketh valour, and controulet the Spirits, that Vertue and Honour give place to Distrust, and yield up their Interest to such Directors as can afford nothing but diffidence and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied but he that setteth upon an Enemy in a strange Country, and so preventeth such Attempts as might be made upon his own Territories, hath that advantage which giveth life unto action, and stealeth his Enterprize with Resolution. For besides the commodity of leaving when he list, and proceeding as far forth as he shall find his means able to promote his Attempts, he knoweth that the strife and Controversie is not for his native Country, which he quietly enjoyeth, and is reserved at all times to entertain him, howsoever Fortune shall favour his designs: But for a Stranger's Kingdom, which his Ambition thirsteth after, wherein, forasmuch as the Riches and Wealth of that State are laid before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, every Mans Valour soareth at a high Pitch, and their Courage is increased, without any Trouble or Disturbance of the other Faculties of the Mind. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his own Kingdom, and in the sight of his Subjects have his Land consumed with Ruin and Destruction; the danger will so disturb the Powers of the Soul, that through the turbulent Disorder of the weaker Parts, the better Faculties will lose their Prerogative of advising how the Enemy may be best resisted, when as every Man shall apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceive the true means to avoid it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his Soul, as the Piety and Respect of aged Parents, the tender Affection towards Wife and Children, are sufficient to raise Valour to the highest point of Resolution; yet the Motives are of such Weight, as will rather make them diffident of their own worth, as insufficient to maintain so great a cause, than hold them in that Resolution which true Honour affecteth: Forasmuch as the Terrour and Fear of so great a Danger will present a greater measure of Woes to their Mind, than the hope of Victory can afford them Joy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference between him that seeketh to maintain that Estate which he hath in possession by Force of Arms, and another that seeketh to increase his Means by Valour. For the former is presented with the danger of losing all his Estate; which affrighteth and troubleth, having no other Reward propounded unto him: And the other looketh upon the advantage which he gaineth by overcoming, which much increaseth his Valour, without any Loss or Disadvantage, if he chance to be worsted. And therefore there is always great Odds between him that hath already lost his Goods, and is by that means become desperate, having nothing further to lose; and another that yet keepeth his Substance, but is in danger to lose it: For Fear will so dismay his Mind, that he will rather distrust his own Ability, than entertain a Resolution of Valour.

To prove this, we need not seek other Examples than those imperial Cities in whose cause this controversy was first moved. For when *Hannibal* was come into *Italy*, and had defeated *Sempronius* the Consul at *Trebia*, the *Romans* were driven into such an Ecstasie of Terrour, that they believed verily that the Enemy was then coming to assault the City; neither had they any hope or aid in themselves to keep or defend the same. On the other side, *Scipio* was no sooner landed in *Africk*, but there was such a Tumult in *Carthage*, as though the City had been already taken: neither could the opinion of Victory, which *Hannibal* by a conquering Army in *Italy* had confirmed for sixteen Years together, prevail in the apprehension of so imminent a danger. And then that which *Fabius* borrowed of Nature to teach the *Romans* (that



first Men ought to defend their own, before they seek other Mens Possessions) was carefully followed by the *Carthaginians*: For with all speed they sent for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*, to be their Champion against young *Scipio*. If therefore other things be correspondent (as there are many other particularities concerning the Power and Strength of either Nation to be considered) I take it much better for a Prince to invade an Enemy in his own Country, than to attend him at home in his own Kingdom.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

THE last Circumstance which I note in this Speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth Legion, being in it self peradventure as faulty as any other: Wherein he shewed great Art and singular Wisdom. For he that hath once offended, and is both burdened with the guilt of Conscience and upbraided with the reproach of Men, can hardly be perswaded that his Fault can be purged with any Satisfaction. And although the Punishment be remitted, yet the Memory of the Fact will never be blotted out with any vertuous Action, but still remaineth, to cast Dishonour upon the Offender, and to accuse him of Disloyalty.

And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an Error being once rashly committed, through Despair of Remission admitteth no true Penitency, but either draweth on more grievous Crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere Scelus tuendum est*; or maintaineth his error by wilful Obstinacy: As it is said of the Lion, that being found by Hunters in a Cave, he will rather die in the place than quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of Refuge; and therefore his property is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cæcus, exeundo protervus*. This did *Cæsar* wisely prevent, by clearing the tenth Legion of that of which he accused the rest of the Army; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, inasmuch as they were witness to themselves of a common Error: And the other Legions envying at their Fortune, resolved to shew as great alacrity in the Sequel of the War, and to deserve more than the Judgment of the Emperour had imputed to their Fellows.

C H A P. XVII.

The Treaty between *Cæsar* and *Ariovistus*.

*Cæsar.*

THE seventh day as he continued on his March, his Spies brought him word that *Ariovistus* with all his Forces was within twenty four Miles of that Place: Who as soon as he understood of *Cæsar's* coming, sent Embassadors unto him, declaring that forasmuch as he was come somewhat nearer, and that he might do it without danger, he was content to admit of a Parley. *Cæsar* refused not the offer, thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his own accord what he had formerly denied at *Cæsar's* request: And thereby was in good hope that understanding what was required, he would in the end consider of the many Favours he had received from the People of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The fifth day following was appointed for the Treaty. In the mean time there passed often Messages reciprocally between them. *Ariovistus* required that *Cæsar* would not bring any Footmen to the Parley, for that he feared to be circumvented by Treachery; and therefore thought fit that either Party should come only with their Cavalry: Otherwise he would not give a meeting.

*Cæsar*, not willing to put off the Treaty for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himself in trust to the French Horse, thought it most convenient to leave the French Riders behind him, and to set the Soldiers of the tenth Legion (whom he best trusted) upon their Horses; that, if he stood in need, he might have a faithful Guard of his Friends about him. Whereupon one of the Soldiers said prettily, That *Cæsar* had done more for them than he had promised; for he had said before, he would make the tenth Legion as a Guard to his Person, and now, he had enrolled them all for Horsemen.

There was a great and open Plain, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, which was almost in the midway between both the Camps: and thither, according to the agreement, they came to parley. The Legion which *Cæsar* had brought with him on Horseback, he placed two hundred Paces from the said Mount: And likewise the Horsemen of *Ariovistus* stood in the same distance. *Ariovistus* requested they might talk on Horseback, and bring each of them ten Persons to the Conference. At their meeting, *Cæsar* began his Speech with a Commemoration of the Favours and Benefits the Senate had done unto him, in that he was by their Authority entituled by the name of a King, and a Friend, and thereupon had received great Gifts: Which favour fell but unto a few, and was by the Romans given only to Men of great Desert: Whereas he without any occasion of access unto them, or other just cause on his behalf, had obtained those Honours through his Courtesie, and the Bounty of the Senate.

He shewed him further what ancient and reasonable causes of Amity tied them so firm to the *Heduns*: What Decrees and Orders of Senate had oftentimes been made in their Favour and Behalf: That from all antiquity the *Heduns* had held the Principality of Gallia, and that long before they were in Amity with the Romans. The People of Rome had always this Custom, not only to endeavour that their Allies and Confederates should not lose any thing of their Properties; but also that they might increase in Dignity and Reputation: And therefore who could endure to see that forced from them, which they quietly possessed when they entred League with the Romans?

In like manner he required the Performance of such things which he had formerly given in charge to his Embassadors; that he should not make War either upon the *Heduns*, or their Associates: That he should restore their Hostages: And if he could not return any part of the Germans back again over the Rhine, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Country.

*Ariovistus* made little answer to *Cæsar's* demands, but spake much of his own Vertues and Valour; That he was come over the Rhine, not out of his own desire, but at the mediation and intreaty of the Gauls; that he had not left his House and Kindred but with great hope of high Rewards; the Possessions which he had in Gallia were given him by themselves; their Hostages were voluntarily delivered unto him; he took Tribute by the law of Arms, which was such as Conquerours might lay upon the Vanquished; he made no War upon the Gauls, but the Gauls made War upon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight against him, and had put themselves into the Field, whose Forces were in one Battle all dispersed and overthrown. If they were desirous to make another tryal, he was ready to undertake them: But if they would have Peace, it were an Injury to retract that Tribute which of their own accord they had paid until that time. He expected that the Amity of the People of Rome should be rather an Honour and a Safety, than a Loss unto him, and that he had sought it to that end: But if by their means the Tribute due unto him should be re-



retracted, he would as willingly refuse their Friendship as he had desired it. In that he had brought so many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, than of any purpose to subdue the Country; as might appear by that he had not come thither but upon intreaty, and set no War on foot but for his own defence. He was seated in Gallia before the Romans came thither; neither had the People of Rome before that time carried their Army beyond the Bounds of their Province: And therefore he knew not what he meant to intrude himself into his Possessions. This was his Province of Gallia, as that was ours: And as it was not lawful for him to command in our Quarters, so it was not fitting that they should disturb his Government.

In that he alledged the Heduians were by decree of Senate adopted into the Amity of the People of Rome; he was not so barbarous, or unacquainted with the course of things, as to be ignorant that in the last War of the Allobroges they were aiding and assisting to the Romans: And in the Quarrel the Heduians had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner assisting unto them. Whereupon he had good occasion to suspect that Cæsar under pretence of League and Amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his Ruin and Destruction: And that if he did not depart and withdraw his Army out of those Countries, he would no longer take him for a Friend, but for an Enemy. And if his fortune were to slay him, he should perform a very acceptable Service to many noble and chief Men of Rome (as he had well understood by Letters and Messengers he had received from them) whose Favour and Amity he should purchase by taking away his Life. But if he would depart, and leave him the free Possession of Gallia, he would gratifie him with great Rewards: And what War soever he desired to be undertaken, should be gone through withall, without his Peril or Charge.

Many things were spoken by Cæsar to shew why he could not desist from that course; for neither was it his Use nor the Custom of the People of Rome, to forsake their well-deserving Associates: Neither could he think that Gallia did rather belong to Ariovistus than the Romans. The Arverns and Rutenes were in due course of War subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: whom the People of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Province, or made them Stipendiaries. And if Antiquity were looked into, the People of Rome had good Claim to that Country: But forasmuch as the intention and will of the Senate was they should remain a free People, they were suffered to be governed by their own Laws, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former Conquest by Force of Arms.

Whilst these things were treated of in Parley, it was told Cæsar that Ariovistus's Horsemen did approach nearer to the Mount, and that accosting our Men they assaulted them with Stones and other Weapons: whereupon he brake off, and betook himself to his Party, commanding them not to cast a Weapon at the Enemy. For albeit he well perceived he might without Peril of that elect Legion give Battel to his Cavalry; yet he thought fit to refrain, lest it should be said he had entrapped them with a Parley, contrary to Faith made and Agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar Soldiers how arrogantly Ariovistus had carried himself in the Treaty, forbidding the Romans to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assaulted our Men, and that thereupon the Parley brake off; the Army was possessed with a greater Alacrity and desire to fight than before. Two days after Ariovistus sent Messengers to Cæsar, signifying that he desired to treat with him concerning those things which were left unperfect, and thereupon willed him to appoint another day of meeting; or if he liked not that, to send some unto him with Authority to conclude of such things as should be found ex-

pedient. Cæsar was unwilling to give any further meeting; and the rather, for that the day before the Germans could not be restrained from Violence and Force of Arms. Neither did he think he might safely expose the Person of any of his Followers to the inhumanity of such barbarous People; and therefore thought it fittest to send unto him M. Valerius Proculus the Son of C. Valerius Caburius, a vertuous Young Man, and well bred, whose Father was made free of Rome by C. Valer. Flaccus: Which he did the rather in regard of his singular integrity, and his perfectness in the French Tongue, which Ariovistus through long continuance had learned; and that the Germans had no cause of Offence against him. And with him he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Ariovistus, with Instruction to hear what was said, and to make report thereof to Cæsar. Whom as soon as Ariovistus saw come into his Camp, he cried out in the Presence of his Army, demanding wherefore they came thither, and whether they were not sent as Spies. And as they were about to make answer, he cut them off, and commanded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he removed his Camp, and lodged himself under a Hill, six Miles from Cæsar. The next day he brought his Forces along by Cæsar's Camp, and encamped himself two Miles beyond him; of purpose to cut off all such Corn and Convoys as should be sent to the Romans by the Heduians and Sequans. From that day forward by the Space of five Days together Cæsar imbattelled his Men before his Camp; to the intent that if Ariovistus had a mind to give Battel, he might do it when he would. But Ariovistus all this while kept his Army within his Camp, and daily sent out his Horsemen to skirmish with the Romans.

This was the manner of fighting which the Germans had practised: there were 6000 Horsemen, and as many strong and nimble Footmen, whom the Horsemen had selected out of the whole Host, every Man one for his Safeguard: These they had always at hand with them in Battel and unto these they resorted for Succour. If the Horsemen were over-charged, these ever stept in to help them. If any one were wounded or unhorsed, they came about him and succoured him. If the matter required either to adventure forward or to retire speedily back again, their Swiftnes was such (through continual Exercise) that hanging on the Horse-mane by the one Hand, they would run as fast as the Horses.

## OBSERVATION.

IT may seem strange unto the Soldiers of our time, that the Footmen should be mingled pell-mell amongst the Horsemen, without hurt and disadvantage to themselves; so unlikely it is that they should either succour the Horsemen in any danger, or annoy the Enemy: And therefore some have imagined that these Footmen in the Encounter, cast themselves into one Body, and so charging the Enemy assisted the Horsemen. But the Circumstances of this place, and of others which I will alledge to this purpose, plainly evince that these Footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the Horsemen to assist every particular Man as his Fortune and Occasion required: And therefore the choice of these Footmen was permitted to the Horsemen, in whose service they were to be employed, that every Man might take his Friend, in whom he reposed greatest Confidence. When they were overcharged, these stept in to help them; if any Man were wounded or unhorsed, he had his Footman ready to assist him: And when they were to go upon any speedy Service, or suddenly to retire upon advantage, they stayed them-

Footmen in  
termingled  
amongst  
Horsemen.



themselves upon the Mane of the Horses with one hand, and so ran as fast as the Horsemen could go. Which Services they could not possibly have performed without Confusion and Disorder, if the Footmen had not severally attended upon them, according to the affection specified in their particular Election.

The principal use of these Footmen of the Germans, consisted in the aid of their own Horsemen upon any necessity, not so much regarding their Service against the Enemy, as the assistance of their Horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Art to a more effectual purpose; namely, as a principal Remedy not only to resist, but to defeat far greater Troops of Horse than the Enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient Memory which History mentioneth, is recorded by Livy in the second Punick War, at the Siege of Capua, under the Regiment of Quintus Fulvius the Consul; where it is said that in all their Conflicts, as the Roman Legions returned with the better, so their Cavalry was always worsted; and therefore they invented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in Force.

Out of the whole Army were taken the choicest young Men, both for Strength and Agility, and to them were given little round Bucklers, and seven Darts apiece instead of their other Weapons: These Soldiers practised to ride behind the Horsemen, and speedily to light from the Horses at a Watch-word given, and so to charge the Enemy on Foot. And when by Exercise they were made so expert, that the novelty of the Invention no whit affrighted them, the Roman Horsemen went forth to encounter with the Enemy, every Man carrying his Foot-Soldier behind him; who at the encounter suddenly alighting, charged upon the Enemy with such a Fury, that they followed them in slaughter to the Gates of Capua. And hence, saith Livy, grew the first Institution of the Velites: which ever after that time were enrolled with the Legions. The Author of this Stratagem is said to be one Q. Navius a Centurion, and was Honourably rewarded by Fulvius the Consul for the same.

Salust in the History of Jugurth saith, That Marius mingled the Velites with the Cavalry of the Associates, *Ut quacunque invaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent.* The like practice was used by Caesar, as appeareth in the third Book of the Civil War; saying that instead of the Velites, he mingled with his Horsemen four hundred of the lustiest of his Legionary Soldiers, to resist the Cavalry of Pompey, while the rest of his Army passed over the River Genusum, after the Overthrow he had at Dyrrachium: *Qui tantum proficere, saith the Text, ut equestri praelio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent.* Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to prove, that the greatest Captains of ancient Times strengthened their Cavalry with Footmen dispersed amongst them. The Roman Horsemen, saith Polybius, at the first carried but a weak limber Pole or Staff, and a little round Buckler; but afterwards they used the Furniture of the Grecians: which Josephus affirmeth to be a strong Launce or Staff, and three or four Darts in a Quiver, with a Buckler, and a long Sword by their right side. The use of their Launce was most effectual when they charged in Troops, Pouldron to Pouldron; and that manner of Fight afforded no means to intermingle Footmen: But when they used their Darts, every Man got what advantage of Ground he could, as our Carbines for the most part do,

and so the Footmen might have place among them: Or otherwise for so good an advantage they would easily make place for the Footmen to serve among them: But howsoever it was, it appeareth by this circumstance how little the Romans feared Troops of Horse, considering that the best means to defeat their Horse was by their Foot Companies. But to make it more plain, of many Examples I will only alledge two; the one out of Livy, to prove that the Roman Horsemen were not comparable for Service to Footmen: The other out of Hirtius, to shew the same effect against Strangers and Numidian Horsemen.

In the Consulships of L. Valerius and Marcus Horatius, Valerius having Fortunately overthrown the Equi and the Volsi, Horatius proceeded with as great Courage in the War against the Sabines; wherein it happened, that in the day of Battel the Sabines reserved two thousand of their Men to give a fresh assault upon the left Wing of the Romans, as they were in Conflict: Which took such effect, that the Legionary Footmen of that Wing were forced to Retreat. Which the Roman Horsemen (being in number six hundred) perceiving, and not being able with their Horse to make Head against the Enemy, they presently forsook their Horses, and made hast to make good the place on Foot; wherein they carried themselves so Valiantly, that in a moment of time they gave the like advantage to their Footmen against the Sabines, and then betook themselves again to their Horses, to pursue the Enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point; the Numidians, as Caesar witnesseth, were the best Horsemen that ever he met with, and used the same Art as the Germans did, mingling among them light-armed Footmen. An Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the Legions upon a suddain, the History saith that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & levis armatura, hostium nullo negotio, loco pulsa & dejecta est de colle.* And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged upon the Rereward of the Army, according to the manner of the Numidian Fight, the History saith, *Cæsariani interim non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se convertissent, & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad unum terga vertebant.* So that to free himself of this inconvenience, he took his Horsemen out of the Rereward, and placed his Legions there, *Ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat.* And ever as he marched, he caused three hundred Soldiers of every Legion to be free and without burthen, that they might be ready upon all occasions; *Quos in Equitatum Labieni immisit.* Tum Labienus, *conversis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis ejus occisis, compluribus vulneratis: Milites legionarii ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire ceperunt.* I alledge the very words of the History, to take away all suspicion of falsifying or wresting any thing to an affected opinion. If any Man will look into the reason of this disparity, he shall find it to be chiefly the work of the Roman Pile (an unresistible Weapon) and the terror of Horsemen; especially when they were cast with the advantage of the place, and fell so thick that there was no means to avoid them.

But to make it plain that any light-armed Footmen could better make Head against a Troop of Horse, than the Cavalry of their own Party, although they bear but the same Weapons: Let us consider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foot, either to take an advantage, or to shun and avoid any danger; casting their Darts with far greater Strength and more Certainty, than

Lib. 3. De bello Africano.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 3. de exid.



than the Horsemen could do. For as the Force of all the Engines of old Time, as the *Balista*, *Catapulta* and *Tolenones*, proceeded from that Stability and resting Center which Nature affordeth as the only Strength and Life of the Engine: So what force soever a Man maketh, must principally proceed from that Firmness and Stay which Nature, by the Earth or some other unmoveable rest, giveth to the Body, from whence it taketh more or less Strength, according to the Violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth up a Weight from the Ground, by so much treadeth heavier upon the Earth, by how much the thing is heavier than his Body. The Footmen therefore having a surer stay to counterpoize their forced Motion than the Horsemen had, cast their Darts with greater Violence, and consequently with more Certainty.

## C H A P. XVIII.

*Cæsar* preventeth *Ariovistus* of his Purpose by making Two Camps.

*Cæsar*. **W**Hen *Cæsar* perceived that *Ariovistus* meant nothing less than to fight, but kept himself within his Camp; lest peradventure he should intercept the Sequans, and others of his Associates, as they came with Convoys of Corn to the Romans, beyond that Place wherein the Germans abode about six hundred Paces from their Camp, he chose a Ground meet to encamp in: And marching thither in three Battels, commanded Two of them to stand ready in Arms, and the Third to fortifie the Camp. *Ariovistus* sent sixteen thousand Foot and all his Horse to interrupt the Soldiers, and hinder the Intrenchment. Notwithstanding *Cæsar*, as he had before determined, caused two Battels to withstand the Enemy, and the Third to go through with the Work: Which being ended he left there two Legions, and part of the associate Forces, and led the other four Legions back again into the greater Camp.

The next day *Cæsar*, according to his Custom, brought his whole Power out of both his Camps; and marching a little from the greater Camp, he put his Men in array, and proffered Battel to the Enemy: But perceiving that *Ariovistus* would not stir out of his Trenches, about Noon he conveyed his Army into their several Camps. Then at length *Ariovistus* sent part of his Forces to assault the lesser Camp. The Encounter continued very sharp on both Parts until the Evening; and at Sun-setting after many wounds given and taken, *Ariovistus* conveyed his Army again into their Camp. And as *Cæsar* made inquiry of the Captives, what the reason was that *Ariovistus* refused Battel, he found this to be the cause; The Germans had a Custom that the Women should by casting of Lots and Southsaying declare whether it were for their Advantage to fight or no: And that they found by their Art the Germans could not get the Victory, if they fought before the New Moon.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**F**irst, we may observe what special Importance this manner of Incamping carried in that absolute Discipline which the Romans observed, and by which they conquered so many Nations: For besides the Safety which it afforded their own Troops, it served for a Hold well-fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified Town in any Part of the Field where they saw advantage; and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselves or straiten the Enemy, by cutting off his

Passages, hindering his Attempts, blocking up his Camp, besides many other Advantages, all averring the Saying of *Domitius Corbulo*, *dolabra vincendum esse Hostem*: A thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed by the Commanders of such Forces as serve the States in the United Provinces of *Belgia*; whom Time and Practice of the Wars hath taught to entertain the use of the Spade, and to hold it in as great Reputation as any Weapons whatsoever, which may be thought worthy Executioners of the Feats of Arms.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**N the second place we may observe that there was no Nation so barbarous (for I understand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the Notions of Religion, as any known Nation of that time, being in a Climate so near the North, that it afforded no Contemplation at all) that could not make use in their greatest Affairs, of that Superstition to which their Mind was naturally intralled, and forge Prophecies and Divinations, as well to stir up as to moderate the irregular Motions of a Multitude, according as they might best serve to advantage their Proceedings. Neither did *Cæsar* let slip the Occasion of making use of this their Religion: For understanding by their Prisoners, that their Divinations forbade them to fight before the New Moon, he used all the Means he could to provoke them to Battel; that their religious Opinion of Mischieving might prejudice their Resolution to return Conquerours. Which may serve to prove, that a superstitious People are subject to many inconveniences, which Industry or Fortune may discover to their Overthrow.

It is recorded that *Columbus* being General of some Forces which *Ferdinando* King of *Castile* sent to discover the West Indies, and suffering great Penury for want of Victuals in the Isle of *Jamaica*, after that he had observed how the Islanders worshipped the Moon, and having Knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he told the Inhabitants that unless they would furnish him with such Necessaries as he wanted for the time, the Wrath of their God should quickly appear towards them, by changing his bright shining Face into Obscurity and Darknes: Which was no sooner happened, but the poor Indians, stricken with a superstitious Fear of that which the Course of Nature required, kept nothing back that might assist their Enemies to depopulate and over-run their own Country.

## C H A P. XIX.

*Cæsar* seeketh means to give them Battel and the Germans dispose themselves thereunto.

*Cæsar*. **T**He next Day *Cæsar* left a sufficient Garrison in each of his Camps; and forasmuch as the Number of his legionary Soldiers was small in respect of the Multitude of the Germans, he placed all the Auxiliary Troops for a Shew before the lesser Camp: And putting his Legions in a Tripple Battel, he marched towards the Camp of *Ariovistus*. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their Power, setting every Tribe and People by themselves, in like distance and order of Battel (as the *Harudes*, *Marcomans*, *Triboces*, *Vangiones*, *Nemetes*, *Sedusians* and *Swevians*) and environing their whole Army with Carts and Carriages, that there might be no hope at all left to save any Man by Flight. And in these they placed their Women, that they by their out-stretched Hands



*Hands and Tears moving pity, might implore the Soldiers, as they descended by course to the Battel, not to deliver them into the Bondage and Thralldom of the Romans.*

*Cæsar assigned to every Legion a Legat and a Questor, that every Man might have an Eye-witness of his Valour: And he himself began the Battel with the right Wing, forasmuch as he perceived that part of Ariovistus's Army to be the weakest.*

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Romans, even from the Infancy of their State, were ever zealous Admirers of true Honour, and always desired to behold with the Eye to what measure of Vertue every Man had attained; that the Tongue with greater Fervency of Spirit might sound out the Celebration of *Maïe Virtute*, which imported more Honour than any Wealth that could be heaped upon them. Neither was this the least part of their Wisdom; considering that the most precious things that are, lose much of their Worth, if they be not suted with other correspondent Natures, whose Sympathy addeth much more Excellency than is discerned when they appear by themselves without such Assistance. For how small is the Beauty which Nature hath given to the Eye-pleasing Diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificial Form? Or what Perfection can the Form give, without a Foil to strengthen it? Or what good is in either of them, if the Light do not illuminate it? Or what avail all these, where there wanteth an Eye to admire it, a Judgment to value it, and an heart to embrace it? Such an Union hath Nature imprinted in the diversity of Creatures concurring to Perfection, and especially in moral Actions, in whose Carriage there is a far greater Exactness of Correspondency required to approve them honourable, than was requisite to make the Jewel beautiful. And this did Cæsar in all his Battels; amongst the rest, that at *Alesia* is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in Conspectu Imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque & Laudis Cupiditas, & Timor Ignominie ad Virtutem excitabat.* And when *Livie* would express how valiantly an Action was carried, he saith no more but *in Conspectu Imperatoris res gerebatur*: Which is as much as to say, that forasmuch as the Romans were diligent observers of every Mans worth, rewarding Vertue with Honour, and Cowardice with reproach, every Man bent his whole Endeavour to deserve the good Opinion of his General, by discharging that Duty which he owed to the Common-wealth with all Loyalty and Faithfulness of Spirit.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Romans had four Forms of the Front of their Battel. The first was called *Acies recta*, when neither the Wings nor the main Body was advanced one before another, but were all carried in a right Line, and made a straight Front; and this was their most usual manner of embattelling.

The second Form of the Front was called *Obliqua*, when as one of the Wings was advanced nearer unto the Enemy than the rest, to begin the Battel: And this was commonly, as *Vegetius* noteth, the right Wing; for the right Wing of an Army had great advantage against the left of the Enemies, in regard of their Weapons and Furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceived that the Enemy was weakest in that part; following a Maxim of great Authority, that the weakest part of an Enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the Strength of an Army: For so favourable

are Mens Judgments to that which is already happened, that the Sequel of every Action dependeth for the most part upon the beginning. *Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet*, saith a Poet: And not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the Sequel by the Nature of a precedent Cause, that the End must needs err from the common Course, when it doth not participate of that Quality which was in the Beginning. Neither can there be any good End without a good Beginning: For although the Beginning be oftentimes disastrous and unlucky, and the End fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that End there was a fortunate Beginning: For the bad Beginning was not the Beginning of a good, but of an evil End. And therefore that his Men might foresee a happy End in a good Beginning, it behoved him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the Enemy.

The third Form of the Front is called *Sinuata*, when both the Wings are advanced forward, and the Battel standeth backward off from the Enemy, after the fashion of a Half-Moon. *Scipio* used it in *Spain*, having observed some days before that the Enemy continually so disposed of the Battel, that his best Soldiers were always in the midst; and therefore *Scipio* put all his Old Soldiers in the Wings and brought them out first to charge upon the weakest Part of the Enemy, that those might decide the Controversie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last Form is called *Gibbosa*, or *gibbera Acies*, when the Battel is advanced, and the two Wings lag behind. This Form did *Hannibal* use in the Battel of *Cannæ*; but with this Art, that he strengthened his two Wings with the best of his Soldiers, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romans following the Retreat of the Battel, which was easily repell'd, might be enclosed on each side with two Wings.


### CHAP. XX.

#### The Battel between Cæsar and Ariovistus.


**T**He sign of the Battel being thereupon given Cæsar.  
our Men charged upon the Enemy very fiercely; and they on the other side received them so warmly, that the Legions had no time to cast their Piles, and in that regard made hast to betake themselves to their Swords: But the Germans according to their manner, putting themselves into a Phalanx, received the force of their Swords. In the Battel there were many legionary Soldiers seen to leap upon the Phalanx, and to pull up with their hands the Targets that covered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: And so the left Wing of the Enemy was overthrown and put to flight.

Now while the right Wing was thus busied the left Wing was overcharged with an unequal Multitude of the Germans: Which young *Craffus* the General of the Horse no sooner perceived (having more Scope and Liberty than any of the Commanders that were in the Battel) but he sent *Tertiam Aciem*, the third Battel to rescue and aid their Fellows that were in Danger; by means whereof the Fight was renewed, and all the Enemy was put to flight, and never looked back until they came to the Rhine, which was about fifty Miles from the Place where they fought. Where some few of them saved themselves by swimming: Others found some Boats, and so escaped. *Ariovistus* lighting upon a little Bark tied to the Shore, recovered the other side, and so saved himself: The rest were all slain by the Horsemen. *Ariovistus* had two Wives: One




















One a Swevian, whom he brought with him from home; and the Other of Norica, the Sister of King Vocion, sent unto him by her Brother into Gallia, and married there: Both these perished in that Fight. His two Daughters likewise being there, One was slain, and the Other taken.

As Cæsar pursued the German Horsemen, it was his chance to light upon Valerius Procillus, as he was drawn up and down by his Keepers bound in three Chains: Which Accident was as grateful to him as the Victory it self; being so fortunate to recover his familiar Friend, and a Man of Reputation in the Province, whom the barbarous Enemy (contrary to the Law of Nations) had cast into Prison. Neither would Fortune by the loss of him abate any thing of so great Pleasure and Contentment: For he reported that in his own Presence they had three several times cast lots whether he should be burned alive; and that still he escaped by the fortune of the Lots. And M. Titius was found in like manner, and brought unto him. The Fame of this Battel being carried beyond the Rhine, the Swevians that were come to the Banks of the Rhine returned home again: Whom the Inhabitants near upon that River pursued, finding them terrified and distracted, and slew a great Number of Men.

Cæsar having thus ended two great Wars in one Summer, brought his Army into their wintering Camps, somewhat sooner than the time of the Year required; and leaving Labienus to command them, himself returned into the hither Gallia, to keep Courts and publick Diets.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

THIS Phalanx here mentioned can hardly be proved to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to understand it to be so termed by reason of the close and compact Embattelling, rather than in any other respect: and it resembled much a *Testudo*, as I said of the *Helvetian* Phalanx. Secondly, I observe that Cæsar kept the old Rule concerning their Discipline in Fight: For although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his History; yet he omitted not the Substance, which was, to have *primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should begin the Battel, and the second should come fresh and assist them: Or peradventure if the Enemy were many and strong, the first and second Battel were joyned together, and so charged upon the Enemy with greater Fury and Violence; but at all Adventures the third Battel was ever in *Subsidio*, as they termed it, to succour any part that should be overcharged; which was a thing of much Consequence, and of great Wisdom. For if we either respect the encouragement of the Soldiers, or the casualty of Fortune, what could be more added to their Discipline in this behalf, than to have a second and a third Succour, to give Strength to the fainting Weakness of their Men, and to repair the disadvantage which any Accident should cast upon them? Or if their Valour were equally balanced, and Victory stood doubtful which of the two Parties she should honour, these always stept in, being fresh, against weary and over-laboured Spirits, and so drew Victory in despite of casualty unto themselves.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning use of Lots, it will not be amiss to look into the nature of them, being in former times so general, that there was no Nation, civil or barbarous, but was directed in their greatest Affairs by the Sentence of Lots. As is undeniable from that which Solomon saith in the sixteenth of Proverbs, *The Lots are cast into the Lap, but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord*: Through the Knowledge whereof *Joshua* was directed to take *Achan*, the Mariners *Jonas*, and the Apostles to consecrate *Matthias*: So whether the Heathen and barbarous People, whose Blindness in the way of Truth could direct them no further than to senseless Superstition, and put them in mind of a Duty which they owed, but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed; whether these, I say, were perswaded that there was any supernatural Power in their Lotteries, which directed the Action to the decree of Destiny, and as the Gods would have it, it remaineth doubtful.

*Aristotle*, the wisest of the Heathen concerning things natural, nameth that Event casual, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of Man could assign no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoever happened in any Action besides the intent of the Agent and Workman, was termed an effect of Fortune, or chance of *Hab-nab*: For all other Effects, which depended upon a certainty and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casual, or subject to the inconstancy of Chance. And because many and sundry such Chances daily happened, which like *Terra Filii* had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawful Children, either to Nature or to Reason, by the appearance of an efficient Cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune, as the principal efficient and sovereign Cause of all such unexpected Events: That is, they made nothing else the Governess and Directress of many things. Which afterward grew to such Credit amongst Men, that it surpassed in dignity all natural Causes, and was deified with celestial Honour, as the Poet saith, *Te Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, Cæloque locamus*. By the providence of this blind Goddess, which held her Deity by the Tenure of Mens ignorance, were all casual Actions directed and especially Lots; the event whereof depended only upon her pleasure and decree. Neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for then their nature had been altered from Chance to Certainty, and the event could not have been called *Sors*, but must have been reputed in the order of necessary Effects, whereof discourse of Reason acknowledgeth a certain foregoing Cause.

Whereby we see upon how weak an Axle-Tree the greatest motions of the godless World were turned, having Irregularity and Uncertainty for the *Intelligentia* that governed their revolutions. And herein all sorts of Men (although in divers respects) rested as well contented as if an Oracle had spoken unto them, and revealed the mysteries of fatal Destiny.

Rome directed the main course of her Government by the fortune of this mock-destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the People, who pleased their own fancy with the free choice of their Commanders, and suited their obedience with a well-liking Authority: Yet the publick Affairs which each Consul was severally



rally to manage, was shared out by Lots. For if an Enemy were entered into their Confines to depopulate and waſt their Territories, the Lots aſſigned this Conſul for the Government of the City, and the other to command the Legions, and to manage the War.

If Forces were to be ſent into divers Provinces, and againſt ſeveral Enemies, neither the Senate nor the People could give to either Conſul his task; but their peculiar charges were authorized by Lots. If any extraordinary Actions were to be done in the City, as the dedication of a Temple, the ſanctifying of the Capitol after a Pollution; *Sors omnia verſat*; that did all in all. And yet (notwithſtanding the weak Foundation of this Practice in their Theology and deepeſt Divinity) we may not think but theſe ſkilful Architects of that abſolute Government, wherein Vertue joyned with true Wiſdom to make an unexampled Pattern, we may not think, I ſay, but they foreſaw the manifold Danger, which in the courſe of common Actions could no other way be prevented but by the uſe of Lots. For when things are equally levelled between divers Objects, and run with indifferency to equal Stations, there muſt be ſome controlling Power to draw the Current towards one Coaſt, and to appropriate it unto one Channel, that the Order of Nature be not inverted nor a well eſtabliſhed Government diſturbed. So the ſtate of Rome caſting many things with equal charge upon her two ſovereign Magiſtrates, which could not be performed but by One of them; what better means could there be

invented to intereſs the One in that Office, and to diſcharge the Other, than to appoint an Arbitrator, whoſe decree exceeded human Reaſon? Of which it could not be ſaid why it was ſo, but that it was ſo. For if the Wiſdom of the Senate had been called to Counſel, or the voices of the People calculated to determine of the matter; it might eaſily have burſt out into civil Diſcord, conſidering the often Contentions between the Senate and the People, the factions of Clients, and the conſtant mutability of every Mans private Affections neceſſarily inclining unto One, although their worth were equal, and by true reaſon indiſcernible; which might have made the One proud of that which peradventure he had not, and caſt the other lower than would have well beſeemed his Vertues: And therefore to cut off theſe with many other Inconveniencies, they invented Lots, which without either Reaſon or Will might decide ſuch Controverſies.

By this it appeareth how little the ancient Law-makers reſpected the ground and Reaſon of an Ordinance, ſo the Commodity were great and the Uſe important to the good of the State: For as they ſaw the thing it ſelf to be caſual, ſo they ſaw that caſual things are ſometimes more neceſſary than demonſtrative Concluſions: Neither ought the Nature, and ſpeculative conſideration of Laws and Statutes to belong to the common People; but the Execution and Obedience thereof maketh the Common-wealth flouriſh. And thus endeth the firſt Commentary of *Cæſar's War in Gallia*.



## The Duke of ROHAN's REMARKS.

**T**HE resolution of this People, which seems Barbarous, and is universally condemn'd, by reason of its ill success, has nevertheless the same principles by which all Conquerors act, viz. a desire of Commanding, and of extending their Territories. Their Prudence is remarkable, in taking three Years time to make Preparations, and their Constancy in persisting in their Design, notwithstanding the Death of their Leader, and in the Execution thereof, by burning their Goods and Houses, to remove all hopes of a return, depending only upon the good success of their Swords. From thence we may gather, that great Designs ought never to be undertaken timorously; That we ought not to think on the means to escape, but rather on those that conduce to Victory: For if at the beginning of a dangerous undertaking, you discover how you may save your self, the natural impatience or timorousness of Mankind will put them upon seeking the way to do it, on the least accident that happens: And had not the *Switzers* encounter'd with the incomparable Vertue of *Cæsar*, who, by his Valour, Industry, Diligence, and good Fortune stop their Fury, they might have succeeded in their undertaking.

In the management of this War, *Cæsar* has shown (as in all the others) that the happy success of all his Exploits is to be imputed to his invariable Order in Incamping securely, always retrenching himself, to avoid being constrain'd to Fight against his Will, and to be in a condition to improve all advantages to beat his Enemies: To his care, that Provision might not fail him, and to his keeping his Soldiers constantly in Exercise and upon their Guard, to be the better able to execute his designs with speed, and in good order.

The Pardoning of *Dumnorix* is remarkable. His natural Clemency inclin'd him to it, suffering himself to be Vanquish'd at the intreaty of his Brother *Divitiac*, whom he lov'd; nevertheless he had a constant Eye upon him, lest new Inconveniencies might thereby arise for the future.

The Fault of *Confidius* shows how necessary it is to employ Persons of experience to view an Army.

And his ordering the *Switzers* to go back to Inhabit their own Country again, was a great piece of Prudence, to hinder the *Germans* (a very powerful Nation) from taking possession of it, and coming too near *Provence*.

Whereupon we may observe how dangerous such Auxiliary Assistances prove, especially when we require 'em of such as are more Potent than our selves. *Cæsar* indeed drove out *Ariovistus*, but the *Gauls* only chang'd their Master; he engag'd in that War for two Reasons; First, Be-

cause he was afraid that if that Potent Nation should once get a footing into *Gallia*, they might Invade *Provence*, and approach too near *Italy*. Secondly, Because that War was a step towards the Conquest of the said *Gauls*, which he manag'd with so much Art, keeping up their Divisions, that he made use of some to overcome others, and finally subdued them all.

We must also observe his diligence (so much commended in all his Actions) in preventing his Enemies by making himself Master of *Bezanccon*, whereby he provided for the Subsistence of his Army. It was in this Expedition a Panick Fear seiz'd his Soldiers, which began by the Volunteers, who being desirous to retire, discourag'd the others in order to cover their own Shame, by the general disgrace of the whole Army; which is a thing a General ought carefully to look to, never hazarding a Battel without having first Incourag'd his Men, which *Cæsar* did at that time by a Speech; a Talent in which he excell'd all others. He also took the advantage (as several other Generals have done, particularly *Marius*) of a very strong Camp, before so formidable an Army, to show his Soldiers, by divers Skirmishes, that their Enemies were neither Invincible, nor braver than they: Making them sensible, that adding order and Military Discipline to the Prudence of their General, they were superior to them: For the *Romans* did never subdue other Nations by Number, or Valour, but by their Skill in War, which daily improv'd by the observation of their Order, and by Retrenching of their Camp. Whereupon it is observable that *Ariovistus* having Encamp'd his Army between *Cæsar* and the place from whence he receiv'd his Provisions, and *Cæsar* not having been able in five days time to draw him to a Battel, having well fortifi'd his Camp, he marches with his whole Army in order of Battel, to fortifie another that was not so large, in a more advantageous place, two Miles distance from the first, which open'd a way for his Provisions, causing one third part of his Army to work, while the other two remain'd in Battalia, which repuls'd the Forces *Ariovistus* sent, to hinder the said Fortifications; which being finish'd, *Cæsar* leaves two Legions in it, and marches back with the remainder of his Army into his former Camp. The next day *Cæsar* places his Men in Battel Array between the two Camps: He being gone back again *Ariovistus* attacks the little Camp, and is repuls'd. *Cæsar* having thus reviv'd the Courage of his Soldiers, causes his whole Army to march out in Battalia, and goes up to the very Retrenchments of *Ariovistus*, provokes him to Fight, he comes out and is beaten.







## The Second COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

### The Argument.

**L**ike as when a heavy Body lieth upon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it cover but a small parcel of the whole surface, yet the other Quarters are burthened and kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight; and through the union and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feel the same suppression which hath really seized but upon their fellow Part. In like manner the *Belgæ*, Inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple Continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burthen which the *Roman* Empire had laid upon the Province, the *Hedui*, and other States of that Kingdom. And lest it might in time be further removed, and laid directly upon their Shoulders, they thought it expedient whilst they felt it but by Participation, to gather their several Forces into one Head, and try whether they could free their Neighbour Nations from so grievous a Yoak, or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves. And this is the Argument of this second Book; which divideth it self into two Parts: The first containing the Wars between *Cæsar* and all the States of *Belgia* united together, the second recording the Battels which he made with some of the States thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.

### CHAP. I.

*Cæsar* hasteth to his Army, marcheth towards the Confines of the *Belgæ*, and taketh in the Men of *Rheims*.

*Cæsar.*

**W**hile *Cæsar* was in his Winter Quarters in the hither *Gallia*, there came every day fresh Rumours to him (the same thing being also certified by Letters from *Labienus*) that all the *Belgæ*, being a third part of *Gallia*, had leagued together against the People of *Rome*, and had given mutual Hostages one to another. The grounds of their Confederacy were these: First, they were afraid that *Cæsar* having settled all the rest of *Gallia* in quiet, would bring his Armies upon them. Secondly, they were solicited to do it by some of the Gauls, such namely, who, as they did not desire the company of the Germans longer in *Gallia*, so they were very much troubled to think that the Roman Army should winter and settle themselves there; and such again as Levity and Inconstancy prompted to seek new Governments; lastly such as saw that it was an easie matter for those Men that were powerful and had the command of Monies, to seize upon Kingdoms in *Gallia*, which they could not so easily do in those Parts where the Romans bare sway. *Cæsar* being moved with Letters and other Intelligence to this purpose, levied two new Legions in the hither *Gallia*, and as soon as Summer came on, sent them by *Q. Pedius* his Legate into the further *Gallia*: And as soon as there was Forage in the Fields he himself came to the Army. He had before

given charge to the *Senones* and other of the Gauls that bordered upon the *Belgæ*, to learn every day what they could of their Doings, and to give him an Account thereof. These presently informed him, that of a certainty there was nothing in *Belgia* but Mustering of Soldiers, and gathering their Forces into one Head. He thought it not therefore safe to make any further delay; but having made Provision of Corn, he drew out his Army from their Winter Quarters, and within fifteen days he came to the borders of *Belgæ*. As soon as he was come thither, which was much sooner than was looked for, the Men of *Rheims* being the uttermost of the *Belgæ*, next adjoining to the *Celtæ*, thought it best to entertain a peaceable Resolution, and sent *Iccius* and *Antebrogius*, two of the chief Men of their State, unto *Cæsar*, to submit themselves and all that they had to the Mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming, that they were innocent both of the Counsel of the *Belgæ*, and of their Conspiracy against the Romans. For proof whereof they were ready to give Hostages, to receive them into their Towns, and to furnish them with Corn, or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the *Belgæ* were all in Arms, and the Germans on the other side of the *Rhine* had promised to send them succour: yea, their Madnes was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the *Suessones* from that attempt, being their Brethren and Kinsmen in Blood, and using the same Laws and Customs as they did, having both one Magistrate, and one form of Government; but they would needs support the same Quarrel which the rest of the *Belgæ* had undertaken.



## OBSERVATION.

I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular revolt in a general cause; and how a confederate State may in regard of their own safety forsake a common quarrel, or whatsoever the universal Society hath enacted prejudicial to their Commonweal; but that I only intend to discover Warlike Practices, leaving these Questions of Law and Policy to Men of greater Judgement and better Experience. Onely I observe in the behalf of the Roman Government, that such Cities as yielded to their Empire, and became tributary to their Treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by Confederacy) seldom or never repented them of their Fact, in regard of the Noble Patronage which they found in that State, and the due respect observed towards them.

## CHAP. II.

The Power of the Belgæ, and their Preparation for this War.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar inquiring of the Embassadors which came from Rheims, what the States were that had taken Arms, and what they were able to do in matter of War, found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germans, who passing over the Rhine time out of mind, and finding it to be a Fertile Countrey, drove away the Gauls and seated themselves in their Possessions: and that these onely of all the Gauls kept the Cimbri and Teutoni from entering into their Countrey; and in that regard they challenged to themselves great Authority, and vaunted much in their feats of Arms. Concerning their number they had these Advertisements; The (a) Bellovaci exceeded all the Belgæ in Prowess, Authority, and number of Men, being able to make 100000 Fighting Men, and out of that number had promised 60000 towards this undertaking, and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole War. Next to them lay the (b) Sueffones, who dwelt in a large and fruitful Countrey, and had lately Divitiacus for their King, being the most Powerful Man in all Gallia, who had in possession a great part of these Countries, and also of Britain it self. Galba was their King now, on whom, for his singular Justice and Prudence, generally with one consent they bestowed the management of the War. They had twelve Walled Towns, and promised to set forth 50000 Men. The (c) Nervii, who were the most barbarous amongst them all, and dwelt furthest off, promised as many; the (d) Atrebatii 15000, the (e) Ambiani 10000, the Vellocaßii and (f) Veromandui as many; the (g) Morini 25000, the Menapii 9000, the Caletes 10000, the Aduatici 29000; the (h) Eburones, Condrusi, and others 40000. Cæsar encouraging the Men of Rhemes to persist in their faithfulness to the Roman Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberal promises of recompence, and commanded all their Noblemens Sons to be given up for Hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And having received two especial Advertisements from the Men of Rhemes, the one concerning the multitude of the Enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their Manhood: he provided for the first, by perswading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep asunder the power of the Enemy; and to withhold their Forces from making

(a) The countrey about Beauvois.

(b) The countrey about Soiffons.

(c) The people about Tournay.

(d) Arras.

(e) Amiens.

(f) Vermandois.

(g) Tervenne.

(h) Liege.

308000 in all.

a Head, that so he might avoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to pass, if the Hedui would enter with a strong Power into the Marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their Territories with Sword and Confusion. Which Divitiacus promised to perform, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his Countrey. Upon the second Advertisement, which presented unto him the great Valour and Manhood of his Enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giving them Battel, but first to prove by Skirmishing with his Horsemen what his Enemies by their Prowess could do, and what his own Men durst do.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**His Rule of making tryal of the worth of an Enemy, hath always been observed by prudent and grave Commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true judgement of the event may be grounded. For if the Doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the word *non putabam*, I wist it not, was never heard out of a wise Man's mouth, hath any place in the course of humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the State of Kingdoms and Empires dependeth. For, unless we be perswaded that blind Chance directeth the course of this World with an uncertain confusion, and that no foresight can sway the balance of our hap unto either part of our Fortune, I see no reason why we should not by all means endeavour to ground our knowledge upon true Causes, and level our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be urged, inasmuch as our Leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an Enemy with equality of number, referring their Valour to be tried in the Battel; not considering that the Eye of it self cannot discern the difference between two Champions of like presence and outward carriage, unless it see their strength compared together, and weighed as it were in the Scale of Trial: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of Battel. For, besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his Men, when they saw themselves able to encounter an Enemy, and knew their task to be within their power to perform. Neither did he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find that he never encountered any Enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour; to make head against them: which equality of strength being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the Discipline wherein his men were trained, as advantages to over sway his Adversaries; and so drew Victory, maugre fortune, unto himself, and seldom failed in any of his Battels.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the River \* Axona, \* La Dîne leaving Titurius Sabinus encamped on the other side with six Cohorts.

**A**S soon as Cæsar understood as well by his Scouts, as from the Men of Rheims, that all the Power of the Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to pass his Army over the River Axona, which divided the Men of Rheims from the other Belgæ, and

Cæsar.



and there encamped. Whereby he brought to pass that no Enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage; and that Corn might be brought unto him from Rheims and other Cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve, to his best advantage, he fortified a Bridge which he found on the River with a strong Garrison of Men, and caused Titurius Sabinus, a Legate, to encamp himself on the other side of the River with six Cohorts, commanding him to fortify his Camp with a Rampier of 12 foot in altitude, and a Trench of 18 foot in breadth.

## OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why *Cæsar* did pass his Army over the River, leaving it on his Back, and did not rather attend the Enemy on the other side, and so take the advantage of hindring him, if he should attempt to pass over; I will set down the Reasons in the sequel of this War, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more evident. In the mean time let us enter into the particularity of these six Cohorts, that we may the better judge of such Troops as were employed in the services of this War. But that we may the better conjecture what number of Souldiers these six Cohorts did contain, it seemeth expedient a little to discourse of the Companies and Regiments which the Romans used in their Armies.

And first we are to understand, that the greatest and chiefest Regiment in a Roman Army was termed by the name of *Legio*; as *Varro* saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*; or as *Plutarch* speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent militares*; so that it taketh the name *Legio*, from the choice and selecting of the Souldiers. *Romulus* is said to be the first Author and Founder of these Legions, making every Legion to contain 3000 Souldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as *Festus* recordeth, unto 4000; and afterward again from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a Legion until *Hannibal* came into Italy; and then it was augmented to 5000: but that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when *Scipio* went into *Africk*, the Legions were increased to 6200 Footmen, and 300 Horse. And shortly after the *Macedonian War*, the Legions that continued in *Macedonia* to keep the Province from Rebellion, consisted of 6000 Footmen and 300 Horse. Out of *Cæsar* it cannot be gathered that a Legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 Men, but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith, that in this War in *Gallia* his Souldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 Men in two Legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. Book of the Civil War, where he saith, that in *Pompey's Army* were 110 Cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 Men; and it being manifest as well by this number of Cohorts, as by the testimony of divers Authors, that *Pompey's Army* consisted of 11 Legions; if we divide 55000 into 11 parts, we shall find a Legion to consist of 5000 Men. Which number or thereabout being generally known to be the usual rate of a Legion, the Romans always expressed the strength of their Army by the number of Legions that were therein: as in this War it is said that *Cæsar* had eight Legions; which by this account might arise to 40000 Men, besides Associates, and such as necessarily attended the Army. Further we are to understand that every Legion had its peculiar name, by which it was known and distinguished from the rest: and that it took either from their order of Muster, or Enrollment; as that Legion

which was first Enrolled, was called the first Legion, and that which was second in the choice, the second Legion, and so consequently of the rest; and so we read in this History, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth Legion; or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *Legiones Germanicæ, Pannonicæ, Britannicæ*, and such others: and sometime of their General, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vitelliana legiones*, and so forth: or to conclude, from some accident of quality, as *Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera*, Plundering, Victorious, Thundring, and such like. And thus much of the name and number of a Legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of Souldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continual observation thereof unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of those smaller parts whereof a Legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to understand, that after the Consuls had made a general choice and sworn the Souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of *Velites*. Their place in regard of the other Souldiers was both base and dishonourable: not only because they fought afar off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the Enemy, as our forlorn hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they called *Hastati*, a degree above the *Velites* both in Age and Wealth, and termed them by the name of *Hastati*, forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Javelin, which the Romans called *Hasta*: but before *Polybius* his time they used Piles; notwithstanding their ancient name continued unto the later times of the Empire. The third choice which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest bodied Men, who for the prime of their Age were called *Principes*: the rest that remain'd were named *Triarii*, as *Varro* saith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur*: These were always the eldest and best experienced Men, and were placed in the third division of the Battel, as the last help and refuge in all extremity. *Polybius* saith, that in his time the *Velites, Hastati*, and *Principes* did consist of 1200 Men apiece, and the *Triarii* never exceeded the number of 600, although the general number of a Legion were augmented: whereof *Lipsius* alledgeth these Reasons; First, because these *Triarii* consisted of the best of the Souldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in worth and Valour. Secondly, they seldom came to buckle with the Enemy, but when the Controversie grew very doubtful. Lastly, we may well conjecture that the Volunteers and extraordinary followers ranged themselves amongst these *Triarii*, and so made the third Battel equal to either of the former: but howsoever they never exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth that in *Polybius* his time the common rate of a Legion was 4200.

In this division of their Men, consisted the ground of that well-ordered Discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their Years and Ability, they reduced their whole strength into several Classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the general composition of their whole body, every part might be fitted with place and Office, according as his worth was answerable to the same: and so they made not only a number in gross, but a number distinct.

A Legion  
what it was.  
Lib. 4.  
De vita Ro-  
muli.

Liv. lib. 22.

Tacitus 3.  
Hist.

Velites.

Hastati.

Principes.  
Triarii.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 1. de  
mil. Rom.

The use of  
this division:



distinct by parts and properties; that from every accident which met with any part of the Army, the judgment might determine how much or how little it imported the whole Body: Besides the great use which they made of this distinction in their degrees of Honour and Preferment, a matter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their Government.

The distinction  
of their Com-  
panies.

Manipuli.

Ordines.

The Soldiers at their enrollment being thus divided according to their Years and Ability, they then reduced them into smaller Companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, each of them into 10 Companies, making of those three sorts of Soldiers 30 small Regiments, which they called *Manipuli*: And again they subdivided every Manipule into two equal parts, and called them *Ordines*, which was the least Company in a Legion, and according to the rate set down by *Polybius*, contained 60 Soldiers. In every Ordo there was a Centurion or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named *Optio* or *Tergiductor*. The Maniples of the *Triarii* were much lesser than the Maniples of either the *Hastati* or the *Principes*; forasmuch as their whole Band consisted but of 600 Men. The *Velites* were put into no such Companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* were called *subsignari Milites*, to make a difference between them and the *Velites*, which were not divided into Bands, and so consequently had no Ensign of their own, but were distributed amongst the other Companies: So that every Manipule had 40 *Velites* attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a Cohort, which the History here mentioneth.

Cohors.

Lib. 3. de Re  
Rust.

The word *Cohors* in Latin doth signifie that part of Ground which is commonly enclosed before the Gate of a House, which from the same word we call a Court: And *Varro* giveth this reason of the Metaphor. *As in a Farm-house. saith he, many Out-buildings joyned together make one Inclosure, so a Cohort consisteth of several Maniples joyned together in one Body.* This Cohort consisted of three Maniples; for every Legion had ten Cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty Maniples: But these three Maniples were not all of one and the same kind of Soldiers, as three Maniples of the *Hastati*, three of the *Principes*, and three of the *Triarii*, as *Patricius* in his *Paralleli* seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd Manipule in every kind, that could not have been brought into any Cohort: But a Cohort contained a Manipule of the *Hastati*, a Manipule of the *Principes*, and a Manipule of the *Triarii*; and so all the thirty Maniples were included in ten Cohorts, and every Cohort was as a little Legion, forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of Soldiers that were in a Legion. So that making a Legion to contain five thousand Men, a Cohort had Five Hundred; and so these six Cohorts which he encamped on the other side of the River under the command of *Titurius Sabinus*, contained three thousand Soldiers: But if you make a Legion to consist but of Four Thousand Two Hundred, which was the more usual rate, there were two thousand five hundred and twenty Soldiers in these six Cohorts.

By this therefore it may appear that a Legion consisted of four sorts of Soldiers which were reduced into ten Cohorts, and every Cohort contained three Maniples, and every Manipule two Orders, and every Order had his Centurion marching in the head of the Troop, and every Centurion had his *Optionem*, or Lieutenant, that stood in the Rere of the Troop.

When a Legion stood ranged in Battel ready to confront the Enemy, the least Body or Squadron that it contained was a Manipule; wherein the two Orders were joyned together, making joyntly ten in front and twelve in file: And so every five Files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rere, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperours, their Battallions consisted of a Cohort, and never exceeded that number how great soever the Army were.

A Legion  
ranged in Bat-  
tel.

*Polybius* distinguishing a Manipule in two Centuries or Orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right Order, which was that Order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of *primus Ordo*; and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left Order; and in the absence of either of them, he that was present of them two commanded the whole Manipule. And so we find that the Centurion of the first place was called *Prior Centurio*: In which sense *Cæsar* is to be understood, where he saith that all the Centurions of the first Cohort were slain, *præter Principem priorem*. From whence we gather two things observable: First the priority between the Centurions of the same Manipule; for a Cohort consisting of three Maniples, whereof the first Manipule were *Triarii*, the second *Principes*, and the third *Hastati*, and every Manipule containing two Orders, and every Order a Centurion, he saith that all the Centurions of this Cohort were slain, saving the first or upper Centurion of the *Principes*. The second thing which I observe, is the Title of the first Cohort: For these ten Cohorts whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of Merit; and that which was held the most meritorious in the censure of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first Cohort; the next, the second Cohort; and so consequently unto the tenth and last.

The first Or-  
der.

3. De Belli  
Civil.

Prima Cohors.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of Preheminence, both in embattelling and in encamping, according either to the seniority of their Inrollment, or the favour of their General, or their own Vertue: And so we read that in these Wars in *Gallia* the tenth Legion had the first place in *Cæsar's* Army. And thus much concerning the Divisions and several Companies of a Legion, and the degrees of Honour which they held in the same.

Upon this description it will not be amiss briefly to lay open the most apparent Conveniences arising from this Discipline; the excellency whereof more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order which Nature hath observed in the frame of her noblest Creatures: For it is evident that such Works of Nature come nearest to perfect Excellency, whose material substance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part indued with that property which best agreeth to his peculiar service. For being thus furnished with diversity of Instruments, and these directed with suitable Abilities, the Creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other Bodies that are but slenderly labour-ed, and find less favour in Nature's Forge, being as Abortives, or barbarously composed, wanting the diversity both of parts and faculties, are no way capable of such excellent uses, not fit for such distinct Services, as the former that are directed with so many Properties, and enabled with the power of so well-distinguish'd Faculties. Which better works of Nature the *Romans* imitated in the Composure of their Army, dividing it into such necessary and serviceable parts as were blest

The benefit of  
this Discipline.



best fitting all Uses and Employments; as first Legions, and Legions into Cohorts, and Cohorts into Maniples, and Maniples into Centuries or Orders, and these into Files; wherein every Man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion: And thus the universal Multitude was by order disposed into parts, until it came unto a Unity. For it cannot be denied but that these Centuries were in themselves so sensibly distinguished that every Soldier carried in his Mind the particular Map of his whole Century: For in embattelling, every Century was disposed into five Files, containing twelve in a File; whereof the Leaders were always certain, and never changed but by Death, or some other special Occasion; and every Leader knew his Follower, and every second knew the third Man, and so on unto the last.

Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth how easie a matter it was to reduce their Troops into any order of a March or a Battel, to make the Front the Flank, or Flank Front, when they were broken and disfrankt to rally them into any Form, when every Man knew both his own and his Fellows Station. If any Companies were to be employed upon sudden Service, the General Idea of the Army being so deeply imprinted in the Mind of the Commanders, would not suffer them to err in taking out such convenient Troops, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the Action. At all occasions and opportunities these principles of Advantage offered themselves as ready means to put in execution any Design or Stratagem whatsoever: The Project was no sooner resolved on but every Man could readily point out the Companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their society was sweetened or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance and friendship one of another; the Captain marching always in the head of the Troop, the Ensign in the midst, and the Lieutenant in the rear, and every Man accompanied with his Neighbour and his Friend: Which bred a true and unfeigned Courage, both in regard of themselves and of their followers. Besides these particulars, the places of Title and Dignity depending upon this Order were no small means to cut off all matter of civil discord, and intestine dissension: For here every Man knew his place in the File, and every File knew his place in the Century, and every Century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and so every Soldier had his place according to his Virtue, and every place gave honour to the Man according as their Discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this Discipline hath dishonoured the Martial Government of this Age with bloodshed and Murthers; whereof France is too true a Witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English Forces that have been sent thither to appease their Tumults: For through defect of this Order, which alloteth to every Man his due place, the Controversie grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir John Burrowes, the Issue whereof is too well known to the World: wherein as our Commanders in France have been negligent, so I may not forget to give due commendation to the care which is had of this Point amongst the English Troops in the service of the States in the United Provinces, where they are very curious in appointing every Man his Place in the File, and every File in the Troop, and find much bene-

fit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the Roman Discipline.

To conclude this point, I will only touch in a word the benefit which the Romans found in their small Battalions, and the disadvantage which we have in making great Squadrons. And first it cannot be denied but that such Troops stand best appointed for disposition and array of Battel, which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most Men to fight with the Enemy: For the principal things which are required in setting of a Battel, are so to order the Troops, that the Depth in Flank may serve conveniently to withstand the assault, taking up no more Men than may well serve for that purpose, and giving opportunity to the rest to fight with the Enemy: And in these two points were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller Troops and Battalions afford this conveniency better than great Squadrons, which hide many able Men in the Depth of their Flanks, and never suffer them to appear, but when the breaking of the Squadron doth present them to the Butchery of the Enemy. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I have noted in the first Book, never carried above sixteen in Flank, and brought Five Hundred to fight in Front. And these little Battalions (considering them as they stood embattelled) made as great a Front or greater than that of the Phalanx, keeping a Depth answerable to the same; besides the second and third Battel, which always were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: Neither would their thick and close embattelling admit any such succour behind them. Now if we compare the advantages and inconveniences which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great Squadrons are not feasible but in plain and open places, where they may either stand immovable, or make easie and slow Marches without shaking or disordering their Body: But the lesser are a scantling for all places, champaign or woody, level or uneven, or of what site or quality soever. And to conclude, if two or three Ranks of these great Battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole Body is as much interested in the disorder as the said Ranks are, and hath less means to rally it self than any other lesser Company: But if any violence chance to rout a Maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Army than that part which it taketh: Neither can the disranking of any one Part betray the safety of the Army to Disorder and Confusion, forasmuch as their distinction served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the general uniting of their strength into one Body. More may be said concerning this matter; but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof to the judgment of our Commanders, and return to our History.

#### CHAP. IV.

The Belgæ attempt the surprize of \*Bibrax: Caesar sendeth succour unto it.

\*Bray in the County of Retell.

Here was a Town called Bibrax, belonging to the State of Rheims, about eight miles from Caesar's Camp, which the Belgæ thought to have surprized as they came along to meet with Caesar; and suddenly assaulted it with such fury that the Townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The Celtæ and Belgæ use one and the same manner in assaulting a Town: For having beset the whole compass of the Wall with Ranks of Souldi-



Souldiers, they never cease sling-  
ing of Stones until they find the Wall naked of Defendants; and then casting themselves into a *Testudo*, they approach to the Gate and undermine the Walls. Which thing was easily effected here; for so great was the number of them that threw Stones and Darts, that it was impossible for the Defendants to abide upon the Walls. As soon as the Night had made an end of the Assault Iccius of Rheims, a man of great birth and authority in his Country, who at that time was Governour of the Town, and had been before with Cæsar, to treat and conclude a Peace, sent him word by Messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same night about midnight (using the same Messengers for Guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers and Slingers of the Isles of Baleares to relieve the Town; by means whereof the Townsmen were put in good hope to make their Party strong, and the Enemy made hopeless of winning the Town: And therefore after a small stay having depopulated their Fields, and burned their Villages and Out-buildings, they marched with all their Power towards Cæsar's Camp, and within less than two Miles of the Army they encamped their whole Host; which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, took up more ground than eight Miles in Breadth.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

To take a town  
by surprize.

IN the Description of their assault, we are to observe two circumstances. The first is the manner they used in a sudden surprize: The second is, the form and quality of a *Testudo*. Although Cæsar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a Town as peculiar to the Gauls, yet we may not think but that the Romans used it as often as they had occasion to surprize any City: But because the Gauls knew no other means to take a Town but this, therefore he setteth it down as peculiar unto them. The Romans called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this Phrase *Cingere Urbem Corona*, forasmuch as the Soldiers enclosed the Town with a Circle, and so resembled a Crown or Garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple Crown of Soldiers which encompassed a Town: And Josephus telleth of *Scutapata*, which the Romans besieged *duplici peditum Corona*, with a double Circle of Footmen: And besides these there was a third Circle of Horsemen outmost of all. There is no further matter to be observed but this, that in surprizing a Town, they encircled it round about with thick continued Ranks of Men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entred as they could.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

A *Testudo*  
described.  
Lib. 49.

THE *Testudo* requireth a larger discourse, and is lively described in *Livy* after this manner. In the *Amphitheatre*, where the People did often assemble to see strange sights and publick Shews, were brought in (saith he) sixty lusty young Men, who after some Motion and seemly March, cast themselves into a square Troop, and roofing their heads close with their Targets, the first Rank which made the Front of the *Testudo*, stood upright on their Feet; the second Rank bowed it self somewhat lower; the third and fourth Ranks did more incline themselves, and so on to the last Rank which kneeled on the ground: And so they made a Body resembling half the side of an house, which they called *Testudo*. Unto this Squadron so strongly combined together, came two Soldiers running some an hundred and fifty foot off, and threatening each other with their Weapons, ran

nimbly up the side of the Roof; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an Enemy that would have entred upon it, sometimes again encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped up and down as steadily as if they had been upon firm ground. And which is more strange, the Front of a *Testudo* being applied to the side of a Wall, there ascended many armed Men upon the said *Testudo*, and fought in an equal height with other Soldiers that stood upon the said Wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the Soldiers that were in Front, and in the sides of the Square, carried not their Targets over their heads as the other did, but covered their bodies with them; and so no Weapons either cast from the Wall, or otherwise thrown against it, could any way hurt them; and whatsoever weight fell upon the *Testudo*, it quickly glided down by the declivity of the Roof without any hurt or annoiance at all.

Thus far *Livy*. Neither do I know what to say further of it: The chiefest use thereof was in a surprize or sudden attempt against a Town, before the Townsmen were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the Wall with safety, and so either to undermine it, or to climb up: And to that end they oftentimes erected one *Testudo* upon another. Tacitus saith that the Soldiers climbed upon the Wall *super iteratam Testudinem*, by one *Testudo* made upon another. And this was the ancient form and use of a *Testudo* in a sudden assault or surprize.

*Dio Cassius* in the Acts of *Antony* saith, that being galled with the *Parthian* Archers, he commanded his whole Army to put it self into a *Testudo*: Which was so strange a sight to the *Parthians*, that they thought the Romans had sunk down for weariness and faintness; and so forsaking their Horses, drew their swords to have made execution: And then the Romans at a Watchword given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and flight. *Dio* describeth the same *Testudo* after this manner: They placed, saith he, their Baggage, their light-armed Men and their Horsemen in the midst; and those heavy-armed Footmen that carried long gutter-riled Targets, were in the utmost Circles next unto the Enemy: The rest (which bare large oval Targets) were thronged together throughout the whole Troop, and so covered with their Targets both themselves and their Fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a Roof of Targets, which were so tiled together, that Men might safely go upon them.

Further, we oftentimes read that the Romans cast themselves into a *Testudo*, to break through an Enemy, or to rout and disrank a Troop. And this use the Romans had of a *Testudo* in field services, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a *Testudo* in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltred as a shell covereth a Fish. And let this suffice concerning a *Testudo*.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

THirdly, we may observe how carefully Cæsar provided for the safety of such Succours as he sent unto *Bibrax*: For he commanded the same Messengers that came from the Town to direct them, as the best and surest guides in that Journey; lest peradventure through ignorance of the Way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a War; but deserveth an extraordinary opportunity



portunity to persuade the necessity of this diligence: for a General that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the Countrey through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of Places, the quality of the Ways, the compendiousness of Turnings, the nature of the Hills, and the course of the Rivers, hath all these particularities as main advantages, to give means of so many several attempts upon an Enemy. And in this point *Hannibal* had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the Commanders of his time, in making use of the way by which he was to pass. But he that leadeth an Army by an unknown and undiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages as the other hath opportunities of good fortune. Let every Man therefore persuade himself that good Scouts are as the Eyes of an Army, and serve for lights in the darkness of Ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good Providence, and make the Path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. *Cæsar* in his Journey to *Ariovistus*, used the help of *Divitiacus* the *Heduan*, in whom amongst all the *Gauls* he reposed greatest confidence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would undertake his Voyage unto \* *Britain*, he well informed himself by Merchants and Travellers of the quantity of the Island, the quality of the People, their use of War, and the opportunity of their Havens. Neither was he satisfied with their Relations, but he sent *Caius Volusenus* in a Ship of War, to see what he could further discover concerning these points. *Suetonius* addeth moreover, that he never carried his Army *per insidiosa itinera*, through places where they were subject to be way-laid, unless he had first well discovered the places.

\* Now England.

The order which is to be observed in discovery.

Concerning the order which skilful Leaders have observed in discoveries, we are to know that this Point consisteth of two parts; the one, in understanding the perfect description of the Countrey; the second, in observing the motions of the Enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this or other Histories, that the *Romans* used the Inhabitants of the Countrey for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not err in so important a matter; provided always that their own Scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether rely upon a Strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were observed by the Horsemen: and these for the most part were *Veterani*, well experienced in the matter of War, and so the General received good Intelligence: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motion, unless they found it confirmed by divers ways; for some Spies may err, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the *Helvetian War*. If therefore the use and benefit which prudent and wise Commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the ignorant, have any Authority to persuade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient for this point.

#### The Fourth OBSERVATION.

THE Souldiers which *Cæsar* sent to relieve *Braxæ*, were Archers of *Creta* and *Numidia*, and Slingers of the Isles *Baleares*, which are now called *Majorca* and *Minorca*: which kind of Weapon because it seemeth ridiculous to the Souldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of these fiery Engines, I will therefore in brief discover the nature and use thereof.

The *Latins* (saith *Isidore*) called this Weapon *funda*, quod ex ea fundantur lapides, because out of it Stones are cast. *Pliny* attributeth the invention thereof to the Islanders called *Baleares*. *Florus* in his 3. Book and 8. Chap. saith, that these *Baleares* used three sorts of Slings, and no other Weapon besides; and that a Boy had never any meat given him before he had first struck it with a Sling. *Strabo* distinguisheth these three sorts of Slings which the *Baleares* used, and saith, that they had one Sling with long Reines, which they used when they would cast affar off; and another with short Reines, which they used near at hand; and the third with Reines of a mean size, to cast a reasonable distance. *Lipsius* saith, that in *Columna Antonina* at *Rome*, he observed that the *Balearean* was made with one Sling about his Head, another about his Belly, and the third in his Hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold: The first was Hemp or Cotton, the second Hair, and the third Sinews; for of any of these Stuffs they commonly made them. The form and fashion of a Sling resembled a platted Rope, somewhat broad in the middle, with an Oval Compass, and so by little and little decreasing into two Thongs or Reines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twice or thrice about their Head, and so to cast out the Bullet. *Virgil* speaking of *Mezentius*, saith,

*Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.*  
He fetcht the Rein three times about his head.

But *Vegetius* preferreth that skill which cast the Bullet with once turning it about the head. In *Suidas* we find that these *Baleares* did commonly cast a Stone of a pound weight: which agreeth to these names in *Cæsar*, *fundas libras*. The Leaden Bullets are mentioned by *Salust*, in the War with *Jugurth*, and by *Livy*, where he saith, that the Consul provided great store of Arrows, of Bullets, and of small Stones to be cast with Slings. This Weapon was in request amongst divers Nations, as well in regard of the readiness and easy reiterating of the blow, as also for that the Bullet flew very far, with great violence. The distance which they could easily reach with their Sling, is expressed in this Verse,

*Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.* Lib. 2.

*Fundum* according to *Varro*, is so much ground as a Man may sling over. Which *Vegetius* interpreteth to be six hundred Foot. Their violence was such, as the same Author affirmeth in his first Book and sixteenth Chapter, that neither Helmet, Gaberdine nor Crocket could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a Sling, was slain *sine invidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. *Lucretius*, *Ovid*, and *Lucan*, three of the Latin Poets say, that a Bullet skilfully cast out of a Sling went with such violence, that it melted as it flew: whereof *Seneca* giveth this reason, Motion, saith he, doth extenuate the Air, and that extenuation or subtilty doth inflame; and so a Bullet cast out of a Sling melteth as it flieth. Notwithstanding *Diodorus Siculus* affirmeth that these *Balearean* Slingers brake both Target, Head-piece, or any other Armour whatsoever.

Lib. 2. na. 1. quest.

There are also two other sorts of Slings, the one mentioned by *Livy*, and the other by *Vegetius*. That in *Livy* is called *Cestrophendo*, which cast a short Arrow with a long thick head: the other in *Vegetius* is called *Fustibalus*, which was a Sling made of a Cord and a Staff. But let this suffice

I 2

for

Slingers with their Art and Use.



for Slings and Slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light-armed Souldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending Towns and Fortresses, where the heavy-armed Souldiers could not come to buckle; and represent the place of our Harquebufiers, which in their proper nature are *levis armatura milites*, light-armed Souldiers, although more terrible than those of ancient times.

#### CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronteth the Belgæ in form of Battel, but without any blow given: The Belgæ attempt the passing of the River Axona, but in vain, and to their loss: The Consult of breaking up the War.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar at the first resolved not to give them Battel, as well in regard of their multitude, as the general fame and opinion conceived of their Valour: notwithstanding he daily made trial by light skirmishes with his Horsemen, what the Enemy could do, and what his own Men durst do. And when he found that his own Men were nothing inferiour to the Belgæ, he chose a convenient place before his Camp, and put his Army in Battel: the Bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain level, was no larger than would suffice the front of the Battel; the two sides were steep, and the front rose aslope by little and little, until it came again to a plain, where the Legions were imbattelled. And lest the Enemy abounding in multitude, should circumvent his Men and Charge them in the Flank as they were fighting, (which they might easily do with their number) he drew an overthwart Ditch behind his Army from one side of the Hill to the other, six hundred paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with Bulwarks, and placed therein store of Engines. And leaving in his Camp the two Legions which he had last enrolled in Lombardy, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour, he imbattelled his other six Legions in the front of the Hill, before his Camp. The Belgæ also bringing forth their Power, confronted the Romans in order of Battel. There lay between both the Armies a small Marish: over which the Enemy expected that Cæsar should have passed, and Cæsar on the other side attended to see if the Belgæ would come over, that his Men might have Charged them in that troublesome Passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides encountered between the two Battels: and after long expectation on either side, neither Party adventuring to pass over, Cæsar having got the better in the skirmish between the Horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own Men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conveyed all his Men again into their Camp. From that place the Enemy immediately took his way to the River Axona, which lay behind the Romans Camp: and there finding Foords, they attempted to pass over part of their Forces, to the end they might either take the Fortress which Q. Titurius kept, or break down the Bridge, or spoil the Territories of the State of Rheims, and cut off the Romans from provision of Corn. Cæsar having advertisement thereof from Titurius, pass'd over the River by the Bridge all his Horsemen, and light-armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himself. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans Charging their Enemies as they were troubled in the Water, slew a great number of them; the rest like desperate Persons, adventuring to pass over upon the dead Carcases of their Fellows, were beaten back by

force of Weapons: and the Horsemen encompassed such as had first got over the Water, and slew every Man of them.

When the Belgæ perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes of winning Bibrax, of passing the River, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their own Provisions began to fail them; they called a Council of War, wherein they resolved that it was best for the State in general, and for every Man in particular, to break up their Camp, and to return home unto their own Houses: and into whose Confines or Territories soever the Romans should first enter, to depopulate and waste them in Hostile manner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there give them Battel; to the end they might rather try the matter in their own Countrey, then abroad in a strange and unknown place, and have their own Household Provision always at hand to maintain them. And this the rather was concluded, forasmuch as they had intelligence, that Divitiacus with a great Power of the Hedui approached near to the borders of the Bellovaci; who in that regard made haste homeward to defend their Countrey.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**F**irst we may observe the Art which he used to countervail the strength of so great a multitude, by chusing out so convenient a place, which was no broader in Front than would suffice the Front of this Battel: and having both the sides of the Hill so steep, that the Enemy could not ascend nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back-part of the Hill strong by Art, and so placed his Souldiers as it were in the Gate of a Fortress, where they might either issue out or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain opinion of fool-hardy resolution, which favoureth of Barbarism rather than of true Wisdom; for he ever thought it great gain to loose nothing; and the day brought always good Fortune, that delivered up the Army safe unto the Evening; attending until advantage had laid sure Principles of Victory: and yet Cæsar was never thought a Coward.

And now it appeareth what use he made by passing his Army over the River, and attending the Enemy on the further side, rather than on the side of the state of Rheims: for by that means he brought to pass, that whatsoever the Enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the Land, his Forces were ready to trouble their Proceedings; as it happened in their attempt on Bibrax: and yet notwithstanding he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them as they passed over the River. For by the benefit of the Bridge which he had fortified, he transported what Forces he would, to make head against them as they passed over; and so he took what advantage either side of the River could afford him.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**A**nd here the Reader may not marvel, if when the Hills are in labour, they bring forth but a Mouse; for how soon is the Courage of this huge Army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruited of their Valour? but being hastily carried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an Enemy: which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability or lasting



lasting quality of all actions proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the mind that are carried with an untemperate violence, and favour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away even with the smock thereof, and bring forth nothing but leafurable repentance. And therefore it were no ill Counsel for Men of such natures, to qualifie their hasty resolutions with a mistrustful lingering; that when their Judgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.

But that which most bewrayeth their indiscreet intemperance in the hot pursuit of this enterprize is, that before they had scarce seen the Enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open Field, their Victuals began to fail them: for their minds were so carried away with the conceit of War, that they had no leisure to provide such necessaries as are the strength and sinews of the War. It was sufficient for every particular Man to be known for a Souldier in so honourable an action, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States in like manner thought it enough to furnish out forty or fifty thousand Men apiece, to discharge their Oath, and to save their Hostages, committing other requisites to the general care of the Confederacy: which being directed by as unskilful Governours, never looked further than the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the Roman Empire. And thus each Man relied upon anothers care, and satisfied himself with the present State of Affairs. So many Men of all sorts and qualities, so many Helmets and Plumed Crests, such strife and emulation what State should seem in greatest forwardness, were Motives sufficient to induce every Man to go, without further inquiry how they should go. And herein the care of a General ought especially to be seen, considering the weakness of particular judgements, that having the Lives of so many Men depending altogether upon his Providence, and engaged in the defence of their State and Countrey, he do not fail in these main Points of Discipline, which are the Pillars of all Warlike designs. To conclude this Point, let us learn by their error so to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, than it was before we first took it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous Arms tended to no other end, than to give *Cæsar* just occasion to make War upon them, with such assurance of Victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that War. And this was not only *gravius bellum successori tradere*, to leave a more considerable War unto his Successor, as it often falleth out in the course of a long-continued War; but to draw a dangerous War upon their heads that otherwise might have lived in peace.

## C H A P. VI.

The Belgæ break up their Camp, and as they return home, are chased and slaughter'd by the Romans.

*Cæsar.*

**T**His general resolution being entertained by the consent of the whole Council of War, in the second Watch they departed out of their Camp with a great noise and tumult, without any Order (as it seemed) or Government, every Man pressing to be foremost on his Journey,

and to be first at home: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof *Cæsar* having notice by his Spies, and mistrusting some practice, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Camp. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their departure, he sent first his Horsemen under *Q. Pedius* and *L. Aurunculeius Cotta*, two Legates, to stay the Rereward, commanding *Labienus* to follow after with three Legions: these overtaking the Belgæ, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the Rereward stayed, and valiantly received the charge of the Romans, the Vanguard being out of danger, and under no Government, as soon as they heard the Alarm behind them, brake out of their Ranks and betook themselves to flight: and so the Romans slew them as long as the Sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a Retreat, they returned to their Camp.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**I**T hath been an old Rule amongst Souldiers, That a great and negligent error committed by an Enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to Treachery. We read of *Fulvius*, a Legate in the Roman Army lying in *Tuscany*; The Consul being gone to *Rome* to perform some publick duty, the *Tuscans* took occasion by his absence, to try whether they could draw the Romans into any inconvenience; and placing an Ambuscado near unto their Camp, sent certain Souldiers attired like Shepherds, with droves of Cattel to pass in view of the Roman Army: who handled the matter so, that they came even to the Rampier of the Camp. Whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet until he had discovered their Treachery, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner *Cæsar* not persuaded that Men should be so heedless, to carry a Retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discamp his Men to take the opportunity of that advantage, until he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 308000 Belgæ were put to flight and slaughtered by three Legions of the Romans, for want of Government and Order in their departure.

## C H A P. VII.

*Cæsar* followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth \* *Noviodunum*. \* *Noyon*.

**T**He next day after their departure, before *Cæsar* they could recover themselves of their fear and flight, or had time to put themselves again in breath, *Cæsar*, as it were continuing still the Chase and Victory, led his Army into the Countrey of the \* *Sueffones*, the next borderers unto the Men of *Rheims*: and after a long Journey came unto *Noviodunum*, a Town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprize, as he passed along by it. For he understood that it was altogether unfurnished of defensive Provision, having no Forces within to defend it: but in regard of the breadth of the Ditch and height of the Wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his Camp, he began to make preparation for a Siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were received into the Town: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought unto the Wall, the Mount raised, and the Turrets built, the Gauls being amazed at the highness of the Works, such as they



they had never seen nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to treat of giving up the Town; and by the mediation of the Men of Rhemes obtained their suit.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

IN this relation we may observe the industrious Art which the Romans used in assaulting and taking Holds and Towns; wherein we find three sorts of Engines described, *Vinea*, *Agger* and *Turres*.

Lib. 4.  
A *Vinea* or  
Vine describ-  
ed.

*Vinea* is thus described by *Vegetius*: A little strong-built House or Hovel, made of light Wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the Roof was supported with divers Pillars of a Foot square, whereof the foremost were eight Foot high, and the hindmost six, and between every one of these Pillars there was five Foot distance. It was always made with a double Roof, the first or lower Roof was of thick Planks, and the upper Roof of Hurdles, to break the force of a Weight without further shaking or disjoyning the Building: The sides were likewise walled with Hurdles, the better to defend the Soldiers that were under it: The whole length was about sixteen Foot, and the breadth seven, the upper Roof was commonly covered with green or raw Hides, to keep it from burning. Many of these Hovels were joyned together in rank, when they went about to undermine a Wall: The higher end was put next unto the Wall, that all the Weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the Engine: The four sides and Groundsils had in every corner a Wheel, and by them they were driven to any place as occasion served. The chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the Soldiers as they undermined or overthrew a Wall. This Engine was called *Vinea*, which signifieth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were under the Roof thereof, as a Vine covereth the place where it groweth.

Agger or  
Mount.

*Agger*, which we call a Mount, is described in divers Histories to be a Hill or Elevation made of Earth and other Substance, which by little and little was raised forward, until it approached near unto the place against which it was built; that upon this Mount they might erect Fortresses and Turrets, and so fight with an advantage of Height. The matter of this Mount was Earth and Stones, Faggots and Timber. *Josephus* saith that at the Siege of Jerusalem the Romans cut down all the Trees within 11 Miles compass, for matter and stuff to make a Mount. The sides of this *Agger* were of Timber, to keep in the loose matter: the Forepart which was towards the place of service, was open without any Timber-work; for on that part they still raised it, and brought it nearer the Walls. That which was built at *Masfalia*, was 80 Foot high, and that at *Avaricum* 80 Foot high and 30 Foot broad. *Josephus* and *Ege- sippus* write that there was a Fortress in Judea 300 Cubits high: Which *Sulla* purposing to win by assault, raised a Mount 200 Cubits high; and upon it he built a Castle of Stone 50 Cubits high, and fifty Cubits broad; and upon the said Castle he erected a Turret of 60 Cubits in height, and so took the Fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these Mounts in the mouth of a Haven, and commonly to over-top a Town, that so they might fight with much advantage.

Towers or  
Turrets de-  
scribed.

Amongst other Engines in use amongst the Romans, their moveable Turrets were very famous: For they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with Wheels put under them were driven to the Walls of the Town. These Turrets were

of two sorts, either great or little: The lesser sort are described by *Vitruvius* to be sixty Cubits; high, and the square Side seventeen Cubits; the breadth at the Topp was a fifth part of the breadth at the Base, and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner Pillars were at the Base nine Inches square, and six Inches at the Top: There were commonly 10 Stories in these little Turrets, and Windows in every Story. The greater sort of Towers were 120 Cubits high, and the square side was 24 Cubits, the breadth at the Top was a fifth part of the Base; and in every one of these were commonly 200 Stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the Stories; for the lowest commonly was 7 Cubits and 12 Inches high, the highest Story 5 Cubits, and the rest 4 Cubits and a third part of a Cubit. In every one of these Stories were Soldiers and Engines, Ladders and casting Bridges, by which they got upon the Wall and entered the Town. The forepart of these Turrets was covered with Iron and wet Coverings to save them from Fire. The Soldiers that removed the Tower to and fro were always within the Square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new Water-Work by *Broken-Warfe* in London much resembleth one of these Towers.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

UPON the building of these mighty Engines, it was no marvel if the *Suessones* submitted themselves to such powerful industry. For whatsoever is strange and unusual doth much affright the spirits of an Enemy, and breed a motion of distrust and diffidency, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practices: For novelty always breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we apprehend it as diverse from the usual course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: And wonder, as it addeth worth to the novelty, so it inferreth diffidency, and so consequently Fear, the utter Enemy of Martial Valour.


#### CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the *Bellovaci*, *Ambiani* and the *Nervii*.

Cæsar taking for Pledges the chiefest of their City, and amongst the rest King Galba's own two Sons, upon the delivery of all their Arms received the *Suessones* to mercy: And from thence led his Army against the *Bellovaci*; who having conveyed both themselves and their goods into the Town called *Brataspantium*, and understanding that Cæsar was come within five Miles of the place, all the Elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to Cæsar's disposal, and would no longer bear Arms against the People of Rome. And so again when he was come near the Town, and had there set down his Army, the very Boys and Women appearing upon the Walls with extended hands (as their Custom is) besought peace of the Romans. For these *Divitiacus* became a Mediator, who after the Belgæ had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his *Hedui* Forces, and was returned to Cæsar. The *Hedui*, saith he, have always found in the *Bellovaci* a faithful and friendly disposition to their State: And if they had not been betrayed by their Nobility (who made them believe that the *Hedui* were brought in Bondage by the Romans, and suffered all Villany and


The *Bellovaci*  
taken to  
mercy.





CÆSARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in front







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

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
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Cariadges



CAESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand



and Despight at their hands) they had never withdrawn themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romans. The Authors of this Counsel perceiving into what great Misery they had brought their Country, were fled into Britany: Wherefore not only the Bellovaci, but the Hedui also in their behalf besought him to use his clemency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greaten the Esteem and Authority of the Hedui amongst the Belgæ, who formerly in their Wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Cæsar in regard of the Hedui and Divitiacus, promised to receive them to Mercy; but forasmuch as the State was very great, and more populous and powerful than other Towns of the Belgæ, he demanded six hundred Hostages. Which being delivered and their Armour brought out of the Town, he marched from thence into the Coast of the Ambiani: Who without further lingering, gave both themselves and all that they had into his power. Upon these bordered the Nervii; of whom Cæsar found thus much by enquiry, That there was no recourse of Merchants unto them, neither did they suffer any Wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their Country: For they were perswaded that by such things their courage was much abated, and their Vertue weakened. Further, he learned that these Nervii were a savage People, and of great Valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ for yielding their Necks to the Roman Yoke, openly affirming that they would neither send Embassadors, nor take peace upon any condition.

The Ambiani yield up themselves.

The Nervii.

\* Sambre near Namur.

Cæsar having marched three days Journey in their Country, understood that the River \* Sabis was not past ten Miles from his Camp; and that on the further side of this River all the Nervii were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romans. With them were joyned the Atrebatæ and Veromandui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of War with them. Besides they expected a Power from the Aduatici. The Women and such as were unmeet for the Field, they bestowed in a place inaccessible for any Army, by reason of Fens and Bogs and Marishes. Upon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his Spies and Centurions before to chuse out a fit place to encamp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendered Belgæ and other Gauls were continually in the Roman Army, certain of these (as it was afterward known by the Captives) observing the Order which the Romans used in marching, came by Night to the Nervii, and told them that between every Legion went a great sort of Carriages; and that it was no matter of difficulty as soon as the first Legion was come into the Camp, and the other Legions yet a great way off, to set upon them upon a sudden before they were disburdened of their Carriages, and so to overthrow them: Which Legion being cut off and their stuff taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this advice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of Horse, but what they did they were wont to do with Foot; that they might the better resist the Cavalry of their Borderers, whensoever they made any inroad into their Territories, their manner was to cut young Trees half asunder, and bowing the Tops down to the ground, plashed the Boughs in breadth, and with Thorns and Briars planted between them, they made them so thick, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or pass through them: So that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid Counsel not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to encamp in was a Hill of like level from the Top to the Bottom,

at the Foot whereof ran the River Sabis: And with the like level on the other side rose another Hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred Paces; the Bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with Wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these Woods the Nervians kept themselves close: And in the open ground, by the River side, were only seen a few Troops of Horse, and the River in that place was about three Foot deep.

Cæsar sending his Horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the Report which was brought to the Nervii: For inasmuch as the Enemy was at hand, Cæsar (as his Custom was) led six Legions always in a readiness, without burthen or Carriage of any thing but their Arms: After them he placed the Baggage of the whole Army. And the two Legions which were last enrolled, were a Rereward to the Army and guarded the stuff.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS treacherous practice of the surrendered Belgæ hath fortunately discovered the manner of Cæsar's March, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: Which is a point of no small consequence in Martial discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a War. Concerning the discreet ordering of a March, by this circumstance it may be gathered that Cæsar principally respected safety, and secondly conveniency. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of Hostility, he was content in regard of conveniency, to suffer every Legion to have the oversight of their particular Carriages, and to insert them among the Troops, that every Man might have at hand such necessities as were requisite, either for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be hem'd in by an Enemy, he then omitted convenient disposition in regard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his Legions in that readiness, that if they chanced to be engaged by an Enemy, they might without any alteration of their March or incumbrance of their Carriages, receive the charge in that form of Battel as was best approved by their military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate Progenitors.

The manner of the Roman March.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a March. 1. Safety. 2. Conveniency.

The old Romans observed likewise the same Rules; for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their Troops *Agmine Quadrato*, in a square March, which as *Livie* seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments which might hinder them in any sudden Alarm. Neither doth that of \* *Hirtius* any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith that Cæsar so disposed his Troops against the *Bellovaci*, that three Legions marched in Front, and after them came all the Carriages, to which the tenth Legion served as a rereward; and so they marched *pene Agmine Quadrato*, almost in a square March. \* *Seneca* in like manner noteth the safety of *Agmen Quadratum*, where he saith that where an Enemy is expected, we ought to march *Agmine Quadrato* ready to fight. The most material consequence of these places alledged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a March little or nothing differed from their usual manner of embattelling; and therefore it was called *Agmen Quadratum* or a square March, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts as were observed in *Quadrata Acie*, in a square Battel; for that triple Form

*Agmen Quadratum*.

\* Lib. 8. de Bel. Gall.

\* 60 Epist.



Form of embattelling which the Romans generally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each Battel, contained almost an equal dimension of Front and File: And so it made *Acie[m] Quadratam* a square Body; and when it marched, *Agmen Quadratum* a square March.

Lib. 6.

*Polybius* expresseth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the carriages: For he saith that in time of danger, especially where the Country was plain and champaign, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any accident the Romans marched in a triple Battel of equal distance one behind another, every Battel having his several Carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an Enemy, they turned themselves according to the opportunity of the place either to the right or left hand; and in placing their Carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood embattelled ready to receive the charge.

*Agmen longum.*

Lib. 5. de Bello Gal.

The contrary Form of marching, where the place afforded more security and gave scope to conveniency, they named *Agmen longum* a long March or Train; when almost every Maniple or Order had their several Carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easie both for themselves and their Baggage. Which Order of march as it was more commodious than the former in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous where the Enemy was expected: And therefore *Cæsar* much blamed *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, for marching, when they were deluded by *Ambiorix*, *Longissimo Agmine* in a very long Train; as though they had received their advertisements, from a friend, and not from an enemy.

The use that may be made of this, in our modern Wars.

And albeit our modern Wars are far different in quality from them of ancient times, yet in this point of discipline they cannot have a more perfect direction than that which the Romans observed as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conveniency: Whereof the first dependeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the Leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken than that manner of embattelling, which shall be thought most convenient if an Enemy were present to confront them? For a well-ordered March must either carry the perfect form of a Battel, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfection of strength which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly March, is diligently to observe the nature and use of each Weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest use and advantage, both in respect of their different and concurring Qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: And this knowledge will consequently infer the best and exactest disposition of embattelling, that the said Forces are capable of; which if it may be observed in a March, is no way to be altered. But if this exactness of embattelling will not admit convenient carriage of such necessary adjuncts as pertain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be relieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgment shall be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and ground, wherein their strength and safety consisteth may still be retained.

Neither can any Man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: He may exempli-

fy the practices of many great and experienced Commanders, what sort of Weapon marched in front, and what in the Rere, in what part of the Army the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their several judgments thought most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the Issue of all will fall out thus; that he that observed this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarry through an unsafe March. Let a good Martialist well know the proper use of diversity of Weapons in his Army, how they are serviceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his Battel, dispose of his March, and bestow his carriages, as shall best suit both with his safety and conveniency.

*Cæsar's* custom was to send his Cavalry and light-armed Footmen before the body of his Army, both to discover and straiten an Enemy; for these Troops were nimble in motion and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the Rere than in the Front, the Horsemen marched in the Rere of the Army, and gave security where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in *Africa* against the *Numidians*; he then removed them as he found it most convenient, and brought his Legionary Soldiers, which were the sinews and strength of his Forces, to march continually in the body of the Army and to make good that which his Horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the ancient prescription and uniformity of Custom, according as he found himself best able to annoy an Enemy, or make way to victory.



## CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their Camp: But are interrupted by the *Nervii*. *Cæsar* maketh haste to prepare his Forces to Battel.

**T**He Roman Horsemen, with the slingers *Cæsar*. and Archers, passed over the River, and encountered the Cavalry of the Enemy: Who at first retired back to their Companies in the Wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them; but the Romans durst not pursue them further than the Plain and open ground. In the mean time the six Legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortifie their Camp. But as soon as the *Nervii* perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood embattelled within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their Forces, and assaulted the Roman Horsemen: Which being easily beaten back, the *Nervii* ran down to the River with such an incredible swiftness, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the Woods, at the River, and charging the Legions on the other side: For with the same violence having passed the River, they ran up the hill to the Roman Camp, where the Soldiers were busied in their Intrenchment. *Cæsar* had all parts to play at one instant: The Flag to be hung out, by which they gave the Soldiers warning to take Arms, the Battel to be proclaimed by sound of Trumpet, the Soldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone far off to get turf and matter for the ram-pier, to be sent for, the Battel to be ordered, his Men to be encouraged, and the sign of Battel to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortness of time, and the sudden assault of the Enemy.

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




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


Prætoria


# MAINE CAMPE



Principia.




Quintana.







Decumana







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## The First OBSERVATION.

The description  
of the Roman  
Camp, with  
all the parts  
belonging unto  
it.

AS the Romans excelled all other Nations in many good Customs, so especially in their Camp-Discipline they strove to be singular: For it seemed rather an Academy, or a City of Civil Government, than a Camp of Soldiers; so careful were they both for the safety, and skilful experience of their Men at Arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their Soldiers to lodge one Night without a Camp, wherein they were Inclosed with Ditch and Rampier, as in a walled Town: Neither was it any new Invention or late found out Custom in their State, but in use amongst the ancient Romans, and in the time of their Kings. Their manner of Encamping was on this wise.

The Centuri-  
ons made  
choice of the  
Place.

The Centurions that went before to chuse out a convenient place, having found a fit situation for their Camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperors Pavillion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the Camp; from whence he might easily over-look all the other Parts, or any Alarm or *signum pugnae* might from thence be discovered to all Quarters. This Pavillion was known by the name of *Prætorium*, forasmuch as amongst the ancient Romans the General of their Army was called *Prætor*. In this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stuck up a white Ensign, and from it they measured every way a hundred Foot, and so they made a square containing two hundred Foot in every side; the Area or content whereof was almost an Acre of Ground: The form of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent among the other Tents, as a Temple is amongst the private Buildings of a City; and therefore *Josephus* compareth it to a Church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or Chair of the Estate, and the place of Divination, which they called *Augurale*, with other Appendices of Majesty and Authority.

The lodging of  
the Legions.

The Generals Tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the Pavillion lay most commodious for Forage and Water, and on that side they lodged the Legions, every Legion divided one from another by a Street or Lane of fifty Foot in breadth; and according to the degree of Honour that every Legion had in the Army, so were they lodged in the Camp, either in the midst which was counted most Honourable, or towards the sides, which was of meaner Reputation. And again, according to the place of every Cohort in his Legion, so was it lodged nearer the Pavillion of the Emperor, towards the Heart of the Camp; and so consequently every Maniple took place in the Cohort, distinguishing their pre-eminence by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward, according as they distinguished the place of their Legions. There went a Street of fifty in breadth overthwart the midst of all the Legions, which was called *Quintana*, for that it divided the fifth Cohort of every Legion from the sixth.

Quintana.

Between the Tents of the first Maniples in every Legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a way of an hundred Foot in breadth throughout the whole Camp, which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sat to hear matters of Justice, the Soldiers exercised themselves at their Weapons, and the Leaders and chief Commanders frequented it as a publick place of Meeting; and it was held for a Religious and Sacred Place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperor's Pavillion, in a direct Line to make even and straight the upper side of the Prin-

Principia.

*cipia*, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, every Tribune confronting the Head of the Legion whereof he was Tribune: Above them, towards the Head of the Camp, were the Legates and Treasurer: The upper part of the Camp was strengthened with some select Cohorts and Troops of Horse, according to the number of Legions that were in the Army.

The Tents of  
the Tribunes

*Polybius* describing the manner of Encamping which the Romans used in his time, when as they had commonly but two Legions in their Army, with as many Associates, placeth the *Ablesti* and *Extraordinarii*, which were select Bands and Companies, in the upper part of the Camp, and the Associates on the outside of the Legions.

The Ditch and the Rampier that compassed the whole Camp about, was two hundred Foot distant from any Tent: Whereof *Polybius* giveth these Reasons; First, That the Soldiers marching into the Camp in Battel-Array, might there dissolve themselves into Maniples, Centuries, and Decuries, without Tumult or Confusion; for Order was the thing which they principally respected, as the Life and Strength of their Martial Body; And again, if occasion were offered to Sally out upon an Enemy, they might very conveniently in that spacious room put themselves into Companies and Troops: And if they were assaulted in the Night, the Darts and Fire-works which the Enemy should cast into their Camp, would little endamage them, by reason of the distance between the Rampier and the Tents.

The space bet-  
ween the  
Tents and the  
Rampier.

Their Tents were all of Skins and Hides, held up with Props, and fastned with Ropes: There were eleven Soldiers, as *Vegetius* saith, in every Tent, and that Society was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefeft was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contubernii*.

Contuberni-  
um.

The Ditch and the Rampier were made by the Legions, every Maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Century; the approbation of the whole Work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: The Soldiers being girt with their Swords and Daggers, digged the Ditch about the Camp, which was always eight Foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the Earth thereof inward; but if the Enemy were not far off, the Ditch was always eleven, or fifteen, or eighteen Foot in Latitude and Altitude, according to the discretion of the General: But what scattling soever was kept, the Ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The Rampier from the brink of the Ditch was three Foot in heighth, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a Wall, with green Turfs cut all to one measure, half a Foot in thickness, a Foot in breadth, and a Foot and an half in length. But if the place wherein they were Encamped would afford no such Turf, they then strengthened the loose Earth which was cast out of the Ditch with Boughs and Faggots, that it might be strong and well-fastened. The Rampier they properly called *Agger*: The outside whereof, which hung over the Ditch, they used to stick with thick and sharp Stakes, fastened deep in the Mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked Stakes; which made the Rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. *Varro* saith, That the Front of the Rampier thus stuck with Stakes, was called *vallum à varicando*, for that no Man could stride or get over it.

The Ditch  
and the Ram-  
pier.

Agger.

Vallum.

The Camp had four Gates: The first was called *Prætoria Porta*, which was always behind the Emperor's Tent; and this Gate did usually look either

Prætoria  
Porta.



## The Second OBSERVATION.

Porta Decu-  
mana.Portæ princi-  
pales.Læva.  
Dextra.Castra Æsti-  
va.

Hiberna.

The Commodi-  
ty of this En-  
camping.

either toward the *East*, or to the Enemy, or that way that the Army was to March. The Gate on the other side of the Camp opposite to this, was called *Porta Decumana*, a *decimis cohortibus*; For the tenth or last Cohort of every Legion was lodged to confront this Gate: By this Gate the Soldiers went out to fetch their Wood, their Water, and their Forage, and this way their Offenders were carried to Execution. The other two Gates were called *Portæ Principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected Place which they called *Principia*, only distinguished by these Titles, *Læva Principalis* and *Dextra*, the Left and the Right-hand principal Gate. All these Gates were shut with doors, and in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, upon which were planted Engines of Defence, as *Balistræ*, *Catapultæ*, *Tolenones*, and such like.

The Romans had their Summer Camps, which they termed *Æstiva*, and their Winter Camps, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*. Their Summer Camps were in like manner differenced, according to the time which they continued in them. For if they remained in a place but a Night or two, they called them *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them *Æstivas* or *Sedes*: And these were more absolute, as well in regard of their Tents, as of their Fortification, than the former wherein they stayed but one Night. The other which they called *Hiberna* had great Labour and Cost bestowed upon them, that they might the better defend them from the Winter Season. Of these we read, that the Tents were either thatched with Straw, or roofed with Boards, and that they had their Armory, Hospital, and other publick Houses. These Camps have been the beginning of many famous Towns, especially when they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, upon the Banks of *Euphrates*, *Danow*, and the *Rhine*. The Order which they always observed in marking out their Camp was so uniform, and well known to the Romans, that when the Centurions had limited every part, and marked it with different Signs and Colours, the Soldiers entred into it as into a known and familiar City; wherein every Society or small Fellowship knew the place of its lodging: And which is more, every particular Man could assign the proper station of every Company throughout the whole Army.

The use and commodity of this Encamping I briefly touched in my First Book: But if I were worthy any way to commend the excellency thereof to our modern Soldiers, or able by perswasion to re-establish the use of Encamping in our Wars, I would spare no pains to achieve so great a good, and glory more in the Conquest of Negligence, than if my self had made some notable Discovery: And yet reason would deem it a matter of small difficulty, to gain a point of such worth in the opinion of our Men, especially when my discourse shall present Security to our Forces, and Honour to our Leaders, Majesty to our Armies, and terror to our Enemies, Wonderment to Strangers, and Victory to our Nation. But Sloth hath such interest in this Age, that it commendeth Vain-glory and Fool-hardiness, contempt of Vertue, and derision of good Discipline, to repugn the designs of Honour, and so far to overmaster Reason, that it suffereth not former harms to bear witness against Error, nor correct the ill achievements of ill directions: And therefore ceasing to urge this point any further, I will leave it to the careful respect of the Wise.

The Fury of the Enemy, and their sudden Assault so disturbed the Ceremonies which the Roman Discipline observed, to make the Soldiers truly apprehend the weight and importance of that Action, which might cast upon their State either Sovereignty or Bondage, that they were all, for the most part omitted: notwithstanding they are here noted under these Titles; The first was *Vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret*, the hanging out the Flag, which was the sign for betaking themselves to their Arms: For when the General had determined to Fight, he caused a skarlet Coat or red Flag to be hung out upon the top of his Tent, that by it the Soldiers might be warned to prepare themselves for the Battel; and this was the first warning they had; which, by a silent aspect, presented Blood and Execution to their Eyes, as the only means to work out their own safety, and purchase eternal Honour. The second was *Signum tubæ dandum*, the proclaiming the Battel by sound of Trumpet: This warning was a noise of many Trumpets, which they termed by the name of *Classicum à Calando*, which signifieth Calling; for after the Eye was fitted with Objects suitable to the matter intended, they then hastened to possess the Ear, and by the sense of Hearing to stir up Warlike Motions, and fill them with resolute Thoughts, that no diffident or base Conceits might take hold of their Minds. The third was *milites cohortandi*, the encouraging of the Soldiers: For it was thought convenient to confirm this Valour with Motives of Reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. The use and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged on in the *Helvetian War*, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my Speech might carry credit in the opinion of our Soldiers, or be thought worthy regard to Men so much addicted to their own Fashions. The last was *Signum dandum*, giving the sign; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselves from their Enemies. *Hirtius* in the War of *Africk* saith, that *Cæsar* gave the word *Felicity*: *Brutus* and *Cassius* gave *Liberty*; others have given *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like words, as might be ominous of good Success.

Besides these particulars, the manner of their Delivery gave a great Grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by Times and Seasons whereof *Cæsar* now complaineth, that all these were to be done at one instant of Time: For without all controversie, there is no matter of such consequence in it self, but may be much graced with Ceremonies and Complements, which like Officers or Attendants add much respect and Majesty to the Action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of less regard.

## C H A P. X.

## The Battel between Cæsar and the Nervii.

In these difficulties two things were a help to the Romans: The one was the Knowledge and Experience of the Soldiers; for by reason of their practice in former Battels, they could as well prescribe unto themselves what was to be done, as any other Commander could teach them. The other was,

Cæsar.



And therefore  
I rather take  
it to be some-  
thing else than  
a Word.

was, That notwithstanding Cæsar had given Commandment to every Legate, not to leave the Work or forsake the Legions until the Fortifications were perfected; yet when they saw extremity of Danger, they attended no countermand from Cæsar, but ordered all things as it seemed best to their own Discretion. Cæsar having Commanded such things as he thought necessary, ran hastily to encourage his Soldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth Legion; where he used no further Speech, than that they should remember their ancient Valour, have courageous Hearts, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their Enemies. And forasmuch as the Enemy was no further off, than a Weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gave them the sign of Battel: and hastening from thence to another Quarter, he found them already closed and at the encounter. For the time was so short and the Enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their Head-Pieces, or to uncase their Targets: So that what part they lighted into from their Work, or what Ensign they first met withal, there they stayed; left in seeking out their own Companies, they should lose that time that was to be spent in Fighting. The Army being embattelled rather according to the nature of the Place, the declivity of the Hill, and the brevity of Time, than according to the Rules of Art; as the Legions encountred the Enemy in divers Places at once, the perfect view of the Battel being hindered by those thick Hedges before spoken of, there could no Succours be placed any where; neither could any Man see what was needful to be done: And therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened divers Casualties of Fortune.

The Soldiers of the ninth and tenth Legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their Piles with the advantage of the Hill, did drive the Atrebatæ, breathless with running and wounded in the Encounter, down into the River; and as they passed over the Water, slew many of them with their Swords. Neither did they stick to follow after them over the River, and adventure into a place of disadvantage, where the Battel being renewed again by the Enemy, they put them to Flight the second time. In like manner two other Legions, the eleventh and the eighth having forced the Veromandui from the upper Ground, fought with them upon the Banks of the River; and so the Front, and the Left part of the Camp was well-near left naked. For in the right Wing were the twelfth and seventh Legions, whereas all the Nervii, under the Conduct of Boduognatus, were placed together; and some of them began to assault the Legions on the open side, and other some to possess themselves of the highest part of the Camp.

At the same time the Roman Horsemen, and the light-armed Footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the Camp, met with their Enemies in the face, and so were forced to fly another way. In like manner the Pages, and Soldiers Boys, that from the Decumane Port and top of the Hill had seen the tenth Legion follow their Enemies in pursuit over the River, and were gone out to Pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the Enemy in their Camp, betook them to their Heels as fast as they could. At the same time rose a great hubbub and outcry of those that came along with the Carriages, who being extremely troubled and dismayed at the business, ran some one way and some another. Which accident so terrified the Horsemen of the Treviri (who, for their Prowess, were reputed singular amongst the Gauls, and were sent thither by their State to aid the Romans) first when they perceived the Roman Camp to be possessed by a great multitude of the Enemy, the Legions to be overcharged and almost enclosed about, the Horsemen, Slingers, and

Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without any further expectation they took their way homeward, and reported to their State that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and that the Enemy had taken their Carriages.

Cæsar departing from the tenth Legion to the right Wing, finding his Men exceedingly overcharged, the Ensigns crowded together into one place, and the Soldiers of the twelfth Legion put into such close Order, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort being slain, the Ensign-bearer killed, and the Ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other Cohorts either slain or sore Wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that Legion, a Valiant Man, so grievously Wounded that he could scarce stand upon his Feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning Tail and forsaking the Field; the Enemy on the other side giving no respite in Front, although he fought against the Hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to that issue, that there was no hope of Succour or Relief for them: He took a Target from one of the hindmost Soldiers, (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the Front of the Battel, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, Commanded the Ensigns to be advanced toward the Enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might with greater facility and readiness use their Swords.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

THIS Publius Sextus Baculus was the chief Centurion of the twelfth Legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarii that was of the first Cohort in that Legion: For that place was the greatest Dignity that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio Primipili, or simply Primipilus, and sometimes Primopilus, or Primus Centurio. By him were commonly published the Mandates and Edicts of the Emperor and Tribunes: And therefore the rest of the Centurions at all Times had an Eye unto him; and the rather for that the Eagle, which was the peculiar Ensign of every Legion, was committed to his Charge, and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this Dignity without a special Profit, as may be gathered out of divers Authors. We read farther, That it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribuneship was expired, to be a Primipile in a Legion; notwithstanding there was a Law made, I know not upon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the Office and Title of P. S. Baculus.

The Place and  
Office of a  
Primipile.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

AND here I may not omit to give the Target any Honour I may: And therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsar's hand, as in the place of greatest Dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to contain two Foot and an half in breadth, overthwart the convex surface thereof, and the length four Foot, of what form or fashion soever they were: For the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their Legionaries; The first carried the proportion of that Figure which the Geometricians call Oval, a Figure of an unequal proportion, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the ends like unto an Egg, described in Plano: The other sort was of an equal proportion and resembled the fashion of a Gutter-Tile, and thereupon was called Scutum imbricatum. The matter whereof a Target was made, was a double Board, one fastened upon another with Lint and

The Target  
described.



Lib. 16.  
Cap. 40.

Bulls Glue, and covered with an Oxe Hide, or some other stiff Leather; the upper and lower part of the Target were bound about with a Plate of Iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the midst there was a boss of Iron or Brass, which they called *Umbo*. *Romulus* brought them in first among the *Romans*, taking the use of them from the *Sabines*. The Wood whereof they were made was for the most part either Sallow, Alder, or Fig-tree: whereof *Pliny* giveth this reason; forasmuch as these Trees are cold and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the Wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But forasmuch as the Target was of such reputation among the *Roman* Arms, and challenged such interest in the greatness of their Empire, let us enter a little into the consideration of the use and conveniency thereof; which cannot be better understood than by that comparison which *Polybius* hath made between the Weapons of the *Romans* and the *Macedonians*: and therefore I have thought good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

*Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.*

I Promised in my Sixth Book that I would make a comparison between the Weapons of the *Romans* and *Macedonians*: and that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies, how they do differ one from another; and in what regard the one or the other were either inferiour or superiour: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And forasmuch as the Armies of the *Macedonians* have given so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the Armies as well of *Asia* as of *Greece*, and that the Battels of the *Romans* have Conquered as well those of *Africa*, as all the Eastern Countries of *Europe*; it shall not be amiss, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen trial both of their Battels and Forces: that knowing the reason why the *Romans* do overcome, and in their Battel carry away the better, we do not as vain Men were wont to do, attribute the same to Fortune, and esteem them without reason, happy Victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of Reason and sound Judgment. Concerning the Battels between *Hannibal* and the *Romans*, and concerning the *Romans* losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Arms, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexterity and industry of *Hannibal*. But we have treated thereof when we made mention of the Battels themselves; and the end it self of that War doth especially confirm this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captain that was able to cope with *Hannibal*, he and his Victories quickly ceased. And he had no sooner overcome the *Romans*, but presently rejecting his own Weapons, he trained his Army to theirs: and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.

And *Pyrrhus* in his War against the *Romans*, did use both their Weapons and Order, and made as it were a Medley both of the Cohort and Phalanx: but notwithstanding it served him not to get the Victory, but always the event by some means or other made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not unfit that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seem to preju-

dice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the Phalanx, if it have the disposition and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it self against it, or to sustain the violence thereof; as may easily by many instances be proved. For when an Armed Man doth stand firm in the space of three Foot in so thick an Array of Battel, and the length of their Pikes being according to the first basis or scantling sixteen Foot, but according to the true and right conveniency of them fourteen Cubits, out of which are taken four allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt-end thereof, whilst he stands in a readiness to attend the encounter; being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest that the length of ten Cubits doth extend it self before the body of every Armed Man, where with both his hands he doth advance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which means it followeth, that some of the Pikes do not only extend themselves before the second, the third, and fourth Rank, but some before the foremost, if the Phalanx have his proper and due thickness, according to his natural disposition, both on the sides and behind: as *Homer* maketh mention when he saith, that one Target doth enclose and fortifie another; one Head-piece is joyned to another, that they may stand united and close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow, that the Pikes of every former Rank in the Phalanx do extend themselves two Cubits before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves: by which may evidently be seen the assault and impression of the whole Phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of sixteen Ranks in depth or thickness. The excess of which number of Ranks above five, forasmuch as they cannot commodiously couch their Pikes without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost Ranks, they grow utterly unprofitable, and cannot Man by Man make any impression or assault: but serve only by laying their Pikes upon the Shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the fways and giving back of the former Ranks which stand before them, to this end, that the Front may stand firm and sure; and with the thickness of their Pikes they do repell all those Darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those Ranks which are more backward.

And farther, by moving forward with the force of their bodies, they do so press upon the former, that they do make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the foremost Ranks should give back.

This therefore being the general and particular disposition of the Phalanx, we must now speak on the contrary part touching the properties and differences, as well of the Arms, as of the whole disposition of the *Roman* Battel. For every *Roman* Souldier for himself and his Weapon, is allowed three Foot to stand in, and in the Encounter are moved Man by Man, every one covering himself with his Target, and mutually moving whenever there is occasion offered. But those which use their Swords, do fight in a more open and distinct order; so that it is manifest that they have three Foot more allowed them to stand in both from Shoulder to Shoulder, and from Back to Belly, that they may use their Weapons to better Advantage. And hence it cometh to pass that one *Roman* Souldier taketh up as much Ground, as two of those which are to encounter him



him of the *Macedonian* Phalanx: So that one *Roman* is as it were to oppose himself against ten Pikes, which Pikes the said one Soldier can neither by any Agility come to offend, or else at close Fight otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him are not only unable to repel their Force, but also with conveniency to use their own Weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible that any Battel being assaulted by the Front of a Phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have its due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the *Romans* do overcome, and that those that do use the Phalanx are void of the hope of Victory? Even from hence, that the *Roman* Armies have infinite Advantages, both of Places and of Times to Fight in. But the Phalanx hath only one Time, one Place, and one Kind whereto it may profitably apply it self: So that if it were of necessity that their Enemy should encounter them at that Instant, especially with their whole Forces, it were questionless not only not without Danger, but in all probability likely that the Phalanx should ever carry away the better. But if that may be avoided, which is easily done, shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable, and free from all Terror? And it is farther evident, That the Phalanx must necessarily have plain and champaign Places, without any hindrances or impediments, as Ditches, uneven Places, Vallies, little Hills and Rivers; For all these may hinder and disjoin it. And it is almost impossible to have a Plain of the capacity of twenty *Stadia*, much less more, where there shall be found none of these Impediments. But suppose there be found such Places as are proper for the Phalanx: If the Enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time Spoil and Sack the Cities and Country round about, what Advantage or Profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? For if it remain in such Places as hath been before spoken of, it can neither relieve their Friends, nor preserve themselves. For the Convoys which they expect from their Friends are easily cut off by the Enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time that they leave them upon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose that the *Roman* Army should find the Phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure it self in gross at one Instant, but would by little and little retire it self; as doth plainly appear by their usual Practice. For there must not be a conjecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their Battel, that they do assault the Enemy altogether, making as it were but one Front: But part make a stand, and part Charge the Enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx do press them that come to assault them and be repelled, the Force of their Order is dissolved. For whether they pursue those that Retire, or fly from those that do Assault them, these do disjoyn themselves from part of their Army; by which means there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: So that now they need not any more to Charge them in the Front, where the force of the Phalanx consisteth, but to assault where the breach is made, both behind and upon the sides. But if at any time the *Roman* Army may keep his due Propriety and Disposition, the Phalanx by the disadvantage of the Place being not able to do the like, doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodness of their disposition, and the disposition of the Phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an Army: Which is, to march through places of all Natures, to Encamp themselves, to possess Places of Advantage, to Besiege, and to be Besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army, and oftentimes are the especial Causes of Victory, to which the *Macedonian* Phalanx is no way fit or convenient; forasmuch as neither in their general Order, nor in their particular disposition, without a convenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: But the *Roman* Army is apt for all these Purposes. For every Soldier amongst them being once Armed and ready to Fight, refuseth no Place, Time, nor Occasion; keeping always the same Order, whether he Fight together with the whole Body of the Army, or particularly by himself Man to Man.

And hence it happeneth, That as the comodioufness of their Disposition is advantageous, so the end doth answer the Expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the *Gracians* are of an opinion that the *Macedonians* are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered how the *Macedonian* Phalanx should be put to the worse by the *Roman* Army, considering the nature of their Weapons.

Thus far goeth *Polybius* in comparing the Weapons and Embattelling of the *Romans*, with the use of Arms amongst the *Macedonians*: Wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wise *Gracians* could best proportion it with that form of Battel, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: So that if our Squadrons of Pikes jump not with the perfect manner of a Phalanx, (as we see they do not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the Wisdom of the *Gracians*, and the experience of other Nations imputed unto it. But suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our Wars, which the nature of the Weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of *Polybius*, the said manner of Embattelling is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one Time, one Place, and one kind of Fight, I hold it not so profitable a Weapon as the practice of our Times doth seem to make it, especially in Woody Countries, such as *Ireland* is, where the use is cut off by such Inconveniencies as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtless, if our Commanders did but consider of the Incongruity of the Pike and *Ireland*, they would not proportion so great a number of them in every Company as there is; for commonly half the Company are Pikes, which is as much as to say in the practice of our Wars, That half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive Weapons, but only against a Troop of Horse. For they seldom or never come to the push of Pike with the Foot Companies, where they may Charge and Offend the Enemy: And for defence, if the Enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advantage to play upon them afar off with Shot, it affordeth small safety to shake a long Pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time to entertain a Volley of Shot with the Body of their Battalion. As I make no question but the Pike in some Services is profitable, as behind a Rampier, or at a Breach; so I assure my self there are Weapons, if they were put to Trial, that would countervail the Pike, even in those Services wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the upper hand, in the judgment of *Polybius*, of all other



other Weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of Embattelling, as the quality of the place wheresoever: For their use was as effectual in small Bodies and Centuries, as in gross Troops and great Companies; in thin and spacious Embattelling, as in thick-thronged *Testudines*.

Neither could the nature of the Place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert, level or unequal, narrow or large, if there were any conveniency to Fight, the Target was as necessary to Defend, as the Sword to Offend: Besides the conveniency which accompanieth the Target in any necessity imposed upon an Army, whether it be to march through places of all Natures, to make a quick March, or a speedy Retreat, to Encamp themselves, to possess Places of Advantage, to Besiege, and to be Besieged, as *Polybius* saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompany an Army. The use of this Weapon hath been too much neglected in these later Ages, but may be happily renewed again in our Nation, if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these Times in the best fashion, shall find any favour in the Opinion of our Commanders. Concerning which Target I must needs say thus much, That the light Target will prove the Target of Service, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: For those which are made proof are so heavy and unweildy (although they be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the use thereof) that they overcharge a Man with an unsupportable burthen, and hinder his agility and execution in Fight with a weight disproportionable to his Strength. For our offensive Weapons, as namely, the Harquebusses and Muskets are stronger in the offensive part than any Arms of Defence, which may be made manageable and fit for Service. Neither did the *Romans* regard the proof of their Targets further than was thought fit for the ready use of them in time of Battel, as it appeareth in many places both in the Civil Wars, and in these Commentaries: For a Roman Pike hath oftentimes darted through the Target, and the Body of the Man that bare it, and fastened them both to the Ground; which is more than a Musket can well do, for the Bullet commonly resteth in the Body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary Arm; yet it serveth to prove, That their Targets were not proof to their offensive Weapons, when they were well delivered, and with good direction. For I make no doubt but in their Battels there were oftentimes some hinderances, which would not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speak of: For in a Volley of Shot we must not think that all the Bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them; so slender Arms, and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a close Battel or Encounter a Man shall meet with more occasions suiting the nature and commodity of this light Target, than such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight which it carrieth with it.

Some Men will urge, That there is use of this Target of proof in some Places, and in some Services: Which I deny not to those that desire to be secured from the extremity of Peril. But this falleth out in some places, and in some particular Services; and hindereth not but that the universal benefit of this Weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important Affairs of a War.

Thus much I am further to note concerning the Sword of the Targetiers, that according to the practice of the *Romans*, it must always hang on the right side; for carrying the Target upon the left Arm, it cannot be that the Sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and inconvenience. And if any Man say, That if it hang on the right side it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out: I say, That the Sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the use of that Weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his Sword within the compass of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this Weapon will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the Pike and the Target.

## CHAP. XI.

The Battel continueth, and in the end Cæsar Overcometh.

**A**T the presence of their General the Soldiers conceived some better hopes; and gathering Strength and Courage again, when as every Man bestirred himself in the sight of the Emperour, the brunt of the Enemy was a little stayed. Cæsar perceiving likewise the seventh Legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore over-laid by the Enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little to join the two Legions together, and so by joining back to back, to make two contrary Fronts; and being thus secured one by another from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater Courage. In the mean time the two Legions that were in the Rearward to guard the Carriages, hearing of the Battel, doubled their pace, and were descried by the Enemy upon the top of the Hill. Titus Labienus, having won the Camp of the Nervii, and beholding from the higher Ground what was done on the other side of the River, sent the tenth Legion to help their Fellows: who, understanding by the Horsemen and Lacqueys that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Camp, the Legions, and the General was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down through extrem Grief of their Wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to Fight afresh; and the Pages and the Boys perceiving the Enemy amazed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their Weapons.

The Horsemen also striving with extraordinary Valour to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the Legionary Soldiers. Howbeit the Enemy in the utmost peril of their Lives shewed such Manhood, that as fast as the foremost of them were overthrown, the next in place bestrid their Carcasses, and fought upon their Bodies: And these being likewise overthrown, and their Bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained possessed themselves of that Mount of dead Carcasses, as a place of advantage, and from thence threw their Weapons, and intercepting the Piles returned them again to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered, That there was great reason to deem them Men of haughty Courage, that durst pass over so broad a River, climb up such high Rocks, and adventure to Fight in a place of such inequality; all which their Magnanimity made easie to them. The Battel being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Nervii being well near swallowed up with Destruction, the Elder sort with the Women and Children, that before the Battel were

con-



conveyed into Islands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, and saw now that there was nothing to hinder the Conqueror, nor any hope of safety to the Conquered, by the consent of all that remained alive sent Embassadors to Cæsar, and yielded themselves to his Mercy; and in laying open the Misery of their State affirmed, that of six hundred Senators they had now left but three, and of sixty Thousand Fighting Men, there was scarce Five hundred that were able to bear Arms. Cæsar, that his Clemency might appear to a distressed People, preserved them with great Care, granting unto them the free possession of their Towns and Country, and straitly Commanding their Borderers not to offer them any Wrong or Injury at all.

## OBSERVATION.

Lib. de Mil-  
tia Ju. Cæf.

And thus endeth the Relation of that great and dangerous Battel, which Ramus complaineth of as a confused Narration, much differing from the direct and methodical File of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good which learned Rhetoricians have observed in their Oratory, That an unperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by Ramus's leave, if any such confusion do appear, it both savoureth of Eloquence, and well suiteth the turbulent Carriage of the Action, wherein Order and Skill gave place to Fortune, and Providence was swallowed up by chance. For that which Hirtius saith of the overthrow he gave to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this, that he got the Victory, *Plurimum adjuvante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus interfunt, tum præcipue iis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari*; by the very great favour and assistance of the Gods; who, as they give aid in all cases of War, so especially in those where Reason and good Skill are at a loss. For so it fell out in this Battel, and the danger proceeded from the same cause that brought him to that push in the Battel with Pharnaces: For he well understood that the Nervii attended his coming on the other side the River Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his Camp in the face of an Enemy without fear or danger, as we have seen in his War with Ariovistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to Encamp himself with three Battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Arms to receive any Charge which the Enemy should offer to give, that the third Battel in the mean time might fortifie the Camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this Stratagem of the Nervii, and made the hazard less dangerous: But he little expected any such Resolution, so contrary to the Rules of Military Discipline, that an Enemy should not stick to pass over so broad a River, to climb up such steep and high Rocks, to adventure Battel in a place so disadvantageous, and to hazard their Fortune upon such inequalities. And therefore he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the Enemy had plotted his own Overthrow, if the Legions had been ready to receive them.

Which may teach a General that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too careful in his best advised directions; considering, that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an unrespected circumstance: So powerful are weak Occurrences in the main course of the weightiest Actions, and so infinite are the ways whereby either Wisdom or Fortune may work. Neither did this warn him to provide for that which an Enemy

might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him; as appeareth by that accident in the Battel with Pharnaces. Which practice of attempting a thing against Reason and the Art of War, hath found good Success in our modern Wars, as appeareth by the French Histories: notwithstanding it is to be cautiously made use of, as no way favouring of Circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *Temeritas non semper felix*, Rashness does not always speed well, as Fabius the Great answered Scipio.

The chiefeft helps which the Romans found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Helvetian War. Secondly, The experience which the Soldiers had got in the former Battels, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they carried themselves as Men acquainted with such Casualties. Lastly, The Valour and undaunted Judgment of the General, which overwayed the Peril of the Battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may observe, That as in a temperate Course, when the issue of the Battel rested upon his directions, he wholly intended wariness and circumspection: So in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of Danger with extremity of Valour, and over-topt Fury with a higher resolution.

## CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

The \* Aduatici before-mentioned, coming with all their Power to aid the Nervii, and understanding by the way of their Overthrow, returned home again; and forsaking all the rest of their Towns and Castles, conveyed themselves and their Wealth into one strong and well-fortified Town, which was compassed about with mighty Rocks and steep Precipices, saving in one place of two hundred Foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent: Which passage they had Fortified with a double Wall of a great height, and had placed mighty large Stones and sharp Beams upon the Walls, ready for an Assault. This People descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who, in their Journey into Italy, left such Carriages on this side of the Rhine, as they could not conveniently take along with them, and 6000 Men to look to them: who, after the Death of their Fellows, being many Years disquieted by their Neighbours, sometimes invading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a Peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

Cæsar.  
\* Either  
Doway or  
Belduc in  
Brabant.

At the first coming of the Roman Army, they sallied out of the Town, and made many light Skirmishes with them: But after that Cæsar had drawn a Rampier about the Town of twelve Foot in height, fifteen Miles in compass, and had Fortified it with Castles very thick about the Town, they kept themselves within the Wall. And as they beheld the Vines framed, the Mount raised, and a Tower in building afar off; at first, they began to laugh at it, and with Scoffing Speeches from the Wall, began to ask with what hands, and with what strength, especially by Men of that Stature (for the Romans were but little Men in respect of the Gauls) a Tower of that huge massie weight should be brought unto the Walls. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near unto the Town (as Men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof) they sent Embassadors to Cæsar to entreat a Peace, with this



this Message; They believed that the Romans did not make War without the special assistance of the Gods, that could with such facility transport Engines of that height, and bring them to close Fight, against the strongest part of their Town: And therefore they submitted both themselves and all that they had to Cæsar's Mercy, desiring one thing of him earnestly, which was, that if his Goodness and Clemency (which they had heard so high praises of) had determined to save their Lives, he would not take away their Arms from them; forasmuch as all their Neighbours were Enemies unto them, and envied at their Valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their Armour: So that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the People of Rome, than to be butcherly Murdered by them, whom, in former time, they had held subject to their Command.

To this Cæsar answered; that he would save the City rather of his own Custom, than for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Ram touched the Wall; but no condition of Remedy should be accepted without present delivery of their Arms: For he would do by them as he had done by the Nervii, and give commandment to their Neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such as had commended their safety to the People of Rome. This answer being returned to the City, they seemed contented to do whatsoever he commanded them: And thereupon casting a great part of their Armour over the Wall into the Ditch, insomuch that they fill'd it almost to the top of the Rampier, and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the Gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards Night Cæsar commanded the Gates to be shut, and the Soldiers to be drawn out of the Town, lest in the Night the Townsmen should be any way injured by them. But the Aduatici, having consulted together before (forasmuch as they believed that upon their submission the Romans would either set no Watch at all, or at the least keep it very carelessly) partly with such Armour as they had retained, and partly with Targets made of Bark, or wrought of Wicker, which upon the suddain they had covered over with Leather, about the third Watch, where the ascent to our Fortifications was easiest, they issued suddainly out of the Town with all their Power: But signification thereof being presently given by Fires, as Cæsar had Commanded, the Romans hastened speedily to that place. The Enemy fought very desperately, as Men in the last hope of their welfare, encountering the Romans in a place of disadvantage, all their hopes now lying upon their Valour: At length, with the slaughter of Four thousand, the rest were driven back into the Town. The next day, when Cæsar came to break open the Gates, and found no Man at defence, he sent in the Soldiers, and sold all the People and Spoil of the Town: The number of Persons in the Town amounted to Fifty three thousand Bondslaves.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

IN the surprise attempted by the Belgæ upon Bibract, I set down the manner which both the Gauls and the Romans used in their sudden surprising of a Town: Whereof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of War) they then prepared for the Siege in that manner as Cæsar hath described in this place. They environed the Town about with a Ditch and a Rampier, and Fortified the said Rampier with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a convenient distance one from another; and so they kept the Town from any Foreign Succour or Relief: And withal secured themselves from Salties,

or other Stratagems which the Townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of Siege was called *Circumvallatio*; the particular description whereof I refer unto the History of *Alesia*, where I will handle it according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE Ram, which Cæsar here mentioneth, was of greatest Note amongst all the Roman Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our Wars. *Vitruvius* doth attribute the Invention thereof to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadix, wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a Castle, they took a long Beam or Timber-Tree, and bearing it upon their Arms and Shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake down the uppermost rank of Stones; and so descending by degrees they overthrew the whole Tower. The Romans had two sorts of Rams; the one was rude and plain, the other artificial and compound: The first is that which the Carthaginians used at Cadix, and is pourtrayed in the Column of Trajan at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by *Josephus*; 'A Ram, saith he, is a mighty great Beam, like unto the Mast of a Ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of Iron fashioned like unto a Ram, and thence it took the name. This Ram is hanged by the midst with Ropes unto another Beam, which lieth cross a couple of Pillars: And hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of Men thrust forward and recoiled backward, and so beateth upon the Wall with his Iron head: Neither is there any Tower so strong or Wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.'

The length of this Ram was of a large scantling; for *Plutarch* affirmeth, That *Anthony* in the Parthian War had a Ram fourscore Foot long. And *Vitruvius* saith, 'That the length of a Ram was usually one hundred and six, and sometimes one hundred and twenty; and this length gave great strength and force to the Engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Century or Order of Soldiers; and their Forces being spent, they were seconded with another Century; and so the Ram played continually upon the Wall without intermission. *Josephus* saith, 'That *Titus*, at the Siege of Jerusalem, had a Ram for every Legion. It was oftentimes covered with a Vine, that the Men that managed it might be in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a Town had continued out until the Ram had touched the Wall, they could not presume of any acceptance of Surrender; forasmuch as by their obstinacy they had brought in Peril the Lives of their Enemies, and were subdued by force of Arms, which affordeth such Mercy as the Victor pleaseth.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

THE Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small security which one State can give unto another, that commendeth their safety to be protected by it: For as *Architas* the Pythagorean saith, 'A Body, a Family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain within themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a State, when their safety dependeth upon a Foreign Protection. For the old saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere*, Neither Walls nor Friends will save him, whom his own Weapons do not defend. Although in



in this case the matter was well qualified by the Majesty of the *Roman* Empire, and the late Victories in the Continent of *Gallia*; whereof the *Hedui* with their Associates were very gainful Witnesses: But amongst Kingdoms that are better suited with equality of Strength and Authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, unless the happy Government of both do mutually depend upon the safety of either Nation. For that which *Polybius* observed in *Antigonus*, King of *Macedonia*, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteem no Man either as a Friend or an Enemy, but as the Calculation of Profit shall find them answerable to their Projects. And contrariwise it cutteth off many occasions of Practices and Attempts, when it is known that a State is of it self able and ready to resist the Designs of Foreign Enemies, according to that of *Manlius*; *Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: Videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent*; Do but shew them War, and you shall have Peace: Let them see you are provided to repel Force, and they will do you nothing but right.

#### The Fourth OBSERVATION.

To give notice  
of an Alarm  
by Fire.

**T**He manner of signifying any Motion or Attempt by Fire, was of great use in the Night season, where the Fortification was of so large an extension: For Fire in the Night doth appear far greater than indeed it is; Forasmuch as that part of the Air which is next unto the Fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the Fire it self, and so it seemeth much greater than it is in substance. And contrariwise in the day time it sheweth less than it is; For the clear brightness of the Air doth much obscure that Light which proceedeth from a more gross and material Body: And therefore their Custom was to use Fire in the Night, and Smoak in the Day, suiting the clear Light with a contrary Quality, that so it might more manifestly appear to the beholder.

#### The Fifth OBSERVATION.

Lib. 25.

The Punishments which  
the Romans  
laid upon a  
Conquered  
Nation.

**A**ND albeit after the Victory, the *Romans* inflicted divers degrees of Punishment, according to the Malice which they found in an Enemy; yet, as *Flavius Lucanus* saith in *Livy*, there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew Mercy than the *Romans* were. The Punishments which we find them to have used towards a Conquered Nation were these; either they punished them by Death, or Sold them for Bond-slaves *sub Corona*, or dismissed them *sub Jugum*, or merced them in taking away their Territories, or made them Tributary States.

Of the first we find a manifest Example in the third of these Commentaries, where *Cæsar* having overthrown the *Veneti* by Sea, inasmuch as they had retained his Embassadors by Force, contrary to the Law of Nations, he put all the Senate to the Sword, and sold the rest *sub Corona*.

*Festus* saith That an Enemy was said to be sold *sub Corona*, inasmuch as the Captives stood Crowned in the Market-place, where they were set out to Sale: As *Cato* saith in his Book, *De re militari*, *Ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam Coronatus supplicatum eat; quam re male gesta Coronatus veneat*; That the People may rather, for

well performing, go to supplicate Crowned, than for ill performance be Sold Crowned. And *Gellius* affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another Reason, forasmuch as the Soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about to keep them together; and this standing round about was called *Corona*. *Festus* saith, That oftentimes they used a Spear, and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: Forasmuch as amongst the *Greeks*, by the Spear or Pike was signified the Power of Arms, and Majesty of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub Jugum*, their Order was to erect three Trees like a pair of Gallows, under which they caused all the Captives to pass, as a sign of Bondage: For they had so Conquered them by force of Arms, that they laid upon their Neck the Yoke of Thralldom.

*Livy* saith, That *Quintius* the Dictator dismissed the *Æquos sub jugum*; And this *Jugum* was made of three Spears, whereof two were stuck upright in the Ground, and the third was tied overthwart them. The Soldiers that passed *sub Jugum* were ungirt, and their Weapons taken from them, as *Festus* saith.

Sometimes again they took away their Lands and Territories, and either sold it for Money, and brought it into the Treasury, or divided the Land amongst the *Roman* People, or let it out to Farm: Of all which *Livy* hath many pregnant Examples.

Of the second sort the selling of the *Veji* in his Fifth Book, and of 7000 *Samnites* in his Ninth Book. Of the third, that remarkable example of passing the two Consuls *T. Veturius Calvinus*, and *Spurius Postumius*, with the Legates, Tribunes, and whole *Roman* Army *sub Jugum*, by *Caius Pontius*, Leader of the *Samnites*, in his Ninth Book. Of the fourth, in all kinds thereof frequently through his History.

### CHAP. XIII.

*Crassus* taketh in all the Maritime Cities that lie to the Ocean: The Legions carried into their Winter-Quarters.

**T**He same time *Pub. Crassus*, whom he had *Cæsar* sent with one Legion to the *Veneti*, *Unelli*, *Ofisimi*, *Curiosolitæ*, *Sesuvii*, *Aulerci*, and *Rhedones*, being the Maritime Cities that lay to the Ocean, advertised him that all those States had yielded themselves to the People of Rome. The Wars being thus ended, and all *Gallia* being settled in Peace, there went such a Fame of this War among other barbarous People, that from Nations beyond the Rhine there came Embassadors to *Cæsar*, offering both Hostages and Obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he then hastened into Lombardy, after he had placed his Legions in their Winter-Quarters, willed them to repair unto him again in the beginning of the next Summer. He himself therefore, after he had first disposed his Army into Winter-Quarters amongst the *Carnutes*, *Andes*, and *Turones*, Cities next to those places where his Wars had been, took his Journey forthwith for Italy. For these things, upon the sight of *Cæsar's* Letters, a general Supplication was proclaimed in Rome for fifteen days together: Which Honour before that time had happened to no Man.

Of this Supplication I will speak in the latter end of the fourth Book.



## *The Duke of ROHAN's REMARKS.*

**C**æsar's Judgment is observable in this Place, who, by his diligence secur'd those of *Rheims*, kept them from Revolting by his Industry and Mildness, and by his Prudence prepar'd a Division against those of *Beauvais*, a most Potent People, which prov'd of great use to him.

In the next place we must observe, That an Army of Thirty or Forty Thousand Warlike, well Disciplin'd Men, may with Patience, retrenching and lodging themselves carefully, dissipate the most numerous Armies, which for want of Provision destroy themselves; and when they engage (provided care be taken to avoid being surrounded by them) are ruin'd by Disorder and Confusion. This is sufficiently justifi'd by the Wars of the *Romans*, who never routed their Enemies but with an inferior number, nor were ever forc'd to come out of their Retrenchments to Fight against their Wills: And particularly in the present War, in which *Cæsar* found more work against one Province of the *Belgæ*, than against all the *Belgæ* together, he having given us a very particular description of the Battel he Fought against those of *Tournay*, as of one of the most dangerous that ever he was engag'd in, in which there are many things worthy of our consideration.

The First, That those of *Tournay* being inform'd that *Cæsar* caus'd his Baggage to march after every Legion, they resolv'd to put themselves in Ambush to Fight him, considering very prudently, That the Baggage separating the Legions, in a very close Country, it would be impossible for them to succour one another, and that consequently they might with all their Forces destroy every Legion apart.

The Second, That they were mistaken in their presupposition, by reason that tho' *Cæsar* made his Army March thus for his own convenience in Countries where he had no Enemies to Encounter, yet, when he came among his Enemies, he caus'd Six Legions to march together, all the Baggage after them, and two new Legions in the Rear, in which Order they Attack'd him in his Quarters.

The Third, *Cæsar's* own Confession, who acknowledges freely, That he was Attack'd so unexpectedly, and with so much Vigour, and in so close a Country, that it was neither his usual Order that sav'd him, (for they did not allow him time to put his Army in Battalia) nor his Exhortations, nor yet his presence in every place, (because he was forc'd to Fight where he chanc'd to be:) but he wholly imputes his Deliverance to the long Discipline of his Soldiers, who knew of their own accord how to place themselves, and to his exactness in causing all the Officers to remain in their Posts, while the Retrenchments of the Camp were making, so that no place wanted Men to Command, and others to Obey: which caus'd the Resistance, and hinder'd the Surprise.

The Fourth, That a rash Resolution proves often dangerous, and that to avoid it, a General ought never to omit any thing relating to Military Discipline.

And the Fifth, That considering the Conspiracy of the People of *Bois le Duc* (whom he Besieged in one of their strongest Holds) against him, after their Capitulation, we must learn to be always diffident of an Enemy, and to keep most upon our Guard, when we are upon the point of subduing him.



# The Third COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**T**His Commentary beginneth with an Accident which happened in the latter end of the former Summer, wherein the *Belgæ* had so thin a Harvest: And then it proceedeth to the War between *Cæsar* and the *Veneti*; *Crassus* and the *Aquitani*; *Titurius Sabinus* and the *Curiosolitæ*; and *Titus Labienus* with the *Treviri*,

### CHAP. I.

*Sergius Galba* being sent to clear the passage of the *Alpes*, is Besieged by the *Seduni* and *Veragri*.

*Cæsar.*

**C**æsar taking his Journey into Italy, sent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth Legion and part of the Horsemen unto the *Nantuates*, *Veragri* and *Seduni*, whose Territories are extended from the River *Rhone* and the Lake *Lemanus*, unto the tops of the highest *Alpes*. The end of this Voyage was chiefly to clear the *Alpes* of Thieves and Robbers, that lived by the spoil of Passengers that Travelled between Italy and Gallia. *Galba* having Order, if he found it expedient, to Winter in those Parts, after some Fortunate Encounters, and the Taking of some Castles and Holds, Embassadors coming to him from round about, and giving Hostages for their Fidelity, he concluded a Peace, and resolved to place two Cohorts of his Legion amongst the *Nantuates*, and himself to Winter with the other Cohorts in a Town of the *Veragri* named *Octodurus*. This Town being seated in a narrow Valley, and encircled about with mighty high Hills, was divided by a River into two parts; whereof he gave one part to the Gauls, and the other he chose for his Winter Quarters, and Fortified it about with a Ditch and a Rampier. After he had spent many days in his Winter-Quarters, and given Order that Corn should be brought thither for Provision; he had intelligence upon a sudden, That the Gauls in the Night-time had all left that part of the Town that was allotted unto them; and that the Hills which hung over the Valley wherein the Town stood, were possess'd with great multitudes of the *Seduni* and *Veragri*. The reasons of this sudden Commotion were chiefly the small number of the Roman Forces, not making a compleat Legion, forasmuch as two Cohorts Wintered amongst the *Nantuates*; besides many particular Soldiers that were wanting, some being gone to fetch in Provisions, and others, upon other necessary Occasions. And besides their being thus contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were perswaded, by reason of the steep descent of the Hill, that the Romans would not endure the brunt of the first Assault. Besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to have their Children taken from them under the Title of Hostages; and the *Alpes*, which Nature had exempted from Habitation, and placed as bounds be-

tween two large Kingdoms, to be seized upon by the Roman Legions, not for their Passage so much, as for their perpetual Possession, and to be united to their Province.

Upon these advertisements, *Galba*, not having as yet finished the Fortification of his Camp, nor sufficiently made Provision of Corn and Forage for the Winter Season, in that he little feared any motion of War, being secured of their Amity and Obedience, both by Hostages and Surrender, presently called a Council of War, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Council the Minds of many were so amazed with the terror of so unexpected a Danger, when they beheld the Hills covered with Armed Soldiers, the Passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, and no hope left of any Succour or Relief, that they could think of no other way for their Safety, than leaving behind them their Baggage and other Incumbrances to Sally out of their Camp, and so to save themselves by the same way they came thither. Notwithstanding the greater part concluded to reserr that resolution to the last push, and in the mean time to attend the fortune of the Event, and defend the Camp.

### OBSERVATION.

**W**hich advice, although at this time it tended to small effect, yet it better suited the Valour of the Romans, and favoured more of tempered Magnanimity than that former Hazard, which argued the weakness of their Minds, by their over-hasty and too forward Resolution. For as it imported greater Danger, and discovered a more desperate Spirit, to break through the thickest Troops of their Enemies, and so by strong hand to save themselves by the help of some other Fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of Terror, and a stronger impression of Fear, which can afford nothing but desperate Remedies: For desperate and inconsiderate Rashness riseth sooner from Fear, than from any other passion of the Mind. But such as beheld the danger with a less troubled Eye, and qualified the Terror of Death with the Life of their Spirit, reserving extremity of help to extremity of Peril, and in the mean time attended what Chances of Advantage might happen unto them upon any enterprize the Enemy should attempt; they, I say, gave greater scope to Fortune, and enlarged the bounds of changing Accidents.



## C H A P. II.

The Enemy setteth upon their winter-quarters:  
Galba overthroweth them.

Cæsar.

**T**He Council being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things as were agreed upon for their defence, but the Enemy at a watch-word given, assaulted the Camp on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting Weapons. The Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the Charge; neither did they spend in vain any Weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soever of their Camp seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of help, thither they came with succour and relief. But herein they were overmatched; for the Enemy being spent and wearied with fight, whensoever any of them gave place and forsook the Battel, there were always fresh Combatants to supply it. But the Romans, by reason of their small number, had no such help: For their extremity in that point was such, that no Man was permitted neither for weariness nor wounds to forsake his Station, or abandon his charge. And having thus fought continually the space of six hours, when both strength and Weapons wanted, the Enemy persisting with greater fury, to fill the Ditch, and break down the rampier, and their hopes relying upon the last expectation, P. S. Bacu. The Principles of that Legion whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Nervian Battel, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the Soldiers, a Man of singular Courage and Wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the only way of safety was to break out upon the Enemy and to try the last refuge in that extremity. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the Soldiers to cease a while from fighting, and only to receive such Weapons as were cast into the Camp; and so to rest themselves a little and recover their strength: and then at a Watch-word to sally out of their Camp, and lay their safety upon their valour. Which the Soldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the Avenues of the Camp, they gave no leisure to the Enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfy his judgment touching so unexpected an enterprize. And thus Fortune being suddenly changed, the Romans encompassing those who came with full expectation of spoiling their Camp, slew more than the third part of thirty thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay upon the Hills near about them. Having thus overthrown the Enemies whole strength and taken their Arms, they returned again into their Quarters.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

The force of  
Novelty, turn-  
ing the fortune  
of a Battel.

**W**Hich strange alteration lively describeth the force of Novelty, and the effectual power of unexpected adventures: For in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the Camp, and the Gauls charged it by assault, the Victory held constant with the Gauls, and threatened Death and Mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any means to recover hope of better success, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the Gauls, in that had they vehemently apprehended an opinion of Victory, by a set fight continuing the space of six hours, without any likelihood of contrariety or alteration. Which practice of frustrating a design intended by an indirect and cross Answer, served the Romans oftentimes to great advantage; as besides this present example, in this Commenta-

ry we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinius defeated the Unelli with the same stratagem, and overthrew them by a suddain fallying out, when they expected nothing but a defensive resistance from the Rampier. From whence a Commander may learn to avoid two contrary inconveniences, according as the quality of the War shall offer occasion: First (if other things be answerable, which a judicious Eye will easily discover) that a fally made out at divers Ports of a Hold, will much mitigate the heat of a Charge, and controll the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place, what advantage soever he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himself of good fortune, if he appoint certain Troops in readiness to receive the charge of any Salley, that the rest that are busily employed in the assault may provide to answer it without disorder or confusion. Which order if the Gauls had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.

## C H A P. III.

Galba returneth into the Province, : the Unelli give occasion of a new War.

**A**fter this Battel, Galba, unwilling to try Fortune any further, and considering that he had met with businesses which he never dreamed of when first he came thither to quarter, especially finding himself in want both of Corn and Forrage, having first burned the Town, the next day he returned towards the Province, and without lett or resistance brought the Legion safe into the Nantuates, and from thence to the \* Allobroges, and there he

Cæsar.

Savoyardi.

After these things were dispatched, Cæsar supposing for many reasons that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further fear of any new War, the Belgæ being overthrown, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alps subdued and vanquished, in the beginning of the Winter was gone into Illyricum, having a great desire to see those Nations. But there grew a suddain tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion: Pub. Crassus wintering with the seventh Legion in Anjou near unto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of Corn in those parts, he sent out the Prefects of the Horsemen and Tribunes into the next Cities to demand Corn, and other Provisions for his Legion: Of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent unto the \* Unelli, Marcus Trebius to the \* Curiosolitæ, Q. Velanius and Titus Silius to the \* Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest Authority amongst all the maritime Nations in that Coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with which they did traffick in Britany, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skill and experience of Sea-faring Matters; having command of as many Ports as lay to those Seas, and the most part of such as used those Seas Tributaries to their State. These Veneti first adventured to retain Silius and Velanius hoping thereby to recover their Hostages which they had given to Crassus. The adjacent Cities induced by their Authority and Example, (as indeed the resolutions of the Gauls are sudden and hasty) for the same reason laid hold upon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedy ambassages one unto another, conjured by their princes and chiefest Magistrates to do nothing but by common consent, and to attend all the same event of Fortune; soliciting also other Cities and States, rather to maintain that liberty which they had received of their Ancestors, than to indure the servile Bondage of a Stranger.

\* Le Perche.  
\* Cornoaille  
in Bretaigne.  
\* Vannes.

The



## The First OBSERVATION.

The weakness  
of our judg-  
ment in re-  
gard of the  
knowledge of  
future times.

THE circumstance in this History which noteth the sudden breaking out of Wars, when the course of things made promise of Peace, sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse in calculating the nativity of *After-chances*: Which so seldom answer the judgment we give upon their beginnings, that when we speak of happiness, we find nothing but misery; and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel, if when almost all Nations are at odds, and in our best conceits threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace: or if peace be in speech, soothing the World with pleasing tranquillity, and through the uncertainty of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater Wars in the end than the former time can truly speak of. Which being well understood, may humble the spirits of our haughty Politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times, under the premisses of their weak projects, and predestinate succeeding Ages according to the course of the present motion: When an accident so little thought of shall break the main stream of our judgment, and falsifie the Oracles which our understanding hath uttered. And it may learn them withal, how much it importeth a wise Commander to prevent an evil that may cross his design, (how unlikely soever it be to happen) by handling it in such manner as though it were necessary to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it self both the causes of his being, and the direct means to resist the repugnancy of a contrary nature: And so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

The authority  
of example.

THIS practice of the *Veneti* may instruct a circumpect Prince in cases of this nature, to have a more watchful eye over that Province or City which shall be found most potent and mighty amongst the rest, than of any other inferiour State of the same nature and condition: For as example of it self is of great authority, making improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intention shall sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerful means, and graced with the Act of superiour personages, it must needs be very effectual to stir up Mens minds to approve that with a strong affection, which their own single judgment did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this advantage to a Prince, which differency cannot afford, that albeit example do set on foot any rebellious motion, yet no supereminency shall authorize the same.

## CHAP. IV.

Cæsar having advertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia; and prepareth for the War.

Cæsar.

ALL the maritime States being by this means drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent an embassy unto Crassus in the name of them all, that if he would have his Men again, he must deliver up the Hostages which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, inasmuch as he was then a great way

distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and Ships of War to be built upon the River \*Loire, \*Ligeris; which runneth into the Ocean, and that Gally-Men, Mariners, and Ship-Masters should be mustered in the Province: Which being speedily dispatched, as soon as the time of the year would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacy understanding of Cæsar's arrival, and considering how heinous a Fact they had committed, in detaining the Embassadors and casting them into Irons, whose name is held sacred and inviolable amongst all Nations; prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, and especially such necessities as pertained to shipping and Sea-fights.

## The OBSERVATION.

FROM hence I may take occasion briefly to touch the reverent opinion which all Nations, how barbarous soever, have generally conceived of the quality and condition of Embassadors: And what the grounds are of this universally received custom, which in all Ages and times hath held authentick. And first we are to understand that all Mankind (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of human society, that albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are unnatural, as proceeding from corruption and defect) drive them into extream discord and disunion of spirit, and break the bonds of civil conversation, which otherwise we do naturally affect; yet without a necessary intercourse and traffick of society, we are not able to keep on foot the very discord it self in terms of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion and go to wrack, for want of these mutual offices performed by messengers: So straight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerful are the Laws which she enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end which might sort to the benefit of either party, (as there are many good uses thereof) yet to hold up the quarrel and keep it from falling, making War according to the grounds of reason, the intercourse of Messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their Persons to be touched with hateful violence: But that which the common reason of Nations hath made a Law, ought as religiously to be observed as an Oracle of our own belief. Secondly, forasmuch as the end of War is, or at the least should be, peace, which by treaty of mutual Messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no People may seem so barbarous as to maintain a War, which only intendeth Blood, and proposeth as the chiefest object the death and mortality of Mankind, no way respecting peace and civil government; such as refuse the intercourse of Messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are justly condemned in the judgment of all Nations as unworthy of human society. Last of all it is an injury of great dishonour, and deserveth the reward of extreme infamy, to revenge the Master's quarrel upon a Servant, and punish Embassadors for the faults of their State: Considering that their chiefest duty consisteth in the faithful relation of such Mandates as they have received; which may as well tend to the advancement and honour of that City to which they are sent, as to the dishonour and ruin of the same, whereof the Messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire War or Peace, the free liberry and holy order of Embassadors is reverently to be respected, and defended from brutish and unnatural violence.



## C H A P. V.

The Proceedings of either Party in the entrance of this War.

Cæsar.

**T**He Veneti conceived great hope of their enterprize, by reason of the strength of their Situation: Forasmuch as all the passages by land were broken and cut off with arms and creeks of the Sea; and on the other side navigation and entrance by Sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether unacquainted with the Channels and Shelves of the Coast, and there were so few Ports. Neither did they think that the Roman Army could long continue there without Corn, which was not to be had in those parts. And if it happened that the course of things were carried contrary to this probable expectation, yet they themselves were strong in shipping, whereas the Romans had none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and Islands of that Coast where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow Sea, to be far different from that which they were accustomed unto in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution they fortified their Towns, stored them with Provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes, against whom Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make War, taking the Osismi, Lexovii, Nannetes, Ambialites, Morini, Menapii, Diablintres, as Consorts and Partakers in this quarrel. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Cæsar to undertake this War: as namely the violent detaining of the Roman Knights; their rebellion after they had yielded themselves by surrender, and had given hostages of their Loyalty; the conspiracy of so many Cities, which being now neglected might afterward incite other Nations and States to the like insolvency. And therefore understanding that almost all the Gauls were inclining to novelty and alteration, and of their own nature were quick and ready to undertake a War; and further considering that all Men by nature desired liberty, and hated the servile condition of bondage, he prevented all further insurrections of the other States with the presence of the Roman Forces in several places at once; and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalry unto the Treviri, that bordered upon the Rhine: To him he gave in charge to visit the Men of Rheims and the rest of the Belge, to keep them in obedience; and to hinder such forces as might peradventure be transported over the River by the Germans, to further this rebellious humour of the Gauls. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus with twelve legionary Cohorts and a great part of the Horse, to go into Aquitain, lest there might come any aid from those Nations, and such considerable Forces joyn together. He sent also Q. Titurcius Sabinus with three Legions unto the Lexovii, Curibolitæ, and Unelli, to disappoint any practice which rebellious Minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chief Admiral of the Navy, and of those French Ships which he had got together from the Pictones, Santones, and other Provinces which continued quiet and obedient, he gave him in charge to make towards Vannes with what speed he could: And he himself marched thitherward with the Foot Forces.

Lendriguer.  
Lisieux.  
Nantes.  
Aurenche.  
Leondoul.  
Cities in little Bretagne.

\* Triers.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N the first Book I observed the authority which the Roman Leaders had to undertake a War, without further acquainting the Senate with the consequence thereof: In this place let us observe the care and circumspection which the Generals

had, who did not undertake a troublesome and dangerous War upon a humour, or any other slender motion; but diligently weighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the peril and hazard of the War, with the good consequence of the effect, informed their judgments of the importance of that action and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labour. And thus we find the reasons particularly delivered that moved Cæsar first to undertake the Helvetian War; and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrel with Ariovistus; then followeth the necessity of that War with the Belgæ; and now the motives which induced him to this with the maritime Cities of Bretagne; and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprize he attempted: which he layeth down as the grounds and occasions of those Wars, and could not be avoided but with the loss and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further let us observe the means he used to prevent the inclination of the Gauls, and to keep them in subjection and peaceable obedience, by sending his Men into divers Quarters of that Continent, and so settling the wavering disposition of the further skirts with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary Soldiers, which he sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning that they might not break out to the prejudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good success of his proceedings: Besides the advantage which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the upshot of that quarrel, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Army upon other services, the rest being sufficient to end that War.

## C H A P. VI.

The manner of their shipping, and their Sea-fight.

**T**He situation of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points and promontories, they could not at full Sea, which happened always twice in 12 hours, be approached by Foot-forces, nor yet with shipping; for again in an Ebb the vessels were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the Enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the Sea with Mounds which they raised equal to the Walls of the Town, and were at the point of entering and taking it; yet the Townsmen having such store of shipping, would easily convey both themselves and their Carriages into the next Towns, and there help themselves with the like advantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the Summer: For the Roman Fleet by reason of continual Winds and foul Weather, durst not adventure to put out of the River Loire into so vast a Sea, wherein the Havens and Roads were few and far distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Gauls was thus built and rigged: The Keel was somewhat flatter than the Romans shipping, the better to bear the Ebbs and Shallows of that Coast: The Fore-deck was altogether level and perpendicular; the Poup was made to bear the roughness of the Sea and the force of the Tempest. And in a word they were altogether built for strength: For the Ribs and Seats were made of Beams of a Foot square, fastened with Iron Pins of an Inch thick. Instead of Cables they used Chains of Iron; and raw Hides and Skins for Sails, either for want of Linen, or ignorant of the use thereof, or because Sails of linen would hardly serve to carry Ships of that burden, or endure the tempestuousness of those Seas, and the violence of the Winds.

The



The meeting and conflict of the Roman Navy with this kind of Ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness with force of Oars; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the Place, or the dangers of the foul Weather, were far inferiour unto them: for the strength of them was such, that they could neither hurt them with their Beak-heads, nor cast a Weapon to any purpose into them by reason of their great height. And if any gust chanced in the mean time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the Weather, their Shipping would better bear the rage of the Sea, and with greater safety skelter it self amongst Flats and Shallows, without fear of Rocks or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman Navy stood continually in danger.

## OBSERVATION.

The causes of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea.

And here let it not seem impertinent to the Argument which we handle, considering the general use which we Islanders have of Navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the Sea, as far forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a Soldier: which albeit they may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret: yet forasmuch as they stand for true principles of Regularity, and well-approved Rules in our Art of Navigation, let us take them for no less than they effect, and give them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those imaginary Circles in the Heavens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in Conceit and Supposal; yet forasmuch as they serve to direct our knowledge to a certainty in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the Globe of the World, as it maketh a right Sphear (for in that position the Naturalists chiefly understand Celestial influence to have operation in this liquid Element of the Water) it is divided by the Horizon and Meridian into four quarters: the first quarter is that between the East Horizon and the Noon Meridian, which they call a Flowing Quarter; the second from the Noon Meridian to the West Horizon, which they make an Ebbing Quarter; the third from the West Horizon to the Midnight Meridian, which they likewise call a Flowing Quarter; and again from the Midnight Meridian to the East Horizon, the second Ebbing Quarter: And so they make two Flowing Quarters, and two Ebbing Quarters of the whole Circuit of Heaven. The Instruments of these sensible qualities and contrary effects, are the Sun and Moon, as they are carried through these distinct parts of the Heaven. And although experience hath noted the Moon to be of greatest power in watry motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force which the Sun yieldeth in this Miracle of Nature.

The true cause of the Ebb and Flood, &c. are the subterranean Vapors that arise out of the Earth: These answer the Motions of the Sun and Moon, and so consequently are wrought on by their influences.

First therefore we are to understand, that when the Moon or the Sun begin to appear above the right Horizon, and enter into that part of the Heaven which I termed the first Flowing Quarter, that then the Sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount up to their Meridian altitude, so it encreaseth until it come to a high Flood. And again, as those Lights passing the Meridian decline to the West, and run the Circuit of the Ebbing Quarter, so the Water decreaseth and returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they set under the West Horizon, and enter into the second Flowing Quarter, so the Sea beginneth again to flow, and still encreaseth until they come to the point of the Night Meridian: and then again it ebbeth, ac-

ording as the Sun and Moon are carried in the other Ebbing Quarter from the Night Meridian to the West Horizon.

And hence it happeneth that in Conjunction or *Spring-tides* New of the Moon, when the Sun and the Moon are carried both together in the same flowing and ebbing quarters, that then the Floods and Ebbs are very great: and likewise in opposition or Full of the Moon, when these Lights are carried in opposite Quarters, which we have described to be of the same nature, either Ebbing or Flowing, that then in like manner the Tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolizing quarters wherein they are carried, do joyn their forces to make perfect this work of Nature in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise in a Quadrate Aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the Moon, when as the Moon is carried in a flowing quarter, and at the same instant the Sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of Nature doth necessarily require, then are the Tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And forasmuch as both the right Horizon and the Meridian also divide every diurnal Circle, which either the Sun or the Moon make in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that every Tide is continually measured with the quantity of six hours: and therefore that which *Cesar* here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of twelve hours there are always two high Tides. And lest any Man should imagine that every Inland City standing upon an ebbing and flowing River, may take the computation of the Tide according to this rule; let him understand that this which I have delivered is to be conceived principally of the Sea it self, and secondarily of such Ports and Havens as stand either near or upon the Sea: but where a River shall run many Miles from the Sea, and make many winding Meanders before it come to the place of calculation, it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, as not impertinent to Martial knowledge.

Concerning the Shipping of the Romans, whereof Posterity hath only received the bare Names, and some few circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Criticks of these times have laboured to set forth a Fleet answerable to that which the terms and Title mentioned in History seem to report: but yet the gain of their Voyage doth not answer their charge. For Many Men rest unsatisfied, first touching the Names themselves, whereof we find these kinds:

The manner of their shipping.

Names	<i>Longas.</i>	<i>Triremes.</i>
	<i>Onerarias.</i>	<i>Quadrirèmes.</i>
	<i>Actuarias.</i>	<i>Quinqueremes.</i>

The first we may understand to be Gallies or Ships of service; the second Ships of burthen; the third Ships that were driven forward with force of Oars; and the rest sounding according to their Names, for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a several sort of Shipping by themselves, or the general Names of the *Quadrirèmes*, *Triremes* and *Quinqueremes*, forasmuch as every kind of these might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*; as it yet remaineth in controversy, so it is not much material to that which we seek after. But that which most troubleth our Sea-Criticks is, in what sense they may understand these Vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadrirèmes*, and



and *Quinqueremes*: whether they were so termed in regard of the number of Rowers or Water-men that rowed continually at an Oar, as the custom of the Gallies is at this day; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of Oars on either side, a *Quadrireme* four, and a *Quinquereme* five, whereof they took their distinction of Names.

Lib. 28. Such as hold that a *Trireme* had on each side three ranks of Oars, and so consequently of a *Quadrireme* and *Quinquereme*, alledge this place of *Livy* to make good their opinion. In the Wars between *Rome* and *Carthage*, *Lælius* meeting with *Asdrubal* in the streights of *Gibraltar*, each of them had a *Quinquereme* and seven or eight *Triremes* a piece: the Current in that place was so great, that it gave no place to Art, but carried the Vessels according to the fall of the Billow: in which uncertainty the *Triremes* of the *Carthaginian* closed with the *Quinquereme* of *Lælius*; which either because she was *pondere tenacior*, as *Livy* saith, or otherwise for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices, facilius regetur*, in regard of the plurality of Banks of Oars which resisted the Billows and stemmed the Current, she sunk two of the *Triremes*, and so got the Victory. From hence they prove that a *Quinquereme* had *plures remorum ordines* than a *Trireme* had; and therefore it took the name from the plurality of Banks of Oars, and not from the number of Men that rowed at an Oar.

But the contrary opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum* to be a couple of Oars one answering another on each side the Vessel, which we call a pair of Oars: So that a *Quinquereme* being far greater and longer than a *Trireme*, had more pairs of Oars than a *Trireme* had, and those Oars were handled with five Men at one Oar, according to the use of our Gallies at this day.

The manner of Sea-fights. But to leave this, and come to their manner of Sea-fights: we must understand that the *Romans* wanting the use of Artillery, and managing their Ships of War with force of Oars, failed not to make use of their Art in their conflicts and encounters by Sea: for all their Ships of service, which we term Men of War, carried a strong Beak-head of Iron, which they called *Rostrum*, with which they ran one against another, with as great violence and fury as their Oars could carry them. And herein Art gave great advantage; for he that could best skill to turn his Ship with greatest celerity, and so frustrate an offer, or with speedy and strong agitation follow an advantage, commonly got the Victory.

Lib. 2. de bello civili. In the Battel which *D. Brutus* had with the *Maffilians*, we read that two *Triremes* charging the Admiral wherein *Brutus* was, one at the one side and the other at the other, *Brutus* and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time wound themselves from between them, and the two *Triremes* met with such a career one against another, that one brake her Beak-head, and the other split with the blow.

For this skill and fortune withal *Euphranor* the *Rhodian* was of great fame in *Cæsar's* time, although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that whom Fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserveth to a harder destiny; as other Sea-men besides *Euphranor* can truly witness.

This first brunt being ended, when they came to grapple and boarding one another, then the Art and Practices of their Land-services came in use: for they erected Turrets upon their Decks, and from them they fought with Engines and Casting-weapons, as Slings, Arrows, and Piles; and

when they entered, they fought with Sword and Target. Neither did the legionary Soldier find any difference when he came to the point between their Fight at Sea and that at Land; saving that they could not be martialled in Troops and Bands, in regard whereof the Sea-service was counted more base and dishonourable; and the rather, inasmuch as it decided the Controversie by Slings and Casting-weapons, which kind of Fight was of less honour than buckling at handy-blows.

## C H A P. VII.

The Battel continueth; and *Cæsar* overcometh.

The Romans having taken Town after another, the Enemies still conveyed themselves to the next; so that *Cæsar* deeming it but lost labour, whilst he could neither hinder their escape, nor do them any mischief, resolved to wait the coming of his Navy. Which was no sooner arrived, but the Enemy descrying it, presently made out 220 Sail of Ships well-appointed and furnished in all respects to oppose them. Neither did *Brutus* the Admiral, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his Navy know what to do, or what course of Fight to take: for the Shipping of the Gauls was so strong, that the Beak-head of their *Quinqueremes* could perform no service upon them; and although they should raise Turrets according to their use, yet these would not equal in height the Poup of the Enemies Shipping; so that therein also the Gauls had advantage. For as the Romans could not much annoy them with their Weapons, in regard they lay so low under them; so on the contrary their Darts must needs fall with great advantage upon the Romans. Yet one thing there was amongst their Provisions which stood them in great stead: for the Romans had provided great sharp Hooks or Sickles, which they put upon great and long Poles; these they fastened to the Tackling which held the Main-yard to the Mast; and then haling away their Ship with force of Oars, they cut the said Tackling, and the Main-yard fell down. Whereby the Gauls, whose only hope for their Navy consisted in the Sails and Tackling, lost at one instant both their Sails and the use of their Shipping: And then the Controversie fell within the compass of Valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gauls; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of *Cæsar* and the whole Army, no valiant Act could be smothered in secret; for all the Hills and Clifts which afforded near prospect into the Sea, were covered with the Roman Army.

Their Main-yards being cut down, and the Romans (though every Ship of theirs had two or three of the Enemies about it) endeavouring with great fury to board them, failed not to take many of their Ships: which the Gauls perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, and turning their Ships before the Wind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out very fitly for the Romans, who now fighting Ship to Ship, easily took them, insomuch that of so great a Navy very few (through the help of the Evening) escaped to Land, after they had fought the space of eight hours: with which Battel ended the War with the Veneti, and the rest of the Maritime Nations. For all sorts of People both young and old, in whom there was either Courage, Counsel, or Dignity, were present at this Battel, and all the Shipping they could possibly make was here ingaged, taken and lost; so that such as remained knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their Towns any longer; and there-



therefore yielded themselves to Cæsar: towards whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous People not to violate the Law of Nations by injuring Embassadors: for he slew all the Senate with the Sword, and sold the People for Bond-slaves.

## OBSERVATION.

The force of Industry.

IN this Battel I chiefly observe the good fortune which usually attendeth upon Industry: for amongst other provisions which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this War, they had made ready these Hooks, not for this intent wherein they were employed, but at all occasions and chances that might happen, as serviceable implements rather than principal instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proved the only means to overthrow the Gauls. Which proveth true the saying of Cæsar, That Industry commandeth Fortune, and buyeth good success with extraordinary labour: for Industry in Action is as Importunity in Speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of Reason, and striveth through continual pursuit, to make good the motives by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition which will easily admit whatsoever is required. In like manner, diligence and laborious industry, by circumspect and heedful carriage, seldom fail either by hap or cunning to make good that part whereon the main point of the matter dependeth. For every action is entangled with many infinite Adherents, which are so interested in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these Adherents, some of them are by Wisdom foreseen, and directed to that course which may fortunate the action; the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, and are all under the Regiment of Fortune; forasmuch as they are beyond the compass of our wisest reach, and in the way either to assist or disadvantage. Of these Industry hath greatest Authority, inasmuch as she armeth her self for all chances, whereby she is said to command Fortune.

## CHAP. VIII.

\* La Perche. Sabinus overthroweth the \* Unelli, with the manner thereof.

Cæsar.

WHILE these things happened in the state of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entred with his Forces into the confines of the Unelli. Over these Viridovix ruled, who was at present made Commander in chief of all the revolted Cities, which furnished him with a great and potent Army. Besides this, the \* Aulerci, † Eburonices, and Lexovii having slain their Senate, because they would not countenance the War, shut their Gates, and joyned with Viridovix. Also there came great multitudes to them out of Gallia, Men of broken fortunes, Thieves and Robbers, whom the hope of prey and spoil had made to prefer the Wars before Husbandry and Day-labour. Sabinus encamping himself in a convenient place, kept his Soldiers within the Rampier. But Viridovix being lodged within less than two Miles of Sabinus his Camp, brought out his Forces daily, and putting them in Battel, gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the Enemy of Cowardice, but to be taunted with the reproachful speeches of his own

Soldiers. The opinion of his being fearful thus settled in the minds of the Enemy, he used all means to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approach the very Rampier of the Camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this general persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtle-witted Gaul, an Auxiliary in his Army, whom he persuaded with great rewards and further promises to fly to the Enemy, and there to carry himself according to the instructions which he should give him. This Gaul coming as a revolter to the Enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans; the extremity that Cæsar was driven into by the Veneti; and that the night following Sabinus was about to withdraw his Forces secretly out of his Camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Cæsar. Upon which advertisement, they all cryed out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other devises, they would go and assault the Roman Camp. Many circumstances persuaded the Gauls to this resolution: as first the lingring and doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered Battel; secondly, the intelligence which this Fugitive had brought; thirdly, the want of Victuals, wherein they had been negligent and unadvisedly careless; fourthly, the hope they conceived of the War of Vannes; and lastly, for that Men willingly believe that which they would have come to pass. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridovix nor the rest of the Captains to dismiss the Council, until they had yielded that they should take Arms, and go to the Roman Camp. Which being granted, they gathered Rubbish and Faggots to fill up the Ditch; and with chearful hearts, as though the Victory were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was encamped; which was the top of a Hill, rising gently from a level, the quantity of one thousand Paces. Hither the Gauls hastened with all expedition: and to the intent the Romans might not have so much time as to put on their Armour, the Gauls for haste ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus encouraging his Soldiers, gave the sign of Battel; and sallying out at two several Inlets of his Camp upon the Enemy, who were hindred with their loads of Rubbish, it fell out that through the opportunity of the place, the weariness and unexperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Roman Soldier, and their exercise in former Battels, that the Gauls could not endure the brunt of the first Encounter, but presently betook themselves to flight. Ours being fresh and lusty pursued after and slew great numbers of them: then chasing their Horse, suffered very few of them to save themselves by flight. And so it happened, that at one time Sabinus had News of the overthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus's Victory by Land. Upon these Victories all the Cities and States yielded themselves to Titurius: for as the Gauls are forward to undertake a War, so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an Enemy, as to draw them into an inconvenience, and so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of Battel. Cæsar coming to succour the Camp of Cicero, made such use of this Art, that he put to rout a great Army of the Gauls with a handful of Men:

M

which

The use which the Romans made of a counterfeit fear. Lib. 5.

\* Roane.  
† Eureux.



which I will refer unto the place where it is particularly set down by *Cæsar*.

The chiefest thing in this place which brought them to their overthrow was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in business of small consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind shall dispose her self to one only intent, and in the upshot meet with a contrary matter to cross her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of Victory, and humour our conceits with that we wish and would have to happen, and in the end meet either with bondage or death, must our best Wits be appalled, having neither respite nor means to think how the evil may be best prevented? Which the wise Romans well understood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproached with shameful Cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of Wisdom; while they in the mean time foresaw their good fortunes, shrowded under the Cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these Examples instruct a Leader so to take the opportunity of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefest points of Order and Discipline, as well for the better effecting of the design, as for his own safety, and the security of his Army. For Order is as the sinews and strength of Martial Discipline, uniting the particular Members into the firm composition of a well-proportioned Body: and so it maketh it more powerful than any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soever.

I might here alledge infinite Examples to confirm this truth: but let the Battel of *Dreux* serve for all; wherein the Protestants, overcharging the Catholick Army, followed the retreat so hard, that they quickly became Masters of the Field; and then neglecting Martial Discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the Victory more glorious by slaughter and mortality. The Duke of *Guise* all this while budged not a foot; but in unexampled patience kept his Regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their General that was taken, until the Regiment of the Prince of *Conde* was likewise dispersed and broken: and then perceiving no difference of order between the victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholick, he dissolved that terrible Cloud that had hung so long in suspense, and so changed the fortune of the day, that he took the chiefest of their Princes prisoners, with little or no loss of his own Men: So powerful is Order in the deeds of Arms, and of such consequence in obtaining Victory. And thus we have first seen the inconveniences which a counterfeit fear, well dissembled, may cast upon a credulous and unadvised Enemy, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their own credulity doth afterward avouch: and secondly, what strength and safety consisteth in Order; and how powerful it is to throw down, and to set up.

#### CHAP. IX.

##### The Proceedings of *Crassus* in *Aquitain*.

*Cæsar.*

**A**T the same instant of time it happened also, that Pub. *Crassus* coming into *Aquitania* (which both in regard of the large extent of the Countrey, as also for the multitude of the Inhabitants, was named the third part of *Gallia*) and considering that he was to make War in those

parts where *L. Valerius Præconius* the Legate was slain, and the Army overthrown, and where *Lucius Manilius* was fain to fly, with the loss of his Carriages; he thought that his Affairs required no mean diligence: and therefore having made provision of Corn, and mustered many Auxiliary Forces, and \* sent for many valiant and prudent Men by name *Evocati*, from *Tolouse*, *Carcafone*, and *Narbone*, Cities bordering upon the Province, he carried his Army into the confines of the *Sontiates*. Which was no sooner known, but they levied great Forces both of Horse and Foot, and with their Horse, in which their principal strength consisted, charged upon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as ours followed the retreat, suddenly the Infantry of the Gauls shewed it self in a Valley as it lay in ambush. These setting upon the Romans renewed the Battel, and there the Fight continued hot a long time. The *Sontiates* being animated with the former Victories, saw all the hope of *Aquitain* rely upon their virtue; and the Romans on the other side desired to shew what they were able to do of themselves, without their grand Captain, and under the conduct of a young Soldier. At length the Enemy overpowered with Prowess, and wearied with Wounds, betook themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number, and then marched directly to the Town of the *Sontiates*, and laid siege unto it: the siege grew hot, the Romans approaching the Walls with Vines, Turrets, and Mounts. The Townsmen defended themselves sometimes by sallying out, sometimes by undermining the Mounts and Fortifications, wherein the *Aquitani* are very skilfull. But when they perceived the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated *Crassus* to accept their Surrender. Which being granted, and all the Army intending the delivery of their Arms, *Adcantuanus* their chief Magistrate fled out in the mean time at another Port of the City, with six hundred devoted Companions, whom they called *Soldurii*; whose manner is, to enjoy all good things in common with those whom they have chosen for their Friends; and if any misfortune befall them, either to die with them, or presently kill themselves: neither was it ever known in the memory of Man, that any of them refused to die when his Friend was slain. But as they attempted to escape, the Soldiers that kept that part of the Fortification, as they signified his evasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betook themselves to Arms, and so after a sharp conflict, repelled him again into the Town; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissive multitude; which was granted. *Crassus*, having taken Hostages of them, went into the confines of the *Vocates* and *Tarulates*.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**T**Hese skilfull and experienced Men which *Crassus* sent for out of all the Cities in *Aquitain*, were those whom the Romans called *Evocati*, such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their Laws from giving their names in Musters, either by reason of their years, or the Magistracy which they had born, or for some other causes which gave them that privilege: and in that regard were sent for by Letters, intreating their assistance in the carriage of that War, as Men well acquainted with the nature of such business. Their places were nothing inferior to the Centurions for advise and direction, although they had no part in Command or Authority.

The



## The Second OBSERVATION.

## CHAP. X.

IN this fight we may further observe their manner of defence against Mounts and Cavaliero's; which we find chiefly to be Mines. *Josaphus* in the *Jewish War* saith, that the *Romans* having raised an exceeding high Mount, the *Jews* undermined the same with such Art, that as they digged underneath, they supported the Mount with huge Props and Planks that it might not shrink: And watching a time of greatest advantage, they set all the timber-work which underpropped the Mount, on fire; which taking fire with the help of Brimstone and Pitch, the Mount fell upon a sudden, to the great terror and amazement of the *Romans*.

Lib. 7. de  
Bello Gal.

At the Siege of *Avaricum*, we find how the *Gauls* by undermining did take the Earth from the Mount, as fast as it was carried unto it by the *Romans*; and so kept it from rising, and made it uneffectual. But if it were for the most part made of Wood, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all means to burn it; as it happened at the Siege of *Massilia*: And oftentimes when both burning and undermining failed, they confronted it with another Mount within the Walls, to disappoint the disadvantage by equal contesting of it, and so made it unprofitable.

Concerning Mines, thus much may I say without prejudice to that Art, that the chiefest points to be respected, are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instrument and help of Geometry, where other marks of certainty are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not err in our course which the Compass affordeth. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermining and cross-meeting. All which parts have very many Circumstances, and require a larger discourse than may be thought pertinent for this place.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

THE strange contract between these *Soldurii* and their Chieftain may well deserve a place amongst these observations, especially considering the obligatory conditions which either party stood bound to observe: For the Captain was to make his *Soldurii* partakers of all his happiness in this life, in regard whereof they were to take part of whatsoever ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death which, is the last end of all sensual misery, took hold of their head, these devoted were tied voluntarily to follow him the self-same way: Neither in any memory was there (saith he) ever Man found that refused to die, if he to whom he was devoted chanced to be slain. Which bloody league of amity as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destiny to a general calamity; so was it dangerous in a well-ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrary to good government: For he himself would presume much upon the assistance of his *Soldurii*; and they on the other side must needs wish well to his attempts, that were so interested in his Life and Death.

The *Gauls* raise new Forces against *Crassus*,

THE barbarous *Gauls* were much troubled, that a Town of that strength both by nature and art should so soon be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadors into all quarters, conjured one with another, confirmed their Covenants with mutual Hostages, and levied what Power they were able to make; sending for aid out of Spain, and from other States that bordered upon Aquitain. At the coming of these Forces they began to make War with a great power, and with many Soldiers of great Fame: For they appointed such Leaders as had seen the experience of *Sertorius* his Wars, and were great in the opinion of Men for their skill and knowledge in the Art Military. These according to the custom of the People of Rome, began to take places of advantage, to fortifie their Camp, and to intercept the *Romans* from free passage of Convoys, and necessary intercourses. Which when *Crassus* perceived, and considering withall that his own Forces were so few that he could not well dismember them upon any service or advantage and that the Enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding a sufficient Garrison in his Camp, by which means Corn and Provision would in time grow scarce with him, whilst the Enemy waxed every day stronger; he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to give them battel.

Cæsar.

The matter being referred to a Council of War, when he understood that all Men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to give them battel: And in the dawning putting his Men in a double Battel, and placing the Auxiliary Forces in the midst, he attended to see what the Enemy would do. The *Gauls*, although they were perswaded that they might adventure battel, both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowess of War, as also in respect of the small number of the *Romans*; yet they thought it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all Carriages and Convoys of Corn, and so the Victory would follow without Bloodshed: And if the *Romans* for want of Corn should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with travel, heavy laden with their burthens, and dejected in their spirits. This resolution being approved by the whole Council of the *Gauls*, when the *Romans* embattelled their Forces, they kept their Men within their Camp.

## The First OBSERVATION.

THIS *Sertorius* had followed the faction of *Marius* and *Cinna*, and when *Sylla* had overthrown both the elder and younger *Marius*, he fled into Spain, and there maintained the quarrel on foot against *Pompey* and *Metellus*, and overthrew them in many Battels: but in the end was treacherously slain by *Perpanna* at a Panquet. He was a Man of great spirit, and of admiral dispatch; and under him were these Captains brought up which *Cæsar* commendeth for their Skill in Arms.

Sertorius:

## The Second OBSERVATION.

IN Histories propounding to our consideration the Deeds and Monuments of former Ages, we may observe two especial means which the great Commanders of the World have entertained to achieve Victory and over-master their Enemies: the first by cunning and wise carriage of a matter before it come to tryal by blows; the second

Two means to  
achieve Vi-  
ctory and to  
over-master  
our Enemies.



by forceable means and waging of Battel: The one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the Soul; and the other depending upon the strength and ability of the Body.

Concerning the first, it hath ever been held more honourable, as better suiting the worth of the Spirit and the divine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the adverse part may be weakened by wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes by anticipation of means and occasions, and so through advantages taken from their own proceedings, to be driven to that exigent which may determine of the controversie before they come to blows, and conclude the matter by terms of Art taken from the directions of good providence. For to speak a truth, the action of Battel, as it is the last part in that faculty, so it is the worst in regard of Christian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of *Lamech* his second Wife (which the Divines do note to be born to the ruin and destruction of Mankind) than the Children of grace, whose joy consisteth in peace and love.

Tubal-Cain  
by War, and  
Naamah by  
the Flood.

*Cæsar* in the first of the civil Wars respected the same thing, but from other grounds: For having shut up *Afranius* and *Petreibus* in a place of disadvantage, so as he might have cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the Victory coming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captains that were earnest upon the Enemy; *Cur etiam secundo Prælio, aliquos ex suis amitteret? Cur vulnerari patere-tur optime de se meritos Milites? Cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?* Why should he lose any of his Soldiers in Battel, though he got the day? Why should he suffer those to be wounded who had deserved so highly at his hands? Or why should he hazard his good fortune? And this course did these *Gauls* take, which under *Sertorius* had learned the Roman Art, and the Roman industry: And were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the *Romans* at their own Weapon.

This first means is principally to be embraced, as the safest way in these uncertain and casual events: For that which resteth upon corporal strength, and maketh execution the means to a Conclusion, is very terrible even to the better party, full of hazard, and of little certainty. For it were a miracle of Fortune never heard of yet, so to carry a Battel upon what advantage or means soever, that the victor Army should buy so great a Fortune without bloodshed or loss of Men; and erect a Trophy to Honour at the sole cost of the Enemy, without loss or expence of his own treasure.

And for the uncertainty in a Battel, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in every small Moment of time, to turn the fortune of the day to this or that Party, and make both sides unconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and fear, joy and sorrow? And therefore *Cæsar* thought it not best to tempt the waywardness of Fortune, when by other means he might obtain his desires.

This, I say, is chiefly to be embraced, if our means will afford us that happiness: But howsoever I hold it wisdom so to entertain this course of Victory, that we omit not the chiefest helps of furtherance when it cometh to blows; but to think of this Conquest by Art and Wit, as necessary if our means will serve us to compass it; and of the other, as necessary whether we will or no: For the History maketh it plain, that when *Brutus* found himself destitute of means to undertake that course of Victory which proceedeth from providence and discreet carriage, he then betook himself necessarily

to the latter, and by the help of Battel sought to free himself from those disadvantages into which the *Gauls* had brought him.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

I Observe further out of this place, that what course soever be taken, a discreet Leader will not easily forego an advantage without great assurance of a better fortune, nor change the certainty of a benefit upon probabilities of other hopes, until it have paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to perform. For so he might forego his Fortune, by presuming too much upon the favour of future Chances, which are often seen to cross our purposes, rather than to further the way which is taken.

Not to forego  
an advantage.

#### The Fourth OBSERVATION.

Further I observe this double Battel to be answerable to the small number of the Roman Forces: For their usual manner was to make a triple Battel, that the first might have a second and a third help; but where their number would not afford that commodity, they then made two Battels, that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they never fought with one single Battel, for ought that may be gathered by their Histories.

#### The Fifth OBSERVATION.

The last thing which I observe is the place where *Crassus* bestowed the Auxiliary Forces, in the disposition of his Troops to Battel, which is here said to be in *Mediam Aciem*; for as their Armies were divided into three Battels, so every Battel was divided into three parts, the two Wings and the body, wherein these Auxiliary Forces were in this service bestowed: Of these he afterward saith, that inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serve the *Romans* in time of Battel with Stones and Weapons, and to carry Earth and Turf to the Mount. The reason why suspected Troops are placed in the body, rather than in either of the Wings, is, for that the Battel hath not such scope to fling out, or take advantage of place to do mischief, as the Wings have: For wheresoever there have been set Battels fought, the strength of their Army consisted always in the Wings, as the two principal instruments of the Battel; and as long as these stood sound, the Victory went always certain on that part; for the Wings both kept the Enemy from encompassing about the body of their Army, and had the advantage also of charging upon the open side of their adversary.

The place  
where suspected  
Forces are  
best bestowed  
in Battel.

At the Battel of *Canna*, *Hannibal* put the weakest of his Forces in the Battel, and advancing them towards the Enemy left the two Wings behind: So that when the Enemy came to charge upon the Battel, they easily beat them back, and as they followed the retreat fell in between the two Wings, wherein the strength of the Army consisted; and being by them encompassed on each side, were defeated and overthrown. And thus we see the advantage which a General hath when his two Wings stand firm, although the Battel shrink in the Encounter. *Hannibal* in the Battel he had with *Scipio* in *Africa*, placed the Strangers in the front and in the rear; according peradventure as he found their number, and the use of their Arms: Which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather upon the judgment of a General, than of any prescription that can be given in this matter.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XI.

*Crassus taketh the Camp of the Gauls: And with their overthrow endeth that War.*

Cæsar.

**C**RASSUS understanding their drift, and finding his Men chearful and willing to fight, the whole Army crying out that they should stay no longer, but immediately set upon the Enemies in their Camp, encouraged his Soldiers, and to the contentment of all Men went directly to the place where they were lodged: And as some began to fill up the ditch, and others with casting Weapons to beat the Gauls from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliary Forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring Stones and Weapons to the Soldiers that fought, and to carry Earth and Turf to the Mount, that so they might make a skew of fighting. And on the other side, as the Enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to cast their Weapons from the higher ground to the great hurt of the Roman Soldier; the Horsemen in the mean time riding about the Camp of the Gauls, brought word to Crassus, that the rampier at the Decumane Port was not fortified with such diligence as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the Commanders of the Horse to encourage their Men with great Promises and Rewards, and instructed them what he would have done. They, according to their Instructions, took four Cohorts that were left in the Camp fresh and no way tired, and carrying them a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the Enemy, while all Mens Eyes and Minds were intent upon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the Fortifications which the Horsemen had found to be weak; which being easily broken down, they had entered the Camp before the Enemy either saw them or could tell what was done. And then a great clamour and shout being heard about that place, the Roman Legions renewing their force, as it falleth out always in hope of Victory, began to charge them afresh with great Fury. The Gauls being circumvented on each side, and despairing of their safety, casting themselves over the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But forasmuch as the Country was open and champaign, the Horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of fifty thousand which came out of Aquitain and Spain, there scarce remained the fourth part.

Upon the News of this Fight the most part of the Aquitani yielded to Cæsar, and of their own accord gave him Hostages: Amongst these were the Tarbelli, Biggeriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elufates, Garites, Ausci, Garumni, Sibutzates, and Cocafates. Only some few that lived farther off, trusting to the coming on of the Winter, held off and did not submit themselves.

## OBSERVATION.

Lib. 3.

Avertimento  
secundo

**F**ROM this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute how an Enemy that is strongly encamped, and for some advantage will not remove, may be dislodged whether he will or no. A point of great consequence in matter of War, and therefore deserveth due consideration. Concerning which he layeth this down for a Maxim, that all Forts and Strong-Holds are taken by the Foot; and that Camps and Lodgings are taken by the Head. By which is meant, that he who purposeth to win a Fortres well manned and provided, must first get the Foot, and take hold of the Ditch; and then seize himself upon the rampier, and so get the place: For he saith that Mounts and

eminent elevations are of little use against Fortresses or Sconces, unless they over-top them; which may be easily prevented, by raising the parapet of the Fortres in front, and the Curtain in Flank, according as the Enemy shall carry his Mounts aloft; and so they shall never come to over-top the holds: But all Camps and Lodgings are taken, by the the head; that is, by Mounts and Elevations, which by the advantage of their height command the champaign: For he holdeth it impossible to raise a Mount within the Camp in so short a time, to contest that which the Enemy shall make without.

This Foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way how to raise a Mount, in despite of the Enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillery, or murder them all within their Trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar at the Siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double Ditch, running like unto the line which the Geometricians call *Helicall*. By this double Ditch he maketh his approach to any place of most advantage, where he may in a night raise a Mount high enough for the ordinance to play upon any quarter of the Camp. The censure of this practice I refer to our judicious Soldiers, who may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this Stratagem in Brancatio himself. Thus much I dare affirm in the behalf of these works, that they were of high esteem amongst the Romans, whom daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest means both for security and Victory. And if our Soldiers could be brought to taste the commodity of these works, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike Practices: But our Men had rather fly upon desperate adventures, and seek Victory in the jaws of Death, than to clear all hazard with pains and diligence.

Lib. de Bellis  
Gallico.

## CHAP. XII.

*Cæsar undertaketh the War with the Menapii and Morini.*

**A**T the same time also, although the Summer Cæsar. was almost at an end, yet forasmuch as all Gallia was in peace, and the \* Morini \* Tervane. only with the \* Menapii stood out in Arms, \* Celve and Gualdres. and had never either sent Ambassador, or otherwise treated of Peace; Cæsar thinking that War might quickly be ended, led his Army into their Country. At his coming he found them to carry their Wars far otherwise than the rest of the Gauls had done; for understanding that the greatest Nations of Gallia, which had waged Battel with the Romans; were beaten and overthrown; and having whole Continents of Woods and Boggs in their Territories, they conveyed both themselves and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar coming to the beginning of the Woods, began to fortifie his Camp, not discovering any Enemy near about him; but as his Men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the Woods, and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily driven in again, with the loss of many of them, as the Romans followed them far into the Woods, they had some few of their Men slain.

The time that remained Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting down the Woods: And lest the Soldiers might be taken unawares while they were busied in that Work, he caused them to place all the Trees which they cut down on either side of the Army, that they might serve for a defence against sudden assaults. A great quantity of ground was thus rid within a few days, so that their Goods and Cattel was

was



was taken by the Romans: But they themselves were fled into thicker Woods. At which time there happened such a continual Rain, as forced them to leave off the Work; and the Soldiers could no longer endure to lie in Tents of Skins: And therefore Cæsar, after he had wasted and spoiled their Country, burned their Towns and their Houses, carried back his Army, and placed them amongst the Auleri, Lexovii, and in other Cities to Winter in, which were subdued in the late Wars.

## OBSERVATION.

THE *Irish* Rebels having the like commodity of Woods and Bogs, do entertain the like course of War as the *Morini* did with Cæsar. The means which he used to disappoint them of that practice was, to cut down the Woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this Age, or ridiculous to our Men of War, let them consider that the *Roman* Discipline wrought greater effects of Valour, than can be made credible by the use of these Times. For besides their exquisite Discipline, which of it self was able to frame Patterns of unexampled Magnanimity, their Industry was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such incessant Travel, that the Soldiers thought it great happiness when they came to wage Battel with the Enemy; and could have means to quit their continual Travel with the hazard of their Lives.

Neither let it seem strange that the *Romans* undertook to cut down the Woods; but rather let us admire their facility in so difficult a Task: For as the History witnesseth, *Magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*, a great quantity of Ground was rid in a few days, with incredible speed. And after the Woods were cut down, they took more pains in placing it on each side of the Legions to hinder any suddain Assault, than they did in cutting it down: Which deserveth as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the Sixth Book of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such Wars, and may serve to acquaint us with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The *Eburones*, or the Men of *Liege*, had the like commodity of Woods and Bogs, and made use of them in the War they had with Cæsar. The matter, saith he, required great diligence, not so much in regard of the peril of the whole Army (for there could no danger come from an Enemy that was frightened and dispersed) as the safety of every particular Soldier, which in part did pertain to the welfare of the whole Army. For the desire of a Booty carried many of the Soldiers far from the Body of the Army; and the Woods being full of unknown and secret Passages, would not suffer them to go either thick together, or close Embattelled. If he desired to have the War ended, and the Race of those Wicked Men to be rooted out, he must of force make many small Companies, and divide his Men into many Bodies: But if he would have the Maniples to keep at their Ensigns, as the discipline and custom of the *Roman* Army required, then the place was a shelter and defence to the Enemy. Neither did they want Courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumvent such as they found alone straggling from their Companies. In these difficulties there was as much done as diligence could do, providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all Mens Minds were set on Fire with Revenge) than to hurt the Enemy with the loss of the *Roman* Soldier. Cæsar sent Messengers to the bordering States, to come out and Sack the *Eburones*, and they should have all the Prey for their Labour: That the Life of the *Gauls*, rather than his Legionary Soldiers, might be hazarded in those Woods; as also that with so great a multitude, both the Race and Name of that People might be quite extinguished.

There are many particulars in this Relation which concern the true motion of the *Irish* Wars, which may be better observed by such as know those Wars by experience, than by my self that understand them only by Relation: And therefore to prevent such Exceptions as my Rule shall make of the Parallel in these two cases, I will leave it to be done by themselves. And thus ended the Third Commentary.

## The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

THUS ended this War, in which, in the first place, we will observe the advantage of retrenching of Camps, which serve to bridle whole Countries, as Citadels do Cities: The *Romans* having thereby only maintain'd so many Conquer'd Nations under their Obedience. For the Armies that are Quarter'd in divers Towns, may easily, thus separated, be defeated in the whole, or in part by a Conspiracy: Besides, the delights of Cities corrupt Military Discipline, and dastardizes the most generous Courages: And when there are more Fortresses than can well be kept, they must be dismantled, to the end that nothing may be able to resist the Army, which being always kept entire opposes the re-

newing of Conspiracies; it being most certain, That the best way, not only to prevent the Revolt of Conquer'd Provinces, but also to preserve ones own Country, against a Potent Enemy (provided care be taken not to want Provisions) is to make strong Retrenchments: For those who put themselves absolutely upon the Defensive, shutting themselves up in Garrisons, must of necessity (unless they are reliev'd) perish at last: By reason that the Country being destroy'd for the space of two or three Years, the Cities must be famish'd of course, and consequently will surrender, finding that you are no longer in a Condition to defend them: Chusing to submit to the Enemy, rather than to perish with you.

Secondly,



*Secondly*, We will consider how much *Crassus* was put to it, when he had to do with Captains that had serv'd under *Sertorius*, and who, according to the custom of the *Romans* made use of the advantage of Places, to Fortifie their Camps, and to cut off Provisions from their Enemies, for by this manner of making War, they reduc'd the said *Crassus* to such Straits, that he was forc'd to Attack them within their Camp, and altho' he forc'd them, either because his Soldiers were better, or because he found out some defect in their Camp, it is most certain, that he undertook it more out of Despair than Reason, and only when he was reduc'd to the necessity of Starving.

We will also observe, That nothing surpriz'd *Caesar* during all this War, whether he was Attack'd in the open Field, or in his Camp, or Surpriz'd, or whether his Enemies retir'd into inaccessible Places; he having all along pursu'd his Enemies every where, without omitting the least point of Military Discipline. For tho' our Ene-

inies behave themselves sometimes as if they were afraid, the better to surprise us, we must never despise them, since our Trade is such that Faults are irreparable, and that in one hours time we may lose the Reputation we have acquir'd in Forty Years.


To end this Discourse, I will add, That the Cruelty *Caesar* practis'd on those of *Vannes*, ought not in the least to reflect on the Clemency he has shewn during the whole course of his Life, but that we ought to believe, that he forc'd his natural Inclination in that severe Action, to chastise the violation of the Law of Nations, which they were guilty of, in detaining those as Prisoners who went to Trade with them as Friends: as also to strike a Terror into those People who were so much inclin'd to Revolt, by using them with great mildness, when they kept within the bounds of their Alliance, and with great rigour when they broke it.

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*The*

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# The Fourth COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**T**HE *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri* are driven to seek new Seats in *Gallia*; they drive the *Menapii* out of their Territories: But in the end are Overthrown by *Cæsar*. That War being ended, he maketh a Bridge upon the *Rhine*, and carrieth his Army over into *Germany*. He taketh Revenge upon the *Sicambri*; and giveth liberty to the *Ubii*: Returneth into *Gallia*, and carrieth his Army over into *Britain*; with the occurrences of that War.

### CHAP. I.

\* Those of  
Zurphen.  
\* Of Haffia.

The \* *Usipetes* and \* *Tenchtheri* bring great multitudes of People over the *Rhine* into *Gallia*.  
The nature of the *Suevi*.

Cæsar.

**T**HE Winter following, Pompey and Crassus being Consuls, the *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, two German Nations, passed over the *Rhine* with great multitudes of People, not far from the place where it falleth into the Sea. The reason of their moving was, the ill treaty which for many Years together they had received of the *Suevi*, the greatest and warlikest Nation amongst the Germans. For these *Suevi* had one hundred Cantons or Shires, which yearly furnished their Wars with a Thousand Men a piece; and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves and their Armies abroad: And these the Year following were in Arms, and the other stayed at home and performed the like Duty; and so by this means they all continued their Experience both of Tillage and matter of War. No Man had any ground proper to himself, neither might they abide longer than a Year in one place. They lived chiefly upon Cattel and Milk, and used much Hunting; which was the cause (what through the quality of their Diet, their continual exercise and liberty of Life, being never brought up to any Calling, or tied to any Discipline, nor urged to any thing against their Disposition) that they were strong, and of a large Stature: And they had used themselves so to it, that they never cared for any Cloathing in the coldest place they came in, more than Skins and Hides, which covered but part of their Body, the rest being Naked: And they wash their Bodies usually in the Rivers. They have Merchants that frequent their Ports, not so much to bring them any Commodities from abroad, as to buy the Prey and Spoil they take in War. And whereas the Gauls take much delight in Oxen and other Beasts, and stick not to give any Price for them, the Germans care not for the bringing of them amongst them, but rather use their own misshapen ugly Cattel, which, by daily inuring they bring to

perform any Service. Their Horsemen oftentimes, in time of Battel, forsook their Horse, and fought on Foot; their Horses being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there anything accounted more base or useless in the course of their Life, than to use Furniture for Horses: And therefore they would adventure to Charge upon great Troops of Horse that used Equipage, with a few of their own Quality. They admitted no Wine to be brought in unto them, lest it might effeminate their Warlike Inclination, or make them unapt for Labour. The greatest Honour in their Opinion was, to have their bordering Territories lie waste and desolate: For so it would be thought that many States together could not resist their Conquering Valour: And it was reported, That the Country lay waste from the *Suevi* one way, six hundred Miles together.

### OBSERVATION.

**B**Y this practice of the *Suevi* it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of Valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of Moral Carriage and Civil Discretion, to make use of that Greatness which Prowess hath obtained: For notwithstanding that they were a Nation both Warlike, and of good Ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of Manhood, that it tended to no other end than to maintain Barbarism at home, and Desolation abroad; whereas true Valour is always subordinate to the preservation of Commonwealths, and is as the defensive Arms of Civil Society. Which I have the rather noted, inasmuch as it resembleth an Humour that aboundeth in this Age, especially in the particular behaviour of our young Gallants; whose naked Valour revealing it self only in the Lye and in the Stabb, for want of other assistant Vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a Metal, leadeth them into such inconveniences and disordered Actions, that it changeth the Nature thereof into giddy-headed Rashness; and in lieu of Vertues Guerdon, is repaired with derision.

N

CHAP.



## C H A P. II.

The Motives inducing the *Usipetes* to come over the *Rhine* into *Gallia*.

Cæsar.

**N**Ext unto these *Suevi* inhabited the *Ubii*, a very ample and potent State: and through their intercourse and traffick with Merchants, being seasoned also with the manners of the *Gauls* their Neighbours, somewhat more civil than the rest of the *Germans*. With these the *Suevi* had often waged Battel: and albeit they could not expell them out of their Country, forasmuch as their State was very great and populous; yet by continual incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their State. In the same case were the *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri* before mentioned: for having made head against the *Suevi* for many years together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions, and wandering the space of three years through the Continent of Germany, at last they arrived where the \* *Menapii* inhabited the banks on either side the River *Rhine*: who being terrified with the arrival of such a multitude, forsook all their dwellings beyond the River, and planted themselves on this side of the Water, to hinder the *Germans* from further passage.

\* *Gueldryes* and *Cleve*.

The *Usipetes* with their associates having tried all means, and not finding themselves able to pass over by force for want of Boats, nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent Watch of the *Menapii*, fained a retreat to their old habitation: and after three days journey, their Horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the *Menapii* both unguarded and unprovided. For they upon the departure of the *Germans*, feared not to return over the River into their Towns and Houses. These being slain and their Shipping taken, they got over the River before the rest of the *Menapii* had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily possessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that Winter upon the provision they found there.

Cæsar understanding of these things, and fearing the weakness of the *Gauls*, inasmuch as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and withal desirous of novelty, he durst no way trust their unconstancy: for it was their practice and custom to stay Travellers and Passengers, and enquire of them what they either heard or knew concerning any thing that had happened; and the common People would flock about Merchants in Fairs and Markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what News they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearsays they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but soon repent themselves, being grounded upon such weak intelligence as was usually coined to please the multitude. Which custom being known, Cæsar to prevent a greater War, hastened to his Army sooner than he was wont to do.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**S**UCH as have spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature and quality of Climates and Nations, have all with one consent made Choler the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the People with such attributes as the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these Conditions which Cæsar so long ago observed in the ancient *Gauls*, any disresemblance from that which the Learned of this Age have delivered concerning the Nature of the said Inhabitants; but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such novelties

and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same unto these times in the Inhabitants of that Country, notwithstanding the alteration of Customs and People, or what else so long a time hath changed: which argueth the unresistable Power of Celestial influence, establishing an uniformity of Nature, according as the Seat of the place lieth capable of their powerful aspect.

The reason of the diversity in the temperature of Nations which are differenced by North and South, is not without apparent cause attributed to their nearness or distance from the course of the Sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern Climates of the Earth, and separateth the Inhabitants thereof by the dominion of their active qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same Climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the virtue of the Celestial Bodies by the same downfal and rebound of their Beams, being differenced only by East and West, are so much distinguished in Nature, and so unlike in disposition, is not so apparent: whether it be, as some have imagined, forasmuch as the all-inclosing Sphear, which remaineth quiet and immoveable above the circuit of the first Motor, hath his parts diversly distinguished with variety of properties, which by continual reference and mutual aspect are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the Earth, and so keep a perpetual residency of one and the same quality in one and the same place, and make also the variety of fashions in such parts as otherwise are equal favourites of the Heavens Majesty, by receiving an equal measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the said quarters of the Earth are in themselves diversly noted with several qualities, which appropriate the self-same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause, I will leave every Man to satisfy himself with that which seemeth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this cholerick passion. Wherein I will endeavour to shew how impatiency, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are natural adjuncts of this humour. And if Cæsar made use of this Philosophy in the managing of that War, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a General to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first I must lay for a Maxim that which long experience hath made authentick, that the motions of the mind are either quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered either with heat or cold: for as the phlegmatical humour is of a moist, cold and heavy nature, begetting weak and gross Spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a lifeless disability; so is the motion of the internal faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments whereby it moveth: and therefore Men of this waterish constitution are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, unless it be beaten into them with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flava bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the active vertue of the fire, doth so purify the instruments of sense, and quicken the Spirits with the vivacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty with



with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the Soul with as great efficacy at the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troops of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth. It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and fit disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth from heat, the chiefeft quality in choler) that the object is at the first moment so strongly fetled in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind with as great speed manifest their Offices concerning the apprehension, and deliver a Sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discursive power to examine the substance thereof by conference of circumstances, nor to give judgment according to the course of our intellectual Court. It behoveth therefore every Man in that unsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolution, before his judgment be informed by discourse of the strength or weakness of the conceived opinion.

But to leave these speculative meditations to Philosophers of learned conceit; forasmuch as the right use of passions is either true Wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best befitteth a Soldier, or how it availeth or disadvantage in matter of War. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgment, than this of anger which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseth it self in his own actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it self, and convince a false pretended cause as the author of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against Truth and Innocency. *Piso* condemned a Soldier for returning from foraging without his Companion, being persuaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution the other that was missing returned, and with great joy of the whole Army they were carried to the General, thinking to have much gratified him with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despight, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withal, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the first because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of Law: the second for that he was the cause of the death of his Companion: and thirdly the Executioner, for not obeying his commandment.

Concerning matter of War, as it consisteth of differenced parts, so hath Choler divers effects. In case of discourse and consultation, when as the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the understanding, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgment, as *Cæsar* noted in his Speech to the Senate concerning *Catiline*: and therefore a Commander must by all means endeavour to avoid even the least motions of so hurtful a passion, and season his affections with that gravity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may either hinder his understanding, or withhold his Will from following that course, which reason appointeth as the best means to a fortunate success; always remembering that all his actions are presented upon a Stage, and pass the censure of

many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true Wisdom, and disallow of passionate and head-strong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and fury of Battel, I take Anger to be a necessary instrument to set Valour on foot, and to overwage the difficulties of terror with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the mind stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take Anger to be the fittest means to advance the valiant carriage of a Battel; for as Fear is treacherous and unsafe, so Anger is confident and of an unquenchable heat. And therefore a Commander ought by all means to suggest matter of anger against an Enemy, that his Men may behold them with a wrathful regard, and thirst after the day of Battel, to satisfy their fury with the blood of their adversaries. If any urge that it hath been heretofore observed of the *Gauls*, that in the beginning of a Battel they were more than Men, and in the later end they were less than Women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it: I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was observed in the *Gauls*, and the passion of Anger well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never satisfied but with revenge. And so that of *Aristotle* is proved true, that Anger serveth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue: whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature; for we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage us; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth us, and not we it, as it happened in the reign of *Tiberius* amongst the mutinous Legions at *Vetera*: and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that Anger which kindleth in his Army. For as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of Obedience, which was the only thing which *Cæsar* required in his Soldiers.

But to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer that which we seek after, I may not omit the Prognostication which *Cæsar* made of the consequence of this accident, by the natural disposition of the People; the event whereof proved the truth of his Predictions: which sheweth what advantage a learned General that hath been somewhat instructed in the School of Nature, hath gained of him whom only Experience hath taught the active rudiments of the War, and thinketh of no further Lesson in that Art, than that which the Office of a Serjeant or Lanceprefado containeth.

### CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* cometh to his Army, marcheth towards the Germans, and by the way treateth of Conditions of Peace.

*Cæsar* being come to his Army, found that to have happened which he before suspected: for some of the States of Gallia had sent Messengers unto the Germans, to leave the Banks of the Rhine, and to come further into the Continent, where they should find ready whatsoever they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the Land as far as the confines of the \* *Eburones* • Liege.



and the Condrusi, who were under the protection of the Treviri. The Princes of the Gauls being called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered concerning their revolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their Loyalty, he commanded certain Troops of Horse to be levied, and resolved to make War upon the Germans: and having made provision of Corn, he directed his march towards them. From whom, as he was on the way within a few days journey of their Camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make War upon the Romans first, so they would not refuse to make trial of their Manhood if they were justly provoked; for their ancient custom was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet thus much they would confess, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman People would accept of their Friendship, and either give them Territories to inhabit, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the Law of Arms, they might prove profitable Friends unto them. They only yielded to the Suevi, to whom the Gods in feats of Arms were inferiour; any other Nation they would easily Conquer.

To this Cæsar answered what he thought fit; but the purport of his Speech was, That he could not make any League with them if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable that they that could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other Mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome amongst the \* Ubii, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; thus much he himself would intreat of the Ubii. The Messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three days to return again to Cæsar: in the mean time they desired him not to bring his Army any nearer their Quarters. Which request Cæsar denied. For understanding that a few days before a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mosa to the Ambivariti, there to pillage and get provisions, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more than the return of their Horsemen.

The River Mosa hath its rise from the Mount Vogesus in the Dominions of the Lingones, and having run far, it receives the River \* Walis, which is a part of the Rhine: these two joining, make the Island of the Batavi: fourscore miles below which it falleth into the Sea. The Rhine ariseth amongst the Lepontii, a People inhabiting the Alpes; and after a tedious course through the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrices, Triboci and Treviri, drawing near the Sea, it divides into several Branches, and so makes many considerable Islands, most of which are inhabited by salvage and barbarous People, some whereof live only upon Fish and the Eggs of Birds: after this the River empties it self at several Mouths into the Ocean.

When Cæsar was come within twelve miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them. But being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those Troops of Horse which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile Encounter; and that he would give them leave to send Messengers to the Ubii: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would swear faith and safe continuance unto their People: neither would they require more than three days to negotiate this business. Cæsar conceived this entreaty to import nothing else than the return of their Horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they

expected within three days; notwithstanding he promised them to march but four miles further that day, to a convenient Watering-place, and bade that a considerable number of them should come thither to him next day, that he might know what they desired: in the mean time he sent to the Commanders of the Horse that were before, not to provoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustain the charge until he came nearer with the Army.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the Gauls with the Germans; and the encouragement which he gave them in a faithful and loyal affection to the People of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty which both their honour and a good respect of their Friends required: for he well understood that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to have objected unto them their errors, had not been to heal, but to discover their Wound. Only he took the way to cut off their hopes of any practices which they might attempt against the Roman People; and held them in the mean time in the appearance of faithful Friends, that they might not be discouraged by the detection of their revolt.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, upon this resolution that there was no League to be made with the Germans if they continued on this side the Rhine, we may observe how he entertained a treaty of Peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readiness to further what he made shew of, and not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselves in the possessions of the Ubii; so was he loath to yield to any condition which might disadvantage his forcible constraint, or weaken his command, if persuasion failed: for he well knew that powerful means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a Parlee, than any other motive how reasonable soever.

Moreover we may observe how careful he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding unto them the Association of the Ubii) by which they might avoid the hazard of Battel. Which thing was always observed by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments whereby Man worketh such wonders (I mean the Hand and the Tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unless they had been forced thereunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, lest while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the way of Antiperistasis, to redouble his strength, and so furnish him with that powerful engine, which *Vetius Mescius* calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest Weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these Examples.

Some few of the Samnites, contrary to the Articles of Peace between them and the Romans, having made incursions into the Territories of the Roman Confederates, the Senate of that State sent to Rome to excuse the Fact, and to make offer of satisfaction. But being rejected, *Claudius Pontius* General of their Forces, in an excellent Oration

\* Colonia Agrippina.

\* Wael.

*Vincitur hand  
gratis jugum  
qui provocat  
hostem.*

*Liv. lib. 9.*



ration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by War; and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Iustum est Bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium*; *Et pia Arma quibus nulla nisi in Armis spes est*, That War is Just which is necessary; and it is piety in those Men to take up Arms, who have no hope but in taking up Arms. The issue thereof was, that the Samnites entrapped the Romans in a place of advantage, so that they were forced upon dishonourable terms to save their lives, as it is at large in the ninth Book of Livy.

**Lib. 9.** Caius Manlius conducting the Roman Legions against the Veii, part of the Veian Army had entered the Roman Camp; which Manlius perceiving, he hastened with a Band of Men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Veii: Which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury that they slew Manlius; and had overthrown the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Roman Captains, being entered into the City of the Veii, that he might take it with greater facility, and disarm the Enemy of that terrible Weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no Veian should be hurt that was found unarmed. Whereupon every Man cast away his Weapon, and so the Town was taken without bloodshed.

Let a Soldier therefore take such hold of occasions and opportunities as are offered unto him, that in time of Battel he may seem to cast necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in his pay: Considering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations; being never subject to any ordinance or law, and yet making that lawful which proceedeth from it.

#### CHAP. IV.

The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Caesar, set upon the Roman Horsemen, and overthrow them.

**N**otwithstanding the Germans request concerning the truce, as soon as they saw the Roman Horsemen, which were in number five thousand (whereas the Germans had not above eight hundred Horse, those that went over the Mosel to forage not being yet returned) they charged upon the Romans not expecting any hostile Encounter, inasmuch as their Embassadors were newly departed from Caesar, and had obtained that day of truce: But being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usual custom, forsook their Horse, and fighting on foot ran our Horses into the bellies, and overthrew many of our Men, so that they easily put the Romans to flight; who never looked back; until they came into the sight of the Legions. In that battel were slain 74 Roman Horsemen, and amongst the rest Piso an Aquitain, a valiant Man, and born of noble Parentage, whose Grandfather was the chief Ruler in his City, and called friend by the Roman Senate. This Piso seeing his Brother compassed about by the Enemy, brake in upon them and rescued him: But having his Horse wounded under him in the Action, and being dismounted, he fought stoutly on foot till such time as the Enemy hemm'd him in, and gave him several Wounds; then he fell down. Which his Brother seeing afar off (for he had left the Battel) he clapp'd spurs to his Horse, and rushing upon the throng to rescue him, was there slain.

After this Battel Caesar thought it not safe either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but War: And to attend any longer until their Horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him especially considering the weakness of the Gauls amongst whom the Germans by this Battel had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.

#### OBSERVATION.

**T**his cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speak somewhat concerning that main controversie of policy, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great Commanders are always to be attended with integrity and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such Arguments and grounds of Reason, which vertue and moral honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian Mind) and the daily practice of States-Men on the other side alledge to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the World, that commend Vertue in a shew, and not in essence and being, and study to maintain their States only with humane Reason, not regarding the Authority of divine ordinance, set this down as a *Maxim* in their Art; That he that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end suitable to his contentment, must in all respects be like qualified, both in judgment and disposition, as the party is with whom he dealeth: Otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared to hold himself strong in the matter which he undertaketh. For a wrestler that cometh with mere strength to encounter another that hath both strength and cunning, may blame his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laugh't at as an unworthy Champion for serious sports: In like manner in this universal confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the Labyrinths of Falshood and avoid the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For it is the course that every Man taketh which must bring us to the place to which every Man goeth: And he that opposeth himself against the current of the World, may stand alone in his own conceit, and never attain that which the World seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore as craft and deceit are so general, it behoveth a Man of publick negotiations to carry a Mind apt and disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that which ancient Writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaur, half a Man and half a Beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of princely carriage; that of the brutish part he might learn to strengthen himself with force and courage, and of the humane shape so to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent whatsoever Mans wit might forge to overthrow it. Neither ought a private Man to wonder at the strangeness of these positions considering that the government of Kingdoms and Empires is carried with another Bias, than that which concerneth particular affairs in a well-ordered State: Wherein truce-breakers and faithless dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruin thereof. But those that sit at the helm of government, and are to shape the course of a State according to the variation of times and fortunes; derive their conclusions from other principles; whereof inferiour Subjects are no more capable, than



than Men are able to understand the Works of the Gods: And therefore they are called *Arcana Imperii*, Secrets of State, to be revered rather than lookt into.

To conclude, the affairs of particular Persons are of so short extension, and encircled in so small a compass, that a mean capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconveniences which may ensue upon the contract; and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgment is worthily taxed with the Loss: But the businesses of the Commonwealth are both subject to so many casualties of Fortune, and rely upon such unexpected Accidents, that it is impossible for any Spirit, how provident soever, to foresee the Issue in that variety of chances. Besides that every particular subject is much interested in the Fortune of the event, and may justly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather than suffer Shipwreck through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the State doth balance out the loss of credit in the Governour.

On the other side such as zealously affect true honour, affirm vertue to be the same both in Prince and People; neither doth condition of state or calling, or the quality of publick or private businesses alter the nature and essence of goodness: For to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of civil society, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Commonwealths. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may so carry a treaty, that he may seem to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honour the practices and stratagems of War, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: But to break any covenants agreed upon may well get a Kingdom, but never honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means whereby a State is continued in happy government: Whereof thus much I dare say by the warrant of this History, that he who falsifieth his word upon advantage, howsoever he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his own safety: For if they once recover the loss, and get any advantage against those truce-breakers, they will find as little favour as the  *Germans*  did with  *Cæsar* .

#### CHAP. V.

*Cæsar*  marcheth directly to the Camp of the  *Germans* , and cutteth them all in pieces, and so endeth that War.

*Cæsar.*

**U**PON these considerations,  *Cæsar*  manifesting his resolution to the Legates and Questor, there happened a very fortunate Accident: For the next Day very early in the Morning, most of the Princes and chieft of the  *Germans*  came unto  *Cæsar*  into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent Practice, and withal to continue their petition of truce. Whereof  *Cæsar*  was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his Horsemen to follow the Legions, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow: And making a triple Battel, marched speedily eight Miles, and so came upon the  *Germans*  before they had notice what had happened. Who being terrified with our sudden Arrival, and the departure of their own Leaders, knew not whether it were their best course to bring forth their Forces, or defend their Camp, or otherwise to seek

their safety by flight. Which tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman Soldiers, but calling to mind their perfidious treachery, they brake into the Camp and were at first a little resisted. In the mean time the Women and Children (for they had brought all they had over the Rhine) fled every one away: Which  *Cæsar*  perceiving sent his Horsemen to pursue them. The  *Germans*  hearing the Clamour and screechings behind their Backs, and seeing their Friends pursued and slain, did cast away their Weapons, forsake their Ensigns, and fled out of the Camp: And coming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhine, such as had escaped cast themselves into the River; where what through fear, weariness, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a Man. The number of the Enemy was 430000, with Women and Children. To them whom he had retained in his Camp, he gave leave to depart: But they fearing the cruelty of the Gauls for the mischief they had done them, desired that they might continue with the Romans: Which  *Cæsar*  agreed unto.

#### OBSERVATION.

**T**HIS relation affordeth little matter of War, but only a severe revenge of hateful treachery: Notwithstanding I will hence take occasion to discover the offices of the  *Questor*  and the  *Legates* ; and shew what place they had in the Army. And first concerning the  *Questor* , we are to understand that he was elected by the common voice of the People, in the same Court which was called to create the General. His Office was to take charge of the publick treasure, whether it came out of their  *Aerarium*  for the pay of the Army, or otherwise was taken from the Enemy.

Of him the Soldiers received their Stipend, both in Corn and Money: And what other booties were taken from the Enemy, he either kept them or sold them for the use of the Commonwealth.

The  *Legates*  were not chosen by the People, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Coadjutors to the Emperor for the publick service, and were altogether directed by the General, in whose absence they had the absolute command: And their number was for the most part uncertain, but proportioned according to the number of Legions in the Army.

#### CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar*  maketh a Bridge upon the Rhine, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.

**T**HE German War being thus ended,  *Cæsar*   *Cæsar.* thought it necessary to transport his Army over the Rhine into the Continent of Germany for many causes: Whereof this was not the least, that seeing the  *Germans*  were so easily perswaded to bring their Colonies and their vagrant Multitudes into Gallia, he thought good to make known unto them, that the Roman People could at their pleasure carry their Forces over the Rhine into Germany. Moreover, those Troops of Horse which were absent at the late overthrow of the  *Germans* , being gone, as I said before, for Spoil and Provision over the Mosa, after they saw their Friends overthrown, were fled into the Confines of the  *Sicambri* , and joyned with them. To whom when  *Cæsar*  sent Messengers to demand them to be sent unto him, they answered that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhine: And if the  *Germans*  were inter-



interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge any Authority in their Quarters? Lastly the Ubii, who amongst all the rest of the Germans, had only accepted of Cæsar's friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest suit unto him to send them aid against the Suevi; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhine: that would serve their turns, that would be help and encouragement enough to them; for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, what with Ariovistus's overthrow, and this last service, that it sounded honourable amongst the farthest Nations of Germany, so that it was the greatest safety to have them their Friends. For these reasons Cæsar resolved to pass the Rhine: but to carry his Army over by Boat was neither safe, nor for his own Honour, nor the Majesty of the People of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftness and depth of the River to make a Bridge: yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he determined not to pass over at all. And so he built a Bridge after this manner.

At two foot distance he placed two Trees of a foot and half square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut them answerable to the depth of the River: these he let down into the Water with Engines, and drove them in with Commanders, not perpendicularly after the fashion of a Pile, but Gable-wise, and bending with the course of the Water: opposite unto these he placed two other Trees, joined together after the same fashion, being forty foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottom of the Water, and reclining against the course of the River. These two pair of couples thus placed, he joined together with a Beam of two foot square, equal to the distance between the said couples, and fastened them at each end on either side of the couples with Braces and Pins: whereby the strength of the work and nature of the Frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the Timber-work, the stronger the Bridge was united in the couplings and Joints. In like manner he proceeded with couples and Beams, until the work was brought unto the other side of the River: and then he laid streight Planks from Beam to Beam, and covered them with Hurdles; and so he made a Floor to the Bridge. Moreover on the lower side of the Bridge he drove down Supporters, which being fastened to the Timber-work, did strengthen the Bridge against the force of the Water: and on the upper side of the Bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed Piles to hinder the force of Trees or Boats, or what else the Enemy might cast down to trouble the Work or hurt the Bridge. Within ten days that the Timber began to be cut down and carried, the Work was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar leaving a strong Garison at either end of the Bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri. In the mean time Embassadors came to him from many Cities desiring Peace and the friendship of the Romans: whom Cæsar answered courteously, and required Hostages of their fidelity.

## OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amiss to enter a little into the consideration of this Bridge, as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar; whom we may observe to insist with as great plenty of Wit and Elequence, in presenting unto us the subtilty of his invention in such manner of handy-works, as upon any other part of his actions; as this par-

ticular description of the Bridge may sufficiently witness: besides the Fortifications at *Alesia*, and the Intrenchments in *Bretaigne*, for the safety of his Shipping, with many other works, which he might well record as the greatest designs of an Heroick Spirit, and the wonderful effects of magnanimous industry, that succeeding Ages might not boast either of Art or Prowess which his vertue had not expressed, or otherwise might wonder at that worth which they themselves could not attain unto. And to that purpose he entertained *Vitruvius* the Father of Architecture, and as worthy to be imitated in that faculty, as his Master Cæsar is in feats of Arms. By whose example a great Commander may learn, how much it importeth the eternity of his Fame to beautifie his greatest designs with Art, and to esteem of such as are able to intreat the Mathematical Muses to shew themselves under the shape of a sensible form; which albeit, through the rudeness of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectual nature, yet their beauty expresseth such a Majesty of Art, that no time will suffer the memory thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this Bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double Posts, whereof the first order bending with the Stream, and the lower rank against the Stream, when they came to be coupled together with overthwart Beams, which were fastened in the couplings with Braces which he nameth *Fibulas*, the more violent the Stream fell upon the work, the faster the Joints of the Building were united, as may better appear by a Model of that making, than can be expressed by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speak of the diversity of Bridges, and of the practices which Antiquity hath devised to transport Armies over Rivers: But inasmuch as it is a common subject for all that undertake this Military task, and hath been handled by *Lipsius* upon the occasion of this Bridge, I will refer the Reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, inasmuch as Cæsar made the means correspondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefeft end of his passage was, to let the Germans understand that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhine, and that a River could not so separate their Territories, but that they were able to join both the Continents together, and make a common Roadway where it seemed most unpassable: he thought it best to pass over his Army by a Bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his Forces, and also conceit their Territories as united unto Gallia, or to be united at the pleasure of the Romans with a firm *Isthmus*, and plain passage by foot, which in times past had always been separated by a mighty River. Neither would a transportation by Boat have wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination of an unaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand that they were not so far off, but that they might be overtaken, and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to prove that a passage over a River by a Bridge is more honourable, safe, and of greater terrour to the Enemy, than any other way that can be devised; especially if the River carry any depth, such as the Rhine is: otherwise, if it have either Shallows or Fords, whereby Men may wade over without any great incumbrance, it were but lost labour to stand about

Lib. de  
Machin.



about a Bridge, but rather to think of it as of a place incumbered with such hindrances as Men often meet with in a march.

## C H A P. VII.

*Cæsar* taketh revenge upon the *Sicambri*: giveth liberty to the *Ubii*; and returneth again into *Gallia*.

Cæsar.

**T**He *Sicambri* understanding that *Cæsar* was making a Bridge over the Rhine, prepared themselves to fly; and at the persuasion of the *Ufipetes* and *Tenchtheri* forsook their Country, and conveyed themselves and their possessions into Woods and solitary Desarts. *Cæsar* continuing a few days in their Quarters, having set on fire their Villages and Houses, and burned up their Corn and Provision, came to the *Ubii*, promising them aid against the *Suevi*: by whom he understood, that as soon as the *Suevi* had intelligence that he went about to make a Bridge, calling a Council, according to their manner, they sent unto all quarters of their State, that they should forsake their Towns, and carry their Wives and Children and all that they had into the Woods; and that all that were able to bear Arms should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; and there they attended the coming of the Romans, and were resolved in that place to give them Battel. Which when *Cæsar* understood, having ended all those things in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrify the Germans, to be revenged upon the *Sicambri*, to set the *Ubii* at liberty; having spent in all eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and done enough as well in regard of his own honour, as the good of the Commonwealth, he returned into *Gallia*, and brake up the Bridge.

## C H A P. VIII.

*Cæsar* thinketh of a Voyage into *Britain*: he enquireth of Merchants concerning the nature of that People.

**A**Lthough the Summer was almost spent, and that in those parts the Winter hastened on apace, inasmuch as all *Gallia* inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go over into *Britain*, forasmuch as he understood that in all the former Wars of *Gallia*, the Enemy had received most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the Year would not suffer him to finish that War; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Island, to understand the quality of the Inhabitants, and to know their Coast, their Ports, and their landing-places, whereof the Gauls were altogether ignorant; for seldom any but Merchants had commerce with them. Neither had they discovered any thing but the Sea-coast, and those Regions which were opposite unto *Gallia*. And therefore calling Merchants together from all quarters, he neither could understand of what quantity the Island was; what Nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of War they had; what Laws or Customs they used; nor what Havens they had to receive a Navy of great Shipping.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**A**S the Germans had oftentimes stirred up motions of Rebellion amongst the Gauls, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their Kingdom; so the Britains had upheld most of their Wars, by furnishing them with such supplies as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if *Cæsar* or the Roman People would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable Government in *Gallia*, as they had chastised the insolency of the Germans, and sent them back again with greater loss than gain; so was it necessary to make the Britains know, that their assistance in the War of *Gallia* would draw more businesses upon them than they were well able to manage. For as I have noted in my former discourses, the causes of an unpeaceable Government are as well external and foreign, as internal and bred in the Body; which need the help of a Physician to continue the Body in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious operations, as any internal sickness whatsoever.

In the second Commentary I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery: but because it is a matter of great consequence in the fortunate carriage of a War, I will once again by this Example of *Cæsar* remember a General not to be negligent in this duty. *Suetonius* in the Life of our *Cæsar* reporteth, that he never undertook any expedition, but he first received true intelligence of the particular situation and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and quality of the People; and that he would not undertake the Voyage into *Britain*, until he had made perfect discovery by himself of the magnitude and situation of the Island. Which *Suetonius* might understand by this first Voyage, which *Cæsar* would needs undertake in the latter end of a Summer, although it were, as he himself saith, but to discover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that governed the World in their time, gave great honour to the exercise of Hunting, as the perfect image of War in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a Country; without which all enterprizes, either of sport in Hunting, or earnest in Wars, were frivolous and of no effect. And therefore *Xenophon* in the Life of *Cyrus* sheweth, that his expedition against the King of *Armenia* was nothing but a repetition of such sports as he had used in Hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite Examples registred in History, how by the dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great Victories, and through the negligence of others irrecoverable overthrows, are not sufficient motives to persuade them to this duty; let their own experience in matters of small moment manifest the weakness of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But let this suffice in the second place to prove the necessity of good discovery, and let us learn of *Cæsar* what is principally to be enquired after in the discovery of an unknown Country: as first, the quantity of the Land; secondly, what Nations inhabit it; thirdly, their use of War; fourthly, their Civil Government; and lastly, what Havens they have to receive a Navy of great Shipping. All which circumstances are such principal Arteries in the body of a State, that the discovery of any one of these demands would have given great light concerning the Motion of the whole Body.

CHAP.



## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volusenus to discover the Coast of Britain; and prepareth himself for that Voyage.

Cæsar.

\*Terroane or  
Montreuil.

**C**æsar sent out Caius Volusenus with a Galley to discover what he could concerning these things, with charge that having made perfect discovery, he should return again unto him as speedily as might be: he himself marching in the mean time with all his Forces unto the \*Morini; forasmuch as from thence lay the shortest cut into Britain. Thither he commanded that Ships should be brought from all the Maritime Cities of that quarter, and namely that Fleet which he had built the year before for the War at Vannes. In the mean time his resolution being known, and carried into Britain by Merchants and others, many private States of that Island sent Embassadors unto him, promising him Hostages of their Loyalty, and signifying their readiness to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them back again. And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made King of Arras, whose wisdom and vertue he held in good account, and whom he took to be faithful to him, and of great Authority in those Regions. To him he gave in charge to go to as many of the States as he could, and persuade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and acquaint them that Cæsar himself would presently follow after.

Volusenus having taken what view of the Country he could (for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarism of the Enemy) after five days returned to Cæsar, and related unto him all that he had discovered. Whilst Cæsar stayed in those parts for the furnishing of his Fleet, the Morini sent Messengers unto him, excusing themselves for their former faults; that being a rude and barbarous People, and altogether unacquainted with our Customs, they had made War against the People of Rome; and withal manifesting their readiness to obey his Commands.

Cæsar not willing to leave any Enemy behind him, or to engage in a new War at this time of the Year, or to neglect his Voyage into Britain for such small matters, willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many Hostages of them: and having made ready eighty Ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two Legions, he divided the Gallies to the Questor, the Legates, and the Commanders of the Horse. There were also eighteen Ships of burthen more, which lay Wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the Horsemen. The rest of the Army he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus and Luc. Aurunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapii, and into those parts of the Morini who had sent no Embassadors to him: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus a Legate to keep the Port with a sufficient Garison.

## CHAP. X.

Cæsar sailerth into Britain, and landeth his Men.

Cæsar.

**T**hese things being thus dispatched, having a good Wind, in the third Watch he put out to Sea, commanding his Horsemen to imbarque themselves at the further Port and follow him; which was but slowly performed. He himself arrived upon the Coast about the fourth hour

of the day, where he found all the Clifts possessed with the Forces of the Enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the Hills lay so steep over the Sea, that a Weapon might easily be cast from the higher ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit Landing-place; notwithstanding he cast Anchor until the rest of the Navy were come up unto him.

In the mean time calling a Council of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by Volusenus, and told them what he would have done; and withal admonished them that the course of Military Affairs, and especially Sea matters, that had so sudden and unconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Council being dismissed, having both Wind and Tide with him, he weighed Anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore.

The Britains perceiving the Romans determination, sent their Horse and Chariots (which they commonly use in War) before, and the rest of their Forces followed after to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his Men, for these respects: the Ships were so great, that they could not be brought near unto the shore; the Soldiers in strange and unknown places, having their hands laden with great and heavy Weapons, were at one instant to go out of the Ship, to withstand the force of the Billow, and to fight with the Enemy; whereas the Britains either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the Water, did boldly cast their Weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their Horses accustomed to such services.

The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether unskilful of this kind of fight, did not use the same Courage as they were wont to do in Land-services. Which when Cæsar perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both strange to the Britains, and readier for use, to be removed from the Ships of burthen, and to be rowed up and down, and laid against the open side of the Enemy; that from thence with Slings, Engines, and Arrows, the Enemy might be beaten up from the Water-side: which stood the Romans in good stead. For the Britains being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oars, and unusual kind of Engines, were somewhat dismayed, and began to retire back, and give way to the Romans. But the Soldiers still lingering, and especially for fear of the depth of the Sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth Legion desiring the Gods that it might fall out happily to the Legion, If you will, saith he, forsake your Eagle, O ye Soldiers, and betray it to the Enemy; for mine own part, I will do my duty both to the Commonweal and to my Superiour. And having spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himself into the Sea, and carried the Eagle towards the Enemy. The Romans exhorting one another not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the Ship: which when others that were near at hand perceived, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the Enemy to encounter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keep any order of Battel; nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their Ensigns, forasmuch as every Man kept with those Ensigns which he first met withal) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy acquainted with the Flats and Shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their Ships; putting Spurs to their Horses, would set upon them incumbered and unprepared, and many of them would overlay a few: others would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their Weapons  
amongst



amongst the thickest Troops of them. Which when Cæsar perceived, he caused the Ship-Boats and smaller Vessels to be manned with Soldiers; and where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were overcharged.

As soon as the Romans got footing on the firm Land, they made head together and charged the Enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of Horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Cæsar's wanted fortune.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

UPON this circumstance of Landing, I may justly take occasion to handle that Controversie which hath been often debated by our English Captains; which is, whether it be better in question of an Invasion, and in the absence of our Shipping, to oppose an Enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his Men on shore, and retire our Forces into some Inland place, and there attend to give him Battel. It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion that we ought not by any means to encounter an Enemy at his landing, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Country, did ground themselves upon the Authority of *Monsieur de Langey* not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Continent: but where their Territories are disjoyned by so great a Bar as the Ocean, and they have not such means to surprise one another, it were mere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appear by the sequel of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be urged to prove it unsafe to oppose an Enemy at his landing, not as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable motive from them which might induce any such opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the Controversies, both with experience and good judgment.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an Enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: For being ignorant in what place he will attempt a landing, we must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will prove mere frivolous; and to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive Forces be sufficient, according to the particular quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our Maritime parts, and the many Landing-places on our Coast, will require a greater number of Men than this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the Enemies arrival would require that they should be lodged either upon, or near the places of danger many days at least, if not many Weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater mass of Treasure, than could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected, that all our Landing-places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the landing: For inasmuch as such places are open and plain, they yield no Convenience to shelter the defendants from the fury of the Artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long Boats and landing Vessels; which beating upon the Beach (for most of our Landing-places are of that quality) will so scatter

them, that no Man shall be able to endure the inconvenience thereof.

The third Objection may arise from the disparity both of numbers, and condition of the Forces of either party. For the first, it must needs be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the Forces, it is without question, that a great and potent Prince (for such a one it must be that undertaketh to invade the Territories of so absolute and well-obeyed a Princess as her Majesty is) would draw out the flour of his Soldiery wheresoever; besides the gallant Troops of Volunteers, which do commonly attend such services. Now these being thus qualified and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equal them with Forces of like vertue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an Enemy at his landing: The rest that have been urged by such as maintain this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the answer of these Reasons, I will lay this down for a Principle, That it is impossible for any foreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting to Invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: Which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage which is required for so great a Fleet. But I will rest my self in the example of the Year Eighty-eight, which proveth the discovery of the pretended Invasion before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first Objection, it cannot indeed be denied but the place of the Enemies landing will be doubtful, and therefore our care must generally extend it self to all places of access: But that our defensive Forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To prove that our Forces are sufficient, we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take *Kent* for a president, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceive not my self, is a shore of as large extension upon the Martime parts as any other within this Kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of *Nesse* by *Lyd*, which is the uttermost skirt upon the Coast of *Suffex*, unto *Margate* upon the Coast of *Essex*, is by computation about twenty-four miles: But notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an Enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugeness of the Cliffs, which do inclose a great part of that skirt, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon, hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoining, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self, being opposed but by a small Force, so streightned, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparent ruine of their whole Forces.

Answer to the first Objection.

Fur-



Further, it cannot be denied but that generally along the Coast of *Kent* there are so many Rocks, Shelves, Flats, and other impediments, that a Navy of great Ships can have no Conveniency to anchor near the Shore; and for the most part the Coast lieth so open to the Weather, that the least Gale of Wind will put them from their Anchors: All which particulars duly considered, it will appear that this large Skirt of *Kent* will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Army, than was thought of at the first. And were it that so publick a treatise as this is would admit with good discretion such an exact relation as falleth within my Knowledge concerning this Point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no Man of an indifferent judgment would imagine our Forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is unfitting to give such particular satisfaction in this publick discourse, give me leave, submitting my self always to better judgments, to give a general taste of that means as would secure all places with a competent number of Men.

Having shewed you before the circuit of the Maritime parts of *Kent*, I would observe this order: first, to make a triple division of all such Forces as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of *Nesse*, and three thousand about *Margate*, and six thousand about *Foulkston*, which I take to be as it were the centre; for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same Shire, but as every Shire bordereth one upon another, so they should mutually give help one unto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the Enemy should attempt a landing about *Nesse*, not only the six thousand lodged as before should march to their succours, but such also of the *Sussex* Forces as were near unto that part, and so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a Force would in few hours be assembled for the strengthening of any of these outskirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole Forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all parts than any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them an especial care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: For my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the Coast by Regiments and Companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the latter part of this objection which urgeth the uncertainty of time when the Enemy shall make his approaches, I hold it most requisite that our defensive Forces should be drawn into a head, before the Enemy should be discovered near our coast, ready to put himself on shore: For it were a gross absurdity to imagine that Companies could upon such a sudden be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a March, with such expedition as the necessity of the occasion would require. Now for that husbanding respect of her Majesties Coffers, which is urged to such extremity, as it would be unsupportable for this State to bear, as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my self, that Men of sound judgment will deem it much out of season to dispute about unnecessary thrift, when

the whole Kingdom is brought in question of being made subject to a Stranger.

*Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte Latrones:*  
*Non expergisceris, ut te ipsum serves?*  
*Thieves rise by night to cut the throats of Men.*  
*Wilt not thou then arise to save thy self?*

The Enemy (peradventure) hath kept thirty thousand Men in pay two Months before, to make Havock of our Country, and to bring us into perpetual Thralldom; shall we think it much, to maintain sufficient Forces upon our Coast to assure our selves that no such Enemy shall enter into our Country? The extremity of this charge would be qualified by our good success, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us to be careful in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to prove that our Forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-Coast, and that the uncertainty of time when the Enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the care and respect of our Prince and Country imposeth upon every good Subject; which is the substance of the first reason which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason, which urgeth the disadvantage of the place in regard of the fury of the Enemies Artillery; true it is, that such places as yield the Enemy Convenience of landing, are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no covert at all. What then? shall a Soldier take every place as he findeth it, and use no Art to qualify the disadvantages thereof? Or shall a Man forego the benefit of a place of advantage, rather than he will relieve with industry the inconveniences of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable time lodged with convenient Forces upon any of those places, yea upon the Beach it self, which is as unapt for defence as any place whatsoever, would use such industry as might give sufficient security to his Forces and over-weigh the Enemy with advantage of place; especially considering that this Age hath afforded such plentiful examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our Forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies Attempt, that our Commanders may have some time to make ready Store of Gabions, and Hand-baskets, with such moveable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.

Neither let this trouble any Man; for I dare avouch it, that if our Forces, are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never mean to oppose their landing, but attend them in some in-land place to give them battel, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to be-think our selves of these necessities, and we will easily overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the firm Land to repel an Enemy, weakened with the Sea, tossed with the Billow, troubled with his Weapons, with many other hindrances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw the landing of our Forces in the Island of *Fial* in the year ninety seven, can somewhat judge of the difficulty of that matter: For what with the working of the Sea, the steepness of the Cliffs, and the troublesome-ness of their Arms, the Soldiers were so incumbred, that had not the Enemy been more

*The Answer to the second reason.*



than a Coward, he might well with two hundred Men have kept us from entring any part of that Island.

The answer  
to the third  
re:sn.

Concerning the third Objection, this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our Forces do equal them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: For we know that in places of advantage and difficult access, a small number is able to oppose a great; and we doubt not but, all circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionably equal the Enemy both in number and quality of their Forces: Always presupposed, that our State shall never be destitute of sufficient Forces trained and exercised in a competent manner, to defend their Country from foreign Enemies. For the neglect thereof were to draw on such as of themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defend our selves from being over-run, as other Nations living in security without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the inconveniences which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of this opinion: As first we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentiful a Country as this is, especially considering, that we have no strong Towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no further testimony than is delivered unto us out of the seventh Book of these Commentaries, in that War which Cæsar had with *Vercingetorix*.

Secondly, obedience, which at other times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a War is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed Persons either to make head themselves or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, 'tis madness to adventure a Kingdom upon one stroke having it in our disposition to do otherwise: With many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Of the name  
Imperator.

THE Word *Imperator*, which the Eagle-Bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest Title that could be given to a Roman Leader: And as *Zonaras* in his second Tome saith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just Victory obtained; and then in the place where the Battel was fought, and the Enemy overthrown, the General was saluted by the name of *Imperator* with the triumphant shout of the whole Army; by which acclamation the Soldiers gave testimony of his Worth, and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Commanders.

3. Annal.

This Ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by many Histories, and namely by *Tacitus*, where he saith that *Tiberius* gave that honour to *Blesus*, that he should be saluted *Imperator* by the Legions; which he sheweth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the Enemy with an eminent overthrow. For every Victory was not sufficient whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certain number of the Enemies to be

slain. *Appian* in his second Book saith, that in old time the name of *Imperator* was never taken but upon great and admirable exploits: But in his time ten thousand of the Enemy being slain in one Battel was a sufficient ground of that honour. *Cicero* saith that two thousand slain in the place, especially of *Thracians*, *Spaniards* or *Gauls*, did worthily merit the name of *Imperator*. Howsoever, it seemeth by the same Author that there was a certain number of the Enemy required to be slain, where he saith, *Se justa Victoria Imperatorem appellatum*, that he was called *Imperator* upon a due and full Victory.

Phil. 14.

Lib. 2.  
Epist. 9.

#### CHAP. XI.

The Britains make peace with Cæsar, but break it again upon the loss of the Roman shipping.

THE Britains being overthrown in this Battel, as soon as they had recovered their safety by Flight, they presently dispatched Messengers to Cæsar to intreat for Peace, promising Hostages, and obedience in whatsoever he commanded. And with these Embassadors returned *Comius* of Arras; whom Cæsar had sent before into Britain, and whom the Britains at his first landing with Cæsar's Mandates, had seized upon and thrown into Prison; but after the Battel they released him, and becoming now suiters for Peace, threw all the blame thereof upon the Multitude, excusing themselves as ignorant of it, and so desiring to be pardoned. Cæsar complained that whereas, they sent unto him into Gallia to desire Peace, notwithstanding at his coming they made War against him without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded Hostages to be delivered unto him: Which they presently performed in part, and the rest being to be fetch'd further off, they promised should likewise be rendred within a short time. In the mean time while they commanded their People to return to their Possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all Quarters to commend themselves and their States to Cæsar. The Peace being thus concluded, four days after that Cæsar came into Britain, the eighteen Ships which were appointed for the Horsemen, put out to Sea with a gentle Wind: And approaching so near the Coast of Britain, that they were within View of the Roman Camp, there arose such a sudden Tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course; but some of them returned to the Port from whence they came, other some were cast upon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the West-ward, and there casting Anchor took in so much Water, that they were forced commit themselves again to the Sea, and direct their course to the Coast of Gallia. The same Night it happened that the Moon being in the full, the Tides were very high in those Seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies that transported the Army which were drawn up upon the Shore were filled with the Tide, and the Ships of burthen that lay at Anchor were shaken with the Tempest. Neither was there any help to be given unto them; so that many of them were rent and split in pieces, and the rest lost both their Anchors, Cables and other Tackling, and by that means became altogether unserviceable. Whereat the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them back again, neither had they any necessities to new furnish the old; and every Man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia, forasmuch as there was no provision of Corn in those places where they

Cæsar.



they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britain, that were assembled to conferr of such things as Cæsar had commanded them to perform, when they understood that the Romans wanted both their Horsemen, shipping and Provision of Corn, and guessing at the small number of their Forces by the small Circuit of their Camp, (that which made it of less compass than usual being, that Cæsar had transported his Soldiers without such necessary Carriages as they used to take with them;) they thought it their best course to rebel, and to keep the Romans from Corn and Convoys of Provision, and so prolong the matter untill Winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallia, never any Man would after adventure to bring an Army into Britain. Therefore they conspired again the second time, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their Men privily out of the Fields, to make Head in some convenient place against the Romans.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Concerning the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, and the causes thereof, it hath already been handled in the Second Book: To which I will add thus much, as may serve to shew how the Romans became so ignorant of the Spring-Tides, which happen in the full and new of the Moon. It is observed by Experience, that the motion of this Watery Element is altogether directed by the course of the Moon; wherein she exerciseth her regency according as she findeth the Matter qualified for her influence. And forasmuch as all Mediterranean Seas, and such Gulfs as are inclosed in Sinus's and Bosoms of the Earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallness of their quantity, are not so capable of Celestial power as the Ocean it self; it consequently followeth that the Tuscan Seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the Moon as the Main Sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious Circuit, and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the Celestial Bodies, taking her course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a Current between the Orcades and the Main of Norvegia, that she filleth our Channel between England and France with great Swelling Tides, and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters than in any other parts of the World. And hence it happeneth that our River of Thames, lying with her Mouth so ready to receive the Tide as it cometh, and having withall a plain level Bottom, and a very small fresh Current, taketh the Tide as far into the Land as any other known River of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the Spring-Tides in the full of the Moon.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Such as either by their own Experience, or otherwise by Observation of that which History recordeth, are acquainted with the Government of Commonweals, are not ignorant with what difficulty a Nation that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by Commanders of their own choosing, is made subject to the Yoak of Bondage, or reduced under the Obedience of a Stranger. For as we are apt by a natural inclination to civil Society; so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of our selves

and Possessions, as the chiefeft end of the said Society: And therefore in the Government of a subdued State, what loss or disadvantage happeneth to the Victor, or how indirectly soever it concerneth the Bond of their Thralldom, the Captive People behold it as a part of their Adversaries overthrow; and conceive thereupon such Spirits as answer the greatness of their hope, and condition with the strength of their Will, which always maketh that seem easie to be affected which it desireth. And this was the reason that the Britains altered their resolution of Peace, upon the loss which the Romans had received in their Shipping.

#### CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken Navy: The Britains set upon the Romans as they foraged; but were put off by Cæsar.

Cæsar, although he had not discovered their determination, yet conjecturing of the Event by the loss of his Shipping, and by their delay of giving up Hostages, provided against all Chances: For he brought Corn daily out of the Fields into his Camp; and took the Hulls of such Ships as were most dismembred, and with the Timber and Brags thereof he mended the rest that were beaten with the Tempest, causing other necessities to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great industry and travail of the Soldiers, he left only twelve Ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in Action, the Seventh Legion being sent out by course to fetch in Corn, and little suspecting any motion of War, as part of the Soldiers continued in the Field, and the rest went and came between them and the Camp, the Station that watched before the Gate of the Camp gave advertisement to Cæsar, that the same way which the Legion went, there appeared a greater dust than was usually seen. Cæsar suspecting that which indeed was true, that the Britains were entred into some new resolution, he took those two Cohorts which were in station before the Port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him, and went that way where the dust was described. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his Men over-charged with the Enemy, and scarce able to sustain the Assault, the Legion thronged together on a heap, and Weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had foraged all other Quarters, there remained one piece of Corn, whither the Enemy suspected the Romans would at last come, and in the Night time conveyed themselves secretly into the Woods, where they continued until the Romans were come into the Field: And as they saw them disarmed, dispersed, and occupied in reaping, they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some few of them, routed the rest, and compassed them about with their Horsemen and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots was, first to ride up and down, and cast their Weapons as they saw advantage; and with the terror of their Horses and rattling of their Wheels to disorder their Companies; and when they had wound themselves between any Troops of Horse, they forsook their Chariots, and fought on foot: In the mean time the guiders of their Chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their Masters needed any help, they might have an easie passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their Fights both the nimble motion



of Horsemen, and the firm stability of Footmen; and were so ready with daily practice, that they could stay in the descent of a steep Hill, and turn short, and moderate their going as it seemed best unto them, and run along the Beam of the Coach, and rest upon the Yoak, or Harness of their Horses, and return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæsar came to rescue them in very good time: For at his coming the Enemy stood still, and the Soldiers gathered their Spirits unto them, and began to renew their Courage that was almost spent. Cæsar taking it an unfit time either to provoke the Enemy or to give him Battel, continued a while in the same place, and then returned with the Legions into the Camp. While these things were a doing, and the Romans thus busied, the Britains that were in the Field conveyed themselves all away.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

BY this we plainly find that there were usually two Cohorts (which according to the rate of One hundred and twenty in a Maniple, amounted to the number of 720 Men) which kept the day-watch before the Gate of the Camp, and were always in readiness upon any service. The commodity whereof appeareth by this accident: For considering that the Advertisement required hast and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue, to have so many Men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might give what help they could until the rest of their Fellows came in.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THEir manner of fighting with Chariots is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer: Only I observe that neither in Gallia, nor any other Country of Europe, the use of Chariots is ever mentioned; but they have ever been attributed as a peculiar Fight unto the Eastern Countries, as fuitable to the plain and level situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the Scripture. Which may serve for an Argument to Geoffrey of Monmouth, to prove the Britains descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise find mention of such Chariots.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

THirdly, we may observe the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his Soldiers confident in his directions: For notwithstanding the Britains had exceedingly urged him to make hazard of a present revenge; yet finding it an unfit time, (inasmuch as his Men had been somewhat troubled with the fury of the Britains) he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearful Retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to embolden his Men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full persuasion in his Soldiers that his Actions were directed with knowledge, and with a careful respect of their safety: Which gave his Men resolution when they were carried upon Service, being assured that what service soever they were employed upon was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that War: Whereas if they had perceived that headstrong fury (which carrieth Men on with a desire of Victory, and never looketh into the

means whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason have drawn back from such employments, and valued their safety above the issue of such an enterprize. And hence ariseth that confident opinion which the Soldiers have of a good General; which is a matter of great importance in the course of War.

### CHAP. XIII.

The Britains make head with their Forces; and are beaten by Cæsar: his return into Gallia.

**A**fter this for many days together there followed such Tempests and foul Weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keep their Camp, and the Britains were kept from attempting any thing against them. But in the mean time they sent Messengers into all Quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman Forces, and amplifying the greatness of the Booty, and the easie Means offered unto them of perpetual Liberty, if they could take the Roman Camp. Shortly upon this, having gathered a great company both of Horse and Foot, they came to the place where the Romans were encamped. Cæsar (although he foresaw the Event by that which before had happened, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some thirty Horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him at his coming into Britain, he embattelled his Legions before his Camp, and so gave them Battel. The Enemy not being able to bear the Assault of the Roman Soldiers, turned their Backs and fled: The Romans followed them as far as they could by running on foot, and after a great Slaughter, with the burnings of their Towns far and near, they returned to their Camp. The same day the Britains sent Messengers to Cæsar to intreat for Peace; whom he commanded to double their number of Hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Equinoctium was at hand, he thought it not safe to put himself to the Sea in Winter with such weak Shipping: And therefore having got a convenient time he hoised Sail a little after Midnight, and brought all his Ships safe unto the Continent. Two of these Ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same Haven, put in somewhat lower into the Land: The Soldiers that were in them, which were about three hundred being set on Shore, and marching towards their Camp, the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britain had made Peace, in hope of a Booty, first with a few of their Men stood about them, commanding them upon pain of death to lay down their Weapons: And as the Romans by casting themselves into an Orb began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them there were suddenly gathered together about six thousand of the Enemy. Which being known, Cæsar sent out all the Horsemen to relieve them. In the mean time the Romans sustained the Force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly about the space of four Hours; and receiving themselves only some few Wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. As soon as the Roman Horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast away their Weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the Horsemen.

#### OBSERVATION.

OF all the Figures which the *Traetici* have chosen to make use of in military Affairs, the Circle hath ever been taken for the fittest to be applied in the defensive part, as enclosing with an equal



equal Circuit on all parts whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that *Area*: And therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple Line, forasmuch as if you alter the Situation of the parts, and transport one Arch into the place of another, the Figure notwithstanding will remain the same, because of the equal bending of the Line throughout the whole circumference. Which property as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole Circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning or this is the end, this is Front or this is Flank: So doth that which *Euclide* doth demonstrate in the third of his Elements, concerning the small Affinity between a right Line and a Circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatness of this strength in regard of any other Line, by which it may be broken. Which howsoever they seem as speculative qualities conceived rather by intellectual discourse than manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proved the strength of this Figure in a defensive part, above any other manner of embattelling, let us not neglect the knowledge of these natural properties, which discover the causes of this effect: Neither let us neglect this part of military knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain Valour, and the sinew of all our Ability: For order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well-ordered Discipline to be irregular, or void of Order. And therefore the Romans did neither eat nor sleep without the direction of the Consul, or chief Commander; otherwise their Valour might rather have been termed Fury than Verrue: But when their Courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time, it never failed as long as the said Order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of Orders for imbattelling, and to weigh the nature thereof, that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans termed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concave and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof I understand this Orb of Men imbattelled to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five, or more, or fewer Ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many Circles described about one Centre; so that either the midst thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbattelling was never used but in great extremity: for as it was the safest of all other, so it gave suspicion to the Soldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in Battel; as will hereafter appear by the testimony of *Cæsar* himself in the fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto *Sabinus* and *Cotta*.

## C H A P. XIV.

Cæsar.

**T**He next day *Cæsar* sent *Titus Labienus* a Legate, with those Legions which he had brought out of Britain, against the revolted *Morini*; who having no place of refuge because their Bogs and Fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the Year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. *Q. Titurius* and *A. Cotta* the Legates, who had led the Legions against the *Menapii*, after they had wasted their Fields, cut up their Corn,

burned their Houses (for the *Menapii* were all hid in thick Woods) returned to *Cæsar*. These things being thus ended, *Cæsar* placed the Winter Quarters of all his Legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the Cities in Britain sent Hostages unto him, the rest neglecting it. These Wars being thus ended, upon the relation of *Cæsar's* Letters, the Senate decreed a supplication for the space of twenty days.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**I**N the end of the second Commentary we read of a Supplication granted by the Senate for fifteen days; which was never granted to any Man before that time since the first building of the City: But forasmuch as in this fourth Year of the Wars in *Gallia* it was augmented from fifteen unto twenty days, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof unto this place. We are therefore to understand, that whensoever a Roman General had carried himself well in the Wars, by gaining a Victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire, that then the Senate did decree a Supplication to the Gods in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought after: Not only because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their Gods should be opened, and their Victories acknowledged with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman People; but also because a Supplication was commonly the forerunner of a Triumph, which was the greatest honour in the Roman Government: And therefore *Cato* nameth it the prerogative of a Triumph. And *Livy* in the 26. Book saith, that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured with Supplication and Thanksgiving to the Gods for things happily effected. The manner of the Ceremony was, That after the Magistrate had publickly proclaimed it with this form or stile, *quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*, that he had happily and successfully administered the Affairs of the Commonweal, the Roman People clothed in white Garments and crowned with Garlands, went to all the Temples of the Gods, and there offered Sacrifices, to gratulate the Victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses but that which pertained to this Solemnity. It seemeth that this time of Supplication was at first included within one or two days at the most, as appeareth by *Livy* in his Third Book, where he saith, That the Victory gained by two several Battels was spitefully shut up by the Senate in one days Supplication; the People of their own accord keeping the next day holy, and celebrating it with greater devotion than the former.

Upon the Victory which *Camillus* had against the *Veii* there were granted four days of Supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usual time of Supplication unto the time that *Pompey* ended the War which they called *Mithridaticum*, when the usual time of five days was doubled and made ten, and in the second of these Commentaries made fifteen, and now brought to twenty days. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad to such as endeavoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge to the benefit of their Commonwealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentary.

Lib. 15.  
fam. Cicero.

The



## The Duke of ROHAN's REMARKS.

**W**E must observe *Cæsar's* Conduct in this Place, who by his quick and unexpected March dissipated the Negotiations that were on foot between the *Germans* and the *Gauls*: By his dissimulation towards the *Gauls* feigning himself Ignorant of their Practices, and expressing a great deal of Confidence in them, retains and hinders them from precipitating themselves into a League with the *Germans*: By his Industry amuses them to Treat, while he still advanc'd towards them and when a favourable occasion offers it self he improves it to take them in disorder, destitute of their Chiefs, making them believe that they had first broken the Treaty.

In the next place we must consider, that taking the advantage of the Renown of so great a defeat, he resolv'd to show the *Roman Eagles* on the other side of the *Rhine*, to frighten the *Germans*, in order to keep them in awe for the future. That he did not venture to pass the *Rhine* upon Boats, looking upon it to be too dangerous; and therefore made a Bridge which he caus'd to be fortify'd and guarded at both ends: That he remain'd no longer in that Country than it was necessary to Establish the Reputation of his Arms, and that upon his return he broke his Bridge, to hinder the *Germans* from making use of it. I add moreover, that the defeat of 5000 *Roman Horse* by 800 *German Horse*, and the following day the defeat of 400000 *Germans* by 30 or 40000 *Romans*, is a clear demonstration that it is not the Natural bravery of a Nation over another, nor yet the greater Number over a smaller which occasions the gain of Battels; but the exact observation of Military Discipline, and the continual exercise of Arms, which not only teaches how to Fight well, but also how to improve advantages, and to know when it is fit to Fight or not.

To begin a War in Autumn, without any visible advantage, in an unknown Country, in

which he holds no Intelligence, being oblig'd to cross the Ocean; is an Enterprize, in my opinion, worthy of the Invincible Courage of *Cæsar*, but not of his usual Prudence. Nevertheless, that Sally must be excus'd, upon the account of his good Fortune, which he had subjected to his Will; for in this undertaking in which Men and the Elements seem'd to have conspir'd against him, the Earth refusing him Provisions, the Sea disabling his Ships, the Air producing Storms, and the Country on which he Landed endeavouring his Ruin: Yet his Constancy overcame it all, opposing to hunger, his Prudence in providing Victuals for his Army; to the Ruins of the Sea, his diligence in refitting of his Ships; to the Assaults of his Enemies, his Arms to overcome them: in so much that he constrain'd them to desire a Peace, and thus he Gloriously archieved an Enterprize in which another would have met his Ruin.

Let us observe, how, before his departure from *France*, he took care of all things that were necessary to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty, and to secure his Return.

Let us moreover observe that *Cæsar* abounded in Inventions, to take his time advantageously in all present Exigencies: For observing that his Soldiers not being us'd to Sea Engagements, were at a loss how to Land; he chang'd his first Order, even during the Action, and drawing closer to the Coast with his Gallies, he Landed in spite of his Enemies, who not being accusom'd to see such kind of Ships, being astonish'd thereat, betook themselves to flight. And indeed we must admire two Excellencies in *Cæsar* which he possess'd in perfection, which are very Essential in a great Captain, *viz.* That he consider'd and took care of all things that might forward or prejudice his design, before he undertook it: And that in the Execution he never fail'd to take his Time, when ever occasion offer'd it self, and to apply an immediate remedy to whatever unexpected accidents might befall him. In which he has been Inimitable.



# The Fifth COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

## The Argument.

**C**ÆSAR causeth a great Navy to be built in *Gallia*: He carrieth five Legions into *Britain*, where he maketh War with the *Britains* on both sides the River *Thames*. At his return into *Gallia* most of the *Gauls* Revolt; and first the *Eburones*, under the Conduct of *Ambiorix*, set upon the Camp of *Q. Titurius* the Legate, whom they circumvent by subtilty, and then besiege the Camp of *Cicero*; but are put by, and their Army overthrown by *Cæsar*.

### CHAP. I.

*Cæsar* returneth into *Gallia*: findeth there great store of Shipping made by the Soldiers, and commandeth them to be brought to the Haven *Itius*.

**L**Ucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being Consuls, *Cæsar* at his going into Italy from his Winter quarters (which he yearly did) gave order to the Legates to build as many Ships that Winter as possibly they could, and to repair the old; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch than those which are used in the Mediterranean Sea, for the speedier lading and unlading of them, and because the Tides in these Seas were very great: And forasmuch as he was to transport great store of Horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottom than such as were usual in other places, and all of them to be made for the use of Oars, to which purpose their low building served very conveniently. Other necessities and furniture for Rigging, he gave order to have brought out of Spain. *Cæsar*, after an assembly of the States in Lombardy, went presently into Illyricum, where he heard that the *Pirustæ* infested the Province by their incursions. As soon as he came thither he levied Soldiers, and appointed them a Rendezvous. Which the *Pirustæ* hearing of, they sent Embassadors presently to him, excusing the business as not done by publick consent, and expressing a readiness to make any satisfaction that should be demanded. *Cæsar* having heard their message, appointed them to give Hostages, and to bring them by such a day, or else they must expect nothing but War and ruine to their City. Hostages were brought by the appointed time; whereupon *Cæsar* deputed certain to arbitrate differences between the Cities, and to punish as they saw cause for it. These things being over, he returned forthwith into Lombardy, and thence to his Army in *Gallia*.

### OBSERVATION.

**T**His *Itius Portus* *Lloyde* thinketh to be *Callis*; others take it to be *Saint Omar*: Partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it self very low, hath notwithstanding very high Banks, which compass the Town about, and in times past was a very large Haven. To this may be added the distance from this Town to the next Continent of the Island of *Britain*, which *Strabo* maketh to contain 320 *Stadia*; which agreeth to the French computation of 13 Leagues: *Cæsar* maketh it thirty Miles. This is the Haven which *Pliny* calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

### CHAP. II.

*Cæsar* preventeth new Motions amongst the *Treviri*, and goeth to his Navy. *Dumnorix* refuseth to accompany him into *Britain*: His flight and death.

**C**Æsar leaving Soldiers enough to do that business, himself marched with four Legions and eight hundred Horse into the Country of the *Treviri*, in regard they neither came to the assembly of States, nor were obedient to his commands, and were farther reported to sollicite the Germans beyond the Rhine to new Comotions. This City was the most powerful of all *Gallia* for matter of Horse, having likewise a great force of Foot, and lying so conveniently upon the Rhine for assistance: Wherein there was at this time a contention betwixt *Induciomarus* and *Cingetorix* who should be chief Ruler. *Cingetorix*, as soon as he heard of the coming of *Cæsar* with his Army, came in to him, assuring him of the fidelity of his Party, and their constancy to the friendship of the People of Rome; discovering withal unto him the present Proceedings amongst the *Treviri*. On the contrary, *Induciomarus* gathered together what Horse and Foot he could, resolving upon nothing else than War: securing all the old and young Folk not fit to bear



Arms in the Wood Arduenna, which is a very large Wood, beginning at the Rhine, and running through the middle of the Treviri, to the borders of the People of Rheims. While things were thus preparing, divers of the chief of the City, some through the favour they bare to Cingetorix, others affrighted at the coming of our Army, came forth to Cæsar; and since they could not do it for the whole City, they endeavoured to make every Man his own peace. Induciomarus seeing this, and fearing to be left at last alone, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, excusing what he had done in not coming to him, which he said was done only to keep the City the better in obedience; for if all the Nobility should have left it, the common People would have been apt to have made new Troubles; that the City was now at his command, and if Cæsar would give leave, he was ready to wait upon him in his Camp, and to lay the Lives and Fortunes of himself and the whole City at his feet. Cæsar, albeit he well knew why all this was spoken, as also what had put him besides his former resolution, yet rather than spend the Summer in those parts, having all things in readiness for his British War, he commanded Induciomarus to come to him, and bring two hundred Hostages with him. Induciomarus did as Cæsar commanded, and withal brought along with him his Son and all that had any near relation unto him: whom Cæsar bade be of good cheer, and exhorted to continue firm in his duty and fidelity. After this, calling to him the chief of the Treviri Man by Man, he reconciled them to Cingetorix, as well looking at the desert of the Man himself, as at his own interest and advantage, to have such a Man bear the chief sway in his City, who had expressed so notable affection and good will towards him in this business. It troubled Induciomarus not a little to find his respect and authority thus impaired; insomuch that he who before was no friend to us, being vexed at this became a bitter Enemy.

Things thus settled here, Cæsar came with his Legions back to the Port called Itius: Where he understood that forty Ships which were built amongst the Meldæ were hindered by Tempests that they could not keep their course, but were forced back from whence they came; the rest were well provided and ready to set sail. Hither also were gathered all the Cavalry in France, to the number of four thousand, and the chief Men of every City: Some few of which, whose fidelity Cæsar had had experience of, he intended to leave at home; and to take the rest along with him for Hostages, lest in his absence they should begin any new stirs in Gallia.

Amongst the rest was Dumnorix the Heduan formerly mentioned. Him of all the rest Cæsar intended to take with him, knowing him to be a Man desirous of change, greedy of rule, a Man of Courage and Resolution, and one of greatest Authority amongst the Gauls. Besides this, Dumnorix had given out at a meeting of the Hedui, that Cæsar had conferred upon him the Government of the City: Which much troubled the Hedui, yet they durst not send any Man to Cæsar to hinder or revoke it. This Cæsar came to hear of. When he saw he must go with the rest, first he besought with all the entreaties he could that he might stay in Gallia; alledging one while that he was afraid of the Sea, having as yet never been used to Sailing, another while that he had some religious accounts that kept him here. When he perceived this would not serve his turn, but go he must, he began to deal with the rest of the chief Men of the Gauls, taking them Man by

Man, and persuading them to continue in their own Country; telling them that it was not without ground Cæsar went about to despoil Gallia thus of its Nobility, his drift being to carry them over into Britain and there murder them, whom he was afraid to put to death amongst their Friends at home. He went farther, to engage them to Fidelity, and to tie them by Oath to proceed upon joint consultation to the acting of what should be thought of most concernment and behoof for the good of Gallia. These things were by divers Persons related to Cæsar: Who as soon as he knew thereof, in regard of the great respect he bare to the Heduan State, he resolved by all means possible to curb and deter Dumnorix from those courses: And in regard that he saw him thus to increase in his madness, he thought it seasonable to prevent his endamaging either the Commonwealth or himself. So staying in the place where he was about twenty-five days, the North-west Wind (a Wind that usually blows in those parts) all that while hindering his putting to Sea; he made it much of his business to keep Dumnorix quiet, and yet at the same time to spy out the whole drift of his designs. At last the Wind and Weather serving, he commanded his Soldiers and Horsemen on Shipboard. And whilst every Man's mind was taken up about this, Dumnorix with the rest of the Heduan Horsemen, unknown to Cæsar, had left the Camp, and were marching homewards. Which when Cæsar heard, he stopt his Voyage, and letting every thing else alone, sent a great part of his Cavalry to attach him, and bring him back, with command that if he stood upon his defence and did not readily obey, they should dispatch him. For he could not believe that this Man could mean any good to him if he once got home, since he made so light of his commands when present with him. The Horse having overtaken him, he stood upon his guard and made resistance, imploring also the aid of those that were with him; still crying out, that he was a Free-born Man and of a Free City. Whereupon they, as they were commanded, hemm'd him in, and so killed him; the Heduan Horsemen returning every Man to Cæsar.

### CHAP. III.

Cæsar saileth into Britain: Landeth his Forces, and seeketh the Enemy.

Cæsar having prepared all things in readiness, he left Labienus in the Continent with three Legions, and two thousand Horse, both to keep the Haven and make provision of Corn, and also to observe the motion of the Gauls, and to do according as he saw time and occasion, and with five Legions, and the like number of Horse as he left in the Continent, about Sun-setting he put out to Sea with a soft South Wind, which continued until Midnight; and then ceasing, he was carried with the Tide until the Morning; when he perceived that the Island lay on his left hand: And again as the Tide changed, he laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Island where he had found good landing the Year before. Wherein the Soldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oars, they made their great Ships of burthen to keep way with the Gallies. About high Noon they arrived in Britain with all their Ships: Neither

Cæsar.



Neither was there any Enemy seen in that place : But as afterward Cæsar understood by the Captives, the Britains had been there with a great Power, but being terrified with the infinite number of Shipping which they discovered from the Shore (for with the Ships of Provision, and private Vessels which several Persons had for their own convenience, there were in all above eight hundred) they forsook the Shore, and hid themselves in the upland Country. Cæsar having Landed his Men, and chosen a convenient place to Encamp, as soon as he understood by the Captives where the Enemy lay, in the third Watch of the Night he marched towards them; leaving Ten Cohorts and Three hundred Horse under Quintus Atrius for a Garrison to his Shipping: Which he the left feared, because it lay at Anchor in a soft and open Shore. He marched that Night about Twelve Mile before he found the Enemy. The Britains sending out their Horse and Chariots to a River that ran between them and the Romans, and having the advantage of the upper Ground, began to hinder the Romans, and to give them Battel: But being beaten back with our Horsemen, they conveyed themselves into a Wood. The place was strongly Fortified both by Art and Nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their Civil Wars: For all the Entrances were shut up with great Trees laid overthwart the Passages. And the Britains shewed themselves out of the Wood but here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the Fortification. But the Soldiers of the Seventh Legion, with a Testudo which they made, and a Mount which they raised, took the place, and drave them all out of the Woods, without any loss at all, saving some few Wounds which they received. But Cæsar forbade his Men to follow after them with any long pursuit, because he was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that day being spent, he would employ the rest thereof in the Fortification of his Camp.

## OBSERVATION.

Cæsar having taken what assurance of Peace he could with the Gauls, both by carrying the chiefest of their Princes with him, and by leaving Three Legions in the Continent to keep the vulgar People in Obedience; he embarked all his Men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same Casualties, and take the benefit of the same Adventures; which being neglected the Year before, drew him into many inconveniencies for want of Horse, which being Embarked at another Haven, met with other Chances and saw other Fortunes, and never came to him into Britain. The place of Landing in this second Voyage was the same where he Landed the Year before; and by the circumstances of this History, may agree with that which Tradition hath delivered of Deale in Kent, where it is said that Cæsar Landed. In the first Year we find that he never removed his Camp from the Sea-shore, where he first seated himself; although his Men went out to bring in Corn, as far as they might well return again at Night: But now he entred further into the Island, and within twelve Miles March came unto a River, which must needs be that of Canterbury, which falleth into the Sea at Sandwich.

In that he saith, That the Garrison of his Shipping consisted of Ten Cohorts, which I have said to be a Legion: We must understand that Cæsar left not an entire Legion in that Garrison; but he took Ten Cohorts out of his whole Forces, peradventure Two out of every Legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his Shipping.

## CHAP. IV.

Cæsar returneth to his Navies, to take Order for such losses as had happened by Tempest the Night before.

**T**He next day, early in the Morning he divided his Forces into Three Companies, and sent them out to pursue the Enemy: But before they had marched any far distance, and came to have the Reward of the Enemy in view, there came news from Q. Atrius, with whom he left the Ten Cohorts, and the Charge of the Shipping, that the Night before there was such a Tempest at Sea, that the whole Navy was either sore beaten, or cast on Shore; and that neither Anchor nor Cable could hold them, nor yet the Sailors endure the force of the Weather: And that there was great loss in the Shipping, by running against one another on the violence of the Tempest.

Cæsar.

Upon these news Cæsar caused the Legions to be called back again, and to cease for that time from following the Enemy any further. He himself returned to the Navy; where he found that to be true which he had heard, and that about forty Ships were lost, and the rest not to be repaired but with great Industry and Pains. First therefore he chose Ship-Wrights and Carpenters out of the Legions, and caused others to be sent for out of Gallia, and wrote to Labienus to make ready what Shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour, yet he thought it best to hale up all the Ships on Shore, and to enclose them within the Fortification of his Camp. In this business he spent Ten days, without intermission, either of Night or day, until he had drawn up the Ships, and strongly Fortified the Camp; leaving the same Garrison which was there before, to defend it.

## OBSERVATION.

Wherein we may behold the true Image of undaunted Valour, and the horrible Industry (as Tully termeth it) which he used to prevent Fortune of her stroke in his business, and comprehend casualties and future contingents within the compass of Order, and the bounds of his own Power: being able in ten days space to set almost eight hundred Ships from the hazard of Wind and Weather, and to make his Camp the Road for his Navy, that so he might rest secure of a means to return at his pleasure.

## CHAP. V.

The Britains make Cassivellaunus General in this War. The Island, and the Manners of the People described.

**C**æsar returning to the place from whence he came, found far greater Forces of the Britains there assembled, than he left when he went to the Navy: And that by publick consent of the Britains, the whole Government of that War was given to Cassivellaunus, whose Kingdom lay divided from the Maritime States, with the River Thames, beginning at the Sea, and extending it self fourscore Miles into the Island. This Cassivellaunus made continual War with his Neighbour States: But upon the coming of the Romans they all forgot their homebred Quarrels, and cast the whole Government upon his Shoulders, as the fittest to direct in that War.

Cæsar.



The inner part of Britain is inhabited by such as Memory recordeth to be born in the Island; and the Maritime Coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make Incursions or Invasions; and after the War was ended they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the Cities from whence they came. The Country is very populous, and well inhabited with Houses, much like unto them in Gallia. They have great store of Cattell; and use Brasse for Money, or Iron Rings weighed at a certain rate. In the innermost parts there is found great quantity of Tin, and in the Maritime Parts, Iron; but they have but little of that: Their Brasse is brought in by other Nations. They have all sorts of Trees that they have in Gallia, excepting the Fig and the Beach. Their Religion will not suffer them to eat either Hare, Hen, or Goose, notwithstanding they have of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The Country is more Temperate, and not so cold as Gallia. The Island lieth Triangle-wise; whereof one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that Angle wherein Kent is, the usual place of Landing from Gallia, pointeth to the East, and the other Angle to the South. This side containeth about 500 Miles. Another side lieth toward Spain and the West, that way where Ireland lieth, being an Island half as big as England, and as far distant from it as Gallia. In the mid-way between England and Ireland lieth an Island called Mona, besides many other smaller Islands; of which some write, That in Winter-time, for thirty days together they have continual Night: Whereof we learned nothing by inquiry; only we found by certain measures of Water, that the Nights in England were shorter than in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the Inhabitants, containeth seven hundred Miles. The third side lieth to the North, and the open Sea, saving that this Angle doth somewhat point towards Germany. This side is thought to contain eight hundred Miles. And so the whole Island containeth in Circuit 2000 Miles. Of all the Inhabitants they of Kent are the most Courteous and Civil; all their Country bordering upon the Sea, and little differing from the fashion of Gallia. Most of the Inland People sow no Corn, but live with Milk and Flesh, clothed with Skins, and having their Faces painted with a blue Colour, to the end they may seem more terrible in Fight: They have the Hair of their Head long, having all other parts of their Body shaven, saving their upper Lip. Their Wives are common to Ten or Twelve, especially Brethren with Brethren, and Parents with Children; but the Children that are born, are put unto them unto whom the Mother was first given in Marriage.

## OBSERVATION.

IN the descriptions of the ancient Britains we may first observe their Pedigree, according to the Heraldry of that time: Wherein we must understand, that in those Ages the Nations of the World thought it no small Honour to derive their descent from a certain beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some Man of famous Memory the Father of that Progeny, and Founder of their State; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their Government, being first laid and established by so powerful a means. But if this failed, they then bragged of Antiquity, and cast all their Glory upon the Fertility of their Soil, being so strong and fruitful that it yielded of it self such a People as they were. And so we read how the Athenians, forasmuch as they were ignorant from whence they came, wore an Oaken Leaf, in token that they

were bred of the Earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the Controversie between the Egyptians and the Scythians concerning Antiquity: Wherein the Egyptians seemed to have great advantage, because of the Fertility and Heat of their Country; whereas the Scythians Inhabited a cold Climate, unfruitful, and an Enemy to Generation. Of this sort were the Britains that Inhabited the middle part of the Island: Who, not knowing from whence they came, nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common received opinion, That they were born and bred of the Earth. The Sea-Coast was possess'd by such as came out of the Continent, and retained the Names of the Cities from whence they came, as a Memorial of their Progenitors.

The form of the Island is very well described, and measured out according to the Scale of our modern Geographers. For concerning the difference of Longitude between the Eastern Angle of Kent, and the farthest point of Cornwall, they make it eight degrees; which in a manner jumpeth with Caesar's dimensions. The other sides are somewhat longer: And therefore Tacitus, in the Life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenter's Axe, making that side which bordereth upon France to resemble the Edge, and the other two sides to incline by little and little one towards another, and so make the Island narrower at the top, according to the form of that Instrument. He setteth down the whole compass of the Island, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers; who, by the quantity of the Circuit did usually judge of the Content: Not considering that the Area of every Figure dependeth as well on the quantity of the Angle, as the length of the side.

Concerning the Temperature of Britain in regard of the cold Winters in France, we must understand that Britain hath ever been found of a more Temperate Constitution in regard of sharp and cold Winters, than any other Country lying under the same Parallel: Whether the cause thereof may be imputed to the continual motion of the Sea about the Island, which begetteth Heat, as some have imagined; or to the situation thereof in regard of other Continents from whence the Wind always riseth, and carrieth with it the nature of the Country by which it passeth; (and so the Island having no other Continent lying North to it, from whence the Wind may rise, but all for the most part upon the South, hath no such cold Winds to dis Temper it, as other parts of Germany, which are under the same parallel: But the Southern Wind, which is so frequent in Britain, tempereth the Air with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warm; or whether it be some other unknown Cause, our Philosophers rest unsatisfied. But as touching Gallia it may be said, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South than this Island doth, the Air thereof (by reason of the continual Heat) is of a far purer disposition; and so pierceth more than this grosser Air of Britain, and carrieth the cold further into the Pores; and so seemeth sharper, and of a far colder disposition.

This Island which Caesar nameth Mona, is known at this time by the name of Man, and lieth between Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemy calleth it Moneda. Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of Mona, peradventure from the nomination of the Britains, who called it Tyrmon, the Land of Mon.

Concerning those places where the Night continueth in the midst of Winter for thirty days toge-



together, they must be seated six degrees beyond the Circle *Artick*, and have a day in Summer of like continuance, according to the Rules of Astronomy. In that he found the Nights in *Britain* shorter than in the Continent, we must understand it to be only in Summer: For the more oblique the Horizon is, the more uneven are the Portions of the diurnal Circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it cometh to a right Horizon, the nearer it cometh to an equality of Day and Night: And hence it happeneth that in Summer time, the Nights in *France* are longer than here in *England*; and in Winter, shorter. The like we must understand of all Southern and Northern Countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the Civility of the *Kentish-Men*, and their Courteous Disposition above the rest of the *Britains*, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought Civility unto all other Nations: of whom such as were first seated in their Possessions and entertained Society, were the first that brought in Civil Conversation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of Civil Government. So we find that first the *Affyrians* and *Babylonians* (as nearest to the Mountains of *Armenia* where the Ark rested, and People first Inhabited) reduced their States into Commonweals or Monarchies of exquisite Government, flourishing with all manner of Learning and Knowledge; when as yet other Countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarism. From thence it flowed into *Egypt*; out of *Egypt* into *Greece*; out of *Greece* into *Italy*; out of *Italy* into *Gallia*; and from thence into *England*: Where our *Kentish-Men* first entertained it, as bordering upon *France*, and frequented with Merchants of those Countries.

#### CHAP. VI.

##### Divers Skirmishes between the Romans and the Britains.

Cæsar.

**T**He Cavalry of the Enemy and their Chariots gave a sharp conflict to the Roman Horsemen in their March: But so that the Romans got the better every way, driving them with great Slaughter to the Woods and Hills, and losing also some of their own Men, being too venturous in the pursuit. The Britains, after some intermission of time, when the Romans little thought of them, and were busied in Fortifying their Camp, came suddenly out of the Woods, and charged upon those that kept station before the Camp. Cæsar sent out two of the chiefeft Cohorts of two Legions to second their Fellows. These two Cohorts standing with a small Alley between them, the other that were first Charged being terrified with that strange kind of Fight, boldly brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and so retired in safety to their Fellows. That day Quintus Laberius Durus, a Tribune of the Soldiers was Slain. The Britains were repelled with more Cohorts, which Cæsar sent to second the former. And forasmuch as the Fight happened in the view of all the Camp, it was plainly perceived that the Legionary Soldiers, being neither able, for the weight of their Armour to follow the Enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go far from their several Ensigns, was not a fit adversary to contest this kind of Enemy: And that the Horsemen likewise Fought with no less danger, inasmuch as the Enemy would retire back of purpose, and when they had drawn them a little from the Legions, they would then light from

their Chariots and encounter them with that advantage which is between a Footman and a Horsemen. Furthermore, they never fought thick and close together, but thin, and at great distances, having Stations of Men to succour one another, to receive the weary, and to send out fresh supplies.

#### OBSERVATION.

**U**Pon this occasion of their heavy Armour, I will describe a Legionary Soldier in his compleat Furniture, that we may better judge of their manner of Warfare, and understand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learn, That their Legionary Soldiers were called, *Milites gravis Armature*, Soldiers wearing heavy Armour, to distinguish them from the *Velites*, the Archers, Slingers, and other light-armed Men. Their offensive Arms were a couple of Piles, or as some will but one Pile, and a *Spanish* Sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point than with the edge. Their defensive Arms were a Helmet, a Corslet, and Boots of Brass, with a large Target; which, in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *umbo* which stuck out in the midst thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first Book, and the Target in the second. The Sword, as *Polybius* witnesseth, was short, two-edged, very sharp, and of a strong point. And therefore *Livy*, in his twenty second Book saith, That the *Gauls* used very long Swords without Points; but the *Romans* had short Swords, readier for use. These they called *Spanish* Swords, because they borrowed that fashion from the *Spaniard*. The old *Romans* were so Girt with their Swords, as appeareth by *Polybius*, and their Monuments in Marble, that from their left Shoulder it hung upon their right Thigh, contrary to the use of these Times; which, as I have noted before, was in regard of their Target, which they carried on their left Arm. This Sword was hung with a Belt of Leather, beset with Studs, as *Varro* noteth. And these were their offensive Weapons. Lib. 4.

Their Helmet was of Brass, adorned with *Plin. lib. 10.* three Ostrich Feathers of a Cubit in length; by which the Soldier appeared of a larger Stature, and more terrible to the Enemy, as *Polybius* saith in his sixth Book. Their Breast-plate was either of Brass or Iron, jointed together after the manner of Scales, or platted with little Rings of Iron: Their Boots were made of Bars of Brass, from the Foot up to the Knee. And thus were the Legionary Soldiers Armed, to stand firm, rather than to use any nimble Motion, and to combine themselves into a Body of that Strength, which might not easily recoil at the opposition of any Confrontment: For Agility standeth indifferent to help either a Retreat or a Pursuit; and nimble-footed Soldiers are as ready to fly back, as to March forward; but a weighty Body keepeth a more regular Motion, and is not hindered with a common Counterbuff. So that whensoever they came to firm Buckling, and felt the Enemy stand stiff before them, such was their practice and exercise in continual Works, that they never fainted under any such Task, but the Victory went always clear on their side. But if the Enemy gave way to their Violence, and came not in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired before the Counterbuff were well discharged, then did their nimbleness much help their Weakness, and frustrate the greatest part of the Roman Discipline. This is also proved in the Overthrow of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, where *Amiborix*



*biorix* finding the inconvenience of buckling at handy-blows, commanded his Men to fight a far off; and if they were assaulted to give back, and come on again as they saw occasion: Which so wearied out the Romans that they all fell under the execution of the Gauls. Let this suffice therefore to shew how unapt the Romans were to fly upon any occasion, when their Armour was such that it kept them from all starting motions, and made them suitable to the staid and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certain principles in the execution of a standing Battel; and therefore not so fit either for a Pursuit or a Flight.

Concerning the unequal Combat between a Horseman and a Footman, it may be thought strange that a Footman should have such an advantage against a Horseman, being overmatched at least with a Sextuple Proportion both of strength and agility: But we must understand that as the Horse is much swifter in a long Career, so in speedy and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the Combat consisteth, the Footman far exceedeth the Horseman in advantage, having a larger mark to hit by the Horse, than the other hath. Besides the Horseman engageth both his Valour and his Fortune in the good speed of his Horse, his Wounds and his death do consequently pull the Rider after, his fear or fury maketh his Master either desperate or slow of performance, and what defect soever ariseth from the Horse, must be answered out of the honour of the Rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soever draweth us into the society of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible be contained in the compass of our own power.

The Sword which we manage with our own hand affordeth greater assurance than the harquebuse, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the Powder, the Stone, the Spring, and such like; whereof if the least fail of his part, we likewise fail of our fortune. But how probable soever this seemeth, this is certain that in the course of the Roman Wars the Horse were ever defeated by the Foot, as is manifestly proved in the first of these Books.

#### CHAP. VII.

*Cæsar* giveth the Britains two several overthrows.

*Cæsar.*

**T**He next day the Enemy made a stand upon the Hills afar off from the Camp, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our Horsemen as they were the day before. But about Noon when *Cæsar* had sent out three Legions and all his Cavalry to get Forage, under the conduct of Caius Trebonius a Legate, they made a sudden Assault upon the Foragers, and fell in close with the Esquins and the Legions. The Romans charged very fiercely upon them, and beat them back: Neither did they make an end of following them, until the Horsemen trusting to them, put them all to flight, with the Slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they give them respite either to make Head, to make a Stand, or to forsake their Chariots.

After this overthrow all their Auxiliary Forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great Power. *Cæsar* understanding their determination, carried his Army to the River Thames, and so to the Confines of Cassivellaunus; which River was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly.

At his coming he found a great Power of the Enemy to be embattelled on the other side, and the Bank fortified with many sharp Stakes, and many other also were planted covertly under the Water. These things being discovered to the Romans by the Captives and Fugitives, *Cæsar* putting his Horse before, caused the Legions to follow suddenly after: Who notwithstanding they had but their heads clear above the Water, went with that violence, that the Enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the Bank, and betook themselves to flight.

#### OBSERVATION.

**T**His attempt of *Cæsar* seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that he runneth into strange conclusions concerning this matter: As first, that he that imitateth *Cæsar* may doubt of his good fortunes; for his proceeding in this point was not directed by any order of War: and that a great Commander hath nothing common with other Leaders: But especially he crieth out at the baseness of the Britains, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if we look into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art and good direction therein: For being assured by the Fugitives that the River was passable in that place, and in that place only, he knew that he must either adventure over there, or leave Cassivellaunus for another Summer, which was a very strong inducement to urge him to that Enterprize. The difficulty whereof was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points; First by sending over the Horsemen in the Front of the Legions, who might better endure the charge of the Enemy than the Footmen could, that were up to the neck in water; and withal to shelter the Footmen from the Fury of the Enemy.

Secondly he sent them over with such speed, that they were on the other side of the water before the Enemy could tell what they attempted: For if he had lingered in the Service, and given the Enemy leave to find the advantage which he had by experience, his Men had never been able to have endured the hazard of so dangerous a service. It is hard to conjecture at the place where this service was performed; for since the building of London Bridge, many Foords have been scoured with the Current and fall of the Water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they do.

#### CHAP. VIII.

The conclusion of the British War. *Cæsar* returneth into Gallia.

**C**assivellaunus having no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest Forces, and retaining only four thousand Chariots, observed our Journeys, keeping the Wood-Countries, and driving Men and Cattel out of the Fields into the Woods, where he knew the Romans would come: And as their Horse strayed out either for Forage or Booty, he sent his Chariots out of the Woods by unknown ways, and put their Horsemen to great peril: In regard whereof the Horsemen durst never adventure further than the Legions, neither was there any more spoil done in the Country, than that which the Legionary Soldiers did of themselves.

In the mean time, the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest State of all those Countries (from whom Mandubratius had fled to *Cæsar* into Gallia, for that

*Cæsar.*



that his Father Imanuentius holding the Kingdom, was slain by Cassivellaunus) sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassivellaunus, and sent unto them to take the Kingdom. Cæsar having received from them forty Pledges, and Corn for his Army, sent Mandubratius unto them. The Trinobantes being thus kept from the violence of the Soldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci and Cassi yielded themselves to Cæsar. By these he understood that Cassivellaunus his Town was not far off, fortified with Woods and Bogs, and well stored with Men and Cattel. The Britains call a Town, a thick Wood enclosed about with a Ditch and a Rampier, made for a place of retreat, when they stood in fear of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæsar with his Army, and found it well fortified both by Art and Nature: and as he assaulted it in two several places, the Enemy unable to keep it, cast himself out of the Town by a back way: And so he took it. Where he found great store of Cattel, and slew many of the Britains.

While these things were a doing, Cassivellaunus sent Messengers into Kent, which as was said lies upon the Sea, and wherein there were four several Kings, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax: Them he commanded with all the power they could make to set upon the Camp where the Navy was kept. The Kings coming to the place, were overthrown by a sally which the Romans made out upon them, many of them being slain, and Lugotorix, a great Commander taken prisoner. This Battel concurring with the former Losses, and especially moved thereunto with the revolt of the fore-named Cities, Cassivellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar by Comius of Arras. Cæsar being determined to winter in the Continent, for fear of sudden Commotions in Gallia, and considering that the Summer was now far spent, and might easily be lingered out, he commanded Pledges to be brought unto him and set down what yearly Tribute the Britains should pay to the Romans; giving withal a strict charge to Cassivellaunus to do no injury either to Mandubratius or the Trinobantes. The Hostages being taken, he carried back his Army to the Sea, where he found his Shipping repaired: Which as soon as he had caused to be set afloat, in regard partly of the great number of Prisoners he had, and that some of his Ships were cast away, he determined to carry his Army over at twice. And so it happened, that of so great a Fleet, at so many Voyages, neither this Year nor the Year before there was not any one Ship missing which carried over our Soldiers: Only of those which were to be sent back to him after they had landed the first half, and those which Labienus caused afterwards to be made, threescore in number, few could make to the place, the rest were all kept back. Which Cæsar having for some time expected in vain, and fearing that the time of Year would not long serve for sailing, for the Equinoctial was at hand; was forced to dispose his Soldiers closer and in less room. So taking the opportunity of a calm Sea, he set Sail about the beginning of the second Watch, and came to Land by break of day, his whole Fleet arriving in safety.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

AND thus ended the War in Britain: Which affordeth little matter of discourse, being indeed but a scrambling War, as well in regard of the Britains themselves, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman Legions, would never adventure to buckle with them in any standing

Battel; as also in regard there were no such Towns in Britain as are recorded to have been in Gallia, which might have given great honour to the War, if there had been any such to have been besieged and taken by Cæsar.

And although Tacitus saith that Britain was rather viewed than subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honour to his Father-in-law Agricola; yet we find here that the Trinobantes, which were more than either the Skirt or the Heart of Britain (for our Historians do understand them to have inhabited that part which lieth as far as Yorkshire and Lancashire) were brought under the Roman Empire by Cæsar: Who was the first that ever laid Tribute upon Britain in the behalf of the people of Rome; or cast upon them the heavy name of a subdued People.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

BUT lest I may seem negligent in these occurrences of Britain, as not deeming the alteration happening in this Island by the power of Rome worthy due memory; I will briefly set down the State thereof from this Area, during the Lives of the twelve Emperors.

Julius Cæsar's next Successors, first Augustus and then Tiberius, thought it Policy to restrain the infinite desire of enlarging the Roman Empire, and so left this Entrance into Britain unseconded. Caius is said to have had a design to invade it, but did nothing. Claudius transported Legions and Aids, and first sent Aulus Plautius Governour, and after him Ostorius, who overthrew King Caradocus in Battel, and shewed him at Rome to Claudius, to Agrippina, and the Lords of the Senate: Who affirmed the fight to be no less honourable than when P. Scipio shewed Siphaces, or L. Paulus Perses. Him Didius Gallus succeeded, who being old and full of honour, thought it sufficient to keep that which his Predecessors had gotten. Next unto Didius came Veranius, only memorable in dying the first Year of his Proprætorship: But Suetonius Paulinus following, got a great name, first by invading Anglesey, strong with Inhabitants, and a receptacle for Fugitives; secondly by overthrowing Boadicea Queen of the Iceni, in a Battel comparable to the Victories of old times: Wherein fourscore thousand Britains were slain, with the loss of four hundred Roman Soldiers. But being thought to be over-severe, he left his charge to Petronius Turpilianus; who composing former troubles with a milder carriage, was succeeded by Trebellius Maximus; whose easie course of government taught the Britains good manners, and made the Soldiers first wanton with ease, and then mutinous: Which by his gentle intreaty being ended without Blood-shed, he left his place to Vedius Bolanus, of like looseness of Discipline, but instead of obedience got much good will. The errors of these three soft Proprætors were holpen by Petilius Cerealis, a great Commander, and worthy his place; he subdued the Brigantes, and left the place to Julius Frontinus, who with no less Happines vanquished the Silures. The last was Agricola, fortunate in divers Battels against the Britains, and as unhappy in his reward; for Domitian maligning his honour, first discharged him of his place, and then, as it is thought, poisoned him. And this was the state of Britain under the twelve Emperors.

Tacit. 12.  
Annal.



## CHAP. IX.

*Cæsar disposeth his Legions into their Winter Quarters, and quieteth the Carnutes.*

*Cæsar.*

*• either  
Cambray,  
Amiens, or  
S. Quintin.*

**A**fter he had put his Ships in Harbour, and held a Council of the Gauls at \* Samarobrina; forasmuch as that Year, by reason of the Drought, there was some scarcity of Corn in Gallia, he was constrained to Garrison his Army, and to disperse them into more Cities than he had done the Years before. And first he gave one Legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero, to be carried to the Nervii; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Essui; a fourth he commanded to Winter amongst the Men of Rheims, in the marches of the Treviri, under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgium, with whom he sent Mar. Crassus his Questor, L. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, Legates; he sent one Legion, that which he had last inrolled beyond the River Po in Italy, with five Cohorts, unto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose Country lieth between the Maes and the Rhine, and was under the command of Ambiorix and Cativulcus; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta. By distributing his Legions in this manner, he thought to remedy the scarcity of Corn; and yet the Garrisons of all these Legions, excepting that which Roscius carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred Miles. And until his Legions were settled, and their Winter Quarters fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

There was amongst the Carnutes a Man of great birth called Tasgetius, whose Ancestors had born the chief Rule in their State. This Man, for his singular Prowess and Good-will towards him, for he had done him very good service in all his Wars, Cæsar restored to the Dignity of his forefathers. Before he had Reigned three Years, his Enemies, with the comploment of divers of his Citizens, kill'd him in the open Streets; which thing was complained of to Cæsar. Who fearing, in regard so many Men had a hand in it, lest that the City should by their instigation to revolt, commanded L. Plancus immediately to march with his Legion thither from his Quarters in Belgium, and there to Winter; and whomsoever he could learn to be the Ring-leaders in the death of Tasgetius, he should take hold of them, and send them to him. Mean while Cæsar had notice from all his Legates and Questors to whom he had delivered his Legions, that they were settled in Winter Garrisons, and their Garrisons fortified.

*The First OBSERVATION.*

**I** Have heard it sometimes contradicted by some that understand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Army keeping head continually in one part of a Kingdom, was more burthensome to the Commonwealth in regard of the expence of Victuals, than when it was dispersed into particular Cities and Families, before the time of the Muster and Inrollment: For, say they, in the general Account of the Publick Weal it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000 Men be maintained with necessary Provisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout every part of the Country; forasmuch as every Man hath but a competent quantity allotted unto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life soever he be ranged: Neither doth the charge of a multitude grow, in regard they are

united together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wheresoever. But such as look into the difference with judgment, shall find a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of Victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: For first we must understand, that an Army lying continually in one place, falleth so heavy upon that part that it quickly consumeth both the fat and the lean (as they say) and leaveth nothing unspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of Provisions, would in a small time come to utter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenty of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be observed that proportion of moderate taking, to Victual the Army with a sufficient competency, but the partial respect which the Purveyors and Victualers will have to their private Commodity, will quickly make an inconvenience either in the Country from whence it is taken, or in the Army for which it is provided, according as the error may best advantage their particular, what Discipline soever be established in that behalf. Whereas on the contrary part, when every particular Man of that multitude shall be billeted in a several Family, throughout all parts of the Kingdom, the charge will be so insensible in regard of the expence of the said Families, that the Country will never feel any inconvenience. And if every Householder that had received into his House one of the said Army, should give a true account of that which riseth above his ordinary expence by the addition of one Man, it would fall far short of that Treasure which is necessarily required to maintain the said number of Men united together into one body.

Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of Victuals which every Man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or united; but in the manner of provision, and the means which is used to maintain them: wherein every Master or Steward of a Family endeavoureth to make his provisions at the best hand, and so to husband it that it may serve for competency, and not for superfluity; and by that means the general plenty of the Country is maintained, and the Commonwealth flourisheth by well-directed moderation. But in the victualling of an Army there is no such respect had which may any way advantage the publick good; for there the gain of the Purveyor riseth by expence and superfluous wasting, rather than by thrift and saving frugality: And so the Commonwealth is weakened by the ill-husbanding of that great portion of Victuals which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should have such variety of Victuals in an Army as they have when they are in several Families, it were impossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstanding the exactness of their Discipline, could afford their Armies no other provision but Corn and Lard, as well in regard of the convenience which that kind of Diet afforded them in the course of their Wars, as also for the good of that Country wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extremity of the Season, or any other cause had brought a Dearth into the Land, there was no readier way to help that inconvenience, than by dispersing their Armies into divers quarters; which Cæsar disposed with that care, that they might be as near together as they could.



## The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning the choice of their Soldiers and their manner of Inrollment, I had rather refer the Reader to Polybius, than enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such Gravity and Religious Ceremonies, as might best serve to possess their minds of the weight and consequence of that business. But forasmuch as the largeness of their Empire and the necessity of their occasions would not admit that the Inrollment should still be made at Rome amongst the Citizens, as it appeareth by this Legion which was inrolled beyond the River Po, it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: And therefore I cannot speak of that which the old Romans did in that part of their Discipline, as a thing continued unto Cæsar's time. But he that desireth to see the manner of their choice, with such Complements as might add both a reverent respect and a Majesty to the work, let him read Polybius of that Argument.

## CHAP. X.

Ambiorix attempteth to surprize the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, plotteth to take them by guile.

Cæsar.

Fifteen days after the Legions were settled in their Winter Camps, there began a sudden Tumult and Rebellion by the means of Ambiorix and Cativulcus, who having received Sabinus and Cotta into their confines, and brought them in Corn to the place where they lay; at the inducement of Induciomatus of Triers, they stirred up their People to Rebellion: And suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get Wood, came with a great Power to assault their Camp. But when our Men had took Arms, and were got up upon the Rampier, and had overmatched them in a Skirmish of Horse, which made a sally out of the Camp upon the Gauls; Ambiorix despairing of good success, withdrew his Men from the assault: And then after their manner they cried unto us, that some of our company should come and speak with them, for they had somewhat to discover touching the publick State, whereby they hoped all Controversies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineus a Roman Horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar Friends, and one Q. Junius a Spaniard, who divers times before had been sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix, were sent out to Treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himself much indebted to Cæsar for many courtesies; in that by his means he was freed from a pension which he payed to the Aduatici; and for that both his own Son and his Brothers Son, whom the Aduatici had held in Prison under the name of Hostages, were by Cæsar released and sent home again. And touching the Assault of the Camp, he had done nothing of himself, but by the impulsion of the State; among whom such was his condition, that the People had as great Authority over him, as he himself had in regard of the People; who were likewise inforced to this War, because they could not withstand the sudden Insurrection of the Gauls, whereof his small means might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to think himself able with so small a Power to overthrow the People of Rome; but it was a general appointment throughout all Gallia, upon this day to assault all Cæsar's Garrisons, to the end that one Legion might not give relief unto

another. Gauls could not easily deny the request of Gauls, especially when it concerned their publick liberty. Now having satisfied that duty which he owed to his Country, he had respect to Cæsar and his benefits; in regard whereof he admonished them, and prayed Titurius for the Hospitality that had been between them, that he would look to the safety of himself and his Soldiers. There was a great number of Germans that had already passed the Rhine, and would be here within two days: And therefore let them advise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceived it, to depart with their Soldiers out of their Winter Quarters either to Cicero or Labienus, of whom the one was not past fifty Mile off, and the other a little further. For his own part, he promised them thus much, and confirmed it by Oath, that they should have safe passage through his Territories; for so he should both do a pleasure to his Country in disburthening it of Garrisons, and shew himself thankful to Cæsar for his benefits. This Speech being ended Ambiorix departed, and Carpineus and Junius made report thereof to the Legates.

## OBSERVATION.

Leander his Counsel, to use the Foxes skin where the Lions faileth, doth shew that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, than the powers of our body are overcome with force. For oftentimes the mind is so disquieted with the extremity of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take sound Instructions, nor the judgment determine of that which is most for our good; but according as any passion shall happen to reign in our disposition, so are we carried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding: Whereas the body continueth firm in his own strength, and is subject only to a greater weight of power, by which it may be subdued and overthrown. It behoveth us therefore to take good heed, that our surest hold be not unfastned by the subtilty of the Fox, when it hath continued firm against the force of the Lion: and that the treachery of the spirit do not disadvantage those means, which either our own power or opportunity hath gained in our actions. Wherein a Commander cannot have a better rule for his direction, than to beware that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withal to be jealous of whatsoever an Enemy shall, either by Speech or Action, seem to thrust upon him, how colourable soever the reasons may be which are alledged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the Mind be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties to resist the motion of fruitless apprehensions, it may easily be seduced (either by fear or vain imagination, diffident conceptions or over-easie credulity, with many other such disturbing powers) from that way which a good discretion, and an understanding free from passion would have taken.

First therefore I hold it necessary to have the consistory of our judgment well settled with a firm resolution, and with the presence of the Mind, before we enter into deliberation of such things as are made happy unto us by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will give some help to a good conclusion, when we consider how improbable it is that an Enemy, whose chieft care is to weaken his Adversary, and bring him to ruine, should advise him of any thing that may concern his good; unless the profit which he himself shall thereby gather, do far exceed that which the contrary part may expect.

Q

I



I grant, That in Civil Wars, where there are many Friends on either Party, and have the adverse Cause as dear unto them as their own, there are oftentimes many Advertisements given, which proceed from a true and sincere Affection, and may advantage the Party whom it concerneth, as well in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their Cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be weighed by Circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof we have many pregnant Examples in the Civil Wars of France, and particularly in Monsieur la Nou his Discourses: But where there are two Armies, different in Nation, Language, and Humour, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth unto one of them, where care to keep that which is dearest unto them possesseth the one, and hope of Gain stirreth up the other, there is commonly such an universal Hatred between them, that they are to look for small advantage by Advertisements from the Enemy. Which, if the Romans had well considered, this subtle Gaul had not dispossessed them of their Strength, nor brought them to ruine.

## C H A P. XI.

The Romans call a Council upon this Advertisement, and resolve to depart, and join themselves to some other of the Legions.

Cæsar.

**T**He Romans being troubled at the suddenness of the Matter, albeit the things were spoken by an Enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moved them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, being base and of no Reputation, durst of themselves make War against the People of Rome. And therefore they propounded the Matter in a Council; wherein there grew a great Controversie among them. L. Aurunculeius, and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first Orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their Winter-Quarters, without express Commandment from Cæsar; forasmuch as they were able to resist never so great a Power; yea, even of the Germans, having their Garrisons well Fortified: An Argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the Enemy and given them many Wounds. Neither wanted they any Victuals; and before that Provision which they had was spent, there would come succour from other Garrisons and from Cæsar. And to conclude, What was more dishonourable, or savoured of greater inconstancy, than to consult of their weightiest Affairs by the advertisement of an Enemy? Titurius urged vehemently to the contrary, that it then would be too late for them to seek a Remedy, when a greater Power of the Enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when any blow were given to any of the next Quarters. He took Cæsar to be gone into Italy; for otherwise the Carnutes would not have adventured to kill Tasgetius, neither durst the Eburones, have come so proudly to the Camp. Let them not respect the Author, but the thing it self: The Rhine was not far off, and he knew well that the Overthrow of Ariovistus, and their former Victories were grievous to the Germans. The Gauls were vexed with the Contumelies they had received, being brought in subjection to the Roman Empire, and having lost their former Reputation in Deeds of Arms.

And to conclude, Who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter without any ground or certainty thereof? But howsoever things

stood, his Council was sure and could bring no harm: For if there were no worse thing intended, they should but go safely to the next Garrisons; or otherwise, if the Gauls conspired with the Germans, their only safety consisted in Celerity. As for the Counsel of Cotta, and such as were of the contrary Opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? Wherein if there were not present danger, yet assuredly Famine was to be feared by long Siege. The Disputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first Orders earnestly repugning it; Do as pleases you, since you will needs have it so, saith Sabinus, (and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the Soldiers might well hear him) for I am not he that most feareth Death among you: Let these be wise; and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall ask account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldst let them, they might joyn themselves within two or three days to the next Garrisons, and with them sustain what chance soever their common destiny should allot them, and not perish with Famine and Sword, like a People cast off and abandoned from their Fellows. After these words they began to rise out of the Council; but hold was laid upon them both: Entreaty was made that they would not by their dissention and obstinacy bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one, whether they went or stayed, so that they all agreed upon one thing; whereas in disagreeing there was no likelihood of well-doing. The Disputation was prolonged untill Midnight; at length Cotta yielded, and the Sentence of Sabinus took place. And thereupon it was proclaimed that they should set forth by the break of day. The rest of the Night was spent in watching. Every Soldier sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leave behind him of such Necessaries as he had prepared for Winter. All things were disposed in such sort, to make the Soldiers believe, That they could not stay without danger, and that the danger might be augmented by wearying the Soldiers with Watching.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**B**Y the resolution in this Disputation it appeareth how little a grave and wise Deliberation availeth, when it is impugned with the violence of Passion, according to the truth of my former Observation: For the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his Positions were grounded upon things certain, and well known to the whole Council; and yet the fear of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions as the quality of his Passion had ratified for true Principles; being grounded altogether upon that which the Enemy had suggested, and not upon any certain knowledge of the Truth. Neither is it often seen when a Council disputeth upon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether clear from such troublesome Motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partiality of a strong affection; so powerful is Passion in the Government of the Soul, and so interested in the other Faculties. And this is one cause of the uncertainty of Man's Judgment, from whence all contrary and different Opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, That a Council of War should so much vary in case of deliberation, when as many special points of Military Discipline remain yet undecided, having the authority of the great Commanders of all Ages to ratifie the Truth on either part; whereof I could alledge many Examples. But concerning the issue and event of our



our Deliberations, what can be more truly said than that of the Poet ?

*Et male consultis pretium est prudentia fallax,  
Nec fortuna probat causas sequiturque merentes ;  
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur.  
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque  
Majus, & in proprias ducat mortalia leges.*

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our Wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it self the good direction of most of the Occurrences which fall within the course of our business ; or if we must needs miscarry, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to think that we went upon best probabilities ; it shall not be amiss to set down some Rules for the better directing of a mature Consultation. Wherein we are to understand, that as all our Knowledge ariseth from some of our Senses, and our Senses comprehend only Particularities, which being carried unto the apprehension are disposed into Forms and Degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their several Properties ; From whence there arise intellectual Notions, and rules of Art, wherein the Science of the said particulars consisteth : So he that intendeth to debate a matter with sound deliberation, must descend from confused Conceptions and a Knowledge in general, to the exact distinction of particular Parts, which are the Occurrences to be directed, and the material substance of every Action. He therefore that can give best direction, either by Experience or judicious discourse, concerning such particulars as are incident to the matter propounded, can best advise which is the safest way to avoid the opposition of contradicting Natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will alledge two Examples : The one Modern, in case of Consultation ; The other Ancient, and may seem not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meer Apology ; yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular Circumstances, it may give great light to that which we seek after.

Lib. 9.

The modern example is taken out of *Guicciardin*, from the Wars which *Lewis* the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the State of *Ferrara*, and the Dutchy of *Millain* : Wherein there arose a Controversie among the French Captains, whether it were better to go directly to seek the Enemy, who albeit they were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope, that with the vertue of Arms and force of Artillery they might be dislodged, and driven to Retreat ; or otherwise to take the way either of *Modena* or *Bologna*, that so the Enemy for fear of losing either of those Towns might quit their hold, and by that means *Ferrara* should be freed from the War. Monsieur *Chauumont*, the General of the French inclined to the former advice : But *Trivulce*, a Man of great Authority and Experience, having been an Executioner in Eighteen Battels, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the Enemy to fight with him ; and I have always heard great Captains hold this as a firm principle, Not to attempt the fortune of a Battel, unless there be either an offer of an especial Advantage, or otherwise compulsion by necessity. The Rules of War give it to the Enemy that is the Invader, and hath undertaken the Conquest of *Ferrara*, to seek to assail and charge us ; but to us, to whom it is sufficient to defend our selves, it cannot be but impertinent to undertake an Action contrary to all direction and discipline of War. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by evident

Reason, that there is no possibility to execute that Device but to our Harms and Disadvantage : For we cannot go to their Camp but by the side of a Hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our Forces cannot be employed ; and yet they with small numbers will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their Vertues. We must march by the rising of a Hill, one Horse after another, neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our Baggage, our Carts and Bridges, but by the streight of the Hill : And who doubteth not but in a way so narrow and cumbersome, every Artillery, every Cart, or every Wheel that shall break will stay the Army a whole hour at the least ? By which Impediments every contrary accident may put us to disorder. The Enemy is lodged in covert, provided of Victuals and Forage ; and we must Encamp all bare and naked, not carrying with us that which should serve for our necessary Subsistence, but expect the things to come after, which in reason ought to go with us. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the Victory is less certain than the Peril, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a Leader ; and in actions of the War, those enterprises are put to adventure, that are done by Will, and not by Reason. Many difficulties may compel us to make our abode there two or three days ; yea, the Snows and Rains joined with the extremity of the Season, may suffice to detain us : How shall we then do for Victuals and Forages ? What shall we be able to do in the Wars, wanting the things that should give us strength and sustenance ? What is he that considereth not how dangerous it is to go seek the Enemy in a strong Camp, and to be driven at one time to Fight against them and against the discommodity of the place ? If we compel them not to abandon their Camp, we cannot but be enforced to retire ; a matter of great difficulty in a Country so wholly against us, and where every little mistake or oversight will turn to our great disadvantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that grave Discourse, in the discovery of the particular Occurrences incident to that enterprise ; which being laid open to their confused Judgments, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages which were to be undergone by that attempt.

The other example is of more Antiquity, taken out of *Tacitus*, and concerneth the arraignment of certain Senators for the friendship that had past between *Sejanus* and them. Amongst whom *M. Terentius* thus answered for himself, according as it hath of late been published by translation.

Annal. 6.

It would be peradventure less behoveful for my Estate to acknowledge, than to deny the Crime I am charged with : But hap what hap may, I will confess that I have been *Sejanus's* Friend, and that I desired so to be, and that after I had obtained his Friendship I was glad of it. I had seen him Joint-Officer with my Father in the Government of the Prætorian Cohort, and not long after in managing the City Affairs, and matters of War : His Kinsmen and Allies were advanced to Honour : As every Man was inward with *Sejanus*, so he was graced by *Cæsar* : And contrariwise such as were not in his favour lived in fear, and distressed with Poverty. Neither do I alledge any Man for an Example of this ; all of us who were not privy to his last Attempts, with the danger of my only estate I will defend : Not *Sejanus* the *Vulsiniensis*, but a part of the *Claudian* and *Julian* Family, which by Alliance he had entered into. Thy Son-in-law, *Cæsar*, thy Companion in the Consulship, and him who took up-  
on



on him thy charge of administring the Commonwealth, we did reverence and honour. It is not our part to judge of him whom thou dost exalt above the rest, not for what considerations: To thee the highest judgment of things the Gods have given, and to us the glory of obedience is left. We look into those things which we see before our eyes, whom thou dost enrich, whom thou dost advance to honours, who have greatest power of hurting or helping; which *Sejanus* to have had no Man will deny. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift it is not lawful to sound, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the end reach unto them. Think not only, Lords of the Senate, of *Sejanus* last day; but of sixteen Years in which we did likewise fawn upon and court *Satrius* and *Pomponius*; and to be known unto his freed Men and Partners was reckoned for a high favour. What then? shall this defence be general, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past and his later actions? No: But let it by just bounds and terms be divided: Let the Treasons against the Commonwealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour, be punished; but as for the friendships, duties, pleasures and good turns, the same end shall discharge and quit thee, O *Cæsar*, and us.

The constancy of this Oration prevailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with Exile. And thus we see how particulars decide the Controversie, and make the way plain to good direction.

## C H A P. XII.

The Romans take their Journey towards the next Legion; and are set upon by the Gauls.

Cæsar.

**A**S soon as the day-light appeared they set forth of their Camp (like Men persuaded that the Counsel had been given them not by an Enemy, but by *Ambiorix* an especial Friend) with a long tailed March, and as much baggage as they were able to carry. The Gauls understanding of their Journey by their noise and watching in the Night, secretly in the Woods some two Miles off laid an Ambuscado in two several places of advantage, and there attended the coming of the Romans: And when the greatest part of the Troops were entered into a Valley, suddenly they shewed themselves on both sides of the Vale, pressing hard upon the Rere, and hindering the foremost from going up the Hill, and so began to charge upon the Romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length *Titurius*, as one that had provided for nothing beforehand, began to tremble, ran up and down, and disposed his Cohorts, but so fearfully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him; as it happeneth for the most part to such as are forced to consult in the instant of execution.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T now plainly appeareth by this negligent and ill-ordered March, and the unlooked for encounter which the Gauls gave them, that fear had ratified in the judgment of *Sabinus* the smooth suggestion of *Ambiorix*, with an approbation of a certain truth; and laid that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would have discerned to be but weak, and of no probability: Which so much the more amazed *Titurius*, by how much his apprehension had

erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsel to a course full of danger; which, as *Cæsar* noteth, must needs fall upon such, as are then to seek for direction when the business requireth execution. I have handled already the inconveniences of disappointment, and therefore at this time will but bring it only into remembrance, that we may take the greater care to prevent an accident of that nature: Wherein as the best remedy for an evil is to foresee it, according to the saying, *Prævisa percunt mala*, evils foreseen fall of themselves; so the greatest mischief in an Evil is when it cometh unthought of, and besides our expectation, for then it falleth upon us with a supernatural weight, and affrighteth the Mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the divine Powers had prevented our designments with an irremediable Calamity, and cut off our appointment with a contrary Decree: Although peradventure the thing it self carry no such importance, but might be remedied, if we were but prepared with an opinion that such a thing might happen.

It were no ill counsel therefore, what resolution soever be taken to make as full account of that which may fall out to cross our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to have a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and feel no further danger than that which the nature of the thing enforceth.

## C H A P. XIII.

The Romans cast themselves into an Orb, and are much discouraged.

**B**Ut *Cotta*, who had before thought that these things might happen by the way, and for that cause would not be the Author of the Journey, was not wanting in any thing that concerned their common safety: For both in calling upon the Soldiers and encouraging them, he executed the place of a Commander; and in fighting, the duty of a Soldier. And when they found that by reason of the length of their Troop, they were not able in their own persons to see all things done, and to give direction in every place; they caused it to be proclaimed, that they should all forsake their Baggage, and cast themselves into an Orb. Which direction although in such a case it be not to be reprov'd, yet it fell out ill-favouredly: For it both abated the Courage of the Romans, and gave the Enemy greater encouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken but upon a great fear and in extremity of peril. Moreover it happened, as it could not otherwise chuse, that the Soldiers went from their Ensigns, to take from the Carriages such things as were most dear unto them: And there was nothing heard amongst them but Clamours and Weepings. But the Barbarous Gauls were not to learn how to carry themselves. For their Commanders caused it to be proclaimed, that no Man should stir out of his place; for the Prey was theirs, and all that the Romans had laid apart was reserved for them: And therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the Victory. The Romans were equal to the Gauls both in Number and Men of Valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Captains and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their Manhood all the hope of their safety: And as often as any Cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the Enemy on that part.

Cæsar.


The



# SABINVS AND COTTA









## The First OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled the nature of an Orb, with such properties as are incident to a Circle; wherein I shewed the conveniency of this Figure, in regard of safe and strong embattelling. I will now add thus much concerning the use thereof, that as it is the best manner of embattelling for a defensive strength, and therefore never used but in extremity; so we must be very careful that the sudden betaking of our selves to such a refuge do not more dismay the Soldiers, than the advantage of that embattelling can benefit them. For unless a Leader be careful to keep his Men in courage that their hearts may be free from despair and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or body soever, when the particular members shall be senseless of that duty which belongeth unto them? For order is nothing but an assistance to Courage, giving means to manage our Valour with advantage. In the War of *Africk* we read, that *Cæsar's* Legions being incircled about with great Multitudes of Enemies, were forced to make an Orb; but he quickly turned it to a better use, by advancing the two Cornets two contrary ways: and so divided the Enemy into two parts, and then beat them back, to their great disadvantage.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

I Need not stand upon this order which the *Gauls* here took concerning Pillage, that no Soldier should forsake his Station, or disfrank himself in hope of spoil; which is a thing that from the very infancy of Wars hath often changed the fortune of the day, and sold the honour of a publick Victory for private lucre and petty Pilfering. Amongst other Examples, let that which *Guicciardine* reporteth of the Battel of *Taro* suffice to warn a well-directed Army, as well by the good which *Charles* the eighth of that Name King of *France* received at that time, as by the loss which the *Italians* felt by that disorder, not to seek after Pillage until the Victory be obtained.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

THE insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof *Cæsar* now complaineth as the only want which these *Romans* had to clear themselves of this danger, bringeth to our consideration that which former times have made a question; which is, Whether it were the Vertue of the *Roman* Leaders, or the Valour of their Soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatness, and made their People and Senate Lords of the World. *Polybius* weighing the causes of a Victory which the *Carthaginians* gained of the *Romans*, by the Counsel and good directions of one *Zantippus* a *Græcian*, having before that time received divers overthrows, during the time of those Wars in *Africk*; concludeth that it was more in the worthiness of the Commanders, than in any extraordinary vertue of the Soldiers, that the *Romans* achieved so many Conquests. And besides the present example of *Zantippus*, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of *Hannibal*; who from the beginning of the second *Punick* War, still gained of the *Roman* Empire, enlarging the Territories of *Carthage*, and streightening the Jurisdiction of mighty *Rome*, untill it had got a Leader matchable to that subtle *Carthaginian*, and found a *Scipio* to confront their

*Hannibal*. To this may be added that famous Battel between the old *Romans* and the last *Latines*; wherein both Parties were equally balanced, both in number and quality of their Soldiers, having both the same Arms, the same use of their Weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had been in a Civil War. Neither could Fortune tell by the presence of their Armies where to bestow her favour, or where to shew her disdain; but that the worthiness of the *Roman* Leaders brought the odds in the trial, and made *Rome* great with the ruin of the *Latines*. Whereby it appeareth how much it importeth the whole fortune of the Army, to have a Leader worthy of the place which he holdeth: Forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality between two equal Armies, than the Wisdom and Experience of a grave Commander, or the disability of an unskilful Leader; which are so powerful in their several effects, that there is greater hope of a Herd of Harts led by a Lion, than of so many Lions conducted by a Hart.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Ambiorix* directeth the *Gauls* how they might best fight with advantage, and frustrate the Weapons of the *Roman* Soldiers.

THE which thing when *Ambiorix* perceived, he commanded his Men to throw their casting Weapons afar off, and keep themselves from coming near at hand, and where the *Romans* charged them to give way, for that by reason of the lightness of their Arms and their daily exercise the *Romans* could do them no harm: And again as they saw them retire to their Ensigns, then to pursue them. Which commandment was so diligently observed by the *Gauls*, that as oft as any Cohort sallied out of the Orb to give an assault, the Enemy gave back as fast as they could; and in the mean time there was no help but that part must be left naked and open to the inconvenience of casting Weapons: And again, as they retired to their place they were circumvented, as well by them that had given place unto them, as by such as stood next about them. And if they went about to keep their ground, they could neither help themselves by their Manhood, nor standing thick together avoid the darts that such a Multitude cast upon them. And yet notwithstanding these inconveniences, besides the wounds which they had received, they stood still at their defence; and having so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight hours together) they committed nothing dishonourable, or unworthy of themselves.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

I Have spoken already of the manner of the *Roman* Fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of embattelling, and in firm standing, and buckling at handy-blows: As may appear by this circumstance, where *Ambiorix* forbiddeth his Men to buckle with them, but to give back and follow on again, as the lightness of their Arms gave them opportunity. In like manner in the first book of the Civil Wars, in the Battel between *Cæsar* and *Afranius*, it appeareth that *Cæsar's* Soldiers were bound to keep their array, not to leave their Ensigns, nor without a weighty occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: Whereas the *Afranius* fought thin and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laid unto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and give back, as they had learned of the *Portugals* and other barbarous Nations.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XV.

The Romans are overthrown.

Cæsar.

**T**hen T. Baluentius, who the Year before had been primipile of that Legion, a valiant Man and of great Authority, had both his Thighs darted through with a Javelin; and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his Son, was slain; and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busily encouraged all the Cohorts and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a Sling. Titurius moved with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix afar off encouraging his Men, sent Cn. Pompeius unto him, to intreat him that he would spare him and his Soldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, he might: For he hoped to obtain so much of the People, to save the Soldiers; but for himself, he should have no harm at all: For the Assurance whereof he gave him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, and that if he liked that they two should go out of the Battel, and have conference with Ambiorix, he doubted not but to obtain of him the safety of themselves and their Soldiers. Cotta absolutely denied to go to an armed Enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions as were present to follow him; and when he came near to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast away his Arms, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him to do the same. In the mean time while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemn protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little and little encompassed about and slain. Then according to their Custom, they cried Victory; and taking up a holling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their Troops. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly was slain, and the most part of the Soldiers with him. The Remnant retired into their Camp; amongst whom L. Petrosidius the Eagle-Bearer, when he saw himself overcharged with Enemies, threw the Eagle within the Rampier, and fighting with a great Courage before the Camp, was slain. The rest with much ado endured the assault until Night: And in the Night, being in despair of all succour, slew themselves every Man. A few that escaped from the Battel, came by unknown ways through the Woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

## OBSERVATION.

**A**ND thus have we heard of the greatest loss that ever fell at any one time upon Cæsar's Army, from the time that he was first Proconsul in Gallia, unto the end of his Dictatorship. For in the two overthrows at Dyrrachium he lost not above 1000 Men, and in that at Gergovia not so many: But here fifteen Cohorts were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 Men or thereabout. Which maketh Cowardice and ill direction the more hateful, in regard that the great Victory which his Valour obtained in Pharsalia cost him but the lives of two hundred Men.

The resolution of such as returned to the Camp witnesseth the exceeding Valour of the Roman Soldier, if a valiant Leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had been absolute Commander, there had been great hope

of better fortune in the Success. But here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equal sharers in the chief authority, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion than the rest: Which being a property rather of Passion than of judicious Discourse, forceth a consent against the temperate opposition of a true discerning understanding. And so consequently it falleth out, that one Coward having Place and Authority in the Council, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the Leaders: For his timorousness flieth always to extremities, making him rash in Consultation, peremptory in Opinion, and base in case of Peril; all which are enemies to good Direction, and the only instruments of ill fortune.

## CHAP. XVI.

Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero, and stirreth up the Aduatici, the Nervii, and so raiseth a great Power.

**A**Mbiorix took such Spirits unto him upon this Victory, that with his Horsemen he went immediately unto the Aduatici, being the next borderers upon his Kingdom, without intermission of Night or Day, commanding his Footmen to follow him. The Aduatici upon his opening the matter being stirred up to commotion, the next day after he came to the Nervii, exhorting them not to let slip this occasion of recovering to themselves perpetual liberty, and revenging them of the Romans for the wrongs they had received. He told them that two Legates were already slain, and a great part of the Army overthrown: It was now no great matter suddenly to surprize the Legion that wintered with Cicero? to the performance whereof he offered himself to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily perswaded the Nervii; and therefore they dispatched speedy Messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, Leuaci, Pleumofii and Gorduni, who were all under their dominion, and raised very great Forces; and with them they hasted to the Camp where Cicero wintered, before any inkling of the death of Titurius was brought unto him.


Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**HE ambitious and working Spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the baseness of a small and ignoble State to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure upon the Roman Legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire by the memory of so many Victories in Gallia, wanted now no means to make an overture to an universal Commotion, propounding Liberty and Revenge to the Gauls (two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued People) if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proved sure and easie. Which may serve to shew, that he that will attempt upon doubtful and unsafe Principles, will take great advantage from a probable Entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.




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## C H A P. XVII.

Cicero defendeth his Camp from the surprize of the Nervii, and prepareth himself against a Siege.

Cæsar.

**I**T happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that many of the Soldiers that were gone into the Woods for Timber and Munition, were cut off by the sudden approach of the Enemies Horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Nervii, and Aduatici, with all their Confederates and Vassals began to assault the Camp. The Romans betook them speedily to their Weapons, and got upon the Rampier. With much ado they held out that day: For the Gauls trusted much upon Celerity; hoping if they sped well in that action, to be Victors ever after.

Cicero dispatched Letters with all speed to Cæsar, promising great rewards to him that should carry them: but all the Ways were so fore-laid, that the Messengers were taken. In one Night there were built in the Camp one hundred and twenty Towers, of such Timber as was brought in for Fortification; and whatsoever wanted of the rest of the work was perfected.

The Enemy the next day with a far greater Power assaulted the Camp, and filled up the Ditch. The Romans made the like defence as they had done the day before; the like was continued divers days after. The Romans made no intermission of their work at any part of the Night, nor gave any rest either to the Sick or the Wounded. Whatsoever was needful for the next days assault, was provided in readiness the Night before: A great number of Stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and many mural Piles were made; the Towers were floored in their Stories; Pinacles and Parapets were set up of Hurdles; and Cicero himself being sickly and of a weak constitution, took not so much leisure as to rest himself in the Night-time: So that the Soldiers of their own accord compelled him by entreaty to spare himself.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**HIS Q. Cicero is said to be the Brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Orator, and to him were the Letters sent which are found in his Epistles directed *Quinto fratri*. In this action his carriage deserved as great reputation in the true censure of Honour, as ever his Brother did for his eloquence *pro Rostris*. And if it had been the others fortune to have performed the like service, he would have made it the greatest Exploit that ever Roman had achieved by Arms. Wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industry which was used, in raising so many Towers in so small a time; for providing the night before such things as were necessary for the next days defence; for making so many Stakes hardened at one end with fire for the defence of the Rampier; and for the store of these mural Piles, which resembled the form of the ordinary Pile, but were far greater and weightier, in regard they were to be cast from the Rampier; which gave them such advantage by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well-practised Arm, they were very effectual and of great terrour.

## C H A P. XVIII.

Nervii propound the same things to Cicero which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus; but are refused.

**T**HEN the Princes and chief Commanders of the Nervii, which had any former familiarity and acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speak with him. Which being granted, they propounded the same things which Ambiorix had used to deceive Sabinus; all Gallia were in Arms; the Germans were come over the Rhine; Cæsar and the rest were besieged in their Winter Quarters; Sabinus and his Men were cut in pieces; and for the more credit to it, they shew him Ambiorix. They said, they were much deceived if they expected any help from those who were at present scarce able to help themselves. Notwithstanding they carried this mind to Cicero and the People of Rome, that they refused nothing but their Wintering among them, which they would not suffer to be made a common practice. they might depart in safety whither they would, without disturbance or fear of danger. Cicero only made this answer; That it was not the custom of the People of Rome to take any Article or Condition from an armed Enemy; but if they would lay their Arms aside, let them use his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiate it with Cæsar: There was great hope, in regard of his Justice and Equity, that they should not return unsatisfied.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**HE first attempt which Ambiorix made upon the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta was but short; but here, what with the pride of the former Victory, and the great multitude of the Assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carry it by Assault. For the first Assault of a place, especially when it cometh by way of surprize, is of greater hope to the Assailant, and of greater danger to the Defendant, than such as afterward are made in the sequel of the War: For after the first brunt the heat of the Enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth cold and remiss, as also with the harms and peril which they meet with in the Encounter; and on the contrary side, the Defendants having withstood the first fury, wherein there is most terrour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their Manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firm against any charge whatsoever.

## C H A P. XIX.

The Nervii besiege Cicero with a Ditch and a Rampier, and work means to set fire on their Tents.

**T**HE Nervii disappointed of this hope, carried a Ditch and a Rampier round about the Camp: The Rampier was eleven foot high, and the Ditch fifteen foot deep: Which they had learned of the Romans, partly by being conversant among them certain Years before, and partly by the Prisoners and Captives which they had taken. But they had no Iron Tools fit for that purpose, but were driven to cut up Turf with their Swords, and gather Earth with their hands, and carry it away with their Mantles and Gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered what a multitude of Men there

Cæsar.



there were at the Siege; for in less than three hours they finished the fortification of fifteen Miles in circuit. The days following the Enemies built Towers to the height of the Rampier, prepared great Hooks and strong Penthouses, or safeguards of Boards and Timber, according as the Captives had given them instruction. The seventh day of the Siege being a very Windy day, they cast hot Bullets of Clay out of Slings, and burning Darts upon the Cabins of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gauls were thatched with Straw. These Cabins were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the Wind was carried over all the Camp. The Enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the Victory were already gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Testudines to the Rampier, and to scale it with Ladders. But such was the Valour of the Roman Soldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and over-charged with multitude of Weapons, and saw all their Wealth burned before their face; yet no Man forsook the Rampier, or scarce looked back at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage. This was the worst day the Romans had, and yet it had this issue, that a very great number of the Enemies were slain and wounded; for they had so thronged themselves under the Rampier, that the hindmost hindered the foremost from retiring back. The flame at length abating, and the Enemies having brought on one of their Towers to the very Works, the Centurions of the third Cohort drew back themselves and their Men from the place where they stood, and with signs and voices called to the Enemies to enter if they thought good: but none of them durst approach. Then did they by casting Stones from all parts, beat them from the Works, and set their Tower on fire.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS one Example may serve to shew the excellency of the Roman Discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art. For they perceiving that the fortune of Wars consisted chiefly in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their Soldiers in that form of Discipline as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so overwage all difficulties and hinderances with a constant preservation and a Courage invincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious Commander, that seeketh to overtop the Trophies of Honour with the memory of his Exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker than the means which lead him to his designs. For where the weight is greater than the strength, the Engine will sooner break than lift it up. Let a discreet Leader therefore so level his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the ability of his particular means: But first let him be well assured what his Soldiers can do, before he resolve what he will do: Or otherwise let him so enable them by Discipline and Instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answer the height of his desires, and follow his aspiring mind with a resolution grounded upon Knowledge and Valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designs, he shall never fail of means to perform what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath within these late years repayed our Commanders in many parts of Christendom with loss and dishonour, when as they have measured the humour of their poor needy and undisciplined Soldier by the garb of their ambitious thoughts, and so laid such pro-

jects of difficulty, as were very unsuitable in the particular occurrences to that which their Soldiers were fit to execute.

## CHAP. XX.

The emulation between two Centurions, Pulpio and Varenus, with their fortunes in the Encounter.

Here were in that Legion two valiant Men, Titus Pulpio and L. Varenus, Centurions, coming on apace to the dignity of the first Orders. These two were at continual debate which of them should be preferred one before another, and every year contended for place of preferment with much strife and emulation. Pulpio, at a time that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtful; or what other place he did look for to make trial of his Manhood. This is the day, saith he, that shall decide our Controversies. And when he had spoken these words, he went out of the fortification; and where he saw the Enemy thickest, he fiercely set upon them. Then could not Varenus hold himself within the Rampier, but for his Credit sake followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulpio cast his Pile at the Enemy, and struck one of the multitude through that came running out against him. He being slain, the Enemies cover him with their Shields, and all cast their Weapons at Pulpio, giving him no respite or time of retreat. Pulpio had his Target struck through, and the Dart stuck fast in his Girdle. This chance turned aside his Scabbard, and hindered his right hand from pulling out his Sword; in which disadvantage the Enemy pressed hard upon him. Varenus came and rescued him. Immediately the whole multitude, thinking Pulpio to be slain with the Dart, turned to Varenus; who speedily betook him to his Sword, and came to handy-strokes; and having slain one, he put the rest somewhat back. But as he followed over-hastily upon them, he fell down. Him did Pulpio rescue being circumvented and in danger: And so both of them, having slain many of the Enemy, retired to their Camp in safety, to their great Honour. Thus Fortune carried as well the Contention, as the Encounter of them both, that being Enemies, they nevertheless gave help to save each others Life, in such sort as it was not to be judged which of them deserved greatest Honour.

## OBSERVATION.

CÆsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of Arms contained in these Commentaries. Wherein we are first to observe the grounds of this Quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they sought after, by shewing their Valour in time of danger and approving their worth by the greatness of their desert: A Contention worthy the Roman Discipline, and may serve for a pattern of true Honour full of Courage, accomplished with Vertue. For these Simultates which desire of honour had cast between them, brought forth emulation, which is the spur of Vertue, far from enmity or hateful contention: For the difference between these two qualities is, that enmity hunteth after destruction, and only rejoiceth in that which bringeth to our Adversary utter Ruin, dishonour, or ill Achievement; but emulation contendeth only by well deserving to gain the Advantage of another Mans Fame, that useth the



the same Means to attain to the like end ; and is always mixed with Love, in regard of the Affinity of their Affections, and the Sympathy of their desires, not seeking the overthrow of their Competitour, but succouring him in time of Danger and defending him from foul and unfortunate Calamity, that he may still continue to shew the greatness of his worth, by the opposition of inferiour Actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and unknown in these days, and would hardly find subjects to be resident in, if she should offer her help in the course of our affairs, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times : For we can no sooner conceive the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the uttermost of our malice, and resteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposer, than with thousand of Trophies deservedly erected to our honour. Which maketh me wonder, when I look into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the Discipline of that time which brought forth such honest effects of vertue, to their Glory and our Ignominy, having learned better rules than were known unto them ; or whether the World weakened with Age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection as it did in those days ; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remiss and negligent, that Vertue hath no part in us but words of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproach. The Injuries, Murthers, scandalous carriages of one towards another, which in these days are so readily offered and so impatiently digested, will admit no satisfaction but private Combate ; which in the first Monarchies was granted only against Strangers and foreign Enemies, as the only objects of Arms and wrath, and capable of that Justice which the private Sword should execute ; for they well perceived that these single Battels were as sparkles of civil discord, and intestine Wars ; although not so apparent in the general view of their State, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good Government. And if there were a true record of such as have been either slain or wounded within these forty years, either in this Kingdom, or in France, or in Germany, by this licentious and brutish custom, I make no question but they would amount to a number capable of that fearful stile which is attributed to Civil Wars.

Neither is there any Law, how rigorous or hard foever, that can give relief to this disorder, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as intolerable in a good Government. *Rotari* King of the *Lumbards*, forbade his Subjects this manner of Combate : But shortly after he was constrained to recall the Edict for the avoiding of greater evils ; although he protested the thing to be both inhumane and barbarous. The like Edict was published in France by *Philip* the Fair ; but was within two years revoked again at the instant request of his Subjects, in regard of the Murthers and Assassins committed in that Kingdom.

The only remedy that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time which the Prince of *Melphe* in *Piemont*, invented to prevent this evil : For perceiving how ordinary Quarrels and Blood-shed were in his Camp, he assigned a place between two Bridges for the performance of the *Duellum*, with this charge, That he that had the worst should always be slain, and cast from the Bridge into the Water. The danger joined with

dishonour (which by this Decree attended such as undertook private Combate) made the Soldiers wiser in their carriage, and put an end to their Sedition and civil Discords. But that which is yet worst of all, is, that Custom hath now made it so familiar, that every trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a private Combate : A cross look calleth another Man's Honour in question ; but the word Lye is of as great consequence as any stab or villainy whatsoever. Whereat we may well wonder, how it happeneth that we feel our selves so much exasperated at the reproach of that Vice which we so ordinarily commit : For in the custom of these times, to cast upon us the Lye is the greatest injury that words can do unto us ; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a property in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption unto which we are most subject.

I speak not this to qualifie the foulness of this Vice ; for I hold a Lye to be a monster in nature, one that contemneth God, and feareth Man, as an ancient Father saith : But to shew the crookedness of our disposition, in disdaining to acknowledge that fault which we so commonly commit. But I would fain learn when Honour first came to be measured with words : for from the beginning it was not so. *Cæsar* was often called to his face Thief and Drunkard, without any further matter : And the liberty of Invectives which great Personages used one against another, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I think our Lye might too ; for I take him that returneth the Lye, and so letteth it rest until further proof, to have as great advantage in the reputation of Honour as the former that first gave the disgrace.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Cicero* findeth means to advertise *Cæsar* of this Accident ; who hastening, raiseth the Siege, and putteth the Enemy to a great slaughter.

**A**S the Siege grew daily hotter and sharper, and especially for that a great part of the Soldiers were laid up with Wounds, and the matter brought into a few Mens hands that were able to make any defence ; so they sent out Letters and Messengers the more often to *Cæsar* : of whom some were taken, and in the sight of our Soldiers tortured to death. There was one within the place besieged of the Nation of the *Nervii*, called *Vertico*, of honest Parentage, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to *Cicero*, and carried himself faithfully in that service. This Man did *Cicero* chuse, perswading him with hope of liberty, and other great rewards, to carry Letters to *Cæsar* : Which he took, and having tied them up in his Dart, travelled as a Gaul amongst the Gauls, without any suspicion, and so came to *Cæsar*. Of whom he understood how dangerously *Cicero* and the Legion was beset.

*Cæsar.*

*Cæsar* having received those Letters about the eleventh hour of the day, dispatched presently a Messenger to *M. Crassus* the Treasurer in the Country of the *Bellovac*, twenty-five miles off, commanding the Legion to set out at Midnight, and speedily to come unto him. *Crassus* set out and came along with the Messenger. He sent another Post to *Caius Fabius* the Legate, to bring that Legion to the confines of the *Atrebat*, through which he was to pass. And wrote in like manner to *Labi*enus, that if it stood with the conveniency of the State, he should bring his Legion



to the Territories of the Nervii: For the rest of the Army that were further off he thought good not to expect. He drew four hundred Horse or thereabouts from the nearest Winter Quarters. And being advertised about the third hour (by the fore-runners) of Crassus's coming, he marched that day twenty miles.

Cambray.

He made Crassus Governour of Samarobrina, and gave him one Legion for the defence thereof; in regard that the Baggage of the whole Army, the Hostages of the Provinces, the publick Transactions and Letters, together with all the Corn which he had got for the Provision of the Winter, was left in that place. Fabius, according to his directions, without any delay met him with his Legion.

Labienus understanding of the death of Sabinus, and the slaughter of the Cohorts, and knowing also that the whole Forces of the Treviri were marching toward him, doubted that if his setting forward out of his Winter Station should seem as a stealing away, he should not be able to undergo the charge of the Enemy, whom a late Victory had made insolent: And therefore informed Cæsar by his Letters, what danger it would be to draw the Legion from their Winter Quarters; relating what had happened amongst the Eburones, and how that all the Forces of the Treviri, both Horse and Foot, lay but three miles distant from his Camp.

Cæsar allowing of these reasons, howsoever his hope of three Legions was fallen unto two, yet his whole trust was in Celerity, as the only means of all their safeties; and so by great journeys came into the confines of the Nervii; where he understood by the Captives how matters passed with Cicero, and what danger he was in. At what time he persuaded a certain Horseman of the Gauls, by great rewards offered unto him, to carry a Letter unto Cicero; which he sent writ in Greek Characters, lest his purposes should be discovered, if the Letter had been intercepted: Advising, that if he could not come to his presence, he should tye it to the string of a Dart, and so cast it into the fortifications. He advertised them by his Letter that he was on the way with the Legions, and would be there instantly to raise the Siege, exhorting him to persevere in his wonted gallantry. The Gaul fearing some danger, followed the directions, and cast it into the works by a Dart; which fell by chance upon a Turret, and there stuck two days before it was perceived: The third day a Soldier finding it, took it down and brought it to Cicero, who read it publicly in the assembly of the Soldiers, and put them all into exceeding great joy. And at the same time the smoak of their fires began afar off to be discovered; which put them out of all doubt of the approach of the Legions.

The Gauls being advertised thereof by their Scouts, left the Siege, and made towards Cæsar with all their Power; which consisted of 60000 Men or thereabouts. Cicero finding himself at liberty, sought out the same Vertico before mentioned, to carry Letters to Cæsar; advising him to be wary and diligent in his passage: Signifying by those Letters that the Enemy had left the Siege, and turned all his Forces towards him. Which Letters being brought unto Cæsar about Midnight, he certified his party of the content thereof, and prepared them by encouragement to fight. The next day as soon as it began to be light, he removed his Camp; and having marched about four miles, he discovered the multitude of the Enemy beyond a great Valley and a River. It was a matter of exceeding danger to give Battel to so great a number in a place of disadvantage: And forasmuch as he knew that Cicero was freed of the Siege, he thought he might the better for-

bear to make such haste; and thereupon sat down; and in as indifferent a place as he could chuse fortified his Camp. Which being of it self very little, as not having scarce seven thousand Men, and those without any Carriages; yet he lessened it as much as he could by narrowing the usual Streets thereof, to the end he might the better defend it, if happily the Enemy might be drawn to ingage himself seriously in any attempt upon the same. In the mean time having sent out Discoverers into all parts, he informed himself which way he might most conveniently pass over the Valley.

The same day, after small encounters of the Cavalry at the Water, either party contained themselves within their fortifications: The Gauls, as expecting greater Forces, which were not yet come; and Cæsar, that by a counterfeit fear he might draw the Enemy to the place where he was lodged on this side the Valley, and so strike the Battel before his Camp; and if he could not bring it so about, then upon discovery of the ways, to pass the Valley and the River with less danger. As it began to be day-light the Cavalry of the Enemy came near unto the Camp, and began to skirmish with our Horsemen. Cæsar of set purpose commanded the Horsemen to fall back, and to betake themselves into the Camp: and withal to fortifie their Camp on all sides with a higher Rampier, to stop up the Passages; and in doing of these things to carry themselves tumultuously, and with a feigned show of great fear. With which inducements the Enemy was so drawn on, that he brought over all his Forces, and imbattelled them in an unequal and disadvantageous place. Our Men being drawn from the Rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were imboldened to come nearer, and to cast Weapons from all parts into our works: Sending Heralds round about with Proclamation, That if any Gaul or Roman would come over unto them before the third hour, he should be taken into their safe protection; but after that time there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so contemn our party, that whereas the Ports were shut up for a skew with a single row of Turfs, to the end they might appear to be made up in such manner that they could not be broken open; some of them began to break down the Rampier with their hands, and others to fill up the Ditches.

Which Cæsar perceiving, sallied out at all the Ports at once; and sending out the Cavalry, put the Enemy so suddenly to flight, that not one of them resisted by way of fighting: Insomuch as he slew a great number of them, and put them all besides their Arms. But because he feared to follow them far, in regard of the Woods and Bogs that lay in their passage, (being unwilling to hazard himself upon the least occasion of danger) he returned with all his Forces in safety, and the self-same day came to Cicero. Where he admired the Towers, the Mantlets and Works which were begun and prepared by the Enemy: And drawing out the Legion, he found that the tenth Man had not escaped without wounds. By all which circumstances he understood, with what danger and Valour the business had been carried. He commended Cicero and the Legion according to their merit; calleth out by name such Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers, as by testimony of Cicero were found to have deserved extraordinarily in that service; informed himself by the Captives of the certainty of Sabinus and Cotta's misfortune. The next day he spake publicly to the Soldiers, opened the particulars of that matter, and then seasoned them with



with comfort and encouragement; shewing, That the loss which happened through the Fault and temerity of a Legate, was to be born with better patience: And the rather, forasmuch as by the assistance of the Immortal Gods, and by their own Virtue, the loss was redeemed in such a fashion, as neither the Enemy did long enjoy it, nor themselves were long afflicted with Grief for the same.

## OBSERVATION.

THE Passages in this Chapter are of great variety, and do give occasion of much discourse. But that which is most remarkable is, That to exceed in Forces and Troops of Men, may be a means to bring a Party to an Overthrow: For an extraordinary Power doth always beget an opinion agreeable to their own Desires, and can hardly think of any other end than that which suiteth with Security and Victorious Success; which being crossed in any material Circumstance, and put besides the course of their Intentions, whereby they fail of what they expected, doth consequently draw all the other way, and changeth hope into misfortune: As it fared here with the Gauls upon Cæsar's suddain fallying out of the Camp.

## C H A P. XXII.

The Commotions of the States of Gallia. Induciomarus attempting great Matters, is Slain, and the Country quieted.

Cæsar.

IN the mean time the report of Cæsar's Victory was carried to Labienus with incredible speed, through the Country of those of Rheims: insomuch as being fifty Miles distant from that place where Cicero Wintered, and that the Overthrow was given about Three of the Clock in the Afternoon, there was a shout at the Camp-Gate before Midnight; whereby the Men of Rheims congratulated Labienus for that Victory. The Fame whereof being carried to the Treviri, Induciomarus, that purposed the next day to Besiege Labienus, fled in the Night-time, and carried all his Forces back to the Treviri. Cæsar remanded Fabius with his Legion into their Winter-Stations: He himself with Three Legions determined to Winter about Samarobrina. And forasmuch as there were such Commotions throughout all Gallia, himself resolved to abide with the Army all the Winter. For, upon the news of the Overthrow of Sabinus, almost all the States of Gallia did enter into a Consultation of War; sent Messengers and Embassadors into all Parts, to make Overtures for future Resolutions, and to understand in what place the War might best be set on foot; holding their Consultations by Night in secret and desert places: In such manner as there passed not a day, during all that Winter, which brought not some new care or trouble to Cæsar, whilst he was daily advertised of new Meetings and Conspiracies amongst the Gauls.

Bretaigne.

Amongst others, he had Intelligence from L. Roscius, the Legate, whom he had set over the thirteenth Legion, That great Forces of those States and Cities of the Gauls that are called Armoricæ, were assembled together to Fight against him, and were come within Eight Miles of his Camp: But understanding of Cæsar's Victory, they fell back in such a fashion as though they meant to fly away. But Cæsar having called unto him the Princes and chief Men of every State, terrifying some, as seeming to understand their Complotments, and perswading others, kept a great part of Gallia in Obedience.

Howbeit the Senones (a strong People, and of great authority amongst the Gauls) went about, by a publick Decree to kill Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had set to be King over them, (whose Brother Moritagus, at Cæsar's coming into Gallia, and whose Ancestors formerly were possessed of that Kingdom) which he perceiving, fled away, and was prosecuted to the very borders, and so driven as well out of his private House as of his Kingdom. And having sent Embassadors to Cæsar to satisfy him herein; whereas he commanded the whole Senate to come unto him, they refused to obey his Warrant. So much it prevailed amongst barbarous People, that there were some found that durst avouch the undertaking of a War. Which made such an alteration in the Minds of all Men, that besides the Hedui and the State of Rheims, whom Cæsar had in great favour and respect (the one, for their ancient and perpetual Fidelity to the People of Rome, and the other, for their late Services in the War of Gallia) there was almost no State free from suspicion. Insomuch as I know not well whether it may not be wondered at or no, as well for many other Reasons, as especially for that they greatly grieved, that they who excelled all other Nations in Deeds of Arms, had now lost their Reputation so far, as they were forced to bear the Yoke of the People of Rome.

The Treviri and Induciomarus lost no time of all that Winter, but sent Commissioners beyond the Rhine, soliciting the Cities, and promising Moneys, with confident assurance that the greatest part of our Army was already cut off, and that which was left was but a small remainder of the same: And yet for all that no People of the Germans could be perswaded to pass the Rhine. For having twice made trial to their cost, in the War of Ariovistus, and in the passage of the \* Tenchtheri, they would tempt \* Franckfort. Fortune no further.

Induciomarus cast down from his hope, did, notwithstanding train and gather Forces, got Horses from the bordering States, and with great Rewards drew unto him Banish'd and Condemned Men from all parts of Gallia; and did thereby get such an opinion throughout all that Continent, that Embassadors came flocking unto him from all Quarters, and sought his favour both in publick and private. When he understood that Men made to him of their own accord, and that on the one side the Senones and Carnutes were instigated with a remembrance of their Offences, and on the other side the Nervii and Aduatici made Provision of War against the Romans, and that he should not want voluntary Forces, if he did but once go out of his Confines; he gave order to call a Council of War: Which, according to the manner of the Gauls, was always the beginning of a War, being such as constrained all the Men that were of Years, by the common Law of the Land, to assemble together in Arms: And he that came last, was, in the sight of all the rest put to Death with exquisite Torture. In that Council he took order to proclaim Cingetorix the Chief of the other Faction, and his Son-in-law, (who, as we have before declared, had followed Cæsar, and not left him in any of those Services) a Traytor to the State, and that his Goods should be Confiscated.

That being done, he published in the Council, that he was sent for by the Senones and the Carnutes, and many other States of Gallia: Whither he meant to go through the Territories of the Inhabitants of Rheims; and that he would harry and waste their Country. But first, his purpose was to take the Camp of Labienus, and accordingly gave Order what he would have done. Labienus being in a Camp exceedingly Fortified, as well by Nature as by Art, did not fear any danger that might happen to himself or the Legion; but rather studied



not to let pass any occasion to carry the matter handsomely and to purpose. And therefore being advertised by Cingetorix and his Allies, what Speech Induciomarus had delivered in the Council, he sent Messengers to all the confining Cities, and Commanded Horsemen to be sent unto him by a certain day.

In the mean time Induciomarus rid up and down almost every day with all his Cavalry under his Camp, sometimes to view the situation thereof, otherwhile to Parlee, or else to terrifie the Soldier: And his Horsemen for the most part would cast their Weapons within the Rampier. Labienus kept all his Men within the Fortifications, and did what he could to make the Enemy believe that he was sore afraid. And as Induciomarus came daily with greater Contempt to the Camp, one Night having taken in the Cavalry of the bordering Cities, which he had formerly sent for, he kept all his Party (by good Guarding) within his Camp, with such diligence, that their Reception could not possibly be bruited abroad, or carried to the Treviri. In the mean time Induciomarus, according to his wonted custom, approached near the Camp, and there spent a great part of the day: The Horsemen cast their Weapons, and with words of high Reproach called out our Men to Fight; without any word given in answer by them. And a little before the Evening, as they dispersed themselves and departed, upon a suddain Labienus let out all the Cavalry at two Ports,

commanding them, that after the Enemy was put to flight (which he saw would necessarily happen) that every one should make after Induciomarus; and that no Man should so much as Wound any other Enemy, before they saw him Slain; being very unwilling to give him time to escape, while the Soldiers were engaged with the rest: And propounded great Rewards to them that slew him. He sent out also several Cohorts to assist the Horse. Fortune made good that direction: For as all made after one, Induciomarus was surpris'd in the Foord of a River, and Slain, and his Head was brought back into the Camp. The Horsemen returning, slew as many of the rest as they could take. This thing being known, all the Forces of the Eburones and Nervii which were met together departed home; and after that time Cæsar had Gallia better settled in quietness.

## OBSERVATION.

AS the misfortune which befel Sabinus and Cotta put all Gallia into Troubles and Com-motions; so the Head of Induciomarus reduced all into Peace. According as it is said of the Spaniard, that in some cases one Man is worth a Thousand.

And thus endeth the Fifth Commentary.

## The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

ALTHO' Cæsar, in his second Expedition for England, went over stronger and better prepar'd than before, having remedied all those things that had been wanting in the former; nevertheless, being oblig'd to cross the Sea to go over into a Country in which he held no manner of correspondence, going out of another that was newly Conquer'd, subject to Revolts and very unwilling to brook Subjection; he indulg'd his Ambition more than he profited the Romans. In which we will observe first his dexterity and Prudence, in prevailing with those that were most stirring among the Gauls, to go along with him, to stand him instead of Hostages. But his natural Clemency seems to have made him commit an Error, by only lessening the Authority of Induciomarus, instead of destroying it absolutely, which he was like to have dearly paid for.

Secondly, That he is never daunted by unexpected Accidents, which he remedies as if he had foreseen them. He shewed it sufficiently in the violent Storm that disabled all his Ships, which would have flung any other Man into absolute Despair.

Thirdly, That tho' the World agrees that no General ever knew how to improve a Victory better than he did, or ever prosecuted it with more Vigour; yet he forbore to do it on this occasion, by reason that he was in a strange Country, and that his Camp was not as yet well Fortified.

Let us also observe, That tho' scarcity of Corn oblig'd him contrary to his Custom to make his Army Winter in different Quarters, and not in one Body, to make it subsist the more easily: He did it so judiciously, that the Places in which he Quarter'd his Men, were neither so distant from each other, as to hinder them from being able to Succour one another, nor yet so near but that they kept divers People in Awe. Nevertheless, the Success of that way of Quartering shews evidently, That there is nothing like remaining in one Body, because a small Body is more liable to be attempted upon than a greater, which em-

bolden'd the Gauls to Revolt, and to Attack the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta, upon whom the subtle Speech of Ambiorix, who, while he was Capitulating with them, told them, That the Revolt was so general, that the other two Camps were Attack'd at the very same time, in such a manner that they could not succour each other; made such an impression, and caus'd such a confusion of Advices, that out of fear they chose the worst, which was to abandon their Camp, and to retire. From whence we may gather, that it is always unsafe to follow the Advice of an Enemy, and that nothing is more dangerous than to Retreat within sight of the Enemy.

Cicero's Resistance in his Camp, who refus'd to receive the Council of his Enemy, and resolv'd to defend himself within his Retrenchments prov'd very successful and glorious to him, and afforded Cæsar time to come to his Relief. In which there are two remarkable Circumstances: The first relating to Cæsar, who, being inform'd, That the Gauls were coming up to him to Fight him, finding himself Weak, chose an advantageous Place, Fortifies it, takes a small Circumference for his Camp, to be the better able to defend it, and to make his Enemies believe that he was very Weak; who, after having challeng'd him divers times to Fight, began to despise him, which created a great carelessness in their Order, insomuch that they no longer Attack'd him without Confusion: Having thus lull'd them, he fell upon them so vigorously that he beat them without Resistance: And Labienus, one of his Lieutenants also defeated Induciomarus by the same Stratagem. The second relating to the Gauls, who not being able to force Cicero's Camp, which contain'd Ten Miles circumference, and yet was made in Three Hours time, by Persons who had nothing but their Swords to dig the Ground with, and nothing but their Cloaths to carry the Earth: Which shews us, what vast number of Men they were, and what may be done in Armies well regulated, and well provided with all things necessary.



## The Sixth COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

### The Argument.

**T**His Summers Commentary setteth forth the Malice of an Enemy that refuseth open Encounter, but keeping himself in the fastness of his Holds, forceth the adverse Party either to leave him untouched, or to seek him out upon disadvantage: Together with such Casualties annexed to the matter, as the power of Fortune doth commonly intermingle with such Occurrences: As also the Manners and Fashions of Life then in use amongst the *Germans* and *Gauls*.

### C H A P. I.

*Cæsar* fearing a greater Commotion in *Gallia*,  
Mustereth more Forces.

*Cæsar.*

**C**ÆSAR for many Reasons, expecting greater Troubles in *Gallia*, appointed M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, Legates in his Army, to make a new choice, and muster up more Soldiers; and withal he entreated Cneius Pompeius Proconsul, forasmuch as he continued at the City about Publick busi-  
nesses, that he would recall to their Ensigns, and send unto him such Soldiers as were before discharged of the Consuls Oath: For he thought it very material for the future time to the opinion of the *Gauls*, when they should see Italy so mighty, that if they had received any loss by the Casualties of War, they could not only in a short time make a supply thereof, but augment their Army with greater Forces. Which when Pompey had granted, both for the good of the Commonwealth and Cæsar's Friendship, the choice being speedily by his Ministers performed, before the Winter was ended Three Legions were inrolled and brought unto him, whereby the number of Cohorts were doubled, which were lost with Q. Titurius: And withal he made experience both by the speed and by the Forces, what the Wealth and Discipline of the People of Rome could do.

### The First OBSERVATION.

**N**otwithstanding any former purpose, I will begin this Commentary with the manner of the choice which the *Romans* used when they Mustred Soldiers for an intended War: And will lay it first down as the Basis and Ground-work of all Military Architecture, and carried by them with such a Ceremonious and grave Respect, as might best express the seriousness of the action, and make the Soldiers understand what consequence the sequel imported. *Polybius*, who only remaineth of them that have written of the ancient fashion of the *Roman* War, amongst other

parts of their Discipline hath left unto Posterity a compendious Relation of their Musters and Enrollments, which, with the help of other Histories, may be thus understood.

Upon the choice of their Consuls, in the be-  
ginning of every Year, their Custom was to en-  
roll four Legions, two for either Consul. At  
which enrollment they first chose fourteen Tri-  
bunes out of the Body of their Gentlemen, whom  
they called *Equites*. These fourteen were such as  
had served five Years in the Wars, whereby they  
became eligible of that Dignity. And again, they  
chose ten other Tribunes out of the Commonalty,  
being such as had seen Ten Years Service:  
Grounding this Custom upon another Law, which  
commanded the *Equites* to serve Ten, and the  
*Pedites* or Commons Twenty whole Years before  
they could be freed and discharged from the Wars.  
And therefore, according to the proportion of  
their stipendary Time, as the *Equites* were ad-  
mitted Tribunes at five Years, so were the Legi-  
onary Footmen at Ten, as at half their compleat  
time of serving in the Wars. The general respect  
which the *Romans* had in the choice of every par-  
ticular Man, from the highest to the lowest, was  
included in the circumstances of their Age, and of  
their Wealth. The Age which they deemed fit to  
endure the labours of War, was from Seventeen  
to Six and Forty; for so saith *Tubero*, concerning  
the first limit of Military Ability, that *Servius* did  
enroll Soldiers from the Age of Seventeen Years,  
adjudging such to be fit for the Service of the  
Common-weal. And *Censorinus* expresseth the  
second with an Etymology of the Name, where  
he saith, That Men were called *Juvenes* unto the  
Age of Forty Six Years, *Quod rempublicam in re  
militari possint juvare*, because till then they were  
able to help and serve their Country in War. In  
this ability of Years we are to understand, that  
the Law required every Man to perfect the com-  
pleat number of Twenty Years stipend; if there  
were occasion of so many Wars in that space of  
Nine and Twenty Years, which is comprehended  
between Seventeen and Forty Six. The Wealth,  
which is the second circumstance that made  
Men



Thirteen  
Pounds Ster-  
ling or there-  
abouts.

Men capable of Military Dignity, was necessarily required to amount to the value of *Drachmas quadringentas*, as *Polybius* saith, which, by the Latin Phrase was termed *Quaterna millia æris*: Such as were not worth so much, were neglected in this choice, and reserved for Sea-Service: Neither was it lawful for any Man to attain to any Office or Magistracy within the City, until he had merited Ten Years Stipend. Upon a resolution to make an Enrolment, which was almost every Year, the Consuls did proclaim a day when all Men of Military Age were to present themselves. Upon which day the Roman Youth being assembled in the City, and then in the Capitol, the fourteen Tribunes elected out of the Body of the *Equites*, divided themselves according as they were chosen by the People into four Parts: forasmuch as in former time the whole Forces of their Empire consisted of four Legions or Regiments, whereof I have discoursed at large in the former Book. And the four Tribunes first chosen were allotted to the first Legion, the three next to the second Legion, the four other to the third, and the three last to the fourth. In like manner the Ten Tribunes which were taken out of the common Body of the People, divided themselves into four Parts: And the two first chosen were enrolled in the first Legion, the three next in the second Legion, the two following in the third Legion, and the three last in the fourth. By which ingenious and discreet allotment it came to pass that the Commonalty were intermingled in the Government of their Armies with the Gentlemen in such an excellent mixture, that the *Equites* were either superior or equal to the *Plebeii*; notwithstanding that every Legion had an equal number of Tribunes. The Election being thus far carried, the Tribunes of every Legion fate them down by themselves: The People being divided first into their Tribes, and then into their Classes and Centuries, casting Lots which Tribe should be taken; and out of that Tribe whereon the Lot fell they drew four Men, as equal as they could, both in Age and Habitude, who being brought forth, the Tribunes of the first Legion made the first choice of one of those four; then the Tribunes of the second Legion had their choice, they of the third Legion took the next, and the fourth had the last Man. And again, out of the same Tribe were other four chosen; and then the Tribunes of the second Legion began first to make their choice, and so consequently the first Legion had the last Man. Again, four other being chosen, the Tribunes of the third Legion had the first Election, and in that course the second Legion had the last Man. And by this alternate and successive Election it came to pass, that every Legion was equally compounded, both in quality and in number. The Enrolment proceeding in this manner until their Numbers were full; The Tribunes of every Legion assembled their several Troops together, and took one out of every Regiment, and gave an Oath unto him that he should Execute and Obey, according to his Power, whatsoever was commanded him by his General: The rest being particularly called, were Sworn to keep the same Oath which their Foreman had taken. And thus we see both, who were the Electors, who were eligible, and the manner of their choice. Wherein we may observe what means they used to engage every particular Man with an Interest in the general Cause: For they thought it not sufficient to force Men out by publick Authority, and to bind them simply to that Service by the Mandates of their Empire, considering the Labours and Difficulties

of War, which are oftentimes able to dull the edge of the greatest Spirit, and to cause omissions of duty in the most honest and obedient Minds; but they tyed them likewise with such particular Respects, as did both concern the Possessions of their Fortune, and the Religion of their Soul. For it is observed concerning Man's Actions, that unless the Mind do faithfully affect the execution, it may be carried with such a perfunctory Service, as shall betray the true intent to no effect, and deceive the end of that which was promised by designment. And therefore they refused to enrol any Man that had not a convenient proportion of Wealth, to maintain a stedfast and well-resolved Courage, and to settle the motions of a staggering Mind, when they bethought themselves that the publick Duties, wherein they were engaged, were the defensive Powers of their Empire, and the means whereby the publick Weal continued happy: And so by consequence their private Fortunes were assured from Violence, and preserved only by an effectual observance of their Military Discipline. I grant that it is not altogether Wealth that doth Grace and Formalize the Actions of Men; for in some Cases Penury and Want makes Men more Valorous, according to the Answer which a Soldier once made to *Lucullus*:

*Ibit eo quo vis, qui zonam perdidit, inquit.*

Horace.

Whither you will, he'll go, who's lost his Purse.

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as the publick cause is either misprized or well affected, according as it doth concern every Man in particular; as who will doubt of the uttermost diligence of those Mariners, that have their Vessel fraught with their own Goods? Or contrariwise, who will blame a Mercenary Pilot for making Peace with Death, with the loss of other Mens Merchandize? for *Patria est ubicunque bene est*, That's a Man's Country where he is well, as one truly saith; and the estimation we have of this Life is entertained only by the benefits we hold by our Life: Therefore it much importeth a State to have such Agents to negotiate the publick businesses, as are engaged in the same by the interest of their own particular. Neither was it sufficient in that Government to choose Men of Ability both in their Body and in their Substance, but they found it necessary to bind their Conscience with a Religious Consecration, and to Swear a faithful Obedience to their General, which, with the reverence of the place, being the Capitol, and other Ceremonies of Majesty attending the enrolment, doth manifestly shew how much the Romans imputed to this part of their Discipline, being the foundation of the sequel of that Action.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, I observe the benefit which an opulent and able State may make of any loss or misfortune received by an Enemy: Which consisteth chiefly in the reinforcing, or, if it may be, in the redoubling of such Troops as the casualties of War have consumed. For it much abateth the Spirit of a People, and turneth the Pride of a Victory into discouragement and faintness of Heart, when they see their best and most fortunate endeavours achieve nothing but a reiteration of their Labours, and are driven to begin again that work which with much difficulty and hazard they had once Overcome. For it is the

Reinforcing  
of Troops de-  
cay'd.

end



end that maketh any labour to be undertaken being otherwise nothing but a pain of the body and vexation of the spirit. And herefore when it shall be found either circular, or of many confrontments, before it can answer the designments of our Mind, we chuse rather to forego that contentment which the accomplishment of our desires would afford us, than to buy it with such a measure of trouble, as exceedeth that which the proportion of our means seemeth able to effect. In regard whereof the ancient Sages of the World made a task of this quality to be one of *Hercules's* labours, by feigning the Serpent *Hydra* to be of this nature, that when one head was smitten off, two other heads grew out presently from the same stump: And so his labour multiplied his travail, and his Valour encreased the difficulty of his Work. It was *Cæsar's* custom in other cases, to have such a beginning of strength at his first entrance into a War, as by continuance might be augmented, and rather encrease than decay upon the resistance of an Enemy. So he began the War in *Gallia* with six Legions, continued it with eight, and ended it with ten: He began the civil War but with one Legion; he arrived at *Brandusium* with Six; he followed *Pompey* into *Greece* with fifteen thousand Foot and five thousand Horse; and ended that War with two and twenty thousand Foot and a thousand Horse. He began the War at *Alexandria* with three thousand two hundred Foot, and ended it with six Legions. He began the War in *Africk* with six, and ended it with eight Legions. And thus he imitated natural motion, being stronger in the end than in the beginning, and made his Army as a plant like to grow great, and sprout out into many Branches, rather than to die or decay for want of strength or fresh recruits.

## CHAP. II.

The *Treviri* sollicite the *Germans* and some of the States of *Gallia*. *Cæsar* carrieth four Legions into the Territories of the *Nervii*.

*Cæsar.*  
\* Part of the  
Diocess of  
Glen.

**I**Nduciomarus being slain, as is related in the former Book, the \* *Treviri* gave the Government unto his Kinsfolk: Who intermitted no time to sollicite their Borderers with the *Germans*, and to promise them Money for the Wars. When they could not prevail with their Neighbours, they tryed those that were farther off: And having found some that hearkened to their Designs, they confirmed their League, with a mutual Oath, giving pledges for assurance of Money, and withal they drew *Ambiorix* into their society and confederation. Which things being known, *Cæsar* perceiving the preparations which in every part were made for War, the † *Nervii*, \* *Aduatici*, and the † *Menapii*, with all the *Germans* on the other side of the *Rhine* to be in Arms, the *Senones* not to come being summoned, but to be in counsel with the \* *Carnutes* and their bordering States, the *Germans*, to be solicited with often Embassages from the *Treviri*; he held it best to think of War sooner than heretofore he was accustomed. And therefore before the Winter was ended, with four Legions that lay next together, he entered suddenly upon the Confines of the *Nervii*, and having taken a great number of Men and Cattel, before they could either make head or fly away, he distributed the booty to the Soldiers, wasted the Country, caused the People to come in, and to give Pledges unto him, That business being speedily ended, he brought the Legions back again into their winter Quarters.

† Tormay.  
\* Beaumont.  
† Gueldres.  
\* Chartres.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**T**HIS exemplary course of proceeding in punishing some one for the offences of many, hath ever been held the best means to repress rebellious and factious motions, as well amongst particular Subjects which do conspire against the common Policy of a State, as also of such inferiour Cities and States as shall entertain a Confederacy prejudicial to the Sovereignty of an Empire: For in all such Combinations the Undertakers are ever more confident in the assistance and mutual encouragement of each others assent and forwardness, than in the strength of their own particular means. For the Mind propounding a course contrary to a vertuous direction, is always suspicious and mistrustful of the Issue: For as honest motions and conceptions of the Heart are attended with assurance, so doth diffidency wait upon indirect and perfidious designments. And thence it happeneth that when the inward thoughts can afford no means of emboldening, they commonly rely upon each others example, and do make the action to appear honest unto themselves, forasmuch as so many Associates do approve it. For the prevention whereof in the Continent of *Gallia*, *Cæsar* first laid a heavy hand upon the *Nervii*, being well assured, that as rebellious motions are strengthened and drawn on by the mutual example of conspiring Members, so they may be weakened and extinguished by the exemplary ruin and subversion of some one or more of the said Members, which is as forcible to dissuade as the other to encourage: Suiting right with the tenour of Justice, which ought to be carried in such sort against offenders, that by the punishment of some few the fear may touch all. According as the Poet describeth the nature and effect of Thunder;

Exemplary  
Justice.

*Ipse Pater media Nimborum in Nocte corusca  
Fulmina molitur dextra, quo maxima Motu  
Terra tremit, fugere Ferae, & Mortalia Corda  
Per Gentes humilis statuit pavor; ille flagranti  
Aut Athon, aut Rhodopea, aut alta Ceraunia  
dextra*

*Dejicit. —*

The whole Earth trembled, but one Hill only smoaked for it.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**S**ECONDLY, I observe the respect which *Cæsar* had to the extraordinary labour of his Soldiers: For whereas they were drawn out of their Winter Quarters before Winter was ended, and were carried unseasonably upon a Service, he rewarded them with the Booty and spoil of the Enemy: contrary to the ordinary course of the Roman Warfare, which reserved either all or the most part thereof for the publick Treasury, and left the Soldier to his stipendiary entertainment. Which is a Point very observable in the carriage of a War: Wherein are required as well eminent and extraordinary Attempts, as common and usual duties, and in the judgment of a wise Commander are thought worthy their answerable rewards. At the Siege of *Gergovia* as it followeth in the seventh Commentary, *L. Fabius* a Centurion told his Companions, that the Booty and Pillage which he had got at the taking of *Avaricum* would not suffer any Man to get up upon the Wall before himself. And so for the most part it falleth out, that honourable

Upon extraor-  
dinary ser-  
vice, the Sol-  
dier extraor-  
dinarily re-  
warded.

At.



Lib. I. civil.  
bell.

Attempts being honourably rewarded, do as Seed sown in good ground, multiply the increase of like vertuous actions. And this was one principal means which he used to give Courage and Valour to his Soldiers; as when he went to get *Spain* from *Pompey* and that Faction, he borrowed Money of the Tribunes and Centurions, and gave it in largesse to the Soldiers, whereby he gained (as he saith) two advantages, *quod pignore animos Centurionum devinxit, & largitione redemit militum voluntates*, for he engaged the Centurions to him whilst he had this pledge from them, and by his largesse purchased the good will of the Soldiers.

### CHAP. III.

*Cæsar* summoneth a general Council, and carrieth his Army against the *Senones*.

*Cæsar.*

**A** General Council or meeting of all the States of *Gallia* being summoned, according to his first resolution, in the beginning of the Spring, whereas all the rest, saving the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Treviri*, made their appearance; he conceived of it as the beginning of War and defection, and thereupon setting all other things aside, he transferred the Council to the City of *Paris* in the confines of the *Senones*, which in the time of their Fathers had united their State unto them, but were held clear of this Confederacy. This thing being published from the Tribunal, the same day he carried the Legions against the *Senones*, and by great journeys came into their Country. His coming being known, *Acco* the chiefest Author of that Rebellion, commanded the multitude to go into the Cities and Towns of defence: But as they endeavoured, before it could be accomplished, News was brought that the Romans were already come; whereby they necessarily left off their purpose, and sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to intreat for favour. They used the mediation of the *Hedui*, whose State had of old time been in faith and league with the Romans. *Cæsar* at the suit of the *Hedui*, did willingly afford them pardon, and accepted their excuse, forasmuch as he judged the Summer time fitter to be spent in the War which was coming on him, rather than in matter of Question and Judgment: And having commanded an hundred Pledges, he delivered them to be kept by the *Hedui*. The *Carnutes* likewise sent Messengers and Pledges, and by the intreaty of the Men of *Rheims*, whose Tributaries they were, received the same answers. *Cæsar* ended the Council, and commanded Horsemen to be sent him from all the States of *Gallia*.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

The benefit  
and use of  
Councils and  
Parliaments.

**I**T shall not seem impertinent to the Reader, that I take occasion here to say somewhat touching the use and benefit of this Parliament or Council-general, wherein all the States of *Gallia*, or at the least such as did acknowledge the Roman Sovereignty, presented their fealty, and were mutual witnesses of each others Allegiance. Concerning which we are to understand, that as all natural bodies have a transitory Being, depending upon motion and function of parts; so specially States and Commonweals, as sympathizing with natural causes, have no certain continuance in one and the same Being, but are subject to the alteration of Time and Fortune, and do pass the ages of a natural Life, from Infancy growing to better strength, until it come to the best perfection which years can afford it, and then decaying again by like degrees, even to the period and death of that

policy. For remedy whereof, and for the prevention of any weakning disease which might infect either the whole powers of the body, or so possess any part thereof, as it might thereby prove either dangerous or unprofitable, amongst other helps, these Councils and Meetings have been thought necessary; wherein every particular State and City had some of their Society present, as well to open their grievances, if any were, and to seek ease and relief by way of Treaty and Dispute, as also to receive such Directions and Mandates as the wisdom of the Prince should think meet for their Government. For as this Common-Council or General Assembly may well be termed the Pulse of a Politick Body, whereby the true state and temperature thereof is discerned: So is it also as a Treaty or Parlee, and a renewing of the Conditions of Peace between the Head and the Members; where Sovereignty and Obedience being mutually propounded, do concur in the establishing of true and perfect Government. And this is that which the Politicians of later time do in their Writings call the reducing of a Commonwealth to the first beginning: For the noisome and superfluous humours being by this means purged and abated, the body of the Publick weal is refined into such true and natural Elements, and settled in that disposition of health as may give great hope of long continuance. Besides this use and benefit of these Assemblies, there were many necessary businesses concluded, and many things agreed unto, serving to the maintainance of War against Parties and Factions; as namely the levies and supplies of Horse and Foot, granted by this Council as a subsidy, which in the Roman Army received stipend and pay by the name of Auxiliary or Associate Forces, whereof we ready in many places of these Commentaries, and particularly in this Book. But the Romans used specially the service of their Horsemen, as the flower of their strength, and far exceeding their Foot Companies in execution of Arms and use of War, wherein the Gauls have ever challenged a pre-eminence before other their neighbour Nations, and have continued the same reputation even unto this time. Whether it be in regard of the nimble and quick motions of their spirits, which are better suited with the swift and speedy execution of Horse, than with any readines which their own strength can afford them, or what other cause it hath, I know not: But this I am sure of, that as the World taketh notice of their hot Phantasies, so would the French be reckoned the best Horsemen of any other Nation. The last saying which I observe concerning this Council is, the time wherein it was summoned, which was the beginning of the Spring, rather than any other part of the year, whereof there is this reason; that if any State neglected the Summons, and refused to make their appearance according to custom, the Summer time coming on, gave good means to the Roman Legions to punish the insolency of such a contempt: As it happened in this place to the *Senones*, *Carnutes* and *Treviri*, whose absence from this meeting was a sufficient argument to *Cæsar* of their rebellion, and deserved the reward of open revolt.

The French  
are better  
Horsemen  
than Foot-  
men.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**T**HE second thing which I will briefly observe in this Chapter, is the pardon which *Cæsar* willingly gave the *Senones* at the mediation of the *Hedui*; not so much for the respect he bare unto the *Hedui*, although they had of long time performed good service to the Roman Empire, and were found more faithful than all the States of *Gallia*:

Not to mis-  
pend the time  
in unnecessary  
services.



*Gallia*; (howbeit I doubt not but that he was glad of that occasion to gratifie the *Hedui*;) but as a Master in that faculty, well knowing what best suited with the publick profit in all times and seasons, he would not mispend the Summer in questions and dispute concerning former errors, which might better be remembred upon other occasions, but rather in prosecuting War against other special revolvers, as a matter more behoveful to the advancement of the Empire, and best fitting the time of Summer. For in following a business, there is nothing more available to a fortunate issue, than to be able to distinguish of the validity of the parties, and to discern which hath most interest in the bulk of the matter, that so we may not be mistaken in our designs, but follow that course as shall most advantage our purpose. And here a General is to take special care, that no humorous respect do hinder that resolution which true judgment approveth: For oftentimes it falleth out, that either particular profit, delighting pleasures, desire of revenge, or some other unreasonable affection doth so intangle them in their proceedings, as they never attain to the main drift of the action: And this is called stumbling by the way.

## CHAP. IV.

*Cæsar intendeth the War of the Treviri.*

*Cæsar.*

**T**His part of *Gallia* being quieted, he bent his whole mind to make War against the Treviri and Ambiorix, commanding Cavarinus with the Cavalry of the Senones to go along with him, lest any Tumult should happen in his absence, either through his discontentment, or the malice of the State. These things being thus determined, forasmuch as he well knew that Ambiorix would not come to blows in open fight, he endeavoured by what means he could to understand his other purposes. The Menapii were borderers upon the confines of the Eburones, inclosed about with a defence of Bogs and Woods; and only they of all the States of *Gallia* had never sent to Cæsar touching any contract of Peace: Of them Ambiorix was received and had familiar entertainment. And further he understood that by the means of the Treviri the Germans were brought to a contract of friendship with him also. These helps he thought were fit to be taken from Ambiorix, before he set upon him with open War; lest despairing of his safety, he should either hide himself amongst the Menapii, or be compelled to fly over the Rhine to the Germans. In this resolution he sent the Baggage of the whole Army with a convoy of two Legions to Labienus, who was then in the Territories of the Treviri, and he himself with five expedient and unburthened Legions made towards the Menapii. They having made no head, but trusting to the strength of the place, fled into the Woods and Bogs, and carried all they had with them. Cæsar dividing his Forces to C. Fabius a Legate, and M. Crassus the Treasurer, having made speedy provision of Bridges, did set upon them in three parts, and burnt Houses and Villages, and took great numbers of Men and Cattel, whereby the Menapii were constrained to send to Cæsar for Peace. He having taken Pledges of them, assured them that he would esteem them as Enemies, if they did either receive Ambiorix into their Country, or any Messengers from him. The matter being thus compounded, he left among them Comius of Arras with certain Horse, as a Garrison to that place, and he himself made towards the Treviri.

## OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that as it falleth out in other things for the most part, so especially in matter of War there is such a medley and interlacing of material circumstances with the body of the action, that commonly one business begets another. Cæsar's chief design at this time was the War against Ambiorix and the Treviri: But considering the Contract and League between them and the Menapii, he would not prosecute the War of the Treviri, until he had taken away that assistance, and left them in the nakedness of their own strength. Wherein we may first observe what opinion Cæsar held of Allies and Associates, or any other that gave help or assistance to an Enemy: For besides this particular, we may read in the fourth Commentary, that the chiefest cause that moved him to take the Voyage into Britain was, for that the Britains had underhand given succour and assistance to the Gauls; a matter not to be neglected in his judgment, whether it were in regard of any friendship or good respect which they bare unto the Gauls, or otherwise to keep the Romans occupied there, that they in the mean time might live quietly at home, which I need not here dispute: But the matter proveth it self plainly by Cæsar's own confession, that the continual supplies sent from Britain were a sufficient cause to move him to that War. And as it followeth in this Commentary concerning the self same matter, the only cause that drew him to pass the Rhine the second time into Germany, was the succours which the Germans had formerly sent to the Treviri; according to reason in cases of other natures, that he that will extinguish a Lamp, must not suffer an addition of Oil, nor admit the influence of lesser streams when he goeth about to dry up the greater River. But that which was the occasion of this business, and might have challenged the first place in this discourse, was, for that Cæsar was almost assured that Ambiorix would not be brought to a tryal of Battel; and therefore he laboured to understand his other projects. From whence a Commander may receive direction what course to hold in a refusal of open Encounter: For as the Art and sleight of War is to subdue an Enemy, so are there more ways and means to effect that purpose, than by waging Battel; as I have discoursed at large in the third Com-

*Cæsar's opinion of Allies and Associates.*

*Chap. 10.*



## CHAP. V.

*Labienus overthroweth the Treviri by guile.*

*Cæsar.*

**W**Hile Cæsar was about these things, the Treviri having raised great Forces both of Horse and Foot, had a purpose to assault Labienus Wintering in their confines with one Legion. And as they were within two days journey of him, they had intelligence of two Legions more which Cæsar had sent unto him; whereupon they encamped themselves some fifteen miles distant from him, and resolved there to attend the German Forces. Labienus being advertised of their resolution, hoping through their rashness to find some good opportunity of Encounter, he left five Cohorts for the safety of the Carriages, and with five and twenty other Cohorts, besides great Forces of Horse, he marched towards the Enemy, and encamped himself within a mile of them. Between Labienus and the Enemy there ran a River, the passage whereof by reason of the broken Banks, was very hard and difficult: This River he did not purpose to pass himself, and doubted the Enemy would not be drawn to do it. They had every day more hopes of fresh aid. In the Meetings and Councils of War he gave out, That forasmuch as the Germans were said to be at hand, he would neither hazard himself nor the fortunes of the Army, but he would rather remove his Camp the next day very early in the morning. This was quickly carried to the Enemy, as amongst many of the Gauls that were with him, some of them did naturally favour the proceedings of their own Nation. Labienus having in the Night-time called unto him the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and the Centurions of the first Orders, acquainted them with his purpose; and to the end he might give greater suspicion of fear to the Enemy, he caused the Camp to be dislodged with more Noise and Tumult than the Roman discipline had usually observed; and thereby made the retreat not unlike a flight or escape: Which before Day-light (the two Camps being so near one to the other) was by the discoverers brought to the Enemy. The last Troops of the Romans were scarce gone out of the Camp, but the Gauls encouraging one another not to lose so hopeful a prey, thinking it long (especially the Romans being thus affrighted) to expect the German Forces, and that it stood not with their dignity, being so able, and so many in number, not to adventure upon a handful of Men, flying from them, and troubled besides with Baggage and Burden; and therefore they doubted not to pass the River, and to give them Battel in a place of disadvantage. Labienus suspecting that which now had happened, to the end he might draw them all over the River, he made as though he would go on forward. At length sending the Carriages a little before, and placing them upon a Hill, Ye have now, (said he) fellow Soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, the Enemy in a cumberfom and unequal place; only afford me your Leader at this time that Valour, which oftentimes heretofore you have shewed to your General; imagine him to be present, and to see this service with his own eyes. And withal he commanded the Ensigns to be carried towards the Enemy, and the Army to be imbattelled: And leaving a few Troops of Horse with the Carriages, he disposed the rest in the Wings of the Army. The Romans taking up a Cry and a Shout, did speedily cast their Pikes at the Enemy: Who when they saw the Romans ready to assault them, whom they had thought had fled from them for fear, they were so discouraged, that even in the first close they betook themselves to flight towards the next Woods.

Labienus pursuing them with his Horsemen, killed many of them, and took more Prisoners, and within a few days took in the whole State of the Treviri: For the Germans which came to their succour, understanding of their overthrow, returned home again; and with them went also the Kinsmen of Induciomarus, the Authors of that defection. The Sovereignty and Government was given to Cingetorix, who from the beginning had ever been true and Loyal to the Romans.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**I** Have already handled this practice of a pretended fear, which the History doth so often recommend to our consideration, and have shewed the inconvenience of over-light credulity, leading such inconsiderate Persons to a disappointment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implied in this relation, and respecteth the chiefest duty of a chief Commander: And that is, what specially is required of a General in the carriage and direction of a Battel. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more material to the effecting of any business than opportunity of time, conveniency of place, and an orderly disposition of the means according to time and place: So in question of Encounter or waging Battel, the duty of a Leader may be included in these three circumstances. Concerning the quality of the place, as the chiefest and first respected in the choice of a judicial directour, the whole scope of the Roman discipline, from the time of their first Kings, even to the last of their Emperours, did always aim at the advantage of place, as a necessary help for the obtaining of Victory: which I have already noted in the Helvetian action. Yet forasmuch as the wisdom and experience of those times did deem it a circumstance of such importance, give me leave once again to enforce the use thereof by these examples. *Habetis, milites, (saith Labienus in this place) quam petiistis facultatem, hostem iniquo atque impedito loco tenetis, præstate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam sæpenumero Imperatori præstistis.* Ye have, fellow-Soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, &c. Whereby he cleareth himself of all imputation of ill direction, as having performed the uttermost duty of a Commander, and given such helps by the advantage of the place as are requisite to an easie Victory, leaving the rest to the execution of the Soldiers. Cæsar at the loss he received at Dyrrachium, cleared himself to his Soldiers in this sort: *Quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuius potius quam suæ culpæ debere tribui, locum securum ad dimicandum dedisse, &c.* the damage that was received was to be attributed to any body rather than him, he had chosen them a safe place of fighting, &c. And as it followeth in the seventh Commentary, being imbattelled upon the side of a Hill right over-against the Army of the Gauls, which stood likewise in a readiness to entertain the Roman Valour, he would not suffer his Men to hazard themselves in the passage of a Bogg of fifty foot in breadth lying between both the Armies, but rather persuaded his Soldiers, disdain the affronts of the Enemy, to endure their contumely, rather than to buy a Victory with the danger of so many worthy Men, and patiently to attend some further opportunity. Which passage of Cæsar, even in the said terms as it is there related, was urged to good purpose by Sir Francis Vere in the year One thousand six hundred, at a Consultation before the Battel of Newport. For the Army of the Netherlands being posselt of the Newport Downs,

*Comm. 3. cap. 8.*

*The duty of a General in a very Battel.*

*Lib. 1. cap. 6.*

*Battel of the Newport Downs,*



Downs, which are small swelling Hills rising unevenly along the Sea-shore upon the Coast of *Flanders*, and the Enemy making a stand upon the Sands at the foot of those Hills, and so cutting off the passage to *Ostend*, it was disputed by the Commanders, whether they should leave the Downs, and go charge the Enemy where he stood imbatelled upon the Sands, or attend him in the fastness of the Downs whereof they were possesst. The whole Council of War were earnestly bent to forsake the Downs, and to hazard the fight on equal terms, as impatient that their passage and retreat to *Ostend* should be cut off. But Sir *Francis Vere* well knowing how much it imported the business of that day to hold a place of such gain and advantage, persuaded Count *Maurice* by many reasons, and specially by this of *Cæsar* which I last alledged, not to forgo the help of the Downs, but to expect the Enemy in that place, and so make use of that benefit upon the first encounter rather than to adventure the success of the Battel in whose terms, in hope of clearing the passage: And shewing also many probable conjectures, that the Enemy would not continue long in that posture. Wherein as his opinion then prevailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesses both of the truth of his conjecture, and the soundness of his judgment. For the Enemy within a while after coming on to charge the Troops of the States, was received with such an encounter from the Hills, and were violently beaten back in such such rude manner, as our Men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile or more, which was no small advantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the opportunity of time, which *Pindarus* calleth the Mother of worthy Exploits, and oftentimes dependeth upon the circumstance of place, a General ought carefully to advise that he neither precipitate nor hinder the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular service of *Labienus*. For where his purpose was to draw the Enemy over a River that had steep and uneasy Banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage, he would not shew his resolution until he had drawn them all over the River: For he was well assured that the *Roman* Legions would so charge the Enemy upon their first encounter with the unresistable weight of their Piles, that in their giving back they could not escape the danger of the River. And therefore to make the Victory more absolute and compleat, he suffered them all to come over the Water, that all might be endangered in their passage back again. And this is the benefit which opportunity bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulness, forasmuch as *Non sepe, ac diu, eadem occasio est*, a Man hath neither often nor long the same opportunity.

Concerning the last circumstance, of the apt and fit disposition of the Forces according to time and place, which is necessarily required in the duty of a General; it is referred to this end only, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one Man is assistant to another in their several Files and Ranks, so one Troop may be *in subsidio*, assistant to another, to the end that no part may stand naked, or fall in the singleness of its own strength, but that one may second another from the first to the last. *C. Sempronius* a *Roman* Consul, having fought unadvisedly, and received an overthrow, *Julius* the Tribune of the People caused *Tempanius* a Horseman that was present at the Battel to be called, and as *Livy* reporteth it, *Coram eis, Sexte Tempani, inquit, arbitreris ne C. Sempronium Consulem, aut in tempore pug-*

*nam iniisse, aut firmasse subsidio aciem?* he said thus before them, *Sextus Tempanius*, do you believe that *C. Sempronius* the Consul chose a good time to fight, or that he took order for assistant supplies to his Army? For *Livy* saith, he fought *incaute inconsultèque, non subsidio firmata acie, non equite apte locato*, heedlessly and without good advice, neither strengthening his Army with supplies, nor well placing his Cavalry. And of these three circumstances consisteth the duty and office of a General, touching the direction of a Battel; wherein whosoever faileth, doth hazard the prerogative of his command over that Army which he leadeth, according to that of *Cæsar* in the first of his Commentaries, *Se scire, quibuscunque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperto, avaritiæ esse convictum*, that he knew well, whensoever an Army refused to be obedient to their Commander, it was either because upon some ill success they saw he was unfortunate, or that by the discovery of some notorious matter they found him guilty of Avarice. Which *Cæsar* himself needed not to fear, if we may believe *Plutarch*, *In the life of* who writeth that he was indowed by nature *Cæsar*. with an excellent promptitude and aptness to take opportunity in any business.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

I May not omit to insist a little upon this noise <sup>The use and benefit of a shout took up in a charge or assault.</sup> or shout which the Soldiers took up in the instant of the charge, and is related in this place as a material point in their carriage at this service. A Custom ancient and usual in the *Roman* Armies, as well in the time of their first Kings, as their first Consuls. *Fusi primo impetu & clamore hostes*, the Enemies were overthrown at the first onset and shout, saith *Livy* concerning *Romulus*. And not long after, *Consul nec promovit aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus*, the Consul neither marched his Army forward, nor suffered them at all to shout. *Cæsar* in the censure which he gave concerning *Pempey's* direction for the Battel at *Pharsalia*, doth express a double use of this clamour or shouting: First the terrour of the Enemy, and secondly the encouragement or assurance of themselves: *Est quædam animi incitatio* (saith he) *atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent: neque frustra antiquitus institutum est ut signa undique concinerent, clamorem universi tollerent, quibus rebus & hostes terreri & suos incitari existimaverunt*. There is a certain rising and cheerfulness of the mind inbred naturally in all, which is stirred up by an eagerness to fight: This a General should not crush but cherish. So that it was not without cause that in old times they had a custom the whole Army should make a noise and raise a general shout, whereby they supposed as the Enemies were affrighted, so their own Men were encouraged. Two contrary effects proceeding from a cause, which to common sense carrieth no shew of any such efficacy: *Vox & præterea nihil*, a bare voice and nothing more; as one said of the *Nightingale* in another sense. But such as do seriously look into the reasons thereof, shall find the saying true which is ascribed to the elder and wiser *Cato*, *Verba plus quam gladium, & voces quam manum hostes territare, & in fugam vertere*; Words will do more than Swords,



Lib. 1.

Lib. 3. cap. 18.

and Voices sooner than Hands may affright the Enemy and put him to flight. The Ear, as I have already noted, will sooner betray the Soul to the distress of fear, than any other of the five Senses. Which *Josephus* well understood, although peradventure he applied not so fit a Remedy, when he commanded his Men to stop their Ears at the Acclamations of the *Roman* Legions, lest they might be daunted and amazed thereat. The reason may be, for that our Discourse (diligently attending upon a matter of that consequence which calleth the Lives of both Parties in Question, and valuing every circumstance at the utmost) doth always presuppose a cause answerable to such an effect of joy and assurance. For these Shouts and Acclamations are properly the consequents of Joy, and are so available that they deceive both Parties: For such as take up the shout by way of Anticipation, do seem to conclude of that which is yet in question; and the Enemy thereupon apprehendeth danger when there is none at all, whereby it happeneth, *Hostes terreri, & suos incitari*, that the Enemies are affrighted, and our own Men encouraged, as *Cæsar* noteth. Besides these Examples, I might alledge the authority of Holy Writ, but that it might seem both unsavory and unseasonable to make a commixture of such diversities. I will therefore content my self with a practice of our time at the Battel of *Newport*, where, after divers Retreats and Pursuits, either side chasing the other as it were by turn and mutual appointment, and as it often falleth out in such Rencontres, at last commandment was given to the *English* to make head again, and after some pause to Charge the Enemy with a Shout; which being accordingly performed, a Man might have seen the Enemy startle before they came to the stroak; and being Charged home, were so Routed, that they made not head again that day. For the prevention of such a disadvantage, there can be no better Precedent than that which *Plutarch* noteth, touching the Battel between the *Romans* and the *Ambrons*, a part of that deluge of People which came down into *Italy* with the *Cimbri* and *Teutones*; for these *Ambrons* coming out to give Battel, to the end they might strike fear into the *Romans*, made an often repetition of their own Name, with a loud sounding voice, *Ambrons, Ambrons, Ambrons*. The *Italians* on the other side that first came down to Fight were the *Ligurians*, Inhabiting the Coast of *Genoa*, who hearing this noise, and plainly understanding them, made answer with the like cry, sounding out their own name, *Ligurii, Ligurii, Ligurii*. Whereupon the Captains of both sides made their Soldiers cry out altogether, contending for Envy one against another who should cry it loudest: And so both sides were encouraged, and neither of them disadvantaged, *Clamore utrinque sublato*, whilst both sides continued the cry.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

**T**His *Labienus* was a great Soldier, and well acquainted with *Cæsar's* manner in Leading an Army, and made many good Fights while he continued under his Command: But after he betook himself to *Pompey's* part, and joyned with a Faction against his first Master, he never achieved any thing but loss and dishonour.

————— *Dux fortis in armis*  
*Cæsareis Labienus erat, nunc transfuga vilis.*

Once *Labienus* was a Captain Stout  
On *Cæsar's* side, now a base Turn-about.

And upon that occasion he is often mentioned as a Memorial of his Disloyalty, to prove that good Success in matter of War, doth follow the General rather than any inferior Captain. For it is observed of divers, whose fortune hath been great under the Conduction of some Commanders, and as unlucky under other Leaders: Like Plants or Trees that thrive well in some Grounds, and bear store of Fruit, but being transplanted, do either dye or become Barren. And doubtless, there may be observed the like sympathy or contrariety in the particular courses of Man's Life, wherein they are carried upon the stream of their Fortunes, according to the course of their first Embarking. And therefore such as happen in a way that leadeth to successful Ends, shall much wrong themselves, either to turn back again, or to seek By-Paths, whose ends are both unknown and uncertain: And herein the *French* saying may serve to some purpose,

*Si vous estes bien, tenez vous la.*

If you find your self well, hold your self there.

## C H A P. VI.

*Cæsar* carrieth his Army over the *Rhine* into *Germany*.

**C**Æsar being come from the *Menapii* Cæsar. to the *Treviri*, did resolve to pass the *Rhine* for two Causes: The one was, for that the *Germans* had sent Succours and Supplies to the *Treviri*; the other that *Ambiorix* might have no Reception or Entertainment among them. Upon this Resolution, a little above that place where he carried his Army over before, he Commanded a Bridge to be made after the known and appointed fashion, which, by the great Industry of the Soldiers, was ended in a few days: And leaving a sufficient strength at the Bridge, lest any sudden motion should rise amongst the *Treviri*, he carried over the rest of his Forces, both Horse and Foot. The *Ubii* which before time had given Hostages, and were taken into Obedience, sent Embassadors unto him to clear themselves from Imputation of Disloyalty, and that the *Treviri* had received no Supplies from their State: They pray and desire him to spare them, lest the general distast of the *Germans* should cause him to punish the Innocent for the Guilty: And if he would ask more Hostages they would willingly give them. *Cæsar*, upon Examination of the matter, found that the Supplies were sent by the *Suevi*: And thereupon he accepted the satisfaction of the *Ubii*, and enquired the way and the passages to the *Suevi*. Some few days after he understood by the *Ubii*, that the *Suevi* had brought all their Forces to one place, and had Commanded such Nations as were under their Dominion, that they should send them Forces of Horse and Foot. Upon this intelligence he made provision of Corn, and chose a fit place to Encamp in. He commanded the *Ubii* to take their Cattel, and all their other Goods from abroad out of the Fields into their Towns, hoping that the barbarous and unskilful Men might, through want of Victuals, be drawn to Fight upon hard Conditions. He gave Order also, that they should every day send out Scouts to the *Suevi*, to understand what they did. The *Ubii* did as they were Commanded, and, after a few days, brought word that all the *Suevi*, having

recei-

In *Marius's*  
Life.



received certain news of the approach of the Roman Army, had retired themselves and all their Forces to their utmost Confines, where there was a Wood of an infinite Greatness, called Bacenis, which served as a Native Wall or Defence to keep the Chirufci from the Incurfions of the Suevi, and the Suevi from the Injury and spoil of the Chirufci. That at the entrance of this Wood the Suevi did expect the coming of the Romans.

## OBSERVATION.

Bridges.

Brancatio  
Lib. 5.Whether Mens  
Wits be sharper  
and readier  
than in former  
Times.Polyhym.  
Herodot.

I Will hold my former purpose, not to deliver any thing concerning Bridges, whereof there are so many Treatises already extant: Neither will I go about to describe the substantial Building or ingenious Workmanship of this Bridge here mentioned, which might well beseem *Cæsar* and his Army: For as he only could, or at the least did put in practice the making thereof, so will I leave the description to himself, as best suiting with his Eloquence. But forasmuch as *Brancatio* an Italian Writer taketh occasion from hence to run into Ignorance and Error, give me leave to set a Mark upon this place, lest others, not knowing the ancient course, should run their Bark upon the same Shallows. Amongst other Advertisements (being but fourteen in all) which he hath given upon *Cæsar's* Commentaries, he noteth and commendeth the use of Bridges made of Boats, which are commonly carried in an Army-Royal to that purpose, before this or any other Invention of former Times, especially in regard of the easiness and expedition which may be used both in making such a Bridge, and taking it up again: For the Boats being prepared ready, as usually they are in Camps-Royal, such a Bridge may be made in a day, which *Cæsar* could not do in Ten, but with great wonderment and admiration. And therein I hold well with *Brancatio*, that for the speedy transportation of an Army over a River, there is no readier means than a Bridge of Boats, presupposing the Boats to be first in a readiness. But that which he concludeth is, That Mens Wits in these Times are much sharper and readier than those of former Ages, forasmuch as they have found out an easie and expedient course, which former Times could never reach unto. Wherein I will not go about to derogate any thing from the condition of the Time in which we live and breath, but do desire to find them better accomplished than any other foregoing Ages; howsoever I may suspect a greater weakness of Wit in these days, wherein the Temperature of the Body is worse conditioned than it was in the time of our Forefathers, as may appear by many Arguments, and serveth not so fitly to the working Powers of the Mind, as it did before this multiplicity of mixture, when the state of Mens Bodies were compounded of those perfect Elements which were in our first Parents. But for this reason which *Brancatio* alledgeth, the Reader may be pleased to understand, that the use of Boat-bridges was both known and in practice, as well before the Roman Empire, as in the time of their Government. *Herodotus* relating the Passage of *Xerxes's* Army into Greece, describeth this Bridge of Boats (which *Brancatio* would attribute to the Invention of our Times) in the self same manner, or rather more artificially than hath been accustomed in these later Ages: For finding that no Timber-work would serve the turn to make a sufficient Bridge over the streights of *Hellespont*, being seven Furlongs in breadth, he caused *Biremes* and *Triremes* to be placed in equal distance one from another,

and fastened with Anchors before and behind, and to be joyned together with Planks and Boards, and then covered with Sand and Gravel, raising a Hedge or Blind on each side thereof, to the end the Horse and Cattel might not be afraid at the working of the Billow, and so made a Bridge for the passage of his Army. And in the time of the Roman Empire, *Tacitus* describeth the like Bridge to be made over the River *Po*, by *Valens* and *Cecina*, with as great Skill as can be shewed at these Times: For, saith he, they placed Boats a cross the River, in equal distance one from another, and joined them together with strong Planks, and fastned them with Anchors; but in such sort, as *Anchorarum funes non extenti fluitabant, ut augesciente flumine inoffensus ordo navium attolleretur*, the Cables of the Anchors floated loose, not being extended to their length, that upon the encrease of the River the Ships might be lifted up without any prejudice to them. Whereby it appeareth how much *Brancatio* was deceived in ascribing that to these later Times which was the Invention of former Ages, and may serve as a Caveat to our Outlandish Humorists, that can endure no reading but that which foundeth with a strange Idiom, not to trust too much upon their Authors, lest whilst they stifle their Memory with strange words, in the mean time they starve their Understanding.

Hist. 2.

## CHAP. VII.

The Factions in Gallia in *Cæsar's* Time.

Ut here it shall not be amiss to deliver some-*Cæsar* what touching the manner and fashion of Life, both of the Gauls and of the Germans, and wherein those two Nations do differ. In Gallia, not only in every City, Village, and Precinct, but almost in every particular House there are Parties and Factions, the Heads whereof are such as they think to be of greatest Authority, according to whose Opinion and Command the main course of their Actions is directed. And this seemeth a Custom Instituted of old Time, to the end that none of the common People, how mean soever, might at any time want means to make their Party good against a greater Man: For if they should suffer their Parties and Followers to be either Oppressed or Circumvented, they should never bear any Rule or Authority amongst them. And this is the course throughout all Gallia, for all their States are divided into two Factions. When *Cæsar* came into Gallia, the *Hedui* were chief Ring-leaders of the one Party, and the *Sequani* of the other. These finding themselves to be the weaker side, (forasmuch as the Principality and chiefest Power was anciently seated in the *Hedui*, having many and great Adherents and Vassals) drew the Germans and *Arrovistus*, by many great Promises, to their Party: And after many great Victories, all the Nobility of the *Hedui* being Slain, they went so far beyond them in Power and Authority, that they drew the greatest part of Vassals from the *Hedui* to themselves, and took the Children of their Princes for Pledges, and caused them to take a publick Oath, not to undertake any thing against the *Sequani*; besides a great part of their Country which they took from them by Force: And so they obtained the Principality of Gallia. And thereupon *Divitiacus* went unto Rome to seek aid of the Senate, but returned without effecting any thing. *Cæsar's* coming into Gallia brought an alteration of these things, for the Pledges were restored back.



back again to the Hedui, and their old followers and Vassals did likewise return to their protection: Besides other new followers which by Cæsar's means did cleave unto them; for they saw that those which entered into freindship with them, were in a better condition, and more fairly dealt with. Whereby their Nobleness and Dignity was so amplified and enlarged, that the Sequani lost their authority, whom the Men of Rheims succeeded. And forasmuch as the World took notice that they were no less favoured of Cæsar than the Hedui, such as by reason of former enmities could not endure to joyn with the Hedui, put themselves into the protection of the Men of Rheims, and found respective protection from that State; which caused a new and sudden raised authority of the Men of Rheims. So that at that time the Hedui went far beyond all the other States of Gallia in Power and Authority, and next unto them were the Men of Rheims.

## OBSERVATION.

Factions  
and Parties.

Factions are generally the rent of a State, and a disjoynting of those parts which common Unity hath knit together for the preservation of good Government. But the Gauls maintained Sides and Parties throughout the whole body of their Continent, and found it necessary for the upholding of their policy at home; and as it fell out in the course of these Wars, rather a help than otherwise in their general defence against a foreign Enemy. The reason of the former benefit was grounded upon two causes, as Cæsar noteth: The one proceeding from the oppression used by the rich and mighty Men towards the poorer and meaner People; and the other from the impatience of those of inferior Condition, refusing to acknowledge any Authority or Pre-eminency at all, rather than to endure the Wrongs and Contumelies of the Mighty. And therefore to prevent the licentious Might of the great Ones, and to give Countenance and Respect to the lower Sort, these Factions and Sides were devised: Wherein the Foot had always a Head sensible of the Wrongs which were done unto it. Things of great Condition are always injurious to lesser Natures, and cannot endure any Competency; not so much as in comparison, or by way of relation. In things without Life, the prerogative of the Mountains doth swallow up the lesser rising of the Downs, and the swelling of the Downs, the unevenness of the Mole-hills: the Stars are obscured at the rising of the Moon, and the Moon loseth both her Light and Beauty in the presence of the Sun. So amongst brute Beast and Fishes, the greater doth always devour the less, and take them as their Due by the appointment of Nature: And Men more injurious in this Point, than either Mountains or brute Beasts, inasmuch as they do always overvalue themselves beyond their own Greatness, have in all Ages verified the old Proverb, *Homo homini lupus*, One Man's a Wolf to another. And on the other side, as Nature maketh nothing in Vain, but hath given a being to the least of her Creatures: So do they endeavour not to be annulled, but to keep themselves in being and continuance. *Habet & musca splenem*, The very Fly hath her Spleen, saith the Poet: And the Pismires and Bees have their Common-weals, though not equal to a Monarch. And therefore that the mighty and great Men of Gallia might not devour the lowest of the People, but that every Man might stand in his own Condition, and by the help of a Rowland live by an Oliver; and again, that the poorer sort might give as a Tribute for their Pro-

tection, that respect and obedience to their Superiours, as belongeth to such high Callings, these Factions and Parties were ordained: Whereby the Nobles were restrained from oppressing the Poor, and the Poor compelled to obey the Nobility, which is the best end that may be made of any Faction.

Concerning the Advantage which the Gauls received by these Factions against foreign Enemies, it was rather in regard of the multiplicity of States and Common-weals, which were in the continent of Gallia, than otherwise: for it manifestly appeareth, that their Factions and Contentions for sovereign Authority, caused one Party to bring in Ariovistus and the Germans; and the other Party the Romans, to make good their Party. But forasmuch as Gallia had many Divisions, and contained many several States, relying chiefly upon their own Strength, and esteeming the subversion of their Neighbour City, as a Calamity befalling their Neighbour, from which the rest stood as yet free, it was not so easily conquered as if it had been all but one Kingdom. The Battle which Cæsar had with the Nervii, which was fought so hard, that of Threescore Thousand Men, there were left but Five Hundred, nor of Six Hundred Senators above Three; nor again, the selling of Three and Fifty Thousand Gauls for Bond-slaves at one time, did not so much advantage the Conquest of Gallia, as the Battle of Edward the Third, or that of Henry the Fifth, our two English Cæsars: In the former whereof were slain at Cressie Thirty Thousand of the French, and in the latter at Agincourt but Ten Thousand. The reason was, for that the former Losses, though far greater, concerned but particular States; whereas these latter overthrows extended to the Members and Branches of the whole Kingdom.

## C H A P. VIII.

Two sorts of Men in Gallia, Druides, and Equites,

Throughout all Gallia there are but two sorts of Men that are of any reckoning or account: For the common People are in the Nature of Servants, and of no worth of themselves, nor admitted to any Parliament; but being kept under, either by Debts, or by great Tributes, or by the oppression of the Mighty, do put themselves in the Service of the Nobility, and are subject to the Authority which the Master hath over his Bond-slave. Of these two sorts, the one are Druides, and the other Equites or Gentlemen. The Druides, which are always present at their Holy Duties, do give order for their publick and private Sacrifices, and expound their Religion. To the Druides great Numbers of the Youth do resort for Learning's sake, and have them in great Honour and Reputation; for they do determine almost of all Controversies both publick and private: For if any Offence be committed, as Murther or Man-slaughter, or any Controversie arise touching their Lands or Inheritance, they sentence it; rewarding the Vertuous, and punishing the Wicked. If any private Man or State do not obey their Decree, they interdict him from Holy Duty, which is the greatest Punishment that is amongst them. Such as are thus interdicted, are reputed in the Number of impious and wicked Men, every Man leaves their Company, and doth avoid to meet them, or speak with them, lest they should receive any hurt by their Contagion: Neither have they Law or Justice when they require it, nor

Cæsar.

Potestas vius  
& necis.



England.

nor any Respect or Honour that doth belong unto them. Over all the Druides there is one Primate, that hath Authority of the rest. At his Decease if any one do excel the rest in Dignity, he succeedeth: If many Equals are found, they go to Election, and sometimes they contend about the Primacy with Force and Arms. They meet at a certain time of the Year in the Confiner of the Carnutes, which is the middle Part of all Gallia, and there they sit in a Sacred Place: thither they resort from all Parts that have Controversies, and do obey their Orders and Judgments. The Art and Learning of the Druides was first found out in Britain, and from thence is thought to be brought into Gallia: and at this time such as will attain to the perfect knowledge of that Discipline, do for the most part travel thither to learn it. The Druides are exempt from Warfare and Payments, and have an immunity from all other Duties: Whereby it falleth out that many do betake themselves to that Profession of their own free Will, and divers others are sent to that School by their Parents and Friends. They are said to learn many Verses, and that some do study therein Twenty Years. Neither is it lawful for them to commit any thing to writing, beside that in other publick and private Businesses they only use the Greek Tongue: And that as I take it for two Causes; First, for that their Learning may not become Common and Vulgar; Secondly, that Scholars might not trust so much to their Writings, as to their Memory, as it happeneth for the most part, that Men rely upon the trust of Books and Papers, and in the mean time omit the benefit of good Remembrance. They endeavour chiefly to teach Men that their Souls do not die, but that they do remove out of one Body into another after Death; and this they think to be very important to stir Men up to Vertue, neglecting the fear of Death. They dispute further, and give many Traditions to the youth touching the Stars and their Motion, the Magnitude of the Earth and the World, the nature of Things, and the Might and Power of the Gods.

## OBSERVATION.

Druides.

THE Quality and Condition of the Druides is in this Place very particularly described by Caesar, and may be reduced to these Heads. First, their Office, extending both to things Divine and things Temporal, whereby they executed the place both of Priests and of Judges. And for that purpose there was one known place appointed where they sate in Judgment: And as I understand it, there was but one Term in the Year, which both began and ended their Suits in Law. The Second Thing is their Authority, having Power to reward Vertue, and to punish Vice. Thirdly, their Privileges and Immunities, being free from Contribution, from Warfare, and all other Burthens of the State. Fourthly, their Doctrine and Learning, which was partly Theological, concerning the Might and Power of the Gods, the immortality of the Soul; and partly Philosophical, touching the Stars and their Motion, the Earth and the Magnitude thereof. And Lastly, their manner of learning, which was altogether Pythagorical, refusing the Help of Letters and Books, and committing their Doctrine to the tradition of their Elders. But that which is especially to be observed, is, that this Learning was not only found out here in Britain, but such as would perfectly attain to the Knowledge thereof, came into England to study the same, contrary to the experience which heretofore hath been observed of the Northern and Southern parts of the World: For as the South giveth a

England.

temper to the Body fit for the science and contemplation of Arts, whereby the mind being enlarged and purified in her Faculties, doth dive into the secret depth of all Learning, and censure the hidden Mysteries thereof; so the Northern Climates do bind in the Powers of the Soul, and restrain all her Vertues to the use of the Body, whereby they are said to have *animam in digitis*, By reason of the curious and artificial Works. their Soul in their Fingers, not affording her that delight and contentment which is usually received by speculation. And thence it happeneth that all speculative Arts and Sciences, and what else soever concerneth the inward contemplation of the Mind, was found out and perfected by such as border upon the South, and from them it was brought by little and little into the Northern Regions: and such as would be Masters in the Arts they professed, went always Southward for the attaining thereof. But here the South was beholding to the North, as well for their principles of Divinity, as for their Philosophy and Moral Learning, being as pure, as that which any heathen People ever drank of. Which proveth an Ancient Singularity in the Inhabitants of this Island, touching the Study of Arts and Matters of Learning, and may with like Evidence be proved from Age to Age even to this time. In Witnes whereof I appeal to the two Universities of this Land, as a demonstration of the Love which our Nation hath ever born to Learning, being two such Magazines of Arts and Sciences, so beautified with curious Buildings, and supplied with indowments for the liberal Maintenance of the muses, enriched with Libraries of learned Works, adorned with pleasant Places for the refreshing of wearied Spirits, Gardens, Groves, Walks, Rivers, and Arbours, as the like such Athens are not to be found in any Part of the World.

Oxford and Cambridge.

## CHAP. IX.

The second sort of Men in Gallia, called the Equites in Caesar's time.

THE other sort of People are Equites or Gentle-men. These when there is occasion, or when any War happeneth (as before Caesar his coming was usual every Year, that either they did offer Injuries, or resist Injuries,) are always Parties therein: And as every Man excelleth other in Birth or Wealth, so is he attended with Vassals and Followers. And this they take to be the only Note of Nobility and Greatness. The whole Nation of the Gauls are much addicted to Religion; and for that Cause, such as are either grievously Diseased, or conversant continually in the Dangers of War, do either sacrifice Men for an Oblation, or vow the Oblation of themselves, using in such Sacrifices the Ministry of the Druides; forasmuch as they are perswaded that the immortal Deity cannot be pleased, but by giving the Life of one Man for the Life of another: And to that purpose they have publick Sacrifices appointed. Others have Images of a monstrous Magnitude, whose Limbs and Parts being made of Osiers, are filled with living Men, and being set on Fire, the Men are burned to Death. The execution of such as are taken in Theft or Robbery, or any other Crime, they think to be best pleasing to the Gods; but wanting such, they spare not the Innocent. They worship chiefly the God Mercury, and have many of his Images amongst them; him they adore as the inventor of all Arts, the conductor and guide in all Voyages and Journeys, and they think him to have great Power in all Merchandize and gain of Mo-  
neys.

Caesar.



neys. Next unto him they preferre Apollo, Mars, Jove and Minerva, and of these they carry the same Opinion as other Nations do: Apollo to be powerful in healing Diseases, Minerva in finding out artificial Works, Jove ruling the Celestial Empire, and Mars for War. When they are to encounter with an Enemy, they vow all the Spoil unto him; and such Beasts as are taken they sacrifice; other things they lay up in some one Place: and many heaps of things so taken are to be seen in the Holy Places of divers of their Cities. Neither doth it often happen, that any Man neglecting his Religion in that Point, dare either keep back any thing so taken, or take away ought laid up in their Repositories; for they incur a heavy Punishment and Torture for that Offence. The Gauls do all boast themselves in the Stock from whence they are descended, understanding by the Druides, that they come of the God Dis. And therefore they end the space of all their times by the number of Nights rather than by the number of Days, observing the Days of their Nativity, the beginnings of their Months and their Years, in such sort as the Day doth always follow the Night. And herein they differ from other Nations, that they suffer not their Children to come openly unto them, but when they are grown fit for War: Thinking it shameful and dishonest, that a Son in his Childhood should in publick places stand in the sight of his Father. To the Portions which they have with their Wives, they add as much more of their own Goods; and the use of this Money thus added together, is kept apart, and the longer liver hath both the Principal and the Interest for all the former Time. The Men have Power of Life and Death, both over their Wives and their Children. And when a Man of great Place and Parentage shall happen to decease, his Kinsfolks assemble themselves together, to enquire of his Death: if there be any occasion of Suspicion, they put his Wife to torture after the manner of a Servant; and if it be found, she dies tormented with Fire and all other Tortures which may be imagined. Their Funerals (according to the rest of their Lives) are magnificent and sumptuous, burying with the dead Corps all that he took delight in while he lived, not sparing living Creatures: And not long out of Memory, the Custom was to bury with the Body such Vassals, and Servants as were favoured by him in his Life-time. Such States as are careful in the Government of their Common-weals, do prohibit by a special Law, that no Man shall communicate a Rumour or Report touching the State to any Man saving a Magistrate; forasmuch as it had been often found, that rash and unskilful Men were so terrified with false Reports, and moved to such desperate Attempts, that they entered into Resolutions touching the main Points of State. The Magistrates do keep secret such things as they think fit, and that which they think expedient they publish: But it is not lawful to speak of matter of State, but in assemblies of State.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

The beginning  
of the Day  
diversly obser-  
ved.

Concerning the beginning of days and times, which Cæsar noteth in this place to be observed by the Gauls after Sun-setting; (whereby it happened that in the natural Day of four and twenty Hours, the Night always preceded the day time, contrary to the use of Italy, where the Day began at Sun-rising, and the Night followed the artificial Day as the second part of the Day natural;) we are to understand, that as all time, and the distinction of the Parts thereof, dependeth upon the two motions of the Sun: The one

as it moveth in its own Orb from West to East, begetting the revolution of Years, and the seasons of Summer and Winter, the Spring and the Autumn, with the measure of Months as it passeth through the signs of the Zodiack; and the other, as it is carried from East to West the first moving Sphere, making the distinction of Nights and Days, Hours and Minutes: so the beginnings of these Times and Seasons are diversly taken amongst diverse People and Nations of the Earth. The Jews had the same Computation touching the beginning of the Day as the Gauls had, but upon other Grounds and Reasons than could be alledged for this Custom in Gallia: for they began their Day in the Evening at Sun-setting, as appeareth by many Places of the Scripture: and Moses in the Repetition of the First Seven Days Work, upon the accomplishment of a Day, saith, The Evening and the Morning were one Day, giving the Evening Precedency before the Morning, as though the Day had begun in the Evening. The Bohemians in like manner do observe the beginning of their Day in the Evening, and do herein follow the use of the Jews. Other Nations do begin at Sun-rising and take the computation of their Day Natural from the first appearing of the Sun in the East. The Greeks begin and end their Day at Midnight, observing the certainty of that Time, and the correspondence between the equal and planetary Hours in the Meridian Circle: Whereas otherwise by reason of the inequality of the Days and the Nights, out of a right Sphere, there is always some difference between the said Hours: And this Use also is observed by us in England.

This God Dis, whom he nameth for the Father of that Nation, is the same whom the Heathen called Pluto, the God of Hell and Darknes; and for that cause they put Darknes before Light, touching the beginning of their Natural Day.

But forasmuch as this circumstance giveth occasion to speak of Days and Times, give me leave to insert the reformation of the Year, which Cæsar so happily established, that succeeding times have had no cause to alter the same.

And although it neither concerneth the art of War, nor happened within the compass of these seven Summers: Yet forasmuch as it was done by Cæsar, and deserveth as often memory as any other of his Noble Acts, it shall not seem impertinent to the Reader to take thus much by the way concerning that matter. There is no Nation of any civil Government, but observeth a course or revolution differenced with Times and Seasons, in such manner as may be answerable to the motion of the Sun, in the Circuit which it maketh through the Signs and Degrees of the Zodiack. But forasmuch as the Government of a civil Year doth not well admit any other composition of Parts, to make it absolute and compleat, than by natural Days; and on the other side, the Sun requireth odd Hours and minutes to finish his Race, and return again to that part of the Zodiack from whence it came; there hath always been found a difference between the Civil and the Solar Year. Before Cæsar's time, the Romans using the ancient computation of the Year, had not only such uncertainty and alteration in Months and Times, that the Sacrifices and Yearly Feasts came by little and little to Seasons contrary for the purpose they were ordained: But also in the revolution of the Sun or Solar Year, no other Nation agreed with them in account; and of the Romans themselves, only the Priests understood it: and therefore when they pleased (no Man



Plutarch.

Cæsar.

Man being able to controll them) they would upon the suddain thrust in a Month above the ordinary Number, which as *Plutarch* noteth, was in old Time called *Mercedonius*, or *Mensis intercalaris*. To remedy this Inconvenience, *Cæsar* calling together the best and most expert Astronomers of that time, made a Kalendar more exactly Calculated than any other that was before: And yet such an one as by long continuance of Time hath bred a difference, for the matter standeth thus.

It is found by certain Observation of Mathematicians of all Ages, that the Sun being carried from the *West* to the *East* by the motion of his own Sphear, finisheth his yearly course in the space of 365 days, five hours, nine and forty Minutes, and some odd Seconds: Whereupon it was then concluded, That their Civil Year must necessarily contain Three Hundred Threescore and Five Days, which maketh Two and Fifty Weeks and One Day. And forasmuch as those Five odd Hours Nine and Forty Minutes, and some Seconds, did, in Four Years space, amount unto a natural Day (wanting Two and Forty Minutes, and six and fifty Seconds, which was thought nothing in comparison) they devised every Fourth Year to add a day more than ordinary, to answer that time which is usually added to *February*: whereby it happeneth that in every Fourth Year *February* hath Nine and Twenty Days. And so they made an Order to reform their Year without any sensible Error for a long time. But since that time, being One Thousand Six Hundred Years and more, those Two and Forty Minutes, and Six and Fifty Seconds, which, as I said, do want of the natural Day of Four and Twenty Hours, which is inserted in every Fourth Year, have bred a manifest and an apparent Error: For whereas the Civil Year is by that means made greater than the Solar Years, the Sun ending his Task before we can end our Times, it happeneth that such Feasts as have relation to seasonable Times, do as it were foreflow the opportunity, and fall out further in the Year, as though they had a motion towards the Summer Solstice. And as these go forward so doth the Equinoctial return backward towards the beginning of the Month. For *Cæsar*, by the help of the Astronomers, observed the *Æquinoctium* the Five and Twentieth of *March*. *Ptolomy*, in his Time, observed the *Æquinoctium*, the Two and Twentieth of *March*. And it was observed the One and Twentieth of *March*, in the Year from the Incarnation 322. what time was holden the first General Council at *Nice*, a City of *Pontus*, in respect whereof the Paschal Tables and other Rules were established for the Celebration of *Easter*. But since that time there are passed 1281 Years, and the *Æquinoctium* cometh before the One and Twentieth of *March* Ten days.

As this Error is reformed among other Nations, and reduced to that state as it was at the *Nicene* Council: So there might many Reasons be alledged to prove the Reformation convenient, of a greater number of days than Ten. For if the Kalendar were so ordered, that every Month might begin when the Sun entrench into that Sign, which is for the Month, and end when the Sun goeth out of that sign, it would avoid much confusion, and be very easie to all sorts of People as have occasion to observe the same: Which doubtless was the purport of the first Institution of Months; and was observed (as it seemeth) by the old *Romans*, who began the Year at the Winter Solstice, as *Ovid* noteth:

*Bruma novi prima est, veterisque novissima solis:  
Principium capiunt Phœbus & annus idem.*

And therefore they called that Month *January*, of *Janus*, that had Two Faces, and saw both the Old and the New Year. Such therefore as would go about to reform the Year to this course, must not cut off Ten Days only, but One and Twenty; and for one Year make *December* to continue but Ten Days, and then *January* to begin, and so successively to the rest of the Months. But it may be said, that although we help our selves, and put off the Inconvenience which is fallen upon us, yet in tract of Time the like Error will fall again upon succeeding Ages, and put their yearly Feasts, besides the Days appointed for them. For remedy whereof, it may be answered; That whereas this Error hath happened by adding every Fourth Year a natural Day, which in true Calculation wanted Two and Forty Minutes, and Six and Fifty Seconds of Four and Twenty Hours, and in every 136 Years hath accrued within One Minute to a Day more than needed: The only way is, every 136 Years to omit the addition of that Day, and to make that Year to contain but 365 Days, which, by the Order of *Cæsar's* Kalendar, is a Leap-Year, and hath One Day more, which hath brought this Error. And so there would not happen the error of a Day in the space of 111086 Years, if the World should continue so long.

But least we should seem more curious in reforming the course of our Civil Year, than the Manners of our Civil Life, I will proceed to that which followeth.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing which I observe in their manner of Life, is the respect they had to matter of State, and the care which they took that no Man should dispute of the Common-weal, but in Assemblies appointed for the Service of the Common-weal. Whereby they gained two special Points for the maintenance of good Government. The first, That no Man might speak of points of State, but the Governours of State: For such I understand to be admitted to their Councils and Parliaments. Secondly, That such matters of consequence as touched them so nearly, might not be handled, but in such Places, and at such Times as might best advantage the State. Concerning the former, we are to note, That Government is defined to be an establishing of Order, best fitting the maintenance of a People, in a peaceable and happy Life. Order requireth Degrees and Distinctions investing several Parts in several Functions and Duties: To these Duties there belongeth a due obsequy, according to the motion and place which every part holdeth in the general Order. Of these Degrees and Distinctions, Sovereignty and Obedience are two main Relatives, the one invested in the Prince or Magistrate, the other in the People and Subject, incommunicable in regard of their Terms and Subjects, and yet concurring in the main drift of Government, intending the benefit of a happy Life. And therefore the *Gauls* did carefully provide, That no Man should exceed the limits of his own Rank, but that such as sat at the helm might shape the course: And for the rest whose Lot it was to be directed, they would have them take notice of their Mandates by Obedience, and not by Dispute.

*Their respect  
to matter of  
State.*

*Tibi summam  
rerum dii de-  
dere nobis ob-  
sequii gloria  
relata est:  
Tacitus.*

T

Touching



Touching the second point, we are to consider the danger which may happen to a State, by common and ordinary Discourse of the Principles of that Government, or of such circumstances as are incident to the same, (without respect of Time or Place, or any other due regard) which the Wisdom of a well-ordered Policy doth hold requisite thereunto: For whatsoever is delivered by Speech, without such helpful attendance, is both unseasonable and unprofitable, and the Commonwealth is always a sufferer when it falleth into such rash Considerations; for our most serious Cogitations assisted with the best Circumstances, can but speak to purpose. And as the execution falleth short of the purport intended by discourse, so is our Speech and Discourse lame and wanting to our inward conceit. And therefore as Religious Actions stand in need of *hoc age*, so may Politick Consultations use the help of the same Remembrancer.

## CHAP. X.

### The manner and Life of the Germans.

Cæsar.

**T**He Germans do much differ from the Gauls in their course of Life, for they have neither Priests nor Sacrifices. They Worship no Gods but such as are subject to Sence, and from whom they daily receive Profits and Help, as the Sun, the Fire, and the Moon; for the rest they have not so much as heard of. Their Life is only spent in Hunting, or in use and practice of War. They inure themselves to Labour and Hardness, even from their Childhood; and such as continue longest Beardless are most commended amongst them: For this some think to be very available to their Stature, others to their Strength and Sinews. They hold it a most dishonest part for one to touch a Woman before he be Twenty Years of Age: Neither can any such matter be hid or dissembled; forasmuch as they bathe themselves together in Rivers, and use Skins and other small Coverings on the Reins of their Backs, the rest of their Body being all Naked. They use no Tillage, the greatest part of their Food is Milk, or Cheese, or Flesh: Neither hath any Man any certain quantity of Land to his own use; but their Magistrates and Princes do every Year allot a certain Portion of Land to Kindreds and Tribes that Inhabit together, as much and in such Places as they think fit, and the next Year appoint them in a new place. Hereof they give many Reasons: Lest they should be led away by continual Custom from the practice of War to the use of Husbandry, or lest they should endeavour to get themselves great Possessions, and so the weaker should be thrust out and dispossessed of their Livings by the Mighty, or lest they should build too delicately for the avoiding of Cold or Heat, or lest they should wax Covetous, and thirst after Money, which is the beginning of all Factions and Dissentions; and lastly, that they might keep the Commons in good Contentment, considering the Parity between their Revenues and the Possessions of the Great Ones. It is the greatest Honour to their States to have their Confines lie waste and desolate far and near about them: For that they take to be an Argument of Valour, when their borderers are driven to forsake their Country, and dare not abide near them; and withal, they think themselves by that means much safer from any suddain Incurfion. When a State maketh War, either by way of Attempt or Defence, they choose Magistrates to Command that War, having power of Life and Death: But in time of Peace they have no common Magistrate, but the chiefest Men in the Country and the Villages, do

interpret the Law, and determine of Controversies. Theft committed out of the Confines of their State is not Infamous or Dishonest, but commended as an exercise of the Youth, and a keeping them from Sloth. When any one of their Princes and chief Men shall, in an Assembly or Council, publish himself for a Leader upon some Exploit, and desire to know who will follow him upon the same, they that have a good Opinion of the Man and the Matter, and do promise him their help and assistance, are commended by the Multitude: The rest that refuse to accompany him, are held in the number of Traytors, and never have any credit afterwards. They hold it not lawful to hurt a Stranger that shall come unto them upon any occasion, but do protect him from Injuries; to such every Man's House is open, and his Table common. The time was, when the Gauls excelled the Germans in Prowess and Valour, and made War upon them of their own accord, and by reason of the multitude of their People, and want of ground for Habitation, they sent many Colonies over the Rhine into Germany. And so those Fertile Places of Germany, which are near unto the Wood Hercynia, (which Eratosthenes, and other Grecians, took notice of by the name of Orcinia) were possessed by the Volcæ Tectosages, who dwelt there at this time, and keep their ancient opinion of Justice and Warlike Praise. Now the Germans still continue in the same Poverty, Want, and Patience, as in former time; do use the same Diet and Apparel for their Bodies: But the Neighbourhood and Knowledge of other Nations hath made the Gauls live in a more plentiful manner, who, by little and little have been weakened and Overthrown in divers Battels, so that now they stand not in comparison with the Germans. The breadth of the Wood Hercynia is nine days Journey over, for they have no other differences of space, but by means of days Journeys. It beginneth at the Confines of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and runs along the River Danubius, to the Territories of the Daci; thence it declineth to the left side from the said River, and by reason of the large extension thereof, it bordereth the Confines of many other Countries. Neither is there any German that can say, that either he durst adventure, or did go to, or had heard of the beginning of the same, although he had Travelled therein Threescore days Journey. In this Wood are many sorts of Wild Beasts, which are not to be seen in any other place: Amongst the rest, the most unusual and remarkable are, An Ox like unto an Hart, that in the midst of his Forehead, between his Ears, carrieth a Horn longer and straighter than usual, divided at the end into many large Branches; The Female is in all respects like unto the Male, and beareth a Horn of the same magnitude and fashion. There is likewise another sort of Beasts called Alces, not unlike unto a Goat, but somewhat bigger, and without Horns; Their Leggs are without Joints, that when they take their rest, they neither sit nor lie upon the Ground, and if they chance to fall, they cannot rise again. When they take their rest in the Night, they lean against Trees. The Hunters having found out their Footsteps and their Haunt, do either undermine the Roots of such Trees, or so cut them asunder, that a small matter will overthrow them; so that when they come, according to their use, to rest themselves against those Trees, they overthrow them with their weight, and fall with all themselves, and so are taken. The third kind of Beasts are those which are called Uri, somewhat lesser than an Elephant, and in colour, kind, and shape not unlike unto a Bull. They are both strong and swift, and spare neither Man nor Beast that cometh in their sight: These they catch with greater labour and diligence in Pits and Ditches, and so kill them. The Youth do



do Inure and Exercise themselves in this kind of Hunting, and such as kill many of these Beasts, and shew most Horns, are highly commended: But to make them Tame, or any their little Ones, was never yet seen. The largeness of their Horns, as also the fashion and kind thereof, doth much differ from the Horns of the Oxen, and are much sought after for Cups to be used in their greatest Banquets, being first bound about the brim, and trimmed with Silver.

## OBSERVATION.

Whether a Civil Life do weaken a Warlike disposition.

Cæsar in this Chapter describeth the course of Life which the Germans in his Time held, throughout the whole Policy of their Government, the scope whereof was to make them Warlike: To which he saith, That in Times past the Gauls were as Valiant and as Warlike People as the Germans: but the Neighbourhood and Knowledge of other Nations had taught them a more plentiful manner of Life, which, by little and little, had weakened their Strength, and made them far inferiour to the Germans. Which bringeth to our consideration that which is often attributed to a Civil Life, that such as taste of the sweetness of Ease, and are qualified with the Complements of Civility, have always an Indisposition to Warlike Practices. The reason is grounded upon use and Custom: For discontinuance doth always cause a strangeness and alienation, benumbing the aptest Parts with unready and painful Gestures; and is so powerful, that it doth not only Sreal away natural Affection, and make Parents forget to love their Children; but, like a Tyrant, it is able to force us to those things which naturally we are unfit for, as though the decrees of Nature were subject to the Controlment of Custom. Much more then, the things got by Use and Practice, are as easily forgot by Discontinuance, as they were obtained by studious Exercise. On the other side, there is nothing so horrible or dreadful, but use maketh easie. The first time the Fox saw the Lyon, he swooned for Fear; the next time he trembled; but the third time he was so far from fear, that he was ready to put a Trick of Craft upon him: whereby it appeareth, That the Germans had no further Interest in Deeds of Arms above the Gauls, than what the use of War had gained them: For as usage continueth the Property of a Tenure, so non-usage implieth a Forfeiture. Cato was wont to say, That the Romans would lose their Empire, when they suffered the Greek Tongue to be taught amongst them: For by that means they would easily be drawn from the Study and Practice of War, to the bewitching delight of speculative Thoughts. And Marcellus was blamed for being the first that corrupted Rome with the delicate and curious Works of Greece: For before that, he brought from the Sacking of Syracuse the well-wrought Tables of Pictures and Imagery, Rome never knew any such Delicacy, but stood full fraught with Armour and Weapons of barbarous People, of the bloody Spoils and Monuments of Victories and Triumphs; which were rather fearful shews, to inure their Eyes to the horror of War, than pleasant Sight to allure their Minds to affections of Peace. Whereby it appeareth, That such as suffer themselves to be guided by the easie Reign of Civil Government, or take a disposition to that course of Life, can hardly endure the Yoke of War, or undergo the tediousness of Martial Labours.

## CHAP. XI.

Basilus his Surprise upon Ambiorix.

Cæsar finding by the Spies which the Ubii sent out, That the Suevi had all betaken themselves to the Woods, and doubting want of Corn, forasmuch as the Germans of all other Nations do least care for Tillage; he determined to go no further. But that his return might not altogether free the Barbarous People from Fear, but hinder the Helps and Succours which they were wont to send into Gallia, having brought back his Army, he cut off so much of the furthest part of the Bridge next unto the Ubii, as came in measure to Two Hundred Foot; and in the end of that which remained, he built a Tower of four Stories, making other Works for the strengthening of that place, wherein he left a Garrison of Twelve Cohorts, under the Command of young C. Volcatius Tullus: He himself, as Corn waxed ripe, went forward to the War of Ambiorix, by the way of the Wood of Arduenna, which is the greatest in all Gallia, and extendeth it self from the Banks of the Rhine, and the Confines of the Treviri, to the Seat of the Nervii, carrying a breadth of Five Hundred Miles. He sent L. Minutius Basilus before, with all the Horse, to see if he could effect any thing, either by prevention and speedy arrival, or by opportunity, Commanding him not to suffer any Fires to be made in his Camp, lest his coming might be discovered, promising to follow him at his Heels. Basilus followeth his Directions, and coming upon them contrary to their expectation, took many of the Enemy abroad in the Fields, and, by their direction, made towards Ambiorix, where he remained in a place with a few Horsemen. As fortune is very powerful in all things, so she Challengeth a special Interest in matter of War: for as it happened by great luck, that he should light upon him unawares and unprovided, and that his coming should sooner be seen than heard of; so was it great hap, that all the Arms which he had about him should be surprised, his Horses and his Chariots taken, and that he himself should escape Death. But this happened by reason of the Wood that was about his House, according to the manner of the Gauls, who, for avoiding of Heat, do commonly build near unto Woods and Rivers: His Followers and Friends sustaining a while the Charge of the Horsemen in a narrow place, while he himself escaped in the mean time on Horseback, and in flying was protected and sheltered by the Woods: whereby Fortune seemed very powerful, both in drawing on a danger, and in avoiding it.

## The First OBSERVATION.

THE Prerogative which Fortune hath always challenged in the accidents of War, and the special Interest which she hath in that course of Life more than in other Mens Actions, hath made the best Soldiers oftentimes to sing a Song of Complaint, the burthen whereof yet remaineth, and serveth as a reason of all such misadventures, Fortune de la guerre, The Fortune of the War. Such as have observed the course of things, and have found one and the same Man continuing the same means, this day happy, and the next day unfortunate; and again, Two other Men, the one advised and respective, and the other violent and rash, and yet both attain the like good Fortune by two contrary Courses, or otherwise, as oftentimes it falleth out, the more heedless the more happy; have been perswaded that all things are so governed by Fortune, that the Wisdom of Man



Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Sylla.

Man can neither alter nor amend them: And therefore to spend much Time or tedious Labour, either in careful Circumspection, or heedful Prevention of that which is unchangeable, they hold as vain as the washing of an *Aethiopian* to make him white. Of this Opinion *Sylla* seemed to be; professing himself better born to Fortune, than to the Wars, and acknowledging his happiest Victories to have proceeded from his most heedless and unadvised Resolutions. And the great *Alexander* so carried himself, as though he had been of the same Opinion, of whom *Curtius* saith; *Quoties illum fortuna à morte revocavit! Quoties temere in pericula vectum perpetua felicitate protexit!* How many times did Fortune call him back from the brink of Death! How often did she happily defend and save him, when he had, by his Rashness, brought himself into Dangers! And *Plutarch* saith, That he had Power of Time and Place.

In the Life  
of Alexander.

Others are not willing to ascribe so much to Fortune, as to make themselves the Tennis-ball to her Racket: And yet they are content to allow her half of every thing they go about, reserving the other Moiety to their own directions. And so, like Partners in an Adventure, they labour to improve their share for their best advantage.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Sylla.

Some other there are that will allow Fortune no part at all in their Actions, but do confront her with a Goddess of greater Power, and make Industry the means to annul her Deity. Of this Opinion was *Timotheus* the *Athenian*, who having achieved many notable Victories, would not allow of the Conceit of the Painter, that had made a Table wherein Fortune was taking in those Cities (which he had won) with a Net, whilst he himself Slept: But protested against her in that behalf, and would not give her any part in that business.

And thus the Heathen World varied as much in their Opinions touching Fortune, as Fortune herself did in her Events to themward: Which were so divers and changeable, as were able to ensnare the deepest Wits, and confound the Wisdom of the greatest Judgments: Whereby the word *Fortune* usurped a Deity, and got an Opinion of extraordinary Power in the Regiment of Humane Actions. But our Christian Times have a readier Lesson, wherein is taught a sovereign Providence, guiding and directing the Thoughts of Mens Hearts, with the Faculties and Powers of the Soul, together with their external Actions, to such ends as shall seem best to that Omnipotent Wisdom, to whom all our Abilities serve as Instruments and means to effect his Purposes, notwithstanding our particular Designs, or what the Heart of Man may otherwise determine. And therefore such as will make their Ways prosperous unto themselves, and receive that Contentment which their Hope expecteth, or their Labours would deserve, must use those helps which the Rules of Christianity do Teach in that behalf, and may better be Learned from a Divine, than from him that writeth Treatises of War.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Celerity and  
Expedition.

*Quintus Curtius* speaking of *Alexander*, saith, *Nullam virtutem Regis istius magis quam celeritatem laudaverim.* I can commend no Vertue in this King before his Speed and Celerity: Whereof this might be a ground, that he followed *Darius* with such speed after the second Battel he gave him, that in eleven Days he marched with his Army six hundred Miles, which was a

Chafe well fitting *Alexander* the Great, and might rest unexampled: Notwithstanding, *Suetonius* giveth this general report of *Cæsar*, that in matter Military, *Aut æquavit præstantissimorum gloriam, aut excessit*, he either equalled or exceeded the Glory of the best: And for this particular he saith, *Quod persæpe nuncius de se prævenit*, that he was very often the Messenger of his own Success. And to speak truly, he seemeth to challenge to himself expedition and speed, as his peculiar Commendation, grounding himself upon the danger which lingering and foreflowing of Time, doth usually bring to well advised Resolutions: According to that of *Lucan* the Poet,

— Nocuit semper differre paratis.

Delay did always hurt those that were ready.

For by this speedy execution of well-digested directions, he gained two main advantages. First, The prevention of such helps and means as the Enemy would otherwise have had, to make the War dangerous, and the event doubtful. And Secondly, The Confusion and Fear, which doth consequently follow such main Disappointments, being the most dangerous Accidents that can happen to any Party, and the chiefeft points to be endeavoured to be cast upon an Enemy by him that would make an easie Conquest.

For proof whereof, amongst many other Examples, I will only alledge his Expedition to *Rome*, when he first came against *Pompey*, according to *Plutarch's* Relation. In the mean time (saith he) News came to *Rome*, That *Cæsar* had won *Ariminum*, a great City in *Italy*, and that he came directly to *Rome* with a great Power, which was not true: For he came but with 3000 Horse and 5000 Foot, and would not tarry for the rest of his Army, being on the other side of the *Alpes* in *Gallia*, but made hast rather to surprize his Enemies upon the sudden, being afraid, and in Confusion, not looking for him so soon, than to give them time to be provided, and so to Fight with them in the best of their Strength, which fell out accordingly. For this sudden and unexpected approach of his, put all *Italy* and *Rome* it self into such a Tumult and Confusion, That no Man knew what way to take for his safety: For such as were out of *Rome* came flying thither from all Parts, and those on the other side that were in *Rome*, went out as fast, and forsook the City. And the amazement was such, that *Pompey* and the Senate fled into *Greece*, whereby it happened that *Cæsar* in threescore Days was Lord of all *Italy*, without any Bloodshed.

Besides this manner of prevention by sudden Surprize, we may see the like Expedition in the very Carriage and form of his Wars. For if the Enemy had taken the Field, he laboured by all means to bring him to Fight; or otherwise if he refused to take the Field, he then endeavoured, with the like speed, to Besiege him, or block him up in some Hold, to the end he might bring the matter to a speedy upshot, as he did with *Vercingetorix* at *Alesia*. But that which is most memorable touching this point, at the first taking in of *Spain* in the disturbance of the Civil Wars, he defeated two Armies, overthrew two Generals, and took in two Provinces in the space of Forty Days. Neither did he make use of Expedition only in his Carriage of a War, but also in the Action and Execution of Battel: For he never forsook an Enemy Overthrown and Discomfited, until he had taken their Camp, and Defeated them of their chiefeft Helps, which *Pompey* felt to his utter Overthrow; For the same

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Pompey.

Veni, Vidi,  
Vici.

Lib. 2. Bell.  
Civil.



same day he routed him at *Pharsalia*, he took his Camp, and inclosed a Hill with a Ditch and a Rampier, where 25000 Romans were fled for their safety, and brought them to yield themselves unto him: And so making use (as he saith) of the benefit of Fortune, and the terrour and amazement of the Enemy, he performed three notable services in one day.

And this he used with such dexterity and depth of wisdom, that commonly the first Victory ended the War: As by this at *Pharsalia* he made himself Commander of the East, and by that at *Tapso* he made himself Lord of *Africk*, and by the Batel at *Monda* he got all Spain.

To conclude this point, I may not forget the like speed and expedition in his works. In fifteen days he cast a Ditch and a Rampier of fifteen foot in height, between the Lake at *Geneva* and *S. Claude's Hill*, containing nineteen miles. He made his Bridge over the *Rhine* in ten days. At the siege of *Marseilles* he made twelve Gallies, and furnished them out to Sea within thirty days after the Timber was cut down. And the rest of his works with the like expedition.

Lib. 1. bell.  
civil.

## C H A P. XII.

*Catuvulus* poysoneth himself. *Cæsar* divideth his Army into three parts.

*Cæsar.*

**N**OW whether *Ambiorix* did not make head and assemble his Forces of purpose, for that he determined not to fight, or whether he were hindered by the shortness of the time, and the sudden coming of the Horsemen, thinking the rest of the Army had followed after; it remaineth doubtful: But certain it is, that he sent privy Messengers about the Country, commanding every Man to shift for himself; and so some fled into the Forest *Arduenna*, others into Fens and Bogs, and such as were near the Ocean, did hide themselves in such Islands as the Tides do commonly make: Many forsook their Country, and committed themselves to their fortunes, to meet Strangers and unknown People. *Catuvulus* the King of the one half of the *Eburones*, who was a party with *Ambiorix* in this matter, being now grown old, and unable to undergo the labours either of War or of flying, detesting *Ambiorix* with all manner of execrations, as the author of that matter, drank the juice of Yew, (whereof there is great store in *Gallia* and *Germany*;) and so died. The *Segni* and *Condrusi*, of the Nation and number of the Germans, that dwell between the *Eburones* and the *Treviri*, sent Messengers to *Cæsar*, to intreat him not to take them in the number of the Enemy, and that he would not adjudge all the Germans dwelling on this side of the *Rhine* to have one and the same cause: For their part, they never so much as thought of War, nor gave any aid to *Ambiorix*. *Cæsar* having examined the matter by the torture of the Captives, commanded them, that if any of the *Eburones* should flie unto them, to bring them unto him, and in so doing he would spare their Country. Then dividing his Forces into three parts, he left the Baggage of the whole Army at *Vatua*, a Castle in the midst of the *Eburones*, where *Turcius* and *Aurunculeius* were lodged. He made choice of this place the rather, for that the fortifications made the year before continued perfect and good, to the end he might ease the Soldier of some labour; and there left the fourteenth Legion for a Guard to the Carriages, being one of the three which he had last enrolled in Italy, making Q.

*Tullius Cicero* their Commander, and with him he left two hundred Horse.

The Army being thus divided, he commanded *Titus Labienus* to carry three Legions towards that part of the Sea Coast which bordereth upon the *Menapii*, and sent *Trebonius* with the like number of Legions to waste and harrafs that Country which bordereth upon the *Aduatici*: He himself with the other three determined to go to the River *Scaldis*, which runneth into the *Maese*, and to the furthest parts of the Wood *Arduenna*; for that he understood that *Ambiorix* with a few Horsemen was fled to those parts. At his departure he assured them that he would return after seven days absence: For at that day he knew that Corn was to be given to that Legion which he had there left in Garrison. He counselled *Labienus* and *Trebonius* to return likewise by that day, if they conveniently could, to the end that after communication of their discoveries, and intelligence of the Projects of the Enemy, they might think upon a new beginning of War.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**HIS sudden surprize upon *Ambiorix* and the *Treviri*, prevented (as I have already noted) their making head together, and put the Enemy to such shifts for their safety, as occasion or opportunity would afford them in particular. And albeit the *Treviri* were by this means disperfed, yet they were not overthrown, nor utterly vanquished, but continued still in the nature and quality of an Enemy, although they were by this occasion defeated of their chiefeft means. And therefore the better to profecure them in their particular flights, and to keep them disjoyned, he divided his Army into three parts, and made three several Inroads upon their Country, hoping thereby to meet with some new occasion, which might give an overture of a more absolute Conquest: For diversity of motions do breed diversity of occasions, whereof some may happily be such, as being well managed, may bring a Man to the end of his desires. But herein let us not forget to observe the manner he used in this service: For first he left a Rendezvous where all the Carriages of the Army were bestowed, with a competent Garrison for the safe keeping thereof, to the end the Soldiers might be assured of a retreat, what difficulty soever might befall them in that action, according to that of *Sertorius*, That a good Captain should rather look behind him than before him; and appointed withal a certain day when all the Troops should meet there again; *Ut rursus* (as he saith) *communicato consilio, exploratisque hostium rationibus, aliud initium belli capere possint*, That after communication of their discoveries, &c.

*Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Sertorius.*

## C H A P. XIII.

*Cæsar* sendeth Messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the *Eburones*.

**T**HERE was (as I have already declared) no certain Band or Troop of the Enemy, no Garrison or Town to stand out in Arms; but the multitude was disperfed into all parts, and every Man lay hid either in some secret and unknown Valley, or in some rough and woody place, or in some Bog, or in such other places as gave them hope of shelter or safety: Which places were well known to the States of that Country. And the matter required great diligence and circumspection, not so much in regard of the

*Cæsar.*

general



general safety of the Army, (for there could no danger happen unto them, the Enemy being all terrified and fled,) as in preserving every particular Soldier; which notwithstanding did in part concern the safety of the whole Army: For hope of Booty did draw many far off out of their Ranks, and the Woods through uncertain and unknown passages would not suffer the Soldiers to go in Troops. If he would have the business take an end, and the very race of those wicked People rooted out, the Army must be divided, and many small Bands must be made for that purpose: But to keep the Maniples at their Ensigns, according to the custom and use of the Roman Army, the place it self was a sufficient Guard for the barbarous People, who did not want Courage in particular, both to lie in wait for them, and circumvent them as they were severed from their Companies. Yet in extremities of that nature what diligence could attain unto was provided, but in such manner, that somewhat was omitted in the offensive part, though the Soldiers minds were bent upon revenge, rather than it should be done with any detriment or loss to the Soldier. Cæsar sent Messengers to the next bordering States, calling them out to sack the Eburones, in hope of Booty and Pillage, to the end the Gauls should rather hazard their lives in the Wood, than the Legionary Souldiers; as also that there might be many spoilers and destroyers, to the end that both the name and race of that State might be taken away. Hereupon a great multitude speedily assembled from all quarters. These things were acted in all parts and quarters of the Eburones, and the seventh day drew near which he had appointed for his return to the Carriages.

## OBSERVATION.

The benefit of  
open Encoun-  
ter.

IT is an Advantage which a General hath, when the Enemy doth not refuse open Encounter, for so he may be sure, that the weight of the business will rest upon Military vertue and prowess of Arms, as a ready means for speedy Victory: But when it shall happen that the Country doth afford covert and protection to him that is more Malicious than Valorous, and through the fastness of the place refuseth to shew himself unless it be upon advantage, the War doubtless is like to prove tedious, and the Victory less honourable. In such cases there is no other way, than so to harraß and waste a Country, that the Enemy may be famished out of his Holds, and brought to subjection by scarcity and necessity. Which is a means so powerful, as well to supplant the greatest strength, as to meet with subterfuge and delay, that of it self it subdueth all opposition, and needeth no other help for achieving of Victory, as may appear by the sequel of this Summer's action. And herein let us further observe the particular care which Cæsar had of his Soldiers, adjudging the whole Army to be interested in every private Man's safety. A matter strange in these times, and of small consequence in the judgment of our Commanders, to whom particular fortunes are esteemed Non-entities, and Men in several of no value; forasmuch as Conquests are made with multitudes. Concerning which point, I grant it to be as true, as it is often spoken in places besieged, that the loss of one Man is not the loss of a Town, nor the defeating of twenty the overthrow of a thousand: And yet it cannot be denied but the lesser is paid for the Laurel Wreath, the more precious is the Victory: And it then goes hard, when it maketh the buyer Bankrupt, or inforceth him to confess that such another Victory would overthrow him. And

therefore he that will buy much Honour with little blood, must endeavour by diligent and careful labour to provide for the particular safety of his Soldiers. Wherein albeit he cannot value an unity at an equal rate with a number; yet he must consider that without an unity there can be no multitude: And not so only, but the life and strength of a multitude consisteth in unities; for otherwise, neither had Nero needed to have wished the People of Rome to have had but one Head, that he might have cut it off at a stroke, nor Sertorius's device had carried any Grace, making a lusty Fellow fail in plucking off the thin Tail of an old lean Jade, and a little weak Man leave the stump bare of a great-tail'd Horse, and that in a short time, by plucking hair by hair.

## CHAP. IV.

The Sicambri send out two thousand Horse against the Eburones, and by fortune they fall upon Cicero at Vatuca.

HERE you shall perceive the power that Fortune hath, and what chances happen in the carriage of a War. There was (as I have already said) the Enemy being scattered and terrified, no Troop or Band which might give the least cause of fear: The report came to the Germans on the other side of the Rhine, that the Eburones were to be sacked, and that all Men had liberty to make spoil of them. The Sicambri dwelling next to the Rhine, who formerly received the Tenchtheri and Usipetes in their flight, set out Two thousand Horse, and sent them over the River some thirty miles below that place where Cæsar had left the half Bridge with a Garrison. These Horse made directly towards the confines of the Eburones, took many Prisoners and much Cattel, neither Bog nor Wood hindered their passage, being bred and born in War and Theft. They inquire of the Prisoners in what part Cæsar was, and found him to be gone far off, and that all the Army was departed from thence. But one of the Prisoners speaking to them, said, Why do ye seek after so poor and so slender a Booty, when otherwise you may make your selves most fortunate? in three hours space you may go to Vatuca, where the Roman Army hath left all their fortunes; the Garrison in that place is no greater than can hardly furnish the Walls about, neither dare any Man go out of the Trenches. The Germans in this hope did hide the Pillage which they had already taken, and went directly to Vatuca, taking him for their guide that gave them first notice thereof.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

IT were as great a madness to believe that a Man were able to give directions to meet with all chances, as to think no foresight can prevent any Casualty. For as the Soul of Man is endued with a power of Discourse, whereby it concludeth either according to the certainty of Reason, or the learning of Experience, bringing these directions as faulty and inconvenient, and approving others as safe and to be followed: So we are to understand, that this power of Discourse is limited to a certain measure or proportion of strength, and inscribed in a Circle of lesser capacity than the compass of possibility, or the large extension of what may happen; for otherwise the course of Destiny were subject to our controulment, and our knowledge were equal to universal Entry, where-



whereas the infinity of Accidents do far exceed the reach of our shallow senses, and our greatest apprehension is a small and imperfect experience. And therefore as such as through the occasion of publick employment, are driven to forsake the shore of minute and particular courses, and to float in the Ocean of Casualties and Adventures, may doubtless receive strong directions, both from the loadstone of Reason, and force of Experience, to shape an easie and successful course: So notwithstanding they shall find themselves subject to the contrary Winds and extremity of Tempests, besides many other lets and impediments beyond the compass of their direction to interrupt their course and divert them from their Haven, which made the Carthaginian that was more happy in conquering than in keeping to cry out; *Nusquam minus quam in bello eventus rerum respondent*, the event of things doth no where answer expectation less than in War, as it happened in this accident.

Hannibal.

## CHAP. XV.

The Sicambri come to Vatuca, and offer to take the Camp.

Cæsar.

**C**icero having all the days before observed Cæsar's direction with great diligence, and kept the Soldiers within the Camp, not suffering so much as a Boy to go out of the Trenches; the seventh day distrusting of Cæsar's return according to his promise, for that he understood he was gone further into the Country, and heard nothing of his return; and withal being moved with the Speeches of the Soldiers, who termed their patient abiding within their Trenches, a Siege, forasmuch as no Man was suffered to go out of them, and expecting no such chance within the compass of three miles, which was the furthest he purposed to send them for Corn: Especially considering that nine Legions were abroad, besides great Forces of Horse, the Enemy being already dispersed and almost extinguished. Accordingly he sent five Cohorts to gather Corn in the next Fields, which were separated from the Garrison only with a little Hill lying between the Camp and the Corn. There were many left in the Camp of the other Legions that were sick, of whom such as were recovered to the number of three hundred, were sent with them all under one Ensign; besides a great company of Soldiers Boys, and great store of Cattel which they had in the Camp. In the mean time came these German Ruters, and with the same gallop as they came thither, they sought to enter in at the Decumane Gate; neither were they discovered, by reason of a Wood which kept them out of sight, until they were almost at the Trenches; insomuch as such Trades-men and Merchants as kept their Booths and Shops under the Rampier, had no time to be received into the Camp. Our Men were much troubled at the unexpectedness of the thing; and the Cohort that kept Watch did hardly sustain the first assault. The Enemy was quickly spread about the Works, to see if they could find entrance in at any other part. Our Men did hardly keep the Gates; the rest was defended by the fortification and the place it self. The whole Camp was in a great fear, and one inquired of another the reason of the Tumult: Neither could they tell which way to carry their Ensigns, or how any Man should dispose of himself. One gave out that the Camp was taken; and another that the Army and General was overthrown, and that the barbarous People came thither as Conquerours: Many took occasion from the place to imagine new

and superstitious Religions, recalling to mind the fatal calamity of Cotta and Titurius that died in that place. Through this fear and confusion that had possessed the whole Camp, the Germans were confirmed in their opinion which they had received from the Prisoner, that there was no Garrison at all in the Works. They endeavoured to break in, and encouraged one another not to suffer so great a fortune to escape them. Publius Sextius Baculus, that had been Primipilus under Cæsar (of whom mention hath been made in the former Battels) was there left sick, and had taken no sustenance of five days before. He hearing the danger they were in, went unarmed out of his Cabbin, and seeing the Enemy ready to force the Gates, and the matter to be in great hazard, taking Arms from one that stood next him, he went and stood in the Port. The Centurions of the Cohort that kept watch followed him, and they for a while engaged the Enemy. Sextius having received many great wounds, fainted at length, and was hardly saved by those that stood next him. Upon this respite the rest did so far assure themselves, that they durst stand upon the Works, and make a shew of defence.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**N the former Observation I disputed the interest which the whole Army hath in one particular Man, which out of Cæsar's opinion I concluded to be such as was not to be neglected: But if we suppose a party extraordinary, and tie him to such singular worth as was in Sextius, I then doubt by this Example, whether I may not equal him to the multitude, or put him alone in the balance to counterpoise the rest of his Fellows. For doubtless if his Valour had not exceeded any height of Courage, elsewhere than to be found within those Walls, the whole Garrison had been utterly slaughtered, and the place had been made fatal to the Romans by two disastrous calamities. In consideration whereof, I will refer my self to the judgment of the wise, how much it importeth a great Commander, not only in honour as a rewarder of vertue, but in wisdom and good discretion, to make much of so gallant a spirit, and to give that respect unto him, as may both witness his valiant carriage, and the thankful acceptation thereof on the behalf of the Commonweal, wherein we need not doubt of Cæsar's requital to this Sextius, having by divers honourable Relations in these Wars, touching his valiantness and prowess in Arms, made him partaker of his own Glory, and recommended him to posterity for an example of true Valour.

## CHAP. XVI.

The Sicambri continue their purpose in taking the Camp.

**I**N the mean time the Soldiers, having made an end of reaping and gathering Corn, heard the Cæsar cry. The Horsemen hasted before, and found in what danger the matter stood. There was in that place no fortifications to receive the affrighted Soldiers: Such as were lately inrolled and had no experience in matters of War, set their faces towards the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and to the Centurions, and expected directions from them. There was none so assured or valiant, but were troubled thereat. The barbarous People having spied the Ensigns afar off, left off their Assault: And



And first, They thought it had been the Legions that had returned, which the Prisoners had told them to be gone a great way off; afterward contemning the smallness of their number, they set upon them on all sides. The Soldiers Boys betook themselves unto the next Hill, and being quickly put from thence they cast themselves headlong amongst the Maniples and Ensigns, and so put the Soldiers in a worse fear than they were before. Some were of Opinion to put themselves into the form of Battel, which resembleth a Wedge, and so (forasmuch as the Camp was at hand) to break speedily through the Enemy: In which course, if any part should be circumvented and cut a pieces, yet they hoped the rest might save themselves. Others thought it better to make good the Hill, and all of them to attend one and the same Fortune. This advice the old Soldiers did not like of, who (as I said before) went out with the others that were sent a Foraging all under one Ensign by themselves: And therefore encouraging one another, Caius Trebonius, a Roman Horseman, being their Captain, and Commanding them at that time, brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and came all safe into the Camp. The Boys and Horsemen following hard after them, were likewise saved by the Valour of the Soldiers. But those that took the Hill, having never had any use of Service, had neither the Courage to continue in that Resolution, which they had before chosen, to defend themselves from that place of advantage, nor to imitate that force and speed which they had seen to have helped their Fellows; but endeavouring to be received into the Camp, fell into places of disadvantage; wherein divers of their Centurions, who had lately been taken from the lowest Companies of other Legions, and for their Valours sake preferred to the highest and chiefest Companies of this Legion, lest they should lose the Honour which they had before gotten, Fighting Valiantly died in the place. Part of the Soldiers, by the Prowess of these Men that had removed the Enemy, beyond all hope, got safe into the Camp; the rest were defeated and slain by the Germans.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

THIS circumstance doth afford us two observable Points. The one, How much an old experienced Soldier, that hath the use and knowledge of Service, exceedeth the rawness of such as are newly enrolled. The second, which dependeth upon the former, That Valour and Military Vertue is a consequent of use and practice, rather than any inherent Gift of Nature. Camillus being sent with an Army against the *Thuscans*, the Roman Soldier was much affrighted at the greatness of the Host which the Enemy had put on Foot: Which Camillus perceiving, he used no other motives of perswasion to strengthen their weakned Minds, and to assure them of a happy day, but this; *Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat*, Let every Man do that which he hath been taught, and used to; as well knowing where to rouse their Valour, and in what part their greatest strength rested. For as Men cannot prevail in that wherein they are unexperienced, but will be wanting in the Supplies of their own particular, and miscarry even under the directions of another Hannibal: So a known and beaten Track is quickly taken, and the difficulties of a business are made easie by Acquaintance. Use maketh Masteries, saith our English Proverb, and Practice and Art do far exceed Na-

ture. Which continual exercise and use of Arms amongst the Romans, attained to such perfection, as made *Militum sine rectore stabilem virtutem*, the Valour of the Soldiery, firm without their Commander, as *Livy* witnesseth: And as *Antiochus* confessed to *Scipio*; *Quod si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis tamen*, though they were Overcome, yet their Courage abated not. *Caesar*, in all his Battels, had a special regard to the inexperience of the new Inrolled Bands, placing them either behind the Army for a Guard to their Carriages, as he did in the *Helvetian* Action, or leaving them as a defence to the Camp, or shewing them aloof off; signifying thereby, as *Livy* saith of the *Sidicini*, *Quod magis nomen quam vires ad presidium adferebant*, that they made more noise of an Army than they did good. Whereby it consequently followeth, that Military Vertue proceedeth not so much from Nature, or any original Habit, as it doth from exercise and practice of Arms. I grant there is a disposition in Nature, and a particular Inclination to this or that Art: according to that Line of the Poet;

*Fortes creantur fortibus & bonis.*

Stout Men are got by Stout and Good.

But this disposition must be perfected by use, and falleth short of Valour or Military Vertue, which consisteth of two Parts. The first, in knowledge of the discipline of War, and the Rules of Service: Whereby they may understand the course of things, and be able to judge of particular Resolutions. The second, is the faithful endeavour in executing such Projects as the Rules of War do propound for their safety. Both which parts are gotten only by use. For as the knowledge of Military Discipline is best learned by Practice; so the often repetition thereof begetteth assurance in Action, which is nothing else but that which we call Valour. In which two Parts, these new enrolled Bands had small understanding; for they were as ignorant what course to take in that extremity, as they were unassured in their worser Resolutions.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THIS *Cuneus*, or Troop of Soldiers disposed into a Triangle, was the best and safest way to break through an Enemy. For an Angle hath a renting and dividing Property, and is so sharp in the meeting of the two side Lines, that the point thereof resembleth indivisibility, and therefore is apt and proper to divide asunder, and to make a separation of any quantity. Which form Nature hath also observed in the fashion of such Creatures as have a piercing and dividing motion; as in Fishes, that have all Heads for the most part sharp, and thence Angle-wise are enlarged into the grossness of their Body: And Birds likewise, the better to divide the Air, have sharp Bills and little Heads, with a Body annexed of a larger proportion. The manner of the Romans was (as I have already shewed) to strengthen the piercing Angle with thick compacted Targets; and then enlarging the sides as occasion served, either to the quantity of an acute, or a right, or an obtuse Angle, they gave the Charge in such sort, *Ut quacunque parte percutere impetu suo vellent, sustineri nequeant*, that wheresoever they fell on, they were not long to be endured, as *Livy* saith.



## C H A P. XVII.

The *Sicambri* give over their purpose and depart.

Cæsar.

**T**He Germans being out of hope of taking the Camp, forasmuch as they saw our Men to stand upon the Works, they returned over the Rhine, with the Booty which they had in the Woods. And such was the fear of the Roman Soldier, even after the Enemy was gone, that Caius Volusenus being sent that Night to the Camp with the Horsemen, they would not believe that Cæsar and the Army were returned in safety. Fear had so possest their Minds, that they did not let to say, That all the Legions were Overthrown, and the Horse had escaped by flight, and desired there to be received: For they could not be persuaded, the Army being safe, That the Germans would have attempted to surprise their Camp. Of which Fear they were delivered by Cæsar's Arrival. He being returned, not ignorant of the events of War, complained of one thing only, that the Cohorts that kept the Watch, were sent from their Stations, forasmuch as no place ought to be given to the least Casualty. And there he saw how much Fortune was able to do by the sudden coming of the Enemy, and how much more in that he was put off from the Rampier and the Gates which he had so nearly taken. But of all the rest, this seemed the strangest, that the Germans coming over the Rhine to depopulate and spoil Ambiorix and his Country, had like to have taken the Roman Camp, which would have been as acceptable to Ambiorix as any thing that could happen.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

Nothing ought  
to be left to  
the hazard of  
Fortune.

**I**T is an old saying, avouched by Plutarch, *Fortuna id unum hominibus non aufert, quod bene fuerit consultum*, What a Man hath once well advised, that, and only that Fortune can never depose him of: Which Tiberius, the Roman Emperor well understood; of whom Suetonius reporteth, *Quod minimum fortune, casibusque permittebat*, That he trusted very little to Fortune or Casualties: And is the same which Cæsar counselleth in this place, *Ne minimo quidem casui locum relinqui debuisset*, That no place is to be given to the least Casualty. It were a hard condition to expose a naked Party to the Malice of an Enemy, or to disadvantage him with the loss of his fight. An Army, without a Guard at any time, is meely naked, and more subject to slaughter, than those that never took Arms: And the rather, where the watch is wanting, for there sudden Chances can hardly be prevented: And if they happen to avoid any such unexpected Casualty, they have greater cause to thank Fortune for her Favour, than to be angry with her for her Malice: For prevention at such times is out of the way, and they are wholly at her Mercy; as Cæsar hath rightly delivered, touching this accident. And therefore, whether an Army march forward, or continue in a place, Sleep or Wake, Play or Work, go in Hazard, or rest Secure, let not so great a Body be at any time without a competent strength, to answer the spite of such Misadventures.

## C H A P. XVIII.

Cæsar returneth to spoil the Enemy: And Punisheth *Acco*.

C

Æsar returning again to trouble and vex the Enemy, having called a great number of People from the bordering Cities, he sent them out into all Parts. All the Villages and Houses which were any where to be seen, were burned to the Ground; Pillage and Booty was taken in every place; The Corn was not only consumed by so great a multitude of Men and Cattel, but beaten down also by the unseasonableness of the Year, and continual Rain: Insomuch, That albeit divers did hide themselves for the present, yet the Army being withdrawn, they must necessarily perish through Want and Scarcity. And oftentimes they happened of the place (the Horsemen being divided into many Quarters) where they did not only see Ambiorix, but kept him for the most part in sight: And in hoping still to take him, some that thought to merit Cæsar's highest Favour, took such infinite Pains, as were almost beyond the Power of Nature: And ever there seemed but a little between them and the thing they most desired. But he conveyed himself away through Dens, Woods, and Dales, and in the Night-time sought other Countries and Quarters, with no greater a Guard of Horse than Four, to whom only he durst commit the safety of his Life. The Country being in this manner harassed and depopulated Cæsar, with the loss of two Cohorts, brought back his Army to Durocortorum, in the State of the Men of Rheims; where a Parliament being Summoned, he determined to call in question the Conspiracy of the Senones, and Carnutes, and especially *Acco*, the principal Author of that Council: Who being Condemned, was put to Death, *More majorum*. Some others fearing the like Judgment, saved themselves by Flight: These he interdicted Fire and Water. So leaving two Legions to Winter in the Confines of the Treviri, and two other amongst the Lingones, and the other six at Agendicum in the borders of the Senones, having made Provision of Corn for the Army, he went into Italy, ad *Conventus agendos*.

Cæsar.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**He conclusion of this Summer's Work was shut up with the Sack and Depopulation of the *Eburones*, as the extremity of hostile Fury, when the Enemy lieth in the fastness of the Country, and refuseth to make open War. That being done, Cæsar proceeded in a course of Civil Judgment with such principal Offenders as were of the Conspiracy: And namely, with *Acco*, whom he punished in such manner as the old Romans were accustomed to do with such Offenders as had forfeited their Loyalty to their Country; a kind of Death which Nero knew not, although he had been Emperor of Rome Thirteen Years, and put to Death many Thousand People. The Party Condemned was to have his Neck locked in a Fork, and to be Whipped Naked to Death: And he that was put to Death after that manner, was punished *More majorum*. Such others as feared to undergo the Judgment, and fled before they came to Tryal, were Banished out of the Country, and made incapable of the benefit of Fire and Water in that Empire.

And thus endeth the Sixth Commentary.



## The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

**C**æsar met with no great opposition in this War, every Body flying before him, while he burnt and destroyed the Country. Nevertheless, there are fine Remarks to be made upon it. For tho' it does not teach us how to Fight, and to take Places; yet it instructs us how to deal with those that defend themselves by flight, and retire into inaccessible Places: In which several Captains have been deficient, for want of having observ'd Three principal things like *Cæsar*, viz. So to prevent them by great diligence, as to surprize them before their being able to retire and to remove their Goods into Forests; by which means some are constrain'd to Surrender, and others perish with Hunger. Secondly, To divide an Army into as many Bodies as may be consistent with Safety, to the end that attacking a Country in divers Places, at one and the same time the Inhabitants may be at a loss which way to fly; And lastly, To hinder the Soldiers from stragling without Order, to run after Booty, lest they should be set upon by the Enemies. Such omissions have often created great Inconveniences in Victorious Armies. Which ought to teach us never to swerve from the strictness and severity of Military Discipline; tho' we suppose our selves at a great distance from our Enemies, and very safe. We have a very good Example of it in this Book, in the case of *Cicero*, who receiv'd a considerable loss, and had like to have been entirely defeated, by having suffer'd himself to be prevail'd upon by the importunity of his Soldiers, who, contrary to *Cæsar's* Command, would go out of their Retrenchments to Forage.

We also learn the difference between old and new Soldiers, who, for want of experience, not knowing how to choose the safest and most honourable way, retiring upon a Hill were cut to pieces: Whereas the others being sensible that there was no safety but by forcing their way to the Camp with their Swords, sav'd themselves and their Camp. We may also see how ingenious fear is to seek our Subjects to encrease it, for

because that place was the same in which *Titirius* and *Cotta* were defeated the preceeding Year, they look'd upon it as an ill Omen.

Let us likewise observe, That when ever *Cæsar* design'd to go about an Expedition of seven or eight days, in which diligence was requir'd, he sent away his Baggage, which commonly is a great hindrance in the Field. Therefore 'tis impossible to conduct an Army well, unless a General retrenches his Camp according to occasion, or marches without Baggage.

Let us moreover admire how careful *Cæsar* was to be well inform'd of all that pass'd by his Spies. And indeed, it is a thing of such use that a Prince or General ought never to spare any thing for it, since it is the only way to attempt great Actions, and to avoid great Ruines.

Neither must we forget his skill in dividing those that were making a League against him, and in attacking them separately: Nor his usual diligence in surprizing them, whereby he did atchieve the best part of his great designs.

We will conclude the Remarks of this Book by the Stratagem of *Labienus*; who being desirous to Fight those of *Triers* before the arrival of the *Germans*, declar'd publickly that he was afraid of them, and that he design'd to retire; being very sensible that there were *Gauls* in his Army who would give them notice of it; and in the mean time gave secret Orders to retire with great noise, and as it were with fear; which those of *Triers* being acquainted with; unwilling to lose the occasion that offer'd it self, cross'd a River, and came up to them in disorder, as to a certain Victory, without staying for the *Germans*. But *Labienus* turn'd against them in good Order, and beat them. However, I would never advise any one to attempt such a Stratagem with Raw Men, who are commonly frightened when an Enemy comes running upon them without Order; tho' on the contrary it encourages those that are experienced in Combats.



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# The Seventh COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

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## The Argument.

**T**His last Commentary containeth the Specialities of the War which *Cæsar* made against all the States of *Gallia*, united into one Confederacy, for the expelling of the *Roman* Government out of that Continent, whom *Cæsar* Overthrew in the end, *Horribili vigilantia, & prodigiosis operibus*, by his horrible Vigilancy, and prodigious Actions.

### CHAP. I.

The Gauls enter into new deliberations of Revolt.

**G**allia being in quiet, *Cæsar*, according to his determination, went into Italy to keep Courts and Sessions. There he understood that *P. Clodius* was slain, and of a Decree which the Senate had made, touching the Assembly of all the Youth of Italy: And thereupon he purposed to Enroll new Bands throughout the whole Province. These News were quickly carried over the Alpes into Gallia, and the Gauls themselves added such Rumors to it, as the matter seemed well to bear; that *Cæsar* was now detained by the Troubles at Rome, and in such Dissentions could not return to his Army. Being stirred up by this occasion, such as before were inwardly grieved, that they were subject to the Empire of the People of Rome, did now more freely and boldly enter into the consideration of War. The Princes and chiefest Men of Gallia having appointed Councils and Meetings in Remote and Woody Places, complained of the Death of *Acco*, and shewed it to be a Fortune which might concern themselves. They pity the common Misery of Gallia, and do propound all manner of Promises and Rewards to such as will begin the War, and with the danger of their Lives redeem the Liberty of their Country: Wherein they are to be very careful not to lose any Time, to the end that *Cæsar* may be stopt from coming to his Army before their secret Conferences be discovered. Which might easily be done, forasmuch as neither the Legions durst go out of their Winter-Quarters, in the absence of their General, nor the General come to the Legions without a Convoy. To conclude, they held it better to die in Fight, than to lose their ancient Honour in matter of War, and the Liberty left them by their Predecessors.

### OBSERVATION.

**T**His Chapter discovereth such sparkles of Revolt, rising from the discontentment of the Conquered Gauls, as were like to break out into an universal burning; and within a while proved such a Fire, as the like hath not been seen in the Continent of Gallia. For this Summer's Work

verified the Saying of the *Samnites*, *Quod pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset*, That Peace is more grievous to those that are in Vassalage, than War is to Free Men: And was carried on either part with such a Resolution, as in respect of this Service, neither the Gauls did before that time engage themselves seriously in their Countries Cause, nor did the Romans know the difficulty of their Task. But as *Epaminondas* called the Fields of *Boetia*, *Mars's Scaffold*, where he kept his Games; or as *Xenophon* nameth the City of *Ephesus*, the Armorer's Shop: So might Gallia, for this Year, be called the Theatre of War. The chiefest encouragement of the Gauls at this time, was the trouble and dissention at Rome, about the Death of *Clodius*, and the accusation of *Milo*, for killing *Clodius*. Livy, lib. 31

This *Clodius* (as *Plutarch* reporteth) was a young Man of a Noble House, but wild and insolent, and much condemned for prophaning a secret Sacrifice, which the Ladies of Rome did Celebrate in *Cæsar's* House, by coming amongst them, disguised in the Habit of a young singing Wench, which he did for the Love of *Pompeia*, *Cæsar's* Wife: Whereof being openly accused, he was quitted by secret means which he made to the Judges; and afterwards obtained the Tribuneship of the People, and caused *Cicero* to be Banished, and did many Outrages and Insolencies in his Tribuneship: Which caused *Milo* to kill him, for which he was also accused. And the Senate fearing that this Accusation of *Milo*, being a bold-spirited Man, and of good Quality, would move some Uproar or Sedition in the City, they gave Commission to *Pompey* to see Justice executed, as well in this Cause, as for other Offences, that the City might be quiet, and the Commonwealth suffer no detriment. Whereupon *Pompey* possessed the Market-place, where the Cause was to be heard with Bands of Soldiers, and Troops of Armed Men. And these were the Troubles in Rome upon the Death of *Clodius*, which the Gauls did take as an occasion of Revolt, hoping thereby that *Cæsar* (being in *Gallia Cisalpina*, which Province was allotted to his Government, as well as that *Gallia* Northward the Alpes) would have been detained from his Army. Plutarch in the Life of Cicero.

Ne quid respici  
detrimenti  
capiat.

Gallia Cisal-  
pina & Trans-  
alpina.



## CHAP. II.

The Men of Chartres take upon them the beginning of a Revolt, under the Conduct of Cotuatus and Conetodunus.

Cæsar.

**T**Hese things being thus disputed, the Men of Chartres did make themselves the chief of that War, refusing no danger for the common safety of their Country. And forasmuch as at that present they could not give caution by Hostage, lest the matter should be discovered; they desire to have their Covenants strengthened by Oath, and by mutual Collation of their Military Ensigns, which was the most Religious Ceremony, they could use, to bind the rest not to forsake them, having made an entrance and beginning to that War. The Men of Chartres being commended by the rest, and the Oaths of all them that were present being taken, and a time appointed to begin, they brake up the Assembly. When the day came, they of Chartres, under the Conduct of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, two desperate Fellows, upon a Watch-word given, ran speedily to \* Genabum; and such Roman Citizens as were there upon business, namely, C. Fufius Cotta, a Knight of Rome, whom Cæsar had left Overseer of the Provision of Corn, they slew, and took their Goods. The report thereof was quickly spread over all the States of Gallia, for when any such great or extraordinary matter happeneth, they signify it through the Country by an Out-cry and Shout, which is taken by others, and delivered to the next, and so goeth from hand to hand, as it happened at this time: For that which was done at Genabum, at Sun-rising, was before the first Watch of the Night was ended, heard in the Confines of the Arverni, which is above an Hundred and Threescore Miles distant.

Orleans.

## OBSERVATION.

The Welch Hoobub.

**T**HIS manner of Out-cry here mentioned to be usual in Gallia, was the same which remaineth in use at this present in Wales, although not so frequent as in former Times. For the Custom is there, as often as any Robbery happeneth to be committed, or any Man to be Slain, or what other Outrage or Riot is done, the next at hand do go to some eminent place where they may be best heard, and there they make an Out-cry or Howling, which they call a Hoobub, signifying the Fact to the next Inhabitants, who take it as passionately, and deliver it further, and so from hand to hand it quickly spreadeth over all the Country. It is a very ready way to put the Country in Arms, and was first devised (as it seemeth) for the stay and apprehension of Robbers and Outlaws, who kept in strong Holds, and lived upon the spoil of the bordering Inhabitants: But otherwise it savoureth of Barbarism, rather than of any Civil Government.

## CHAP. III.

Vercingetorix stirreth up the Arverni to the like Commotion and Revolt.

Cæsar.

**I**N like manner Vercingetorix, the Son of Cellillus, of the Nation of the Arverni, a young Man of great Power and Authority, (whose Father was the Commander of all Gallia, and because he sought a Kingdom, was Slain by those of his own State) calling together his Followers and

Vassals, did easily incense them to Rebellion. His purpose being known, every Man took Arms; and so he was driven out of the Town of Gergovia, by Gobanitis his Uncle and other Princes, who thought it not safe to make trial of that Fortune. And yet he desisted not, but enrolled needy and desperate People; and with such Troops, whomsoever he met withal of the State, he did easily draw them to his Party, perswading them to take Arms for the defence of Common Liberty. And having at length got great Forces together, he expelled his Adversaries out of the Town, by whom he was himself before thrust out. He was called of his Men by the Title of King, and sent Embassages into all Parts, adjuring them to continue constant and faithful. The Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the Aulerci, the Lemovices, the Andes, and all the rest that border upon the Ocean, were quickly made of his Party: And by all their Consents, the chief Command was conferred upon him. Which Authority being offered him, he Commanded Hostages to be brought in unto him from all those States, and a certain number of Soldiers to be sent him with all speed. He rated every City what proportion of Arms they should have ready, and especially he laboured to raise great store of Horse. To extraordinary Diligence he added extraordinary Severity, compelling such as stood doubtful, by hard and severe Punishment: For such as had committed a great Offence, he put to Death by Fire and Torture; lesser Faults he punished with the loss of their Nose or their Eyes, and so sent them home, that by their Example others might be terrified. By these Practices and Severity, having speedily raised a great Army, he sent Lucetius of Cahors, a Man of great Spirit and Boldness, with part of the Forces, towards the Rutheni, and he himself made towards the Bituriges. Upon his coming the Bituriges sent to the Hedui, in whose Protection they were, to require aid against Vercingetorix. The Hedui, by the advice of the Legates which Cæsar had left with the Army, sent Forces of Horse and Foot to the aid of the Bituriges: Who coming to the River Loire, which divideth the Bituriges from the Hedui, after a few days stay, not daring to pass over the River, returned home again, bringing word to our Legates, that they durst not commit themselves to the Bituriges, and so returned. For they knew that if they had passed over the River, the Bituriges had inclosed them in on the one side, and the Arverni on the other. But whether they did return upon that occasion, or through perfidious Treachery, it remaineth doubtful. The Bituriges, upon their departure, did presently joyn themselves with the Arverni.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T is observed, by such as are acquainted with the matter of Government, that there ought to be always a proportion of quality between him that Commandeth and them that Obey: For if a Man of Sardanapalus's condition should take upon him the charge of Marius's Army, it were like to take no better effect, than if Manlius had the leading of laicivious Cinades. And as we may observe in economical Policy, a dissolute Master may as soon command Hair to grow on the palm of his Hand, as to make a vertuous Servant; but the respect of Duty between such Relatives doth likewise infer the like respect of quality: So in all sorts and Conditions of Command, there must be sympathizing means to unite the diversity of the parts in the happy end of perfect Government. In this new Empire, which befell Vercingetorix, we may observe a double proportion be-

There ought to be a proportion of quality between a Commander and his Soldiers. MultiMariani. Such a Master, such a Servant.



between him and his People. The first, of Strength and Ability; and the other, of Quality and Resemblance of Affection: Upon the assurance of which proportion, he grounded the austerity of his Command. For it appeareth, That his first beginning was by Perswasion and Intreaty, and would endure no direction, but that which was guided by a loose and easie Rein; holding it neither safe nor seemly, but rather a strain of extreme Madness, first to punish or threaten, and then to want Power to make good his Judgments: But being strengthened by authority from themselves, and backed with an Army able to control their Disobedience; he then added Punishment as the Ensign of Magistracy, and confirmed his Power by rigorous Commands; which is as necessary a demonstration of a well-settled Government, as any circumstance belonging thereunto.

Livy.

Touching the resemblance and proportion of their Qualities, it is manifestly shewed by the sequel of this History, that every Man desired to redeem the common liberty of their Country, in that measure of endeavour as was fitting so great a cause. Amongst whom Vercingetorix being their Chief Commander, *Summa diligentia* (as the Story saith) added *Summam severitatem*, to great Diligence great Severity; as well assured, That the greater part would approve his Justice, and condemn the uncertainty of doubtful Resolutions, desiring no further Service at their hands, than that wherein himself would be the foremost. In imitation of *Valerius Corvinus: Facta mea, non dicta, vos milites, sequi volo; nec disciplinam modo, sed exemplum etiam à me petere*; I would have you, O my Soldiers, do as I do, and not so much mind what I say; and to take not your discipline only, but your Pattern also from me. And therefore the Party was like to be well upheld; forasmuch as both the Prince and the People were so far engaged in the matter intended, as by the resemblance of an earnest desire might answer the Measure of due proportion.

## CHAP. IV.

Cæsar cometh into Gallia, and by a device getteth to his Army.

Cæsar.

**T**Hese things being told Cæsar in Italy; as soon as he understood that the matters in the City were by the Wisdom of Pompey brought into better state, he took his Journey into Gallia, and being come thither he was much troubled how to get to his Army. For if he should send for the Legions into the Province, he understood that they should be certainly fought withal by the way, in his Absence. If he himself should go unto them, he doubted how he might safely commit his Person to any, although they were such as were yet in Peace. In the mean time Lucterius of Cahors, being sent against the Rutheni, doth easily unite that State to the Arverni: And proceeding further against the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, he received Hostages of both of them, and having raised a great Power, he laboured to break into the Province, and to make towards Narbo. Which being known, Cæsar resolved by all means to put him by that purpose, and went himself to Narbo. At his coming he encouraged such as stood doubtful or timorous, and placed Garrisons amongst the Rutheni, the Volsci, and about Narbo, which were Frontier Places and near unto the Enemy, and

Commanded part of the Forces which were in the Province, together with those Supplies which he had brought out of Italy, to go against the Helvii, which are adjoyning upon the Arverni. Things being thus ordered, Lucterius being now Suppressed and Removed holding it to be dangerous to enter among the Garrisons, he himself went towards the Helvii. And albeit the Hill Gebenna, which divideth the Arverni from the Helvii, by reason of the hard time of Winter, and the depth of the Snow, did hinder their Passage; yet, by the industry of the Soldiers, making way through Snow of six foot deep, they came into the Confines of the Arverni: Who being suddenly and unawares Suppressed, little mistrusting an Invasion over the Hill Gebenna, which encloseth them in as a Wall, and at that time of the Year doth not afford a Path to a single Man alone, he Commanded the Horsemen to scatter themselves far and near to make the Enemy the more afraid. These things being speedily carried to Vercingetorix, all the Arverni full of Fear and Amazement flocked about him, beseeching him to have a care of their State, and not to suffer themselves to be Sacked by the Enemy, especially now at this time, when as all the War was transferred upon them. Upon their instant entreaty he removed his Camp out of the Territories of the Bituriges, and marched towards the Country of the Arverni. But Cæsar having continued two days in those places, forasmuch as he understood, both by use and opinion, what course Vercingetorix was like to take; he left the Army, pretending some Supplies of Horse, which he went to raise, and appointed young Brutus to Command those Forces, admonishing him to send out the Horsemen into all Quarters, and that he himself would not be absent from the Camp above three days. These things being thus settled, none of his Followers knowing his determination, by great Journeys he came to Vienna; where taking fresh Horse, which he had laid there many days before, he ceased neither Night nor Day, until he came through the Confines of the Hedui to the Lingones, where two Legions Wintered; to the end if the Hedui should undertake any thing against him, he might with speed prevent it. Being there, he sent to the rest of the Legions, and brought them all to one place, before the Arverni could possibly have notice of it.

## OBSERVATION.

**C**Æsar, upon his first entrance into Gallia, was perplexed how to get to his Army: And the matter stood in such Terms, as brought either the Legions or his own Person into hazard. For (as he saith) if he should send for the Legions to come unto him, they should doubtless be Fought withal by the way, which he was loath to adventure, unless himself had been present: Or otherwise if he himself had gone unto them, he doubted of the entertainment of the Revolting Gauls, and might have Overthrown his Army, by the loss of his own Person. In this extremity of Choice, he resolved upon his own Passage to the Army, as less dangerous and more honourable, rather than to call the Legions out of their Winter-Quarters, where they stood as a Check to bridle the Insolency of the Mutinous Gauls, and so to bring them to the hazard of Battel, in fetching their General into the Field: Whereby he might have lost the Victory before he had begun the Wars. And for his better safety in this Passage, he used this cunning. Having assured the Roman Province by strong and frequent Garrisons on the Frontiers, and removed Lucterius from those

To abuse an Enemy by way of Stratagem, commendable in a Commander.

Paris;



• *Avergne.*  
• *La montagne de*  
*Geneve.*

Parts; gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of *Italy*, with other Forces which he found in the Province, he went speedily into the Territories of the \* *Arverni*, making a way over the Hill, \* *Gebenna*, at such a time of the year as made it unpassable for any Forces, had they not been led by *Cæsar*; only for this purpose, to have it noised abroad, that whereas *Vercingetorix* and the *Arverni* had principally undertook the Quarrel against the *Romans*, and made the of beginning a new War, *Cæsar* would first deal with them, and lay the weight thereof upon their shoulders, by calling their Fortunes first in question, to the end he might possess the World with an opinion of his presence in that Country, and draw *Vercingetorix* back again to defend his State, whilst he in the mean time did slip to his Army without suspicion or fear of peril: For staying there no longer than might serve to give a sufficient colour to that pretence, and leaving those Forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the Project, he conveyed himself to his Army with such speed and celerity, as doth verifie the saying of *Suetonius*; *Quod persæpe nuncios de se prævenit*, that he often outwent the ordinary Messengers.

*Vita Cæsaris.*

These blinds and false intentions, are of special use in matter of War, and serve as well to get advantages upon an Enemy, as to clear a difficulty by cleanly Evasion: Neither is a Commander the less valued for fine conveyance in Military Projects, but deserveth rather greater honour for adding Art unto Valour, and supplanting the strength of opposition with the sleight of Wit.

—*Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit?*

Who looks at Fraud or Valour in a Foe? hath always been held a principle amongst Men of War. And *Lisander* his Counsel is the same in effect, that where the Lion's skin will not serve the turn, there take the Fox's. *Carbo* spake it to the commendation of *Sylla*, that he had to do both with a Lion and a Fox, but he feared more his Fox's pate than his Lion's skin. It is reported that *Hannibal* excelled all other of his time for abusing the Enemy in matter of Stratagem, for he never made fight but with an addition of assistants, supporting Force with Art, and the fury of Arms with the subtilty of Wit.

Of late time amongst other practices of this nature, the Treaty at *Ostend* is most memorable, entertained onely to gain time: that while speech of Parlee was continued, and Pledges delivered to the Arch-Duke *Albertus*, for the safety of such as were sent into the Town to capitulate with the General, there might be time gained for the sending in of such supplies of Men and Munition as were wanting, to make good the defence thereof: which were no sooner taken in, but the Treaty proved a stratagem of War.

In these foils and tricks of Wit, which at all times and in all ages have been highly esteemed in Men of War, as special vertues becoming the condition of a great Commander, if it be demanded how far a General may proceed in abusing an Enemy by deeds or words; I cannot speak distinctly to the question: but sure I am, that *Surena*, Lieutenant-General of the *Parthian* Army, did his Master good service, in abusing *Crassus* the *Roman* General by fair promises; or as *Plutarch* saith, by foul Perjury, till in the end he brought his head to be an actor in a Tragedy: albeit *Surena* never deserved well of good report since that time. Howsoever, Men of civil Society ought not to draw this into use from the example of Soldiers, forasmuch as it is a part of the profession of cutting of Throats, and hath no prescription but in extremities of War.

*Plut. Crassus.*

*Vercingetorix* besiegeth *Gergovia*. *Cæsar* taketh in *Vellaunodunum* and *Genabum*.

**T**His being known, *Vercingetorix* brought back his Army again into the Country of the *Bituriges*, and thence marched to besiege *Gergovia*, a Town held by the *Boii*, whom *Cæsar* had left there after the *Helvetian* War, and given the Jurisdiction of the Town to the *Hedui*. Which brought *Cæsar* into great perplexity, whether he should keep the Legions in one place for that time of Winter which remained, and so suffer the stipendaries of the *Hedui* to be taken and spoiled, whereby all *Gallia* might take occasion to revolt, forasmuch as the *Romans* should seem to afford no protection or countenance to their Friends; or otherwise draw his Army out of their Winter quarters sooner than was usual, and thereby become subject to the difficulties of provision and carriage of Corn. Notwithstanding it seemed better, and so he resolved, rather to undergo all difficulties, than by taking such a scorn to lose the good wills of all his followers. And therefore persuading the *Hedui* diligently to make supply of necessary Provisions, he sent to the *Boii*, to advertise them of his coming, to encourage them to continue Loyal, and nobly to resist the assaults of the Enemy: and leaving two Legions with the Carriages of the whole Army at *Agendicum*, he marched towards the *Boii*. The next day coming to a Town of the *Senones* called *Vellaunodunum*, he determined to take it, to the end he might leave no Enemy behind him, which might hinder a speedy supply of Victuals: and in two days he inclosed it about with a Ditch and a Rampier. The third day some being sent out touching the giving up of the Town, he commanded all their Arms and their Cattel to be brought out, and six hundred Pledges to be delivered. Leaving *C. Trebonius* a Legate to see it performed; he himself made all speed towards *Genabum* in the Territories of the *Men of Chartres*; who as soon as they heard of the taking in of *Vellaunodunum*, persuading themselves the matter would not rest so, they resolved to put a strong Garrison into *Genabum*. Thither came *Cæsar* within two days, and incamping himself before the Town, the Evening drawing on, he put off the assault unto the next day, commanding the Soldiers to prepare in a readiness such things as should be necessary for that service. And forasmuch as the Town of *Genabum* had a Bridge leading over the River *Loire*, he feared lest they of the Town would steal away in the night: for prevention whereof he commanded two Legions to watch all night in Arms. The Townsmen a little before Midnight went out quietly, and began to pass over the River. Which being discovered by the Scouts, *Cæsar* with the Legions which he had ready in Arms, burnt the Gates, and entering the Town took it; the greatest number of the Enemy being taken, and a very few escaping, by reason of the narrowness of the Bridge and the Way which stout in the multitude. The Town being sacked and burned, and given for a Booty to the Soldiers, he carried his Army over the River *Loire*, into the Territories of the *Bituriges*.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**I**T is a known and an approved saying, *E malis minimum est eligendum*, of evils the least is to be chosen: but in a variety of evils to be able to discern the difference, and to chuse the least, *Hic*



*Hic labor, hoc opus*, here's all the skill and work. *Vercingetorix* besieging *Gergovia* (a Stipendary Town belonging to the *Hedui*, that of long time had served the *Roman* Empire,) at such a time of the year as would not afford provision of Victual for the maintenance of an Army, but with great difficulty and inconvenience of Carriage and Convey; *Cæsar* was much perplexed, whether he should forbear to succour the Town and raise the siege, or undergo the hazard of long and tedious Convoys. A matter often falling into dispute, although it be in other terms, whether honesty or honourable respect ought to be preferred before private ease and particular commodity. *Cæsar* hath declared himself touching this point, preferring the honour of the People of *Rome*, as the Majesty of their Empire, and the reputation which they desired to hold, touching assistance and protection of their Friends, before any inconvenience which might happen to their Army. And not without good reasons, which may be drawn as well from the worthiness of the cause, as from the danger of the effect: For duties of Vertue and respects of Honesty, as the noblest parts of the mind, do not only challenge the service of the inferiour faculties of the Soul; but do also command the Body and the casualties thereof, in such sort as is fitting the excellency of their Prerogative: for otherwise Vertue would find but bare attendance, and might leave her Scepter for want of Lawful Authority. And therefore *Cæsar* chose rather to adventure the Army upon the casualties of hard Provision, than to blemish the *Roman* name with the infamy of Disloyalty. Which was less dangerous also in regard of the Effect: For where the Bond is of value, there the Forfeiture is great: And if that tie had been broken, and their opinion deceived touching the expectation of assistance and help, all *Gallia* might have had just cause of revolt, and disclaimed the *Roman* Government for non-protection. To conclude then, let no Man deceive himself in the present benefit, which private respect may bring upon the refusal of honest regard, for the end will be a witness of the errour, and prove Honesty to be the best Policy.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

It is observed by some writers, that *Cæsar* never undertook any Action, or at the least brought it not to trial, but he first assured himself of these four things.

The first was provision of Victuals, as the very foundation of warlike expeditions, whereof I have already treated in the first Commentary: The difficulty whereof made him so doubtful to undertake the relief of *Gergovia*. And doubtless whosoever goeth about any enterprize of War, without certain means of Victual and Provision, must either carry an Army of Camelions that may live by the Air, or intend nothing but to build Castles in the Air, or otherwise shall be sure to find his Enemy either in his bosom, or as the Proverb is in *Plutarch*, to leap on his Belly with both his Feet.

The second thing was Provision of all necessities, which might be of use in that service: wherewith he always so abounded, that there might rather want occasion to use them, than he be wanting to answer occasion. And these were the instruments whereby he made such admirable works, such Bridges, such Mounts, such Trenches, such huge Armadoes, as appeareth by the Sea-fight with the Maritime Cities of *Gallia*: According to which his former custom, forasmuch as the day

was far spent before he came to *Genabum*, he commanded such things to be fitted and had in a readiness, as might serve for the siege the next day.

The third thing was an Army for the most part of old Soldiers, whom the *Romans* called *Veterani*, whereof he was likewise at this time provided; for the two Legions which were fresh and lately inrolled, he left at *Agendicum* with the Carriages, taking only the old Soldiers for this service, as knowing that *in pugna usum amplius prodesse quam vires*, usefulness is more serviceable in War than numbers.

The fourth thing was the trial and experience of the Enemies Forces, which the former Victories assured him to be inferiour to the *Romans*; it being always a Rule in the *Roman* Discipline, (as I have already noted,) by light and easie Skirmishes, to acquaint the Soldiers with the manner of the Enemies fight, *Ne eos novum bellum, novus hostis terreret*, lest a new kind of fight, or Enemy might affright them; as *Livy* saith.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* taketh in *Noviodunum*, and beateth the Enemy coming to rescue the Town.

**V**ercingetorix understanding of *Cæsar's* coming, left the siege, and went to meet him. *Cæsar* resolved to take a Town lying in his way in the Territories of the *Bituriges*, called *Noviodunum*, Which they of the Town perceiving, sent out unto him to beseech him to spare them, and to give order for their safety. To the end therefore that he might speed that business with as much celerity as he had accomplished former services, he commanded them to bring out their Arms, their Horse, and to deliver Pledges. Part of the Hostages being given, while the rest were in delivering over, divers Centurions and a few Soldiers being admitted into the Town, to seek out their Weapons and their Horses, the Horsemen of the Enemy, which marched before *Vercingetorix's* Army, were discovered afar off: Which the Townsmen had no sooner perceived, and thereby conceived some hope of relief, but they presently took up a shout, and betook themselves to their Arms, shut the Gates, and began to make good the Walls. The Centurions that were in the Town perceiving some new resolution of the Gauls, with their Swords drawn, possessed themselves of the Gates, and saved both themselves and their Men that were in the Town. *Cæsar* commanded the Horsemen to be drawn out of the Camp, and to begin the Charge. And as they began to give ground, he sent four hundred German Horsemen to second them, whom he had resolved to keep with him from the first: Who charged the Enemy with such fury, that the Gauls could no way endure the assault, but were presently put to flight; and many of them being slain, the rest retired back to the Army. Upon their overthrow, the Townsmen were worse affrighted than they were before; and having apprehended such as were thought to have stirred up the People, they brought them to *Cæsar*, and yielded themselves unto him. Which being ended, *Cæsar* marched towards the Town of *Avaricum*, which was the greatest and best fortified of all the Towns in the Territories of the *Bituriges*, and situate in the most fertile part of the Country; for that being taken in, he doubted not to bring the whole State of the *Bituriges* easily into his subjection.

OBSER-



## OBSERVATION.

Forasmuch as nothing is more changeable than the mind of Man, which (notwithstanding the low degree of baseness wherein it often fitteth,) will as occasion giveth way to revenge, readily amount to the height of Tyranny, and spare no labour to cry quittance with an Enemy: It hath been thought expedient in the wisdom of foregoing ages, to pluck the wings of so mounting a bird, and to deprive an Enemy of such means, as may give hope of liberty by mutiny and revolt.

The means which the Romans used to weaken an Enemy.

The practice of the Romans in taking in any Town, was to leave them forceless, that howsoever they might stand affected, their Nails should be surely pared for scratching, and their Power confined to the circuit of their mind. For as it appeareth by this and many other places of Cæsar, no Surrender of any Town was accepted, until they had delivered all their Arms, both offensive and defensive, with such engines and instruments of War as might any way make for the defence of the same. Neither that only, but such Beasts also, whether Horse or Elephant, or any other whatsoever, as might any way advantage the use of those Weapons. Which as it was a great dismay and weakning to the Enemy; so was it short of the third condition, commanding the delivery of so many Hostages or Pledges as were thought convenient, being the prime of their Youth, and the flower of their Manhood, and were as the marrow to their bones, and the sinews to that body. Whereby it came to pass, that the remnant was much disabled in strength, concerning their number of Fighting Men; and such as were left had neither Arms nor means to make resistance.

The Turk observeth the same course with the Christians, but in a more cruel and barbarous manner: For he cometh duely at a certain time, not regarding any former demeanour, and leadeth away the flower of their Youth, to be invested in impiety and infidelity, and to be made Vassals of heathenish impurity.

Oftentimes we read, that a Conquered People were not only interdicted Arms, but the matter also and the Art whereby such Arms were made and wrought: For where the People are great, and Metal and Matter plenty, it is a chance if Artificers be wanting to repair their loss, and to refurnish their Armory. At the siege of Carthage the Romans having taken away their Arms, they notwithstanding, finding store of Metal within the Town, caused Workmen to make every day an hundred Targets and three hundred Swords, besides Arrows and Casting-slings, using Womens Hair for want of Hemp, and pulling down their Houses for Timber to build Shipping. Whereby we may perceive, that a General cannot be too careful to deprive an Enemy of all such helps as may any way strengthen his hand, or make way to resistance.

## CHAP. VII.

Vercingetorix persuadeth the Gauls to a new course of War.

Cæsar.  
• Ville neuve en la Franche comte.  
• Orleans.  
• Noyon.

Vercingetorix having received so many losses one in the neck of another, \* Vel-launodunum, \* Genabum and \* Noviodunum being taken, he calleth his Men to Council, and telleth them that the War must be carried in another course than it hath been heretofore; for they must endeavour by all means

to keep the Romans from Forage and Convoy of Victual: Which would easily be brought to pass forasmuch as they themselves did abound in Horsemen: And for that the time of the Year did not yet serve to get Forage in the Field, the Enemy must necessarily seek it in Houses and Barns, whereby the Foragers would dayly be cut off by their Horsemen. Moreover, for their safety and defence they were to neglect their private Commodity: Their Houses and their Villages were to be burnt up round about as far as Boia, wheresoever the Romans might go to fetch their Forage. For themselves they thought it reason that they should make supply of Victual and Provision, in whose possessions they were, and for whom they fought. By this means the Romans would never be able to endure that want as would befall them, or at the least be constrained to fetch their Provisions far off, with great danger and peril to themselves: Neither did it make any matter whether they killed them or put them besides their Carriages; for without necessary supplies they were never able to hold War. And to conclude, such Towns were likewise to be set on fire, as by the strength of their situation were not safe from danger, lest they should prove receptacles to linger and detract the War, and serve the Romans for booty and supplies of Provision. And albeit these things might seem heavy and bitter; yet they ought to esteem it more grievous to have their Wives and their Children led away into servitude, and themselves to be slain by the Sword of the Enemy: which doth necessarily fall upon a Conquered People. This opinion was generally approved by the consent of all Men, and more than twenty Cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day: the like was done in other States, great fires were to be seen in all parts. And although all Men took it very grievously, yet they propounded this comfort unto themselves, that the Enemy being by this means defeated, they should quickly recover their losses. Touching Avaricum they disputed it in Common Council, whether it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges do prostrate themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, that they might not be forced to set on fire with their own hands, the fairest City in all Gallia, being both an ornament and a strength to their State; they would easily defend it by the situation of the place, being incircled round about with a River and a Bog, and being accessible by one narrow passage only. At length leave being granted them to keep it, Vercingetorix at first dissuading them from it, and afterwards yielding unto it, moved by the intreaty of the Gauls, and the commiseration of the common multitude; and so a fit Garrison was chosen to defend the Town.

## OBSERVATION.

I have seen an Imprese with a Circle, and a Hand with a sharp Stile pointing towards the centre with this Motto, *Hic labor, hoc opus*, this is a thing of work and labour; signifying thereby, that albeit the Area thereof were plainly and distinctly bounded, and the Diameter of no great length, yet it was not an easie matter to find the Centre, which is the heart and chiefest part of that figure. In like manner, there is no business or other course so easie or plain, but the Centre may be mistaken, and the difficulty commonly resteth in hitting that point, which giveth the circumference an equal and regular motion.

The Gauls were resolved to undertake the defence of their Country, and to redeem their liberty with the hazard of their Lives: But it seemeth they were mistaken in the means, and

It is a hard matter in following a business, to hit that course which may most advantage it.



ran a course far short of the Centre. For *Vercingetorix* perceiving the Romans daily to get upon the Gauls, first by taking in one Town, secondly another, and lastly of a third, he advised them to set on fire all the Country Houses, Villages and Towns for a great circuit round about, and so force the Romans to fetch their Forage and Provisions far off, and undergo the difficulties of long Convoys, whereby the Gauls might make use of their multitude of Horse, and keep the Romans without supplies of necessary Provisions: And so they doubted not but to give a speedy end to that War. And this he took to be the centre of that business, and the true use of their advantage.

Lib. 4.

*Polybius* writeth, That *M. Regulus* having divers times overthrown the Carthaginians in Battel, one *Xantippus* a Lacedæmonian, clearly perceiving the cause of their often routs, began openly to say, That the Carthaginians were not overthrown by the Valour of the Romans, but by their own Ignorance: For they exceeding the Romans in Horse and Elephants, had neglected to fight in the Champaign, where their Cavalry might shew it self, but in Hills and Woody places, where the Foot Troops were of more force, and so the Romans had the advantage. Whereby the manner of the War being changed, and by the counsel of the pregnant Greek, brought from the Hills into the level of the Plain, the Carthaginians recovered all their former losses by one absolute Victory. In like manner *Hannibal* finding himself to exceed the Romans in strength of Cavalry, did always endeavour to affront them in open and Champaign Countries; and as often as the Romans durst meet him, he put them to the worse: But *Fabius* perceiving the disadvantage, kept himself always upon the Hills, and in covert and uneven places, and so made the advantage of the place equal the multitude of the Enemies Horsemen.

Plutarch in the Life of Fabius.

There is no greater scorn can touch a Man of reputation and place, than to be thought not to understand his own business. For as Wisdom is the excellency of humane nature, so doth want of Judgment deject Men to the condition of such as *Aristotle* calleth Servants by Nature: whose Wit being too weak to support any weight, do recompence that want with the service of their body, and are wholly employed in a Porter's occupation. Which *Homer* layeth upon *Diomedes's* Shoulders, with as fine conveyance as he doth the rest of his inventions. For *Ulysses* and he going out on a Party to do some Exploit upon the Trojans, they carried themselves so gallantly, that they fell to share King *Rhesus's* Chariot and Horses. *Ulysses* presently seized upon the Horses, being of a delicate Thracian breed, and *Diomedes* seemed well contented with the Chariot. But being to carry it away, *Pallas* advised him to let it alone, lest he might prove his Strength to be greater than his Wit, and yet not find so much neither as would carry it away.

Seruus a natura. Polit. 1.

Iliad. 10.

But for these Directions which *Vercingetorix* gave unto the Gauls, I referr the Reader to the sequel of the History, wherein he shall find how they prevailed.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Cæsar* besiegeth *Avaricum*, and is distressed for want of Corn.

**V**ercingetorix followed *Cæsar* by small and easie Journies, and chose a place to incamp in, fortified about with Bogs and Woods, fifteen miles distant from *Avaricum*: where he understood what was done at *Avaricum* every hour of the day, and commanded likewise what he would have done. He observed all our Foraging and Harvesting, and did set upon such as went far off upon any such occasion, and incumbred them with great inconveniences: albeit they took what course they could to meet with it, as to go out at uncertain times, and by unknown and unusual ways. *Cæsar* incamping himself before that part of the Town which was not shut in with the River nor the Bog, and afforded but a narrow and straight passage, began to make a Mount, to drive Vines, and to raise two Towers; (for the nature of the place would not suffer him to inclose it round about with a Ditch and a Rampier;) and never rested to admonish the *Hedui* and the *Boii* to bring in supplies of Corn: Of whom the one, by reason of the small care and pains they took, did little help him; the other, of no great ability, being a small and a weak State, did quickly consume all that they had. The Army was distressed for want of Corn, by reason of the poverty of the *Boii*, and the indiligence of the *Hedui*, together with the burning of the Houses in the Country, in such manner as they wanted Corn for many days together, and sustained their lives with Beasts and Cattel which they had fetched a great way off: And yet no one voice at all was heard to come from them, unworthy the Majesty of the Roman Empire, and their former Victories. And when as *Cæsar* did speak unto the Legions severally as they were in the Works, that if their wants were heavy and bitter unto them, he would leave off the Siege; all of them with one voice desired him not to do so, for since they had so serv'd many years under his command, as they never had received any dishonour, neither had they at any time departed and left the business undone; it would be imputed unto them as an ignominy and disgrace to leave this Siege; and that they had rather undergo all difficulties, than not to revenge the death of the Citizens of Rome that by treachery were slain at *Genabum*. The same Speeches they delivered to the Centurions and Tribunes, to be told *Cæsar*.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**T**He worth of a Soldier consisteth in a disposition of Mind and Body, which maketh him apt to suffer and to undergo the difficulties of War. For let his resolution otherwise be never so great, and his Courage invincible in the day of Battel; yet if he faint under the burthen of such tediousness as usually attendeth upon warlike designs, he is no way fit for any great enterprize. *Pindarus* saith, that he understandeth not the War, that knoweth not that the atchieving of one piece of service, is always accompanied with the sufferance of another difficulty as great as that which was first intended. *Et facere, & pati fortia, Romanum est.* It was the peculiar commendation of the Roman People, patiently to endure the extremities of warfare: which made the *Volsci* to cry out, That either they must forswear Arms, and forget to make War, and receive the Yoak of Thraldom and Bondage;

Patience in a Soldier excelleth Valour.



Livy. lib. 6.

*aut iis quibuscum de imperio certetur, nec virtute, nec patientia, nec disciplina rei militaris cedendum;* or else they must shew themselves no ways inferior to their Antagonists, either in Valour, or Sufferance, or Military Discipline. *Appian* forgetteth not to say, that the *Roman Empire* was raised to such Greatness, not by Fortune or good Luck, but by meer Valour, and patient enduring of Hardness and Want. Which is the self-same which *Crassus* in his Sorrow uttered to his Soldiers, who neither did nor spake many things well: For as *Plutarch* rightly censurcth him out of the Comical Poet, he was

Plut. Crassus.

*A good Man, any way else but in Wars.*

The Empire of *Rome* (saith he) came not to that Greatness which it now possesseth by good Fortune only, but by patient and constant suffering of Trouble and Adversity; never yielding or giving place to any danger.

Boterus di  
Principe.

Some *Italian Writers* are of an Opinion, That the two chiefeft parts of a Soldier's Valour and Sufferance, are in these Times divided unto two Nations, the *French* and the *Spaniard*: The *Spaniard* making War rather by Sufferance than by violence of Assaults; and the *French* impatient of delay, and furious in Assaults: So that according to his Opinion, a *Spaniard* and a *French-Man* will make one good Soldier. Touching the *Spaniard*, I cannot deny but that he hath the name of one of the best Soldiers in Christendom, and I do gladly allow all that Vertue can Challenge, for Truth will prevail against all Affecti-on: yet I may say thus much on the behalf of our own People, That we have seldom lost Honour in confronting any Nation. Concerning the Sufferance, and patient enduring of Hardness, which is said to be in the *Spaniard*, being able to live long with a little, it may peradventure not unfitly be attributed to the property of their Country, and the nature of their Climate, which will not bear nor digest such plenty of Food; as is required in Colder Countries: And thereupon being born to so weak a digestion, they are as well satisfied with a Root or a Sallet, as others with better plenty of Food; and therein they go beyond other Nations. Of the *French* I say nothing, but leave them to make good the Opinion of the *Italian Writer*.

*Suetonius* witnesseth of *Cæsar*, That he himself was *laboris ultra fidem patiens*, one that endured toil beyond belief, whereby he might the better move his Army to endure with patience the difficulties of the Siege: And yet so artificially, as he seemed rather willing to leave it un-effected, than to impose any burthen upon them, which they themselves should be unwilling to bear; the rather to draw the Legions to engage themselves therein, by denying to forsake it, than to cast that upon them, which their unwillingness might easily have put off.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

WE may further observe the means the Soldiers used to acquaint *Cæsar* with their desires, which was by the Tribunes and Centurions. For as these were mediate Officers between the General and them, and delivered the Mandates and Directions of the Emperor to the Soldier; so did the Soldiers use their help to make known unto him their Requests; as besides this place may appear in the First Commentary, where they desired to give him satisfaction touching the fear they had con-

ceived of *Arionistus* and the *Germans*, which they likewise did by the Centurions and Tribunes.

#### CHAP. IX.

*Cæsar* leaveth the Siege, and goeth to take the Enemy upon advantage; but returneth again without Fighting.

WHEN the Towers began to approach near *Cæsar*. unto the Walls, *Cæsar* understood by the Captives, that *Vercingetorix* having consumed all his Provision of Forage, had removed his Camp nearer to *Avaricum*, and that he himself was gone with the Cavalry, and such ready Footmen as were accustomed to Fight among the Horsemen, to lye in ambush in that place where he thought our Men would come a Foraging the next day. Which being known, setting forward about Midnight in silence, in the Morning he came to the Enemies Camp. They having speedy advertisement, by their Scouts, of *Cæsar's* coming, did hide their Carriages in the Woods, and drew up all their Forces in an eminent and open place. Which being told *Cæsar*, he Commanded the Baggage to be speedily laid together, and their Arms to be made ready. There was a Hill of a gentle rising from the bottom to the top, encompassed round about with a difficult and troublesome Bog of fifty Foot in breadth. Upon this Hill, the Bridge being broken, the Gauls kept themselves, trusting to the strength of the place, and being distributed into Companies, according to their several States, they kept all the Fords and Passages of the Bog with Watches, with this Resolution, that if the Romans did pass over the Bog, they might easily, from the higher ground, keep them under, as they stuck in the Mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deem the Fight to be upon equal Terms, whereas they themselves well-knowing the inequality of the Condition, did make but a vain and idle Ostentation. The Soldiers disdaining that the Enemy could endure their presence so near at hand, and requiring the sign of Battel, *Cæsar* acquainted them with what detriment, and loss of many Valiant Men, the Victory must at that time be bought, who being so resolute, that they refused no danger to purchase him Honour, he might well be condemned of great Ingratitude and Villainy, if their Lives were not dearer unto him than his own Safety: And so comforting the Soldiers, he brought them back again the same day into the Camp, and gave order for such things as were requisite for the Siege of the Town.

#### OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter hath divers special particulars worthy observation. The first is, The opportunity which *Cæsar* took to visit the Army of the Gauls, when *Vercingetorix* was absent, and gone to lie in Ambush for the Roman Foragers: Which was a Caveat to *Vercingetorix*, not to be too busie with the Roman Convoys, lest his absence might draw on such an inconvenience, as might make him repent for going a Birding.

The second is, the inequality which the advantage of the place giveth to a Party: Which I have already so often spoken of, as I am almost weary to repeat it; and the rather, for that I have produced this passage in the former Book, to signifie the benefit of such an advantage. Yet forasmuch as it is so pregnant to that effect, as may



The advantage of the place doth countervail the absence of the General.

may well deserve a double consideration, and was also produced by Caesar himself upon occasion at Gergovia, give me leave to note how much it swayeth to counterpoise the want of the adverse Party. Wherein, as it cannot be denied, but that it may give such help as may make a small number equal a far greater proportion of Men; so in Caesar's Judgment it countervaileth the absence of the General, and maketh the Body perfect without the Head. Neither were they weakened only with the absence of their General; but their Cavalry, wherein they so much trusted, was absent likewise; and yet more than that too, by how much the Roman Legions excelled the Gauls in Valour and Prowess of Arms: Which being all put together, is no small advantage. For doubtless, if the matter had stood upon equal terms touching the place, neither the presence of Vercingetorix, nor the addition of their Cavalry to assist them, had hindered the Battel, or turned the Romans back to their Camp.

The third thing is, the moderation which he shewed, forbearing to Fight, the Gauls insolently vaunting, and the Roman Soldiers fretting and disdainful the Enemies Pride: Whereby he settled such a confidence of his Directions in the Minds of his Men, by shunning the peril of apparent danger which might fall upon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no question of his Commands, but take them as the only means of their Safety, being never better assured than in performing what he Commanded. The practice of later Times hath not so well deserved that Vertue, but hath often shewed it self more prodigal of Blood, as though Men were made only to fill up Ditches, and to be the woful Executioners of other Men's Rashness.

The last thing is, the making ready of their Weapons, *Arma expediri jussit*. Concerning which point, we must understand that the Romans always carried their Targets in Cases, and did hang their Helmets at their Backs, and fitted their Piles as might be most convenient with the rest of their Carriages. And therefore whensoever they were to give Battel, they were first to put on their Helmets, to uncase their Targets, to fit their Piles, and to make them ready for the Charge: And this was called *Arma expedire*.

#### CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix excuseth himself to the Gauls for his Absence.

Caesar.

**V**ercingetorix returning back to the Army, was accused of Treason: In that he had removed his Camp near unto the Romans; and further, that he had gone away from it, and took all the Cavalry with him; that he had left so great an Army without any one to Command it; that upon his departure the Romans should come so opportunely and so speedily: For all these things could not fall out by chance without Counsel and Direction: It seemed he had rather have the Kingdom of Gallia, by a grant from Caesar, than by their Means and Gift. Being thus Charged, he answereth, That he removed the Camp for want of Forage, they themselves desiring it. He came near unto the Romans, being led thereunto by the opportunity of the place, which was such as might defend it self by its own Strength; The Cavalry was of no use in a boggy place, but might do good Service there where it went. He left no Man to Command the Army of purpose, lest by the persuasion of the multitude he should be forced

to Fight, which he knew they all desired, as not able long to endure any labour. If the Romans came by chance, they were to thank Fortune; if by any Man's Direction, they were beholding unto him that had brought them, where they might from the higher ground, both see how small a number they were, and contemn their Valour; who not daring to Fight, did shamefully return into their Camp. He desired to receive no Imperial Dignity by Treachery from Caesar, which he might otherwise have by lawful Victory, which was now most certain and sure, both to himself and the rest of the Gauls. And for that Authority which he had received from them, he was ready to give it up into their hands again, if they thought the Honour which they gave him to be greater than the help and safety which they received from him. And to the end you may understand these things to be truly delivered by me (saith he) hear the Roman Soldiers. And therewithal he brought forth Servants which were taken Foraging a few days before, miserably tormented with Famine and Irons. They being taught before-hand what to answer, said they were Legionary Soldiers, and had stole out of the Camp to see if they could meet with any Corn or Cattel in the Fields: The whole Army suffered the like Penury, and Mens Strength began to fail them, insomuch that they were not able to undergo any Labour: And therefore their General had resolved, That if he prevailed not against the Town, he would withdraw his Army within Three days. These Benefits (saith Vercingetorix) you have of me, whom you accuse of Treason: For by my means, without shedding of your Blood, you see so great a Conquering Army almost consumed with Hunger; and by me it is provided, That when they fly from hence, no State shall receive them into their Territories. The whole multitude applauded his Speech, by shaking and striking their hands together, as their manner is in such cases, commending Vercingetorix for a great Soldier, whose Loyalty, as it was not to be distrusted, so the War could not have been carried with better directions. They agreed further to send 10000 choice Men out of all their Forces into the Town, as not thinking it fit to commit the common safety of Gallia only to the Bituriges, for they were perswaded that the Summ of all the Victory consisted in making good that Town against the Romans.

#### OBSERVATION.

**A** Multitude is *Bellua multorum capitum* (as one saith) an unreasonable Beast of many Heads, apt to receive froward and perverse Incitements, and hard to be drawn to better Understanding, Jealous, Impatient, Treacherous, Unconstant, an Instrument for a wicked Spirit, and sooner moved to Mischief by *Thersites*, than reclaimed to Vertue by the Authority of *Agamemnon*, or the Eloquence of *Ulysses*, or the Wisdom of *Nestor*, more turbulent than the raging, either of the Sea, or of a devouring Fire. And therefore they may well go together to make a triplicity of Evils, according to the saying, *Ignis, mare, populus, tria mala*; Fire, the Sea and the rabble Multitude are three Evils.

Vercingetorix had both his hands full in this Service, for his care was no less to keep the Gauls from being distasted, than to make his Party good against Caesar. It is disputed, touching the Government of a multitude, whether it be fitter to be severe or obsequious. *Tacitus* saith peremptorily, that *In multitudine regenda plus pena quam obsequium valet*; foul means does more than fair to the governing of a multitude. But he understandeth such a multitude as are subject to their

Horace.

Whether severity or Clemency do more avail in governing a Multitude.



their Commander, either by ancient Service, or the interest of regal Authority, whereby they are tied to Obedience by hereditary Duty, and cannot refuse that which Custom prescribeth. For otherwise, where the People stand free from such Bonds, and have submitted themselves to Government for some special Service, their Clemency or obsequious smoothing prevaileth more than the severity of Command: According to the saying, *Homines duci volunt, non cogi*; Men will be led by fair means, not compelled. Upon a dissention which happened at Rome, between the People and the Senate, the People were presently sent into the Field under the leading of two Senators, *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*. *Appius*, by reason of his Cruelty and Severity, was not obeyed by his Soldiers, but forsook his Province, and returned *non proficiens*, they will do nothing: *Quintius* being courteous and benign, had an obedient Army, and came home a Conquerour. In the like terms did *Vercingetorix* stand with the Gauls, who, not long before, were all of equal Authority, and for the defence of the common Cause had submitted themselves to Order and Government: And therefore he carried himself accordingly, but with some cunning too, for he made no scruple to abuse the Beast, and to present them with a lesson of deceit, taught to Servants and Roman Slaves, as the confession of Legionary Soldiers, which is a liberty that hath ever been allowed to such as had the managing of an unruly Multitude, who have made as much use of the false Rein, as the Bit or the Spur, or any other help belonging to that Art.

#### CHAP. XI.

*Cæsar* continueth the Siege at *Avaricum*, and describeth the Walls of the Towns in *Gallia*.

*Cæsar.*

**B***Y the singular Valour of our Soldiers all the Counsels and Devices of the Gauls were made void and of none effect. For they are a Nation of great dexterity, apt to imitate and make any thing which they see other Men do before them: For they turned aside the Hooks with Ropes, and drew them into the Town with Engines: They withdrew the Earth from the Mount with Mines, with their great Skill, by reason of their Iron Mines, wherein they are much practised: They set up Towers upon every part of the Wall, and covered them with Raw Hides: They sallied out of the Town Night and Day, and either set fire to the Mount, or assaulted the Soldiers as they were at Work: They did every day make their Towers equal to that height of our Towers, which the daily increase of the Mount had added to their height: They hindered the open Trenches, and kept them from approaching the Walls with sharp burned Stakes, cast into them with hot Pitch and with great Stones. All their Walls are almost of this fashion: Long strait Beams are placed upon the ground, with an equal distance of Two Foot one from another, and bound together on the inside of the Wall, and fastned with great store of Earth: The distances between the Beams are filled and fitted with great Stones in the Front of the Wall. These being thus placed and fastned with Mortar, another such a course is laid upon that, keeping always the same distance, so as one Beam be not laid upon another, but in the second rank placing them upon the distances filled up with Stones, and so forward until the Wall be*

*raised to the due height. This fashion, as it is a work not deformed either in shew or variety, observing alternate courses of Beams and Stones, which keep their Order by even Lines; so is it profitable also and very much advantaging the defence of the Town: For as the Stone keeps it from burning, so doth the Wood from the violence of the Ram, forasmuch as the Beams are for the most part Forty Foot long, and can neither be broken nor pull'd out.*

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**T**His Chapter doth in some part express the manner of their Siege in ancient time, and the means which the defendant had to frustrate the Assaults and Approaches of the Enemy. Besides the Ram which the Romans used to shake and overthrow the Wall (whereof I have already spoken) they had commonly great Hooks of Iron to catch hold of a Turret, and to pull it over the Wall, or to pull down the Parapet, or to disturb any Work which was to be made upon the Wall. These Hooks were used by the Legionary Soldiers, being covered with Vines in the same manner as they handled the Ram: And were averted and put off by the ingenious practices of the Gauls, with Ropes cast and ensnared about them, and then by force of Engines drawn into the Town. In like manner the open Trenches, by which the Romans made their approaches to the Wall, were answered from the Town with Stakes or Piles, hardned at the end with Fire, and then cast into them to hinder such as were at work, together with seething Pitch and great Stones. Furthermore, as the Romans raised their Mount, and brought matter unto it to enlarge it in breadth and height, so did the Gauls undermine it, and drew the Earth away, or set it on Fire to burn it: For as I have already noted in the description of a Mount, it was made as well with Wood and Timber, as with Earth and Stones. They strengthened their Walls with Turrets and Towers, and covered them with raw Hides to keep them from burning: And as the Romans mounted in height with their Turrets and Engines, so the Gauls raised their Towers answerable unto them, that in the defence of the Town they might Fight with equal advantage.

And thus they proceeded both in the offensive and defensive part, as far as either Valour or Wit could improve those means which were then in use in Besieging a Town.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**T was the use of all Nations to Fortifie their strong Towns with such Walls as might make best defence against the practice of those Times wherein they lived, touching the Taking and Besieging of Towns. So the Gauls, as it appeareth by *Cæsar*, raised their Walls of Wood and Stone, laid in mutual courses one with another, that the Wood might make void the violence of the Ram, and the Stone keep it from burning with Fire, which in those days were the means to assault and overthrow a Wall. In these Times the Walls of Strong and Fortified Towns are only made and raised of Earth, as the best defence against the fury of the Artillery. But forasmuch as the old manner of Fortification is here in part delivered by *Cæsar*, give me leave to speak a word or two touching the Fortifications of these Times.

And

*The use and practice of ancient Time in Besieging and defending Towns.*

*The manner of Fortification in use in these days.*



Fortifications  
defined.

And first touching the art it self, in respect of the matter and the manner, it is a member of Architecture, but the end is military: For to fortifie is nothing else but to make a Building answerable to necessity and the occurrences of War. Neither is it the end of Fortification to make a Place inexpugnable, or impossible to be taken, for so it were *Ars Artium*, but to reduce it to a good and reasonable defence.

Wheresoever then any such defence is required, the mystery of Fortification is to raise such a Fort, and to apply such a Figure, answering the quality and situation of that place, as may give greatest strength thereunto: For as all places are not capable in the disposition of their best strength of all sorts of Figures, so there is a difference of strength between this and that Figure. And as the place wanteth the advantage of Nature for its own defence, so is it requisite it should be furnished with the best means and commodities both to annoy the Enemy, and to defend its own People. And in that respect all circular Forms, as compounded of parts of one and the same nature, are unfit for Fortification: For where a Fort ought so to be disposed, that it may have as many hands to strike as *Briareus* and as a *Hydra* never to want a head, it is necessary that the Figure thereof be of different and unlike parts, as apt to work divers effects. For unless it be able to discover afar off, to command the Country about as far as the Artillery will play, to stop the passages, to hinder approaches and assaults, to damne the Enemy at hand and afar off, sometimes with the Artillery, sometimes with Small Shot, sometimes with Fire-works, and other times by Sallies, it hath not that perfection as is requisite.

Circular  
Forms.Triangular  
Fort.

Admitting therefore composition of parts, next unto the Circle of the triangular Fort is most imperfect; first in regard it is a Figure of less Capacity than any other of equal bounds, which is a great inconvenience in a Hold, when the Soldiers shall be pinn'd up for want of room, and through the streightness of the place, not to be able to avoid confusion. Secondly, the Bulwarks of all such triangular Fortresses, have always such sharp Cantons as are easily subject to breaking, which giveth the Enemy means to approach them without disturbance from the Fort.

Quadrangle  
Fort.

The Quadrangle Fort hath almost the same imperfection of Angles as the Triangle hath, but is more spacious within, and of greater Capacity.

Five-sided and  
six-sided For-  
tresses.

And therefore Pentagons or Hexagons, or any other that hath more Angles, is fittest for Fortification, (understanding the place to be capable of them,) as being of a greater content, and having their Angles more obtuse, and by consequence more solid and strong.

Forts in a  
plain level.

Advantages.

A plain champaign level doth admit all sorts of Figures, and may take the best; having these advantages: It easily hindereth an Enemy from approaching near unto it, or encamping before it, and is not subject to Mines, by reason of the water rising in such levels. But on the other side, a small Troop will besiege it, and Battery may be laid to divers places of it: It is always subject to Mounts of Earth, and needeth many Bulwarks, Ditches, and much cost to keep it.

Forts upon a  
Hill.

Advantages.

A Fort upon a Hill hath these advantages: an Enemy can hardly lodge near unto it, or lay battery against it; it requireth more Men to besiege it, and is not subject to Mounts. The disadvantages are, that it is not in our choice to make it in the best Form of strength, but must give it such a Figure as may best fit the Place, be-

ing sometimes too large and spacious, and sometimes too strait. The Enemies Artillery hath greater force against it playing upward, and the Artillery of the Fort playeth not so sure downward.

The Strength of all Forts are the Bulwarks from whence the Artillery playeth; the supplements to the Bulwarks are the Ravelins, the Platforms, the Casemates, and the Cavalero's. The Walls are made in scarp cutting inwards, the better to bear the weight of the Earth, with this proportion, that to every five foot and half, or six foot in height, there be one foot allowed in scarp. The Counterscarp is another Wall outward to the first, and slopeth inward in the same manner as the former.

The strength of  
all Forts.

And thus much touching the general view of Fortification, which is as much as may well be comprehended in these short Observations, reserving the further consideration thereof to a particular Treatise by it self.

## C H A P. XII.

The Siege of *Avaricum* continued.

**T**He Siege being hindered by so many disturbances, and the Soldiers afflicted all the time with cold and continual Rain, yet they overcame all these lets with continual labour, and in five and twenty Days they raised a Mount of three hundred and thirty Foot in breadth, and fourscore in height. When it came almost to touch the Wall, Cæsar himself attending the work, as his Custom was, and encouraging the Soldiers to omit no time from the same: A little before the third Watch of the Night, the Mount was seen to smook, the Enemy having set it on fire with a Mine. And at the same instant of time, a Shout being taken up by them that stood upon the Wall, they made a Sally out at two Gates on both sides the Towers. Some cast Fire-brands and dry matter from the Wall unto the Mount, pouring Pitch and other things to nourish the Fire; that no Man knew whither to run first, or where to give help. Notwithstanding forasmuch as Cæsar had appointed two Legions by turns to watch before the Camp, and two other to follow the Works, it happened, and that quickly, that some were ready to confront the Sallies and others to draw back the Towers from the Front of the Mount, and to cut the Mount asunder the whole Multitude coming out of the Camp to quench the Fire. The rest of the Night being now spent, the Fight continued every where, and ever the Enemy took new Spirits and had hope of Victory the rather because they saw the Sheds or Hovels belonging to the Towers burnt, and that the Soldiers could not come near the said Towers to manage them as was fitting, without shelter and covert, and that they ever sent fresh Men to take the Rooms of such as were weary and over-laboured: Supposing the safety of all Gallia to consist in that instant of time. There happened, our selves beholding it, an accident worthy memory, which I think not fit to omit. A certain Gaul before the Gate of the Town, casting with his hands Balls of Tallow and Pitch to increase the Fire, right over against the Tower, was shot through the right side with a Cross-Bow, and fell down dead. One that stood next him stepped over him and began to do the like service: He likewise was slain with a Shot out of a Cross-bow. Him a Third Man succeeded; and the Third, a Fourth. Neither was the Place forsaken, until the Mount was quenched, the Enemy removed, and the Fight ceased.

Cæsar.

The



## The First OBSERVATION.

Whether there  
need not as  
many Men to  
defend a  
Town, as to  
besiege it.

**I**T were a matter worthy observation to consider, whether there need not as many Men to defend a Town as to besiege it. Which at the first sight may peradventure seem frivolous: Forasmuch as the defendants, are but to make good the place which they hold, and to stand only upon their defensive Guard, having the advantage of the place, the shelter of the Walls, the strength of the Ditch, and many other like helps for their defence and safety; whereas the Assailant is to strive against all these advantages, and to oppose himself to the danger of so many difficulties. But if we look a little nearer into the matter, and consider the service to be performed on either part, we shall find, that to say, As many Men are necessary to defend a Town as to besiege it, is no Paradox.

The defence of  
a Town consisteth  
in four  
Points.

For the better understanding thereof, we are to know, that the defence of a Town touching matter of fight, consisteth chiefly in these four Points. First, in manning and making good all parts of the Wall. For if the defendant be not able to strengthen all parts with a competent Force, then he hath not Men enough to defend the Town; forasmuch as all parts are subject to assault, and what part soever is not made good, that lieth open to an Enemy: Or otherwise if the Assault be only to be made at a Breach, the rest of the Wall being strong enough to defend it self, there is required a competent strength within the Town to defend that Breach. In this point there is little difference touching a competent number of Men between the Assailant and the Defendant: For if he that layeth siege to a Town hath Men enough to assault all parts at one instant, the Enemy must have an answerable proportion to defend all; or if he have no use of more Men than may serve to give an assault at a breach, the Defendant must have the like proportion for the defence of the Breach.

The second point is, in relieving wearied Men, either fighting or working with fresh supplies to continue that business, as oftentimes it falleth out in the Siege of a Town. Wherein likewise there is small or no difference touching an equality between both Parties. For if the Defendant be not as well able to relieve his wearied Soldiers with fresh supplies, as the Enemy is to continue the assault, the Town may quickly have a new Master.

The third point is, in defeating and making void such works as the Enemy shall make against the Town, as Mounts, Mines, Approaches, and such like inconveniences; which being suffered to go on without opposition and prevention, the Town cannot hold out long. In this point the Defendant hath the disadvantage, having need of more Men to overthrow and prevent the Works, than the Assailant hath to make them good. For there he that besiegeth the place fighteth with the advantage, and hath the same helps as the Defendant hath in the fastness of his hold: Which caused this extraordinary accident, which Cæsar noteth, touching the successive slaughter of so many Gauls, who labouring to burn the Roman Works with Balls of Tallow and Pitch, were all slain with the blow of one Man's Bow.

The last point is in sallies, which is as necessary for the defence of a Town as any thing else whatsoever. For if the defendant be not able to sally out, the Enemy will quickly coop him up, and tread upon his Belly. And herein the Defendant needeth more Men than the Assailant.

For he that is in the Field, lyeth in the strength of his Trenches; whereas the other cometh out naked upon him.

And thus much touching this question in particular. Concerning the general, if it be demanded whether there have been more Men lost in the defence of *Ostend*, than in besieging it; I answer, That neither side can much vaunt of a small loss.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**N the second place there are two observable points. The one, Cæsar's continual attendance upon the Works, being present night and day, without any long intermission, which did much advantage their proceeding at that time, and was as important to a fortunate issue, as any other thing whatsoever. For where an Enemy is extraordinary, either in Valour or Diligence, there must needs be extraordinary means to countervail the Height of so great a resolution: Which Cæsar overtopt with monstrous and huge Works, and speeded those works with his continual attendance.

The second point is the successive task of the Roman Army, being eight Legions present at that Siege; (for the other two were left at *Agendicum* with the Carriages of the Army;) in such sort as half the Army was always at rest, and the other half employed: Two Legions at work and two Legions in the Watch: And thus they eased each other, and still continued the Work. For otherwise they had not been able to have undergone the burthen, as the saying is;

*Quod caret alterna Requie durabile non est.*  
It cannot hold that rests not now and then.

## C H A P. XIII.

Cæsar by an Assault taketh *Avaricum*.

**T**He Gauls having tried all means, and Cæsar none taking effect, the next day they consulted touching their leaving of the Town, Vercingetorix both commanding and persuading them unto it: Which they hoped they might do in the Night time, without any great loss unto themselves, forasmuch as Vercingetorix was not far off with his Camp, and all the way thither was a continual Bog, which would hinder the Romans from following after them. And for that purpose they prepared themselves against the next Night. Which the Women perceiving, did run suddenly out into the Streets and publick places, and cast themselves at the Feet of their Husbands; and by all means intreated them not to leave them and their Children to the cruelty of the Enemy, whom Nature and infirmity of Body would not suffer to flie away. But finding them to continue resolute in their purpose, forasmuch as in extremum peril, fear for the most part hath no Commiseration, they cried out, and signified their Flight unto the Romans. Wherewith the Gauls being feared, they desisted from their Purpose, lest the Ways should be forestalled and laid by the Roman Horsemen. The next day Cæsar having advanced forward the Tower, and perfected those Works which he had determined to make, there happened to fall a great Rain, which he thought to be a fit occasion for his purpose. And forasmuch as he saw the Guard upon the Wall to be somewhat negligently disposed, he commanded his Men to work fair and softly, and shewed them



them what he would have done. And encouraging the Legions which were hid in a readiness under the Vines, at length to enjoy the sweetness of Victory for their manifold labours; he provided a reward for such as were seen first upon the Walls, and gave them the sign to begin. The Soldiers flying suddenly out of all Parts, did quickly possess themselves of the Walls. The Enemy being frightened with so sudden an accident, and put from the Towers and Walls embattelled themselves angle-wise in the Market-place, and in other spacious Streets of the City, with this resolution, that if they were assaulted in any part, they would resist in form of Battel. But when they saw no Man to descend on even ground, but to enclose them round about upon the Wall, fearing lest there would be no way to escape, they cast their Arms away and fled all to the furthest Part of the Town. Part of them sticking in a Throng at the Gate, were there slain by the Soldiers; and Part being got out of the Gate, were slain by the Horsemen. Neither was there any Man that looked after Pillage, but being moved to anger with the slaughter of our Men at Genabum, and with the Travel and Labour of those great Works, they neither spared Old Men, Women nor Children. In the end of all that number, which was about fourty thousand, scarce eight hundred (that upon the first noise forsook the Town) came safe to Vercingetorix. These he received with great silence, being now far in the Night, lest any sedition should have grown in the Camp, through the Pity and Commiseration of the vulgar People; and sent out his familiar Friends and chiefeest Men of each State to meet such as had escaped away, and to bring them to their own People as they lay quartered in the Camp.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

The Gauls in the beginning are more than Men and in the end less than Women.

WE may see here the saying verified touching the disposition of the Gauls for matter of Valour: Which in the beginning seemed so great, that it needed no further strain to countervail the worth of Caesar's Army, and was expressed with such industry and resolution, both in spoiling and disappointing the Roman Works, as also by ingenious fortifying and making good their own labours; that a Man would have deemed them *virtute pares*, equal in Valour. But being a little spent in the action, like a Pot that hath a Mouth as big as the Belly, and poureth out all the Liquor at an instant, they fell at length to that baseness, as shewed less spirit than the Women did, who chose rather to betray their Husbands purposes to the Enemy, than to hazard their Lives by escaping to Vercingetorix. And this is that which is so often noted by Historiographers; *Quod multa Bella impetu valida per tedia & moras evanuerunt*: That many Wars which are hot at the first, slacken and vanish upon a tedious continuance. The first thing that I observe, is that which Caesar himself noteth: *Quod plerumque in summo Periculo, Timor misericordiam non recipit*; That usually in case of extreme Danger, Fear hath no mercy. Which was true on either side. For the Gauls were so set upon flying to Vercingetorix, that they regarded not the wofull laments of the Women and Children, whom they were well content to hazard, whilst they themselves might escape in safety. And on the other side the Women did forget to be pitiful to their Husbands, whom they would not suffer to escape, and leave them in their weakness behind as a prey to appease the wrath of the bloody Soldier, which would consequently follow in that escape. Which

sheweth that there is no tie comparable to the bond of nature, especially when it concerneth the preservation of Life. For as in other things, respect and affection may easily work a communication of good things unto others, as also a participations of their evils for their relief: So herein we are altogether senseless, and the love we owe to our Lives is so great, that it admitteth no respect. Agesilaus to his Friend was without respect a Friend: And yet notwithstanding being driven one day to remove upon the sudden, and to leave one sick behind him whom he loved dearly; the Sick Man calling him by his name as he was going away, besought him that he would not forsake him. Agesilaus turning back again, answered; O how hard it is both to love and to be wise! according to the saying, *Sapere & amare vix Deo conceditur*, To be wise and to love, God himself can scarce do it.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

IT is a principle among Men of War, not to put necessity upon an Enemy, nor make him valiant whether he will or no, (as I have already noted in the former Commentaries;) which the Romans well observed in this particular service at Avaricum: For being possessors of the Walls, they did not suddenly assault them in the Market-place, where they had made head for their defence, but gave them a breathing time, the better to understand what they did, and respite to bethink themselves of a starting hole for the safety of their Lives. Which as it was quickly apprehended by the Gauls, so it made an easie execution to the Roman Soldier.

A General must not put necessity upon an Enemy.

And as it seemeth, it was the more carefully handled in respect of the condition of the Enemy being Revolters: For such Provinces as have rebelled, are harder to be recovered after their Revolt, than they were at first to be subdued. For at the first, they have no occasion to fear any hard condition, but yielding to subjection do look for Favour: Whereas Rebels and Revolters, besides the condition of an Enemy, are in the nature of Offenders, and stand in fear of the Extremities of War which maketh them more obstinate than otherwise they would be. And therefore it behoveth a General not to impose any further necessity upon an Enemy, than the quality of the War doth lay upon him: which oftentimes is more than can be well avoided.

Revolters are in the condition both of an Enemy and of an offender.

#### CHAP. XIV.

Vercingetorix doth comfort the Gauls for the loss of Avaricum.

THE next day calling a Council, he comforted the Gauls, and exhorted them not to be utterly dismayed with that Loss: For the Romans had not overthrown them with Valour, nor in a set Battel, but with a kind of Art, and Skill in besieging a Town, whereof they themselves were ignorant. He erred much that looked for all the Events of War to fall out prosperously. It was never his opinion, that Avaricum should be kept; whereof they themselves were Witnesses. But it fell out by the imprudency of the Bituriges, and over great indulgence of the Rest, that this Loss happened unto them: Which notwithstanding he would speedily heal with greater helps. For by his diligence he would unite such States unto them, as were not yet of the Confederacy, and make one

Caesar.

pur-



purpose of all Gallia, which the whole World was not able to resist: and that he had almost effected it already. In the mean time he thought it fit that they should yield unto one thing for their safeties sake, which was to fortifie their Camp; to the end they might better sustain the sudden assaults of the Enemy. This Speech was not displeasing to the Gauls; and the rather, that he himself was not dejected in Spirit upon so great a loss, nor did hide himself, or flie the presence of the multitude: Being the more esteemed, forasmuch as when the matter was in question, he first thought it fit that Avaricum should be burned, and afterwards he persuaded them to forsake it: Wherein as misfortune and adversity do impair the Authority of other Commanders; so contrariwise his Honour daily increased by the loss which he received. And withal they were in great hope upon his affirmation, to win the rest of the States unto them. And that was the first time that the Gauls began to fortifie their Camp, being so appalled in Spirit, that where they ever were unaccustomed to labour, yet they thought it their part to suffer and undergo all that was commanded them.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

A great Commander must have a great courage.

NEXT to the knowledge and experience of War, there is nothing more requisite in a great Commander, than greatness of Spirit: For where his employment consisteth in managing the great businesses of the World, such as are the slaughter of many thousands in an hour, the sacking of Cities, the fighting of Battels, the alteration of Commonweals, Victories, Triumphs, and the Conquest of Kingdoms, which like the Constellations in the eighth Sphere, are left to succeeding Ages in such Characters as cannot be defaced, and make an impression of the greatest measure of joy, or the greatest heap of sorrow; it is necessary that his Courage be answerable to such a fortune, neither to be crushed with the weight of Adversity, nor puffed up with the pride of Victory; but in all times to shew the same constancy of mind, and to temper extremities with a settled resolution.

Homo quadratus.

Of this metal and temper, is the Philosophers *homo quadratus* made of, such as *Camillus* was in Rome. For never Speech did better beseem a great Personage than that, of his, having known both the favour and the disgrace of Fortune: *Nec mihi dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit*. Neither did my Dictatorship puff me up, nor my banishment sink my Spirits, saith he. Whereas weak Spirits do either vanish away in the smook of Folly, being drunk with the joys of pleasing Fortune; or otherwise upon a change of good Times, do become more base and abject, than the Thief that is taken in the Fact: Such as *Perseus* the last Macedonian King was, who besides his ill fortune for losing his Kingdom in the space of one hour, hath ever since stood attainted of a base and abject mind, unworthy the Throne of *Alexander* the Great.

Plutarch. Paulus Æmilius.

The wise Romans used all means to give Courage and Spirit to their Leaders, and to free their minds from such external respects, which loss or dishonour might cast upon them. And therefore when *Varro* had fought so rashly at *Canna*, that he had like to have lost the Roman Empire to *Hannibal*, upon his return to Rome the whole Senate went out to meet him: And although they could not thank him for the Battel, yet they gave him thanks that he was returned home again, whereby he seemed not to despair of the State of Rome.

Plutarch.

In like manner did the Gauls congratulate *Vercingetorix*, that notwithstanding so great a loss, he was neither dejected in spirit, nor did hide himself from the multitude; but as a Commander of high resolution, had found out means to heal those harms, and to recompence the loss of *Avaricum*, with the uniting of all the States of Gallia into one Confederacy.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

SECONdly we may observe, how dangerous it is to be the Author of a Counsel touching any important or grave deliberation, or to lay down any project for the service of a State: For all Men are blind in this point, that they judge of good or ill Counsel by the success, and look no further than the end which it taketh, which proving disastrous or unfortunate, doth either bring the Author to destruction, or into danger both of Life and State.

It is dangerous to be the Author of a Counsel in a State.

In the Occurrences of this Kingdom, it appeareth that *Henry* the Fifth being solicited by the Commons touching the Abbeyes in England, and moved by Petition exhibited in Parliament, to that which was afterwards accomplished by *Henry* the Eighth, was diverted from those thoughts by an eloquent Oration made in Parliament by *Henry Chicheley* Archbishop of Canterbury, a grave and learned Prelate, persuading the King by many concluding Reasons, to carry a great Power into France, and there to make his claim for that Kingdom, according to the right derived unto him from his noble Progenitors. Whereupon the King was persuaded to undertake that War; which albeit it fell out most happily, yet the Bishop to satisfy both the King and the People for his former Counsel, whereby many Men were lost, built a College in Oxford dedicated to All Souls, wherein he placed forty Scholars, to make Supplications for all Souls, and especially for such as had been mischieved in France in the time of that War.

Holinshed.

*Vercingetorix* was happy in this point, for he persuaded the Gauls not to keep *Avaricum*, but to suffer it to be burned as an Enemy to their safety: And thereupon he did not let to put them in mind of his opinion, as free from the danger which happened to a great Man near unto *Perseus* whom I last spake of, who after his overthrow by *Paulus Æmilius*, being told by that party of many errors which he had committed in the carriage of that War, turned himself suddenly, saying, Traitor, hast thou reserved thy Counsel until now, when there is no remedy? And therewithal (as some report) slew him with his own hand. And this was it that gave *Vercingetorix* that happiness: *Ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversæ auctoritatem minuunt: sic hujus ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto indies augebatur*; As Misfortune and Adversity, &c. as before.

Ut felicitas rerum gestarum exercitum benevolentiam imperatoribus: ita res adversa odium conciliant. Lib. 3. bel. civ.

#### CHAP. XV.

*Vercingetorix* laboureth to unite all Gallia into one League for the upholding of their War.

NEITHER did *Vercingetorix* omit any endeavour for the accomplishment of his promise, to draw the rest of the States unto him: And to that purpose he dealt with their chiefest Men both by rewards and promises, and chose out fit Men, that either by subtile Speeches, or Friendship, or some other means, might win them unto him. He took order that such as

bad

Cæsar.



had escaped from Avaricum, should be both cloathed and armed: And withal, that he might reinforce his Troops which were weakned, he commanded every State to furnish out certain supplies, and to be brought by a day to the Camp. He commanded likewise all the Archers, of whom there is great store in Gallia, to be sought out and sent unto him. And by this means he speedily repaired his losses at Avaricum. In the mean time Teutomatus the Son of Ollovico King of the Nitriobriges, whose Father had the Title of a Friend from our Senate, came to him with a great number of Horsemen, which he had brought out of Aquitain.

## OBSERVATION.

Archery.

IT seemeth by this place, that France in those days did favour Archery: For (as the Story saith) they had great store of Archers amongst them, but of what value they were, is not here delivered. The use they made of them followeth after in this Commentary, which was to intermingle them amongst the Horse, and so they fought as light-armed Men.

In the times that our English Nation carried a scourging hand in France, the matter between us and them touching Archery, stood in such terms as gave England great advantage: For I have not heard of any Bow-men at all amongst them; whereas our Nation hath heretofore excelled all other, as well in number of Bow-men, as in excellent good Shooting, and hath made so good proof thereof against the French, as it needeth not any long dispute.

\* Things considerable touching Archery.

In the time of Henry the fifth, the English Bow-men did commonly shoot an Arrow of a yard long besides the head.

It is not so profitable to intermingle Bow-men with other sorts of Weapons, as to put them all into one body.

\* At the battel of Cressie the black Prince leading the Vanguard, had the Archers standing in the manner of a Hearse. Holingshed. The Archery worketh two effects, 1. Gallung the Enemy. 2. Disorder.

Plut. Crassus.

\* Concerning Archery I find these things considerable.

First, that every Man be so fitted with Bow and Arrows, as he may be apt for strong and quick Shooting: Wherein I cannot so much commend these Livery Bows, being for the most part heavy slugs, and of greater weight than strength, and of more shew than service.

Secondly, that in a day of service the Bow-men endeavour so to deliver their Quivers, that the whole band or sleeve of Shot may let go all at one instant of time: For so the shower of Arrows will be more fierce and terrible, and more available against an Enemy.

Thirdly, the fittest form of imbattelling for Bow-men; which must not at any hand be deep in Flank, for so such as are in the hindmost Ranks, will either shoot short or to no purpose. And therefore the fittest form of imbattelling for Archery, hath ever been accounted a long-sided Square, resembling a \* Hearse, broad in Front, and narrow in Flank.

Fourthly, their defence in a day of Battel; which must either be a covert woody place, where the Horse of the Enemy cannot come at them, or a Trench cast before them, or the place must be fortified with Galthrops and Stakes, such as were devised by Henry the Fifth at Agincourt Field, or some other means to avoid the Cavalry.

The last thing is the effects which the Bow-men work: which are two; first the Gallung of the Enemy, and secondly Disorder. Touching the Gallung of the Enemy, there cannot be a better description than that which Plutarch maketh of the overthrow of the Romans by the Parthian Arrows. The Roman Soldiers Hands (saith he) were nailed to their Targets, and their Feet to the ground, or otherwise were sore wounded in their Bodies, and died of a cruel lingring death, crying out for anguish and pain they felt, and turning and tormenting themselves upon the ground, they brake the Arrows sticking in them. Again, striving by

force to pluck out the barbed heads, that had pierced far into their Bodies through their Veins and Sinews, they opened the Wounds wider, and so cast themselves away.

The Disorder or routing of an Enemy which is caused by the Bow-men, cometh from the fearful spectacle of a drift of Arrows: For a shower of Arrows well delivered and well seconded, for a while is so terrible to the Eye, and so dreadful in the success, that it is almost impossible to keep the Enemy from routing.

The two great Victories which our Nation had in France at Cressie and Agincourt, next to the Valour of the English, are attributed to our Archery: And the effect of our Archery at those times, was first Disorder, and consequently Slaughter. In the Battel of Cressie the King of Bohemia fighting for the French, caused his Horsemen to tie the Bridles of their Horses together in Rank, that they might keep Order, notwithstanding the Gallung which he feared from our English Archery: But it fell out as ill as if he had tied their Heads and their Tails together in File; for the drift of Arrows fell so terribly amongst them, that they ran together on heaps with such confusion, as made the slaughter great, and their particular destinies most miserably fortunate. At Agincourt the number of Prisoners which every Soldier had, was admirable to speak of; for some report that many of our English had ten Prisoners apiece: Which hapned chiefly from the Disorder which fell amongst the French, and that Disorder came by our Archery. And doubtless if ever we should have occasion to go against an Enemy that so aboundeth in Horse as the French do, there could be no better means against such Horse than our English Bow-men. I know it hath been said, that now the times are altered, and the Harquebuse and Musket are so generally received, and of such reputation in the course of our modern Wars, that in comparison of them, Bow-men are not worth the naming. Wherein I will not go about to extenuate the use of either of these Weapons, as knowing them to be both very serviceable upon fit and convenient occasions, nor take upon me to determine which of them is most effectual in a day of service; but only deliver my conceit touching their effects, and leave it to the consideration of wise and discreet Commanders.

And first touching Shot. A Wing of Musketiers is available against an Enemy, only in such Bullets as do hit; for such as do not hit, pass away insensibly without any further fear, and the crack is but as the lose of the Bow. Of such Bullets as do hit, the greatest part do not strike to death, but are oftentimes carried until the skirmish be ended before the party do feel himself hurt: So that an Enemy receiveth no further hurt by a charge of Shot, than happeneth to such particular Men as shall chance to be slain out-right or sore hurt. But a sleeve of Archers is available against an Enemy, as well in such Arrows as do not hit, as in such as do hit: For whereas the cloud of Arrows is subject to our sight, and every Arrow is both suspected and able to bring death sitting on the head, an Enemy is as much troubled at such Arrows as come fair upon him and do not hit, as at those that do hit; for no Man is willing to expose his flesh to an open and eminent danger, when it lieth in his power to avoid it. And therefore whilst every Man seeketh to avoid hurt, they fall into such confusion, as besides the loss of particular Men, the Enemy doth hardly escape Disorder; which is the greatest disadvantage that can befall him. Moreover, the Arrows having barbed heads, although they make but a light hurt, yet they are

The battel of Cressie.

The battel of Agincourt.

Harquebuse and Musket.

How far a wing of Shot prevaileth.

How far a sleeve of Archers is available against an Enemy.



not easily pulled out, which maketh the Soldiers not to mind the Fight until they be delivered of them: And the Horse so to fling and chafe, that it is impossible they should either keep their Rank or be otherwise managed for any service.

And thus much touching Bow-men and Archery, which is a Weapon as ancient as the first and truest History, and is of the number of such Weapons as Men use to fight with afar off. The use whereof is too much neglected by the English of these times, considering the Honour they have achieved by it in former ages.

## CHAP. XVI.

A Controversie fell out in the State of the Hedui, touching the choice of their chief Magistrate.

Cæsar.

**C**æsar stayed many days at Avaricum: For finding there great store of Corn and of other Provisions, he refreshed his Army of their former labour and wants. The Winter now being almost ended, and the time of the Year being fit for War, he determined to follow the Enemy, to see whether he could draw him out of the Woods and Bogs, or besiege him in some place. Being thus resolved, divers of the principal Men of the Hedui came unto him, beseeching him that he would stand to them, and assist their State in a time of great need, the matter being in extreme danger: Forasmuch as their ancient usage was for one to be created their annual Magistrate, having Regal Authority for that Year: Whereas now two had taken upon them the said Office, both of them affirming themselves to be lawfully created; the one was Convictolitanis, a famous and flourishing young Man, the other Cotus, born of an ancient Family, and he himself of great Power and Kindred, whose Brother Vedeliacus had born the said Office the Year before. All their State was in Arms, their Senate and their People divided, together with their Vassals and followers: If the Controversie continued for any time, it would come to a Battel; the prevention whereof consisted in his Diligence and Authority. Cæsar, though he knew it would be disadvantageous unto him to leave the War, and to forsake the Enemy: Yet knowing what inconveniences do usually arise of such discords and dissensions, lest so great a State, and so near to the People of Rome, which he himself had always favoured, and by all means honoured, should fall to War amongst themselves; and that Faction which distrusted their own strength, should seek help of Vercingetorix; he thought it most necessary to be prevented. And forasmuch as such as were created chief Magistrates among the Hedui, were by their Laws forbidden to go out of their confines: to the end he might not seem to derogate any thing from their Laws, he himself determined to go unto them. At his coming he called before him to Decetia all the Senate, and those also that were in controversie for the Office. And finding in an Assembly almost of the whole State, that one of them was chosen by a few privately called together, in another place, and at another time than was accustomed, the Brother pronouncing the Brother: Whereas their Laws did not only forbid two of one Family, both being alive, to be created Magistrates, but also to be of the Senate together: He compelled Cotus to give over his interest in the Magistracy, and confirmed Convictolitanis, being created by their Priests, and according to the custom of their State. This Decree being ratified, he exhorted the Hedui to forget their private Controversies and Dissensions, and to give their best

help to the War in hand, wherein they might challenge and expect (the Gauls being subdued) such rewards as they deserved; commanding all their Horse and ten thousand Foot to be speedily sent unto him, which he meant to dispose into Garrisons for the better provision of Corn. And then dividing his Army into two parts, he sent four Legions towards the Senones and the Parisians under the leading of Labienus; the other four he led himself against the Arverni, to the Town of Gergovia, along the River Elaver, sending part of the Horse with him, and keeping part with himself.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**o loose the least jot of that which a Man hath in possession, is more dishonourable, than to fail of getting what he hath not. And therefore Cæsar chose rather to forgo the advantages which a speedy pursuit of the Enemy might have afforded him to the ending of that War, than to hazard the loss of so great a State, and so well-affected to the People of Rome, as were the Hedui, wherein he carried so equal and indifferent a hand, that he would do nothing but what the Laws of that State directed him unto, as most assured that such directions were without exception.

*Non minor est  
virtus, quam  
quævere, parati  
tueri.*

## CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the River Elaver, and incampeth himself before Gergovia.

**W**hich thing being known, Vercingetorix having broken down all the Bridges of that River, took his journey on the other side of Elaver; either Army being in view of each other, and incamping almost over against one another: Scouts being sent out to watch, lest the Romans should make a Bridge in any place, and carry over the Forces. Cæsar was much troubled, lest he should be hindered by the River the greatest part of that Summer, forasmuch as Elaver is not passable at any Ford until towards the Autumn. And therefore to prevent that, he incamped himself in a Woody place, right over-against one of those Bridges which Vercingetorix had commanded to be broken. The next day he kept himself there secretly with two Legions, and sent forward the rest of the Forces, with all the Carriages, as were accustomed, taking away the fourth part of each Cohort, that the number of Legions might appear to be the same; commanding them to go on as far as they could: And making conjecture by the time of the day, that they were come to their Camping-place, upon the same Piles, (the lower part whereof remained there whole) he began to re-edifie the Bridge; and having speedily ended the work, and carried over the Legions, and chosen a fit place to incamp in, he called back the rest of his Forces. Vercingetorix having notice thereof, lest he should be forced to fight against his will, went before by great journeys. Cæsar with five incampings went from that place to Gergovia, and after a light skirmish between the Horse the same day he came, having taken a view of the situation of the Town, which was built upon a very high Hill, and had very hard and difficult approaches on all sides, he despaired of taking it by Assault, neither would he determine to besiege it, until he had made provision of Corn. But Vercingetorix having set his Camp on a Hill before the Town, had placed the several Forces of the States by themselves, in small distances round about him, and having possessed himself of all the tops of that Hill, made a very terrible shew into all parts where he might be seen: He commanded likewise

Cæsar.



wise the chief Men of the States, whom he had chosen out to be of the Council of War, to meet always together with him at the dawning of the day, to know if any thing were to be communicated unto them, or what else was to be done. Neither did he omit any day to skirmish with his Horsemen, with Archers intermingled amongst them: to the end he might try what Courage and Valour was in his People. Right over-against the Town at the foot of the Hill, there was a Mount or rising ground exceedingly fortified, and hard to be come unto on all sides, which if our Men could get, they were in hope to hinder the Enemy, both of a great part of their Water, and also from free Foraging: but the place was kept with a strong Garrison. Notwithstanding Cæsar went out of his Camp in the silence of the night, and before any help could come out of the Town, he put by the Garrison, possessed himself of the place, left two Legions there to defend it, and drew a double Trench of twelve foot in breadth from the greater Camp to the less, that single Men might go safe to and fro from any sudden incursion of the Enemy.

## OBSERVATION.

The means which Cæsar used to pass over the River Elaver.

Demetrius quartis quibusque cohortibus.

First we may observe his manner of passing over the River Elaver, without any impediment from the Enemy, notwithstanding the care which Vercingetorix had to hinder his passage, which was plotted with as great dexterity as could be devised in such a matter: And to shadow his purpose the better, that the number of Legions marching up the River might appear to be the same, he took the fourth part of every Cohort, which in the whole amounted to two Legions. For, as I have already delivered in my former Observations, a Legion consisted of ten Cohorts, and every Cohort contained three Maniples, and every Manipule had two Companies, which they called Orders: So that every Cohort having six Companies, the fourth part of a Cohort was a Company and a half, and a Legion came to fifteen Companies, and in eight Legions one hundred and twenty Companies; which being reduced make threescore Maniples, which were equal to two Legions: and proveth that which I have already noted, to fit and convenient disposition of their Troops, to take out at all times competent Forces for any service without seeming to lessen any part. Secondly, I observe the phrase which he useth in this place, *Quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit*, he came to Gergovia at five incampings; which implyeth their infallible custom of incamping every night within a Ditch and a Rampier: For as we usually say, that to such a place is so many days journey, because an ordinary Traveller maketh so many journeys before he come thither; so the Romans reckoned their journeys with their Army by their incampings, which were as duly kept as their journeys, and were the most signal part of their days journey.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Conviſtolitanis moveth the Hedui to a Revolt.

Cæsar.

Whilst these things were a doing at Gergovia, Conviſtolitanis the Heduan, to whom the Magistracy was adjudged by Cæsar, being wrought upon by the Arverni with Money, brake the matter to certain young Men, amongst whom Litavicus was chief, and his Brethren, being Youths of a great House: With them he treated at first, and wished them to remember, that they were not only

born Free-men, but also to Empire and Government. The Hedui were the only State which kept Gallia from a most assured Victory: For by their Authority and Example, the rest would be concluded, which being set over, there would be no place in Gallia for the Romans to abide in. Touching himself, he had received a good turn from Cæsar, but in such sort, as he had but his right: but he owed more to the common liberty. For why should the Hedui rather dispute of their Customs and Laws before Cæsar, than the Romans come before the Hedui? These young Men were quickly persuaded, as well by the Speech of the Magistrate, as by rewards; insomuch as they offered themselves to be the Authors of that Council. But now the means was to be thought on, forasmuch as they were persuaded that the State would not easily be drawn to undertake that War. They determined at last, that Litavicus should have the leading of those ten thousand Men that were to be sent to Cæsar, and that his Brethren should be sent before to Cæsar, and concluded likewise in what sort they would have other things carried.

Litavicus having received the Army, when he was about thirty miles from Gergovia, calling the Soldiers suddenly together, and weeping: Whither do we go (saith he) fellow Soldiers? All our Horsemen and our Nobility are slain, the Princes of our State, Eporedorix and Viridomarus, being falsely accused of Treason, are put to death by the Romans without calling them to their answer. Understand these things from them that are escaped from the slaughter: for I my self (my Brethren and Kinsmen being slain) am hindred with grief from telling you what hath happened. Presently these were brought forth, whom he had taught beforehand what he would have said: who verified to the multitude those things which Litavicus had spoken: that all the Horsemen of the Hedui were slain, forasmuch as they were said to have had Speech with the Averni: for themselves they were hid amongst the multitude of Soldiers, and were escaped out of the midst of the slaughter. The Hedui cry out all together, and do beseech Litavicus to look to himself, and to them also. As though (saith he) the matter needeth any advice or counsel, and that it were not necessary for us to go directly to Gergovia, and to joyn our selves with the Averni. For do we doubt, but that the Romans, having begun so wickedly, will run presently upon us to take away our Lives? And therefore if there be any Courage at all in us, let us persecute their death that have perished so undeservedly, and let us kill these Thieves. He shewed them divers Roman Citizens that were in the Troops for safety of Convoy: And forthwith he seized upon a great quantity of Corn and other Provisions, and tortured them cruelly to death. He sent out Messengers throughout all the State of the Hedui, continuing the same false suggestion touching the slaughter of the Horsemen, and the Princes; persuading them to revenge their injuries in like manner as he had done.

## The First OBSERVATION.

THIS treacherous practise of Conviſtolitanis, who a little before (as we may remember) had received so great a benefit from Cæsar, proveth true the saying of Cornel. Tacitus, That Men are readier to revenge an injury than to requite a good turn; forasmuch as *Gratia oneri, ultio in questu habetur*, A good turn is as a burthen and a debt to a Man, whereas revenge is reckoned a gain. The debt of Loyalty and good Affection, wherein Conviſtolitanis stood engaged to Cæsar, for confirming that right unto him

Gratia oneri, ultio in questu habetur.



which civil dissention had made doubtful, together with the respect of the general cause, made him so willing to revolt from the Romans, and in lieu of thankful acknowledgment to requite him with Hostility. A part so odious and detestable, that Vertue grieveth to think that a Man should be capable of any such Wickedness; or be stained with the Infamy of so horrible a Crime. Other Vices are faults in special, and are branded with the several marks of Ignominy: But Ingratitude is equal to the Body of Evil, and doth countervail the whole nature of hateful Affections; according to that of the Philosopher, *Ingratum si dixeris omnia dixeris*; Ingratitude is culpable of all sorts of Wickedness, and deserveth the greatest measure of revenge. And the rather, for that it taketh away the use of Vertue, and maketh Men forget to do good. For whereas the nature of goodness is seen in communicating it self to the relief of other Mens Wants, we ought to give all diligence not to hinder this enlargement, nor by a froward and crooked example to prejudice others that stand in need of the like favour.

Seneca.

I have often heard it spoken, but I know not how true it is, and am loth to believe it, that in the exchange of a good turn, the party that receiveth it hath more assurance of his Benefactor, touching a faithful and friendly disposition for the future time, than he that shewed the kindness can have of the Receiver: For Men are loath to loose both the Fruit and the Seed, and will rather bestow more cost and labour, than forego the hope of their first endeavours, expecting both in reason and nature, Fruit answerable to their Seed: Whereas the badness of our nature is such of it self, *Ut gratia oneri, ultio in Quaestu habetur*.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

A Multitude is easily abused by false Suggestions.

Phado Platonis.

There is no means so ready to abuse a Multitude as false suggestion, which like a lying spirit seduceth the minds of Men from the truth conceived, and fashioneth their hearts to such purposes as seemeth best to the abuser: And the rather when it is delivered by a Man of place and authority, and such a one as pretendeth carefulness for the safety of a People; for then it flieth as fast as the Lightning in the Air, and deludeth the wisest and best experienced of the Multitude. A Mischiefe that can hardly be prevented, as long as there is a Tongue to speak or an Ear to hear. But as *Socrates* said of Pain and Ease, that they are always tied together: So Men must endeavour to redeem the hurts of such an Evil, by the benefit which thereby is consequently implied: For it were hard if wise Men could not make the like use of a Multitude to good purposes, as these deceivers do for their own advantage.

*Numa Pompilius* (to whom the Roman Empire did owe as much for Laws and civil Government, as to *Romulus* for their martial discipline:) the better to establish such ordinances and decrees as he made in his Kingdom, feigned familiar acquaintance with a Goddess of that time called *Egeria*, and by her he said he was assured, that the Statutes which he made were both equal and just, and good for the Romans to observe: And the People found no hurt in believing it.

In like manner *Lycurgus* having given many Laws to the Spartans, repaired to the City of *Delphos*, and there he got a pleasing Oracle, which he sent to *Sparta*, assuring them that his Laws were very good, and that City keeping them, should be the most renowned of the World.

And *Sertorius* for want of other means used the service of a white Hind, as a Gift sent him from *Diana*, to make the *Lusitanians* believe whatsoever might best advantage his business: And thus a Multitude lieth open to good and ill purposes, and is either happy or unfortunate in the Counsel of their Leader.

#### CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar hindereth the revolt of the Hedui.

**E**Poredorix the Heduan, a young Man of great Parentage, and of great Power in his Country, together with *Viridomarus*, of like Age and Authority, but not so nobly born, who being preferred to Cæsar by *Divitiacus*, was by him advanced from mean Estate to great Dignity, came both to Cæsar with the Heduan Horsemen, being called out by name to that War by him. Between these two there was always Contention who should be the chiefest, and in that Controversie for Magistracy, the one stood for *Convictolitanis*, and the other for *Cotus*. Of these two Eporedorix understanding the resolution of *Litavicus*, opened the matter to Cæsar almost about Midnight. He prayed him not to suffer their State to fall away from the Friendship of the People of Rome by the wicked Counsel of Young Men, which would necessarily fall out, if he suffered so many thousand Men to joyn themselves to the Enemy, whose safety as neither their Kingsfolks would neglect, so the State could not lightly esteem of. Cæsar being much perplexed at this Message, forasmuch as he had always cherished the State of the Hedui, without any further doubt or dispute, he took four expedite and unburthened Legions and all the Horse out of the Camp: Neither was there space at such a time to make the Camp lesser, forasmuch as the matter seemed to consist in expedition. He left behind him *C. Fabius* a Legate with two Legions for a Garrison to the Camp. And having given order for the apprehending of *Litavicus's* Brethren, he found that a little before they were fled to the Enemy. Thereupon exhorting the Soldiers not to think much of their labour in so necessary a time, every Man being most willing, he went five and twenty Miles, and then met with the Forces of the Hedui. The Horsemen being sent to stay their March, he commanded not to kill any one of them, and gave order to Eporedorix and *Viridomarus* (whom they thought to be slain) to ride up and down amongst the Horsemen, and to call to their Countrymen. They being once known, and the fraud of *Litavicus* discovered, the Hedui stretched out their hands, making Signs of submission and casting away their Weapons, desired to be spared from death. *Litavicus*, with his Vassals and Followers, who by the custom of *Gallia* must not forsake their Patrons in the extremest danger, fled to *Gergovia*. Cæsar having dispatched Messengers to the State of the Hedui, to acquaint them that he had saved their People, which by the law of Arms he might have slain, gave the Army three hours rest that Night, and then returned towards *Gergovia*. In the Midway certain Horsemen sent by *Fabius* made known unto Cæsar in what danger the matter stood: That the Camp was assailed with all the Enemies Forces; and forasmuch as such as were wearied were still relieved with fresh Men, it came to pass that our Men fainted with continual labours; for the Camp was so great, that they were always to stand upon the rampier to make it good: And that many were wounded with the Multitude of Arrows and other sorts of Weapons; wherein their Engines had served them to good purpose for their

Cæsar.



their defence. Fabius when these Messengers came away, had shut up two Gates, and left other two open, and had made sheds and Hovels for the better defence of the Wall, and prepared himself for the like fortune the next day. These things being known by the exceeding travel of the Soldiers, Cæsar came into the Camp before Sun-rising.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

AS often as the People of Rome had occasion to make War, besides the body of the Army inrolled for that service, in such sort and with such ceremonies as I have formerly delivered; the Consul or General had authority to call out such others, either of the Commonalty or the Equites, as for their long service were freed by the Laws from giving in their Names at a Muster: And these they called *Evocati*, as a Man would say, called out, being all Men of special note and service, and such as were able to give sound advice for matter of War. These *Evocati* went all for the most part under an Ensign, and were lodged together in the Camp behind the Pavilion of the General, near unto the Gate which they called *Porta Prætoria*, and were always free from ordinary duties, as watching, Encamping, and fighting, unless it came to such a pass, that every Man would put to his helping hand: But in all services they had their place appointed them according to their former experience and worth. And thus the Romans strengthened their Army with the Wisdom and experience of such, as for many Years together had been acquainted with the difficulties and casualties of War, and oftentimes were able to afford such helps both by example and otherwise by good directions, as the Wisdom of the General did gladly embrace. Concerning these two Young Nobles *Eporodrix* and *Viridomarus*, whom he nameth in this place *Evocati*, we are to understand that they were called out to that War under the same Title, but to another End: For being Men of great place and Authority, he feared least in his absence they might be so wrought to favour *Vercingetorix*, as neither himself nor the *Hedui* should have any cause to commend them, according as it happened to *Litavicus*.

## C H A P. XX.

The *Hedui* rob and kill divers Roman Citizens.

W Hile these things were a doing at Ger-govia, the *Hedui* having received the first messages from *Litavicus*, gave themselves no time to understand the truth: Some being led on by covetousness, others by anger and rashness, as it is naturally ingrafted in that Nation to take a light hear-say for a certain truth, spoiled the Roman Citizens of their Goods, and slew them besides, or drew them into bondage; *Convictolitanis* stirring up the Common-people to Madness, that when they had done some wicked Fact, they might be ashamed to be good again. They drew *Marcus Aristius* a Tribune of the Soldiers, as he went to the Legion, out of the Town *Cavillonium*, notwithstanding their Faith and Promise before given, causing the rest to do the like, which were there for matter of Trade: These they set upon forthwith as they travelled, robbed them of their Carriages, and besieged such as made resistance Day and Night: Many were slain on both sides, and a greater number were stirred up to take Arms. In the mean time News being

come that all their Soldiers were under Cæsar's Power, they ran speedily to *Aristius*, they tell him that nothing was done by publick Authority, they called such as robbed the Romans of their Goods to answer the matter, they confiscate the Goods of *Litavicus* and his Brethren, they send Embassadors unto Cæsar to clear themselves of these disorders: And this they do for the better recovery of their People that were now with Cæsar. But being contaminated with a wicked Fact, and taken with the shame of robbing the Roman Citizens, many of them being touched in the Fact, and much perplexed for fear of punishment; they privily entered into consultations of War, and solicited other States to that purpose by their Embassadors. Which although Cæsar understood, yet he entertained them as courteously as he could, telling them that for the ignorance and levity of the Common People he would not think hardly of the State, nor abate any thing of his good will and favour to the *Hedui*.

## The First O B S E R V A T I O N.

A Wicked Act is not only hurtful in it self and of its own condition, but is like that box of evil, which the Poets feign to have been given to *Pandora* to be kept always shut: For when the Way is once made, and the Gap opened, one Mischief draws on another, and the Tail that followeth is more viperous than the Head. There was never any one that stained himself with any detestable Crime, but was moved to commit a second Evil that had relation to the first: For Wicked Deeds are justified by themselves, and one Crime is upheld by another. When the hand is dip'd in Blood, it seemeth no great matter to imbrue the Arm: And the Loyalty of a People being once shaken by the indirect practices of a few, it is no strange matter if the whole body of that State do immediately enter into treasonable Consultations. As it happened in this place with the *Hedui*, who from that time which disclosed the Treachery of their Heart, carried no faithful regard to the Roman Government, until the bitterness of that War which happened shortly after had made them know their error.

It shall be necessary therefore, as much as lieth in the possibility of our means, to keep the Body of Vertue safe from wounding: For albeit the Wound be never so little, yet it is always wide enough to let out both the Blood and the Spirits, even to the evacuation of the Vital Breath of moral honesty.

## The Second O B S E R V A T I O N.

*Convictolitanis Plebem ad furorem impellit.* Stirred up the Common People to madness (saith the story) as the fittest instruments to trouble the State, and to level the rest of the People with the fury of madness. For the poorer and meaner People, that have no interest in the Common-weal but the use of Breath, nor any other Substance but a Flie in the Commons, are always dangerous to the Peace of that Kingdom: For having nothing to lose, they willingly embrace all means of innovation, in hope of gaining something by other Mens ruin, believing altogether in the Proverb, which averreth the fishing to be good which is in troubled Waters.

*Catiline* conspiring against the Roman Empire, made choice of such to accompany him whose fortune was desperate. And thereupon *Salust* saith; *Homini Potentiam quærenti, Egentissimus quisque Opportunissimus, cui neque fides chara, quippe quæ nulla sunt, & omnia cum pretio honesta*

The poorer sort of People do embrace all means of innovation.

Salust in the Conspiracy of *Catiline*.



*honesti videntur*: Indigent Fellows are the fittest Instruments for Ambitious Men, who regard not their own, because they have nothing, esteeming all Actions honest that they gain by.

*Livy* writeth, That upon the rumour in Greece, of War between *Perseus* and the Romans, the poorer sort did put themselves in pay under *Perseus*, with this resolution, that if there happened no alteration upon this occasion, they would then cleave to the Romans, and assist them to put the state of Greece into a Confusion. *Semper in civitate* (saith *Salust*) *quibus opes nulla sunt, bonis invident, malos extollunt; vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student.*

There are these two means left for a State to ease it self of this sort of People: Either to employ them abroad in Wars, or to interests them in the quiet of the Commonweal, by learning them such Trades and Occupations as may give them a taste of the sweetness of Peace, and the benefit of a Civil Life.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Cæsar* spieth an occasion to advance the Service at Gergovia.

*Cæsar.*

**C**æsar suspecting a greater Revolt of the Gauls, lest he might be hemmed in with the strength of all the States of Gallia, he entred into deliberation how he might leave Gergovia, and get all his Army together again, that his departure might not seem to rise from the fear of their Revolt, and thereby be thought of flying away. And as he thought upon these things, he seemed to spy an occasion of doing somewhat to purpose: For coming into the lesser Camp to view the Works, he observed a Hill which was kept by the Enemy to be bare of Men, which the day before could scarce be discerned, by reason of the multitude of People: And wondering at it, he enquired the cause of the Disserters, which came daily in great numbers unto him. They all agreed of that which *Cæsar* had before understood by the Scouts, that the back of that Hill was almost level, but narrow and woody where it gave passage to the other part of the Town. The Gauls did much fear that place, for the Romans having took one rising Ground, if they should possess themselves of another, the Gauls were almost block'd in round about, and cut off from Foraging, or any other issuing out of the Town: And therefore *Vercingetorix* had called them all to fortifie that place. This being known, *Cæsar* sent many Troops of Horse to that place about Midnight, Commanding them to ride up and down all thereabout somewhat tumultuously. And early in the Morning he caused many Horses and Mules for Carriage to be taken out of the Camp with Horse-keepers upon them, having Casks upon their Heads, the better to resemble Horsemen, and to be carried round about the Hills. And to them he added a few Horsemen, to the end they might spur out the more freely, and so make a better shew, commanding them all to go to the same place by a long circuit about. These things were done in view of the Town; for Gergovia so stood, that they might from thence see into the Camp; but yet in so great a distance they could not certainly perceive what was done. He sent likewise one Legion to the same Hill, and appointed them to go a little way, and then to make a stand in a Dale, and to hide themselves in the Woods. The Gauls began more to suspect that place, and all their Forces were drawn thither for the

strengthening of it. *Cæsar* perceiving the Enemies Camps to be void of Men, hiding his Ensigns and Colours, he drew the Soldiers by little and little out of the greater into the lesser Camp, and acquainted the Legates, to whom he had given the several Legions in charge, what he would have done; warning them especially to keep in the Soldiers, lest they should be carried out either with a desire of Fighting, or in hope of Booty. He propounded unto them the incommodious disadvantage of the place, which must only be avoided by expedition, the matter consisting rather in occasion and opportunity, than in Fighting.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**I**T is an easier matter to begin a business, and to make work for many hands; but to put it off again, and to quit it without prejudice of other important respects, is no small labour. *Cæsar* being engaged in the Siege of Gergovia, and fearing a general Revolt throughout all Gallia, was not a little troubled how he might clear himself of that business, without suspicion of fear or flight, and gather all his Forces into one body again, which he had before divided into two Armies: For as *Marcellus* said to *Fabius*, touching the Siege of *Cassellum*, *Multa magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non dimittenda esse, quia magna fama momenta in utramque partem fiunt*; Many things, as they are not to be attempted by great Captains; so when they are once attempted they must not be left unachieved: For in either their Reputation is much concerned. An Enemy will conceive greater hopes from such a Retreat, than from a greater advantage. And therefore a General ought to have as special a regard to the Opinion which he desireth to be held of his Proceedings, as of any part belonging to his Charge: For Fame is the Spirit of great Actions, and maketh them memorable or unworthy by report. *Ceteris mortalibus in eo stare consilia quid sibi conducere putent; Principum* (saith *Tacitus*) *diversam esse sortem, quibus præcipua rerum ad famam dirigenda*; Other Mens Consultations tend only to what may most advantage themselves: Princes have more to do; to look in their management of things principally at their Honour and Reputation. Wherein there cannot be a better Rule for the avoiding of that Inconvenience, than that which *Lucretius* observed, of whom *Livy* saith; *Id prudenter ut in temere suscepta re Romanus fecit, quod circumspectis difficultatibus, ne frustra tempus tereret, celeriter abstulit incepto*: He did thus far prudently in a business rashly undertaken; that when he saw what difficulties attended the enterprise, rather than spend time in vain, he forthwith desisted from his purpose. For the speedy leaving of any such enterprise, doth excuse the rashness which might be imputed to the beginning; and Men are not so much blamed for making tryal of an ill-digested project, as they are for obstinate continuing in the same.

*Livy.*

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**S**OME Services (saith *Cæsar*) are *Res occasionis*, Some Services are *Res occasionis*, *non prælii*, Businesses of Opportunity, not of War: Whereof I have already disputed. Notwithstanding, give me leave to add the Mistake, which often falleth out in matter of Opportunity. For in viewing the occurrences of the Wars of these later Times, we may find that some hor-

spur



four Commanders, having tasted of the good Success which occasion affordeth, have thought of nothing but of Services assisted with opportunity, in such manner as at length they forgot that occasion came but seldom, and carried their Men upon such desperate Attempts, as proved the business to be a matter scarce affording means to Fight for their Lives, but were often swallowed up with devouring danger: Wherein they did mistake the condition of the Service, and fell short of *Cæsar's* Example. For albeit he sent out his Men to struggle with the height of the Hill, and the disadvantage of well-fortified Camps; yet he knew they should find little resistance by the Enemy, being drawn away upon other occasions, if they made that expedition as was requisite in this Service; whereby he left them not without means to overway those difficulties, and so made it *Rem occasionis, non prælii*, a business of opportunity, not of War.

## C H A P. XXII.

The Romans make an assault upon Gergovia.

*Cæsar.*

**T**Hese things being delivered, he gave the Soldiers the sign to begin, and at the same time he sent out the *Hedui* by another ascent on the right side. The Wall of the Town was distant by a right Line from the Plain and the foot of the Hill (if it lay even without any Dale or Valley) a Thousand and Two Hundred Paces: Whatsoever more was added in fetching Circuits about, to climb the steep of the Hill, was over and besides that distance. From the midst of the Hill in length, as the nature of the place would bear it, the Gauls had with great Stones raised a Wall of six Foot in height, to hinder the assault of our Men; and all the lower part being left void and empty, they filled the upper part of the Hill even to the Wall of the Town with thick and frequent Camps. The Soldiers upon the sign given were quickly come to the Works, and passing over them they possessed themselves of Three Camps, with such speed and expedition, that *Teutomatus*, the King of the *Nitiobriges*, being surprised in his Tent as he rested about Noon time, the upper part of his Body being naked, and his Horse Wounded, did hardly escape the hands of Soldiers Occupied in Booty. *Cæsar* having got that which he propounded to himself, commanded a Retreat to be sounded; and the Ensigns of the Tenth Legion staid. But the Soldiers of the other Legions not hearing the sound of the Trumpet, forasmuch as a great Valley was between them, were staid notwithstanding at first by the Tribunes of the Soldiers and the Legates, according as *Cæsar* had given in Charge. But being carried away as well with a hope of speedy Victory, as by the flight of the Enemy, and the fortunate Battels of former Times, they thought nothing so difficult but they could overcome it by their Valour, insomuch as they desisted not from following, until they came to the Wall, and the Gates of the Town. Then a great Out-cry being took up in all parts of the Town, such as were further off being terrified with the suddenness of the Tumult, thinking the Enemy had been within the Gates, did cast themselves out of the Town: And the Women cast down their Apparel and their Silver from the Walls; and holding out their naked Breasts, with their hands spread abroad, adjured the Romans to save them, and that they would not (as they had done at *Avaricum*) destroy both Women and Children: And some Women slipped down by their hands from the Wall, and gave themselves freely to the Soldiers. *L. Fabius* a Centurion of the

*Eighth Legion*, who was heard to say that day, that the Booty which he had got at *Avaricum* so stirred him up, that he would suffer no Man to get up upon the Wall before himself; having got Three of his Manipular Soldiers, with their help he climbed up to the top of the Wall, and then he himself did help up his Fellows. In the mean time such as were on the other side of the Town, busied in Fortifying that place (as we have already delivered) first the noise being heard, and then stirred up by often Messengers, that the Romans had took the Town, sending their Horsemen before, they hasted thither in great numbers, and still as they came, they stood under the Wall, and encreased the number of such as they found Fighting. A great multitude being at length come together, the Women that a little before had reached out their hands from the Wall to the Romans, began now to adjure their own People, and, as the manner of the Gauls is, to shew their Hair loose about their Ears, and to bring out their Children.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**I**T is both safe and honourable for Soldiers and inferior Commanders to keep their directions: For whensoever they go about to enlarge their business according to their own fantasie, howsoever occasion may seem to further their desires, they invert the whole course of Discipline, and do arrogate more to themselves than they do attribute to their General.

The Romans were strict in this point, as may appear by that of *Manlius*, who put his own Son to Death for making a happy Fight against the Enemy, contrary to his directions: For although it fortun'd to fall out well at that time, yet the Example was so dangerous in a well-ordered War, that he chose rather to bring a mischief upon his own Son, than an inconvenience to their Military Government. *Injussu tuo* (saith one in *Livy* to the Consul) *nunquam pugnabo, non si certam victoriam videam*; unless thou biddest, I will never Fight, no, though I see the Victory clear before me; making profession of true Obedience, and ranging himself in the order of such Parts, as have no other Office but Observance. For an Army is as a Body, and the Soldiers are as particular Parts, every Man according to his Place: The General is as the Life and Soul, and giveth Motion to every part according to reason. And as in a natural Body no part can move without directions from the Life; so in the Body of an Army, when any part moveth without the consent of the Head, the motion is either monstrous or exorbitant, and suiteth with such an effect as condemneth the Instruments of unadvised Rashness.

*Polybius* saith, That Men have two ways to come by Wisdom, either by their own Harms, or by other Mens Mis-casualties. Such Wisdom as is got through Correction, happening by their own Errors, is dearly bought; but sitting near them, is not easily forgotten: That which is obtained by other Mens Misfortunes, is well come by, and at an easie rate; but for the most part it is soon forgotten: But such as can retain it to a good use, are most happy Men. This Precept to Soldiers, touching Obedience, and the precise keeping of their Directions, hath, by other Mens Harms so often been urged, as a Man would think, That later Ages should beware of this Disorder. And yet it falleth out almost in every small Service. For the greatest Loss which the English received at any one time at *Ostend*, was in a Sally; wherein Captain *Woodward* having possessed himself of some of the Enemies Works,



Works, when by his directions he should have stayed, thinking to improve his Reputation by some further Service, deeming it easie peradventure to go forward, he went on beyond the compass of his Command: Whereby it happened, that both the Enemy had greater scope to Revenge their former Dishonour, and the rest of our *English* Troops that had their part in that project by way of second Helps, could not proceed according to their directions; and so they all returned with loss.

Institution of  
Cyrus.

That which *Xenophon* reporteth touching one *Chrysantas*, is notable to this purpose; who being in the heat of a conflict, and having his Sword lift up to strike one of the adverse Party, he chanced to hear a Retreat sounded, whereupon he presently withdrew his hand, and did forbear to smite him. Which howsoever to some may seem ridiculous, and unfitting the Temper of a Soldier in time of Battel; yet let them know that *Xenophon* a great Commander, and an excellent Historian, did alledge that Example to the eternal Memory of the forenamed Party, for the Knowledge and Instruction of *Cyrus*, whom he propoundeth to the World as an absolute Pattern both of Military and Civil Vertue.

#### C H A P. XXIII.

The Romans continue the Assault, and are beaten off with loss.

Cæsar.

**T**He Contention was not indifferent to the Romans, neither in place nor in number of Combatants, being wearied withal, both with the long Race which they had Run, and with the continuance of their Fight, whereby they did not so easily bear, the Enemy being whole and fresh. Cæsar seeing the Fight to be in an unequal place, and the Enemy still to encrease their Forces, fearing his People, he sent to T. Sextius, the Legate, whom he had left to Command the lesser Camp, to bring out the Cohorts speedily, and to place them at the foot of the Hill on the right side of the Enemy; to the end, That if our Men were forced to forsake their place, yet the Enemy might be terrified from following them over freely, he himself removing a little out of that place where he stood with the Legion, attended the event of the Battel. And as they fought at hand very fiercely, the Enemy trusting in the place, and in the multitude, and our Men in their Valour, the *Hedui* suddenly appeared on the open side of our Men, whom Cæsar had sent up by another ascent on the Right-hand, to keep off part of the Enemy. These, by the likeness of their Armour, did wonderfully astonish our Men: Who, although they saw their Right-Arms shewed or put forth, which was a sign of Peace, yet they doubted lest the Enemy had used that Policy to deceive them. At the same instant L. Fabius the Centurion, and those that climbed up upon the Wall with him, being slain, were cast down from the Wall again, and M. Petreius, a Centurion of the same Legion, as he was about to cut down the Gates, being oppressed with the multitude, and despairing of his own Life, having received many Wounds; Forasmuch (saith he to his Soldiers that followed him) as I cannot save my self and you too, I will certainly provide for your safety, whom I have brought into danger, whilst I thirsted after Honour. You, while you may, shift for your selves. And withal, he brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and with the slaughter of a couple, he removed the rest from the Gate. And as his Soldiers went about to help him, In vain (saith he) do you endeavour to save my Life,

which Blood and Strength have already forsaken: And therefore get you hence, while you have means, and betake your selves to the Legion; and so Fighting fell down dead, but saved his Men. Our Men being over-charged on all sides, with the loss of six and forty Centurions, were beaten down from the place: But the Tenth Legion, which stood for a Rescue in a more equal place, hindered the Gauls from following over eagerly. And again, the Cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, which Sextius had brought out of the Camp, seconded that Legion, having got the advantage of the upper Ground. The Legions as soon as they came into the Plain, stood still, and turned head to the Enemy. Vercingetorix drew back his Men from the foot of the Hill, and brought them into their Camps. That day few less than Seven hundred Soldiers were wanting.

#### OBSERVATION.

**A**ND this is the end of presumptuous Rashness, when Men are become so pregnant, as to take upon them more than is required. But as they say of fair Weather, that it is pity it should do hurt: So is it great pity that Valour and Resolution should prove disadvantageous. For this over-doing of a Service, is but the spirit of Valiant Carriage, and the very motion of Prowess and Courage, memorable in the Offenders themselves; as we may see by this particular report of *Fabius* and *Petreius*: And much to be pitied, that Vertue should at any time be over-quelled with a greater strength.

At this Service the Romans stood in these Terms; they were over-matched in number, they had spent their Strength in speedy running to the place which in it self was not favourable unto them, but almost as great an Enemy as the Gauls, only they trusted in their Valour, and thought by Vertue to clear all difficulties. The Gauls had the favour of the place, a far greater number of Fighting Men, they came fresh to the Battel, and were always seconded with fresh Supplies. Cæsar seeing the two Armies engaged one with another, could neither part them nor recall his Soldiers, but set such Forces as were free in such convenient places, as might rescue his People in the Retreat, and keep the Gauls from following the Chase, or making any great slaughter of the Roman Soldier. Whereby it happened, that in so great an inequality, where there were so many Swords drawn to make way to Death, there were not Seven Hundred Men lost of the Roman Army. And yet it happened to be the greatest loss that ever he received in those Wars in his own presence, when the issue of the conflict gave the Enemy the better of the day.

#### C H A P. XXIV.

Cæsar Rebuketh the Rashness of his Soldiers; and maketh light, but successful Skirmishes upon the Enemy.

**C**Æsar the next day calling the Army before him, rebuked the Temerity and stupidity of the Soldiers, forasmuch as they had took upon them to judge how far they were to go, or what they were to do; neither would they stay upon the sounding of a Retreat, nor hearken to the Tribunes nor the Legates that would have kept them back. He laid open unto them how available the inequality of the place was, and what he himself thought of it, when at *Avaricum* he took the Enemy without a General, and without Cavalry, yet did foregoe a most assured Victory; left



lest in the buckling he might have received a small loss through the inequality of the place. How admirable was the greatness of their Spirit, whom neither the Fortifications of the Camps, the height of the Hill, nor the Wall of the Town could stop or hinder! Wherein he blamed their licentious Arrogancy the more, forasmuch as they had took upon them to judge better of the Victory, and the success of that Service, than the General himself: Neither did he so much desire to find Courage and Vertue in his Soldiers, as Modesty and Sobriety. This Speech being delivered, and in the end confirming their Minds that they might not be discouraged at the matter, nor attribute that to the worth of the Enemy, which indeed was in the nature of the place: Keeping his former purpose of departure, he brought the Legions out of the Camp, embattelled them in a convenient place, and finding that Vercingetorix would not be drawn into an indifferent place, after a light skirmish of Horse, wherein the Romans had the better, he carried his Army back again into the Camp: And doing the like the next day, thinking it sufficient to abate the Pride of the Gauls, and to strengthen the Courage of his Soldiers, he removed his Camp into the State of the Hedui, the Enemy refusing to make after him.

## OBSERVATION.

Reparation of Honour, what it is.

Plutarch in the Life of Marcellus.

Lib. 3. Bel. Civil. post pugnam Dyrrachianam. Cæsar neque satis militibus perterritis confidebat, spatiumque interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat.

Reparation of Honour is a chief point in the carriage of an Army: For he that leaveth an Enemy upon a loss received, when his Soldiers are either awed or well-beaten, must look to find the same Spirit and Courage in them, when they shall come again to confront the Enemy, as they had when they last left him with a disadvantage; which is nothing else but an unskilful continuance of his own loss, and a preparation to a second Overthrow. In the War the Romans had with Hannibal, in all the Fights they made, they continued their first loss unto the Battel at Nola: At what time by Marcellus's good directions, they gave him an Overthrow; which was the first time that ever Hannibal's Soldiers began to give place to the Romans, and repaired the Romans Valour again, after so many Battels as they lost. For then they were perswaded that they fought not with an Enemy altogether Invincible, but that he was subject to Loss and Overthrow. And in respect of this so happy a Fortune, restoring the Roman Soldiers to their ancient Valour and good Fortune, it is that Livy saith, *Ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*, A great piece of Service was performed that day, and I think I may say the greatest that was done in that War. Cæsar did well understand this Philosophy: And therefore he laboured to repair the breach which the Enemy had made in the Valour of his Soldiers, by light and small Skirmishes, before he would adventure to hazard the main drift of the business in any set conflict. And the rather, for that he had a purpose to leave the Enemy for a time, whereby he seemed to end the former Services; wherein he had a special care not to depart with the last Blow, having always before that time had the better: For the condition of the end doth challenge much of the former proceedings, and doth draw the opinion of Men to deem of all as the conclusion importeth. According as Claudius Nero told his Soldiers: *Semper quod postremo adjectum sit, id rem totam videri traxisse*: As the end of the Service is, so the whole seems to have been.

## CHAP. XXV.

The Hedui Revolt: Cæsar passeth his Army over the River Loire.

He third day he repaired the Bridge at the River Elevar, and carried over his Army. There he understood by Viridomarus and Eporedorix, that Litavicus was gone with all the Enemies Horse to sollicite the State of the Hedui, and therefore it was requisite that Cæsar should send them before to confirm the State, and keep them in Loyalty. And although Cæsar did mistrust the State of the Hedui for many Causes, and did think that the departure of these two Nobles would hasten their Revolt; yet he did not think it fit to detain them, lest he should either seem to do them wrong, or to give any suspicion of distrust. At their departure he propounded unto them briefly, how well he had deserved of their State, how low and weak they were when he received them, confined within their Towns, their Lands extended, all their Associates taken from them, a Tribute laid upon them, Pledges extorted from them with great contumely; and into what Fortune and Greatness he had brought them again, that not only they had recovered their former state, but did exceed the Dignity and Favour of all former Times: And with these Mandates he let them go. Noviodunum was a Town of the Hedui, situate in a convenient place, upon the Bank of the River Loire. Thither had Cæsar sent all the Hostages of Gallia, the Corn, the Publick Treasure, and the greatest part of the Baggage of the Army; and thither he had likewise sent great store of Horse, which he had bought in Spain and Italy for the Service of this War. Eporedorix and Viridomarus coming thither, and understanding touching the Affairs of their State, that Litavicus was received into Bibract by the Hedui, which is the Metropolitan City of their State, and that Convictolitanis their chief Magistrate, and a great part of the Senate were come unto him, and that publick Messengers were sent to Vercingetorix, touching a League of Peace and Amity; they did not think it fit to omit so great an opportunity. And thereupon having slain the Guard at Noviodunum, with such others as were there, either by way of Trade or Travel, they divided the Money and the Horses between them, and took order that the Hostages of the other States should safely be conveyed to Bibract. For the Town, forasmuch as they thought they were not able to keep it, lest the Romans might make any use of it, they burned it: Such Corn as they could carry on the suddain, they conveyed away in Boats, the rest they either burned or cast it into the River. They began to raise Forces in the Country next adjoining; to dispose of Watches and Garrisons on the Bank of the River Loire; to shew their Cavalry in all places, to strike fear into the Romans, to the end they might exclude them from Provision of Corn; or drive them through necessity of Want to forsake the Province. Whereof they were the rather assured, forasmuch as the Loire was much swelled by a fall of Snow, whereby it was unpassable at any Ford. These things being known, Cæsar thought it necessary for him to make hast (especially if he must make up the Bridges) to the end he might give them Battel before they had gathered a greater head: For touching his purpose for returning into the Province, he did not think it fit by any means, both in respect of the Shame and Infamy thereof, as also forasmuch as the opposition of the Hill Gebenna, and the difficulty of the passage did hinder him; but especially for that he did exceedingly desire to joyn himself with Labienus and the Legions that were with him.

Cæsar.

Z

And



And therefore making great journeys both by Day and Night beyond all Mens expectation, he came to the River Loire, where the Horsemen having found a convenient Ford for the necessity of the time, that the Soldiers might pass over with their Arms and Shoulders above the Water, to hold up their Weapons, discomfiting the Horse in the River to break the force of the Stream, and the Enemy being affrighted upon their first skew, he carried over his Army in safety. And having satisfied his Soldiers with Corn which he found in the Fields, and good store of Cattel, he determined to march towards the Senones.

## OBSERVATION.

The change which the revolt of the Hedui made in Gallia.

THE greatest difficulty that ever Cæsar found in the course of these Wars, was at this instant upon the revolt of the Hedui. For whereas that State after Cæsar's coming into Gallia, was ever reputed the Favourite of the Roman Empire, having received such special Privileges and Prerogatives above the rest, as might tie them with an inviolable bond of amity to the People of Rome: It was not to be expected that they should forsake so great a stay, or favour any thing that might tend to the weakning of that Authority, which preferred them in Dignity before all other States of that Continent: and was as a Remora to divers other Nations of Gallia, from shewing that defection by plain and open revolt, which they had so long before conceived in their minds.

But when it appeared (notwithstanding any precedent benefit, or the merit of Imperial favours) that the Hedui did affect the common cause of their Countries Liberty, and were content to ingage themselves therein, as far as their Lives or Fortunes could any way be valued: It was not to be doubted, but that such other Commonwealths, as before that time had remained neutral, and had less cause than the Hedui to keep back their hands from a work of that Piety, would apprehend the matter as a business importing the safety of their Country, whereunto Cæsar and the Legions were common Enemies. The consideration whereof made Cæsar to think of returning back into the Province, had not the dishonour of such a retreat, and the desire he had to joyn with Labienus, hindered that purpose.

## CHAP. XXVI.

Labienus cometh to Lutetia with four Legions.

Cæsar.

WHILE these things were done by Cæsar, Labienus having left those supplies which came last out of Italy, at Agendicum, for the safety of the Carriages, went himself with four Legions towards Lutetia, a Town of the Parisians, built in an Island in the River Sequana. The Enemy understanding of his coming, great Forces were speedily brought together out of the Countries near about. The chiefest Command was given to Camulogenus of the Nation of the Aulerci, who notwithstanding his great Age, was called to that Honour for his singular knowledge in matter of War. He finding it to be a continued Bog that ran into Sequana, and much hindered all that place, did stay there with his Army, and purposed to hinder the passage of the Romans. Labienus did first endeavour to drive the Vines, to fill up the Bog with Hurdles and Earth, and so to make the passage firm: But after that he perceived it to be very hard to effect, in the third Watch of the Night he went out of the Camp with silence, and

the same way that he came, he went to Melodunum a Town of the Senones, situate in an Island of Sequana, as Lutetia is: And having surpris'd some fifty Ships and Boats, and Manned them with Soldiers, the Townsmen being affrighted with the novelty of the matter, of whom a great part were called out to that War, he possess'd himself of the Town without any resistance. The Bridge being repaired which the Enemy had cut down a few days before, he transported over the Army, and went down along the River towards Lutetia. The Enemy having notice thereof by such as escaped from Melodunum, commanded Lutetia to be burned, and the Bridges of the Town to be broken: They themselves forsaking the Bog, sate down upon the Banks of Sequana, right over-against the Camp of Labienus. By this time Cæsar's departure from Gergovia was known abroad, with the revolt of the Hedui: and rumours were brought of a second rising and motion in Gallia. It was certainly confirmed, that the Gauls were in consultation, that Cæsar was kept back both by the difficulties of the Passage and the River Loire, and for want of Corn was constrained to return into the Province. The Bellovaci also understanding of the revolt of the Hedui, whereas they were before treacherous and disloyal of themselves, did now begin to raise Forces and prepare for open War. Labienus upon so great a change of things, understood that it was necessary for him to take another manner of course than was before intended. For now he thought not of making any Conquest, or urging the Enemy to Battle, but to bring the Army back in safety to Agendicum. For on the one side, the Bellovaci stood ready to Charge him, being a People that had the name for deeds of Arms of all the Nations in Gallia; the other side was kept by Camulogenus with an Army ready in the Field: And last of all, the Legions were kept from their Garrison and their Carriages with a great River that ran between them and it.

## OBSERVATION.

THE great alteration which the revolt of the Hedui made in Gallia, caused Labienus to let fall his former resolutions, and to shape such a course as might best answer the extremity of the Tempest. For he that will attain the end of his desires, or make peace with the affections of his mind, must not think at all times to carry away contentment with the strength of his means, or subdue resistance with force of Arms, but must be well pleased to be driven with the Stream, until he meet with a tide of better opportunity: For oftentimes it falleth out, that the opposition of resisting Power is more available than ten Legions commanded by Cæsar, or what the Roman Empire could add besides, to so great an Army. For there is no quantity so great, but there may be found a greater; nor none so little, but there may be a less: Which may teach a Man neither to conceit himself in a matchless singularity, nor to despair of a weak condition. And this is that which is so often recommended to the consideration of discreet Governours, whether they be Magistrates in Peace, or Commanders in War, to put them in mind of the condition of times, and to carry themselves answerable thereunto: Forasmuch as fortunate and happy success, riseth for the most part from such means as have respect to the occurrences of the time, not running always upon one bias, nor sailing at all times with a fore-wind; but sometimes to press forward, and sometimes to give back, according as the circumstances of the time shall make way to good Fortune.

Fabius

He that will do things well, must vary with the time.



Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Fabius.

*Fabius* the great Roman thought it no scorn to be called Coward, or to undergo the displeasure of the People of Rome, while he gave place to the fury of the Carthaginian, and refused to receive a third overthrow. And thus he altered the course of the Roman warfare according to the time, and overthrew that Enemy by shunning to encounter him, which in a Battel would have hazarded the Conquest of Rome. In like manner *Cn. Sulpitius* the Dictator, did imitate this wisdom of *Fabius* against the Gauls, by lingring out the War: *Nolens se fortunæ committere adversus hostem* (as *Livy* saith) *quem tempus deteriore indies & locus alienus faceret*; Not willing to put the trial to Fortune, when as he dealt with an Enemy, which time and ignorance of the place rendred every day weaker and weaker. And to conclude this point, *Cæsar* upon the loss which he received at *Dyrachium*, *Omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit*, thought it his best way to alter the whole course of the War, as the Story saith: Which was nothing else but varying with the time, and helping a bad Fortune with new directions.

## C H A P. XXVII.

*Labienus* passeth the River *Sequana*, and fighteth with the Gauls.

*Cæsar*.

**F**OR the avoiding of these great difficulties which came so suddenly upon him, he knew there was no help to be had, but that which the vertue of his mind would afford him: And therefore calling a Council a little before the Evening, he exhorted them to execute such things as he commanded both with diligence and industry; and so taking the Ships which he had brought from *Melodunum*, he divided them amongst the Roman Horsemen, and after the first Watch he commanded them to go four miles down the River in silence, and there to attend him. He left five Cohorts, which he thought to be too weak for any Fight, as a Garrison to the Camp, and sent the other five Cohorts of the same Legion about midnight with all the Carriages up the River, commanding them to make a great noise and tumult as they went. He sought out all Barges and Boats, and sent them up the River with much noise and beating of Oars: and a little while after he himself went quietly with three Legions to the place where he had commanded the Ships to abide him. At his coming thither, the Enemies Scouts which were disposed on all parts of the River, were suddenly and at unawares surprised by our Men, by reason of a sudden Tempest that did rise in the mean time: and the Army and the Horse were by the diligence of the Roman Knights (to whom he had committed that business) carried over. At the same time a little before day-light, the Enemy had intelligence that there was an extraordinary noise and tumult in the Roman Camp, and a great Troop went up the River, and the beating of Oars was heard that way, and a little below the Soldiers were carried over. Which being known, forasmuch as they judged that the Legions were carried over in three places, and that they were so perplexed at the revolt of the *Hedui*, that they fled away; they divided their Forces also into three parts. For a Garrison being left right over-against the Roman Camp, and a small Band sent towards *Glossendium*, which was to go so far as the Boats went, they carried the rest of their Army to meet *Labienus*. By the dawning of the day all our Men were carried over, and the Enemy was discovered ranged in Battel. *Labienus* exhorting the Soldiers to bethink themselves of their

ancient Vertue, and to recall the Memory of their fortunate Battels, and to suppose that *Cæsar* himself was present, under whose leading they had oftentimes overthrown the Enemy; he gave the sign of Battel. Upon the first assault, on the right Wing, where the seventh Legion stood, the Enemy was beaten back and put to flight; in the left Wing, where the twelfth Legion was, the former Ranks of the Enemy being pierced through and beaten dead down with the Piles, the rest notwithstanding did stoutly resist, neither did any Man give suspicion of flying. *Camulogenus* the General was present with his Men, and encouraged them to fight, the Victory being uncertain. When the Tribunes of the seventh Legion understood what was done in the left Wing, they shewed the Legion behind on the back of the Enemy, and there began to charge them: and yet none of them forsook his place, but were all inclosed and slain, *Camulogenus* ending his days by the same fortune. Such of the Enemy as were left over against the Roman Camps, understanding that the Battel was begun, came to second their Fellows, and took a Hill, but were not able to abide our Conquering Soldiers; but joyning themselves to the rest that fled, were neither protected by the Woods nor the Mountains, but were all slain by the Horsemen. This business being ended, *Labienus* returned to *Agendicum*, where the Carriages of the whole Army were left: and from thence came to *Cæsar* with all the Forces.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**L**Abienus being to pass the River of *Seine*, which was strongly guarded by the Gauls, was forced to seek a means out of the vertue of his mind, (as *Cæsar* saith,) and to lay such a Project as might amuse the Enemy, and keep him in suspence what way to take to prevent his passage, until he had effected that which he desired. Which bringeth to our consideration the saying of *Epaminondas* the Theban, that there is nothing

Necessary for  
a General to  
understand  
the purposes of  
the Enemy.

more necessary or behoveful for a General, than to understand the purposes of the Enemy. A point so much the more commendable, by how much it is in it self difficult, and hard to be discovered; for it were hard to understand their secret deliberations, which for the most part are only known to the General, or to such chief Commanders as are near about him, when their very actions which every Man knoweth, and such things as are done in the open view of the World, are oftentimes doubtful to an Enemy. *Livy* hath a notable Story to this purpose. *Sempronius* the Roman Consul giving Battel to the *Æqui*, the Fight continued until the Night parted them, not without alteration of Fortune, sometimes the Romans prevailing, and sometimes the *Æqui*: The Night coming on, both sides being weary and half routed, they forsook their Camps, and for their better safety took each of them a Hill. The Roman Army divided it self into two parts: the one part followed the Consul, and the other a Centurion, named *Tempanius*, a Fellow of great spirit, and had shewed much worth in the Battel. The next morning the Consul without further inquiry, made towards Rome; and so did the *Æqui* withdraw their Army back into their Country: either of them deeming themselves overthrown, and casting Victory upon each others Shoulders. It happened that *Tempanius* with that part of the Army that kept with him, inquiring after the Enemy, found him to be overthrown and fled: Whereupon he first went to the Roman Camp and made that good, and then marched to the Camp of the *Æqui*, which he took and rifled, and so returned Victor to Rome.

Z 2

The



Holingshead,  
Henry the 5.

The morning following the Battel of Agincourt, Montjoy the French Herald coming to enquire for Prisoners, King Henry asked him who had won the Field: To which he answered, That the French had lost it: which was unknown to that worthy Conquerour. Plutarch writeth, that Cæsius killed himself upon the like errour, not knowing the fortune of the right Wing of his Army. And therefore it must needs be a commendable matter, to understand the deliberations of an Enemy, when the issue of a Battel is oftentimes so uncertain.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The fittest age  
of life for a  
General.

Cæmulo-genus hath the report in this place of singular knowledge and experience in matter of War, and being of a great Age he fought as resolutely as the youngest Gallant of them all, which may bring to our consideration the fittest Age of Life to be wished in a General, for the achieving of noble and worthy Exploits. Wherein we are to consider, that the Youth and former years of a Man's Age, are plentifully stored with hot Blood and nimble Spirits, which quickly apprehend the conceptions of the mind, and carry them with such violence to Execution, that they bereave the judgment of her Prerogative, and give it no respite to censure them; whereby it cometh to pass, that young Men are for the most part heedless, inconsiderate, rash and resolute, putting more upon hazard than upon good advice.

On the other side, Old Age is cold in Blood, and not so quick of Spirit, but being beaten with the Rod of long experience, it learneth to be slow and lingring, full of doubts and consideration, inclining rather to a feminine fear, than to a forward resolution.

Neither of these attributes are simply in themselves the best attendants of noble Enterprises: For a hot-spur Gallant may run apace, but not go sure; and what young Man soever is advanced to Command, had need of an old Man's Wit to discharge it. And if Authority did at any time fall into the hands of Youth in the Roman Government, which was very seldom, it was *Premium virtutis, non ætatis*; for his Vertues sake, not his Age. Pompey was extraordinary happy in that behalf, for he attained the surname of Great, because he had deserved the honour of Triumph before his Beard was grown. And yet Sertorius took such advantage at Pompey's Youth, coming against him in Spain, that he said he would have whipped the young Boy to Rome again with Rods, had not that old Woman (meaning Metellus) come to help him.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Sertorius.

Again, where Old Age heapeth doubt upon doubt, and falleth into the danger of unprofitable lingring, *Nec ausus est satis, nec providit*, it wanteth boldness to steel the Enterprise, and falleth also short of good Providence, as Tacitus speaketh of F. Valens. Augustus Cæsar purposing to commend Tiberius his Successour with an extraordinary praise, said he was a Man that never put one thing to be twice consulted of. And it is said of Marius, that being come to the age of Threescore and five years or thereabouts, he shewed himself very cold and slow in all his Enterprises, forasmuch as Age had mortified his active heat, and killed that ready disposition of body that was wont to be in him. The Romans finding Fabius Maximus to be full of doubts and delay, good to defend but not to offend, and Marcellus of a stirring spirit, neither quiet with good nor ill fortune, (as Hannibal truly said of him) they thought to joyn Marcellus's youthful Courage with Fabius's Fear and Wisdom,

Hist. 3.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Marius.

and so make a temperature fit for a General; whereupon they called Marcellus the Sword, and Fabius the Buckler: wherein Cæsar of himself was excellent, of whom Suetonius reporteth, *Dubium cautior, an audentior*; It is uncertain whether he was more wary or daring.

The best state of years then for business, is that which tempereth the heat of Youth with the coldness of Age, and quickneth the slow and dull proceedings of double advice, with the rathness of youthful resolution: and falleth out between the years of five and thirty and five and fifty. Scipio Africanus commanded the Roman Army in Spain at four and twenty years of age, and died at four and fifty. Hannibal was chosen General to Asdrubal at six and twenty years, and poisoned himself at threescore and ten. Pompey was slain at nine and fifty, and Cæsar at six and fifty. Marcellus kept his youthful resolution to his old days: For being threescore years of age, he never longed for any thing more than to fight with Hannibal hand to hand.

C H A P. XXVIII.

The Gauls consult of the carriage of that War.

THE revolt of the Hedui being known, the War waxed greater. Ambassadors were sent out into all parts, and they laboured to draw the rest of the States to their party, as far as either Favour, Authority, or Money could prevail: Having got the Pledges into their hands which Cæsar had left with them, they terrified such as stood doubtful, by threatening to kill them. The Hedui do desire Vercingetorix to come unto them, and to acquaint them with the course of that War; which being yielded unto, they labour to have the chief command transferred upon them. The matter growing unto a Controversie, a General Council of all Gallia was summoned at Bibract. Thither they repaired in great multitudes: and the matter being put to Voices, they all with one consent made allowance of Vercingetorix for their General. The Men of Rheims, with the Lingones and Treviri, were absent from this Council; the two first continuing their affection to the Roman party: The Treviri were far off, and were annoyed by the Germans; in respect they were absent from that War, and remained neutral. The Hedui were much grieved that they were put by the Principality, they complain of the change of their Fortune, and wished for Cæsar's former indulgence; neither yet durst they disjoyn themselves again from the rest, the War being already undertaken; but Eporedorix and Viridomarus, two young Men of great hope, were constrained, though unwilling, to obey Vercingetorix. He commanded Pledges to be delivered by the rest of the States, and appointed a day for that business. He commanded fifteen thousand Horse to be speedily brought together: touching Foot Forces, he would content himself with those which he had; for his purpose was not to wage Battel, but whereas he was very strong in Horse, he made no doubt to keep the Romans from Corn and Forage: Only they must patiently endure to have their Corn spoiled, and their Houses burnt; which particular loss would quickly be recompenced with liberty and perpetual sovereignty. These things being ordered, he commanded ten thousand Foot to be raised by the Hedui and Segusiani bordering upon the Province; and to them he added eight hundred Horse, and sent them under the command of Eporedorix his Brother, to make War against the Allobroges. And on the other side he caused the Gabali and the nearest Villages



Villages of the Arverni to set upon the Helvii, the Rutheni, and the Cardurci, and to depopulate their Country. Notwithstanding by secret Messages he dealt with the Allobroges, whose Minds he thought to be scarce settled from the former War: He promised Money to their Chiefest Men, and to give the Government of all the Roman Province to their State. To answer all these Chances, there were provided but two and twenty Cohorts, which being raised out of the Province, were disposed by L. Cæsar a Legate to prevent these Mischiefs. The Hedui of their own accord giving Battel to their Borderers, were beaten out of the Field, and were driven into their Towns with the Slaughter of C. Valerius Donotaurus, the Son of Caburus the chief Men of their State, and of many others. The Allobroges having set many Watches and Garrisons upon the River Rhine, did with great care and diligence defend their Borders. Cæsar understanding the Enemy to be stronger in Horse than he himself was, and the passages being shut that he could not send either into the Province or into Italy for any Supplies, he sent over the Rhine into Germany, and got Horse from such States as he had quieted the Year before, with such light-armed Footmen as were accustomed to fight amongst the Horse. At their Arrival, forasmuch as they were not well fitted with Horse, he took the Horses from the Tribunes, the Roman Knights, and the Evocati, and distributed them amongst the Germans.

## OBSERVATION.

Three chief means to win Men to favour a matter.  
1. Favour or Friendship.  
2. Authority.  
3. Money.

There are three principal means to draw a State into a Party which of it self standeth neutral, or to win the Minds of Men, when they carry equal or indifferent affections. The first, is by favour or friendship; the second, by Authority; and the third, by Money.

Friendship relieth upon former respects, and the exchange of precedent Courtesies. Authority concludeth from future dangers, and the inconveniences which may follow the refusal. Money doth govern the present occasion, and is more general than either Favour or Authority. The Gauls were not wanting to make their Party good in any of these three perswading Motives: But as Cæsar saith, *Quantum gratia, Auctoritate, Pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas Civitates nituntur*: They solicited the Neighbour States as far as Friendship, Authority, and Money would go.

Wherein as they went about to lay the Stock upon it, so they left themselves but one tryal for the right of their Cause and joyned Issue for all upon the Fortune of that Action: For when they should see their best possibilities too weak, and their uttermost Endeavours profit nothing against a mighty prevailing Enemy, the greater their hopes were which they had in the means, the greater would be their despair when such means were spent; for it is a shrewd thing for Men to be out of means, and not to drive a hope before them.

It is usual upon such main occasions to imploy the chiefest Man in a State, in whom the Soldiers may have most assurance, and to accompany him with such means as the strength of the Commonwealth may afford him: But if their greatest hopes die in his ill success, or wax faint through cold Fortune, the Kingdom receiveth Loss, and the Enemy getteth Advantage, as may appear by the Sequel of this great Preparation.

## C H A P. XXIX.

The Cavalry of the Gauls do set upon the Roman Army, and are beaten.

While these things were a doing, the Cæsar. Enemies Forces and the Horsemen that were commanded to be levied in all Gallia, met together, and came out of the Territories of the Arverni. A great number of these being gathered together, as Cæsar marched against the Sequani by the Borders of the Lingones, to the end he might the easier relieve the Province, Vercingetorix sate down about ten Miles from the Romans in three several Camps, and calling the Captains and Colonels of Horse to Counsel, he told them that the time of Victory was now come; for the Romans left Gallia, and fled into the Province: Which was sufficient for the obtaining of their present liberty, but availed little for the Peace and Quiet of future time, forasmuch as the Romans did not purpose to make an end of the War, but to return again with greater Forces. And therefore it was necessary to set upon them in their March laden with Carriages. If the Foot did assist their Horse, then they were not able to make any way or proceed in their Journey. But if (which he hoped would rather happen) forsaking their Carriages every Man shifted for himself, they would depart both robbed of their Necessaries and of their honour: For they need not doubt of the Enemies Horse, of whom he was most assured that they durst not go out from amongst the Foot Forces. And to the end they might be the better encouraged, he would draw all the Forces in a readiness out of the Camp, and place them so as they might be a Terror to the Enemy. The Horsemen cried out all together, that this resolution might be strengthened with an Holy Oath: Let him never be received under any Roof, or have access to his Wife, Children, or Parents, that did not twice run through the Army of the Enemy. The thing being well liked of, and every Man forced to take that Oath, the next Day he divided his Cavalry into three parts: Two Armies shewed themselves on each side, and the third began to make stay on the Van. Which being known, Cæsar divided his Horses likewise into three Parts, and sent them to make head against the Enemy. At the same time they fought in all Parts, the Army stood still, the Carriages were received within the Legions: If our Men were overcharged any where, Cæsar bent the Legions that way, which did both hinder the Enemy from following them, and assure our Men of hope of rescue. At length the Germans having possessed themselves of a Hill on the right side, did put the Enemy from their place and followed them as they fled even to the River where Vercingetorix stayed with the Foot Companies and slew many of them. Whereupon the rest fearing lest they should be encompassed about betook themselves to flight: Execution was done in all places. Three, of the Nobility of the Hedui were taken and brought to Cæsar: Corus the General of the Horse, who at the last Election of the Magistrates stood in Controversie with Convictolanis; and Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litavicus commanded the Foot Troops; and Eporedorix, under whose command, before Cæsar's coming into Gallia, the Hedui made war with the Sequani. All the Cavalry being put to flight, Vercingetorix drew in his Forces which he had embattelled before his Camp and, immediately after began to march towards Alefia a Town of the Mandubii, commanding the Baggage to be speedily brought out of the Camp and to follow him. Cæsar having conveyed his Carriages to the next Hill, under the Custody of two Legions, he fol-



followed the Enemy as long as the day would give him leave: And having slain some three thousand of the Rere, the next day following he encamped at Alefia.

## OBSERVATION.

Whether the Cavalry or Infantry be of greater importance and use in a War.

THE Gauls were much stronger than the Romans in Cavalry, both according to quantity and quality: But the Roman Infantry was greater in Vertue and Worth than any Foot Forces of the Gauls, notwithstanding their inequality in number. Which sheweth that the Romans did more rely upon their Legionary Soldiers, than upon their Equites: And may serve for an argument in the handling of that question, which is so much debated amongst Men of War, whether the Horse or the Foot Companies be of greater importance in the Carriage of a War. Which indeed is a question *à male divisis*: Being both so necessary for the perfect execution of Martial Purposes, as they cannot well be disjoined. And if we look particularly in the nature of their several services, we shall easily discern the differences, and be able to judge of the Validity of their parts.

Footmen sister far more Services than Horsemen.

Wherein first it cannot be denied, but that Foot Companies are serviceable to more purposes than Troops of Horse: For the Horsemen are of no use, but in open and Champaign Places; whereas Footmen are not only of importance in Champaign Countries, but are necessary also in mountainous or Woody places, in Vallies, in Ditches, in Sieges, and in all other parts of what site or nature soever, where the Horsemen cannot shew themselves. Whereby it appeareth that the Infantry extendeth its service to more purposes than the Cavalry, and maketh the War compleat, which otherwise would prove lame and uneffectual.

The main stroke in a day of Battel is given by the Footmen. The use of Horsemen.

Touching the weight of the business when it cometh to a day of Battel, it resteth for the most part upon the Foot Troops: For the Horsemen are profitable to the Army wherein they serve, by making discoveries, by harassing the Enemies Country, by giving succour or rescue upon a suddain, by doing execution upon an overthrow, and by confronting the Enemies Horse; but these are but as second services, and fall short of the main Stroke, which for the most part is given by the Footmen. Neither doth a rout given to the Cavalry serving an Army royal, concern the Body of that Army further than the services before mentioned; but the Army doth oftentimes go on notwithstanding, and may well atchieve a happy Victory: Whereas upon the overthrow of the infantry, the Horsemen have nothing to do, but to shift for themselves, and get away to their own home. So that it appeareth that the Foot Companies are the Bulk and Body of the Army, and the Horse as the Arms and outward parts, having expedient and necessary offices, but always subordinate to the main stroke given by the Foot.

The Dictator forbidden the use of a Horse in the Wars: And why.

If any Man look for proof hereof by example, he shall not need to seek further than the Romans, being Masters of the Art Military, who by an ancient Law interdicting the Dictator to have the use of a Horse in the Wars for his private ease, intimated, as *Plutarch* saith, the strength of their Army to consist in their Footmen, which the General in a day of Battel should assist with his presence, and in no wise forsake them if he would. But touching the use of War amongst them, their Equites were so far short of the service performed by their Foot Troops, that when they would stand to it indeed, they forsook their Horses and fought on foot: As in the Battel with the Latines at the Lake Regillus, which I have already

mentioned in my former Observations. Neither were the Romans good Horsemen, as it seemeth by Cæsar: For he took the Horses from the Tribunes and the Roman Equites, and gave them to the Germans, as better Riders than any Romans. But howsoever a State that aboundeth in Horse, and trusteth more in them than in Foot Companies, may harass a Champaign Countrey, but shall never be able to follow a War with that strength, as is requisite to make it fortunate.

## CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar besiegeth Alefia, and fighteth with the Enemies Cavalry.

Cæsar having viewed the situation of the Town, and knowing the Enemy to be much troubled for the overthrow of their Horse, in whom they put all their hopes, exhorting the Soldiers to take a little pains, he determined to inclose the Town round about with a Ditch and a rampier. Alefia was seated on the top of a Hill in a very eminent place, and not to be taken but by a continued Siege. At the foot of the Hill ran two Rivers on each side of the Town: Before the Town there lay a Plain of three Miles in length: The other sides were enclosed round about in a reasonable distance with Hills of equal height with the Town. Under the Wall on the East side lay all the Forces of the Gauls, having drawn a Ditch and a dry Wall on that part of eight Foot in height: The whole Circuit of the Works which the Romans made to inclose the Town about, contained eleven Miles. Their Camp was seated in a convenient place, where there were made three and twenty Castles, which in the day time were kept by Garrisons, to prevent any sudden attempts of the Enemy, and in the night by strong Watches. The Work being begun, there happened a Skirmish between the Cavalry of both sides in that plain which lay before the Town of three Miles in length. They fought eagerly on both sides. Our Men being overcharged, Cæsar sent the Germans to second them, and set the Legions before the Camp, lest there might happen any sudden Sally by the foot of the Enemy. Upon the safeguard of the Legions our Men took Courage. The Enemy was put to flight and being many in number one hindered another, and stuck in heaps in the streight passage of their Gates. The Germans followed them close to their Fortifications and made a great execution amongst them. Many of them forsaking their Horses attempted to leap the Ditch, and to climb over the dry Wall. Cæsar commanded the Legions drawn before the Camp to advance a little forward. The Gauls that were within the Fortification were no little troubled: For thinking the Enemy would presently have come unto them, they made an Alarm: Some were so frightened that they brake into the Town. Vercingetorix commanded the Gates to be shut, lest the Camp should be left naked of Defendants. Many of the Enemy being slain, and very many Horses taken, the Germans fell off and returned to Cæsar.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

FORASMUCH as casualty and chance have oftentimes the Prerogative of a Service, and in misdeeming opinions do carry away the Honour from Vertue and Valour: The first Trial of a fortune is not of that assurance, nor so much to be trusted, as when it is seconded again with the like effect: For when a matter by often trial falleth out to be of one and the same quality, it sheweth a cer-

One event is not so certain for the approving of a cause, as when it is seconded with another of like condition.



a certainty of a cause, producing ends of like condition. The Gauls (as it seemeth) were much discouraged upon the first overthrow of their Horse, in whom they so much believed, and altered the course of their high resolutions so far, as where before they swore the overthrow of the Romans, they were now content to take the protection of a strong Town: But this second foil which they received, did so assure them of a harder resistance and stronger opposition than they were able to bear, that they never thought of any further trial, but were content to go away losers, rather than to hazard their Lives in a third Combat. And thus, when a second event backeth a former Fortune, it taketh away the suspicion of Casualty, and maketh the winner bold, and the loser desperate. Pompey was so transported with joy for the blow which he gave Caesar at *Dyrnachium*, that he sent Letters of that days Victory into all parts of the World, and made his Soldiers so secure touching the issue of that War, *Ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse jam sibi viderentur*, that they never thought how the War was to be carried on, esteeming themselves already absolute Victors: Not remembring, as Caesar saith, the ordinary changes of War; wherein oftentimes a small matter, either of a false suspicion, or of a sudden fright, or some other accident, doth indanger an Army, which the Enemy taketh to himself, *perinde ac si virtute vicissent*, as if he had overcome by his Valour.

## C H A P. XXXI.

*Vercingetorix* sendeth away the Horse: Caesar incloseth *Alesia* with a strong Wall.

Caesar.

**V**ercingetorix thought it best to dismiss all the Horse, and send them away in the Night, before the Fortifications were perfected by the Romans. At their departure he commanded them, that every Man should repair unto his own State, and send all to the War that were able to bear Arms. He layeth open his deserts towards them, and doth adjure them to have regard to his safety, and not to suffer him to be delivered over to the torture of the Enemy, that had so well deserved of the common liberty; wherein if they should prove negligent, fourscore thousand chosen Men would perish with him in that place. And looking into their Provisions, he found that they had Corn scarce for thirty days, but by sparing and good husbandry it might be made to serve longer. With these Mandates he sent out the Horsemen in silence about the second Watch of the Night, at that part of the Town where the works were not perfected: he commanded all the Corn to be brought unto him upon pain of death. The Cattell he distributed to the Soldiers by Pole, whereof there was great store brought out from the *Mandubii*: The Corn he began to measure out very sparingly. All the Forces which he had placed before the Town, he received within the Walls; and so he purposed to attend the supplies of Gallia. Which being known by the Runaways and Captives, Caesar appointed to make these Fortifications. He drew a Ditch of twenty foot in breadth and depth, with streight sides, as broad at the bottom as at the top. The rest of the work he made forty foot short of that Ditch, which he did for these reasons; that the whole body of the Romans might not easily be inclosed about with an Army of Soldiers, which he thought to prevent by taking in so great a circuit of Ground; and secondly, lest the Enemy sallying out upon a sudden, should in the Night come to destroy the works, or in the day-time trouble the Soldiers with Darts and

casting Weapons as they were busied about the works. This space of forty foot being left, he made two Ditches of fifteen foot in breadth and depth, the innermost whereof being carried through the Fields and the lower ground, he filled with Water drawn out of the River. Behind them he made a Ditch and a Rampier of twelve foot, and strengthened it with a Parapet and Pinacles, and with great boughs of Trees cut in Cags like unto a Harts-horn, which he set where the Hovels were joyned to the Rampier, to hinder the Enemy from climbing up; and made Towers round about the whole work, in the distance of fourscore foot one from another. At the same time the Roman Soldiers were both to get stuff for the fortification, to go a foraging for provision of Corn, and to make such great works. Our Forces being much weakened, and being to seek Corn and stuff far off from the Camp; the Gauls also oftentimes attempting to destroy the works, and to sally out of the Town at divers Ports: Therefore Caesar thought it fit to add thus much more to the fore said works, that the fortifications might be made good with the less number of Men. He made Ditches round about the works of five foot deep, and in them he planted either the bodies of Trees, or great firm boughs sharpened into many pikes and Snags, being bound together at the bottom, that they might not be easily plucked up, and spreading themselves at the top into very sharp Cags. There were of these five Ranks, so combined and infolded one in another, that which way soever the Enemy should enter upon them, he would necessarily run himself upon a sharp Stake; these they called *Cippi*. Before these, in oblique courses, after the manner of a quin-cunce, were digged holes of three foot deep, narrow at the bottom like a Sugar-loaf: These they set with round Stakes of the bigness of a Man's Thigh, with a sharp hardened point, in such sort that they stuck not above four fingers out of the Earth; and for the better fastening of them, they stuck all a foot within the ground: the rest of the hole for the better ordering of the matter, was hid with Osiers and small Twigs. Of these were eight courses three foot distant one from another: and these they called *Lilies*, from the resemblance they had to the figure of that flower. Before these were Galtrops of a foot long, fastened in the Earth, and headed at the top with barbed Hooks of Iron, sowed up and down in all places in a reasonable distance one from another: and these they called *Stimuli*. The inner fortifications being thus perfected, he followed the even and level ground as much as the nature of the place would give him leave, and took in fourteen miles in circuit, and made the like fortification in all points against the Enemy without, as he had done against the Town; to the end that if he were driven upon occasion to depart and leave the works, it might be no danger for him to leave the Camp; forasmuch as a few Men would defend it. He commanded every Man to have Forage and Provision of Corn for thirty days.

## The First OBSERVATION.

I promised in my former Observation to speak for newhat touching the Roman works, and to shew the use they made of them in their greatest occasions: But this description of the works at *Alesia*, doth so far exceed the enlargement of commenting words, that it hath drowned the Eloquence of great Historians, and instead of Expositions and Inforcements, hath drawn from them Speeches expressing greater admiration than belief. *Circa Alesiam (saith Paterculus) tantæ res gestæ, quantas audere vix hominis, perficere nullius nisi Dei fuerit*: So great things were done at *Alesia*, that



that they might seem too great for any Man to attempt, or any but a God to effect. To inclose a Town with a Ditch and a Rampier of eleven miles in circuit, was a matter worthy the Roman Army: But to add such variety of works, and to make such strange Traps and oppositions against an Enemy, was admirable to the hearer; and not that only, but to make the like works without, to keep the Gauls from raising the siege, did double the wonder: By which works he did besiege and was besieged, took the Town and overthrew the Enemy in the Field.

Such as since that time have imitated this industry only by a small Ditch and a Rampier (for I think no Man ever made such works) have wrought wonders in matter of War. *Castruccio* got the name of renewing the ancient Military Discipline in Italy, chiefly for that he besieged *Pistoia*, and with the help of a double Trench, according to the example of *Cæsar*, he kept in the *Pistoians* on the one side, and kept out an Army on the other side of thirty thousand Foot and three thousand Horse, in such manner as in the end he took the City and made their succours of no effect. The States Army of the United Provinces under the leading of *Grave Maurice*, did the like at the Town of *Grave* in the year 1602. But of this at *Alesia* may well be said that which *Livy* speaketh of the Battel at *Nola*: *Ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*: A great piece of service was done that day, and I think I may call it the greatest in that whole War.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

IT is here delivered, that the outward circuit of the works contained fourteen miles, and the circuit of the inward works eleven miles: upon which ground *Justus Lipsius* maketh an unjust conjecture of the space between the outward and the inward works where the Romans lay incamped. For according to the proportion between the circumference and the diameter, he maketh the diameter of the greater Circle four, and of the lesser three miles: And then he taketh the lesser diameter out of the greater, and concludeth the space to be almost a mile between the inner and the outward Rampier, where the Romans lay incamped between the works: And lest the matter might be mistaken in Cyphers, he doth express it at large in significant words, whereby he maketh the space twice as much as indeed it was. For the two Circles having one and the same center, the semi-diameter of the one was to be taken out of the semi-diameter of the other, and the remainder would amount almost to half a mile; which according to the ground here delivered, was the true distance between the works, if the nature of the place (whereunto they had a respect) would suffer them to keep the same distance in all parts. But *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*, *Hom*er himself is out sometimes; and no disgrace neither to the excellency of his Learning, deserving all Honour for the great light which he hath brought to the knowledge of Histories, and for redeeming the truth from blots and Barbarism.

#### CHAP. XXXII.

The Gauls raise an Army of 248000, to raise the siege at *Alesia*.

*Cæsar.*

While these things were a doing at *Alesia*, the Gauls having summoned a Council of the Princes and chiefest Men of each State, they thought it not convenient to take all that were able to bear Arms, according to *Vercingetorix's* di-

rection; but to proportion out a certain number for every State; lest that of such a confused multitude there would be no Government, being not able to know their Soldiers, or to Martial them in any good order, or to make provision of Victual for so great a body. The *Hedui* and their Vassals, the *Segusiani*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci*, *Brannovices*, and *Brannovii*, were commanded to send out 35000: The *Arverni* with their Vassals, the *Heleuteri*, *Cadurci*, *Gaballi*, *Ve-launi*, as many: The *Senones*, *Sequani*, *Bituriges*, *Santon*es, *Rutheni*, *Carnutes*, 12000: The *Bellovaci*, 10000: The *Lemovices* as many: The *Pictones*, *Turones*, *Parisi*, *Heleuteri*, *Suessiones*, 8000: The *Ambiani*, *Mediomatrics*, *Petrocorii*, *Nervii*, *Morini*, *Nitiobriges*, 5000: The *Aulerci Cenomani*, as many: The *Atrebat*es, 4000: The *Bellocaffi*, *Lexovii*, *Aulerci Eburones*, 3000: The *Rauraci* and *Boii* 30000: The States bordering upon the Ocean, whom by the custom of Gallia they call *Aremoricæ*, such as are the *Curiosolites*, *Rhedones*, *Ambibarri*, *Cadetes*, *Osismii*, *Lemovices*, *Veneri*, *Unelli*, 6000. Of these the *Bellovaci* refused to give their number, saying, that they would make War with the Romans in their own name, and according to their own directions, neither would they serve under any Man's command. Notwithstanding being intreated by *Comius*, for his sake they sent two thousand. *Cæsar*, as we have heretofore delivered, had used the help of this *Comius* the Years before in Britain, being both faithful and serviceable: In recompence of which service he had freed his State of all duties to the Roman Empire, and restored unto them their ancient Laws and Customs; and to himself he had given the *Morini*. Notwithstanding such was the universal consent of all Gallia, to redeem their Liberty and their ancient Honour in matter of War, as neither friendship, nor the memory of former benefits could any way move them, every Man intending that War as far as either the power of his mind or the possibility of his means would reach unto: And having drawn together eight thousand Horse, and two hundred and forty thousand Foot, they mustered their Forces in the confines of the *Hedui*, where they appointed Captains; and the chief Command was given to *Comius* of *Arras*, and to *Viridomarus* and *Epor-dorix*, *Hedui*, and to *Vergasilaunus* of the *Ar-verni*, Cousin-germain to *Vercingetorix*. To these there were certain chosen out of every State to give assistance in Council of War: and all of them went jocundly and full of hope to *Alesia*. Neither was there any Man that did think, that the very sight of such a multitude was able to be endured, especially when the Fight would grow doubtful by sallies made out of the Town, and so great Forces of Horse and Foot should be seen without.

#### OBSERVATION.

*Vercingetorix's* desire was to have had as many of the Gauls sent to his Rescue as were able to bear Arms, grounding himself upon that *Maxim*; Where the whole State is in question, there the whole Forces of that State are to be employed. But the other Princes of Gallia thought it not expedient to raise so great a number: For they would have accrewed to such a multitude of People, as could not have been contained within the rules of Government: which may bring to our consideration that which the course of these times doth not often bring into dispute: What number of Men well martialled and with good discipline, are a competent proportion for any service. *Xerxes's* Army which he carried into Greece, was famous for two respects: First, in

What number of men are a competent proportion for any service.  
regard



regard of the multitude, which was so great, that when he himself returned back into Asia, he left behind him three hundred thousand of the best Soldiers chosen out of the whole Army, under the conduct of one Mardonius. Secondly, that of so many Fighting-men, there were two hundred and threescore thousand slain in one Battel, with the loss of one thousand and three hundred Grecians. Whereby it appeareth, That the Conquest of a Kingdom doth not necessarily follow the multitude of Soldiers in an Army; for either Xerxes's Army was too few in number to Conquer Greece, or too many to be well Martialled.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Marius.

Marius, with Fifty Thousand Men, defeated the Cimbri that were so many in number, as they made a Battel of Thirty Furlong square, and of them he slew an Hundred and Twenty Thousand, and took Threescore Thousand Prisoners. And for that I do remember of that which I have read, the greatest Conquests that ever were made, were achieved with Armies under Fifty Thousand Fighting Men. The great Alexander subdued all Asia, and brought the Monarchy from the Persian into Greece with Thirty Thousand Men.

The Romans had very seldom Ten Legions in an Army, which was about that rate, but commonly their Conquering Armies were far under that proportion. Paulus Aemilius only had an Hundred Thousand in his Army against Perseus, and won the Battel in an hour. The condition of our Times requireth no dispute touching this point, for we seldom see an Army of Fifty Thousand Men in the Field, unless it be the Turk, or some such Monarch.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Paulus Aemy-  
lius.

#### C H A P. XXXIII.

Critognatus his Speech at Alesia, touching the keeping of the Town.

Caesar.

**T**hey that were Besieged in Alesia, the day being past by which they looked for Succour, their Corn being spent, and not knowing what was done abroad, entred into Consultations touching the end of their Fortune; and divers Opinions being delivered, some of them tending to the yielding up of the Town, and others perswading that as long as strength lasted there might be Sallies continually made upon the Enemy: I will not omit the Speech of Critognatus, for the singular and wicked Cruelty which it imported. He was a Man of great Birth and Authority amongst the Arverni. I will say nothing (saith he) of their Opinion, that call base Servitude by the name of Surrender: Neither do I think them fit to be accounted Citizens, or to be admitted to Council of State. With them will I deal that like well of Sallies, in whose Advice and Counsel, even by all your Consents, the Memory of ancient Vertue seemeth to consist. It is no Vertue, but a weakness of the Mind, not to be able to bear Want a little while. It is an easier matter to find Men that will offer themselves willingly to Death, than such as will endure Labour with patience. For mine own part, I could like well of that Opinion, (for Honour much prevaileth with me;) if I did not see a further loss than of our Lives. But in these our Consultations, let us look upon all Gallia, whom we have called together to succour us. What Spirits do you think would our Friends and Kinsmen conceive, Fourscore Thousand Men being Slain in one place, if they were constrained to wage Battel upon their dead Carcasses? I would not have you to defraud them of your help, that do neglect all peril for your sake; nor by your Foolishness, and your Rashness, or the weakness of your Mind, throw down all Gallia, and cast it into

perpetual Bondage. Do you doubt of their Faith and Constancy, because they came not by a day! What do the Romans then mean in these outward Works? Do you think they make them for exercise, or to pass away the time? If you cannot then receive assurance by their Messengers, all passage being stopt, use them for Witnesses, that their coming is at hand, for fear whereof they labour night and day. What then? my Advice is that we do, as our Forefathers did in a War against the Cimbri and Teutones, not equal to this, who being shut up within their Towns, and brought to the like necessity, did satisfy their Hunger with the Bodies of such as were found unfit for War, neither did they yield themselves unto the Enemy: Whereof, if we had not an Example, yet I would judge it an excellent thing to be begun now for Liberties sake, and to be left to Posterity. For, What War was like this? Gallia being wasted and dispeopled, and the Kingdom brought into great Misery, the Cimbri at length forsook our Country, and sought out other Territories, and left unto us our Laws, Customs, Lands, and Liberty. For the Romans, What is it they desire? Or, What would they have! But being drawn on with Malice and Envy, whom they understood to be a Noble and a Warlike Nation, their Fields and Cities they did desire to take from them, and to Yoke them with eternal Bondage; as never making War with other Condition. For if you be ignorant what they do far off in other Countries, look at home in that part of Gallia which is reduced into a Province. Their Laws and Customs being changed, it is subjected to the Axe and to perpetual Servitude. Their Opinions being delivered, they decree, that such as through Age or Sickness were unfit for War, should depart the Town; and that they should prove all means, before they yielded to Critognatus's Opinion: And yet if the matter so required, to consent unto it, and to attend their Succours, rather than to yield to any Surrender and Condition of Peace.

#### O B S E R V A T I O N.

**I**T is oftentimes made questionable in the extremity of a Siege, how far the Commanders may go in continuing their resistance to the danger and hazard of the People Besieged, whether they may not in Honour proceed as far as Critognatus's Opinion would draw them: Or how they may know when to leave it, in the very point of discreet and valiant Carriage. Which is to be answered according to the quality of the Enemy that giveth Siege to the place. For against a Treacherous and Disloyal Enemy, that maketh profession of Infidelity, and would not stick after a Composition to ensnare them in a greater danger than the peril of Death, there would be much endured rather than to undergo so hard a Fortune. And yet I do no way approve the cruel Resolution of this Gaul, but do rather commend the Example of the Hungarians at the Siege of Agria. For in the Year 1562. Mahomet Bassa lay before that Town with an Army of Threescore Thousand Turks, and laid Battery to it with fifty Cannons. There were within the Town Two Thousand Hungarians, who endured and put off Thirteen most terrible Assaults of the Enemy: And for the better strengthening of their high Resolution, they took a mutual Oath, that no Man, upon pain of Death, should once speak of a Treaty, or of giving up the Town, or to make any Answer to the Enemy, but by the Harquebuss or the Cannon: And if the Siege should happen to continue long, rather to die for Hunger, than to put themselves in the hands of so cruel and barbarous an Enemy. They determined further, That such amongst them as were not serviceable

How long a  
Commander  
may hold out  
in a Siege.

Agria,

A a

with



with a Weapon, should attend continually to reinforce the Rampier and repair the Ruines. And to avoid Treachery, they took Order that there might be no Assemblies in the City above the number of Three together. They Commanded likewise that all the Victual as was either publick or private: should be divided into equal Portions amongst the Soldiers, and the best of it should be reserved for such as were hurt in Fight. It is further reported, That the Bassa having oftentimes offered a Treaty, they only shewed for an answer to his Summons a Funeral Bier covered with black, lifted up above the Wall between two Pikes, to signifie thereby that they would not come out but by Death.

As this is a degree short of Critognatus's Resolution, so I do not deny but that a General may give up a Town before he come to these Terms with true Honour and Wisdom. But the matter (as I have said) consisteth altogether upon the circumstances interlaced. But that which is further to be observed in this place, is the extream contrariety of Opinions, which are usually delivered upon dispute of such difficult cases, wherein *Quantum alteri sententia deest animi, tantum alteri superesse solet*; one Man's Opinion speaks too much Courage, and anothers as much too little: As Curio said upon the like occasion. *Medio tutissimus ibis.*—The middle is the safest way, was Phœbus's direction to his Son Phaeton in a matter of difficulty and great hazard, and observed in this place by the Gauls.

Lib. 2. Bel.  
Civil.

#### C H A P. XXXIV.

The Gauls do set upon Cæsar's Camp, both from the Town and the Field side.

Cæsar.

**T**He Mandubii, who had received the Army into the Town, were themselves thrust out with their Wives and Children. They coming to the Roman Works, did with Weeping Tears beseech them to receive them into Bondage, and relieve them with Food. Cæsar gave Order they should not be received, and set a guard on the Rampier to keep them out. In the mean time Comius, and the rest of the Captains, that had the chief Command given them, came to Alefia with all their Forces, and having taken a Hill on the outside, they sate down not above half a Mile from our Works. The next day bringing their Cavalry out of their Camp, they filled all that Plain, which, as I have already said, extended Three Miles in length before the Town, setting their Foot Forces a little distant from that place, and hiding them upon higher Ground. The prospect lay open out of the Town into the Field: And upon the sight of these Succours they ran together, and Congratulated each other, and all their Minds were filled with Gladness. And thereupon the next day they brought their Forces and placed them before the Town, and began to cover the next Ditch upon them with Hurdles, and to fill it up with Earth, and to provide themselves to Sally out, and to endure all Chances. Cæsar having disposed of all his Army on each side of the Works, that if there were occasion, every Man might both know and keep his place, he Commanded the Cavalry to be carried out of the Camp, and to Charge the Enemy. There was a fair view out of all the Camps, which were seated round about upon the ridge of the Hill, and all Mens Minds were bent upon the expectation of the event of the Fight. The Gauls had mingled amongst their Horse some few Archers and light-armed Soldiers, which might relieve their Fellows, being over-charged, and sustain the Force

and Assault of our Horse. By these were many hurt upon a suddain, and forsook the Fight. The Gauls being perswaded that their Men had the better of the Fight, perceiving our Men to be overcharged with multitudes on all sides, as well those that were Besieged, as the other that came to relieve them, they took up a shout, and a howling to encourage their People. And forasmuch as the matter was carried in the sight of all Men, so that nothing could be hid, whether it were well or ill done; the desire of Honour and the fear of Ignominy did stir up both sides to Prowess and Valour. And having Fought with a doubtful Fortune from Noon-tide until almost Sun-setting; the Germans on the one side with thick-thronged Troops, gave a fierce Charge upon the Enemy, and put them to flight: Whereby it happened that the Archers were circumvented and slain. In like manner on the other side, our Men finding them to give ground, did follow them even to their Camps, and gave them no time to recover themselves. Such as were come out of Alefia, returned back sad into the Town, despairing of Victory. One day being intermitted, in which time they made provision of great store of Hurdles, Ladders, and Hooks, about Midnight they marched silently out of their Camp, and came to the Works on the Field side; and taking up a suddain Shout, to give notice of their coming, to them of the Town, they cast their Hurdles upon the Ditches, and with Slings, Arrows, and Stones, they began to put our Men from the Rampier, and to put in practice such things as belong to a Siege. At the same time the shout being heard, Vercingetorix sounded the Trumpet, and brought his Men out of the Town. Our Men betook themselves to the Fortifications, according as every Man's place was allotted him the day before; and with Slings and Bullets which they had laid ready upon the Works, they did beat down the Gauls, their fight being taken away through the darkness of the Night. Many Wounds were received on both sides, and many Weapons were cast out of Engines. M. Antonius and C. Trebonius, Legates, who had the Charge of those Parts where our Men were most laid to, caused Men to be taken out of the further Castles, and to be brought to second them. The Gauls being a good way distant from the Works, did much hurt with multitudes of Weapons: But approaching nearer, either they struck themselves unwittingly upon the Galtrops, or falling into the Holes, were struck through the Bodies with the sharp Stakes, or died with mural Piles, being cast from the Rampier and the Towers. Many Wounds being received on all sides, as the day appeared, the Gauls fearing lest they should be Charged on the open side by a Sally from the upper Camp, retired back again to their Fellows. On the inner side, whilst they brought out such things as were prepared beforehand by Vercingetorix, and were filling up the first Ditches, being somewhat long in the Execution of these things, they understood that the other Gauls were departed before they themselves could come near the Works: And thereupon they returned into the Town without doing any thing.

#### O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**He Gauls committed the Command of this great Army to four Generals, contrary to practice of Warlike Nations, and the order which Nature observeth throughout all the several Kinds of Creatures: Amongst whom there was never Body found of many Heads, but one Hydra, being made, as it seemeth, or rather feigned to be made, to the end that Hercules might have a task answerable to himself, and make it one of his twelve Labours to kill the Beast. The Serpent *Amphisbæna* is said to have two Heads, whereby she

One Army  
would have  
one General.

Et gravis in  
geminum ca-  
pit Amphi-  
sibæna.



the either loseth the use of local Motion, or at the least moveth so imperfectly, one Head taking one way and the other another way, as there is no certain or direct passage in her creeping.

These many-headed Armies do resemble these Serpents, being carried according to the fence of their several Heads, and distracted by the diversity of their many Leaders. The Government of Rome consisting of several Magistrates, having sovereign Authority, gave occasion oftentimes to make two Heads to one Body, but with such Success, as they were forced in the end to create one Head for the repairing of that Loss, which the multiplicity of Leaders had brought upon their State; as it happened in the War against the Fidenates Revolted, which nothing but their Recourse to a Dictator could make happy to their Empire. Whereupon Livy saith; *Tres Tribuni, potestate consulari, documento juere quam plurimum imperium Bello inutile esset; Tentando ad sua quisque consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti*: The Three Tribunes with consular Power, clearly shewed how inconvenient a thing it is to have more than one Commander in Chief: For while every one adheres to his own Advice and Judgment, one Man thinking this thing convenient, another that, they open a way to the Enemy to make advantage against them. In the time of their Consuls, Quintius and Agrippa being sent against the Aequi, Agrippa, referred the business wholly to his Colleague, concluding, as Livy saith: *Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est summum imperii ad unum esse*; It is the safest way in the managing of great Affairs to have one Man bear the chief sway. And therefore, as one Body requireth but one Head, so one business would have but one Director, forasmuch as *Emulatio inter pares, & ex eo impedimentum*; Emulation, and consequently hindrance will be amongst Equals.

Tacitus.

## C H A P. XXXV.

The Gauls do choose out Sixty Thousand of their best Men, and do Assault the weakest part of Caesar's Camp.

Caesar.

**T**He Gauls being Repelled twice with great loss, do fall into consideration what they were next to do. They call unto them such as were well acquainted with the nature and situation of the place, by whom they understand of the situation of the upper Camp. On the North side there lay a Hill, which, by reason of the greatness of the Circuit, our Men could not take in within the compass of their Works: And thereupon were necessarily constrained to lay their Camp in an unequal place somewhat shelving. This part was kept by Caius Antistius Reginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus with two Legions. This being known by the Scouts, the Captains of the Enemy chose out Sixty Thousand of those States which carried the greatest Opinion of Manhood, and did secretly determine amongst themselves, how and in what sort they would have the Service carried, and do determine to put it in execution, when the Sun should be near about the Noon Meridian, appointing Vergasilaunus to Command those Forces, being one of the four Captains, and Kinsman to Vercingetorix. He going out of the Camp in the first Watch of the Night, came to the end of his Journey a little before day, and hiding himself behind a Hill, Commanded his Soldiers to refresh themselves from the former Nights Travel. And when it began to be

towards Noon, he made towards that part of the Camp which I have before mentioned: And at the same time the Horsemen began to approach towards the Works, and the rest of the Forces shewed themselves before the Camp. Vercingetorix perceiving this out of the Watch-Tower of Alefia, went out of the Town, and carried with him long Poles, Hooks, and such other Provisions which he had made ready before-hand for a Salley. They fought at one instant in all places, all ways were tried: And where they thought it to be weakest, thither they ran. The Roman Forces were dismembered by reason of the large extension of their Works, so that they could not easily defend many places: And the shout which was made behind their Backs, did much affright our Men, forasmuch as they perceived that their danger did consist in other Mens Valour; for such things as are absent do for the most part greatly perplex and trouble Mens Minds. Caesar having got a convenient place, doth see what is done in every part: If any were overcharged he sent them succour, and was ready to answer all occasions on both sides the Camp. He told them, that that was the time, wherein it was behoveful for them to Fight. The Gauls would despair of all good success, unless they brake down the Works. The Romans, if they obtained their purpose, might expect an end of their Labours. The greatest Contention was about that place to which Vergasilaunus was sent. A small rising in a place doth give much advantage in a shelving descent. Some cast Weapons, others put themselves into a Testudo, and came under the Works. The wearied and over-laboured were seconded by fresh Supplies. Every Man cast Earth into the Works, which raised it so high, that the Gauls had advantage of ascent: And the Pikes and sharp Stakes which the Romans had cunningly hid under the Earth to annoy the Enemy, were thereby covered. It came at last to that pass, that our Men wanted both Strength and Weapons. Which being known, Caesar sent Labienus with six Cohorts to Relieve those that were overcharged, Commanding him (if he could not bear out the Charge) to Sally out upon them, but not unless he were constrained unto it. He himself went about to the rest, exhorting them not to faint under their Labour, forasmuch as the fruit and benefit of all their former Battels consisted in that day and that hour. The Enemy within being out of hope of doing any good upon the Works made in plain and Champaign Places, by reason of the Strength of the Fortifications, tried what they could do in steep and broken places; and thither they brought those things which they had prepared. With the multitude of their casting Weapons, they cast out such as fought from Turrets, they filled their passages with Hurdles and Earth, they brake down the Parapet and the Rampier with Hooks. Caesar sent first young Brutus with six Cohorts, and after him Fabius a Legate with seven more; and at length as the Fight waxed hot, he went himself with a fresh supply. The Fight being renewed and the Enemy beaten off, he hastened to that place whither he had sent Labienus, and took four Cohorts out of the next Castle. Part of the Horsemen he commanded to follow him, and the rest to compass about the outward Works, and to set upon the Enemy behind. Labienus finding that neither Rampier nor Ditches were able to keep out the Enemy, having got such Forces together as were drawn by chance from the Works nearest hand, to the number of thirty nine Cohorts, he acquainted Caesar by Messengers what he thought fit to be done. Caesar made haste to be at the Fight. His coming being known by the colour of his Garment, which he was accustomed to wear in time of Battel, and the Troops of Horse and the Cohorts being discovered which he had Commanded to follow him,



him, as the shelving and declining places were subject to the view of higher Grounds; the Enemy began the Fight, a great shout was taken up on both sides. Our Men having thrown their Piles, betook themselves to their Swords. Suddenly the Horsemen were discovered behind them, and other Cohorts made their approaches towards them. The Enemy turned his back and fled: The Horsemen met them as they fled; the slaughter was great in that place. Sedulius, a Captain and Prince of the Lemovici, was Slain. Vergasilaunus was taken alive. Threescore and fourteen Ensigns were brought unto Cæsar: And very few of so great a number returned safe into their Camp. Those of the Town beholding the Slaughter and Flight of their Friends, being out of all hope, drew back their Forces from the Works. This being known, the Gauls fled presently out of their Camp: And if the Soldiers had not been wearied with that days Labour, they might easily have destroyed all their Enemies. About Midnight the Horse being sent out to fall upon the Rere, a great number was Taken and Slain, the rest escaped into their Countries.

## OBSERVATION.

IT is an old saying of a Hungry Man, That it is an easier matter to fill his Belly than his Eye: Which is as true in other cases; wherein our desires are oftentimes so great, that we think no means sufficient to accomplish the same: But when we shall come to put it in tryal, and suffer every Man to be measured with his own Foot, it will appear that our desires are better applied to the infinity of the Mind, than to the necessary occasions of our Life. Vercingetorix was so far interessed in the success of this War, that he thought all the able Men of Gallia not enough to make it happy unto him: But the other Princes that were not so deeply touched, and yet stood as well affected to the Cause, refused to Inroll all that were able to bear Arms, but thought Two Hundred Forty and Eight Thousand Men to be a competent force for this Service. But coming to the execution of the business, they employed only sixty Thousand: And when they failed of their endeavour, and were Routed and Overthrown by the Romans, the rest staid no longer to dispute the matter, but fled all away by Night. Which sheweth the difference between the Affections which are fore-runners of a Cause, and such as grow and encrease with a business, and are not commonly found in one and the same subject in their greatest Strengths. For these antecedent desires are like Womens Longings; strong and violent at first, but decaying as fast again before they come to any Ripeness: Whereas such Affections as rise from the carriage of a business, and grow from the Occurrences of that proceeding, are not so easily abated, but do hold out strong either for Constancy or Obstinacy.

A little is  
enough to save  
a longing.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

Vercingetorix yieldeth himself and the Town to Cæsar.

Cæsar.

THE next day Vercingetorix having called a Council, told them, that he had not undertook that War for his own occasions, but for the cause of common Liberty: And forasmuch as they were necessarily to yield to fortune, he made offer of himself unto them, either to satisfy the Romans with his Death, or to be delivered unto them alive. Ambassadors were sent

to Cæsar, touching that point. He Commanded their Arms to be delivered, and the Princes to be brought out. He himself sate in the Fortifications before the Camp: Thither the Captains were brought, Vercingetorix was delivered; their Weapons were cast out. The Hedui and the Arverni being reserved, to the end he might recover the rest of the States by them; of the rest of the Captives he gave throughout all the Army, to every Man a Prisoner, by the name of a Booty. These things being ended, he went to the Hedui, and received in the State. Thither did the Arverni send Ambassadors unto him, promising to obey whatsoever he Commanded. He demanded a great number of Hostages, and sent the Legions into their Winter-Quarters. He sent home Twenty Thousand Captives to the Hedui and the Arverni. He sent T. Labienus with two Legions, and the Horse into the Sequani, and gave him M. Sempronius Rutilius to assist him. He lodged C. Fabius and Lucius Minutius Basilus with two Legions amongst the Men of Rheims, lest they should receive any damage by the near bordering Bellovaci. He sent C. Antistius Reginus to the Ambivareti, and T. Sextius to the Bituriges, and C. Caninius Rebilus to the Rutheni, with each of them a Legion. He placed Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpitius at Cavillonis and Matifcona of the Hedui upon the River Arar, for Provision of Corn: He himself determined to Winter at Bibract. This Years Service being known at Rome, there was a Feast of Thanksgiving appointed for twenty days together.

## OBSERVATION.

Vercingetorix, notwithstanding a hard Fortune, entertained a noble Resolution: For having first acquainted the Gauls that he had not undertook that War for any respect to himself, but for the cause of Gallia, and the ancient liberty of that Continent; he made offer to satisfy the angry Romans with his Body dead or alive.

Plutarch reciteth the manner of his Delivery to be in this sort: Being armed at all Parts, and Mounted on a Horse furnished with a rich Caparison, he came to Cæsar, and rode round about him as he sate in his Chair of State; then lighting off his Horse, he took off his Caparison and Furniture, and unarmed himself, and laid all on the Ground, and went and sate down at Cæsar's Feet, and said never a word. Cæsar at length committed him as a Prisoner taken in the Wars, to be led afterwards in his Triumph at Rome: But the Civil Wars did cut off that Solemnity.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Cæsar.

If it be demanded, what became of these great Princes and Personages after the Triumph: It will appear that they did not stroke their Heads, or make more of them than of miserable Captives. For Paulus Æmilius, after the noble Triumph for King Perseus, pining his Fortune and desiring to help him, could never obtain other Grace for him, than only to remove him from the common Prison, which they called Carcer, into a more cleanly and sweeter House: Where being streightly guarded, he died, either by Abstinence, or being kept from Sleep by the Soldiers. Two of his Sons died also, but the third became an excellent Turner or Joyner, and could write the Roman Tongue so well, that he afterwards became Chancellor to the Magistrates of Rome. And thus the Romans dealt with their Captive Princes, making them examples of Fortunes unconstancy, and turning their Diadems into Shackles of Iron.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Paulus Æmilius.

And thus far did Cæsar Comment himself upon the Wars he made against the Gauls, being a Noble



Noble and a Worthy People, and bred in a large and fertile Continent; the Inhabitants whereof have in all Ages, even to these times, challenged an eminency, both for Politick Government and Martial Prowess, amongst the Western Kingdoms of the World: Their Actions and Carriage from time to time deserving as Honourable Memory, as these Wars recorded by *Cæsar's* own hand; whereof *Paulus Æmylius*, *Philip Commynes*, and of late *John de Seres* are

very pregnant witnesses. They continued under the *Roman* Government Four Hundred Forty and One Years, according to the computation made by *John Tillius*, reckoning from the last Victory in *Cæsar's* Proconsulship, to the time of *Marcomer* a General of the *French*, by whose Prowess and means they denied to pay that Homage and Tribute to the Emperour *Valentinianus*, which *Vercingetorix* had lost to *Cæsar*.

## The Duke of ROHAN's REMARKS.

ALL the other Wars of *Cæsar* against the *Gauls* were different from this, by reason that in the former he made use of their Divisions to Ruin them. This was made almost by a general consent of them all, Electing a Supreme Chief of great Prudence and Courage, who being sensible that the good Discipline of the *Romans*, and their Skill in the Trade of War, render'd them invincible in Battel, chang'd the manner of making it, by Protracting of time, without hazarding a general Combat, being superiour in Horse, in a Country which favour'd him; and by cutting off the Provisions of their Army, fail'd but little of ruining them: Which affords us a scope for very fine Remarks.

First upon *Vercingetorix*, who being voluntarily chosen Head of divers People, who Emulated each other, knew so well how to Govern them, that, notwithstanding all his Adversities, he still preserv'd a great Authority among them, and kept them in great Awe; never sparing Severity where it was requisite: (For fear is the most powerful motive to keep Men within Bounds) his ill Success having never daunted him, nor alter'd his Mind; even when he was accus'd of holding Intelligence with the Enemy: He Harangu'd them with so much boldness, that it encreas'd his Authority instead of lessening it. And indeed the most effectual way to satisfy People is to speak often to them about present transactions. He was allow'd to Burn about Twenty Towns to inconvenience their Enemies: Which argues his Ability; since the only way to Vanquish the *Romans* (who were too hard for them in Fight) was to Combat them by Hunger. In such Affairs all mild Councils, or such as are only Executed by halves are ruinous; of which the taking of *Bourges* may serve for a memorable Example by reason that in saving it from a necessary Conflagration, it was preserv'd for the use of the *Romans*, who supply'd their Wants by the taking of it. His great Credit is remarkable, by his being able to perswade Free People at the very beginning of a War, before their having try'd the ill success of it, when they were full of hopes of Vanquishing without applying such violent Remedies, to set Fire to their Houses and Goods, for the preservation of which, Wars are commonly made. It was, without doubt, a very difficult Enterprize; by reason that the loss of things that are certain and present, that are seen and felt, is prefer'd by Ignorant People, to those things of which the Event is uncertain, and the usefulness distant: And none can perfectly apprehend that difficulty, unless such as have experienc'd it in governing of People. He also express'd his Constancy to the very last, not fearing (tho' at the Head of so

many different Nations) to lock himself up in a place, in which he perform'd what-ever could be done by a prudent brave Commander, despising Hunger, and all the Inconveniences of a Siege, and holding out until the Relief he expected was Repuls'd and Defeated, but whereas Histories are only compil'd by the Victorious, we seldom hear the Praises of any but the Children of Fortune.

Let us now Examine *Cæsar's* Conduct in this War, which surprises him in the midst of Winter, he being in *Italy* at that time, his Army divided into divers Countries, distant from each other, and the Revolted laying so much in his way, that it was almost impossible for him to joyn his Legions. Those great difficulties requir'd an incomparable Labour in order to overcome them, which he did, by making himself a Passage through Mountains which were cover'd with six Foot deep of Snow, and terrifi'd his Enemies more by appearing in the midst of them (at a time when they imagin'd him to be in *Italy*, without a possibility of coming towards them) than by the number of his Forces. He likewise improv'd their Terror, by making several Incursions with his Horse, to perswade them that he was very Strong.

Let us also consider, that *Cæsar* finding the Method of the War alter'd, and that his Enemies avoided to come to Battel; addicts himself to the Siege of Towns, in which he shew'd himself as excellent as in other Feats of War. For whatever is practis'd by the best Modern Commanders, is Copy'd after him; and all that we admire in the Siege of *Ostend*, *Breda*, *Bois le Duc*, and several other Sieges of the late Prince *Maurice*, who surpass'd all others in those Matters, falls infinitely short of the two Circumvallations of *Alexia*: The Industry and Labour of which, together with the shortness of time in which they were perform'd, surpasses whatever has been done elsewhere, by much. I am sensible that the Invention of Powder and Artillery has alter'd the manner of Fortifications, Attacks, and Defence of Places; but not so much but that the principal Grounds on which they are establish'd are particularly Copy'd from *Cæsar*, who excell'd all the *Roman* Generals in that point.

He is equally to be admir'd for his Inventions and Stratagems, and for the boldness of his Undertakings. When he resolv'd to Storm the Retrenchments about *Clermont*, he created a Jealousie in them, by a Body he form'd of the Servants and Baggage of the Camp, which he caus'd to March in sight of them, on that side which he did not design to Attack, but not so near as to permit them to discern what they were, and having put a Legion in Ambush in the Night, and

slipt



slip the Flower of his Army into the little Camp, which was nearest to the Place, he falls upon them so unexpectedly that he Forces all their Retrenchments.

When he resolv'd to pass the River of *Aliers*, which was oppos'd by *Vercingetorix*, he Posted some Legions near a Bridge that had been broken down, and with the remainder of the Army, which he had order'd in such a manner, that it seem'd to be entire, he marches along the River-side, as if he had sought for another Passage: Amusing the Army so well, that the Bridge was mended before any Body took notice of it, and thus he pass'd without any hindrance.

When *Vercingetorix*, during the Siege of *Bourges*, march'd out with his Cavalry, he departed in the Night, and Attack'd his Infantry in his Camp, which he was very near taking.

When at the Siege of *Clermont*, being inform'd of the Revolt of 10000 *Autunois*, who were come to his Assistance, he takes four Legions, marches Day and Night to surprize them; takes them all, and returns time enough to defend his Camp which was Attack'd by *Vercingetorix*. Whereupon we will observe by the by, the advantage of keeping a Camp always well Fortified, in order to be ever in a condition to Assault ones Enemy, according as occasions offer themselves.

I cannot pass by his great Modesty, in the Case of *Cornio*, whom he had ever favour'd, en-

creas'd in Wealth and Honour, and in whom he greatly Confided: He excuses his Revolt, instead of blaming him for it; alledging, that he suffer'd himself to be involv'd in the general design that was form'd for the recovery of the Liberty and the Glory of all the *Gauls*.

Let us speak a word of *Labienus*, one of his Lieutenants, who finding himself nonplus'd with four of *Caesar's* Legions in that general Revolt, being Surrounded on all Parts with Enemies, and necessitated to cross the *Seine* upon Boats, in order to joyn *Caesar*, being oppos'd by great Forces in three Bodies, makes a great shew of passing in two places, where he did not design it. And having thus divided their Forces in divers Bodies, not knowing whither to go to oppose him, pass'd in the Night with three Legions in the Place where he was least expected, fought and routed the next that came in his way; insomuch that having pass'd the remainder of his Forces with ease, he joyn'd *Caesar* without the least opposition. Upon which I will make this Remark, that whoever is not very careful, diligent, and watchful in keeping the passage of a River or Mountain is commonly surpriz'd, by reason that he who keeps it, relies upon the advantage of the Place, whereas those that design to pass, seek out all means (and finally find them) to overcome all those Obstacles.

*The next Summer's Service compiled by Hirtius, omitted in the former Editions, has been thought fit to be added in this, for the better compleating of the whole Work.*

The



# The Eighth COMMENTARY of the Wars in GALLIA.

Written by AULUS HIRTIUS.

## CHAP. I.

*The Gauls raise new Troubles in divers Places.  
Cæsar scattereth and wasteth the Bituriges, and  
after that the Carnutes.*

**A**fter that all *Gallia* was Subdued, forasmuch as *Cæsar* had rested no part of the former Summer from War, he was desirous to refresh his Soldiers after so great Pains taken, the rest of the Winter season; when News was brought him that many States at the self-same time, did lay their Heads together again about War, and make Conspiracies. Whereof there was reported a very likely Cause; in that it was known to all the *Gauls*, that there could not any Power so great be assembled into one place, as should be able to withstand the *Romans*: Neither if many States at once made War in divers places at one Instant, could the Army of the People of *Rome* have sufficient, either of Aid, or of Time, or of Men of War to pursue all at once: And there ought not any State to refuse the lot of their Misfortune, if by the respite thereof, the rest might set themselves at liberty.

The which Opinion, to the intent it should not settle in the Minds of the *Gauls*, *Cæsar* leaving *M. Antonius*, the Quæstor, with charge of his Winter Garrisons, went, with a strong company of Horsemen the last day of *December* from *Bibracte* to his twelfth Legion, which he had placed not far from the borders of the *Hedui*, in the Country of the *Bituriges*, and taketh thereunto the eleventh Legion, which was next unto it. Leaving two Cohorts to defend his stuff and Carriages, he led the rest of his Army into the most plentiful Fields of the *Bituriges*: The which being a large Country, and full of Towns, could not be kept in awe with the Garrisoning of one Legion amongst them, but that they prepared for War, and made Conspiracies.

By the suddain coming of *Cæsar*, it came to pass (which must needs happen to such as are unprovided and scattered abroad) that such as were Tilling the Ground without fear, were surprised in the Fields by our Horsemen, before they could get them into the Towns. For at that time the common token of Invasion which is wont to be perceived by burning of Houses, was by *Cæsar's* Commandment forborn, lest they should either want Forage and Corn if they were minded to make any further Road into the Country, or else, that their Enemies for fear of the Fires, should convey themselves out of the way.

After that many Thousands of Men had been taken, the *Bituriges* being fore afraid, such of them as could escape out of the *Romans* hands at their first coming, upon confidence either of the old acquaintance and familiarity that had been privately between them, by reason of resorting as Guests one to another, or of their mutual Agreement, and partaking in the same Devices, fled into the next Cities: But all was in vain. For *Cæsar*, by great Journeys came so suddainly upon all places, that he gave not any City leisure to think of the safeguard of other Folks rather than of themselves. Through the which speed he both kept his Friends faithful unto him, and put the wavering sort in such fear, that he compelled them to be glad to receive Peace.

The matter standing in this case, when the *Bituriges* saw that through *Cæsar's* gentleness there was yet a way for them to return into his Favour again, and that the next States had delivered him Hostages, and were thereupon received to Mercy without further Punishment: They themselves did so likewise. *Cæsar*, because his Men had patiently endured so great Travail in the Winter-days, through most cumbersome ways, in intolerable cold Weather, and continued most resolutely in the same to the uttermost, promised to give to his Soldiers Two Hundred Sesterces apiece, and to the Captains Two Thousand apiece, in the name of a Prey: And so sending his Legions again into their Winter Places, he himself returned to *Bibracte* the Fortieth day after his setting forth. There, as he was Ministring of Justice, the *Bituriges* sent Messengers unto him, desiring help against the *Carnutes*, whom they complained to make War upon them.

Upon the receipt of this News, when he had not lain in Garrison past eighteen days, he draweth the fourteenth and sixteenth Legions out of Garrison from the River *Arar*, where he had placed them for the speedy purveyance of Corn and Victual, as was shewed you in the last Book: And with those two Legions went to prosecute the *Carnutes*.

When our Enemies heard of the coming of our Army, the *Carnutes*, moved with the Calamity of others, left their Towns and Villages that they dwelt in, which they had made upon the sudden with little Cottages for necessities sake to keep off the Winter; (for since they were Conquered of late, they had lost many of their Walled Towns:) and fled scattering abroad. *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he would not put his Soldiers to the abiding of the unseasonable sharp Storms which chiefly at that time fell, encamped himself within *Genabum*,



a Town of the *Carnutes*, and Housed his Soldiers partly in the Buildings of the *Gauls*, and partly in such Buildings as being unfinished they Thatched in haste with the Straw that was brought in to cover their Tents and Cabbins. Nevertheless he sendeth abroad his Horsemen and Auxiliary Footmen into all parts, whither he heard his Enemies resorted: And that was not in vain; for commonly our Men returned ever with a great Booty.

The *Carnutes* being put to it with the hardness of the Winter, and the terror of the Danger, being driven out of House and Home, and not daring to stay any where any long time, the Woods not being able to defend them from the bitterness of the Storms, were scattered abroad, and with the loss of a great part of them, dispersed into the next Cities.

## CHAP. II.

*The Bellovaci and other States under the leading of Corbeus and Comius Invade the Sueffiones: Cæsar marcheth against them.*

**C**æsar at that hard time of the Year, thinking it enough to disperse the Powers that were assembling, to the intent no beginning of War might spring up, and weighing how much it concerned him, to prevent any open War from breaking out the beginning of the next Summer; he placed C. Trebonius in Garrison at *Genabum* with those two Legions that he had there about him: And forasmuch as he was by often Messages certified from the Men of *Rheims*, that the *Bellovaci* (who excelled all *Gauls*, and the *Belgæ* also in Military Fame) and the States adjoining unto them, under the Conduct of *Corbeus* of *Beauvais* and *Comius* of *Arras*, Levied Men of War, and assembled them into one place, to the intent with their whole Power to Invade the borders of the *Sueffiones*, which were appertaining to the Men of *Rheims*; thinking it stood not only upon his Honour, but also tended to his own Security for the future, to save his Allies, which had deserved well of the Commonwealth, from displeasure and damage, he called the eleventh Legion again out of Garrison. Moreover he wrote to C. Fabius to bring the two Legions that he had, into the Confines of the *Sueffiones*; and sent for one of those two Legions that were with T. Labienus. So according as his Garrisons lay for the purpose, and as the state of the War required, to his own continual Trouble, he put sometimes one of his Legions, and sometimes another, to March from their Quarters.

With this Power that he had assembled he went against the *Bellovaci*: And Encamping himself in their Country, sent abroad his Horsemen into all Quarters to glean up some of them, by whose means he might learn what his Enemies purposed to do. His Horsemen doing their Duty, brought word how few were found in the Houses, and those not such as had stayed behind to Till the Ground, (for they were purposely removed out of all places) but such as had been sent back again to Spy. Of whom Cæsar enquiring in what place the Forces of the *Bellovaci* were, and what was their intent; found that all the *Bellovaci* were gathered together into one place: And that the *Ambiani*, *Aulerci*, *Calètes*, *Velocasses*, and *Attrebates* had chosen a very high Ground to Encamp in, enclosed with a troublesome Marsh, and had conveyed all

their Stuff into Woods that were farther off: Of the which War there were many Noblemen that were Ring-leaders, but the multitude obeyed *Corbeus* chiefly, because they understood that he hated most the name of the People of *Rome*: And that *Comius* of *Arras* was a few days before gone to fetch aid of the *Germans*, who were their next Neighbours, and swarmed in multitudes of People. He learned moreover at their hands, that the *Bellovaci* by the consent of all the Noblemen, at the earnest instance of the Commons, were determined, if Cæsar came (as it was said he would) but with three Legions, to offer him Battel, left afterward to more disadvantage and hindrance they should be compelled to Encounter with his whole Host: And if he brought a greater Power with him, then to keep themselves still in the same Ground that they had chosen, and by Ambushes to keep the *Romans* from Forage (which by reason of the time of the Year was scarce, and also lay scattering) and from Corn, and other Victuals and things necessary for their Army.

The which things when Cæsar understood, by the concurring Report of many, considering how full of Wisdom this Project was, and how far from the rashness that the Barbarous People are wont to use, he determined to make the best advantage of all things, to the intent his Enemies disdain his small Company, should make the more haste to come into the Field. For he had three old practised Legions, the seventh, eighth, and ninth, of singular Valour and Prowess; and the eleventh, which was of chosen young Men of great Hope and Towardness, which having at that time received eight Years Wages, was, notwithstanding look'd upon as not comparable to the other three either for standing, or for Valour and Courage.

Wherefore summoning an Assembly, and there declaring all things that had been reported unto him, he confirmed the Hearts of the common Soldiers, if peradventure with the number of Three Legions, he might draw out his Enemies to Fight with him in the Field. He set his Battel in this Order: The seventh, eighth, and ninth Legions went before the Carriages, and the eleventh closed in the Rere thereof, the which notwithstanding was but small, as it is wont to be in such Expeditions: And this he did, lest the Enemies should find a greater number than they expected. By this means, in a square Battel almost, he brought his Host in fight of his Enemies sooner than they looked for him.

When the *Gauls* beheld these Legions so suddenly set in order, marching toward them apace, as it had been in a pitched Field (whereas it was reported to Cæsar that they intended to carry on their business with confident boldness) whether it were for the peril of the Encounter, or the suddainness of our coming, or that they looked to see what we intended to do, they set themselves in order of Battel before their Camp, and would not descend from the higher Ground. Albeit that Cæsar was desirous to have fought with them, yet wondering at the great number of his Enemies, he pitched his Camp directly over against theirs, on the other side of a Valley, which was more in deepness downward, than in wideness any way at the bottom. This Camp he commanded to be Fortified with a Rampier of twelve Foot, and an open Gallery to be builded upon it according to the measure of the same height, and a double Ditch to be made of fifteen Foot apiece, with sides plum down, and many



many Turrets to be reared of three Stories high, and to be joyned together with Draw-Bridges to let down at pleasure, the Fronts whereof were fenced with Grates of Wicker; to the intent the Enemy might be repulsed with double Rows of Defendants: Of which the one from the Bridges, the more out of danger they were by reason of the height, so much the boldier and the farther off might they send their Darts; the other the nearer they were placed to their Enemy upon the Rampier, so much the better should they be covered from the Artillery that might fall down upon them: And over the Gates he made high Towers. This kind of Fortification was to two good purposes: For by the greatness of his Works and his pretence of fear, he hoped to put the barbarous Gauls into a great Confidence; and whensoever he should have occasion to send out far for Forage or Victuals, he saw that the Camp might be defended with a small Power, the strength of the Fortifications was so great. In the mean while, Parties on both sides would several times go out and skirmish in the Marish that was between our two Camps: The which oftentimes either the Gauls and Germans that were of our Host would pass, and eagerly pursue their Enemies; or else in like manner our Enemies passing over it, did send our Men farther off.

It happened in our daily Foraging (as there was no other shift, forasmuch as we were fain to fetch Forage at Houses that stood scattering far asunder) that our Foragers being dislevered in disadvantageous places, were entrapped. The which thing, as it was some loss to us of our Beasts of Carriage and Slaves, so it heightened the foolish Courages of the barbarous Gauls: And that so much the more, because Comius of Arras (who we said before was gone to fetch aid of the Germans) was returned with some Horse; of whom, although there was not above the number of Five Hundred, yet the Gauls were puffed up at the coming of the Germans.

### CHAP. III.

*Cæsar strengthens himself with more Forces. The Men of Rheims worsted by the Enemy, and they again by the Germans on Cæsar's Party.*

**W**hen Cæsar perceived how his Enemies kept themselves many days together within their Camp, which was Fortified both with a Marish and also with advantage of the Ground, and that he could neither Assault them without manifest Peril, nor enclose the place where they were with any Fortifications, without a greater Army; he directed his Letters to Trebonius, that he should with all haste possible send for the Thirteenth Legion which Wintered amongst the Bituriges, under T. Sextius the Legate, and so with Three Legions make long Marches to come to him. In the mean season he sent out by turns the Horsemen of Rheims, and of the Lingons, and other States, of whom he had called forth a great number, to safe Conduct the Foragers, and to withstand the suddain Assaults of the Enemy.

This being done day by day, and our Men taking now less heed, because it was an ordinary matter with them, (which thing for the most part cometh to pass by daily custom) the Bellovaci, with a Band of chosen Footmen, knowing the places where our Horsemen daily kept their standings, laid Ambushes in Woody places: And the next day they sent thither their Horsemen,

first to draw out our Men into the danger of their Ambushments, and then to assail them as they were enclosed. The lot of this ill luck lighted upon the Men of Rheims, whose turn it was to perform the duty that day. For they, when they had espied the Horsemen of their Enemies upon the suddain, despising them because they were less in number, followed them over-greedily, and were enclosed by the Footmen. Whereby being disordered, they retired more hastily than Horsemen are accustomed to do in Battel, with the loss of Vertisco the Prince of their State, and Captain of their Horsemen. Who being scarce able to sit upon a Horse, by reason of his Age, would notwithstanding (according to the custom of the Gauls) neither seek to disburthen himself of the Captainship, by excuse of his Age, nor suffer the encounter to be Fought without him. With this lucky Battel, wherein they slew the Prince and Captain of the Men of Rheims, the Courages of our Enemies were heightened and raised, and our Men were taught by their own harm, to search the places better where they should keep their standings, and to follow their Enemy more advisedly when he fled. In the mean while ceased not the daily Skirmishes in the fight of both our Camps, which were made at the Foords and Passages of the Marish.

In this kind of exercise, when as the Germans (whom Cæsar had for the same purpose fetch'd over the Rhine, that they should Fight intermingled with his Horsemen in the Battel) had all boldly passed the Marish, and slaying a few that made Resistance, followed eagerly upon the rest of the multitude; not only they that were overthrown at hand, or Wounded aloof, but also they that were wont to succour afar off, were so stricken with fear, that they ran away shamefully, and never left flying from higher Ground to higher, which they oftentimes lost, before they either recovered into their Camp, or (as some did for very shame) fled farther off. With whose danger the rest of the Host was so troubled, that it can scarcely be judged, whether good Success (were it never so small) would make them more Arrogant, or a Misfortune (were it never so mean) would make them more cowed and fearful.

### CHAP. IV.

*The Gauls Discamp, and are pursued by Cæsar. The Routing of part of them, and the Death of Corbeus.*

**A**fter they had lurked many days in the same Camp, when the Captains of the Bellovaci understood that C. Trebonius, one of Cæsar's Legates, was at hand with more Legions, fearing the like Siege as was at Alexia, they sent away in the Night all such as by reason of Years, or otherwise wanted strength, and all such as wanted Armour among them, and with them they sent away also their Carriages. While they were setting forth this troubled and confused Company, (for the Gauls, even when they go lightest, are wont to have a great multitude of Carts following them) day-light came upon them; and therefore they set their Men in Battel-Array in their Camp, lest the Romans should pursue, before the Company of their Carriages could get any thing forward. But Cæsar thought it not good to assail them that were ready to defend themselves, having so high a Hill to climb up unto them; and



and yet he thought to come so near them with his Host, as that they might not depart out of the place where they were without danger, our Men being hard at hand ready to fall upon them. Therefore whereas he perceived that the troublesome Marish parted Camp from Camp, (the difficult passage whereof might hinder the speedy pursuit of our Enemies) and that the same ridge of the Hill which went from the farther side of the Marish almost to the Camp of the Enemies, was parted from their said Camp with a small Valley: He made Bridges over the Marish, and passing over his Army, got quickly into the Plain of the said Ridge, the which on two sides was fortified with a deep descent. There embattelling his Men, he came to the farthest end of the Ridge: And ordered his Battels in such a place, from whence with an Engine Artillery might be shot amongst the thickest of the Enemies.

The *Gauls* trusting to the advantage of the place, when they would neither have refused the Encounter, if perchance the *Romans* should have adventured up the Hill against them, nor yet durst by little and little diminish their Battel by severing themselves, lest when they had been out of Array, they might hap to have been set upon, kept themselves in order of Battel. Whose wilfulness *Cæsar* perceiving, kept twenty Cohorts in a readines, and pitching his Tents in the same place commanded his Camp should be fortified. As soon as the works were finished, he set his Legions in Array before the Rampier, and appointed the Horsemen to their standings with their Horses ready bridled.

When the *Bellovaci* saw the *Romans* in a readines to pursue them, and that themselves could not without peril either lodge that night, or continue any longer in the same place where they were, they devised this shift to recover themselves. In the place where they were set together, (for it is declared in *Cæsar's* former Commentaries, how the *Gauls* are wont to sit down in the Battel) they received from hand to hand one of another bundles of Straw and Faggots, whereof there was great store in their Camp, and cast it all on a heap before their Battel, and in the latter end of the day, at a watch-word that was given, they set it on fire all at one instant: By means whereof the continual flame suddenly took away the sight of all their Army from the *Romans*: And therewithal the savage *Gauls* fled away as fast as their Legs could bear them.

Albeit that *Cæsar* could not perceive the departing of his Enemies, by reason of the flame that was betwixt them; yet notwithstanding, forasmuch as he suspected it to be a deceit practised by them, that they might the safer fly away; he marched his Footmen forward, and sent his Horsemen to pursue them. Howbeit for fear of Treachery in the business, lest perhaps his Enemies should abide still in the same place, and only draw us forth into a Ground of disadvantage, he went the slower pace. His Horsemen fearing to venture into the smoak and thick flame (and if any were so resolute as to enter it, they could scarce see the fore-parts of their own Horses) lest they should be intrapped, gave the *Bellovaci* free liberty to recover themselves whither they would. Thus our Enemies by their flight, which was mixt with fear and subtilty, escaping without any loss, went but ten miles off, and encamped themselves in a very advantageous Ground. From whence by laying Ambushes both of Horse and Foot in divers places, they did the *Romans* great displeasure as they went a Foraging.

After this had happened many and sundry times, *Cæsar* learned of a Captive, that *Corbeus*, Captain of the *Bellovaci*, had chosen out of his whole Host, six thousand of the valiantest Footmen, and a thousand Horsemen, which he had laid in ambush in the same place whether (for the plenty of Provision and Corn that was there) he judged the *Romans* would send to Forage.

This being known, *Cæsar* bringeth forth more Legions than usual, and sendeth his Horsemen before as he was wont to do, to safe-conduct his Foragers. Among them he mingled for their assistance many light-armed Footmen, and himself with his Legions followeth as near as possibly he might. The Enemies that were laid in ambush, having chosen a Field for their purpose, not above a mile over every way, environed round about, either with cumbersome Woods, or else a very deep River, beset it with their ambushment, as it had been with a toil.

Our Men, forasmuch as they were privy to the design of their Enemies beforehand, being ready both with heart and hand to fight, seeing their Legions followed hard after them, would refuse no encounter: but went Rank by Rank down into the said place. At whose coming, *Corbeus* thinking an occasion of doing some good to be fallen into his hands, first discovereth himself with a small number, and giveth charge upon the next Troops. Our Men stoutly withstand the brunt, and flock not many into one place at once; which in skirmishes of Horse is wont commonly to happen through fear, and their clustering together turneth to their own loss. They being thus engaged in small parties, and having a care still that their Fellows should not be circumvented, the rest brake out of the Woods while *Corbeus* was fighting. Then was the Encounter hot and doubtful. After it had continued indifferent a good space, by little and little came their Footmen in array out of the Woods, which compelled our Horsemen to give back. But they were quickly relieved again by the light-armed Footmen, which as was said, were sent before our Legions, who being intermixed among the Horsemen, fought stoutly.

The Encounter continued a good while doubtful. But as the course of War requires, they that had withstood the first brunt of them that lay in ambush for them, had thus much the advantage, that they received not unawares any foil at their hands. In the mean while our Legions drew nearer, and divers Messengers brought word both to our Men and to our Enemies at one and the same time, that the General was at hand with his Army in Battel array. Which thing being known, our Horsemen trusting to the help of the Cohorts, lay about them very eagerly, lest if they should have delayed the matter, they might have given the Footmen part of the honour of the Victory. Upon this our Enemies hearts began to fail; and they sought to fly by several ways: but all was in vain. For by the disadvantage of the same places in which they would have inclosed the *Romans*, they were themselves trapt and could not get out. Notwithstanding, being vanquished and altogether out of heart, when they had lost the greatest part of their company, like Men amazed they betook themselves to flight; and some made toward the Woods, others toward the River, where being overtaken by our Men that followed eagerly after them, they were all slain. In the mean time *Corbeus*, whose heart could by no misfortune be daunted or overcome, never departed out of the Battel, nor made toward the Woods, neither could by the



the entreaty of our Men be persuaded to yield himself: But fighting most valiantly, and hurting many of our Men, he so far exasperated the Victors, that they could not forbear to throw their Darts at him, and dispatch him.

## CHAP. V.

*The remainder of the Gauls submit themselves to Cæsar. Comius in danger to be slain by Treachery.*

**T**He matter being brought to this pass, Cæsar pursuing his newly-got Victory, forasmuch as he thought that his Enemies being discouraged with so great a misfortune, would immediately upon the news thereof, forsake the place where they were encamped, which was said to be not above eight miles from the place where the slaughter was made; although he saw it would be some trouble to him to pass the River, yet passed he his Army, and marched toward them. But the *Bellovaci* and the other States, upon the return of a few of their Men, and those wounded, out of the chase, which had escaped the mischance by means of the Woods, understanding by them their own great misfortune and misery by the death of *Corbeus*, the loss of their Horsemen, and the slaughter of their stoutest Footmen, and mistrusting that the Romans would out of hand come upon them; immediately called an Assembly by the sound of a Trumpet, and cried all with one voice, to send Ambassadors and Hostages to Cæsar.

When *Comius* of *Arras* perceived that this motion would be entertained, he fled to those Germans of whom he had borrowed assistance to the War. The rest sent Ambassadors presently unto Cæsar, desiring him to content himself with that punishment of his Enemies, which if he might have laid upon them without Battel in their chief prosperity, they were well assured that of his clemency and courtesie he would not have done it. The *Bellovaci* said that their power was weakened by the loss of their Horsemen, many thousands of their choicest Footmen were cut off, scarce any escaping to bring tidings of the slaughter: Yet notwithstanding their great misfortune, they had by that Battel received this happiness, that *Corbeus*, the Author of the War and raiser of the multitude, was slain. For as long as he was alive, the Senate could never bear so great sway in the City, as the rude and unskilful Commonalty.

As the Ambassadors were speaking these things, Cæsar put them in mind, that about the same time the last Year, the *Bellovaci* and other States of *Gallia* raised War, and that they above all others stood most stiffly in their opinion, and would not be reduced to obedience by the submission of the rest. He told them, he knew and understood it was an easie matter to lay the fault of their offence upon him that was dead. But he was sure that there was no Man of so great power, that against the Noblemens wills, the Senate resisting him, and all good Men withstanding him, could with a weak handful of the Commonalty, raise a War, and go through with it. Nevertheless he was satisfied with the punishment which they had brought upon themselves.

The Night following, the Ambassadors returned this answer to those that sent them, and forthwith they gave Hostages. Then also the Ambassadors of other States, which waited to see what success the *Bellovaci* would have, came to Cæsar, giving Hostages, and performing his com-

mands; only *Comius* stood off, who durst not for fear trust his Life into any Man's hands. For the Year before *Titus Labienus* perceiving how while Cæsar was ministring Justice in the hither *Gallia*, *Comius* stirred up the States and made Confederacies against Cæsar, thought he might without being accounted a faith-breaker, revenge his treacherous carriage. And thereupon, because he thought he would not at his sending for come into the Camp, lest he should by such a message make him more cautious, he sent *C. Volusenus Quadratus* to murder him, under pretence of communing with him: and for the performance of the matter, he sent with him certain selected Centurions for the purpose. When they came to conference, and that *Volusenus* (as it was agreed upon) had caught *Comius* by the right hand, one of the Centurions, as if he had been moved at the strangeness of the matter, gave *Comius* a shrewd blow on the Head with his Sword; howbeit he could not dispatch him, because his Friends stepped in and saved him. By and by was drawing of Swords on both sides, and yet none of both parties were minded to fight, but to fly away: Our Men, because they believed that *Comius* had had his deaths wound; the Gauls, because perceiving the Treachery, they feared there had been more behind than they saw. Upon which business it is reported, that *Comius* vowed he would never come in the fight of any Roman.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar disposeth his Forces into several parts of Gallia, and himself wasteth the Country of Ambiorix.*

**W**Hen Cæsar had subdued the Nations that were most Warlike, perceiving there was now no City that prepared War, to stand against him, but that many to eschew the present Yoke of the Roman Empire, left their Towns and fled out of the Fields, he determined to send his Army abroad into divers quarters. *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with the eleventh Legion he took to himself. *C. Fabius* the Legate with Twenty-five Cohorts, he sendeth into the farthest part of all *Gallia*, because he heard say that certain States were there in Arms, and that he thought *C. Caninius Rebilus* the Legate had not a sufficient strength of those two Legions that were with him already. *T. Labienus* he called unto him from the place where he was: And the twelfth Legion which wintered under him, he sent into *Gallia Togata*, to defend the Towns that the Romans had there peopled with their own Citizens, lest any such harm should happen to them by invasion of the barbarous People, as had happened the Summer before to the *Tergestini*, who were surpris'd and spoiled of their Goods by their sudden Invasions.

He himself set forward to waste and spoil the borders of *Ambiorix*; who flying before him for fear from place to place, when he saw there was no hope to get him into his hands, he thought it was most for his Honour, so to despoil his Country of People, Buildings and Cattel, that is Countrymen might so hate him (if Fortune reserved any Countrymen for him) that for the Calamities he had brought upon his Country, he might never have access thither again.

After he had sent abroad his Host into all parts of *Ambiorix* his Country, and wasted all places with slaughter, burning and rapine, having slain and taken Prisoners a great number of



Men, he sent *Labienus* with two Legions among the *Treviri*: Whose Country, by reason of the nearness thereof unto *Germany*, being daily inured to the Wars, is not much unlike to the *Germans* in rudeness and salvageness of life; neither did they obey the commandments of *Cæsar* at any time longer than we had an Army in their Country to compell them.

#### CHAP. VII.

*A new War raised in the Territories of the Pictones. C. Fabius putteth to flight the Forces of Dumnacus: Subdueth the Carnutes and Aremorici.*

**I**N the mean season *C. Caninius* the Legate, understanding by the Messengers and Letters of *Duracius*, (who had continued always firm to the friendship of the People of *Rome*.) that a great number of Enemies were assembled in the borders of the *Pictones*; forasmuch as a part of that City had renounced their obedience, went to the Town of *Lemovicum*. When he came near the Town, and understood by his Prisoners, how that *Dumnacus* Captain of the *Andes*, with many thousands of Men had enclosed *Duracius*, and that *Lemovicum* was besieged; he durst not with his weak Legions adventure upon his Enemies, but pitched his Camp in an advantageous ground. *Dumnacus* hearing of the approach of *Caninius*, turned all his power against the *Roman* Legions, determining to set upon them in their Camp. After he had spent many days in the assault, and had lost many of his Men, and yet could not break down any part of their Fortifications, he returned again to besiege *Lemovicum*.

At the same time, *C. Fabius* receiveth many Cities by composition, and assureth them with Hostages; and is advertised by *Caninius's* Letters, of those things that were done among the *Pictones*. Upon the knowledge whereof, he setteth forth to rescue *Duracius*.

But *Dumnacus* understanding of *Fabius's* coming, forasmuch as he thought he should hazard the losing all, if at once he should be compelled both to abide the *Romans* his Enemies without, and also to have an eye to and stand in fear of the Town, retired suddenly with all his Forces from the place, and could not think himself to be sufficiently in safety, before he had passed his Army over the River *Loire*, which by reason of the greatness thereof, was to be passed by a Bridge, and not otherwise.

Although *Fabius* was not yet come within sight of his Enemies, nor had joyned with *Caninius*, yet forasmuch as he was thoroughly informed by such as knew the Coast of the Country, he suspected that his Enemies would take that way which they did. Therefore he marcheth with his Army to the said Bridge where his Enemies had passed, and commanded his Horsemen to go no farther before the Footmen, than that they might upon occasion retire into the same Camp without tiring their Horses. Our Horse, as was commanded them, overtook the Host of *Dumnacus* and set upon them; and assaulting them flying and amazed, as they marched with their luggage at their backs, slew a great number and took a great Prey: and so with good success retired into their Camp.

The Night following *Fabius* sent his Horsemen before, so provided, that they might en-

counter the Enemy, and stay all the whole Army until he should overtake them. *Q. Atrius Varus* the Commander of the Horse, a Man of singular Courage and Wisdom, having encouraged his Men and overtaken the body of his Enemies, disposed certain of his Troops in places convenient, and with the rest of his Horsemen gave charge upon his Enemies. The Cavalry of the Enemy fought so much the more boldly, because their Foot were ready to assist them, who being mingled through the whole Army, as often as occasion was, did succour them against our Men. The encounter was very sharp. For our Men despising them whom they had vanquished the day before, and remembering that the Legions followed at their heels, ashamed to give ground, and desirous to get the day before their coming, fought very valiantly against the Footmen. On the other side, our Enemies believing that no greater Forces of ours were behind, according as they had seen the day before, thought a fair opportunity offered them to destroy our Cavalry utterly.

When they had fought a good while very eagerly, *Dumnacus* made a Battel to relieve his Cavalry, when occasion should be. But on the sudden our Enemies espied our Legions coming up close together: At the sight of whom their Horse were stricken into such a fear, and the Foot so amazed, that breaking through their Carriages, with great clamour and confusion they betook themselves every where to flight. Then our Cavalry, who a little before had their hands full, being heartened with joy of the Victory, raised a great shout on all sides, and casting themselves amongst them as they fled, made slaughter of them as far as their Horses breaths would serve to pursue them, and their Arms were able to strike them. Insomuch that having slain above twelve thousand Men, armed, and such as for fear had cast away their Arms, they took all their Carriages, none escaping.

Out of the which chase, forasmuch as it was certainly known, that *Drapes* the *Senon* was escaped (who when *Gallia* first began to rebel, gathering to him Men of desperate fortunes out of all places, setting Bondmen at liberty, entertaining Outlaws of all Countries, and receiving Highway Thieves, had cut off the Carriages and Victuals of the *Romans*) was going toward the Province with five thousand Men at the most, which he had rallied after the chase; and that *Luterius* of *Cahors* joyned himself with him, who in the former Commentary is said to have attempted an Invasion of the Province at the first Insurrection of *Gallia*; *Caninius* the Legate with two Legions pursued after them, lest some great dishonour might be received by those loose Fellows terrifying and harrassing the Province.

*C. Fabius* with the rest of the Army went against the *Carnutes* and the other States, whose power he knew to be crushed in the Battel that was fought against *Dumnacus*. For he doubted not, but he should find them more tractable to deal with, by reason of the late overthrow: Whereas if he should give them time of respite, by the instigation of the said *Dumnacus*, they might be raised again. *Fabius* with marvellous good luck and speed brought those States to submission. For the *Carnutes*, who had been oftentimes before ill-handled by us, yet would never listen to Peace, now gave Hostages, and came into subjection. And the rest of the States situate in the farthest parts of *Gallia*, bordering upon the Sea, which are called *Aremoricæ*, follow-



following the example of the *Carnutes*, at the coming of *Fabius* with his Legions amongst them performed his commandments without delay.

*Dumnacus* thus driven out of his own Country, wandering and lurking in Corners alone, was compelled to betake himself to the uttermost Countries of all *Gallia*.

#### CHAP. VIII.

*Drapes* and *Luterius* seize upon *Uxellodunum*.

*Caninius* pursueth them, overthroweth their Forces, taketh *Drapes* Prisoner, and with *Fabius* besiegeth *Uxellodunum*.

**B**UT *Drapes* and *Luterius*, when they understood that *Caninius* approached with his Army, perceiving they could not without manifest Peril enter the Bounds of the Province, considering how the Army pursued them, nor yet range abroad on thieving at their pleasure, stayed together in the Country of the *Cadurci*. There *Luterius* (who in times past while he was in prosperity, was able to sway greatly with his Countrymen, and had gotten great estimation among the rude People, as one that was ever a beginner of new designs) took with his own and *Drapes*'s Forces, a Town called *Uxellodunum*, which had been formerly in his tuition, a place excellently well fortified by the natural situation thereof, and caused the Townsmen to joyn with him.

To this Town *Caninius* forthwith came; and perceiving that all parts of the same were fortified with craggy Cliffs, insomuch that though no Man were there to defend it, yet were it a hard matter for Men in their Armour to get up; knowing also that the Moveables of the Townsmen were great, which if they should go about to carry privily away, they could not escape either our Horsemen or Footmen: He divided his Cohorts into three parts, and made three Camps upon a very high ground; from which by degrees, as his Army was able, he determined to draw a Rampier and Trench round about the Town.

The Townsmen perceiving that, and remembering the miserable Condition of *Alexia*, feared the like Siege. *Luterius* especially, who had tasted the smart of that misfortune, advised them to lay for Corn beforehand: Whereupon they determined by general consent, that leaving a part of the Army for the defence of the Town, *Luterius* and *Drapes* with the best provided should go forth to fetch in Corn. This counsel being approved of, the next Night *Drapes* and *Luterius* leaving two thousand Armed Men behind them, drew the rest out of the Town. After a few Days being abroad, they brought in a great quantity of Grain out of the Country of the *Cadurci*, who partly were willing to help them therewith, and partly durst not withstand their taking it, as not being able to make their part good against them. Oftentimes also they would fly out in the Night, and assault the Castles of our Camp. Upon which consideration *C. Caninius* stayed the making of Fortifications round about the Town, lest he should not be able to defend the Circumvallation when it was finished, or else should be forced

to set but weak Watches in so many places at once.

When they had gotten together a great quantity of Grain, *Drapes* and *Luterius* took up their standings not above ten Miles from the Town, the better at times to convey it in; and they parted the Charge between them. *Drapes* tarried behind with part of the Army to keep the Camp: *Luterius* drove the Beasts with their Carriages toward the Town: And setting Guards there for his defence, about ten of the Clock in the Night purposed by narrow ways through the Woods to convey the Corn into the Town. The Watchmen of our Camp hearing the noise of their Feet, and the Scouts which were sent out reporting what was a doing, *Caninius* caused his Cohorts to arm themselves quickly, and about break of Day made attempt out of the next Castles upon the Foragers. Who being frightened with the suddenness of the Mischief, fled to their Guards. Which as soon as our Men perceived, they flew more fiercely upon them, and suffered none to be taken alive. *Luterius* fled from thence with a few, but returned not to his Camp.

After this good success, *Caninius* understood by his Prisoners that part of the Army was behind in the Camp with *Drapes*, not above twelve Miles off. Which when he had learned by many to be truth, believing that one of the Generals already put to flight, the remnant of the Army being terrified might easily be overthrown; he thought it a great piece of happiness, that none escaped from the Slaughter into the Camp, to carry tidings of the Mishap to *Drapes*. And forasmuch as he saw there was no danger in putting the matter to tryal, he sent all his Horsemen and the German Footmen, swift and nimble Fellows, before, to the Camp of his Enemies. One of his Legions he left in his Camp, and the other eased of all Carriages, he took with him.

When he came near his Enemies, his Scouts that he had sent before, brought word that (as the custom of the barbarous Nations commonly is) they had abandoned the higher Ground, and encamped themselves by the River side; and that our Horse and the Germans had flown upon them suddenly ere they were aware, and charged them. Upon the receipt of this News, he hastened forward with his Legion well armed and well appointed: And so the sign being given suddenly on all sides, the higher places were taken by our Men. At the doing whereof, the Germans and our Cavalry seeing the Ensigns of our Legion, fought very stoutly: And by and by all our Cohorts charged upon them round; so that in the conclusion, they were all either slain, or Prisoners, and a great booty taken. *Drapes* himself was also taken in the same conflict.

*Caninius* having done his work successfully, without almost any hurt at all to his Soldiers, returned to besiege the Town: And having now destroyed his Enemy without, for fear of whom he could not before divide his Garrisons, nor environ the Town with Fortifications; he commandeth the Works to be carried on round about the Town. The next day came thither *C. Fabius* with his Forces, and took another part of the Town to besiege.



## C H A P. IX.

*Cæsar having punished Guturvatus for the revolt of the Carnutes, joyneth with Caninius and Fabius before Uxellodunum. Upon his depriving them of Water the Town yieldeth. Cæsar cutteth off their Right-Hands.*

**I**N the mean time, *Cæsar* left *M. Antonius* the *Quæstor* with fifteen Cohorts among the *Bellovaci*, to prevent any new confederacies among them for the future: And he himself visited the other States, charging them with more Hostages, and with comfortable Words raising the fearful Hearts of them all.

When he came amongst the *Carnutes*, in whose Country (as *Cæsar* hath declared in his former Commentary) the War first of all began, inasmuch as he perceived them to be chiefly afraid, as being conscious to themselves of their fault, to the intent he might the more speedily deliver the rest of the State from fear, he demanded *Guturvatus*, the ring-leader of that Mischiefe, and raiser of the Rebellion, to be delivered unto him to be punished: Who albeit he trusted not himself with his own Country-men, yet all Men made so diligent search for him, that he was soon found out and brought to the Camp. *Cæsar*, contrary to his own Nature, was compelled to punish him whether he would or no, by the importunity of his Souldiers, who imputed all the Dangers and Losses that they had sustained by this War, unto *Guturvatus*: inasmuch that his Body after it was in a manner whipped to Death, was beheaded.

While *Cæsar* tarried here, he was advertised by several Letters from *Caninius*, what was done to *Drapes* and *Luterius*, and how the Townsmen persevered in their resolution: the small Number of whom although he despised, yet he deemed their wilfulness worthy of severe Punishment; lest they might give occasion to all *Gallia*, to think that they wanted not Strength, but Constancy and Resolution to withstand the *Romans*; or lest by their Example, other Cities of *Gallia*, trusting to the advantage and strength of Places, should attempt to recover their Liberty: especially seeing he was sure that all the *Gauls* knew his Commission lasted but one Summer longer, which if they could hold out, they should need to fear no danger after. And therefore leaving *Q. Calenus* the Legate behind with twon Legions to follow leisurely after him by easy Marches, he himself with all his Cavalry made haste to *Caninius*.

When *Cæsar*, contrary to all Mens expectation, was come to *Uxellodunum*, and saw the Town environed with Fortifications, perceiving that it was not for him to break up his Siege on any Condition, and learning moreover by Runaways that the Town had great abundance of Victuals: He assayed to cut off the Water from his Enemies.

There was a River that ran through the bottom of the Valley, which environed well-near all the Hill whereon the Town stood, from whence the Descent was rough and steep on all sides. The Nature of the Place would not suffer this Stream to be turned any other way. For it ran in such sort at the very Foot of the Hill, that there could be no Ditch cut low enough to drain it. The Townsmen had hard and very steep coming down to it, inasmuch that if our Men withstood them, they could not without Wounds or danger of their Lives, either come down to the River, or

get up the steep Hill again. Which distressed of theirs *Cæsar* well knowing, placed Archers and Slingers, and other Artillery also, against such places where the easiest coming down was, to keep the Townsmen from the Water of the River: who afterward came for Water all to one Place. For under the very Walls of the Town there gushed out a great spring of Water on that side where there was a space almost of three hundred Foot not encompassed with the River.

Now whilst all the rest wished, and only *Cæsar* perceived, that this Spring might be taken from the Town, though not without great Damage; he began to raise Vines directly against it toward the Hill, and to make Mounts, with great labour and continual fighting. For the Townsmen came running down from the higher Ground, and fought with our Men at a distance without danger, wounding many of them that pressed up too forwardly. Notwithstanding our Men were nothing deterred from bringing forward their Vines, endeavouring to overcome the crabbedness of the Place, with their Labour and Works. At the same time they drew privy Mines to the Head of the Spring, which kind of Work they might do without any Danger or Mistrust of their Enemies. A mount was cast up six Foot high, and thereupon was raised a Tower of Ten Stories; not such a one as might equal the Height of the Walls, (for that was not possible to be done any way) but such a one as might exceed the top of the Spring. From which conveying Darts with Engines to the Brim of the Spring, so that the Townsmen could not fetch Water without Danger, not only all sorts of Cattle, but also a great Number of Men died for Thirst.

The Townsmen greatly astonished hereat, filled Barrels with Grease, Pitch, and Shingles, and setting them on Fire, rolled them down upon our Works, and at the same time also fought very desperately, with the peril of fighting to keep the *Romans* from quenching the Fire. Suddenly there was a great Flame in our Works. For whatsoever was thrown down from that steep Place, the same staying against the Vines and Rampier, took hold upon the things that stayed them. On the other side, our Souldiers, albeit they were hindered both with the dangerousness of the Encounter, and with the disadvantage of the Place, yet they bare out all things with a stout Courage. For the thing was done both in an eminent Place, and also in the sight of our Army: and a great Cry was raised on both sides. So that every Man as far as he could, especially the most daring, (to the intent his Valour might the better be known and testified) ventured himself upon the Fire, and the Weapons of his Enemies.

*Cæsar* when he saw many of his Men wounded, commanded his Cohorts to climb up the Hill on all sides of the Town, and to raise a Shout as if they purposed to scale the Walls. Where-with the Townsmen being frightened, forasmuch as they knew not what was doing in other Places, called back their Men from assaulting our Works, and placed them upon the Walls. So our Men having respite from fighting, did quickly either quench the Works that were on fire, or else cut them off from the rest.

The Townsmen stubbornly standing out, tho' they had lost a great part of their Men by Thirst, and continuing still unanimously resolved, at length the Veins of the Spring were cut off within the Ground by Mines, and turned another way: By means whereof the Fountain of running



ning Water was presently dried up. Which so daunted the Hearts of the Defendants, who believed it could not be done by the Wit of Man, but came to pass by the Will of the Gods; that when they saw there was no other Remedy, they yielded themselves.

Cæsar being assured that his Clemency was sufficiently known to all People, and therefore he needed to fear that it would be imputed to the cruelty of his Nature, if he dealt something harshly with them; and besides that, considering with himself, that it might well be thought he little regarded the good success of his Counsels and Undertakings, if by suffering such things Unpunished, others should be encouraged to rebel in divers Places: he thought it requisite to hold the rest in awe by the Punishment of these. And therefore he cut off the Hands of as many of them as were able to bear Arms, and let them live still, that the Punishment of such wicked Men might be more manifest to the World.

## C H A P. X.

*Drapes dieth. Luterius brought to Cæsar. Labienus's good Success against the Treviri. Cæsar after his expedition into Aquitania, putteth his Army into Winter-quarters.*

**D**Rapes, whom I declared to have been taken by Caninius, whether it were for Vexation and Grief that he was in Bands, or for fear of more heavy punishment, fasted a few Days from Meat, and so starved.

At the same time Luterius, that escaped by flight from the Battle (as I shewed before) fell into the Hands of Epasnaetus the Arvernian. For in often shifting from Place to Place, he was fain to venture himself upon the Courtesy and Civility of many, because he thought he could never continue any long time in one Place without Danger, his Heart misgiving him how much he had deserved to have Cæsar his Enemy. Epasnaetus the Arvernian being a faithful Friend to the People of Rome, as soon as he had gotten him into his Hands, brought him without further delay bound unto Cæsar.

In the mean time Labienus warreth prosperously against the Treviri: And having slain many both of the Treviri and also of the Germans, who were ready to assist any Man against the Romans, got the Chief of them alive into his Hands; among whom was Surus the Heduan, a Man of great Valour and Noble Birth, who alone of the Heduan had unto that Day continued in Arms against the People of Rome.

Cæsar knowing thereof, and forasmuch as he saw his Affairs went well forward in all parts of Gallia, weighing himself how all Celtica and Belgica where the former Summers conquered and subdued, and that he had never all this while visited Aquitania, only he had made a kind of entrance into it by certain Victories gotten by P. Crassus: He marched thither with two Legions, with intent to bestow the latter part of the Summer there. Which thing (as he had done all others before) he dispatched quickly and luckily. For all the States of Aquitania sent Ambassadors unto him, and gave him Hostages.

After the accomplishment of these things, he went to Narbone with his Guard of Horlemen, and sent his Foot into their Winter-quarters by his Legates. Four Legions he placed in Belgium under M. Antonius, C. Tribonius, P. Vatinus, and Q. Tullius, Legates. Two he quar-

tered amongst the Heduan, whom he knew to be of greater Authority in all Gallia. Two more he placed amongst the Treviri, in the borders of the Carnutes, to be a stay to all the Country that lay upon the Sea-coast. The other two he placed in the borders of the Lemovici, not far from the Arverni: That so there might not be any part of Gallia without an Army.

After he had tarried a few Days in the Province, and there speedily taken cognizance of all their Courts, sitting upon publick Controversies, and rewarded such as had deserved well, (for he had a great desire to understand how every Man had carried himself towards the Commonwealth during the general Rebellion of all Gallia, which he had born out through the faithfulness and assistance of the said Province) as soon as he had dispatched these things, he returned to his Legions into Belgium, and wintered at Nemetocenna.

## C H A P. XI.

*Comius of Arras overthrown in a Battle of Horse by C. Volusenus, submitteth to M. Antonius, and receiveth Pardon.*

**W**HILE he was there, he understood that Comius of Arras had encountered with his Cavalry. For Antonius being come into his Winter-quarters, and the City of Arras continuing firmly Loyal, Comius, who after his Wound that we spake of before, was wont still to be ready at hand to his Countrymen at every Turn, to the intent that if they would begin any new rising, they should not want a Head and a Captain for the War; as long as the City continued obedient to the Romans, he with his Horsemen maintained himself and his followers by thieving, for laying the Ways, he cut off many Convoys that were going with Provision to the Roman Garrisons. C. Volusenus Quadratus, the General of the Horse, was appointed to winter in the same Place with Antonius: Him did Antonius send to pursue the Horse of his Enemies. Volusenus, beside the singular Valour that was in him, did also bear a great Hatred toward Comius, and for that cause was the more willing to execute the thing that was commanded him. Wherefore placing divers Ambushes, he oftentimes set upon Comius's Horsemen, and worsted them.

At last, when the contention grew more Vehement, and that Volusenus, desirous to cut off Comius himself, followed him somewhat more eagerly with a small Party, and Comius on the other side fled the faster away, thereby to draw him farther from his Company; at length espying his Advantage, Comius suddenly cried out to all his Men, that as they were true unto him they should stand to him, and not suffer the Wound that was given him basely under colour of Friendship, to be unrevenged: And therewithal turning his Horse, he runneth from the rest of his Company upon Volusenus. All his Horse followed, and because there were but a few of our Men, they made them retreat, and pursued them. Comius putting Spurs to his Horse, encountered the Horse of Quadratus, and with his Spear thrust Volusenus by great Violence through the Thigh.

When our Horse saw that their Captain was wounded, they bestirred themselves, and turning again upon the Enemy, put them back. Many of the Enemies by the violent charge of our Men were



were beaten off, and wounded : Of whom some were overthrown in the chase, and some were taken Prisoners. As *Comius* escaped any farther mishap by the swiftness of his Horse : so our General being by him in this Battle sore wounded, was carried into the Camp in such a case, that it was not likely he should have lived. And *Comius*, whether it were that he thought himself sufficiently revenged, or because he had lost a great part of his Men, sent Messengers to *Antonius*, giving Hostages, and assuring him that he would continue where it should please him to appoint, and do whatsoever he should command him. Only one request he made, wherein he besought him to bear with his fearfulness, that he might not be forced to come in the fight of any Roman. Which request, *Antonius* judging to proceed out of a real fear, and not without good cause, he pardoned him according to his desire, and receiving his Hostages.

## C H A P. XII.

*While Cæsar is busie in quieting and ordering things in Gallia, and visiting some municipal Towns in Italy, his Enemies conspire against him at Rome.*

**D**URING the time that *Cæsar* wintred in *Belgium*, his chief purpose was, to keep the States in amity, and to take away all hope and occasion of War : For he intended nothing less, than the carriage of his business so, as he should be constrained to have War at the time of his departure : lest when he should withdraw his Army, he should leave any Troubles behind, which all *Gallia* could willingly engage in, so that it might be without present Danger. And therefore by entreating the Cities honourably, by rewarding the Noble-men highly, by burdening the Country with no new impositions, he easily kept all *Gallia*, which now was tired out with so many unfortunate Battels, in quiet and obedience.

Winter being over, *Cæsar*, contrary to his custom, hasteth into *Italy* with as much expedition as might be, to treat with the municipal Towns and Colonies, and to commend unto them the Suit of his Quæstor *M. Antonius* for the Priesthood. For he made all the Friends for him he could, both because the same *Antonius* was his very dear Friend, whom he had sent before to sue for that promotion, as also to oppose the factions and unreasonable proceedings of a few Men, who by putting *Antonius* beside his purpose, sought to disparage *Cæsar* now going out of his command.

Albeit he had tidings by the way before he came near *Italy*, that *Antony* was made Augur, yet he thought he had as good reason as before, to visit the municipal Towns and Colonies, both to give them thanks for appearing in the business, and for their Civility shewed in the behalf of *Antony* ; as also to commend unto them his own case, touching the honour which he purposed to sue for the next year : And that the rather, because his Adversaries proudly made their brag, that *L. Lentulus* and *C. Marcellus* were created Consuls, to deprive *Cæsar* of all Honour and Authority : and that the Consulship was wrested from *Sergius Galba*, though he had more Voices on his Side, because he was a familiar Friend of *Cæsar's*, and had been engaged unto him as his Legate.

*Cæsar* at his coming among the municipal Towns, was entertained with extraordinary Affec-

tion and Respect : That being his first coming from the Wars in *Gallia*. Nothing was omitted that could be devised for the decking and adorning of their Gates, Ways, and Places where *Cæsar* should pass. All the People came forth with their Children to meet him by the Way ; Sacrifices were every where offered ; the Temples and Market-places were hanged with Clothes of Tapestry : So that a Man would have thought by the expressions of Joy, there had been some great Triumph expected and provided for. So great Costliness was among the richer Sort, and such hearty Expressions was among the meaner Sort.

When *Cæsar* had lightly passed through all the Countries of *Gallia Togata*, he returned with all speed to his Army at *Nemetocenna*, and calling all his Legions out of their Winter-quarters into the Country of the *Treviri*, he went thither, and there mustred them. *T. Labienus* he made Governour of *Gallia Togata*, thereby to get himself the more Favour and Furtherance in his Suit for the Consulship. He himself removed from one Place to another, accordingly as he found it necessary for Health. And albeit he heard oftentimes that *Labienus* was solicited strongly by his Enemies, and was also advertised how it was carried on by a small Faction at *Rome*, to take away part of his Army from him by a Decree of the Senate : yet notwithstanding he neither gave Credit to any thing that was reported of *Labienus*, nor would be drawn to do any thing contrary to the Authority of the Senate. For he believed that if the Senators might give their Voices freely, he should easily obtain his purpose.

For *C. Curio* Tribune of the People, who had taken upon him the defence of *Cæsar's* cause and dignity, had oftentimes propounded to the Senate, that if the fear of *Cæsar's* Army prejudiced any Man, and seeing that the Authority and Power of *Pompey* did not a little keep the Courts in awe ; that both of them might lay down their Arms and dismiss their Armies : And so should the City be at liberty to use her own Right as she pleased. This he not only propounded, but began to divide the Senate about it : Which the Consuls and the Friends of *Pompey* commanded should not be done : and so ruling the matter as they listed, they departed. This was a great Testimony of the whole Senate, and agreeable to their former Act.

For *Marcellus* the Year before opposing *Cæsar's* Dignity, contrary to the Law of *Pompey* and *Crassus*, and having put up a Bill to the Senate for the discharge of *Cæsar* before the time of his Commission was expired ; when they had given their Voices, *Marcellus*, who sought all his Honour by working Spight against *Cæsar*, departed aside, and the Senate fell all of them quite upon other matters.

This did not at all daunt the Spirits of *Cæsar's* Enemies, but rather stirred them up to strengthen their Party, and thereby to compel the Senate to approve of that which they had determined. Hereupon a decree was made, that *Cneius Pompeius* should send one Legion, and *Cæsar* another, to the War against the *Parthians*. But it was easily discerned that both these Legions were taken from *Cæsar*. For the first Legion, which *Cneius Pompeius* had sent unto *Cæsar* levied in the Province, he gave unto *Cæsar* as one of his own Number. Nevertheless, albeit that no Man need doubt but that *Cæsar* was spoiled at the Pleasure of his Enemies, yet he sent *Pompey* his Legion again : and of his own Forces, he ordered the fifteenth Legion which he had in the hither *Gallia*, to be delivered to him according to the



the Decree of the Senate. In the room whereof he sent the thirteenth Legion into *Italy*, to lie in Garrison in the same place from whence the fifteenth was drawn.

Then he distributed his Army into Winter Quarters. *C. Trebonius* with four Legions he placed in *Belgium*: *C. Fabius* with as many amongst the *Hedui*. For this he thought would be the best way to keep *Gallia* in most safety and quiet, if the *Belgæ*, who were the most Valorous, and the *Hedui*, who were of most Authority, had Forces quartered among them to keep them

in obedience. This done, he took his journey into *Italy*.

When he came thither, he understood that the two Legions which he had dismissed, which by the Decree of the Senate should have been employed in the *Parthian War*, were by *C. Marcellus* the Consul delivered to *Pompey*, and kept still in *Italy*. Although by this dealing it was evident to all the World, what was intended against *Cæsar*, yet *Cæsar* determined to take all things patiently, as long as he had any hope left to decide the controversy rather by the Law than by the Sword.

## OBSERVATIONS upon the Eighth Commentary of the Wars in GALLIA.

**S**ome attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gauls to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be Larded over by Strangers: and others, to the too great Clemency of *Cæsar*. I grant that Clemency apt to pardon emboldens to Revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our Liberty: But if Cruelty causeth them less frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when despair driveth Men thereunto, and that the hope of safety resteth only in Victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithful to the end; which never falleth out where there is hope of the Enemies Clemency. We have here plentiful Examples thereof. *Cæsar* in the greater part of the Revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his Clemency; which hath been a powerful means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their Revolts: And if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by foul and unworthy Acts; as when the *Veneti* under publick faith imprisoned the Roman Officers, which came to them to buy Corn for the sustenance of the Army. But I cannot excuse that of *Uxellodunum*. On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of *Alva*, drove poor Fishermen so into despair, that they have shaken off his insupportable Yoke; and with an admirable constancy have maintained and enriched themselves, and are grown so Potent, as that they are able to resist him by Land, and by Sea take from him his Treasure in the Indies.

*Cæsar* sheweth us also by his care and industry to get intelligence of the Enemies proceedings (whether by taking Prisoners in the Field, or by having good Spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successful designs having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaileth hath more Courage than he which is assailed, and always believeth the Assailant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well-exercised and well-disciplined Army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but where are new-levied Soldiers, fall out great disorders: Which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his Camp very strongly; to the end he might defend it and all his Baggage with a few Men, and might without danger execute many brave designs, being always assured of his retreat. Let us farther take a view of the Siege of *Uxellodunum*: Which *Cæsar* judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of Corn, undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from Water, which was from a Fountain without the Town, from whence they were only supplied: Which the besieged perceiving, having set fire on *Cæsar's* Works, by a Sally they hindered him from quenching it. *Cæsar* not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an assault upon the Town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.



## The Duke of ROHAN's REMARKS.

**S**ome People impute the frequent Revolts of the Gauls to the fickleness of their Temper and their Impatience, which can abide no Foreign Yoke; and others to Cæsar's extraordinary Clemency. I confess that Clemency which gives hopes of Pardon, sometimes Imboldens to a Revolt; by reason that Men easily forget kindnesses which do not fully restore Liberty. But if Cruelty renders them less frequent, it makes them more dangerous, because that when Men are by Despair, and have no hopes unless of Victory, the most Timorous become Valiant, Obstinate, Constant, and Faithful to the last, which never happens when People rely on the Clemency of their Enemies. These Wars afford us frequent Examples of it. Cæsar in most of the Revolts of the Gauls, has often found it easie to bring them back to their Allegiance, by his Clemency, which prov'd a puissant Motive to create divisions among them, and to hinder them from being obstinate in their Revolts. And when ever he chanc'd to exert any Severity it was groundd on some base unworthy Action; as when those of Vannes contrary to the Law of Nations stoop'd the Roman Knights, who came to buy Corn of them for the Maintenance of the Army, (but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac;) On the contrary, the King of Spain's Cruelties, Executed by the Duke of Alva, reduc'd miserable Fishermen to despair, who thereupon, shook off his Insupportable Yoke, and by an admirable Constancy have maintain'd themselves, increas'd their Dominion, and are become so formidable, that they are able to Resist him in these Parts, and to snatch his Treasures in the Indies.

Cæsar teaches us also by his Care and Industry, to inform our selves with what passes among our Enemies, either by taking Prisoners in the Field, or by keeping Spies among them, and shews us the advantage of it. Several of his happy Successes were groundd upon it, it being always advantageous to attempt them, by reason that he who Attacks has more Courage than he who is Attack'd, whoever supposes the Assailant stronger than himself, does not know which way he will Attack him, and dreads Treachery. Finally, all that can be done in such a case by a brave well-disciplin'd Army, is to defend themselves. But it occasions great disorders among raw Soldiers. And therefore he took so much care to Fortifie his Camp, in order to Guard it, and all his Baggage, with a small number of Men, and to be able to perform great Executions without danger, being always certain of a Retreat.

Let us also consider the Siege of Cadenac. Cæsar judging it Impregnable by open force, knowing that it was very well provided with Corn, undertakes a great and dangerous Labour to deprive them of the Water of a Fountain, which lay without the Town, and the only one that supply'd them. But the Besieged perceiving it, put the Works on Fire, and endeavour'd by a Sally to prevent the Extinguishing of it, which Cæsar observing, and finding that he could not repulse them, by reason of the advantage of the Place, he bethought himself to Storm the City, whereby he oblig'd them to Retire.



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OBSERVATIONS  
UPON  
Cæsar's Commentaries  
OF THE  
CIVIL WARS  
Betwixt  
HIM and POMPEY.

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By CLEMENT EDMUNDS, Remembrancer of the City of London.

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*The First COMMENTARY of the Civil Wars.*

*The Argument.*

**T**His Commentary containeth the Motions and Contentions at Rome, concerning Cæsar's giving up his Government: The rent in the State, upon the disagreement of the Senate: How either side bestirred themselves, to seize upon the Provinces. Pompey got the East, and Cæsar the West part of the Empire; and defeated Afranius and Petreius in Spain.

CHAP. I.

The Senate's affection on Cæsar's behalf.

Cæsar.

**L**etters being delivered by Fabius to the Consuls from C. Cæsar, it was hardly obtained by the extreme importunity of the Tribunes, to get them read in the Senate: but to consult thereof, or to bring the Contents in question, would not be granted. The Consuls propounded businesses concerning the state of the City. L. Lentulus, Consul, protested his assistance should not be wanting, neither to the Senate nor to the Commonwealth, if they would speak their minds freely and boldly: But if they respected Cæsar, and had an eye to his favour (as in former times they usually had) he would then take a course for himself, and not regard the Authority of the Senate; neither wanted he means of entrance into Cæsar's friendship and good acceptance. To the same effect spake Scipio; That Pompey was resolved to be aiding to the Commonwealth, if the Senate would stand to him: But if they temporized, and dealt coldly, in vain hereafter should they seek aid from him, albeit they instantly desired it. This Speech of Scipio's seemed to come from Pompey's own mouth, he himself be-

ing present, and the Senate kept within the City. Some others spake more temperately. As first M. Marcellus, who thought it not convenient that the Senate should bring these things in question, until they had made a levy of Soldiers throughout all Italy, and inrolled an Army; by whose protection, they might safely and freely determine what they thought fit. As also M. Calidius, who thought it requisite, that Pompey should go to his Provinces and Governments, to remove all occasions of taking Arms: For Cæsar having two Legions newly taken from him, feared that Pompey kept them near about the City to his prejudice. And likewise M. Rufus, varying some few words, declared himself of Calidius's opinion. All these were bitterly reproved by L. Lentulus the Consul; who utterly denied to publish what Calidius had sentenced. Marcellus scared with these Menaces, retracted his opinion. And so, what with the clamour of the Consul, the terror of the present Army, and the threatening used by Pompey's Faction, most of the Senators were compelled against their will, to allow that which Scipio thought fit: which was, that by a certain day Cæsar should dissolve and dismiss his Army; which if he did refuse to do, that then he openly shewed himself an Enemy to the Commonwealth. M. Antonius and L. Cassius, Tribunes of the People, did oppose this



Decree. Their opposition was instantly spoken unto; and many sharp and hard censures were given upon the same: For according as any one spake most bitterly and cruelly, so they were most highly commended by Cæsar's Enemies.

### The First OBSERVATION.

AS the former Commentaries do carry in their front the ensigns of Honour, displaying the Military Valour of the Roman People in the Continent of Gallia, and other Kingdoms of Warlike Nations: So are these Relations branded in the Forehead with a note of Infamy, and Titled with the direful name of Civil War. An odious and detestable Cause, ill befitting the Integrity of that State, or the excellency of the Actors, which are chief in this Tragedy; who neglecting all that might either enlarge the Empire, or repair Rome's Honour for the loss of Crassus, chose rather to imbrow their ambitious Swords in the Blood of their own Country, (a) Eagle against Eagle, and Pile against Pile, in a War which could challenge no Triumph. If it be now demanded, as formerly it was,

(a) *Pares Aquilas, & pile nimanitia pilis. Bella geri placuit nullis habitura triumphos.* Luc. lib. 1.

*Quis furor, ô Cives? quæ tanta licentia ferri?*  
What fury's this? what these licentious Arms?

Was it Pompey's Ambition, or Cæsar's high Thoughts, that bereft the State of Liberty, with the loss of so many Romans? It were besides the scope of these discourses, to lay an imputation upon either of those Worthies; the one being chief Assistant to the Empire, when she put off her Consulary Government, and the other sitting sole at the Helm, directing a course to fetch in many Cæsars. Only this I may truly say with Tacitus (b); That Civil Wars were never set on foot by justifiable courses. Yet for the Readers better direction, and for opening the truth of this Story (c) which is more to be regarded than either Socrates or Plato's friendship) it shall not be impertinent to fetch the causes of this War a little higher in a word than these Commentaries do afford them.

(b) *Arma civilia neque parari, neque haberi, per bonas Artes possunt.* Tac. 1. An.  
(c) *Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato: magis amica veritas.* Aristot. 1. Ethic.  
*Pom. Mag. Constantine was so jealous thereof, that he published an Edict, that the honour of all Victories should be attributed to him, although they were achieved 100 leagues off.*

The Histories of that Age do all intimate, that when Rome had ennobled Pompey with her service, and stiled him by employments with the Title of Greatness, as a satisfaction for the injuries done unto his Father; he (forgetting the Rights of a State, which challengeth the Renown of other Mens labours, and suffereth no Subject to be co-partner therein, further than by approbation of Service and Obedience) assumed to himself the Honour due to the Commonwealth, and became proud of that which was none of his: In which conceit, the ambition of his Spirit kept no measure, but over-valued his merits so far, that he thought himself rather a Sovereign than a Servant. So easily are Men bewitched, when the favour of a State hath once made them Absolute, and put it self under the awe of private Command. In this height of Greatness and Authority, he made way for Cæsar, his Father-in-law; who had a Spirit as subject to Ambition, and as capable of publick Dignities, as any one amongst all the Patrician Families: And upon the ending of his first Consulship, in the Year of Rome 695, obtained the Government of Gallia Transalpina, and likewise of that other Gallia which they called Cisalpina, containing the Countries that lie between the Alpes and the (d) little River Rubicon, together with Sclavonia, and four Legions of Soldiers, for the term of five Years. At the expiration whereof, his charge was continued, by the like

(d) *Fonte cadit modico, parvisque impellitur undis Punicus Rubicon, & Gallica certus Limes ab Ausonius diffinitur arva colunt.* Lucan. lib. 1.

favour and mediation of (e) Pompey, and the assistance of Crassus, for five Years longer, with a redoubling of his Forces. But after that Crassus was slain in the Parthian War, and that Julia, Cæsar's Daughter, whom Pompey had Married, was deceased (whereby Cæsar stood single, without any tie of alliance, or other (a) counterpoise of a third party, to hold them balanced at the same weight as they stood while Crassus lived) Pompey jealous of those Victories and passages of Arms which Cæsar had achieved by his Valour, and impatient of any (b) partner in point of Lordship; found means first to draw two Legions from him, under colour of the Parthian War; and afterwards got a Decree of Senate, to send him a Successour before his time was expired; and withal, to return as a private Person to Rome, to render an account of his Actions during his employment. Which Cæsar taking as an assurance of his downfall, gave (c) huge sums of Money to gain Paulus Æmylius, one of the Consuls, and C. Curio, a Tribune of the People, to resist this Decree. Howbeit, the succeeding Consuls being both his Enemies, having no farther hope of repealing the same, he intreated in the end, that he might hold only Gallia Cisalpina and Illyricum with two Legions, until he should obtain the Consulship; which was the effect of these Letters delivered by Fabius. And being denied by Pompey's Faction, in these partial and tumultuous assemblies of the Senate, caused him to forfeit his Loyalty to the State, verifying the old saying, (d) That oftentimes an injury maketh way to a greater fortune.

(e) *Facta tribus dominis communis Romanæ Pompeio Cæsari & Crasso.*

(a) *Nam sola futuri Crassus erat belli mediocris mora.*

(b) *Nulla sancta societas, nec fides regni. Ennius. Nec quenquam jam ferre potest, Cæsare priorem, Pompeiusve Patrem.* Luc. lib. 1.

(c) *Ardua res hac est, opibus non trahere mores.* Martial. lib. 1.

(d) *Sape majori fortuna locum fecit injuria.* Seneca Epist. 91.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the opposition of the Tribunes, it is to be understood, that the People, eaten up with Usury and other grievous exactions, forsook both the City and the Camp, when the State had War with the Volsci and the Æqui; and taking themselves to a Mountain near unto Rome, would not return from thence, until the Senate had given order for their grievances. In which Transaction it was agreed, that there should be Magistrates chosen out of the body of the People, to counterpoise the Power of the Senate, and to restrain the boundless Authority of the Consuls: Which Office was reckoned in the number of their holiest things, never to be violated either in word or deed, but the offender should redeem it with the loss of his life. Their whole Power consisted in letting and hindering. As when either the Senate, or any one Senator, went about a matter which might be prejudicial to the People in general, or to any one of the Commonalty in particular; then did the Tribunes interpose their Authority, to frustrate and avert the same: Which was available, albeit the matter was gainsaid but by one Tribune only. By which intervention they kept the Senate in awful moderation, and were always profitable to the State, but when they happened upon factious and turbulent Persons; howbeit, their Power was bounded with the Walls of Rome, and extended no further than the Gates of the City. Their Doors were never shut, but stood open night and day, for a refuge to such as should fly to them for succour: Neither was it lawful for them to be absent from Rome a whole day together. The Robes of their Magistracy were of Purple; as Cicero intimateth in his Oration *Pro Cluentio*. This Tribunitian Power began about the Year of Rome 260; was suppress'd by Sylla; restored by Pompey; and utterly taken away by the Emperour Constantine.

The Tribunes of the people.



What kind of  
Common-  
wealth was  
this of Rome.  
(a) Libertatis  
originem inde  
magis, quia  
annuum con-  
sulare Imperi-  
um factum  
est, quam  
quod diminu-  
tum quic-  
quam sit ex  
regia potestate,  
numeres. Liv.  
lib. 2.  
(b) His legibus  
dissolutum est  
imperium con-  
sulare, &c.  
Liv. lib. 4.  
(c) Licet.  
(d) Viator.

If it be demanded what kind of Commonwealth this Roman Government was; it is to be understood, that upon the expulsion of their Kings, the Sovereignty rested in their Consuls. For, as (a) Livy saith, there was nothing diminished of Kingly Government, save only for the better establishing of Liberty, that the Consular Dignity was made Annual. But that held not long, for *Publius* imparted this Sovereignty to the Commonalty, making it lawful to appeal from the Consuls to the People. Whereby (b) the Consular Sovereignty was dissolved, and the People took occasion to oppose themselves against the Fathers. Hence grew the reciprocal Invectives between the Senate and the Tribunes; and when the Consul sent a (c) Serjeant to the Tribune, the Tribune would send a (d) Pursuevant to the Consul. And so the Commonwealth halted between an Aristocracy and a Democracy, until at length the vogue of the Commonalty drew it to a perfect Democracy, and made their Acts of Senate of no value, unless they were ratified by the People. Howbeit, the Senate afforded always many famous and eminent Men, such as having enlarged the bounds of their Empire, and kept on foot their ancient Valour, and were the flower of that People, which *Cyneas* called *A Town of Kings*, were consequently so engaged in the businesses of the State, that matters were for the most part carried as they stood affected; as appeareth by this passage of *Cæsar*.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

Faction in a  
Council, is an  
enemy to the  
publick good.

THirdly, we may observe, that Violence and Partiality are the bane of all Consultations: especially, when the common good is shadowed with private respects. And albeit the Gravity of the Roman Senate far exceeded all that can be spoken of other Councils of State, rectifying the inordinate affections of any *Catiline* that would lift up his head higher than his Fellows: Yet here it suffered equity and indifferency to be suppressed with Faction, giving way to Violence, (e) which governeth all things untowardly, and with Cords of private hate oftentimes draweth the Commonwealth into utter desolation. For prevention whereof, the *Athenians* swore their Senators to make the common good the chiefest scope of all their Counsels: Implying thereby, that private respects are always offensive to publick ends; and the State ever suffereth, when favour prevail-eth against the common profit.

*Tully* going about to direct a Counsellour in this behalf, only wisheth a Man to deliver sincerely what he thinketh of any matter, although he happen to stand alone in his own conceit: For the issue of a business doth not so much concern a Counsellour, as to speak truly his opinion thereof. And to that end, the custom of the Roman Senate was, that the youngest, and such as came last in place should declare themselves first; that they might not be forestalled in their Opinions, nor put besides that they would have spoken; together with the equality which it made of their Voices: For things first spoken, do always stick fastest in our apprehensions. And for that cause *Theodorus* (a Greek Tragedian) would never shew himself on the Stage after any other Actor; as holding the first passages to affect most the Spectators. Notwithstanding which Custom, it is reported that *Cæsar*, in favour of *Pompey*, after their new-made Alliance, would take his Voice first, thereby to anticipate the opinion of others that should follow.

The Emperors (as it seemeth) took what place they pleased: For *Tiberius* in *Marcellus's* cause, said, that he would sentence openly, and upon Oath, that other Men might do the like; Whereunto *Cn. Piso* replied; What place wilt thou take to declare thy self, *Cæsar*? For if thou speak first, I know how to follow; if last, I am afraid I shall dissent from thy opinion. But that which is most blameable in matter of Counsel is, when they come to the Senate-House as to a prize of flattery. Wherein *L. Piso* is deservedly commended, for that he never willingly shewed himself of a servile Opinion; but when necessity forced him, he tempered it with Wisdom. Neither is it the least mischief, that the condition of Sovereignty is such as will hardly endure reproof, but must be disguised, as *Apollonius* corrected *Lyons*, by beating Dogs before them.

Tacit. 1.  
Annal.

Tacit. 6.  
Annal.

Plutarch.

#### CHAP. II.

The Senate proceed against *Cæsar* with all eagerness.

THE Senate rising a little before Night, were all sent for to *Pompey*. He commended the forward for what they had done, and confirmed them for after Resolutions; reprehended such as shewed themselves indifferent, and stirred them up to more forwardness. Many which were of *Pompey's* former Armies were sent for, upon hope of Reward and Advancement: Many of the two Legions which lately came from *Cæsar*, were Commanded to attend; insomuch as the City swarmed with Soldiers against the Election of new Magistrates. *C. Curio* called out the Tribunes of the People. All the Consuls Friends, the Kinsfolks and Allies of *Pompey*, and such others as had any former Enmity with *Cæsar*, were compelled into the Senate. By the presence and Votes of these Men the Weakest were terrified, the Doubtful confirmed, and the most part were cut off from giving absolute and free Voices. *L. Piso* the Censor, and *L. Roscius* the Prator, offered themselves to go to *Cæsar*, to advise him of these things; requiring but six days space to return an Answer. Others thought it fit, that Embassadors should be sent to *Cæsar*, to give him notice of the pleasure of the Senate. To all these was opposed, what the Consul *Scipio*, and *Cato* thought fit. *Cato* was incited, through former Enmity, and especially by the repulse of the Pratorship. *Lentulus*, out of a consideration of his great Debts, hoping to Command an Army, to Govern Provinces, and to receive the liberal acknowledgments of Kings, whom he should thereby procure to be stiled with the Title of Friends to the People of Rome; insomuch as he would not stick to boast in private, that he was like to prove a second *Sylla*, on whom the sovereign Command of the Empire would be conferred. *Scipio* was drawn on by the same hope of having the Government of a Province, or the Command of an Army, which, by reason of his Alliance, he thought to share with *Pompey*; being otherwise afraid to be called into Justice; as also through flattery and Ostentation, both of himself and other great Friends, which were able to sway much, as well in the course of Justice as in the Commonwealth.

*Pompey*, in his particular, was much provoked by *Cæsar's* Enemies, and especially for that he could endure no Man to be his Equal. He was alienated altogether from *Cæsar's* Friendship, and had reconciled himself to their common Enemies; the greatest part of whom were, by his means, gained to *Cæsar*, in the time of their Alliance. He was also moved by the Dishonour which he had gotten by taking these

*Pompeius* ut  
primum rem-  
pub. aggressus  
est, non  
quemquam  
animo parem  
tulit. *Velleius*  
*Paterculus*.

two

(e) Nam male  
cuncta mini-  
strat impetus,  
& stimulat  
non raro pri-  
vati odii per-  
tinacia in  
publicum ex-  
cium. Tac.  
1. hist.  
Atheniensis  
Senator jura-  
bat se prae-  
cipue populo  
consulturum.  
Demost. cont.  
Narc.  
1. Philipp.

Arist. 7.  
Polit. 17.

Sueton. in  
vita Julii  
Cæsaris.



two Legions from their Journey towards Asia and Syria, and using them for the Advancement of his own particular. Which things moved him to draw the matter to Arms. For these respects all things were carried impetuously and confusedly; neither was there leisure given to Cæsar's Friends to advertise him thereof; nor yet to the Tribunes, to avoid the danger which was falling upon them, or to use their right of opposition which L. Sylla left unto them: But within seven days after they were entered into their Office, they were forced to shift for their safety; notwithstanding, that the most turbulent and seditious Tribunes of former Times, were never put to look into their Affairs, or to give account of their Actions, before the eighth Month. In the end, they betook themselves to that extremum and last Act of Senate, which was never thought upon, but when the City was upon the point of burning, or in the most desperate estate of the Commonwealth: That the Consuls, Prætors, Tribunes of the People, and such as had been Consuls, and were resident near about the City, should endeavour that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. This Act was made the seventh of the Ides of January: So that the five first days, in which the Senate might sit, after that Lentulus was entered into the Consulship (excepting only two days for the general Assembly of the People) most heavy and cruel Decrees were made against the Authority of Cæsar, and against the Tribunes of the People, famous and worthy Men; who thereupon fled presently out of the City, and came to Cæsar: Who being then at Ravenna, attended an Answer to his easie and modest Demands, if by any reasonable course matters might be drawn to a peaceable end.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

IT is the condition of Humane Nature, to make a good that which once it hath avouched, although the matter be of small consequence in particular, and tendeth rather to Infamy than to Profit; neither will it easily be reclaimed by Motives of Reason, but is rather incited thereby (per Antiperistasin) to persist in wilfulness, than to hearken to that which is more convenient; especially when either Jealousie or Revenge do imply an advantage: For then Partiality keepeth no measure; but to justify an Error, runs headlong into all Extremities, and flieth to the last Refuge of desperate and deplored cases, to make disordered Passions seem good Discretion. Which evidently appears by Pompey's Faction, in resolving of that desperate Act of Senate, which was never thought of but in most eminent danger. For as in foul Weather at Sea, when a Ship rideth in a dangerous Road, and through the violence of the Tempest, is upon the point of Shipwrack, the Mariners are wont to cast out a Sheet-Anchor as their last Refuge: So had Rome anciently recourse to this Decree, at such times as the Commonwealth was in imminent and extremum Calamity; whether it were by Enemies abroad, or by Serpents in their Bosom at home. Livy speaking of the War of the Æqui, saith; The Senators were so affrighted, that following the form of the Decree, which was always reserved for cases of extremity, they ordained that Posthumius (one of the Consuls) should take care that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. The like was used in Civil and Intestine Seditions: As when Manlius Capitolinus aspired to a Tyranny; and as likewise in the tumults of the Gracchi, the Conspiracy of Catiline, and other times of like danger. For albeit the Consuls had all sovereign Authority, as well in War as in Peace:

Yet nevertheless there were certain reserved cases wherein they had no Power, without express Order from the Senate, and assent from the People; as, to Levy on Army, to make War, to take Money out of the Treasury: Whereas upon such a Decree, they were enabled to dispose of all businesses of State, without further moving of the Senate or People, which Tully noteth in his Orations against Antony. I think it fit (saith he) that the whole state of the Commonwealth be left unto the Consuls, and that they be suffered to defend the same; and to take care that the Commonwealth be not endangered.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

I May not omit (for the better understanding of this noble History) to say somewhat of the Persons here mentioned. And first of Fabius, Fabius. as descended of the noblest and most ancient Family of the Patrician Order; being able of themselves to maintain War a long time against the Veii, a strong and Warlike Town, until at length they were all unfortunately slain by an Ambushment: Which Ovid mentioneth, where he saith;

*Hæc fuit illa dies, in qua, Veientibus arvis,  
Ter centum Fabii ter cecidere duo.*

This was that black day, when in Veian Field Three hundred and six Fabii were kill'd.

Only there remained of that House a Child then kept at Rome; which in tract of Time multiplied into six great Families, all which had their turn in the highest Charges and Dignities of the Commonwealth: Amongst whom, he that supplanted Hannibal by temporizing, and got thereby the surname of Maximus, was most famous, as Ennius witnesseth;

*Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem:  
Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.  
Ergo postque magisq; viri nunc gloria claret.*

One Man by wise delay hath sav'd our State;  
Who rumours after publick safety set.  
For which his Fame grows every day more great.

But C. Fabius, here mentioned, never attained to any place of Magistracy, other than such Commands as he held in the Wars under Cæsar.

Lentulus the Consul was of the House of the Cornelii, from whom are said to come sixteen Consuls. He was from the beginning a Mortal Enemy to Cæsar, and so continued to his Death, which fell unto him in Egypt, by commandment of King Ptolemy, after Pompey was slain.

Scipio was Father-in-law to Pompey, after the Death of Julia, Cæsar's Daughter; and by that means obtained the Government of Asia. In the beginning of the Civil War, he brought good Succours to assist his Son-in-law, as it follows in the third Commentary: And upon the Overthrow at Pharsalia he fled into Africk, where he renewed the War, and became chief Commander of the remaining Parry against Cæsar; but being in the end defeated, he made towards Spain; and fearing by the way left he should fall into his Enemies hands, he slew himself.

Marcellus was of the ancient Family of the Claudii, which came originally from the Sabines: On his behalf there is an Oration extant of Tully's, Intituled, Pro Marcello. He was afterwards slain by one Chilo.

M. An-

Ne quid  
respub. de-  
trimenti ca-  
piat. Confe-  
cuti sunt dies  
Comitiales,  
per quos se-  
natus haberi  
non poterat.  
Cic. L. fratri.

Ut gratia  
oneri, sic ultio  
in questu ha-  
beatur. Tac.

Suprema lex  
Salus reipub.

Lib. 3.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Cicero.

5. Philip. Con-  
sulibus totam  
Rempub. com-  
mendandam  
censeo, iisque  
permittendum  
ut rempub.  
defendant,  
providentque  
ne quid detri-  
menti respub.  
accipiat.

2. De Fastis.

Fab. Max.

Lentulus.

Scipio.

Marcellus.



M. Anton.

*M. Antonius* is Famous in all the Roman Histories, for attaining in a small time to so great a height in that Government. For in all the Wars of *Gallia*, he was but a Treasurer under *Cæsar*, which was the least of all publick places of Charge. In the beginning of the Civil Wars he was made Tribune of the People; and within less than eight Years after, came to be Fellow-Partner with *Octavius Cæsar* in the Government of the Empire. And if *Cleopatra's* Beauty had not blinded him, he might have easily, through the favour of the Soldiers, supplanted his Competitor, and seized upon the Monarchy.

Cassius.

The name of *Cassius* was ominous for trouble to the state of *Rome*, and their ends were as unfortunate. This *L. Cassius*, for his part, after the great Troubles he had stirred up in *Spain*, was drowned in the mouth of the River *Eber*.

Piso.

*Piso* was made Censor in the Consulship of *L. Paulus* and *Claudius Marcellus*, having himself been Consul eight Years before, in the Year of *Rome*, 695. succeeding *Cæsar* and *Bibulus*; and was the Man against whom *Tully* Penned that Oration, which is extant in *Pisonem*. Touching the Office of Censor, it is to be understood, that about the Year of *Rome* 310. the Consuls being distracted with multiplicity of Foreign business, omitted the Censure or Assessment of the City for some Years together: Whereupon it was afterwards thought fit, that there should be a peculiar Officer appointed for that Service, and to be called Censor; forasmuch as every Man was to be Taxed, Rank'd and Valued, according to his Opinion and Censure. The first part of their Office consisted in an Account or Valuation of the Number, Age, Order, Dignity, and Possession of the Roman Citizens: For it was very material for the State to know the number of their People, to the end they might be informed of their own strength, and so shape their course accordingly, either in undertaking Wars, transplanting Colonies, or in making Provision of Victuals in time of Peace. It was also as requisite to know every Mans Age, whereby they grew capable of Honour and Offices, according to that of *Ovid*;

To know the number of Citizens.

Their Age. De Fast.

—finitaque certis  
Legibus est ætas, unde petatur honos.

—In certain Laws  
Age is defin'd, and thence is Honour had.

Halicarnasseus, lib. 4.  
Giosfred ad L. ætatem 3.  
S. De Cens.

*M. Antonius* commanded that the names of the Roman Children should be brought into the Treasury within thirty days after they were born; according to which custom, *Francis* the French King published an Edict, Anno 1539, that every Parish should keep a Register of Burials and Christenings: which since that time is used in *England*.

Their Calling.  
Majorum pri-  
mus quisquis  
fuit ille tuo-  
rum, Aut  
Castor fuit,  
aut illud quod  
dicere nolo.  
Their Ability.  
Florus lib. 1.  
cap. 6.

The distinction of Conditions and States, ranging every Man in his proper order, is as necessary in the Commonweal, and as worthy of the Censors notice, as any thing besides. Neither may the assessment of Mens abilities be omitted: which was ordained, that every Man might bear a part in the Service of the State. In which respect \**Servius Tullus* is commended, for rating Men according to their Wealth; whereas before that time every Man paid alike: For Men are taken to be interested in the Commonweal according to their means. The last and basest sort of Citizens were named *Capite censi*, and were set in the Subsidy at three hundred seventy five pieces of Money. Such as were not assessed, had no Voice in the Commonweal.

Gell. lib. 16.  
cap. 10.  
Æris.

The second and chiefest part of this Office was in reforming Manners, as the ground-plot and foundation of every Commonwealth; to which end they had power to enquire into every Mans Life. If any one had plaid the ill husband, and neglected his Farm, or left his Vine untrimmed, the Censors took notice of it. If a Roman Knight kept his Horse lean, it was a matter for them to look into. They deposed, or brought in, new Senators. They reviewed all degrees and conditions of Men: Advanced this Man from a mean Tribe to a more honourable, and pulled another down. They had the care of Buildings, repairing of High-ways, with other publick Works; and were reputed of the best rank of Magistrates in *Rome*. *L. Roscius* had formerly been one of *Cæsar's* Legates in *Gallia*; as appeareth in the fifth Commentary, *Tertiam in Essuos*, *L. Roscio*; the third Legion amongst the *Essui*, under *L. Roscius*. The Prætor was Judge in Causes of Controversie, and differences between Party and Party; and was as the Caddy amongst the *Turks*.

Polyb. lib. 6.

L. Roscius.

## C H A P. III.

The Senate prepareth for War.

**T**He next day after the Senate assembled out of the City: Where Pompey (according to such instructions as he had formerly given to *Scipio*) extolled their Constancy and Magnanimity; acquainted them with his Forces, consisting of ten Legions in Arms; and further assured them, he knew of a certain that *Cæsar's* Soldiers were alienated from him, and would not be drawn either to defend or follow him. And upon the assurance of these Remonstrances, other motions were entertained. As first, that a Levy should be made throughout all Italy. That *Fauftus Sulla* should forthwith be sent as Proprætor into *Mauritania*. That Money should be delivered out of the Treasury to Pompey. That King *Juba* might have the Title of Friend and Confederate to the People of *Rome*. Which *Marcellus* contradictting, stopt the passage thereof for that time. *Philippus*, Tribune of the People, countermanded *Fauftus's* Commission. Other matters were passed by Act. The two Consular, and the other Prætorian Provinces, were given to private Men that had no Office of Magistracy. *Syria* fell to *Scipio*, and *Gallia* to *L. Domitius*. *Philippus* and *Marcellus* were purposely omitted, and no Lots cast for their Employment. Into the other Provinces were sent Prætors, without any consent or approbation of the People, as formerly had been accustomed: Who having performed their ordinary Vows, put on their Military Garments, and so took their Journey. The Consuls (which before that time was never seen) went out of the City, and had their Serjeants privately within the City, and in the Capitol, against all Order and ancient Custom. A Levy was made over all Italy: Arms and Furniture was commanded: Money was required from Municipal-Towns, and taken out of Temples and Religious places. All Divine and Humane Rights were confounded.

Pompey having a charge of an Army, could not enter into the City, prohibited by divers Laws.

Fauft. Sulla.

Rex Juba, socius &amp; amicus,

Gallia and Syria were two consular Provinces. Quorum nemo stultior est quam L. Domitius. Cic. ad Art. cum. Paludati exeunt.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**T**He neglect of Ceremonies and Forms in matter of State, is the ruin and abolishment of a Commonwealth. For if it hold generally true which Philosophers say, That the Form giveth being to whatsoever subsisteth, and that every thing hath his name from his fashion and making: Then it must necessarily follow, that the life and per-

The use of Ceremonies. Forma dat nomen &amp; esse.



*Nimia nec  
Minima.*

perfection of a State dependeth wholly of the form; which cannot be neglected but with hazard of confusion. For Complements and Solemnities are neither *Nimia* nor *Minima* (as some have imagined,) either superfluous, which may be spared, or trifles of small consequence. But as the Flesh covereth the hollow Deformity of the Bones, and beautifieth the Body with natural Graces: So are Ceremonies which ancient Custom hath made reverent, the Perfection and Life of any Commonweal; and do cover the nakedness of publick Actions, which otherwise would not be distinguished from private businesses. And therefore the neglect of such Ceremonies, as were usually observed to ennoble their Actions, was as injurious to the safety of the Empire, and as evident a Demonstration of Faction and Disloyalty; as the allotment of Provinces to private Persons, or whatsoever else they broached, contrary to the fundamental rights of the publick Weal.

*Civitas legis  
conservatio,  
salva quoque  
populi  
dominatio.  
Æsch. in  
Ctesiphont.*

*The manner  
of disposing of  
the Provinces  
and Govern-  
ments.*

*Sortiri Pro-  
vincias. Com-  
parare Pro-  
vincias. Lib.  
43.*

Concerning which it is to be understood, that no Man was capable of those Governments, but such as had born the chiefest Offices and Places of Charge. For their manner was, that commonly upon the expirations of their Offices, the Consuls and Prætors did either cast Lots for the Provinces, which they called *Sortiri provincias*: or did otherwise agree amongst themselves how they should be disposed, and that they termed *Comparare Provincias*. *Livie* toucheth both the one and the other; *Principio insequentis anni cum consules novi, de Provinciis retulissent, primo quoque tempore, aut comparare inter eos Italiam & Macedoniam, aut sortiri placuit*: In the entrance of the next Year, when the new Consuls had proposed the business of the Provinces; it was forthwith embraced, that they should either divide by agreement *Italy* and *Macedonia* betwixt them, or take them as their Lots fell. Howbeit sometimes the People (whose assent was always necessary) interposed their Authority, and disposed the same as they thought expedient. But such as had never bore Office of charge in the State, were no way capable of those Dignities, nor thought fit to command abroad, having never shewed their sufficiency at home.

*The manner of  
their setting  
forward to  
their Govern-  
ments.*

*Vota nuncu-  
pare.*

*Voti reus.*

*Macrob. li. 3.  
cap. 2. Sa-  
turn.*

For the manner of their setting forward out of *Rome*, after they were assigned to employments, it appeareth by infinite Examples of Histories, that they first went into the Capitol, and there made publick Sacrifices, and solemn Vows, either to build a Temple, or to do some other Work worthy good Fortune, if their designs were happily atchieved: which they called *Vota nuncupare*, the solemn making of Vows. And he that had made such a Vow, stood *voti reus*, ty'd by Vow, until his business came to an issue: and after he had attained his desire, he was *voti damnatus*, bound to perform his Vow, until he had acquitted himself of his promise.

*Paludati.*

*Lib. 6. de lin-  
gua Lat.*

Touching their habit expressed in this phrase, *Paludati exeunt*, it appeareth, as well by ancient Sculpture, as Medals, that *Paludamentum* was a Cloak used and worn by Men of War, whether they commanded in chief, or as Lieutenants and Centurions; and was ty'd with a knot upon their left shoulder. *Festus* calleth all military Garments, *Paludamenta*. And *Varro* giving a reason of that Name, saith; *Paluda à Paludamentis, sunt hæc insignia & ornamenta Militaria. Ideo ad bellum cum exit Imperator, ac Lictores mutant vestem, & signa incinuerunt, Paludatus dicitur proficisci: quæ, propterea quod conspiciuntur qui ea habent, & palam fiunt, Paludamenta dicta. Paludamenta are military Ornaments.* So when the Emperor removes and

the Serjeants change their Garment, he is then said to march *Paludatus*. Which Garments, in regard they are conspicuous which wear them, and so are taken notice of, are called thence *Paludamenta*. The Colour of this Cloak was either Purple or White. And therefore it was held a Presage of Ill-fortune, when at *Carræ*, a City in *Mesopotamia*, one gave *Crassus* a black Cloak in stead of a White, as he went, to lose the Battle to the *Parthians*.

*Valerius, li.  
1. cap. 6.*

### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE Romans not contented with the spacious Circuit of the Sun, bounding their Empire with the East and the West, but for want of Regions and Countries searching the vastness and depth of the Seas, did seldom acknowledge any other sovereignty, and leave a Parry worthy their amity, in any remote Angle of the then-known World. But if any Prince had been so fortunate, as to gain the Favour and Estimation of a Friend or a Confederate to the State, it was upon special and deserved respects, or at the instance of their Generals abroad, informing the worthiness of such Potentates, and the Advantage they might bring to the service of the Empire. Which appeareth by that of *Livie* concerning *Vermina*, King *Syphax's* Son; that \* no Man was at any time acknowledged either a King or a Friend by the Senate and People of *Rome*, unless first he had right well deserved of the Common-weal.

*Raptores orbis, postquam cunctis vastis Terræ, & Mare scrutantur: quis nec oriens nec occidens satiaverit. Tac. Neminem esse Regem solitum & amicum a Senatu Populoque Rom. appellari, nisi qui optime de Reipublicæ meritis esset, lib. 1. decad. 4.*

The manner of this acknowledgement is likewise particularly expressed by *Livie* in another Place, speaking of *Scipio*. The day following (saith he) to put King *Massinissa* out of his Grief and Melancholy, he ascended into his Tribunal, and having called an assembly of the Souldiers, presented him before them: Where he first honoured him with the Appellation of King, accompanied with many fair Praises; and then gave him a Crown of Gold, a Cup of Gold, a Chair of State, a Scepter of Ivory, and a long Robe of Purple. To which agreeth that of *Cæsar*: That *Ariovistus* was by the Senate stiled by the Name of King and Friend, and presented with great and rich Gifts; which happened but to few, and was only given by the Romans to Men of great desert. Howbeit, such as had Governments and Employments abroad did oftentimes make profit of giving this Honour: whereof *Cæsar* taxeth *Lentulus* in the former Chapter. And in this sence was King *Juba* brought in question, to be called by the Senate a Friend and Associate to the State of *Rome*.

*Sequenti die &c. lib. 10. dec. 3.*

*Lib. 1. de bel. Gal.*

*Et spe appellandorum Regum Rex Juba, socius & amicus.*

### The Third OBSERVATION.

Touching the Franchises and Liberties of the Towns of *Italy*, and others in the Dominions of the Roman Empire, called *Municipia*; it is to be noted, that according to *Gellius* those were called *Municipes*, that being governed by their own Laws, and their own Magistrates, were nevertheless endowed with the freedom of *Rome*. And therefore *Adrianus* marvelled, that the *Italicenses* and *Uticenses* did rather desire to be *Coloni*, and so tied to the Obedience of foreign and strange Laws, than to live in a Municipal State under their own Rights and Customs; and as *Festus* added, with the use of their peculiar rites for matter of Religion, such as they anciently used, before they were privileged with the immunities of *Rome*.

*Municipes. L. d. 6. cap. 13.*

*Lib. 11.*

For the better understanding whereof, we are to observe, that there were Degrees and Differences



*Municipi-  
um.* *Cum* ces of Municipal Towns: For some had Voices with the Roman People in all their Elections and Suffrages; and some others had none at all. For *Gellius* in the same Place saith, that the *Cerites* obtained the Freedom of the City, for preserving the holy Things of Rome in the time of the War with the Gauls, but without Voice in elections. And thence grew the Name of *Cerites Tabula*, wherein the Censors inrolled such as were by them for some just cause deprived of their Voices. And the *Tusculani*, being at first received into the Liberties of the City according to the admission of the *Cerites*, were afterward, by the free Grace of the People, made capable of giving Voices.

*Livy lib. 3.* The means of obtaining this freedom was first and specially by Birth: Wherein it was required (as may be gathered by *Appius's* Oration) that both the Parents, as well the Mother as the Father, should be free themselves. Howbeit *Ulpian* writeth, that the Son may challenge the Freedom of the State, wherein his Father lived and was free. So that the Father being of *Campania*, and the Mother of *Puteolis*, he judged the Son to belong to *Campania*: According to that of *Canuleius*, that the Children inherit the condition of the Father, as the Head of the Family, and the better Rule to direct in this behalf. Nevertheless *Adrianus* made an Act of Senate in favour of Issue: that if the Wife were a Citizen of Rome, and the Husband a *Latine*, the Children should be Roman Citizens. And the Emperour *Justinian* caused it likewise to be decreed that the Mother being a Free-woman, and the Father a Bond-man, the Son should be Free. Such as were thus born Free were called *Cives originarii*.

*Cives origina-  
rii.* The second means of obtaining this freedom was by Manumission, or setting Bond-men at Liberty: For in Rome all Men freed from Bondage were taken for Citizens; and yet rankt in the last and meanest order of the People.

*Polydor. Virg.* The third means was by Gift, or Cooptation: And so *Romulus* at first enlarged and augmented Rome; *Theseus*, Athens; *Alexander Magnus*, *Alexandria*, seated at the out-lets of Nilus; and *Richard* the First, London; by taking all such strangers into the freedom of the City, as had inhabited there for ten Years together. The Emperours were profuse in giving this Honour. *Cicero* flouts *Caesar*, for taking whole Nations into the freedom of the City; and *Antony* gave it to all that lived in the Roman Empire. Whereupon, as *Ulpian* witnesseth, Rome was called *Communis Patria*. Popular States were more sparing in this kind; as may be deemed by the answer of one of the *Corinthian* Embassadors to *Alexander*: We never gave the freedom of our City (saith he) to any Man but to thy self and *Hercules*. And until *Herodotus's* time, the *Lacedaemonians* had never admitted any, but only *Tisamenus* and his Brother.

*An quisquam  
amplissimus  
Gallia, cum  
infimo Cive  
Romano com-  
parandus est?* The Privileges of this Freedom were great; for the Citizens of Rome were held to be *Majestate plenos*. Is the best Man of *Gallia* (saith *Tully*) to be compared with the meanest Citizen of Rome? And hence came that Law, requiring, That the Life of a Citizen should not be brought in question, but by the general assembly of the People. *Verres* having Condemned one *Cossanus*, a Roman Citizen in *Sicilia*, *Tully* urgeth it as a matter unsufferable: *Facinus est (inquit) vinciri Civem Romanum, scelus verberari, prope parricidium necari, quid dicam in crucem agi?* It is a great Crime to bind a Roman Citizen, an hainous wickedness to beat him, little less than Parricide to kill him; what then shall I call the hanging of him? with

many the like Examples. Besides the possibility they were in, if their sufficiency were answerable accordingly, to become great in the State; and consequently, Commanders of the Empire.

## CHAP. IV.

*Caesar* tasteth the affection of the Soldiers.

*Caesar* understanding of these things, called the Soldiers together, and acquainted them with all the injuries which his Enemies from time to time had done unto him; complaining that *Pompey* was by their practice and means alienated from him, and drawn through envy of his good fortune to Partiality against him; notwithstanding that he had always affected his Honour, and endeavoured the advancement of his Renown and Dignity: Lamenting likewise the precedent which this time had brought into the State, that the Tribunes Authority should be opposed and suppressed by Arms, which former Ages had by force of Arms re-established. For *Sylla* having stript the Tribuneship naked of all Rights and Prerogatives, yet left it the freedom of opposition: But *Pompey*, who would seem to restore it to the Dignity from which it was fallen, did take away that Power which was only left unto it. The Senate never resolved of that Act, That the Magistrates should take a course for the safety of the Commonwealth, whereby the People were necessarily summoned to Arms, but in times of pernicious Laws, upon the violence of the Tribunes, or the mutiny and defection of the People, when the Temples and high places of the City were taken and held against the State: which Disloyalties of former Ages were expiated and purged by the fortune and disaster of *Saturniuns* and the *Gracchi*. But at this present, there was no such matter attempted, so much as in thought; no Law published; no practice with the People; no Tumult; no departure out of the City. And therefore he exhorted them, That forasmuch as under his leading and command, for nine Years together they had most happily carried the Government, fought many prosperous and victorious Battels, settled all *Gallia* and *Germany* in peace; they would now in the end take his Honour into their protection, and defend it against the malice of his Adversaries. The Soldiers of the thirteenth Legion which were present (for them only had he called out in the beginning of the troubles, and the other Legions were not as yet come) cried out instantly, That they were ready to undertake his defence against such wrongs, and to keep the Tribunes of the People from injury.

## The First OBSERVATION.

AS Publick-weals and Societies are chiefly supported and maintained by Justice: So likewise, such as live in the civil community of the same, and enjoy the benefit of a well-qualified Government, do take themselves interested in the maintenance of Justice, and cannot endure the tyranny of wrongs; unless happily (as every Man is partial in his own cause) they be the Authors thereof themselves. The first duty of Justice, which is, *Ne cui quis noceat*, That no Man hurt another, did *Caesar* make the theme of his Oration to his Soldiers; aggravating his particular injuries, by opening and enforcing the malice of his Adversaries: And making the State a party in his sufferings, through the oppression and defacing of the Tribuneship; which in times of liberty and just proceeding, was sacred and inviolable.

D d

These



Qui non defendit nec ob-  
sistit si potest  
injuria, tam  
est in vitio,  
quam si parens  
es, aut ami-  
cos, aut patri-  
am, aut socios  
deserat. Cic.  
lib. 1. offic.

These Remonstrances were apprehended by the Soldiers, as matters specially concerning their duty; holding themselves either bound to redress them, or otherwise to be guilty of betraying their Parents, Country, Companions and Friends. Some report, that one Lælius, a Primipile of Cæsar's Army, making answer to this Speech, gave assurance of the Soldiers good affection; which the rest approved with a general acclamation. Howbeit the Argument lay couched in a Sophism, pretending Cæsar's right, but concluding the ruin of the State.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Opulentis  
civitatibus  
venenum sedi-  
tio, magna  
imperii mor-  
talia reddidit.  
Liv. lib. 2.  
Non Exercitus  
neque Thesau-  
ri præsidia  
regni sunt,  
verum amici.  
Salust. in bel-  
lo Jugurth.  
\* Lib. de  
amicitia.

SEcondly, we may observe, that as discord and dissension, rending asunder the bonds of civil community, are the bane of flourishing and opulent Cities, and make the greatest Empires examples of Mortality: So by the same rule of discourse, it is also true, that the mutual respects of well-qualified Friendship, are as expedient, both for the fastening of the joynts of a publick State, and for keeping the particular parts in due temper and proportion, as either Treasures, or Armies, or any other thing required thereunto. Hence it is that \* Cicero saith, that we have as much use of Friendship, as of Fire and Water: And that he that should go about to take it from among Men, did endeavour (as it were) to take the Sun out of the Heaven; which by heat, light, and influence, giveth life unto the World. And as Men are eminent in Place and Authority, and have use of many Wheels for the motion of their several occasions; so have they the more need of amity and correspondency, to second the multiplicity of their desires, and to put on their businesses to their wished ends.

Ut quisque  
maxime opi-  
bus, principa-  
tu & potestate  
excellit, ita  
amicis max-  
ime indiget.  
Arist. Eth. 8.

#### CHAP. V.

Cæsar taketh Ariminum; receiveth and answereth Messages from Pompey.

Cæsar.

Rimini.

L. Cæsar.

Cæsar having sounded the minds of the Soldiers, went directly with that Legion to Ariminum, and there met with the Tribunes of the People that were fled unto him; sent for the rest of the Legions from their Winter Quarters, and gave order they should follow him. Thither came young L. Cæsar, whose Father was a Legate in Cæsar's Camp. And after some Speech of the occasion of his coming, acquainted Cæsar, that Pompey had given him a Message in charge to be delivered unto him: Which was, That he desired to clear himself to Cæsar, lest he might peradventure take those things to be done in scorn of him, which were commanded only for the service of the State; the good whereof he always preferred before any private respect: And that Cæsar likewise was tied in honour to lay aside his indignation and affection for the Commonwealths sake; and not to be so transported with anger and disdain of his Adversaries, as he seemed to be, lest in hoping to be avenged of them, he should hurt the Publick Weal of his Country. He added somewhat more of the same subject, together with excuses on Pompey's behalf. Almost the self-same discourse, and of the self-same things, Roscius the Prætor dealt with Cæsar, and said that he had received them in charge from Pompey. Which although they seemed no way to satisfy or remove the injuries and wrongs complained of; yet having got fit Men, by whom that which he wished might be imparted to Pompey, he prayed them both, for that they had brought unto him what Pompey

required, they would not think it much to return his desires to Pompey; if happily with so little labour they might accord so great differences, and free all Italy from fear and danger. That he had ever held the dignity of the Commonwealth in high regard, and dearer than his own life. He grieved much that a benefit given him by the People of Rome, should be spitefully wrested from him by his Adversaries; that six Months of his Government were to be cut off, and so he to be called home to the City: Notwithstanding the People had commanded at the last creation of Magistrates, that there should regard be had of him, although absent. Nevertheless, for the Commonwealths sake he could be content to undergo the loss of that Honour. And having writ to the Senate that all Men might quit their Armies, he was so far from gaining the same, that contrariwise a Levy was thereupon made throughout all Italy; and the two Legions which were drawn from him under a pretence of the Parthian War, were still retained about the City, which was likewise in Arms. And to what tended all this, but his destruction? And yet notwithstanding he was content to condescend to all things, and to endure all inconveniences for the cause of the Publick weal. Let Pompey go to his Government and Provinces; let both the Armies be discharged; let all Men in Italy lay down their Arms; let the City be freed of fear; let the Assemblies of the People be left to their ancient liberty; and the whole Government of the State remitted to the Senate and People of Rome. For the better accomplishment whereof, under well-advised and secure conditions, let an Oath be taken for due keeping of the same: Or otherwise, let Pompey approach nearer unto him, or suffer Cæsar to come nearer to him, that these controversies might happily receive an end by conference.

Roscius having this Message, went to Capua, accompanied with L. Cæsar; where finding the Consuls and Pompey, he delivered unto them Cæsar's Propositions. They having consulted of the matter, made an Answer in Writing, and returned it by them to Cæsar, whereof this was the effect; That he should return into Gallia, quit Ariminum, and dismiss his Army: which if he did, Pompey would then go into Spain: In the mean time, until assurance were given that Cæsar would perform as much as he promised, the Consuls and Pompey would not forbear to levy Soldiers. The condition was too unequal, to require Cæsar to leave Ariminum, and to return into his Province; and Pompey to hold Provinces and Legions belonging to other Men: to have Cæsar dismiss his Army, and he to raise new Troops: to promise simply to go to his Government, but to assign no day for his departure: Insomuch, that if he had not gone until Cæsar's time of Government had expired, he could not have been blamed for falsifying his promise. But forasmuch as they appointed no time for a conference, nor made any shew of coming nearer, there could no hope be conceived of Peace.

Capua.  
Cicero, lib. 7.  
ad Atticum,  
Epist. 13.  
saith, that  
this Answer  
was made at  
Thianum, in  
the territories  
of Lavour,  
the 25 of  
January.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Cæsar lying at Ravenna, within his Government of Gallia, and understanding how matters past at Rome, according as Plutarch reporteth, commanded divers of his Centurions to go before to Ariminum, without any other Armour than their Swords; and to possess themselves thereof with as little Tumult as they could. And then leaving the Troops about him to be commanded by Hortensius, he continued a whole day together in publick fight of all Men, to behold the fencing of the Sword-players. At night he bathed his Body, and then kept company with such as he had bidden to Supper; and after a while rose from the Table, wishing every Man to keep his place, for he

Plutarch in  
vita Cæsaris.

Magi  
rem in  
invad  
lent  
curro  
ut te  
turam  
cu.  
lib. 6.  
-Ar  
venti  
dat, q  
negar  
Lucan



he would instantly come again. Howbeit, having secretly commanded some of his followers to attend him, in such manner as might give least suspicion, he himself took a Coach which he had hired; and making shew of going a contrary way, turned suddenly towards *Ariminum*. When he came to the little River *Rubicon*, which divided his Government from the rest of *Italy*, he stood confounded through remorse of his desperate design, and wist not whether it were better to return or go on: But in the end, laying aside all doubtful cogitations, he resolved upon a desperate attempt, importing as much as *Fall back, fall edge*: And passing over the River, never stayed running with his Coach, until he came within the City of *Ariminum*; where he met *Curio* and *Antonius*, Tribunes of the People, and shewed them to the Soldiers, as they were driven to fly out of *Rome*, disguised like Slaves in a Carrier's Cart.

It is said, that the night before he passed over this River, he dreamed that he lay with his Mother in an unnatural sense; but of that he himself maketh no mention. This City of *Ariminum* is now called *Rimini*, and standeth in *Romania*, upon the *Adriatick* Sea, in the Pope's Dominion. The River *Rubicon* was anciently the bounds of *Gallia*; over which *Augustus* caused a fair Bridge to be built with this Inscription;

JUSSU. MANDATU-VE. P. R. COS. IMP.  
MILI. TIRO. COMMILITO. MANIPULARIS-VE. CENT. TURMÆ-VE. LEGIONARI-VE. ARMAT. QUISQUIS. ES. HIC. SISTITO. VEXILLUM. SINITO. NEC. CITRA. HUNC. AMNEM. RUBICONEM. DUCTUM. COMMEATUM. EXERCITUM-VE. TRADUCITO. SI. QUIS. HUIUSCE. JUSSIONIS. ERGO. ADVERSUS. FECIT. FECERIT-VE. ADJUDICATUS. ESTO. HOSTIS. P. R. AC. SI. CONTRA. PATRIAM. ARMA. TULERIT. SACROSQUE. PENATES. E. PENETRALIBUS. ASPORTAVERIT. SANCIO. PLEBISCI. SENATUS-VE. CONSULT. ULTRA. HOS. FINES. ARMA. PROFERRE. LICEAT. NEMINI. S. P. Q. R.

The substance whereof is; That it should be unlawful for any Man to come over the said River Armed, under penalty of being adjudged an enemy to the Commonwealth, and an invader of his own Country.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

IF this manner of proceeding be brought into dispute, and the reason required why *Cæsar* kept not himself in the Province of *Gallia*, where he might have held his Government according to his own desire, or otherwise have drawn his Adversaries to buckle with the strength of those conquering Legions, and so brought the business to a short end, with as great probability of good success, as by any hazard of undertaking: It is to be understood, that in cases of this nature, which seldom admit any treaty of accord, he that striketh first, and hath the advantage of the forehand, is well entred into the way of Victory. For the rule is of old, That if any Enemy hath a design in hand, it is far more safe to begin first, and by way of prevention to give the Onset on him, rather than to shew a readiness of resisting his assaults. For if Blows (of necessity) must be way-makers to Peace, it were a mistaking to be either wanting or behind-hand therein; besides the gain which attendeth this advantage. For he that stands affected to deny what is just, and of right due,

doth nevertheless grant all things which the Sword requireth; and will not stick to supply all unjust refusals, with as great an over-plus of what may be demanded. For which cause, *Cæsar* staid not the coming of his whole Army, but began with those Forces which were ready at hand: And so preventing all designs, he put his Adversaries to such a streight, that they quitted *Italy* for fear, and left *Rome* (with whatsoever was sacred or precious therein) to the mercy of them whom they had adjudged enemies to their Country.

#### CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar* taketh divers Municipal Towns.

For which regard, he sent *M. Antonius* with five Cohorts to *Aretium*: But he himself stayed at *Ariminum* with two Legions, and there intended to inroll new Troops; and with several Cohorts took *Pisaurum*, *Fanum*, and *Ancona*. In the mean while, being advertised that *Thermus* the Prætor did hold *Tignium* with five Cohorts, and fortified the place, and that all the Inhabitants were well inclined towards him; he sent *Curio* thither with three Cohorts, which he had at *Pisaurum* and *Ariminum*. Upon notice of whose coming, *Thermus* (doubting of the affection of the Town) drew his Cohorts forth of the City, and fled. The Soldiers by the way went from him, and repaired homeward. *Curio* was there received with the great contentment and satisfaction of all Men. Upon notice whereof *Cæsar* conceiving hope of the favourable affections of the Municipal Towns, brought the Cohorts of the thirteenth Legion out of their Garrisons, and marched towards *Auximum*; a Town held by *Actius*, with certain Cohorts which he had brought thither with him, who having sent out divers Senators, made a levy of Men throughout all the Country of *Picenum*.

*Cæsar's* coming being known, the Decuriones of *Auximum* repaired to *Actius Varus*, accompanied with great Troops of People: And told him that the matter concerned not him at all; for neither themselves, nor the rest of the Municipal Towns, would shut their Gates against such a Commander as *Cæsar* was, that by great and worthy service had so well deserved of the Commonwealth: And therefore advised him to consider what might ensue thereof, and the danger which might befall him in particular. *Varus* being thoroughly wakened at this warning, drew out the Garrison which he had brought in, and so fled away: and being overtaken by a few of *Cæsar's* first Troops, was compelled to make a stand; and there giving Battel, was forsaken of his Men. Some of the Soldiers went home, and the rest came to *Cæsar*. Amongst them was taken *L. Pupius*, Centurion of a *Primipile* order, which place he had formerly held in *Pompey's* Army. *Cæsar* commended *Actius's* Soldiers; sent *Pupius* away; gave thanks to them of *Auximum*; and assured them of a mindful acknowledgement on his behalf for this service.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Amongst other things which serve to inable our judgments, and do make Men wise to good fortune, that which is gathered from similitude or likeness of quality, is not the unsurest ground of our discourse; but oftentimes giveth more light to guide our passage through the doubtfulness of great enterprises, than any other help of reason. For he that will attend an overture from every particular, and tarry for circumstances to accomplish all his purposes, and make no use of

Multa videri  
volumus velie,  
sed volumus.  
Seneca.  
epist. 96.

Let it lie upon  
the Dice.  
Bonum est  
dum adhuc  
est navis in  
portu, praca-  
vere tempesta-  
tem futuram;  
et non eo tem-  
pore, quo in  
mediis irruer-  
is procellas,  
trepidare,  
Joseph. de  
bello Jud. l. 2.

Magis terro-  
rem incutit, ut  
invadere vo-  
lent prior oc-  
currens, quam  
ut se repugna-  
turum signifi-  
cat. Th. cyd.  
lib. 6.  
Arma te.  
reus Omnia  
dat, qui iusta  
negat.  
Lucan lib. 1.



Instances to better his Advantage, shall never wade far in businesses of moment, nor achieve that which he desireth, which Cæsar well observed: For upon the accidental Discovery of the disposition of one Town, he thereby took occasion to make trial how the rest stood affected; and either found them or made them answerable to his Hopes.

Pesaro Ital.  
Plus. Antic.

Concerning these places taken by Cæsar, it is to be understood, that *Pisaurum* is seated on the *Adriatick* Sea, and belongeth to the Dutchy of *Urbine*: A Town famous of old, by reason of the prodigious opening of the Earth, and swallowing up the Inhabitants before the Battel of *Actium*, some few Years after it was thus Taken by Cæsar.

Fano Ital.

*Fanum* was so called of a fair Temple which was there built to Fortune. *Tacit. Annal. 10. Exercitus Vespasiani ad Fanum Fortune iter sistit*; The Army of *Vespasian* made a Halt at the Temple of Fortune. It is a small Town on the same Sea, and belongeth to the Pope.

Ancona.

*Ancona* is a famous Town upon the *Adriatick* Sea, seated upon a bow-like Promontory, which receiveth the Sea between two Fore-lands; and so maketh one of the fairest Havens of all Italy, as well for largeness as for safety. From whence riseth that common saying, expressing the rareness and singularity of three things; *Unus Petrus in Roma*, One Peter in Rome; noting the Beauty of Saint Peter's Church: *Una Turris in Cremona*, One Tower in Cremona; the excellent Workmanship of a Steeple there: And *unus Portus in Ancona*, One Haven in Ancona; which is this Haven. The Emperor *Trajan*, to give it more shelter, and keep it from the fury of the Wind, raised the top of the Promontory in fashion of a Half-Moon, with a Mount made of great Marble Stones; and made it Theatre-wise, with descents and degrees to go to the Sea; together with an Arch triumphal in Memory thereof. The Town is now under the Pope.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Decuriones.

THIS word *Decurio* hath a double understanding: For *Romulus* having 3000 Foot and 300 Horse, divided them into three Tribes, and every Tribe into Ten Curies, containing an Hundred Footmen and Ten Horsemen. Whereby *Marcellinus* concludeth, that *Decuriones* & *Centuriones* à numero cui in Militia præerant dicebantur; they were called *Decurions* and *Centurions* from the number they Commanded in the Wars. But *Vegetius* is more particular in this point. A Company of Footmen (saith he) was called a *Century* or *Maniple*: And a Troop of Horse was called *Turma* of *Ter-denos*, containing Thirty Men, whereof the Captain was named *Decurio*. In which sense Cæsar speaketh; *Ea res per fugitives L. Amylii Decurionis equitum Gallorum hostibus nunciatur*: This business was bewrayed to the Enemy by the Fugitives of *L. Amylius*, a *Decurion* of the French Horse. But in this place it hath another signification: For the Romans, when they sent any Citizens to People and Inhabit a place, chose out every Tenth Man; such as were found most able and of best sufficiency to make and establish a publick Council; whom they called *Decuriones*; according as *Pomponius* and other Civilians understand it. So that these *Decuriones* were the Senate of that place.

Lib. 2. cap. 14.

Lib. 1. de Bell. Gall.

#### CHAP. VII.

*Lentulus* flieth in great fear out of Rome. Cæsar cometh to *Corfinium*.

THESE things being reported at Rome, the City was suddenly struck into such a Terror, that when *Lentulus* the Consul came to open the Treasury, to deliver out Money to *Pompey* according to the Act of Senate, he fled out of the City, and left the inner Chamber of the Treasury open. For, it was reported (although untruly) that Cæsar was near approaching, and that his Cavalry was hard at hand. *Marcellus*, the other Consul, together with most of the other Magistrates, followed after. *Pompey* departing the day before, was gone to those Legions which he had taken from Cæsar, and had left in *Apulia* to Winter. In the mean while the Inrollment of Soldiers ceased within the City. No place seemed secure between that and *Capua*. There they began first to assemble and assure themselves; Impresting for Soldiers such as by *Julius's* Law were sent thither to Inhabit. And the Fencers which were there Trained and Exercised by Cæsar, for the entertainment of the People of Rome, were by *Lentulus* brought out, set at Liberty, mounted upon Horses, and Commanded to follow him. But afterwards, upon advice of his Friends, (every Man's Judgment disallowing thereof) he dispersed them here and there throughout *Campania*, for their better safety and keeping.

Cæsar.

Sanctiorem  
Æratio.

Capua.

Lex Julia.

Cæsar dislodging from *Auximum*, marched throughout all the Country of *Picenum*, and was most willingly received by all the *Præfectures* of those Regions, and relieved with all necessaries which his Soldiers stood in need of. Insomuch as Commissioners were sent unto him from *Cingulum*, a Town which *Labienus* had Founded, and built from the Ground at his own Charges, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded: Whereupon he required Soldiers, and they sent them accordingly. In the mean time the Twelfth Legion overtook Cæsar; and with these two he marched directly to *Asculum*, a Town which *Lentulus Spinther* held with Ten Cohorts: Who understanding of Cæsar's approach, left the place; and labouring to carry the Troops with him, was forsaken by the greatest part of the Soldiers: And so marching with a few, happened by chance upon *Vibullius Rufus*, sent of purpose by *Pompey* into the Country of *Picenum*, to confirm and settle the People. *Vibullius* being advertised how matters went there, took the Soldiers, and so dismissed him of his Charge: Gathering likewise from the confining Regions, what Cohorts he could get from *Pompey's* former Inrollments; and amongst others, entertained *Ulcilles Hirus*, flying with six Cohorts out of *Camerinum*, whereof he had the keeping. These being all put together, made thirteen Cohorts; with which, by long Marches he made towards *Domitius Ænobarbus*, who was at *Corfinium*, telling him that Cæsar was at hand with two Legions. *Domitius* had raised twenty Cohorts out of *Albania*, *Marfia*, and *Pelignia*, adjacent Countries. *Asculum* being taken in, and *Lentulus* driven out, Cæsar made enquiry after the Soldiers that had left *Lentulus*, and commanded them to be Inrolled for him. And after one days abode for the Provision of Corn, he marched towards *Corfinium*. Upon his approach thither, *Domitius* sent five Cohorts out of the Town, to break down the Bridge of the River, which was about Three Miles off. The Vanguard of Cæsar's Army encountering with *Domitius's* Soldiers, drave them from the Bridge, and forced them to Retreat into the Town: Whereby Cæsar past over his

Picenum.

Cingulum.

Asculum.

Ulcil. Hirus.  
Camerinum.

Domitius  
Ænobarb.  
Corfinium.

Albania.  
Marfia.  
Pelignia.

2500 Men.



his Legions, made a stand before the Town, and Encamped himself under the Walls.

The First OBSERVATION.

*Sempre è congiunto in un medesimo soggetto, l' Insolentia con la Timidità.*  
Lib. 2.

IT is well observed by Guicciardine, That Insolency and Timidity are never found asunder, but do always accompany one another in the same Subject: For the Mind being the Centre of all such Motions, doth according to every Man's Nature, give the like scope to Passions of Contrariety, and extend them both to an equidistant Circumference: As if Courage shall happen to dilate it self to Insolency, then is Doubtfulness, in like manner enlarged to Cowardice; and will imbase Mens thoughts as low, as they did rise in height by insulting. For which cause it is advised by such as treat of Morality, that Men be well wary in admitting dilatation of Passions, or in suffering them to fly out beyond the compass of Reason, which containeth the measure of Equality, commended by Cicero to be observed throughout the whole course of Man's Life. Lentulus the Consul may be an instance of this weakness, and learn others Moderation by shunning his Intemperancy. For in question of qualifying the Rage of these Broils, and sorting of things to a peaceable end, his Arrogancy was incompatible with terms of Agreement, and overfway'd the Senate with heedless Impetuosity. And again, when his Authority and Consular Gravity should have settled the distracted Commons, and made good his first Resolution, his over-hasty flying out of the City did rather induce the People to believe, that there was no safety within those Walls, not for so small a time as might serve to have shut the Treasury at his Heels; and so he became as Abject, as before he shewed himself Insolent.

*Ærarium.*

*Plutarch in vita Publicola. Ærarium populus Romanus in ade Saturni habuit, Festus.*

Concerning these words (*Aperto sanctiore Ærario*, rendred the inner Chamber of the Treasury left open) it is to be noted, that *Ærarium* was their publick Treasury; and by the appointment of *Valerius Publicola*, was made within the Temple of *Saturn*: Whereof divers Men make divers Conjectures. *Macrobius* saith, That as long as *Saturn* continued in *Italy*, there was no Theft committed in all the Country: And therefore his Temple was thought the safest place to keep Money in. *Plutarch* thinketh rather, That the making of the Treasury in that place, did allude to the Integrity of the Time wherein *Saturn* Reigned; for Avarice and Deceit was not then known amongst them. *St. Cyprian* is of an Opinion, That *Saturn* first taught *Italy* the use and Coinage of Money; and therefore they gave the keeping thereof to his Deity. Howsoever, it is manifest, That not only the publick Treasury was there kept, but also their Records, Charts, Ordinances and Edicts: Together with such Books as were, for their immeasurable Greatness, called *Libri Elephantini*; containing all their Acts of Senate, and Deeds of Arms achieved by the Commanders abroad, as also their Military Ensigns which they fetched always from thence when they went into the Field: And there likewise did such Embassadors as came to *Rome* Register their Names, as *Plutarch* affirmeth.

*Libri Elephantini.*

*Signa ex Ærario prompta feruntur ad Distratorem*  
Liv. lib. 4.

It was called *Ærarium* of *Æs*, signifying Brass; for that the first Money used by the Romans was of that Metal, until the Year of *Rome* 485. as *Pliny* witnesseth; when they began first to Coin pieces of Silver marked with the Letter *X*. whereof they took the appellation of *Denarium*, as valuing Ten *Asses* of Brass, which before they used for their Coin; and every of the said *Asses*

weighed 12 Ounces. Touching their order observed in their Treasury, for their disposing and laying up of their Moneys, we must understand, that as Bodies Politick require necessary and ordinary Treasure to be employed in such manner, as may best concur with the publick Honour and Weal of the same; so there must be special Care to provide against unusual and extraordinary Casualties, which are not removed but by speedy and effectual Remedies. According to which providence the Romans disposed of their Treasure, and took the twentieth part of their Receipt, which they called *Aurum vicesimarium*, and reserved it apart in an inner Chamber; where it lay so privileged, that it was a Capital Crime to touch it, but in extremam and desperate necessity: As in time of War with the Gauls, or in a Sedition and Tumult of the People. *Livy* affirmeth as much, where he saith, *Cetera expedientibus quæ ad bellum opus erant consulibus, aurum vicesimarium, quod in sanctiore Ærario ad ultimos casus servaretur, promi placuit: Prompta ad quatuor millia pondi Auri.* The Consuls furnishing all other things needful for the War, it was resolved, that the *vicesimary* Gold should be brought forth and employed: Which said Gold was reserved in the inner Treasury, till such time as Affairs happened to be in a desperate condition. Accordingly, there was 4000 pound of Gold taken out.

*Aurum vicesimarium.*

Lib. 24.

The Second OBSERVATION.

SUCH as affect Offices and Dignities in a State, must ever have means to court Sovereignty, according as may best suit with her *Pelitia*, either as she is espoused to a Monarch, or left in trust to a Multitude. Hence it was that the Romans, to gain the favour of the People, and to make way for their own ends, were very sumptuous in setting forth Shews and Spectacles of divers sorts and fashions; and especially of Gladiators or Fencers, as best fitting a Roman Disposition, and more pleasing than others of any kind. *Equidem* (saith *Tully*) *existimo, nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quam illud Gladiatorum, neque concionis ullius, neque vero ullorum Comitiorum; I verily believe, that there is at no time a greater concourse of People than is at the Fencing-plays; neither at an Oration, nor at an Assembly of the State. And in another place; Id autem spectaculi genus erat, quod omni frequentia, atque omni hominum genere celebratur, quo multitudo maxime delectatur; That is a kind of shew, which is celebrated with the flocking together of all sorts of People; it being a thing the multitude are extremely delighted with.*

Pro Rosio.

Their manner was to keep great numbers of these Fencers, in some convenient and healthful Towns of *Italy*, as at *Ravenna* and *Capua* (which were as Seminaries of these People) and there to train them up in the Feat of Fencing, until they had occasion to use them in their Shews, either at their Triumphal Entries into the City upon their Victories, or at the Funeral Solemnity of some Personage of Memory, or otherwise at their Feasts and Jollities.

And therefore they were called, *Buſtarii, a Buſtis.*

*Quin etiam exhilarare viris convivia cæde Mos olim, & miscere epulis spectacula dira.*

Sil. Ital.

The Death of Men made Mirth at Feasts of old, And Banquets then were grac'd with Fencers bold.

They Fought commonly Man to Man, at all advantage, and were seldom excused until one of the two lay dead upon the place. Neither was he



Lemnisci.  
Spectatum  
fuit & dona-  
tum jamrud.  
Hor.  
The Romans  
never used  
these Gladia-  
tors in any  
Military Ser-  
vice, but only  
in Civil Wars.  
Ac deforme  
insuper auxi-  
lium, duo mi-  
lia Gladiato-  
rum: Sed per  
civilia arma  
guerra duci-  
bus usurpatur.  
Tac. Hist. 1.

he then quitted that had Slain his Companion, but stood liable to undertake another, and so a third, until he had foiled six or seven Combatants. And if his hap were to prevail so often, he was then honoured with a Garland, wound about with Ribbands of Wool, which they called *Lemnisci*, and received of the Prætor a great knotted Staff, called *Rudis*; which he afterward carried about with him as an ensign of Liberty. These bloody Spectacles continued unto the time of *Constantine the Great*, and were by him prohibited, as likewise also by *Arcadius* and *Honorius*; and utterly abolished after the Reign of *Theodorick*, King of the *Goths*. Let him that would look further into the fashion of these shews, read what *Lipsius* hath written concerning the same. That which I observe herein is, the use which the State made hereof: For howsoever these Sights and Solemnities were set forth for the compassing of private ends; yet nevertheless the Commonweal drew benefit from the same. For a multitude being of a fickle and mutable Nature, are no way so well settled with contentment of the time, or kept from Novelties and Innovations, as with publick Shews and Entertainments; which are as stays to their Affections, that they swerve not from the Government by which they live in civil Association. So we read how the *Græcians* Instituted, as popular Entertainments, their *Olympian*, *Nemean*, *Isthmian*, and *Pythian* Games; the *Romans*, their *Apollinary*, *Secular*, *Gladiatory*, and *Hunting* Shews, with *Tragedies* and *Comedies*: And all for the satisfaction of the People. Wherein, howsoever the *Græcians* seem more Judicious, for Inventing such Games as might both exercise and entertain the People; yet the *Romans* failed not of the end aimed at in these Spectacles, which was, to inure them to Blood and Slaughter, and to make them dreadless in cases of Horror.

But to leave all Shews of this nature, as either too little for earnest, or too much for pass-time; it shall suffice to note, that these publick Entertainments are so far expedient as they consist of Pleasure and Comeliness: For as their chiefest end is to pleasure and content the People; so their manner must be directed by Lawfulness and Honesty. In which respect, a Tragedy is more commendable than a Comedy; forasmuch as few comical Arguments do sympathize with Honesty.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

TO be great and of a large proportion, doth not take away Casualties of inconvenience; nor can it give a privilege, to free things from Distemperature: Tall Men are as subject to Fevers, as others of lesser Stature; and great Empires as easily disturbed as the States of petty Princes.

Lucan. lib. 1.  
Parave. &  
quære ardu-  
um: Tueri  
difficilis.  
Livy lib. 37.

O faciles dare summa Deos, eademque tueri,  
Difficiles!

O Gods easie to grant, but to preserve  
Your Gifts as hard!—

It is easier to attain the end of high desires, than to keep it being got: And better is the assurance of seeking than of possessing. The Roman People that had over-awed the World with Arms, and left no Kingdom unfoiled with the fear of their Legions, were as much dismayed at a subjects Disloyalty, as was possible for a mean State to be amuzed upon an Alarm of any danger. And that City which suffered no Enemy to approach near her Confines, but in the condition of a

Captive, was not trusted as able to give her own People safety.

————— Sic turba per Urbem  
Præcipiti lymphata gradu, velut unica rebus  
Spes foret afflictis patrios excedere muros,  
Inconsulta ruit.—————

————— So through the Streets  
With headlong madness ran the multitude,  
As if their case no other hope had left  
Of safety, than to quit their Native Walls.

The advantage is, That Kingdoms of great Command have great helps in cases of disturbance; but are otherwise as subject to apprehensions of distrust, as those of lesser Power to resist.

#### C H A P. VIII.

Cæsar goeth on with the Siege of Corfinium, and Taketh it.

**D**omitius being thus engaged, sent out skilful Men of the Country, with promise of great Reward, to carry Letters to Pompey, entreating and praying, that he would come and relieve him; for Cæsar, by reason of the streightness of the passages, might, with two Armies, be easily shut up: Which opportunity, if he neglected, himself, with above 30 Cohorts of Soldiers, besides a great number of Senators and Roman Knights, were in danger of running a hard Fortune. In the mean time he exhorted his Men to Courage and Resolution; placed his Artillery on the Walls; assigned every Man his Quarter to be made good; promised in publick Assembly of the Soldiers, four Acres apiece to each Man out of his own Lands and Possessions, and the like proportion to the Centurions and Evocati. Mean while it was told Cæsar, that the Inhabitants of Sulmo, a Town distant seven Miles from Corfinium, were desirous to receive his Commands, but that they were restrained by Q. Lucretius, a Senator, and Actius Pelignus, that kept the Town with a Garrison of seven Cohorts. Whereupon he sent thither M. Antonius with five Cohorts of the seventh Legion: Whose Ensigns were no sooner discovered by those of the Town, but the Gates were opened, and the Inhabitants and Soldiers came all out to Gratulate and Welcome Antonius. Lucretius, and Actius conveyed themselves over the Wall. Actius being Taken and brought to Antony, desired to be sent to Cæsar. Antonius returning the same day, brought Actius and the Soldiers that were found in Sulmo, to Cæsar; whom he took to his Army, and sent Actius away in safety.

Cæsar, the three first days, made great Works to fortifie his Camp; caused store of Corn to be brought from the Towns next about him; and there determined to stay the coming of the rest of his Forces. Within the space of those three days the Eighth Legion came unto him, with 22 Cohorts newly enrolled in Gallia, together with Three Hundred Horse, which the King of Noricum had sent unto him. Upon the arrival of which Forces, he made another Camp on the other side of the Town, and appointed Curio to Command it. The rest of the time was spent in compassing the Town with a Ram-pier and with Castles. The greatest part of which work being finished, it chanced at the same time, that such as were sent to Pompey returned. The Letters being read, Domitius dissembled the truth, gave out in the Council of War, that Pompey would come speedily to succour them: And therefore wished that

Duces rebus  
afflictis hila-  
ritatem de  
industria si-  
mulant.  
Seneca ad  
Poly.



that no Man should be dismayed, but to prepare such things as were of use for the defence of the Town, but he himself conferring secretly with some of his familiar Friends, consulted how he might escape away. But forasmuch as his Looks agreed not with his Words, and that his carriage seemed more troubled and timorous than usual, and likewise his secret Conferences with his Friends were more than ordinary, as also by his avoiding of publick Counsels and Assemblies as much as he could, the matter could be no longer dissembled. For Pompey had writ back, that he would not hazard the cause, by drawing it into such terms of extremity: Neither was Domitius engaged in the keeping of Corfinium by his advice or consent: And therefore, if by any means he could, he should quit the place, and bring the Forces unto him. But the Siege was so streight, and the Works did so begin the Town, that there was no hope of effecting it. Domitius's purpose being known abroad, the Soldiers within the Town, about the beginning of the Evening, forsook their Stations, and drew themselves apart; and thereupon had conference with the Tribunes of the Soldiers and Centurions to this effect: That they were Besieged by Cæsar, whose Works and Fortifications were almost finished; their General Domitius (in hope and confidence of whom they were engaged in that place) setting aside all matters whatsoever, was bethinking himself how he might escape and fly away: And in regard thereof, they were not to neglect their own safety. The Marſi at first began to differ from the rest upon that point, and possessed themselves of that part of the Town which seemed to be strongest: And such a dissension thereby grew amongst them, that they had almost gone to Blows. Howbeit, understanding a while after (by Messengers which past to and fro between them) of Domitius's purpose to fly away, whereof formerly they were ignorant, they agreed together, and with one consent brought Domitius out in publick; and sent some to Cæsar, to let him know, they were ready to open the Gates, to receive his Commandments, and to deliver Domitius alive into his hands. Upon advertisement whereof (albeit Cæsar found it a matter of great consequence to gain the Town with as much speed as he could, and to take the Soldiers into his Camp, lest either by large Promises and Gifts, or by entertaining other purposes, or otherwise through false Bruits or devised Messages, their Minds might happily be altered, as oftentimes in the course of War, great and eminent chances and alterations do happen in a small moment of time; yet for that he feared lest the Night-time might give occasion to the Soldiers, upon their entrance to Sack and Pilfer the Town) he commending those that came unto him, sent them back again, and willed that the Gates and the Walls should be kept with a good Guard. He himself disposed the Soldiers upon the Work which he had begun; not by certain spaces and distances, as he had accustomed in former times, but by continual Watches and Stations, one touching another round about all the Fortifications. Moreover, he sent the Tribunes and Captains of the Horse about, and willed them to have a care that there might be no Eruptions or Sallies, and that they should look to the private slippings out of particular Men. Neither was there any Man so heavy or dull, that suffered his Eyes to be shut that Night: For so great was the expectation of what would ensue, that no Man thought of any other thing, than of what would happen to the Corfinians, to Domitius, to Lentulus and the rest. About the fourth Watch of the Night, Lentulus Spinther spake from the Wall to our Soldiers that had the Watch, and signified that he would willingly have leave to come to Cæsar. Which being granted, he was sent out of the Town, attended

with some of Domitius's Soldiers, who left him not until he came in sight of Cæsar. With him he dealt concerning his Life, and prayed him to Pardon him; put him in Mind of their former familiarity, acknowledged the favours received from Cæsar, which were very great; namely, That by his means, he was chosen into the College of Priests, that upon the going out of his Pratorship, he obtained the Province of Spain, and in his suit to be Consul, he was much assisted by him.

Collegium Pontificum.

Cæsar interrupting his Speech, told him, That he came not from his Government to hurt any Man; but to defend himself from the Injuries of his Adversaries; to restore the Tribunes of the People to their Dignity, that were thrust out and expelled the City; and to put himself and the People of Rome into Liberty, which were oppressed with the Partialities of a few Factionous Persons. Lentulus, being reassured upon this answer, prayed leave to return into the Town; and the rather, that this which he had obtained touching his own safety, might give hope to the rest: Amongst whom some were so affrighted, that he doubted they would fall into some desperate course. And having obtained leave, he departed. Cæsar, as soon as it was day, commanded all the Senators and Senators Children, together with the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and the Roman Knights, to be brought out unto him. Of Senators there were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, Vibullius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus, the Treasurer, L. Rubrius; besides Domitius's Son, and many other young Men; with a great number of Roman Knights and Decurions, whom Domitius had called out of the Municipal Towns. These being all brought forth unto him, were protected from the Insolencies and Injuries of the Soldiers. Moreover, he spake a few words unto them, concerning the ill requital on their behalf, for the great benefits he had done unto them: And so sent them all away in Peace.

The sixty Sestertia of Gold which Domitius had laid up in the publick Treasury, being brought unto him by the two chief Magistrates or Bailiffs of Corfinium, he redelivered to Domitius; lest he should seem more continent in taking away Mens Lives than their Moneys: Although he knew that this Money was part of the publick Treasure, and delivered out by Pompey to pay Soldiers. He commanded Domitius's Party to be sworn his Soldiers. And that day removing his Camp, went a full day's march (after a stay of seven days about Corfinium) through the confines of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates, and came into Apulia.

Duumviri.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

AS it is true, that a Friend is not solely tied to the respects of right, but doth give more advantage by offices of good endeavour, than by that which duty requireth: So is it dangerous for a Man to put his Sickle further into the Corn, than haply may deserve thanks of the Owner. Neither can it be cleared from Imputation of Folly, to attend another Man's business, with hazard and peril of our own Fortune. Howbeit, the current and drift of things doth oftentimes so engage both our Persons and Affections, either in the main action it self, or in some circumstances of the same, that we cannot avoid the hazard of Rebuke, if our endeavours do not sort with his liking that is to approve them. Whereof Domitius may be an instance; who, taking Corfinium on the behalf of the State, was nevertheless disavowed in his Merit, and consequently brought into extremity of danger, for his over-forwardness in the Service of his Country. Such liberty hath sovereignty, either to take or leave, when the event shall not rise answerable to a good meaning.

Latius patet officiorum quam juris Regula.

Stultitia videtur, alienam rem suo periculo curare. Salust. de bello Jugurth.

Lentulus Spinther.

The



## The Second OBSERVATION.

WHEN a party is fallen into an exigence, it hath no better remedy for relief than that of the Comick, *Redimas te captum quam queas minimo*; redeem your self at as cheap a rate as you can. Which is not understood, that we should clear the Head, and leave the rest of the Members to misfortune: for that were to draw a double mischief on the whole body. But the Head is to escape with as little prejudice to the other parts, as by Wisdom and Vertue may be gained: And so much the rather, lest in seeking to purchase safety with hazard of the other Members, it draw the whole destruction upon it self; as it fell out with *Domitius*: who going about to fly out of the Town, and to leave such Forces as by his means were embarked in that cause, was justly made the sacrifice of their peace. *Sulla* deserved better to be followed by Men of adventure: For, being moved to escape himself away by Night, and to leave his Troops to such fortune as *Jugurth* upon advantage should put upon them; he answered, *Etiam si certa pestis adesset, mansurum potius, quam proditis quos ducebat, turpi fuga, incerta, ac forsitan paulo post morbo interitura vite parceret*: Although the Plague were never so near and certain to befall him, yet he would stay by it, rather than by a base flight betray those under his command, thereby to save his fickle life for a time, which it may be some disease or other would immediately after deprive him of. And therefore if a Commander shall at any time go about to betray his Forces, with hope of his own safety, the issue will bring out either his dishonour, or his confusion.

Salust. de bello  
Jugurth.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

SUCH as undertake great designs, do likewise project the means of achieving the same, and do propound unto themselves such Principles to be observed, as they take to be special way-makers to the fortune they reach at; from which grounds they seldom or never swerve. As appeareth by this of *Cæsar*: who aiming at the Sovereignty of that Empire, and knowing no way so direct to lead him thereunto, as to climb up by the steps of Mildness, and to make his Adversaries debtors to his Clemency, he left aside his Maxims of War, to hold firm that Principle; and did forbear to gain a Town of great importance, with that speed which occasion and opportunity did afford him, and to take the Troops into his Camp, for the prevention of such chances and changes, as do happen in a small moment of time, lest his Soldiers entering into the Town, after the shutting of the Evening, might take leave of the Night-time to make forfeiture of his mercy.

It shall therefore well becom the wisdom of a Leader, to have always respect to the Principles of his Means, and to distinguish between that which is fit and that which is more fit, in the native carriage of his business.

## The Fourth OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING this *Collegium Pontificum*, the College of Priests, we are to note, that *Numa*, the founder of the Roman Commonweal, for the preventing of Partialities and Factions in that State, which at that time consisted of two Nations or Tribes, did break the whole body into many small parts and fractions, making his division by Arts and Occupations; whereby he ordained,

Collegium  
Pontificum.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Numa.

that all Minstrels or Trumpeters should be incorporated into one Brotherhood; and that in like manner, Goldsmiths, Carpenters, Dyers Shoemakers, Coriers, Tanners, Bell-founders, Pottery, and all other Trades and Sciences, should have their peculiar body or Fraternity; appointing them Feasts, Assemblies, and Services, according to the worthiness of each Mystery, as *Plutarch* hath observed in the Life of *Numa*.

*Valerius Maximus* maketh mention of the College of Pipers or Minstrels. And *Pliny*, in like manner, mentioneth the College of Coppersmiths. *Cicero* taketh notice of the College or company of Merchants, which he calleth *Collegium Mercurialium*; for that of old time, the nimble-tongued *Mercury* was believed in, as the Guider and Protector of Merchants. The Privileges and Customs wherewith these Fraternities were endowed, are set down by *Caius* the Civilian. There are certain Colleges at *Rome*, saith he, incorporated by Act of Senate, and established with good Ordinances and Constitutions, having certain things in common, in imitation of the Publick weal: And as *Scaevola* further noteth, with power to make Laws, for the better Government of such Colleges and Societies; so the same be not contrary to the fundamental Laws of the State. After the same manner, the Priests had their peculiar College or Corporation; and at the first institution were but four in number, and all of Patrician Families, unto the Year of *Rome* 454: At what time there were four of the Commons chosen, and added to the former number; whom *Sulla* increased to fifteen, as *Dio* witnesseth. And these were called *Collegium Pontificum*, whereof this *Pontifex Maximus* was President: one of the absolute Dignities of *Rome*, as being for term of life, and of greatest and Divine Authority. Which general distribution of the *Romans* into Trades and Mysteries, doth not unfitly bring into remembrance, that which is usual amongst the *Turks*, who by their Law are all bound to be of an Occupation; not excepting the Grand Signior himself. For he that now upholds the *Ottoman* Family, by the name of *Sultan Acmet*, is a professed maker of Rings, which the *Turks* do wear on their Thumb when they shoot, to let the String go easily without hurting them: and his Father *Mahomet* was a Fletcher, and made Arrows. In like manner, all his Courtiers are of Trades and Occupations; and every Man is called by the Title of his Art: As, he that was lately *Visier Bassa* to the present *Sultan*, was called by the name of *Natcash Bassa*, the *Visier* Painter, being indeed the *Sultan's* Painter. Neither are they ashamed to acknowledge as much: For, opening Letters which were sent into *Turky* out of *Christendom*, that were limned about the Margin, he said, he could Paint as well as that himself.

Cap. de instit.  
tutis. Lib. 34.  
cap. 1.  
Lib. 2.  
Epist. ad  
Qu. fratrem.  
Epist. 5.

In L. 1. §.

L. Pater  
filium §.

Lib. 36.

Acometus  
the Great  
Turk.  
Fruterer  
Bassa, Nailor,  
or payer of  
Nails.  
Bustangi  
Bassa,  
Gardener.

## The Fifth OBSERVATION.

THE fifth thing which I observe out of these Passages at *Corfinium*, is, the restoring back of such Monies to *Domitius*, as were brought unto *Cæsar* by the Officers of the Town, and which he knew to be of the publick Treasure of the State. Which howsoever it may seem admirable to the hearers of these times, wherein there is but this one Rule for matter of Money, *Unde habeas querit nemo, sed oportet habere*, No body asks how you come by it, but it must be had: Yet such as will lay a sure foundation of Honour, and thrive in the courses which they follow, must not be ignorant, that there is nothing more requisite to gain opinion and reputation in the carriage of any




THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN







THE BATTEL WHICH CÆSAR HAD













Caput autem  
est in omni  
procuratore  
negotii, &  
muneris pub-  
lici, ut avari-  
tia pellatur  
animi minima  
suspicio. Nulla  
autem re, con-  
siliare facilius  
bonvolentiam  
multitudinis  
possunt ii qui  
reipub. pre-  
sunt, quam  
abstinentia  
& continentia.  
Cicero.  
(a) Cic. lib.  
Offic.

any publick business, than to be clear of the least suspicion of covetousness. Neither is there any means that will sooner win a multitude, to believe in those things which are set abroad by publick Authority, than those two Virgin virtues, Abstinence and Continency: especially when they are found in Princes and chief Commanders, that can otherwise justify their actions with Sovereignty and uncontrollment. Nor, on the other side, did ever *Apollo* give out truer Oracle than that, which said, That there was no means to ruine *Sparta* but by Avarice.

In which sense (a) *C. Pontius* the *Samnite* wished, that the Gods had reserved him to times wherein the *Romans* would have been corrupted with Gifts: for then he would soon have seen an end of their Commonwealth. And certainly that Empire could never have towered so high, nor continued firm so many Ages, had not her foundation been laid by Men of admirable temper in this kind: Such as was *Paulus Æmylius*; who having sacked *Macedonia*, and brought as much Wealth into the publick Treasury as gave an end to Tributes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but in Honour) for all that he had taken. And such also was *Scipio Africanus*; that of all the Wealth of *Carthage*, brought nothing into his private House, but a high and triumphant Name, as a merit of his virtues and deeds of Arms: leaving behind him this Oracle, as a document to following times; That covetous Captains are good to none but to the Enemy. And to conclude, such was *M. Curius*; who having triumphed over the *Samnites*, the *Sabines*, and *Pyrrhus*, refused a great mass of Gold, which was offered him by the *Samnites*: esteeming it more honourable to command them that had Gold, than to have Gold of his own. Howbeit, such is the frailty of humane nature, that for the most part, Men have always suffered their desire of Money to increase with their Wealth, although it were to their ruin and destruction. Which *Cæsar* well discerned, as appeareth by that which he writ to *Oppius*, touching this accident: *Hæc nova sit vincendi ratio, ut misericordia & liberalitate nos muniamus*; It is a new way of Conquering, to strengthen our selves by Mercifulness and Liberality.

#### The Sixth OBSERVATION.

UPON occasion of *Cæsar's* calling unto him, out of the Town, *Senatores, senatorumque filios, Equitesque Romanos*, the Senators, Sons of Senators, and Roman Knights, it shall not seem impertinent, to note the degrees and conditions of State whereof the *Roman* People consisted. For the better clearing whereof, it is to be understood, that by that notable Transaction at *Comitium*, between *Romulus* and *Tatius*, it was agreed, That both those Nations should dwell together at *Romulus's* Town, which after his name, should be called *Rome*; and that the Inhabitants thereof should be named *Quirites*, after the name of *Tatius's* City. Howbeit, specially they were divided into three Tribes, whereof they which were of *Romulus's* party, were called after his name, *Rhamnenses*; those that came with *Tatius*, *Tatienses*; and the third Tribe *Lucerences*, of *Lucus*, a Grove: Forasmuch as they being neither of *Romulus's* retinue, nor yet of the *Sabines*, were nevertheless met together at that place, from divers parts, as at a Grove, where commonly Assemblies were made to offer Sacrifice, and to perform their heathenish Solemnities.

Each of these Tribes were divided by *Romulus* into ten *Curie*; and so made the number of thirty

*Curie*. And out of each of these *Curie* he chose three Persons, such as by their presence and sufficiency seemed fittest, and most worthy; which amounted to Ninety. To whom, out of every Tribe he further added three, and one more of his own choosing, to make the number up an hundred; whom he established as his Council or *Se-Senatus*. By whose advice he resolved of all matters of consequence, either concerning Peace or War, as *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* noteth. Howbeit *Plu- Lib. 2.* *tarch* saith, they were seldom assembled but to understand the King's pleasure; and had no other pre-eminence in the Common-weal, saving they were the first that did know what was purposed. Howsoever, they were stiled by the name of *Senatores, quasi seniores*, as thereby qualified to be admitted to Counsel: and in the same sense they were called *Patres*.

The Senate being thus established, *Romulus* selected out of every of those *Curie* ten young Men, and so made up the number of three hundred, for a guard to his Person; who for their readiness and nimbleness were called *Celeres*, all mounted on Horseback: Whence grew their *Ordo Eque- Equites: ordo* *stris*, or band of *Roman* Knights, which were the mean between the Senate and the People, and as a Seminary to supply the Senate; for out of them were the Senators taken. The rest, that were not of these two Orders, were comprehended under the name of the Commons, or Populacy. Whereby it appeareth that *Rome* consisted of three estates, Senators, Knights, and the Commons, according to that of *Aufonius*;

*Martia Roma triplex; Equitatu, Plebe, Senatu.*

Of three sorts *Rome* consists, Knights, Commons, Senate.

Touching the number of Senators, it is further to be noted, that *Tarquinius Priscus*, to gain the favour of the People, took a hundred of the Commons, and added them to the Senate, who were called *Senatores minorum Gentium*. And *Brutus Senatores minorum* *Gentium*. having reduced it to a Commonwealth, made them up three hundred out of the band of Knights; and from that time they were called *Patres conscripti*. *Patres con-* *scripti*. Neither were they at all times limited to that number: For the seditious *Gracchi* added three hundred more unto them; and *Julius Cæsar* admitted unto the Senate all manner of Persons. In which regard *Augustus* (as *Suetonius* saith) *Senato-* *rum affluentem numerum deformi & incondita turba* *(erant enim super mille, & quidam indignissimi)* *ad modum pristinum & splendorem redegit*: Reduced the excessive number of Senators, which was become a deformed and shapeless company (for they were above a thousand, and divers of them unworthy Fellows) to their ancient way and splendour.

Concerning a competency of Wealth, to make a Man capable of the place of a Senator, we may observe, that in the Reign of *Servius* the King, he that was worth a thousand *Asses* (which are about three hundred pound sterling) was eligible. But the Riches of the Empire increasing, a Senator's Wealth was rated at nine thousand pound, according to *Suetonius*; *Senatum censum ampli-* *vit, ac pro octingentorum millium summa duodecies* *H. S. taxavit, supplevitque non habentibus*. The Wealth of a *Roman* Knight was rated at three hundred threescore, or thereabouts.

This *Corfinium* was the chief Town of the *Pe-* *Corfinium.* *Strabo,* *lib. 6.* *lignians*, and stood in the centre of *Italy*, where all the Confederate People assembled when they consulted of War against the *Romans*, for their

Imperatores  
muneribus  
bianres, Hosti-  
bus sunt per-  
viles.  
Appian de  
bell. Hispan.  
Cic Cato  
Major.



their right of Burgeſſſhip, or Freedom of the City, which was then denied them: Which War was called *Bellum Sociale*, *Marſicum*, and *Italicum*. There is now nothing remaining of that Town but the Ruines, as a Mark of the Place where it anciently ſtood, upon a Plain, commonly called *Pentina*, or *Sant Peligno*.

## C H A P. IX.

Pompey goeth to Brundisium: Cæſar maketh means to treat with him.

Cæſar.

Luceria.

**P**ompey underſtanding of theſe things which had paſt at Corfinium, departed from Luceria, and went to Canuſium, and from thence to Brundisium; cauſing all the power he could to be raiſed by new Muſters and Inrollments, arming Shepherds and Slaves, and mounting them on Horſeback; of whom he made ſome three hundred Horſe. In the mean time L. Manlius, the Prætor, fled from Alba with ſix Cohorts; and Rutilius Lupus, Prætor, fled from Tarracina with three Cohorts: Who deſcrying aſar off the Cavalry of Cæſar, commanded by Bivius Curius, forſaking the Prætor, turned their Enſigns towards Curius, and joyned with him. In like manner the days following divers other Cohorts came in as they marched, ſome to the Foot Troops, and ſome to the Horſe. Cn. Magius of Cremona, Maſter of the Works, and of the Munition in Pompey's Army, was taken on the Way and brought back to Cæſar: Whom he ſent back again to Pompey, with commiſſion to treat with him to this effect: Forasmuch as there had yet happened no opportunity of meeting or conference, he was now determined to ſeek him at Brundisium; for it much imported the Commonweal, and every Man's ſafety in particular, that they two might conſerr together. Neither could things be ſo well handled upon ſo great a diſtance of way, where the Articles of Treaty muſt be carried to and fro by a third Party, as when they met face to face to conclude of the conditions.

This Meſſage being firſt given, he came to Brundisium with ſix Legions; four Legions of old Soldiers, and the other raiſed by new inrollments, or made up as he came along the Country: For he had preſently diſpatched Domitius his Cohorts from Corfinium into Sicily. At his coming, he found the Conſuls gone over to Dyrrachium with the greateſt part of the Army, and Pompey remaining at Brundisium with twenty Cohorts. Neither could he certainly be informed, whether he remained at Brundisium to make good the Town, whereby he might the eaſier be Maſter of the Adriatick Sea, and command both the utter Parts of Italy, and the Regions of Greece, and ſo to keep the War on foot on the one ſide and on the other; or whether he ſtaied there for want of ſhipping. Howſoever he would not endure that Pompey ſhould think he could not be forced to quit Italy; and therefore reſolved to ſtop up the mouth of the Haven, and to take away the uſe thereof: Which he went about in this manner. Where the mouth of the Haven, was narrow-

est, he raiſed great Mounts of Earth on either ſide near unto the Shore; for there the Sea was ſhallow: but going further into the deep, where no ſuch Mounts could be raiſed, he placed double Floats of Wood, right againſt the ſame Mounts of thirty Foot ſquare; and at the corners caſt out four Anchors to faſten them that they might not be toſſed up and down by the Waves. Theſe Floats being thus placed, he then added other Floats of the ſame ſcantling, and covered them with Bavin and Earth, to

the end Men might come readily upon them to defend them. He armed them in Front and on each ſide with Hurdles and Gabions: and on every fourth Float made a Tower of two Stories high the better to defend them from Violence of Shipping, and from burning.

Againſt this work Pompey ſent out great Ships of burthen, which he found in the Haven, armed with Towers of three Stories high, full of Munition, and all ſort of Weapons, to hinder and diſturb the ſame. So that every day they fought aſar off each with other, with Slings, Arrows, and other caſting Weapons. Which Buſineſs Cæſar ſo carryed, as being willing not to let fall the conditions of Peace, if happily it might be effected. And albeit he greatly wondered that Magius, whom he had ſent to Pompey, did not return again; and that this Treaty ſo often attempted, did hinder much his deſigns: Yet he thought it fit by all means to perſevere therein: And therefore ſent Caninius Rebilus, one of his Legates, an inward Friend of, and near allied to Scribonius Libo, to ſpeak with him; commanding him to perſwade Libo to mediate a reconciliation, and that Cæſar himſelf might ſpeak with Pompey. It might be that thereupon both of them would yield to lay down their Arms upon equal conditions: The greateſt part of which Honour would redound to Libo, if by his interceſſion the War might take an end.

Libo having heard Caninius, went ſtreight to Pompey; and within a while returning, told him, That forasmuch as the Conſuls were abſent, there could be nothing done touching an agreement. Whereupon Cæſar reſolved to let fall the matter of Treaty, which he had ſo often attempted, and to prepare for War.

## The Firſt OBSERVATION.

**T**His Accident of taking Cn. Magius, hath made known an Officer of great place and uſe in the Roman Army, of whom otherwiſe their Hiſtories make little mention. For, howſoever there is found in theſe Commentaries many particular Deſcriptions of admirable and incredible Works, ſuch as may ſeem to be made rather by Giants and Cyclopes, than any labour of Man; yet there is no mention of any *Præſectus Fabrūm*, or Maſter of the Works in any of Cæſar's Armies. Howbeit *Vegetius*, expreſſing their ſingular care to have in abundance all manner of Proviſions requiſite for an Army, ſaith; That to every Legion did belong Carpenters, Bricklayers, Smiths, Painters, and other Artizans, ſkilful and fit to build Lodgings for their Winter Camps; to make Engines and Devices for War; ſuch as were their portative or ambulatory Towers, Targets, Morions, Corſlets, Bows, Arrows, Darts, and Piles, or whatſoever elſe might ſerve, either for offence or defence. Which Artificers were all known by the name of *Fabri*; and he that was chief, and had the command of them, was called *Præſectus Fabrūm*. And in like manner *Plutarch* ſheweth that there was ſuch an Officer; as alſo that the Place was given by the General; where he ſaith that *Vibius* a Sicilian reſuſed to lodge *Cicero*, as he paſſed to Exile through *Lucania*; although that in his Conſulſhip he had beſtowed upon him the place of *Præſectus Fabrūm*. And albeit Cæſar maketh no mention of any ſuch Officer; yet *Catullus* doth it for him, in ſuch biting Trimetres as will not be forgotten:

Quis

Pompey's Son married Libo's Daughter.


Præſectus Fabrūm.

Lib. 2. Cap. 11.

Plutarch in the Life of Cicero.

Cæſar beſieged Pompey at Brundisium, the 23 day of February Anno urbis cond. 704.



















*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,  
Nisi Impudicus, & Vorax, & Helluo,  
Mamurram habere, quod comata Gallia  
Habebat & ultima Britannia?*

Who can this endure to see,  
But must a wanton Glutton be,  
That Mamurra should have all  
Fetch'd from Britain and from Gaul?

Lib. 36.  
cap. 6.

Of which Mamurra Pliny thus writeth; Cornelius Nepos, saith he, writeth that Mamurra a Roman Knight, born at Formia, and Master of the Works under Caesar in Gallia, was the first that covered all the Walls of his House, which he built in Mount Caelius, with Leaves of Marble. Neither let any Man disdain the Authour as a mean Person; for this is that Mamurra, whom Catullus doth note in his Verses; whose House was far more stately than Catullus did express, by saying he had gotten all the Wealth of Gallia Comata. For the said Cornelius affirmeth, that he was the first in Rome that made the Pillars of his House of solid Marble, even hewn out of the Quarries of Caristus, or Luna. Thus far goeth Pliny. Out of which may be noted, that exorbitancy in gaining doth produce the like course in spending; and howsoever such comings in may be close and secret, yet the issuings out will proclaim it in profuse and lavishing manner: And therefore such as command in these places, and have such means to enrich themselves, had need to be clean-fingered. Caesar writing to Oppius, mentioneth the taking of this Man, as a thing of some note. Cn. Magium, Pompeii Praefectum deprehendi scilicet, meo instituto usus sum, & cum statim missum feci: Jam duo Praefecti Fabrum in meam potestatem venerunt, & a me missi sunt: When I had taken Cn. Magius, a Master of the Works to Pompey, according to my usual manner, I let him go. So that there have two Masters of the Works fallen into my Hands, and I have let them both freely go. Concerning the use of these manual Arts, and the prerogative they have in well-ordered States; it is to be noted, that without these, no City can conveniently be built, fortified, or furnished with Arms. And thereupon such Artizans have alwayes challenged a place of chief regard in the Commonweal. Whence it was that Ulysses scorned not *Se Fabrum profiteri*, to profess himself such an Artizan.

Epist. ad  
Attic. Lib.  
9. Epist. 8.

Homer.  
Odys. 23.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**T**He *Maxime proprium*, or most proper part of War is opposition; and that universal, rather than any other kind of repugnancy: For there is no sympathizing condition between two Enemy Armies, otherwise than by mutual exchange of *velle & nolle*, throughout the whole course of their designs; as may be here observed upon Caesar's Arrival at Brundisium. For finding Pompey to remain there after the departure of the Consuls, and not certainly informed of the reason of his stay; lest he should think he could not be forced to quit Italy, Caesar went about to thrust him out headlong: Or otherwise if his purpose were to follow after the Consuls to Dyrrachium, Caesar's design then was to shut him in, and so to have followed the rule of contradiction, by which Soldiers are directed in their Achievements.

Concerning the Situation of Brundisium, which hath ever been famous for the commodiousness of

the Haven, and the usual Port where the Romans took shipping for Greece, being but a hundred Italian Miles distant from Apollonia in Epirus; we are to note that the Town standeth upon a Langet of Earth, extended into the Haven Peninsule-like from the main Land, resembling the Neck and Head of a Stag, and in that regard is called *Brundisium*, of *Bréum*, which signifieth a Stag: Which Langet hath many crooked Guts, or Inlets of the Sea, capable of great shipping; besides the two main Ports on either side of the Town, which with the rest of the Haven, make the safest and fairest Road of that part of the World. The Mouth of the Haven where Caesar made his Floars, is very streight; and opposite thereunto, some three Miles distant into the Sea, standeth a small Island, to abate the Violence and Rage of the Waves. Now to besiege *Brundisium*, it was requisite to take away the use and benefit of the Haven: Which Caesar attempted with such rare and artificial Works of Mounts where the Sea was shallow, and of Floars where the Water was deep; and those made firm with Earth, and fenced with Hurdles and Turrets, that the Reader may discern it, by the Description, to be a Master-piece of excellent invention.

Brundisium  
quidam Poeta  
causa Brendam  
dixerunt.  
Festus.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

**I**T is truly said of old, That Peace is not dear at any rate. Which Antiochus well understood, when he bought it of the Romans for twelve thousand Attick Talents, and five hundred and forty thousand Bushels of Wheat: Esteeming it as the sovereign happiness of Man's fortune, and an extraordinary effect of those intelligent Spirits, which guide the motions of the Caelestial Spheres, to keep the Elements in a disagreeing Concord, and the Feet of Men in the Paths of Tranquility. Hence it is, that such as are Instruments of so great a good, and shall thereby happen to redeem a Nation from Horror and Confusion, have in all Ages been crowned with Honour and Renown, as the due reward of a Mediator of Peace. And therefore Caesar, perswading Libo to negotiate a cessation of Arms, and to work in Pompey a disposition to an Agreement, propounded the Honour which attended this Service, and the Merit of that Endeavour which brought back Peace into the Empire.

Livy Lib. 8.  
Dec. 4.

#### CHAP. X.

Pompey leaveth Brundisium, and shippeth himself for Greece.

**T**He Work being half perfected, and nine Days Labour bestowed upon it; the Ships that had transported the Consuls and the other part of the Army, returned from Dyrrachium to Brundisium: And thereupon Pompey began to fit himself for a departure; being induced thereunto either by the Works which Caesar had begun, or by a resolution formerly taken to quit Italy. And the better to retard Caesar's prosecution (lest upon his issuing out, the Soldiers should enter the Town) he mured up the Gates, and stopt the Entrances of the Streets and Passages, sunk Ditches and Trenches cross the Ways, and therein stuck sharp Piles and stakes, and covering the same with slight Hurdles, levelled it with thin and light Earth: leaving onely two ways free, which went unto the Haven, which he hedg'd in with a strong Palisado of huge sharp Piles. These things being thus prepared, he commanded

Caesar.



the Soldiers to get on Shipboard, without Noise or Tumult; and left upon the Walls and in the Towers, here and there, some of the readiest Slingers and Archers, to be called away upon a warning Sign, when the rest of the Soldiers were all shipped; appointing Gallies to take them in at an easie and safe Place. The Inhabitants of Brundisium, oppressed with the Injuries and Contumelies of Pompey and his Soldiers, did favour Cæsar's Party; and understanding of this departure, whilst they were running up and down, and busied about getting aboard, gave notice thereof from the Tops of their Houses. Which being perceived, Cæsar (not to omit any opportunity of atchieving his purpose) commanded Ladders to be prepared, and the Soldiers to take Arms. Pompey a little before Night weighed Anchour: And the Soldiers keeping guard on the Wall, upon the Watch-word given, were all called from their Stations, and by known Passages repaired to the Ships. Cæsar's Soldiers with Ladders got upon the Wall: But being admonished by them of Brundisium to take heed of the blind Ditch, they stood still. At last they were brought a great compass about, and so came to the Haven; and with Skiffs and Boats, seized two Ships with Soldiers, which stuck by chance upon the Mounts which Cæsar had made.

Cæsar Val-  
lun.

## OBSERVATION.

Plutarch in  
the Life of  
Pompey.

FORASMUCH as this manner of Pompey's departure from Brundisium, and the sleight he used to imbarc himself and his Army without danger of Cæsar's entering the Town, is commended for one of the best Stratagems of War that ever he used; let us a little consider the parts thereof, which present themselves of two sorts: The one consisting of the Works he made, to hinder and retard Cæsar's entrance, if happily he should have knowledge of his departure; and the other in the cleanly conveyance of his Men aboard, without noise or Tumult, and the semblance he made of keeping the Town, by continuing Watch upon the Walls, to the end there might be no knowledge taken thereof. The Works were of three sorts. For first he mured and stopped up the ends and entrances of Streets and Lanes, which might give access to a pursuing Enemy. And to that end also, he sunk Ditches, or Trenches, cross the Ways and Passages: Which he stuck full of sharp Stakes and Galthrops, and covered them with light and thin Hurdles, that the Enemy might not espy them. And thirdly hedged in the Ways leading to the Port, with a strong Pallisado of huge sharp Piles. And so used both the Lyon's and the Fox's Skin, to avoid the danger which might have fallen upon him, if Cæsar happily had found means to attach them, as they were incumbered in getting to their Ships, and disposing themselves to fly away. Which being an occasion that might have given him great advantage, was in this manner carefully prevented by Pompey. Howbeit, this his quitting Brundisium is censured but for a faulty resolution handsomely carried: For Cicero doth much blame him for abandoning Italy; calling it a Themistoclean Policy, to perswade his Party to forsake their Country, and to leave the best of their pleasures, and the weakest of each Sex, to such misery and desolation, as moved pity in those that considered but the condition of the Dogs and brute Beasts; as it fell out at Athens, when Themistocles perswaded the Athenians to leave their Town and Country, and betake themselves wholly to sea, to fight against Xerxes.

Cicer. Epist.  
ad Atticum.

## CHAP. XI.

Cæsar dispatcheth Forces into Sardinia and Sicily.  
Cato's endeavour to keep Sicily for Pompey,

Albeit Cæsar well knew, that it much im-ported a speedy end of the business, to get Ships and pass the Seas after Pompey, before he could joyn himself with the Forces of the Transmarine Parts; yet doubting the lets, and the long time before it could be effected, for that Pompey had taken with him all the shipping he could get, and thereby left him for the present no means to follow after: It remained that he attended shipping to be brought from remote Parts, as out of Gallia, from Ancona and the Streights; which at that time of the Year, would require a long and troublesome passage. In the mean time, he thought it no way fit that Pompey's old Army, and the two Provinces of Spain should be settled and assured; (one of them being deeply engaged to Pompey for many great and ample Benefits:) Or that they should have time to raise new Troops, especially of Horse; or that Gallia or Italy should be solicited or wrought from him in his absence. And therefore for the present, he resolved to desist from making any further pursuit after Pompey, and to go into Spain; giving order to the Duumviri of all the Municipal Towns, to provide shipping, and send it to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, a Legate, into Sardinia with one Legion; and Curio the Proprætor, into Sicily with three Legions; commanding him, after he had possessed Sicily, to transport his Army into Africa. Marcus Cotta governed Sardinia, and M. Cato, Sicily, Tubero should by lot have held Africa.

Bailiff.

The Caralitani understanding that Valerius was to be sent unto them, before he had left Italy, of their own accord thrust Cotta out of the Town. Cotta amused thereat, and perceiving withal that the whole Province gave consent unto it, fled presently out of Sardinia into Africa. Cato prepared and new trimmed the Gallies in Sicily, giving order to the Towns to build new, and prosecuted his direction with great diligence. Moreover, by his Legates, he mustered and enrolled Citizens of Rome in Lucania and Brutia, requiring proportionable numbers of Horse and Foot from the Towns in Sicily. Which things being almost accomplished, understanding of Curio's coming, he complained in publick how he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey; who without any providence or preparation, had engaged himself in an unnecessary War: And yet being demanded by himself and the rest in the Senate, answered confidently, that he was provided of all necessaries fit for War. And after he had thus publicly complained, he fled out of the Province: By which means, Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio Sicily, void of Government, and thither brought their Armies.

Tubero arriving in Africa, found Actius Varus commanding the Province: Who (as we have formerly shewed) having lost his Cohorts at Auximum, fled forthwith into Africa, and of his own Authority possessed himself of the Province, which he found without a Governour. He got together by new Enrolments two compleat Legions, which he raised by his Knowledge and Experience of the People of that Country, by reason he had governed that Province as Prætor some few Years before. Tubero arriving with his Fleet at Utica, was by Varus kept out of the Town and the Haven; neither would he suffer him to set his Son ashore, which was sick, but compelled him to weigh Anchour and depart.



## The First OBSERVATION.

Plutarch in  
the life of  
Pompey.

**T**His Chapter maketh the first period of this War, as it is taken from the beginning of these Civil Broils, unto Pompey's forsaking Italy, which was begun and ended in the space of 60 days: and also openeth the Gate to second resolutions, which are prosecuted, as the sequel of the History will manifest: Containing likewise the reasons, why Caesar made not present pursuit after Pompey, as the hinges of the succeeding War, and the true causes of the consequents of the same. In the consideration whereof, albeit Caesar understood the advantage of him that prosecuteth a receding Enemy, and the hopes which might be thereby conceived of a speedy end of that War; yet having no ready means to accomplish his desire, he thought it better to prevent such inconveniences as might happily have fallen out upon the same: And so to keep his Party in a progress of their active thoughts, by clearing and assuring that Western part of the Empire, which Pompey had left unto him by his departure; rather than to leave an Enemy on his back, or to admit a cooling and languishment of their resolutions, through expectation of Shipping, to follow that course which otherwise had been without exception.

Europa prima  
& praeantissi-  
ma mundi  
pars, Appian.  
Europaatrix  
victoris omni-  
um gentium  
populi, longe-  
que terrarum  
pulcherrima.  
Plin. lib. 3.  
cap. 1.

In the carriage whereof we may observe, that as upon the first breaking out of these troubles, they scrambled for the Towns of Italy, and fought to strengthen their parties by such as had no voice in the grand Chapter of the Senate, but only enjoyed the benefit of Municipal rights; so now being parted asunder, and the contagion of this intestine evil spread abroad, and grown to more ripeness, they made like haste to fasten upon the remoter Provinces, wherein Caesar had the better portion. For in his share were contained Italy, Gallia, Britannia, Hispania, Sicilia; which being the prime Countries of Europe, were consequently the flour of that Empire, for that Europe hath ever been taken for the principal and chiefest part of the World.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**S**Econdly, we may observe in Cato, the effects of a Stoical or formal Spirit, which are more valuable in the easiness of Peace, than in the difficulties of War. For, howsoever he made shew of bestirring himself, in rigging and trimming up the Gallies of his Province, commanding more to be built, raising new Troops of Horse and Foot, and prosecuting his commands with purpose of an exact account: Yet in the end, understanding of Curio his coming, he spent his fury in complaining of his Friends, and laying the cause of those animosities upon him, whom by election and consent he had formerly set up, to make head against such, as otherwise may be supposed would have contained themselves in a better measure of moderation.

## C H A P. XII.

Caesar goeth to Rome; and, calling a Senate, complaineth of the injuries done unto him.

Caesar.

**T**Hese things being ended, that the Soldiers might for the residue of the time be a little eased and refreshed, Caesar brought them back into the next Municipal Towns; he himself went directly to the City: And having called a Senate, he layeth open the injuries and

wrongs offered unto him by his Adversaries; sheweth them, that he never sought Honour in the State by extraordinary means, only he looked to have enjoyed the full time of his Consulship, and therewith to have been contented: Which was no more than any Citizen might stand for. The Tribunes of the People had required, that consideration might be had of him in his absence, notwithstanding the opposition of his Enemies, and Cato his bitter resistance, spending the time, after his old manner, with long and tedious Speeches: which if Pompey (being Consul) had disliked, why did he suffer that to pass which was enacted? But if then he did allow and like of it, what reason had he to hinder him from enjoying a benefit which the People of Rome had bestowed upon him? From that, he fell to speak of his Patience: which appeared, in that of his own accord he moved that either party might quit their Forces; which might have been very prejudicial to his Honour and Dignity: Declared what had been the malice and bitterness of his Adversaries, who refused to do that themselves, which they required of another Man; choosing rather to imbroid and confound the whole State, than to forgo the command of an Army: Spake at large as well of the wrong done unto him, by taking the two Legions from him, as also for their hard and insolent dealing, in putting the Tribunes of the People by their place and Authority.

He forgot not likewise to relate the conditions which he propounded; the conference which he desired, and would not be granted. In regard whereof, he prayed and required, that they would take the charge of the Commonwealth, and give a helping hand to him for the Government thereof. But if they should upon any doubt or mistrust refuse to joyn with him, he would not much importune them, but would take it into his own hands; and in the mean time, let Commissioners be sent to Pompey to treat of Peace. Neither did he respect what Pompey a little before had said in the Senate, That to whomsoever Embassadors were sent, to such seemed to be ascribed Authority and Pre-eminence; as, on the contrary part, such as sent them, manifested an apprehension of fear; for these were arguments of pusillanimity. For his part, as he had gone beyond him in deeds of Arms and noble Acts; so would he in like manner, endeavour to excell him in Justice and Equity.

The Senators were well pleased that Embassadors should be sent: but there was no Man found that would go; every Man refusing in particular, for fear of Pompey; who, upon his departure from Rome, had said in the Senate, That he would hold him that stayed at Rome, in the same condition with them that were in Caesar's Camp. So that three days were spent in debate and excuses; L. Metellus, Tribune of the People, being drawn by Caesar's Adversaries, to protract the time, and to hinder any matter which Caesar should propound unto them.

L. Metellus.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**F**IRST, we may observe, how irksome it is to humane nature, for him that hath tasted the sweetness of Authority, to forgo the reins of command, and again to inroll his name in the List of common duty; descending from the Throne of Sovereignty, to the condition of Obedience, and to lose his eminency in respectless equality: especially, if the Honour be Military, and of Martial nature. For that fasteneth on us with a stronger hold, than any other power; being less capable of moderation, and waited on with the eyes and expectation of present and future Ages. Whereby Men grow desperately jealous of the opinion of the World, and cannot endure to quit themselves of that

Felicitatis &  
moderationis  
dividuum  
Contubernium.



that care, although they have attained to the full time of their deliverance: But to be supplanted in the midst of so glorious a Race, or to be pulled out of the Seat of Magistracy by an abortive miscarriage, is able to inrage an ambitious spirit so far beyond the bounds of Modesty, that it will not spare any endeavour to confound the greatest Empire, with irrecoverable Calamities.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe the disposition of those Senators, that by their staying at Rome, became neutral in that Faction; and thereupon refused either to take Cæsar's commands, or to present themselves to Pompey, as Mediators of Peace. Plutarch hath two reasons why the Senators would undertake no such matter of Commission as was required by Cæsar. The first is this which is here expressed; every Man fearing the displeasure of Pompey, who at his departure from Rome, had protested to hold them for Enemies that went not along with him: Whereas Cæsar censured their forbearance with better advantage to himself, and took their neutrality as an argument of becoming his followers. The other reason which Plutarch avoucheth, is the opinion which the Senators had of Cæsar's double dealing; as not carrying his heart in his mouth, but pretending that which he never meant. For they could not be persuaded that his end was a cessation of Arms, or such a Peace with Pompey as should have kept on foot their ancient liberty; but fought rather pretexts of good meaning, to colour his design of making Rome his Servant. Howsoever, we may not omit what is reported to have happened between him and Metellus, more than he himself speaketh of. For, going about to take Money out of the Treasury, he was there stoutly resisted by this Metellus, of whom he complaineth; alledging the Laws and Acts of the State, forbidding any Man to touch that Money, but in such times of extremity as were therein expressed.

To which Cæsar answered; That those Laws were only made for time of Peace: But now, Arms and War required another course of proceeding. Nevertheless Metellus \* would not suffer him to break open the doors, until Cæsar advised him to be gone if he loved his Life; for it was easier for him to dispatch him than to speak it: and so entred and carried away the Treasure. Whereupon groweth that of Florus, *Censum & patrimonium populi Romani ante rapuit quam Imperium*; He carried away the Treasure and Patrimony of the People of Rome, before he got the Empire.

And Appian, deriding the scrupulousness of the ancient Romans, that would not touch that Treasure but in extremity of War against the Celts or Gauls, saith, that Cæsar might lawfully take it, for that he had vanquished and subdued the Gauls; whereby the Romans had no further cause to fear them.

stood that Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, whom Cæsar had a little before taken at Corfinium and dismissed him: And that Domitius likewise was gone to take Marseilles, with eight Gallies, which he set out from Sicilia and Sardinia, and manned them with Slaves, Men infranchised, and his own Husbandmen: Sending as Messengers before, certain young Noble-men of Marseilles, with whom Pompey upon his departure from the City had earnestly dealt, that Cæsar's new favours might not put out of their remembrance the old benefits which he had done unto them. Those of Marseilles having received this Message, shut their Gates against Cæsar, called into the City the Albicans, barbarous and mountainous People (who of ancient time had held amity with them, and dwelt upon the Hills above Marseilles) brought Corn from all the adjacent Regions and Castles into the Town, set up Offices and Forges to make Arms, repaired both their Walls, their Navy, and their Gates.

Cæsar called out unto him some fifteen of the chiefest Men of Marseilles, and treated with them, that the beginning of the War might not grow from that Town; who should rather follow the example of all Italy, than apply themselves to the will of any one Man: not omitting such other persuasions as he thought pertinent to a sound resolution. These Men reported at Marseilles what Cæsar had delivered, and by the common consent of the Town returned this answer; That they understood, that the People of Rome was divided into two parts; neither was it in them to judge, or could they discern which of the two was in the right. The Leaders of these two Factions were Pompey and Cæsar, both special Patrons and Benefactors to their City: Of whom, one had augmented the publick revenues of the State, and endowed it with the Lands and Territories of the Volcæ Arecomici, and the Helvij; the other, having conquered and subdued \* Gallias, gave it unto them, \* By this Gallias, is understood some place near to Marseilles. whereby their Tributary Incomes were much augmented; and therefore, as they were equally bound to both for their favours, so would they carry to both an equal respect, not aiding either of them against the other, or receiving them within their Gates.

Whilst these things were in handling, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with his Shipping; and being received in, was made Governour of the City, and had the whole direction of the War committed unto him. By his appointment the Fleet was sent out into all Coasts; and such Ships of burthen as they found, they brought in: the Nails, Timber, and Tackling whereof, they took to mend and rigg out other Ships. What Corn soever was found in the City, was brought in publick keeping; reserving the overplus of Victual and Provision for a Siege, as occasion should require.

Cæsar, provoked with these injuries, brought three Legions to Marseilles, determined to make Towers and Mantelets ready for an Assault, and to build twelve new Gallies at Arles; which were armed, rigged, finished, and brought to Marseilles, within thirty days after the Timber was cut down. Of these he made D. Brutus Admiral, and left C. Trebonius to follow the Siege.

OBSERVATION.

From the Marseillians we may learn, that it is far easier to say well than to do well: For howsoever they were able to discern the truth, and to give an answer to Cæsar, well-beseeming the fame and opinion of their literature and knowledge, (being an Academy little inferiour to the best, and in later times more frequented by the Romans, for the study of Oratory and Philosophy, than Athens, or any other such chief Seat of the Muses;) yet in their actions they disavowed all: taking

Augustodunum vetustissima post Marseilliam bonarum artium sedes. Tacit. 3. Annal. Strabo lib. 4.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar leaveth the City, goeth into Gallia, and treateth with the Marseillians.

Cæsar perceiving their resolution, after he had spent there in vain some few days (that he might not lose any more time, and leave those things undone which he purposely intended) he left the City, and went into the further Gallia. Upon his arrival there, he under-


Denunciante Pompeio pro hostibus se habiturum qui reipub. defuisent; ipse medios & neutrius partis, suorum sibi numero futuros pronuntiavit. Sueton. 75. Cicero 10. Epist. ad Atticum. Plutarch. Lucan. Appian. Florus.

\* Non nisi per nostrum vobis percussa patebunt Templalatus, nullaque feres. sine sanguine sacro, Sparsas, raptores opes. Lucan. lib. 3. Dignum te Cæsaris ira, Nullus honor faciet. Idem eodem.




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F  
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*Cumque alii  
fama populi  
terrore pave-  
rent, Phocais  
in dubiis ausa  
est servare ju-  
ventus Non  
Graia levitate  
fidem, signata-  
que iura, Et  
causas, non  
fata sequi.*  
Lucan l. 3.

taking upon them most unseasonably to arbitrate those differences, and to shew their opinion of the Quarrel, by taking part with one Faction. Wherein their error the more appeared, in that the party grieved was not liable to their award, but rather had occasion to gain thereby a double honour to himself; first, by forcing them, and then by pardoning their rashness. And yet some Writers do think, they did no more than they were tied unto by former Treaties, and Leagues with the Empire (which they took to consist in Pompey's Party) whereof they were Loyal and zealous Confederates; as appeareth by their love, when Rome was taken by the Gauls: For having news thereof, and understanding of the composition which was to be made to raise the Siege from the Capitol, they provided all the Gold and Silver they could get, and sent it to Rome for that service. In regard whereof they were endowed with many Privileges and Immunities, both in the City, and elsewhere in the Empire. Howsoever, their hap being to respect more an exact observance of what had passed, than the fatal succeeding course of things, drew upon them a sharp and bitter War; whereof they could not be freed, but by submitting themselves to his mercy whom they had rejected. And thus we see verified that of the Poet;

*Horace.*

*Quicquid delirant Reges plectuntur Achivi.*

Kings play the fools, and the poor people suffer.

Which implieth also how dangerous it is, for Men of Authority and Employment to be subject to wilful Ambition. For as their service is of great importance to Government, when it is attended with well-qualified affections; so are their motions as fearful, which are carried with the violence of exorbitant passions: Especially, considering the means they have, either to mis-employ the power of the State, or to give way to such inconveniences as may necessarily pervert all things but the ends they aim at: besides the aptness of a high spirit, not to doubt the truth of that saying which is attributed to Caesar, *Si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia violandum est*; If a Man would violate all Right and Law, he would do it for a Kingdom.

#### C H A P. XIV.

*Caesar* hasteth into Spain.

**W**Hilst these things were prepared and put in order, he sent C. Fabius, one of his Legates, with three Legions, that had wintered about Narbone, before him into Spain; commanding him with all speed and diligence to take the passage of the Pyrenean Hills, which were kept at that time with the Forces of L. Afranius: and gave order for the other Legions which wintered further off, to follow after. Fabius, according to his directions, made haste, put the Garrison from the passage, and by great journeys marched towards Afranius's Army.

Upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, who (as it is formerly related) was sent by Pompey into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, Pompey's Legates (of whom the one governed the nearest Province of Spain with three Legions; the other held the Country from the \* Forest of Castile, to the River † Ana, with two Legions; and the third commanded the Vectones and Lusitania, with the like number of Legions;) did so dispose and divide their charges, that Petreius was appointed to bring his Legions out of Lusitania, through the Territories of the

Vectones, and joyn himself with Afranius; and that Varro with his Power, should keep the further Province of Spain. Which being so resolved and determined, Petreius having commanded the Lusitanians to levy Horsemen, and other Auxiliary Forces; and Afranius likewise having made the like levy in the Territories of the \* Celtiberi, † Cantabri, and the rest of the barbarous Nations bordering upon the Ocean: Petreius came speedily through the Vectones to Afranius; and induced by the opportunity of the place, by mutual consent, they resolved to keep the War on foot near about Ilerda.

There were with Afranius (as formerly hath been shewed) three Legions, with Petreius's two, besides \* Targetiers of the nearer Province, and † Buckle-bearers of the further Province, some 80 Cohorts, and of both Provinces about 5000 Horse. Caesar had sent his Legions into Spain, accompanied only with six thousand Auxiliary Forces, and three thousand Horse, which had been with him in the former Wars. And the Gauls at his request furnished him with the like number; besides the noblest and valiantest amongst them, of whom he had made particular choice to follow him in that War. To these were added the better sort of the Aquitani, and High-landers, borderers upon the Province in Gallia. He was advertised that Pompey was on his journey, coming through Mauritania into Spain, and that he would speedily be there with his Legions: And thereupon he borrowed Money of the Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers, and gave it to his Army, whereby he gained two points: For first, he engaged the Captains by that lone to endeavour his good success; and secondly, bought the good affections of the Soldiers by largess and distribution. Fabius omitted no opportunity to get the favour of the Cities near about him; which he laboured as well by Letters as Messengers: and had already made two Bridges over the River Sicoris, distant one from another about four miles, and over these Bridges sent out his Men to Forage; for he had spent all that was to be found on this side the River. The same thing, and upon the same occasion, did the Leaders of Pompey's Army; and oftentimes their Cavalry met and encountered together. And as it hapned, that two of Fabius's Legions going out to Forage according to their daily custom, and had passed the River, the Carriage and the Cavalry following after, upon a sudden (by the over-pestering of Horses, and swelling of the water) the Bridge broke, and the rest of the Cavalry was secluded and cut off from the Legions. Which Petreius and Afranius perceiving, by the Hurdles and Planks that came down the River; Afranius presently by the Bridge which was adjoining to the Town and his Camp, put over four Legions, and all his Cavalry, and went to meet with Fabius his two Legions. Upon whose approach, L. Plancus, that commanded the Legions, being constrained by necessity, took the upper ground, dividing his Men into two Battalions, and making their Fronts to stand two contrary ways, to the end they might not be circumvented by the Horsemen. And although the number were very far unequal, yet he valiantly withstood very violent charges of the Enemy. The Cavalry being thus engaged, the Ensigns of two Legions were descried afar off, which Fabius had sent by way of the further Bridge, to second these other two; suspecting that which was come to pass, that the Commanders of the adverse Army would take the occasion and benefit of this accident, to cut off our party. Upon whose approach the Battel ceased; and the Legions on either side were brought back into their Camps.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**T**He first Observation may be taken from this design of Caesar's upon Spain, being at that time under the Government and Command of Pompey; the standing or falling whereof did much

\* Nos Celtis  
geniti, & ex  
Iberis Mar-  
tial lib. 4.  
† A valiant  
people, de-  
tended from  
Lacedaemon;  
of whom Sil-  
lial faith,  
Daminatum  
vivere poci.  
† Scutati.  
† Cetrati.  
Nonnius,  
Cetra, scutum  
br. ve. Quis  
rotundam  
facere cetram  
nequeat?  
Evocati.

Hesperios in-  
ter Sicoris  
non ultimus  
amnes, Saxo-  
us ingenti  
quem pons  
amplectitur  
arcu, Hyber-  
nas passurus  
aquis--  
Lucan lib. 4.

Plancus five  
Plantius á  
Planitie  
pedum,  
Splay-footed.

*Caesar.*

*Afranius.*

*Petreius.  
Varro.*

\* Salsus  
Castulonensis.  
† Guadiana.  
Jure pari  
rector, ca-  
stris Afranius  
illis, Ac Pe-  
treius erat--  
Lucan lib. 3.



much import the success of that War: For which respect it was, that when *Cæsar* could not buckle with the Person of his Enemy, he used all means to beat down his Authority, as the next in degree to his Essence and Being, and most concerning his Honour and Reputation. For if he took from him those Provinces, which the State had commended to his Charge, and left him no interest in the obedience of such, whom he might in a sort challenge for his own People; what assurance could the other Parts of the Empire have in his Protection? or what could he elsewhere expect of that which these refused him?

*Lib. Ethic. 4.* The excellency of a General is that perfection of judgment commended by *Aristotle*, inabling him to discern, *quid primum*, or what is most material in that variety of undertaking, which falleth out in following a War. And if that cannot with any conveniency be attained, then to know the next point of importance; and so consequently to distinguish the degrees of difference, as they stand ranked in the order of judicious proceeding.

For the effectual prosecuting of which design, let us take a short view of their Forces on each side, according as we find them mustered in this Chapter; that by the inequality of their Troops, we may judge of the want or sufficiency of their directions, *Afranius*, as it is said in the Story, had three Legions, and *Petereius* two Legions, together with 80 Cohorts of Auxiliary Forces, supplied unto them by the two Provinces of *Spain*; which Cohorts equalled the number of eight Legions, and so in all made thirteen Legions; and according to the usual rate at that time of 5000 in a Legion, amounted to 65000 Men: Together with 5000 Horse; which came to 70000 Men, or thereabouts. To confront so great an Enemy, *Cæsar* had five Legions, 12000 Auxiliary Troopers from the *Gauls*, and peradventure 1000 *Evocati*: which, according to the former rate of a Legion, did rise to 35000 or 40000 Men at the most. Whereby the one exceeding the other well near in a double proportion of strength, and yet failing in correspondency of success, calleth the verity of that Proverb in question, *Ne Hercules contra duos*, *Hercules* himself cannot deal with two. Besides, the inequality of the place where the trial was to be made, being wholly devoted to the greater Party, was a matter of no small consequence. For he that maketh War in a Country absolutely favouring the Enemy, and confronting his purposes, had need of more Forces than the adverse Party, or better fortune in his proceedings. And therefore *Fabius*, to prevent such mischiefs as might grow by that advantage, sought all means to draw some of the Towns to his Faction, and to make himself Friends for his better Support and Security; according to that which was said of old, *That War cannot be made without some Peace.*

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

*Rablais saith, That the Creditor wisheth all good to his Debtors.* Secondly, We may observe the means he used to secure himself of the Loyalty of his Army, and wholly to engage the Soldier in his Fortune. For the Money he borrowed of the Tribunes and Centurions, was a special Tye of their Affections to his Service: Forasmuch as no Man wisheth ill to him, by whose welfare and prosperity he hopeth to thrive; for so (wounding himself through another Man's Body) the hurt would fall upon his own Head: But rather desireth such an accomplishment of his hopes, as may make himself Partaker thereof. And on the other side, the

Largess he made unto the Soldiers did so oblige their endeavour to his purposes, that they were thereby ready to perform as much as Warlike *Lælius* had promised in his own Person, on the behalf of the rest.

*Pectore si fratris gladium, juguloque Parentis  
Condere me jubeas, plenaque in viscera partu  
Conjugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra.*

*Lucan. l. 1.*

Bid me to Stab my Brother, cut  
My Father's Throat, or rip the Gut  
Of my Big-bellied Wife (though loath) I'll do't.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, Let us consider the effects of diligence and provident Foresight, which do oftentimes redeem an Army from a dishonourable Overthrow; as may be learned from two circumstances in *Fabius's* directions. First, In that he trusted not to one passage over the River *Sicoris*, but made two several Bridges, as well for the conveniency as the better security of his People. Secondly, Upon the occasion which the Enemy might take by the breaking of the Bridge, to distress the Legions on the other side of the Water, he presently sent out Succours to prevent such a Casualty: Which albeit it might seem to have proceeded out of curious suspicion, or idle fear, yet it fell out to be no more than was requisite and expedient. Which may teach a General to be careful even of possibilities, and to prevent Contingencies, with the certainty of industrious directions; accounting always that which may happen, to be as certain as any thing we most expect.

#### The Fourth OBSERVATION.

Concerning *Spain*, we are to note, That the *Romans* at first divided it into two Provinces, which they called the Nearer and the Further; or according to *Strabo*, the Outer and the Inner; and they were separated asunder by the River *Iberus*, now *Ebro*: And thence also they were called *Cis Iberum*, & *ultra Iberum*, *Spain* on this side *Ebro*, and *Spain* beyond. The Nearer Province, being the lesser, continued without alteration during the *Romans* Government, and was sometimes called *Tarraconensis Provincia*, of *Tarraco*, the principal Town of the same. But the Further, in process of Time, was divided into two parts; the one called *Betica*, and the other *Lusitania*: And so the whole Region of *Spain* came to be divided into three Provinces. It was first entered by the *Romans*, by occasion of the notable Siege of *Saguntum*: Upon which, *P. Scipio* having subdued the *Carthaginians*, reduced *Spain* into a Province, and left it Governed by Proconsuls, unto the time of *Cornelius Lentulus* and *Lucius Stertinius*. Afterwards it was Governed by Pro-Prætors, and sometimes by Prætors, according as the Empire came to be enlarged; and had thereby many Governments, for the Preferment of such as had supplied the better places of Dignity in the State. Nevertheless, in the times of Trouble the Governors had always Consular Power; as, in the War against *Sertorius*, *Quintus Metellus* Proconsul, and *Cn. Pompeius* Quæstor, Cum Consulari potestate missi sunt, were sent with consular Power. And at this time *Pompey* Governed it by two Deputies or Legates. Touching the form and figure of the Country, *Strabo* likeneth it to an Oxe-Hide; the Neck whereof joyneth to the *Pyrenean Hills*, which rise in Towers



Towers from one Sea to another, as limits and bounds between France and Spain; taking their name (as some think) from Pyrene, the Maid that Hercules deflowred, whom Sil. Ital. mentioneth, lib. 3.

*Pyrene celsa nimbo si verticis arce  
Divisos Celtis late prospectat Iberos;  
Atque aeterna tenet magnis divortia terris.  
Nomen Bebrycia duxere à virgine colles.  
Hospitis Alcidae crimen: qui sorte laborum  
Gerionis peteret cum longa tricornis arva,  
Possessus Baccho, sava Bebrycis in aula  
Lugendam formæ sine virginitate reliquit  
Pyrenen ——— and a little after,  
Defletumq; tenent Montes per secula nomen.*

The lofty Tower of Pyren's cloudy head  
O'erlooks th' Iberi, whom it parts from Celts,  
For aye dividing those two spacious Lands.  
From Bebryx Daughter first these Hills took name  
Ravish'd by Hercules: Who, as he went,  
The triple-bodied Gerion's Land to seize,  
Drunk at the time, and lodg'd in Bebryx's Court,  
Pyrene left to be bewail'd by Beauty,  
No more a Virgin ———  
And her lamented Name the Hills still keep.

But according to the opinion more generally received, they are so called of the Greek word Πύρ; for that Shepherds and Herdsmen set them once on Fire, as witnesseth Diodorus Siculus. And Aristotle, In Hiberia inquit combustis aliquando pastoribus Sylvis, calenteque ignibus terra, manifestum argentum defluxisse: Cumque postmodum terræ-motus supervenisset, eruptis hiatis, magnam copiam argenti collectam; atque inde Massiliensibus proventus non vulgares obtigisse: He saith, That on a time in Spain the Shepherds having set Fire on the Woods, the ground was so heated thereby, that plain Rills of Silver flowed from the Hills; and that afterwards, by reason of Earthquakes, several gapings being made in the said place, they gathered great plenty of Silver; which the Marseillians made no small benefit of. The Country of Spain is commended for many things, as may appear by divers Elogies: Amongst which, that of Claudianus the Poet is written, as though the Author had been a Pensioner to the Kingdom.

*Quid dignum memorare tuis Hispania terris  
Vox humana valet? primo lavat æquore solem  
India: Tu fessos, exacta luce, jugales  
Proluis, inque tuo respirant sydera fluctu.  
Dives equis, frugum facilis, pretiosa metallis,  
Principibus sæcunda piis. ———*

What noted thing in Spain can Man commend?  
As Indian Seas first drench the morning Sun,  
So his tir'd Steeds wash here when day is done:  
In Spanish Waves the wearied Stars take breath.  
Spain store of Horse, Fruits, precious Metals hath;  
Breeds Pious Princes. ———

## CHAP. XV.

Caesar coming to his Army, advanceth forward, and Encampeth near unto the Enemy.

**W**ithin two days after Caesar came into the Camp with Nine Hundred Horse, which he had kept with him for a Convoy. The Bridge broken by the Tempest, was almost re-edified, and that which remained

undone, he commanded to be finished in the Night. And having seen the nature and situation of the place, he left six Cohorts to keep the Camp and the Bridge, with all the Carriages of the Army. And the next day, putting all his Forces into a tripple Battel, he marched towards Ilerda: And there standing a while in Arms, offered Battel in an equal and indifferent place. Afranius brought out his Forces, and made a stand in the mid'st of the Hill, under his Camp. Caesar perceiving that Afranius at that time was not disposed to Fight, determined to Encamp himself some 400 paces from the foot of the Hill. And lest the Soldiers should be interrupted in their Works by the sudden Assaults and Incursions of the Enemy, he forbade them to fortifie it with a Rampier or Wall, which must necessarily be discovered and seen afar off; but caused a Ditch to be made of fifteen foot in breadth, in the front of the Camp, next unto the Enemy. The first and second Battel (according as was directed) continued in Arms; and the third Battel performed the Work behind them unseen, before it was understood by Afranius that Caesar would Encamp in that place. Which being finished he drew his Legions within the Ditch, and so stood in Arms all Night.

The next day he kept all his Army within the Ditch. And forasmuch as the matter to make the Rampier was to be fetched far off, he kept the like course for the finishing of the rest; allotting each side of the Camp to be Fortified by a several Legion, with a Ditch to be sunk about of the same scantling: And in the mean time, made the other Legions to stand ready in Arms against the Enemy.

Afranius and Petreius, to the end they might amuse the Soldier and hinder the Work, brought down their Forces to the foot of the Hill, and provoked them to Fight. Howbeit, Caesar intermitted not the Work, trusting to three Legions in Arms, and the Munition of the Ditch. The Enemy not making any long stay, or advancing further than the foot of the Hill, led back their Troops into the Camp. The third day Caesar Fortified his Camp with a Rampier; and commanded the rest of the Cohorts and the Carriages which were left in the other Camps, to be brought unto him.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T may be observed for Caesar's Custom throughout the whole course of his Wars, to approach as near the Enemy as conveniently he could; that so he might the better observe his Passages, and be ready to take the favour of any opportunity, which either the nature of the place, or the motions of the adversary would afford him. Which was the rather his advantage, in regard of his dexterity and superlative knowledge in the use of Arms, together with the experience of his old Legions: Whereby he was able, not only to improve his own designs to the utmost of an honourable Success, but to return the disgrace of any Attempt made upon his Army, upon the heads of them that were Authors of the same. For otherwise, his approaching so near an Enemy might have turned to his own loss; as being full of hazard, and subject to more Casualties than he that standeth further off. And therefore the rule is, That he that desireth to sit near his Adversary, must be exceeding circumspect, and sure of some advantage, either from the place, or the overawing power of his Forces, or else out of his own Vertue, or by some other means to over-sway the inconveniences which attend such Engagements. As may appear by that which Frontinus observeth hence, touching the streight whereunto Caesar was fallen; being either to give

*Prænotum  
Caesar Olym-  
po, In noctem  
subita cir-  
cundedit  
agmina fossa,  
Dum primæ  
præstant  
acies, hostem-  
que fecellit,  
Luc. l. 4.*

Lib. I. cap. 5.

F f

Battel,

Caesar.



Battel, which the Enemy refused; or to make good that place, from whence he could not Retreat but with danger. Whereupon, a little before Night he stole the making of a Ditch on the back of his Army, and retiring himself within the same, stood in Arms all Night for his better safety.

The use of such Ditches are of much Importance, and have oftentimes redeemed an Army from great extremities: And were so frequent upon all occasions with the Romans, that he that shall deny them to be good Ditchers, shall do them wrong. And not only they, but other Nations could tell how to make use of the Spade.

Pericles of Athens, being forced by them of Peloponnesus into a place that had but two Outlets of escape, sunk a Ditch of a great breadth thwart one of the passages (as though he meant to keep out the Enemy) and set his Soldiers to break out the other way. The Peloponnesians thinking he could no way escape by the passage where the Trench was cut, applied themselves wholly to the other place, where the Soldiers made shew of breaking out: Whereby (through the help of Bridges which he had formerly provided) he escaped over the Ditch without resistance. Sometimes they added other helps to these Trenches, especially when they sought handsome means to get themselves away: Whereof Sertorius may be an Instance; who, having the Enemy pressing him in the Rere, and being to pass a River, drew a Ditch and a Rampier at his back, in the fashion of an Half-Moon: Which Rampier he heaped with Wood and combustible Matter, and so setting it on Fire, kept off the Enemy, and passed with ease over the Water.

In like manner, Herculeius, one of Sertorius's Legates, having rashly entred with a small Power into a long and narrow passage, between two Hills, and finding himself pursued by great Forces of the Enemy, sunk a cross Trench between the two Mountains; and piling the Rampier with Wood, set it on Fire, and so cut off the Enemy.

#### C H A P. XVI.

Cæsar's Attempt to possess himself of a small Hill: What disadvantage he ran into, by missing of his purpose; what means he used to recover himself.

**Cæsar:** **B**etween the Town of Ilerda, and the next Hill where Petreius and Afranius were Encamped, there was a Plain of about three hundred Paces; in the midst whereof stood a little Mole, rising higher than the rest: Which if Cæsar could get and fortifie, he hoped to cut off the Enemy from the Town and the Bridge, and from such Victuals and Provisions as were brought to the Town. Hereupon he took three Legions out of the Camp; and having put them into order of Battel, he commanded the Antesignani of one Legion to run before and possess the place. Which being perceived, the Cohorts that kept Watch before Afranius's Camp, were presently sent a nearer way to take that Mount. The matter came to Blows: But forasmuch as Afranius's Party came first to the place, our Men were beaten back; and by reason of new Supplies sent against them, were constrained to turn their Backs, and retire to the Legions.

The manner of Fight which those Soldiers used, was first to run furiously upon an Enemy, to seize any place boldly, and with great Courage; not much respecting their Orders or Ranks, but fighting in a scattered and dispersed fashion. If they chanc'd to be throughly Charged, they thought it no Shame to give

way and retire; accustomed thereunto by frequenting the Lusitanians, and other barbarous People, using that kind of Fight: As it commonly falleth out, that where the Soldiers have long lived, they get much of the usage and condition of those places. Notwithstanding our Men were much troubled thereat, as unaccustomed to that kind of Fight: For seeing every Man leave his Rank, and run up and down, they feared lest they should be circumvented, and set upon in Flank, and on their bare and open side; whereas themselves were to keep their Order, and not to leave their Places but upon extraordinary occasion.

Upon the Routing of the Antesignani, the Legion that stood in the Cornet left the place, and retreated to the next Hill; almost all the Army being affrighted, upon that which had happened beyond every Man's Opinion, contrary to former use.

Cæsar encouraging his Men, brought out the ninth Legion to second them; by that means compelling the Enemy (insolent of good success, and skrewldly pursuing our Men) to turn their Backs, and to retire to the Town of Ilerda, and there to make a stand under the Walls. But the Soldiers of the ninth Legion, carried on with endeavour, and going about to repair their loss, rashly followed the Enemy into a place of disadvantage, and came under the Hill whereon the Town stood: And as they would have made their Retreat, they were Charged afresh from the upper Ground. The Front of the place had an uneasy broken ascent, and was on each side steep; extended only so much in breadth, as would serve three Cohorts to Embattel in: Neither could the Cavalry come to help them. The Hill declined easily from the Town about four hundred paces in length: And that way our Men had some conveniency of Retreat, from the disadvantage to which their desire had unadvisedly led them. The Fight continued in this place; which was very unequal, both in regard of the streightness thereof, as also for that they stood under the foot of the Hill, whereby no Weapon fell in vain amongst them. Notwithstanding, by Prowess and Valour they patiently endured all the Wounds they received. The Enemies Forces were supplied and renewed, by such Cohorts as were often sent out of the Camp through the Town, that fresh Men might take the place of such as were wearied out. And the like was Cæsar fain to do, sending fresh Cohorts to that place to relieve the wearied.

After they had thus continually fought for the space of five hours together, and that our Men were much over-charged with an unequal multitude; having spent all their Weapons, they drew their Swords, and ascended up the Hill to charge and assault the Enemy: And having slain a few of them, the rest were driven to make Retreat. The Cohorts being thus put back to the Walls, and some of them for fear having taken the Town, our Men found an easie Retreat. Our Cavalry did from a low ground get up unto the top of the Hill; and riding up and down between the two Armies, made our Soldiers to retreat with better ease: And so the Fight succeeded diversly.

About seventy of our Men were slain in the first onset. And amongst these was slain Q. Fulginius, Capt. of the first Hastate Century of the fourteenth Legion; who, for his exceeding Valour, was preferred to that place from the lower Orders. Six hundred at least were Wounded. And of Afranius's Party were slain T. Cæcilius, Centurion of a Primipile Order, and four Centurions more, besides two hundred Soldiers. But such was the opinion of that days business, that either side believed they left with the better.

Afranius's Party was so perswaded, for that they long stood to handy-blows, and resisted the violence of our Soldiers, although in all Mens Judgment they were the weaker: As also, for that they at first took and held the place which gave occasion of that Fight;

Et victor  
subducto  
Marte pe-  
pendit.  
Lucan. lib. 4.



Fight; and in the first Encounter, compelled our Men to turn their Backs. Our Men in like manner thought they had the better, in regard they had maintained Fight for five Hours together, in a place of disadvantage and with an unequal Multitude; that they ascended up the Hill with their Swords drawn, and compelled their Adversaries to turn their Backs, and to retreat into the Town, maugre the disadvantage of the Place.

### The First OBSERVATION.

IN this direction which *Cæsar* gave, to take the little Hill between *Ilerda* and *Afranius's* Camp, we may observe the danger depending upon the mischieving of an Action. For the failing of a purpose in seeking to obtain that which would prove of great advantage, doth oftentimes draw Men into as great inconveniences. And as the end in every design pretendeth gain, so the means thereof do give way to hazard: From whence it consequently followeth, that such as are employed in execution, had need to use all endeavour, not to falsifie the grounds of good directions, by negligent or inconsiderate Carriage; but rather to make good any want or defect, by serious and wary prosecution of the same.

And the rather, for that it specially concerneth their good that have the charge and handling of commands: For they first are like to feel the smart of any error committed therein; or otherwise, to have the honour of any fortunate success, forasmuch as Vertue hath all her praise from Action.

Concerning the use of running, we are to understand that the *Romans* (amongst other their exercises of Arms) had special practice of this, as available in four respects, according as *Vegetius* hath noted. First, to the end they might charge the Enemy with greater Force and Violence. Secondly, that they might possess themselves with speed, of Places of advantage. Thirdly, that they might readily discover, as should be found expedient upon all occasions. And Lastly, to prosecute a flying Enemy to better purpose and effect. And this, as *Seneca* saith, they practised in peace; that being accustomed to needless Labour, they might be able to discharge necessary duties. And \**Livy*, amongst the military exercises used by *Scipio*, to fit his Men for those glorious Exploits which he afterwards achieved, saith; That the first day, the Legions ran four Miles in Arms. And *Suetonius* affirmeth, that *Nero*, having appointed a Race for the *Prætorian* Cohorts, carried a Target lifted up before them with his own hand. And that *Galba* did more admirably; for being futed of purpose to make himself eminent, he directed a Field-race with a Target, himself running as fast as the Emperor's Chariot, for twenty Miles together.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing to be noted in these specialties, is, the bold Enterprize of *Cæsar's* Men, in charging the Enemy with their Swords drawn, against the Hill; whereby making them to give back, they had an easie and safe retreat from the danger wherein they were engaged. Whereby we may observe, that difficulties of Extremity are never better cleared, than by adventurous and desperate undertakings: According to the condition of Diseases and Distemperatures of the Body, which being light and easie, are cured with mild and easie Portions; but being grievous and doubtful, do require sharp and strong remedies. Which doth also in like manner appear throughout the

whole course of Nature, and particularly in Weights: For as ponderous and heavy Bodies are not moved but with a Counterpoise of greater Force; no more can Extremities of hazard be avoided, but by like perilous Enforcements.

And hence groweth the difference between true Valour and fool-hardy rashness; being but one and the same thing, if they were not distinguished by the subject wherein they are shewed. For to run headlong into strange adventures, upon no just occasion, were to shew more levity than discretion: And again, to use the like boldness in cases of extremity, deserveth the opinion of vertuous Endeavour. As is well observed by *Homer*, in the Person of *Hector*, perswading the *Trojans* that fled away, to stand and make a head against the *Grecians*; This is the Time, saith he, considering the danger wherein we are, to use that prowess and Courage which we boast of.

And accordingly, *Diomedes* censured *Glauco* in the same place, for offering himself to the Fury of the *Grecians*; Either thou art some God, saith he, or else but a lost and forlorn Man. Which may serve to learn us the true use of Courage; that ordinarily is never more shewed than in misemployment.

### The Third OBSERVATION.

I Have already, in the Observations of the second Commentary of the Wars of *Gallia*, discoursed particularly of the Parts of a Legion: Where it appeareth, that in *Cæsar's* time a Legion consisted of five thousand Men, or thereabouts: and according to the sufficiency and experience of the Soldiers, was divided into three parts. The first and meanest of such as followed an Ensign, were called *Hastati*; the second, *Principes*; and the third and chief sort, *Triarii*: And according to this division, had their place and precedence in the Army.

Again, each of these three kinds was divided into ten Companies, which they called *Maniples*; and every *Manipulus* was subdivided into two Centuries or Orders; and in every Order there was a Centurion or Captain. These Orders were distinguished by the numbers of the first, second, third, and so consequently unto the tenth Orders, which were the last and lowest of each of these three kinds. So that this *Q. Fulginius*, here mentioned, was Centurion of the first and Prime Order of the *Hastati*: And *T. Cæcilius* Centurion of the first Order of the *Triarii*, which by excellency was called *Primipilus*, or the Leader of the first Company of a Legion.

Now concerning their imbattelling, we are to note, that according to this former division of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, upon occasion of Fight, they made a Triple Battel, one standing in Front to another; which we call the Vant-guard Battel, and Rere-ward. Whereof the *Hastati* were called *Antesignani*: Not for that they had

no Ensigns of their own, for every *Manipulus* had an Ensign; but because they stood imbattelled before the Eagle, and other the chief Ensigns of the Legion. To which purpose is that of *Livy*, *Pugna orta est, non illa ordinata per Hastatos, Principesque & Triarios, nec ut pro Signis Antesignanus, post Signa alia pugnaret Acies*: The Fight began, not a regular Fight by *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, nor in that Order that the *Antesignani* fought before the Ensigns, and another Battel behind the Ensigns. And again; *Cadunt Antesignani: Et ne nudentur Propugnatoribus Signa, fit ex secunda prima Acies*: The *Antesignani* were cut down: So that left the Ensigns should

Omnia Laus virtutis in actione consistit. Arist. Eth.

Lib. 1. cap. 9. The use of running.

Miles in media pace decurrit, sine ulla Hoste, & supervacuo labore lassatur, ut sufficere necessario possit. Seneca Epist. 18. Lib. 26.

The parts of a Legion.

Antesignani

Lib. 22.

Lib. 9.



should be left naked of defendants, the second Battel was made the first. Whereby it appeareth that most of the chiefeft Ensigns were with the *Principes*, which were called *Subsignani*, as the *Triarii Postsignani*.

Amongst other Benefits of these so particular divisions of an Army, that is not the least which is noted by *Thucydides*, *Ut jussa Imperatoris brevi spacio ad singulos Milites deferri possent*; the Commands of the General are thereby suddenly transmitted to every particular Soldier.

Lib. 5.

## C H A P. XVII.

Cæsar brought into great extremity by overflowing of two Rivers.

Cæsar.

**T**He Enemy fortified the Mount for which they contended, with great and strong Works, and there put a Garrison. In the space of those two Days that these things were in doing, there fell out upon a sudden a great Inconvenience, for such a Tempest happened, that the like Waters were never seen in those Places. And further besides, the Snow came down so abundantly from the Hills, that it overflowed the Banks of the River; and in one day brake down both the Bridges which *Fabius* had made: And thereby brought Cæsar into great extremity. For as it is formerly related, the Camp lay between two Rivers, *Sicoris* and *Cinga*; and within thirty Miles neither of these Rivers were passable, so that all the Army were of necessity couped up in that straightness: Neither could the Cities which had formerly ranged themselves with Cæsar's Party, furnish any supplies of Victual and Provision; nor such of the Army as had gone far for Forage, being hindered by the Rivers, could return to the Camp; nor yet the great Convoys and Reinforcements, coming to him out of Italy and Gallia, could get to the Camp.

Cinga rapidus magis quam magis.

The time of Year was very hard; for there was neither old Corn left of their Winter Provisions, nor that on the Ground was as yet ripe. The Cities and Towns near about were all emptied: For *Afranius* before Cæsar's coming had caused all the Corn to be brought into *Ilerda*; and that which remained, was since Cæsar's coming all spent. And for Cattel (which might have relieved this necessity) by reason of the War, they were removed by the bordering Towns, and carried farther off. Such as were gone out to Forage, and to seek Corn, were by the light-armed Portugals, and the Buckler-bearers of the hither Spain, much troubled and molested: For these Men could easily pass the River, forasmuch as none of them used to go to War, without Bladders for that purpose. On the contrary part, *Afranius* abounded with all necessary Provisions: Great Quantity of Corn was formerly provided and stored up, much was brought in from all the Provinces round about, there was also great plenty of Forage in his Camp: For the Bridge at *Ilerda* afforded means of all these things without danger, and the Country beyond the River was whole and untouched, which Cæsar could not come unto by any means. The Waters continued for many Days together. Cæsar used all means to re-edifie the Bridges; but neither the swelling of the River would permit him, nor yet the Cohorts of the Enemy, placed on the Banks of the other side, suffer him to go forwards with it: Which they might easily hinder, both in regard of the nature of the River and the greatness of the Water, as also for that they might easily cast their Weapons from along the Bank, unto one place or Point Whereby it was very hard, at one and the same time (the River running so

violently as it did) to do the Work, and to shun the Weapons.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**F**irst we may observe, that the strength of a Multitude is not privileged from such casualties as betide the weaknesses of particular Persons; but doth oftentimes undergo extremities, which can neither by Providence be prevented, nor removed by industry: and Are such as proceed not from the endeavour of the Enemy, but out of the circumstances of time and place; together with such accidents as are interlaced with the same. In respect whereof it was, that *Cambyfes* told *Cyrus*, that in the course of War he should meet with some occasions, wherein he was not to labour and contend with Men, but with chances and things; which were not to be overcome with less difficulty than an Enemy; and are the more dangerous, according as they give way to scarcity and want of Victual. For as it is said in the same place; *Scis brevi finem habiturum Imperium si Commeatu Exercitus careat*: *Cyri*. You know that if your Army be once starved, your Empire can be but short-lived.

*Sunt quidam in quibus non aduersus homines certamen est, sed cum ipsis rebus: quas superare per difficile est.* *Xenoph. Lib. 1. de Inf.*

The remedies whereof are first, Patience: Which is as requisite in a Soldier, as either Courage or any other Ability; and in such cases keepeth an Army from discontentment and disorder, until means of better fortune. And secondly, Good Endeavour, which availeth much in such Chances; the effect whereof will appear by that which Cæsar wrought, to redeem his Army from these Inconveniences.

*Diligentia in omnibus rebus plurimum valet.*

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning that which is here noted of the *Spaniards*, that made nothing of passing a River with the help of Bladders, which the *Romans* were readier to wonder at than to imitate; it is observed, that as People exquisitely fashioned to a civil Life, by a firm and settled Policy of Government, are firm and real in the whole course of their proceedings, and accordingly do shew their punctuality, as well in their solemnities and private Carriages, as in their magnificent and stately Buildings. So on the other side, barbarous and rude Nations, that live under general and slight Laws, are as slight and rude in their Actions; as amongst other things, may appear in that the *Spaniards* thought it no scorn to use the help of Bladders in passing over a River, as a device coming next to hand; which the People of a wise and potent State would not have done, but by a sure and substantial Bridge.

*Bladders used by the Spaniards in swimming over Rivers.*

The use of which Bladders, as it hath been ancient amongst People of that Nature, so it is continued in the same manner by the Salvages inhabiting *Greenland*, and the North Parts of *America*; as appeareth by Discoveries made of late by the *Moscow* Merchants, about the North-West Passage: From whence such as are employed in those Voyages, have brought great and large Bladders or Baggs, made of Seal-skins, ingeniously devised to be filled and blowed with Wind, and tied behind at their Girdle, and at their Coller, to help themselves in swimming. And after the same easie fashion, the *Indians* of *Peru*, as *Josephus Acosta* writeth (instead of Wood and Stone) made their Bridges over great Rivers of plaited Reeds, which they fastened to the Banks on each side with stakes: or otherwise with Bundles of Straw and Weeds, by which Men and Beasts (if there be any credit in his Story) pass over with ease. Howbeit, as

when

*Lib. 6. Cap. 14.*



when the ancient Greeks would note a Man of extream insufficiency, they would say, he could neither read nor swim: So Cæsar seemed of the same opinion, by commending the Skill of swimming, as a thing of much consequence in the use of Arms. Whereof he made good experience in Egypt: Where he cast himself into a small Boat, for his better Safety; and finding it over-charged, and ready to sink, he leapt into the Sea, and swam to his Fleet, which was two hundred paces off, holding certain Papers in his left hand above the Water, and trailing his coat of Arms in his Teeth, that it might not be left to the Enemy.

## C H A P. XVIII.

Afranius marcheth with three Legions, to cut off a Party. The Scarcity of Victual in Cæsar's Army.

Cæsar.

**I**T was told Afranius of great Troops and Convoys that were coming to Cæsar, but were hindered by the Waters, and abode there by the River's side: For thither were come Archers out of Ruthenia, and Horsemen out of Gallia, with with many Carres and Carriages, according to the Custom of the Gauls. There were besides of all sorts, about six thousand Men, with their Servants and Attendants; but without Order or any known Command: For every Man was at his own Liberty, travelling the Country without Fear, according to the former Freedom and Safety of the Ways. There were likewise many Young Men of good rank, Senators Sons, and Knights of Rome; besides Embassadors from sundry States and divers of Cæsar's Legates. All these were kept back by the River.

Afranius went out in the Night time with three Legions, and all his Horse, to cut off this Party; and sending his Cavalry before, set upon them unawares. Howbeit, the Cavalry of the Gauls put themselves speedily in order, and buckled with them. And as long as it stood upon indifferent terms, they being but a few, did withstand a great number of the Enemy: But as soon as they discovered the Ensigns of the Legions coming towards them, some few of them being slain, the rest betook themselves to the next Hills.

Jam Comes  
semper mag-  
norum prima  
malorum, Sæ-  
va Fames ad-  
erat: Nulloq;  
obscurus ab  
Hoste Miles  
eger, toto  
censu non  
prodigus e-  
mit Exiguam  
Cererem.  
Lucan. l. 4.

This small time of Encounter was of great consequence for the safety of our Men: For by this means they had opportunity to take the upper ground. There were lost that day two hundred Archers, a few Horsemen, and no great number of the Soldiers Boys, together with the Baggage. Victuals by reason of all these things waxed very dear, as well in regard of the present want, as also for fear of future Penu-ry, as commonly it happeneth in such cases; insomuch as a Bushel of Corn was worth fifty Pence. Whereby the Soldiers grew weak for want of Sustenance; and the Inconveniences thereof daily more and more increased. For so great was the alteration which happened in a few days, that our Men were much afflicted with the extream want of all necessary Provisions: Whereas they on the other side, having all things in abundance, were held for Victors. Cæsar sent unto those States which were of his Party, and instead of Corn, gave them order to furnish him with Cattell; dismissed Soldiers Boys and sent them to Towns farther off; relieving the present scarcity by all the means he could.

Afranius and Petreius, together with their Friends enlarged these things in their Letters to Rome: Rumour and report added much hereunto; as that the War was even almost at an end. These Messengers and Letters being come to Rome, there was

great concourse from all Parts to Afranius's House, much congratulation and rejoycing for these things: And thereupon many went out of Italy to Pompey, some to be the first Messengers of the News; others, that they might not seem to expect the event of the War, and so prove the last that came to that Party.

When the matter was brought to these difficulties and extremities, and all the Ways were kept by Afranius's Soldiers and Horsemen, and no Bridges could be made; Cæsar gave order to the Soldiers, to make such \* Boats and Barks as he had in former Years taught them the use of in the War of Britain: The Keels whereof were made of light stuff, and small Timber, and the upper parts made with Wicker: and covered with Hides. Which being finished, he laded them upon Carres, and carried them in the Night some twenty two miles from the Camp. And in those Barks transporting his Soldiers over the River, upon a sudden he possessed himself of a little Hill, which lay near unto the Water side: Which Hill he speedily fortifyed, before the Enemy had notice thereof. Afterwards he brought over a Legion to that Place, and made a Bridge from side to side in two days space: And so the Convoys, which had gone forth for Provisions and Forage, returned back in safety; where- by he began to settle a course for Provision of Corn.

The same day he passed over the River a great part of his Cavalry, who falling unlooked for upon the Foragers (scattered here and there without fear or suspicion) cut off a great number of Men and Cattell. Whereupon the Enemy sending certain Spanish Troops, bearing little round Bucklers, to second and relieve the Foragers, they divided themselves of purpose into two Parts; the one to keep and defend the Booty which they had got, and the other to resist and beat back the Forces sent to charge them. One of our Cohorts, which had easily run out before the Army, was intercepted and cut off: The rest returned by the Bridge into the Camp in safety with a great Booty.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**T**Hese Rutheni inhabited that part of Provence where Rhodes now standeth: Amongst whom Cæsar had ordinarily a Legion or two in Garrison, for the better keeping of the Country in obedience, being a stout and Warlike People, and using Archery, as appeareth in this place. Which howsoever the course of time hath brought into utter contempt, yet let us not scorn to take notice, that anciently it hath been used by such as performed the greatest feats of Arms: For Hercules had but two sorts of Weapons to achieve Labours of so much variety; a Club for such Monsters as would contest with his Valour, and Bow and Arrows for others that kept farther off. And in the old War of Troy (if Homer may be believed) Pindarus Duke of Lycia, having a Stable of gallant Courfers, left them all at home, lest he should not find means at Troy to give them their ordinary keeping; and came on foot with his Bow and Arrows, with such reputation of his deeds of Arms, that Aeneas sought him out in a conflict to resist the rage and extream pressures of Diomedes. And on the contrary part, Teucer relieved the distressed Grecians from a hot and desperate pursuit, by slaying with his Bow eight valiant Trojans before he stirred his foot.

Concerning the use of which Weapon, howsoever it may seem ridiculous (to such as understand nothing but the course of the present age) to recall the long Bow to the service of a Battel; yet they may remember, that the Grey-Goose wing gave our Forefathers such advantage, that they wrought Wonders amongst all Nations for deed of Arms: Which we should imitate with

\* Primum  
cana talix  
made facta  
vimine par-  
vam Texitur  
in Puppim,  
caeloq; indu-  
ta juvenco,  
Vectoris pa-  
tiens tumi-  
dum super-  
natat amnem.  
Lucan. l. 4.

Rutheni.  
Soluntur  
flavi longa  
statione  
Rutheni.  
Lucan. l. 1.

Stymphali-  
dæ.  
Iliad. Lib. 5.

Iliad. Lib. 7.



as much hope of success, if we could handle our Bows in any measure as they did. Of this I have already formerly treated.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

An ill chance  
cometh not  
alone.

IT is a saying as true as it is old, that an ill hap cometh not alone, but is always attended with such consequents as will inforce other inconveniences; as may be observed by this extremity here mentioned. For the mischief was not bounded with the affliction which Cæsar suffered for want of needful provision, notwithstanding the weight was such as could not be born by ordinary patience: But the Enemy enlarged it to his further advantage, vaunting of it as a helpless remedy, and making out dispatches to send Victory to Rome. Which gave him yet further prejudice in the opinion of the World; and made those his Enemies, that formerly shewed no dislike of his proceedings. And thus every ill chance hath a tail of many other misfortunes; which if either providence or endeavour may prevent, it shall much import a Commander to avoid them.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

Necessitas  
fortiter ferre  
docet, consue-  
tudo facile.  
Sen. de tran-  
quil. cap. 10.

Lib. 5.

AS Necessity maketh Men constant in their sufferings, so Custom giveth easiness and means of deliverance: according as may appear by this direction of Cæsar, which was wholly drawn from former experience. For first the Boats here prescribed, were such as he used in the War of Britany; and as far as may be gathered out of the former Commentaries, were those he commanded to be built for his second Journey: which he would now imitate in regard of the flatness of their bottoms, and not otherwise. For it is not to be supposed, that those Barks were covered with Skins; unless peradventure he used some such as these upon occasion in that War, not expressed in the Story.

Coracles.

Herodotus in his *Clio*, describeth the like; The Boats (saith he) which come from Babylon, down the River Euphrates, are made by the Herdsmen of Armenia, of light Timber, in a round fashion, without Beak or Poup, and are covered with Skin, the hairy side inward; and in these they take their passage. Such as Fish for Salmon in the River Severne, use the like Boats in all respects, which they call Coracles of Corium; being all covered with Horse-skins Tanned.

Secondly, the means he used to pass over without impeachment from the Enemy, by carrying those Boats in the Night-time up the River to a place of security, was such, the like whereof he had formerly practised in Gallia, to pass the River Loire, being then guarded on the other side by the Enemy. Whereby we see how much use and continuance doth inable Men, beyond others of smaller experience: According to that, *Dies Diem docet*, One day teacheth another; or, Older and wiser.

#### CHAP. XIX.

The Massilians encounter with Brutus at Sea, and are beaten.

Cæsar.

WHILE these things were done at Ilerda, the Massilians (by the direction of L. Domitius) rigged and set out 17 Gallies, whereof 11 were covered; besides many lesser Vessels which went along with them, to make the Navy seem the greater for the astonishment of the Enemy. In these they put a great number of Archers, and many Albicks, of whom we have formerly made mention; encouraging them both by rewards and promises. Domitius required certain

Ships for himself, and them he filled with Shepherds and Countrymen, which he had brought thither with him. The Navy being thus furnished, set forward with great confidence towards our Shipping, whereof D. Brutus was Admiral, and lay at Anchor at an Island right over-against Marseilles. Brutus was far inferiour to the Enemy in Shipping; but Cæsar having pick'd the chieftest and valiantest Men out of all the Legions, as well of the Antesignani as Centurions, put them aboard the Fleet, they themselves requiring to be employed in that service. These Men had prepared Hooks and Graples of Iron, and had likewise furnished themselves with many Piles and Darts, and other sorts of Weapons; and understanding of the Enemies coming, put to Sea, and encountered with the Massilians. They fought on either side very valiantly and fiercely: Neither were the Albicks much inferiour to our Men in Prowess, being rough mountainous People, exercised in Arms, and having a little before fallen off from the Massilians, did now remember the late Contract and League they had made with them. The Shepherds, in like manner (a rude and untamed kind of People, stirred up with hope of liberty,) did strive to shew their Valour in the presence of their Master.

The Massilians (trusting to the nimbleness of their Shipping, and in the skill and dexterity of their Pilots, did frustrate (in a deluding manner) the Shock of our Ships, when they came violently to stemm them. And forasmuch as they had Sea-room enough, they drew out their Navy at length, to compass and inclose our Men about: And sometimes they would single out one of our Ships, and set upon them with divers of theirs together, or wipe off a side of their Oars in their passage along by them.

When they came to deal at hand (leaving aside the Art and Skill of the Pilots) they took themselves to the stoutness and valour of the Highlanders. Our Men were fain to use worse Oar-men, and more unskilful Pilots; who being lately taken out of Ships of burden, did not well know the true names of the Tackling, and were much troubled with the heaviness and sluggishness of the Shipping; which being made in haste of unseasoned Timber, was not so nimble or ready for use. But as the matter came to bandy-blows, every single Ship willingly undertake two at once; and having grappled with either of them, fought on each side, entering valiantly the Enemies Ships, killing a great number of the Highlanders and Shepherds. Part of the Ships they sunk, some they took with the Men, and the rest they beat back into the Haven. That day the Massilians lost nine Ships, with those that were taken. This news was brought to Cæsar at Ilerda.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

I Have formerly observed the manner of their Sea-fight, consisting of three parts. The first was, their nimble and skilful managing of their Ships, either forcibly to assault, or to shun and bear off, as might fall for their best advantage: wherein the Massilians, by reason of the skilfulness of their Pilots, had great confidence. The second was, their Fight before they came to Grappling, as well with great Engines, such as were their Balistæ and Catapultæ, casting Stones and Logs of Wood one against another, as also with Slings, Arrows and Darts; resembling our great Artillery, and small Shot: For which purpose, their Ships were built with Fore-castles and Turrets, and other advantages of height, for their casting-weapons. The third was, their grappling and forcible entry; wherein, forasmuch as the matter was referred to the arbitrement of Valour, the Legionary Soldiers carried the cause. Whence

we



we may observe, that their Legions were the Nurseries of their Valiant and Worthy Men, as well for the Sea as the Land; being fitted by the discipline of their Military exercises, to undertake any service subject to humane industry; whereof they gave an account worthy the School wherein they were instructed.

Neither is it seen at any time, but that such Kingdoms as take care to train up their Men in Academies of vertuous Activity, do always keep their Honour at a high price; affording at all times Men of absolute and compleat carriage, both for design and performance.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

I Have a little before shewed out of Livy, that the *Antesignani* were ordinarily taken for the *Hastati*; which being the easiest sort of Soldiers, according to the general division of a Legion, doth seem to contradict the passage in this Chapter, *Sed delectos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros Antesignanos, Centuriones Caesar ei classi attribuerat*; But Caesar having pickt the valiantest of the *Antesignani* out of all the Legions, put them into this Fleet as Centurions. For the better clearing whereof, we are to note, that as the *Hastati*, or first Battel of a Legion, were generally taken for the *Antesignani* (as standing before the Eagle and other the chiefest Ensigns, which were always amongst the *Principes* or second Battel;) so every Maniple having an Ensign in the midst of the Troop, the Soldiers that stood in front before the Ensign were likewise called *Antesignani*, and were the best Soldiers in the Company: For the Centurion, standing always in the head of the Troop, was accompanied with the valiantest and worthiest Men; the rest filling up the Rear, comforted with the Lieutenant, who thereupon was called *Tergi-duktor*.

Whence we may admire the temperature and disposition of a Roman Army; being first generally divided into three Battels; whereof the meanest were in the Vanguard, to make trial of their strength, and to spend the heat of their young blood in the first affront of an Enemy: The *Veterani*, or old Soldiers, being left in the Rereward, to repair any loss, which either force or casualty should cast upon their Leaders. And again, to counterpoise themselves, in such a manner as the weakest might not always go to the Wall, their private Companies were so ordered, that the best Men were always in front. Whereby they made such an exquisite temper, as kept every part of the Army in their full strength.

#### C H A P. XX.

Upon the making of the Bridge at Ilerda, the Enemy resolveth to transferr the War into Celtiberia.

Caesar.

**U**Pon Caesar's making of his Bridge, Fortune suddenly changed. The Enemy fearing the Courage and Valour of our Cavalry, did not so freely range abroad as they had wont to do; sometimes seeking Forage within a small distance of the Camp, to the end they might find a safe and easie retreat if occasion required; sometimes fetching a great compass about, to avoid the guards and stations of our Horsemen. And if they had received but the least check, or had but descried the Cavalry afar off, they would have cast down their burdens, and fled away.

At last they omitted Foraging for many days together, and (which was never used by any

Nation) sent out to seek it in the Night. In the mean time those of Osca and Calaguris, being in League together, sent Embassadors to Caesar, with offer of their service, in such sort as he should please to command it. Within a few days the *Tarraconenses*, *Lacetani*, and *Ausetani*, together with the *Illurgavonenses*, which border upon the River Ebrus, followed after. Of all these he desired supplies of Corn and Provision: which they promised to furnish; and accordingly got Horses from all quarters, and brought Grain into the Camp. In like manner, the Regiment of the *Illurgavonenses*, understanding the resolution of their State, left the Enemy, and came unto him with their Colours: and suddenly a great alteration of things appeared.

The Bridge being perfected, five great Cities and States being come in unto him, a course settled for provision of Corn, and the rumour blown over of the succours and Legions, which Pompey was said to come withal by the way of Mauritania; many other Towns farther off revolted from Afranius, and clave to Caesar's party.

The Enemy being much affrighted and abashed at these things, Caesar (to avoid the great circuit by which he continually sent his Horsemen about by the Bridge) having got a convenient place, resolved to make many Trenches of thirty foot in breadth, by which he might drain some part of the River Sicoris, and make it passable by a Foord. These Trenches being almost made, Afranius and Petreius did thereupon conceive a great fear, lest they should be cut off altogether from Victual and Forage, forasmuch as Caesar was very strong in Horse; and therefore they determined to leave that place, and transferr the War into Celtiberia, being the rather thereunto induced, for that of those two contrary Factions, which in the former War had stood for L. Sertorius, such Cities as were subdued by Pompey, did yet stand in aw of his Name and Authority: And such as from the beginning had continued firm unto him, did intirely love him, for the great benefits they had received from him; amongst whom Caesar's name was not known. There they expected great succours both of Horse and Foot, and made no doubt but to keep the War on foot until Winter.

This Advice being agreed upon, they gave order to take up all the Boats that were on the River Iberus, and to bring them to Octogesa, a Town seated upon Iberus, twenty miles from the Camp. There they commanded a Bridge of Boats to be made; and transporting two Legions over Sicoris, fortified their Camp with a Rampier of twelve foot in height. Which being known by the Scouts, Caesar, by the extream labour of the Soldiers, continued day and night in turning the course of the Water: And at length brought the matter to that pass, that the Horsemen (with some difficulty) durst adventure over; but the Foot Troops, having nothing above the Water but their Heads, were so hindred as well by the depth of the River, as the swiftness of the stream, that they could not well get over. Notwithstanding at the same instant of time, news was brought of the making of the Bridge over the River Iberus, and a Foord was found in the River Sicoris.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**F**irst, concerning the places here mentioned, the Reader may take notice that Ilerda (now known by the name of Lerida) standeth upon the River Sicoris, in the Province of Catalonia; and being seated upon a Hill, is inclosed round with a Wall of hewen Stone, in a pleasant and fertile Country, both for Corn, Wine, Oil, and Fruit: as it is graphically described by Lucan;



*Colle tumet modico, levique excrevit in altum  
Pingue solum tumulo, super hunc fundata vetusta  
Surgit Ilerda manu; placidis prælabitur undis  
Hesperios inter Sicoris non ultimus amnes:  
Saxcus ingenti quem pons amplectitur arcu,  
Hybernas passurus aquas.-----*

With a light rising to a pretty height  
The rich ground swells, on which by ancient  
hand

Ilerda's plac'd: With gentle Waves slides by  
The Sicoris, none of Spain's meanest Streams.  
O'er it a Bridge of Stone with noble Arch,  
Subject to suffer by the Winter Floods.

It was formerly an University, and at all times famous for Salt Meats and Pickled Fish. Whereunto *Hæce* alludeth, when he tells his Book, That although it fell out that no Man would regard it, nevertheless it might serve at Ilerda to wrap Salt-Fish in.

*Aut fugies Uticam, aut unctus mittêris Ilerdam.  
Either to Utica thou'lt pass,  
Or to Ilerda in an Oily case.*

*Osca.* *Osca*, now called *Huesca*, a Town likewise of *Catalonia*, in former time surnamed *Victrix*, where *Sertorius* kept the Sons of the Grandees of Spain, as pledges of their Loyalty; under pretext of Learning the Greek and Latin Tongue, which he had there caused to be taught, in form of an Academy.

*Lib. 2.* In this Town his hap was to be slain by *Perpenna*, as *Paterculus* recordeth the Story; *Tum M. Perpenna prætorius, è proscriptis, generis clarioris quam animi, Sertorium inter cœnam Ætosce interemit; Romanisque certam victoriam, partibus suis excidium, sibi turpissimam mortem, pessimo auctoravit facinore;* Then *M. Perpenna* a *Prætorian*, one of the proscribed Party, of a more noble stock than Mind, slew *Sertorius* at *Ætosca*, as he was at Supper; occasioning by this wicked deed of his certain Victory to the Romans, ruine to his own Party, and a shameful death to himself. Which *Ætosca* is by all Men taken for this *Osca*.

The Inhabitants boast of nothing more at this day, than that *St. Laurence* was a Citizen of their Town.

*Calaguris.* *Calaguris*, now *Calaborra*, is seated upon a Hill on the Banks of *Iberus*; the People whereof are famous for their constancy and faithfulness to their Commanders, and especially to *Sertorius*: as appeareth by that of *Valerius Maximus*; *Quo perseverantius interempti Sertorii cineribus, obsidionem Cn. Pompeii frustrantes, fidem præstarent; quia nullum jam aliud in urbe eorum supererat animal, uxores suas, natosque ad usum nefarie dapis verterunt: Quoque diutius armata juvenus viscera sua visceribus suis aleret, infelices cadaverum reliquias salire non dubitavit.* That they might demonstrate their Fidelity to the Ashes of *Sertorius*, to the very last, by defeating *Pompey's* Siege, in regard there was no live thing else left in the City, they most inhumanely made their Wives and Children serve them for Food; and that those which were in Arms might so much the longer with their own Bowels feed their Bowels, they stuck not to Salt up the pitiful remainders of the dead Carcasses.

Nevertheless *Afranius* took them in the end by continual Siege; amongst whom that Antiquity of *Bebricius* is very remarkable, which is yet extant near to *Logronno*.

DIIS. MANIBUS.]  
Q. SERTORII.  
ME. BEBRICIUS. CALAGURITANUS.  
DEVOVI.  
ARBITRATUS.  
RELIGIONEM. ESSE.  
EO. SUBLATO.  
QUI. OMNIA.  
CUM. DIIS. IMMORTALIBUS.  
COMMUNIA. HABEBAT.  
ME. INCOLUMEM.  
RETINERE. ANIMAM.  
VALE. VIATOR. QUI. HÆC. LEGIS.  
ET. MEO. DISCE. EXEMPLO.  
FIDEM. SERVARE.  
IPSA. FIDES.  
ETIAM. MORTUIS. PLACET.  
CORPORE. HUMANO. EXUTIS.

In English thus: To the Dii Manes (or Divine Ghost) of Q. Sertorius, I Bebricius of Calaguris devote my self; supposing it a business of Conscience, he being gone, who had all things in common with the Immortal Gods, for me to seek to save my own Life. Farewel Traveller, who readest this, and learn of me to be faithful. Faithfulness is a thing pleaseth even the Dead, when they have put off their Humane Bodies.

In Memory of whose Fidelity, *Augustus Caesar* took a Band of these People for a Guard to his Person. In this Town was *Quintilian* the Rhetorician Born; and being brought from thence to Rome in Nero's time, was the first that taught a publick School for Salary: as witnesseth *Saint Hierome*; *Quintilianus ex Hispania Calaguritanus primus Romæ publicam Scholam tenuit, & salario cobonestatus publico claruit.* *Quintilian* a Spaniard of Calaguris first taught a publick School at Rome, and had a stipend allowed him.

*Celtiberia* was the Country lying along the River *Iberus*, Inhabited by People coming out of *Gallia Celtica*: Whereupon *Lucan* saith,

----- *Profugique à gente vetusta  
Gallorum Celtae, miscentes nomen Iberis.*

Some Celtick Fugitives from Gallia came,  
And with th' Iberi made a compound name.

*Florus* calleth them *Hispania Robur*. And *Valerius Maximus* affirmeth, That they were always glad of War, as being to end their Life in Happiness and Honour; and lamented their ill Fortune to die in their Beds, as a miserable and shameful end.

*His pugna cecidisse decus, corpusque cremari  
Tale nefas: Cælo credunt, superisque referri,  
Impastus carpat si membra jacentia vultur.*

----- To die in Fight (Rite.  
They count great Honour, know no Funeral  
Heav'n's theirs they think, and the celestial Seats,  
Whose scattered Limbs the Ravenous Vulture  
Eats.

Their Arms and Weapons were of singular Rarity: For besides the Water of *Bilbo*, which gave them an invincible Temper, they had also a peculiar fashion of working them, as witnesseth *Diodorus Siculus*; hiding their Plates of Iron in the Earth, until the worst and weakest part were eaten out with Rust, and of that which remained, they made very hard Swords.



## The Second OBSERVATION.

THE suddain alterations of War are like the changings of Mens Minds upon small accidents; which are so forcible to shake our Resolutions, as made a great Philosopher to describe a Man by the property of *mutabile Animal*, or a changeable living Creature. And it is notably seen in this; That *Afranius*, in the compass of a few days, triumphed at *Cæsar's* Overthrow, and fled away for fear of his Power. Whence we may note the advantage coming to a Party, when they shake off any eminent distress: For as the extremity thereof threatneth ruine and destruction, so the alteration bringeth with it an opinion of Victory. And surely, such is the condition of all sorts of Misery, that when the Storm is over, and the bitterness of the affliction allay'd, good Times come redoubled upon the Patients; as though the vicissitude of things did inforce contrary effects. And therefore a Commander, knowing the advantage of such an opportunity, must endeavour to improve the same, as may best serve to a speedy end.

## C H A P. XXI.

The Enemy setteth forward, and is stayed by *Cæsar*.

Cæsar.

THE Enemy thereupon thought it expedient for him to make the more haste; and therefore leaving two Auxiliary Cohorts for the safe keeping of *Ilerda*, he transported all his Forces over the River *Sicoris*, and Encamped himself with the two Legions which formerly he had carried over. There remained nothing for *Cæsar* to do, but with his Cavalry to impeach and trouble the Enemy in their March. And forasmuch as it was a great compass about to go by the Bridge (whereby it would come to pass, that the Enemy would get to *Iberus* a far nearer way) he passed over his Horsemen by the Foord. About the third Watch, as *Petreius* and *Afranius* had raised their Camp, upon a suddain the Cavalry shewed themselves in the Rere, and swarming about them in great multitudes, began to stay and hinder their passage. As soon as it began to be day-light, from the upper ground where *Cæsar* lay Encamped, it was perceived how the Rereward of the Enemy was hard laid to by our Cavalry, and how sometimes they turned head again, and were nevertheless broken and Routed: Sometimes their Ensigns stood suddainly still, and all their Foot Troops charged our Horse, and forc'd them to give way; and then turning back, went on their way again. The Soldiers walking up and down the Camp, were grieved that the Enemy should so escape their hands, whereby the matter would consequently be spun out into a long War: And went unto the Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers, praying them to beseech *Cæsar* not to spare them for any danger or labour; for they were ready and willing to pass the River where the Horse went over. *Cæsar* moved through their desire and importunity, albeit he feared to expose his Army to a River of that greatness, yet he thought it expedient to put it to Trial, and therefore commanded that the weakest Soldiers of all the Centuries should be taken out, whose courage or strength shewed a disability to undertake that Service: And these he left in the Camp with one Legion to defend the same, bringing out the other Legions without carriage or burden: And having set a great number of Horses and Cattel both above and below in the River, he transported his Army over. Some few of the Soldiers being car-

ried away with the Stream, were succoured and taken up by the Horsemen; insomuch as not one Man perished.

The Army carried thus over in safety, he ranged them in order, and marched forward with a three-fold Battel. Such was the endeavour of the Soldier, that albeit they had set a Circuit of six Miles to the Foord, and had spent much time in passing the River, yet by the ninth hour they did overtake the Enemy that rose about the third Watch of the Night.

Three of the Clock in the Afternoon.

As soon as *Afranius* and *Petreius* had discovered the Legions afar off (being terrified with the Novelty of that pursuit) they betook themselves to the upper Ground, and there Embattelled their Troops. In the mean time *Cæsar* refreshed his Army in the Field, and would not suffer them (being weary) to give Battel: And as the Enemy tried again to go on in their March, he followed after and staid them, whereby they were forced to Encamp sooner than was purposed: For there were Hills a little before them, and for five Miles together, the passages were very difficult and narrow.

By which means (being advanced between the Hills) they hoped to be free from *Cæsar's* Cavalry, and by keeping the Passages to hinder the Army from following after; to the end they themselves might without peril or fear, put their Forces over the River *Iberus*: which by all means was to be effected. Nevertheless, being wearied with Travelling and Fighting all day, they put off the business to the next Morning.

*Cæsar* also Encamped himself on the next Hill; and about Midnight, some of their Party being gone out from the Camp, somewhat far off, to fetch Water, were taken by the Horsemen. By them *Cæsar* was advertised, that the Enemy with silence began to remove, and to lead their Troops out of their Camp. Whereupon he commanded the sign of rising to be given, and the cry (dislodging and trussing up their Baggage) to be taken up, according to the discipline and use of Soldiers.

Vasa conclamari.

The Enemy hearing the cry, fearing least they should be impeached in the Night, and forced to Fight with their burthens on their backs, or to be shut up in those streight passages by *Cæsar's* Horsemen, stayed their Journey, and kept their Forces within their Camp.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS passage over *Sicoris*, was in the same manner as he carried his Army over the River *Loire*, in the seventh Commentary of the War of *Gallia*; *Vado per Equites invento, pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut Brachia modo atque Humeri, ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu, qui vim fluminis frangerent, incolumem exercitum transduxit.* The Horsemen having found a Foord, indifferent convenient in regard of the necessity they were put to, to the end that the Soldiery might have their Arms and Shoulders at liberty, and not be hindered by the Water from carrying their Weapons, he so disposed his Horse, that he broke the force of the River with them, and so carried his Army over in safety.

Hannibal per superiora Padis vada exercitum traducens, elephantos in ordinem opposuit ad impetum fluminis sustinendum. Livy.

Ac nequid Sicoris, repetitis audeat undas, Spargitur in sulcos, & scisso gurgite rivus Dat pœnas majoris aqua. Lucan. l. 4.

The Horse that stood above brake the force of the Water, and those that were below took up such as were overcome with the Stream, and withal, gave Courage to the Soldier to venture with better assurance, seeing the passage impaled in on each side, to keep them from miscarrying. His attempt upon *Sicoris*, to abate the swelling pride of that River, by dividing it into many Streams, was in imitation of the first *Cyrus*, who taking displeasure at the River *Cyndes*, next unto *Euphrates*

Herodot. Clis.



In the same manner Euphrates was divided first by Semiramis and afterwards by Alexander. Herod. Just.

Lib. 2. cap. 7.

the greatest River of Assyria, drew it into three hundred and threescore Channels.

Cæsar not finding the River Halis passable by a Foord, and having no means to make a Bridge, funk a great Trench behind the Camp, from the upper part of the River, and so drew all the Water behind his Army.

Vegetius hath a particular discourse of passing an Army over a River, whether it be by Bridge or Boat, or by wading or swimming, or any other way: To which I refer the Reader.

## CHAP. XXII.

Afranius seeketh to take the Streights between certain Mountains; but is prevented by Cæsar.

**T**He next day following, Petreius went out secretly with a few Horse, to discover the Country; and for the same purpose some went likewise out of Cæsar's Camp: L. Decidius Saxa was sent with a small Troop to view the situation of the Place. And either Party returned with the same report: That for five Miles the way was open and champain, and afterwards very rough and mountainous; and whosoever first took those streights, might easily impeach the Enemy from going further. The matter was disputed in the Council of War, by Petreius and Afranius; the time of their setting forward was debated. Most of them thought it fit to take their Journey in the Night; for by that means they might come to those streights before it were perceived. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steal out in the Night; as appeared by the cry of rising taken up the Night before in Cæsar's Camp, upon their removing: And Cæsar's Horsemen did so range abroad in the Night, that all places and passages were kept and shut up. Neither were they to give occasion of Night Fights, but to avoid the same by all the means they could; forasmuch as in civil dissention, the ordinary Soldier would rather suffer himself to be overmastered by fear, than continue firm in the Allegiance which he had sworn unto: Whereas, in the day time, every Man hath shame and dishonour before his Eyes, together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes; with which respects a Soldier is restrained, and kept within the bounds of duty. And therefore the attempt was by all means to be undertaken in the day time: And although it fell out to some loss, yet nevertheless the Body of the Army might pass in safety, and possess that place which they sought for.

This opinion prevailing in their Consultation, they determined by break of day the next Morning to set forward. Cæsar, having diligently viewed the Country, as soon as day began to appear, drew all his Forces out of his Camp, and marched forward in a great circuit, keeping no direct way. For the ways which led to Iberus and Octogesa, were taken up with the Enemies Camp; insomuch as they were to pass over great and difficult Vallies. And in many places, broken Rocks and Stones did so hinder them, that they were necessarily forced to give their Weapons from hand to hand, the Soldiers lifting up one another; and so they passed most part of the way. Howsoever, no Man thought much of the labour, for that they hoped to give an end to all their Travel, if they could keep the Enemy from passing over the River Iberus, and cut off his Victuals.

At the first, Afranius's Soldiers ran joyfully out of their Camp to see the Army, casting out words of Derision and Reproach, that for want of Victuals they fled and returned to Iberda; for the way they held was quite contrary to that they intended, where-

by they seemed to go back again: And the Commanders themselves did much approve their own Counsel, that they had kept their Troops within the Camp. For that which confirmed them in their Opinion was, that they perceived they were come out without their Carriages: Whereby they hoped, necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But when they saw the Troops by little and little to wind to the right hand, and that they perceived, how those that were in Front had fallen backward beyond their Camp, there was no Man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them. Whereupon they cried to Arm; and all their Forces, excepting some few Cohorts which were left to keep the Camp, went out, and marched directly towards Iberus.

The whole business consisted in speed and celerity, which of the two should first take the Streights, and possess the Hills. Cæsar's Army was hindered by the difficulty of the way: And Afranius's Party was retarded by Cæsar's Cavalry. The matter was come to that upshot, that if Afranius's Party did first get the Hills, they might haply quit themselves of danger; but the Baggage of the whole Army, and the Cohorts left in the Camp could not be saved: For being intercepted and secluded by Cæsar's Army, there was no means to relieve them.

It fell out, that Cæsar first attained the place; and being come out from among those great Rocks into a plain Campagne, put his Army in order of Battel against the Enemy.

Afranius seeing the Enemy in Front, and his Rereward hardly charged by Cæsar's Cavalry, got the advantage of a small Hill, and there made his stand: And from thence sent four Cohorts, bearing round Bucklers unto a Mountain, which in all Mens sight was higher than the rest; commanding them to run as fast as they could, and possess that Hill, intending to follow after with all his Forces, and altering his course, to get along the ridges and tops of the Mountains to Octogesa.

As the Cohorts were advanced forward by an oblique Circuit, Cæsar's Cavalry perceiving their intent, set upon them with such violence, that they were not able any time to bear their Charge, but were surrounded by them, and all cut in pieces in the fight of both Armies.

### The First OBSERVATION.

**P**etreius and Afranius, in their Council of War, resolved by all means to shun Night Encounters, as a thing full of hazard and uncertainty, and apt for looseness and disobedience: For the Night, being neither a discoverer of Errors, nor yet a distinguisher either of Actions or Persons, but wrapping up both the Vertuous and the Faulty in her Mantle of Obscurity, doth not admit of directions to follow an opportunity, or to help a mistake; but rather giving way to Impunity and licentious Confusion, leaveth no hope of what is wished: Whereas the light is a witness of every Mans demeanour, and hath both Honour and Rebuke to make duty respected.

For which Causes, Curio (as it followeth in the next Commentary) in his Harangue before that untimely Expedition against King Juba, thus rejected their advice that would have had him set forward in the Night; At etiam ut media nocte profisciscamur addunt: Quo majorem credo licentiam habeant qui peccare conantur: Namque hujusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Further than this, they advise us to set out in the middle of the Night: That so (I think) those Men who have a mind to do mischief may take the greater

Attollunt campo geminæ juga faxea rupes, Valle cavæ media: tellus hinc ardua celsos Continuat colles, tutæ quos inter opaco Anfractu latuere viæ: quibus hoste potito Fau-cibus, emitti terrarum in devia Mar-tem, Inque feras gentes Cæsar videt.

Lucan. lib. 4.

Ite fine ullo Ordine, air, raptumque fuga conver-tite bellum, Et faciem pugnae, vul-tusque inferte minaces.

Lucan. lib. 4.

Nocturna prælia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili dissensione, timori magis quam religioni consulere consuevit; at lucem multum per se pudorem, omnium oculis afferre. Neque in victoria decus; nec in fuga flagitium. Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.



greater liberty : For in the day-time they would be restrained either through Shame or Fear, to both which the darkness of the Night is a great Adversary.

And that the danger may appear as well by effect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that Battel by Night, between *Antonius Primus* on the behalf of *Vespasian*, and the *Vitellian* Legions, near unto *Cremona* ; whereof *Tacitus* hath this description ; *Prælium tota Nocte variarum, anceps, atrox ; his, rursus illis, exitiabile. Nihil Animus, aut Manus, ne oculi quidem provisu juvabant, &c.* The Fight was doubtful and bloody the whole Night, now this Party going to the worse, by and by that. A stout heart or a valiant hand availed little, neither could the Eyes see before them either advantage or disadvantage. And thus are all Night-works condemned, wherein either Order or Honour are of any moment.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

I Have already noted, in the former Commentaries, the use of exact and particular discovery of the Country, where a Party is engaged : Than which nothing doth more advantage a Commander to expedite the happy Issue of a War. For by that means he is not only able to judge of any motion which the Enemy shall offer, and to give sure Directions to frustrate and make void the same ; but also to dispose himself according as shall seem expedient for his safety. Wherein, if a place of such consequence as is here mentioned shall by design be aimed at, this History sheweth how much it importeth either Party to obtain it : And therefore *Cæsar* had reason to make his passage through Vallies and Rocks, rather than to lose Victory, for want of labouring in an uneasy way.

This *Lucius Decidius Saxa*, or *Didius Saxa*, employed in this Discovery, was afterward advanced by *Cæsar* to be Tribune of the People ; whereat *Tully* was so much offended. How can I omit (saith he) this *Decidius Saxa*, a Man brought from the furthest end of the World, whom we see Tribune of the People, before we ever saw him a Citizen.

#### C H A P. XXIII.

*Cæsar* refuseth to fight upon an advantage offered, contrary to the opinion and desire of all Men.

Here was an opportunity then offered of doing something to purpose ; neither was *Cæsar* ignorant thereof. Such an Overthrow given before their Faces, did consequently so discourage them, that it was thought they would not endure a charge ; especially being compassed about with the Cavalry, in an indifferent and open Place, where the matter was to be decided by Battel. Which was on all sides instantly desired at *Cæsar's* Hands : For the Legates, Centurions, and Tribunes of the Soldiers, came joyntly unto him, desiring him to make no doubt of giving Battel, for all the Soldiers were very ready and forward thereunto ; whereas the contrary Party had shewed many Arguments of Fear and discouragement. First, in that they did not succour their Fellows. Secondly, inasmuch as they had not budg'd from the Hill, which they had took for a retreat. Neither had they withstood the Charge and Incursion of the Cavalry, but had throng'd pell-mell together, and confusedly mingled their Ensigns one with another, no Man either keeping his place or his Colours.

And if he feared the inequality and disadvantage of the Place, he might take some other of more indifferency ; for certainly *Afranius* could not long stay where he was, but must depart from thence for want of Water.

*Cæsar* was in hope to end the matter without either blow or wound of his Men ; forasmuch as he had cut off the Enemy from Victual. And why then should he lose a Man, although it were to gain a Victory ? Why should he suffer his valiant and well-deserving Soldiers, to be so much as hurt or wounded ? Or why should he put the matter to the hazard of Fortune ? Especially, when it no less concerned the Honour and reputation of a Commander to vanquish an Enemy by direction and advice, than to subdue them by force of Arms ? being moved withal with a tender commiseration of such Citizens of Rome, as were consequently to be hazarded or slain in the Fight ; whereas he desired to work out his own ends with their safety.

This opinion of *Cæsar's* was disallowed by most Men : And the Soldiers would not stick to speak plainly amongst themselves : Forasmuch as such an occasion of Victory was overslipt, that when *Cæsar* would have them, they would not fight. He notwithstanding continued firm in his opinion ; and fell a little off from the Enemy, to lessen and abate their fear and amazement. *Petreius* and *Afranius*, upon the opportunity given them, withdrew themselves into their Camp. *Cæsar* having possess'd the Hills with Garrisons of Soldiers, and shut up all the Passages leading to *Iberus*, encamped himself as near as he could to the Enemy.

The Commanders of the adverse Party being much afflicted that they had absolutely lost all means of Provision of Victual, and of gaining the River *Iberus*, consulted together of other courses. There were two ways left open ; the one to return to *Ilerda*, and the other to *Tarracon*. And while they were considering of these things, it was told them, that such as went out for Water were very much pressed by our Cavalry. Whereupon they placed many Courts of Guard, as well of Horse, as Auxiliary Footmen, interlacing the Legionary Cohorts amongst them ; and began also to raise a Rampier from the Camp to the Watering-place, that the Soldiers might safely, without fear, fetch Water within the Bounds of their Fortification. Which Work *Petreius* and *Afranius* divided between themselves ; and for the perfecting of the same, had occasion to go far off from the Camp : By means of whose absence the Soldiers taking liberty of free Speech one with another, went out ; and as any Man had an Acquaintance or Neighbour in each others Camp, they sought him out. And first, they all gave thanks to all our Party, that they had spared them when they were terrified and amazed the day before : In regard whereof, they acknowledged to hold their lives by their favour : And afterwards enquired how they might safely yield themselves to their General, complaining that they had not done it in the beginning, and so have joyned their Forces with their ancient Friends and Kinsmen.

And having proceeded thus far in their communication, they require assurance for the Lives of *Afranius* and *Petreius* ; lest they should seem to corceive mischief against their Generals or betray them in seeking their own safety. Which things being agreed upon, they promised to come with their Ensigns to *Cæsar's* Camp ; and thereupon sent to *Cæsar* some of the Centurions of the first Orders, as Deputies to treat of Peace.

In the mean time, they invited their Friends on either side into the Camps, insomuch as both their Lodgings seemed but one Camp. Many of the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and Centurions

Et quamvis  
nullo macu-  
latus sangui-  
ne Miles.  
Quæ potuit  
fecisse, timet.  
Lucan. Lib. 4.

Oratio 13.  
Philip.

Cæsar.

Signs of  
Fear in the  
Enemy.



Ho pitis ille  
ciet nomen.  
vocat ille pro-  
pinqui: Ad-  
monet hunc  
studiis con-  
fors puerili-  
bus ætas:  
Nec Romanus  
erat qui non  
agnoverat  
hostem. Lu-  
can. lib. 4.

came to Cæsar, recommending themselves to his fa-  
vour: And the like did the Grandees and chief Prin-  
ces of Spain, whom they had commanded out, to take  
party in this War, and to remain with them as Ho-  
stages and Pledges. These inquired after their old  
Acquaintances and ancient Hosts, by whom each Man  
might have access to Cæsar with some commenda-  
tion. In like manner, Afranius's Son dealt with  
Cæsar, by the Mediation of Sulpitius a Legate,  
touching his own and his Father's Life. All things  
founded of Joy and mutual Congratulation: Of them  
that had escaped such imminent dangers; and  
of us, that seemed to have effected such great mat-  
ters without Bloodshed. Insomuch as Cæsar (in all  
Mens Judgment) reaped great Fruit of his accusto-  
med Clemency and Mildness; and his Counsel was  
generally approved of by all Men.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

--- Neque e-  
nim tibi ma-  
jor in armis  
Æmæthiis  
Fortuna fuit.  
ÆC. Lucan.

THIS Chapter containeth a passage of that note  
and eminency, as the like is not read in any  
Story. For if we search the Records of all Nati-  
ons, from the very Birth of Bellona unto times of  
later Memory, it will no where else appear that a  
General spared an advantage to purchase a victo-  
rious Name, by the bloodshed and ruin of his E-  
nemy; especially contrary to the will and desire  
of his Army, that had undergone such difficulties  
and hazards, to give an end to that War; contra-  
ry to his Knowledge and late experience of the  
mutability and change of time and fortune; con-  
trary to the surest rule of War,

----- Dolus an Virtus, quis in Hoste requirit?

Valour or Craft, who cares which in a Foe?

and contrary to the use of Arms, which were al-  
ways bent against an Enemy to subdue him.

This is the Fruit of that other part of Military  
Knowledge, which Men do rather admire than  
attain unto, no less concerning the honour of a  
Commander, \* *Consilio superare quam Gladio*, To  
overcome by Counsel and good Direction, rather  
than by the Sword, and was a main step to raise  
him to the Empire. For howsoever the Soldier  
(to prevent further labour) stood hard for Blood,  
not respecting that of the \* *Comick, Omnia pri-  
us experire verbis, quam Armis sapientem decet*;  
A wise Man should try all fair Words before he  
brings the business to Blows: Yet if Cæsar had  
been so injurious to Nature, as to have left them  
to their own desires, and suffered their Fury to  
have violated the Law of Humanity more than  
was requisite for Victory, they would after-  
wards have loathed themselves, and cursed their  
Swords for such unseasonable Execution; and may  
be doubted, would have revenged it upon his head,  
before the time came to strike the fatal stroke of  
the everion of that State. Cæsar esteemed it also  
a part of divine Power, to save Men by Troops,  
according to that of Seneca; *Hæc divina Potentia  
est, gregatim, ac publice servare*: It is a divine Pow-  
er that saves Men by Troops and all at once. And  
therefore he chose rather to displease the Soldier  
for the present; than to lose that honour which  
attendeth the sparing of home bred Blood: Where-  
of foreign Enemies are not altogether so capable.

\* Non minus  
est Imperato-  
ris, consilio su-  
perare, quam  
Gladio.  
Cæsar. Com-  
ment. 6. de  
Bel. Gal.  
\* Terentius  
\* Eunuch.

latura inju-  
am facit &  
umanitatis  
legem violat,  
qui ultra Vi-  
ctoriam ira-  
cundia indul-  
get. Nicetas.

De clementia.  
Lib. 1.  
cap. 26.

Ingens Victo-  
ria decus, ci-  
tra domesti-  
um sangui-  
nem belanti.  
Tacit. in  
Agricola.

Petreibus breaketh off the Treaty, and new swear-  
eth the Soldiers to the Party.

A Franius being advertised of these Passages, Cæsar  
left the Work which he had begun, and  
withdrew himself into the Camp; prepared  
(as it seemed) to take patiently whatsoever  
should befall him. But Petreibus was no way dismay-  
ed thereat: For having armed his household Family, he  
went flying with them, and a Prætorian Cohort of  
Buckler-bearers, together with some few stipendary  
Horse of the barbarous People, whom he was wont to  
keep about him as a guard to his Person, and came  
suddenly and unlooked for to the Rampier; brake off  
the Soldiers Treaty; thrust our Men off from the  
Camp, killing such as he could apprehend. The rest  
got together, and affrighted at the suddenness of the  
danger, wrapt their Coats about their left Arms, and  
with their Swords drawn, defended themselves from  
the Buckler-bearers and Horsemen: And trusting to  
the nearness and propinquity of their Camp, they took  
Courage and got safely thither, being protected by the  
Cohorts that had the Guard at the Camp Gates.

This being done, Petreibus went weeping about  
to the Maniples, calling the Soldiers, and beseech-  
ing them not to leave and forsake him, nor yet  
Pompey their General, that was absent, nor to deli-  
ver them over to the cruelty of their Adversaries.  
Presently thereupon a great Concourse of Soldiers was  
about the Prætor, requiring that every Man might  
take an Oath not to abandon or betray the Army or  
their Generals, nor yet to enter into private consulta-  
tion thereof without consent of the rest. He himself  
first took an Oath to this effect, and caused Afranius  
to take the same. The Tribune, of the Soldiers and  
Centurions followed in order: And after them, the  
Soldiers were brought out according to their Centuries,  
and were sworn the same Oath.

They caused it also to be proclaimed, that who-  
soever had any of Cæsar's Soldiers, should cause them  
to be brought out: And being brought forth, they slew  
them publicly before the Prætorian Pavilion. But  
most Men concealed such as were with them, and in  
the Night time sent them out over the Rampier.  
Whereby it came to pass that the Terrour wherewith  
the Generals had affrighted them, the cruelty they  
had shewed in punishment, together with the vain  
Religion of the new Oath, had taken away all hope of  
yielding for the present; and quite changing the Sol-  
diers Minds, had reduced the matter to the former  
course of War.

Cæsar for his part, caused diligent enquiry to be  
made of such Soldiers as came into his Camp during  
the time of the Treaty, and sent them away in  
safety. But of the Tribunes of the Soldiers and Cen-  
turions, many of their voluntary accord remained with  
him: Whom afterwards he held in great honour;  
and advanced the Centurions, and such Roman  
Knights as were of the better rank, to the place and  
dignity of Tribunes.

The Afranians were sorely laid unto in their forag-  
ing, and watered likewise with great difficulty.  
Many of the Legionary Soldiers had store of Corn,  
being commanded to take Provision with them from  
Ilerda for twenty two Days. But the Buckler-bearers  
and Auxiliary Forces had none at all, having but  
small means to provide and furnish themselves, and  
their Bodies not being used to carry Burthens;  
for which cause, a great Number fled daily to  
Cæsar.

Junctos am-  
plexibus ense  
Separat, &  
multo distur-  
bat sanguine  
pacem, Luc.

Inter men-  
sasq; toro-  
Quæ modo  
complexu fo-  
verunt pecto-  
ra cædunt.  
Luc. lib. 4.

Hoc siquidem  
solo civilis  
crimine Belli  
Dux cause  
melioris eris  
Luc. lib. 2.



## The First OBSERVATION.

THat every Man is the Maker of his own Fortune is evidently seen in the several Carriages of these two Generals. For *Afranius* gave way to the Soldiers Treaty, and resolved to suffer whatsoever that Transaction should cast upon him. But *Petrcius*, opposing himself to their desires, raised new troubles, had further designs, and another Fortune. Wherein forasmuch as the event of things riseth according as they are first directed, either by weak or strong resolutions; it better suiteth the temper of a Soldier (howsoever the success fall out with our desires) rather to be stiff in what he wisheth, than to make his own easiness the ready means of his Adversaries happiness.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

VERTue at all times hath had this privilege in the difference and degrees of State and condition, to make a Noble Man's Word equal to a Common Man's Oath: But the integrity of former Ages, had a more general prerogative, avouching every Man's Promise for the strictness of an Oath. Hence it was that the Romans, upon their Enrollment for a War, gave but their Promise to the Tribune of the Soldiers, to keep such Ordinances as their Militia required: Until at length that the Corruption of time (falsifying the simplicity and truth of Words) did enforce them to give an \* Oath, as the surest bond of Faith and Obedience: As is noted by *Livy* at large; the Soldiers (saith he) which was never before that time practised, were sworn by the Tribunes to appear upon summons from the Consuls, and not to depart without leave. For until then, there was nothing required of them but a solemn Promise (which the Horsemen made by their Decuries, and the Foot Troops by their Centuries) not to leave their Colours by flight, or through fear, not to forsake their rank, unless it were either to assault an Enemy, to take up an offensive Weapon, or to save a Citizen: which being at first but the offer of a free Mind, was now by the Tribunes required by obligation of an Oath.

The form of this Oath was diversly varied, as appeareth by *Aul. Gel.* and more specially in the times of the Emperours: For *Caligula* made this addition to the Soldiers Oath, that they should hold neither their Lives nor their Children dearer unto them than the Emperour *Caius* and his Sisters. Concerning the respect had of this Military Oath, that which *Tully* reporteth of *Cato* is of excellent note. *Popilius* having charge of the Province of Macedonia, had (amongst other Roman Youths) *Cato's* Son, a young Soldier in his Army; and being occasioned to dismiss a Legion, discharged likewise young *Cato*, being one of that Legion. But he desirous to bear Arms in that War, continued still in the Army: Whereupon *Cato* writ from Rome to *Popilius*, requiring him, that if he suffered his Son to remain in that War, he would by any means swear him again; for being discharged of his first Oath, he could not lawfully fight against the Enemy.

Ever since *Constantine* the great, the Soldiers were sworn by a Christian Oath, as *Vegetius* noteth, to obey all things the Emperour should command them, not to leave their Warfare without Licence, not to shun Death for the service of the Publick Weal. And at this day, amongst other Nations, an Oath is given to the Soldier upon his enrollment, to this effect; Well and lawfully to serve the King, towards

all Men, and against all, without exception of Persons; and if they know any thing concerning his service, to reveal the same incontinently; not to leave their Colours, without leave either of the General or his Lieutenant.

The ancient Romans did charge their solemn and publick Oaths with many Ceremonies: As appeareth by that form which was used in ratifying Treaties and Transactions; Their Heralds killed a Hog, and cried out withall, that the like would happen to him that first falsified his faith.

*Polybius* reporteth, that he that read the Oath whereby the Romans and Carthaginians swore their accord, had the Hair of his Head tied up in an extraordinary manner: The Parties invoking their *Jupiter*, to grant all prosperity to him that without fraud or deceit did enter into that Agreement. But if (saith he that took the Oath) I shall either do, or purpose otherwise, all the rest being safe and sound, let me alone (in the midst of the Laws and Justice of my Country, in my own habitation and dwelling, and within my proper Temples and Sepulchres,) perish most unfortunately, even as this Stone flieth out of my hand. And (as he spake those Words) he cast away a Stone.

I do not find the use of a Military Oath in our Nation. Howbeit the common form of our Oath is as ceremonious and significative as any other whatsoever: which may be observed by the 3 parts it containeth, as I have seen them allegorized in some Antiquities. For first the Book being always a part of holy Writ, implyeth a renunciation of all the promises therein contained. Secondly, the touching it with our Hands, inferreth the like defiance of our Works, never to be successful or helping unto us. Thirdly, the kissing of the Book importeth a vain mis-spending of our Vows and Prayers, if we falsifie any thing thereby averr'd.

## C H A P. XXV.

The Endeavour which *Afranius* used to return to *Ilerda*; but failed in his design.

THE matter being in this extremity, of two means which were left unto them, it was thought the readier and more expedient, to return to *Ilerda*. For having left there behind them a little Corn, they hoped to take some good course for the Sequel. *Taracco* was farther off, and thereby subject to more Casualties concerning their Passage. In regard whereof they resolved of the former Course, and so dislodged themselves.

*Cæsar* having sent his Cavalry before to incumber and retard the Rere-guard, followed after himself with the Legions. The hindmost Troops of their Army were constrained (without any intermission of time) to fight with our Horsemen. And their manner of Fight was thus. Certain expedite Cohorts, free of Carriages, marched in the rere of their Army, and in open and champaign places many of these Cohorts made a stand to confront our Cavalry. If they were to ascend up a Hill, the nature of the place did easily repell the danger wherewith they were threatned; forasmuch as such as went before, might easily from the higher ground protect them that followed after: But when they came to a Valley or Descent, that those that were in the former Ranks could not help them in the Rere, the Horsemen from the upper ground, did cast their Weapons with great ease and facility upon the Enemy. And then continually they were in great hazard and danger: And still as they approached near unto such places, they called to the Legions, and

Anno Urb.  
cond. 538.  
Nullum  
vinculum ad  
astringendam  
fidem, jure-  
jurando arcti-  
us esse potest.

Lib. 22.

Lib. 16.  
cap. 4.

Lib. 1. offic.  
M. Popilius.

Lib. 2.  
cap. 5.

Lib. 3.  
Histor.

Cæsar.



willed them to make a stand with their Ensigns, and so by great force and violence repelled our Cavalry.

Who being retired back, they would suddenly take a running, and get all down into the Valley. And presently again, being to ascend into a higher ground, they would there make a stand. For they were so far from having help of their own Cavalry (whereof they had a great number) that they were glad to take them between their Troops, (being much affrighted with former Encounters) and so to shelter and protect them: Of whom if any chanced (upon occasion) to stray aside out of the rout the Army held, they were presently attacked by Cæsar's Horsemen.

The Fight continuing in this manner, they proceeded slowly on their way, advancing forward but by little and little; and oftentimes stood still, to succour and relieve their party, as then it fell out. For having gone but four miles on their way (being very hardly laid to, and much pressed by our Cavalry) they took to an exceeding high Hill; and there putting themselves into one front of a Battel, fortified their Camp, keeping their Carriages laden upon their Horses. As soon as they perceived that Cæsar's Camp was set, and that the Tents were up, and their Horses put to Grass; they rose suddenly about Mid-day, upon hope of some respite, by reason of our Horse put out to feeding, and went on their journey.

Which Cæsar perceiving rose and followed after, leaving a few Cohorts to keep the Carriages: And about the tenth hour, commanding the Foragers and Horsemen to be called back, and to follow after, instantly the Cavalry returned, and betook themselves to their accustomed charge.

The Fight was very sharp in the Rere, insomuch as they were ready to turn their backs. Many Soldiers, and some of the Centurions were slain. Cæsar's Troops pressed hard upon them, and threatened the overthrow of their whole Army; insomuch, as they had neither means to chuse a fit place to incamp in, nor to proceed forward in their march. Whereby they were necessarily enforced to make a stand, and to pitch their Camp far from any Water, in an unequal and disadvantageous place. But Cæsar forbore to meddle with them, for the same reasons that have been formerly declared; and for that day, would not suffer the Soldiers to set up their Tents, that they might be the readier to follow after, at what time soever, by night or by day, they should offer to break away.

The Enemy having observed the defect of our Camp, employed all that night in advancing their Works, and in casting their Camp with an opposite front to our Army. The like they did all the next day: But so it fell out, that by how much their Camp was brought farther on, and the Fortification grew nearer to finishing, by so much farther off they were from Water: and so remedied one evil with a worse mischief. The first night, none of them went out of their Camp to fetch Water: and the next day, they led out all their Troops together to Water, but sent no Man out to Forage. Whereby Cæsar, finding them oppressed with many inconveniences, chose rather to force them to a composition, than to fight with them.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

IN this troublesome and confused retreat, which these Commanders undertook, to regain the advantages that formerly they had quitted at Ilerda, we may observe the difficulties attending a weaker party, when they would free themselves from the pressures of a strong confronting Enemy. For the frailty of humane fortune is always so yoked with incumbrances, and hath so many lets from the native weaknesses of its own endea-

vour; that if the opposition of foreign malice shall therewithal unhappily concur, to stop the current of our desires, there is little hope of better success, than that which the ordinary condition of extremity doth afford: Which is, to hazard the peril of a Wound, in seeking to avoid the smart of a Rod; and to fall into Scylla, upon a desire we have to shun Charybdis: according as it befell this party. Wherein let us farther note the advantage which a Commander hath, either to take or leave, when he is able to over-master the Enemy in Cavalry: For the Horsemen serving an Army Royal, by making discoveries, by Foraging, by giving rescue upon a sudden, by doing execution, and retarding an Enemy in his march, if (over-awed by the Cavalry of the Enemy) they cannot perform these services as is requisite; the contrary party is the stronger by so many advantages.

*Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim.*

#### C H A P. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth about to inclose the Enemy, and he to hinder Cæsar.

**H**owbeit Cæsar laboured to inclose them about with a Ditch and a Rampier, to the end he might with better ease hinder their sudden Sallies and Eruptions, to which he thought the Enemy would necessarily betake themselves.

The Enemy being streightened for want of Forage, and to the end also they might be the readier to escape away, caused all their Horses of Carriage to be killed: and in these Works and Consultations were two days spent. The third day, a great part of Cæsar's Works being already perfected, the Enemy (to hinder the business intended concerning the Fortifications) about two of the Clock in the Afternoon made the Alarm, brought out the Legions, and imbattelled themselves under their Camp. Cæsar calleth back the Legions from their Work; and commanding all his Horse to troop together, putteth his Army in Battel. For having made such a shew of unwillingness to buckle with the Enemy, against the will of the soldier and opinion of all Men, he found himself subject thereupon to much inconvenience: Howbeit he was resolved (for the reasons already specified) not to strike a Battel; and the rather at this time, for that the space between his Camp and the Enemies was so little, that if he had put them to flight, it could not have much availed him, for the gaining of a perfect and absolute Victory. For their Camps were not above two thousand foot asunder; whereof the Armies took up two parts, and the third was left for incursion and assault. So that, if he had given Battel in that nearness of the Camp, they would have found a speedy retreat upon their overthrow. For which cause he resolved to stand upon his defence, and not to give the Onset, and charge them first.

*Hora octava, signo dato.*

*Tela tenejam miles, ait, ferrumque ruenti Subtrahere, non ullo constet mihi sanguine bellum. Vincitur haud gratius jugulo qui provocat hostem. Lucan. lib. 4.*

Afranius had put his Army in a double Battel: The first consisting of five Legions; and the Auxiliary Cohorts, which he usually served in the Wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second Battel.


Cæsar's Army was ordered in a tripple Battel: The first was of four Cohorts, a piece of the five Legions: the second, of three; and the third again of three of each Legion, following in order. The Archers and Slingers were in the midst, and the Cavalry on the sides. Being thus both imbattelled, they seemed to obtain their several ends: Cæsar, not to fight unless he were forced to it; and the Enemy, to hinder Cæsar's Fortification. But the matter being drawn out in length, they stood imbattelled until Sun-setting: and then returned both into their Camps.

The
















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## The First OBSERVATION.

**C**ontra opinionem enim militum, famamque omnium, videri praelio diffugisse, magnum detrimentum afferebat. Having made a shew of unwillingness to buckle with the Enemy, against the will of the Soldier, and the opinion of all Men, he found himself subject to much inconvenience, saith the History. Whence we may observe two points. First, that a Commander in striking a Field, must partly be directed by his Army: For he may neither fight against the liking of the Soldier, nor withhold them from fighting when they are willing to embrace it, if other circumstances do indifferently concurr therewithal. For when Men are commanded to do what they would do, the matter is thoroughly undertaken, and the issue is commonly answerable to the readiness of their desires: But being restrained in their affections, and put besides their aptness of their voluntary disposition, there groweth such a contrariety between the Generals Order and the Soldiers Obedience, as will hardly sympathize to beget good fortune.

And if a Leader of that fame and opinion, and so well known to his Army, as *Cæsar* was, grew into distaste with his Soldiers, upon so good causes which he had to shun a Battel; what hazard that Commander runneth into, who seldom or never gave argument of his resolution in this kind, may be conceived by this passage. The second thing which I note, is, that a General must learn especially to disguise his intents, by making shew of that which he meaneth not. For albeit the more judicious sort of Men are not so well satisfied with Pretences as with Deeds: Yet forasmuch as the \* condition of Princes, contrary to the manner of private Persons, requireth such a direction of business, as may rather suit with Fame and Opinion, than with particular ends; it behoveth them to use such glosses, as may take away all perulant and sinister interpretations, howsoever their courses may aim at other purposes. And certainly, † the generality of People are better paid with appearances than with truth; according as *Ma-chiavill* hath observed. But concerning *Cæsar*, that which *Ephicrates* said of himself, having imbattelled his Army to fight, That he feared nothing more, than that his Enemy knew not his Valour; may more properly be said here. For there was nothing abused the Enemy more, or made them take up so many Bravadoes, or use so much delay before they came to composition, but that they knew not *Cæsar*. For as the \* Eagle is able to mount aloft in all seasons and temperatures of the Air; so was his Sword steeld to make way through all resistance.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**N the next place, the manner of their imbattelling cometh to be observed: which generally in all Editions runneth thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alariae cohortis obtinebat: Cæsaris triplex, sed primam aciem quaternæ cohortes ex V. legione tenebant. Has subsidiariae ternæ, & rursus alia totidem, suæ cujusque legionis, subsequebantur: sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat*: And needeth the help of some excellent Critick, to make it have answerable sense to the other parts of this History. For first, how shall we understand those words, *Acies Afraniana duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii*; *Afranius* his Army was in a double Battel; the fifth Legion,

and the third for succours? Shall we take the meaning to be, that the first Legion stood in front, and the other stood for succours behind? Or shall we take it with *Faernus*; *Acies Afraniana duplex: ex legione prima, & tertia, in subsidii locum alariae cohortes obtinebant; Afranius, &c.* out of the first Legion and the third, the Cohorts which use to be in the Wings were put in place of the succours? But neither by the one or by the other, is there found more than two Legions: whereas there is express mention of five, besides the Cohorts of the Country. And therefore, as not knowing other more probable, I have translated it according to *Lipsius's* correction, and made the Text thus: *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legionum quinque: & in subsidii locum alariae cohortes obtinebant: Afranius* had put his Army in a double Battel: The first consisting of five Legions; and the Auxiliary Cohorts, which usually served in the Wings, were now placed for succours, and made the second Battel, The first Battel consisted of five Legions; and the second, of the Spanish and Auxiliary Forces.

The like help must be lent to *Cæsar*: for otherwise, the Text doth afford him but few Cohorts, standing thus, *Primam aciem quaternæ cohortes, ex quinta legione, tenebant. Has ternæ, & rursus alia, &c.* The first Battel was of four Cohorts out of the fifth Legion: then followed three: and then as many others, &c. For undoubtedly *Cæsar* had five Legion equal to *Afranius*; but being far inferiour unto him in Auxiliary Troops, was driven to a more artificial division, to help his weakness in that point. And therefore, as the same Critick hath mended it, we are to read, *Quaternæ cohortes ex quinque legionibus*, four Cohorts out of the five Legions: Which bringeth forth this fence; In the first Battel were five times four Cohorts, in the second, five times three Cohorts, and as many in the third Battel. And by the addition of *sua cujusque legionis*, of every one of the Legions, it appeareth, that every Legion was so divided into three parts, that it had four Cohorts in the first Battel, three in the second, and three in the last.

Concerning the space which their Armies imbattelled, took up, it appeareth, that the whole distance between their Camps contained two thousand foot; whereof either Army took up one third, being 666 foot, or an hundred and eleven paces, a little more than a Furlong: But that altered more or less, as place and occasion required.

## C H A P. XXVII.

## The Treaty of Peace.

**T**He next day, *Cæsar* went about to finish *Cæsar*, and end the Fortification which he had begun; and the Enemy, to try whether they might find a Foord in the River *Sicoris*, and so get over. Which being perceived, *Cæsar* carried over the light-armed Germans, and part of the Cavalry, and disposed them in Guard along the River bank. At length, being besieged and shut up on all sides, and having kept their Horses without Meat four days together, besides their extreme want of Water, Wood and Corn, they required a Parley, and that (if it might be) in some place out of the presence of the Soldier. Which *Cæsar* denied, unless it were in publick. Whereupon *Afranius* his Son was given in Hostage to *Cæsar*; and so they presented themselves in a place of *Cæsar's* appointing.

And

It is hard  
catching  
Heres with  
unwilling  
Bonds.

\* Cæsaris mor-  
talibus in eo  
fuit consilia  
quid sibi con-  
ducere putent;  
Principum di-  
versa sors est,  
quibus præci-  
pua rerum ad  
famam divi-  
tenda. Tacit.  
† L' univers-  
sité de gli  
hommes si  
passe, così di  
quello che paie,  
come di quello  
che è anzi:  
molte volte si  
muove uno più  
per le cose che  
paiono, che per  
quelle che sono.  
Lib. 1. Sop.  
\* Tit. Liv.  
cap. 25.  
Omnis aer  
Aquila pene-  
trabilis.

Their manner  
of imbattel-  
ling.

Lib. 4. de  
militia Ro-  
mana.



And in the hearing of both the Armies, Afranius spake to this effect; That he was not to be offended, neither with him nor with the Soldier: for being faithful and obedient to the General Cn. Pompeius; but now, having made sufficient proof of their Duty, they had also thoroughly suffered for the same, having endured the extremity of want in all necessary Provisions: Insomuch as now they were shut up as Women, kept from Water, kept from going out, oppressed with a greater weight of Grief in Body, and of dishonour in their Reputation than they were able to bear; and therefore did confess themselves to be vanquished and overcome: Praying and beseeching, that if there were any Mercy left, they might not undergo the extremity of Fortune. And this he delivered as humbly and submissively as was possible.

At nunc sola  
mihi est oran-  
da causa sa-  
lutaris.  
Dignum do-  
nanda, Cæsar,  
te credere  
vita.

To which Cæsar answered; That these terms of complaint and compassion could be used to no Man more improperly than himself: For whereas every Man else did his duty; he only, upon fit conditions of Time and Place, refused to Fight with them, to the end all circumstances might concur to a Peace: Albeit his Army had suffered much Wrong, in the Death and Slaughter of their Fellows, yet he had kept and preserved such of their Party as were in his Power, and came of their own accord to move a Peace; wherein they thought they went about to procure the safety of all their Fellows. So that the whole course of his proceeding with them consisted of Clemency. Howbeit their Commanders abhorred the name of Peace, and had not kept the Laws either of Treaty or Truce: For they had caused many simple Men to be Massacred and Slain, that were deceived by a skew of Treaty. And therefore it had befallen them, as it happeneth for the most part to perverse and arrogant Persons, to seek and earnestly to desire that which a little before they had foolishly condemned.

Neither would he take the advantage of this their submission, or of any other opportunity of time, either to augment his Power, or to strengthen his Party: But he only required, that those Armies might be discharged, which for many Years together had been maintained against him. For neither were those six Legions for any other cause sent into Spain, nor the seventh Enrolled there, nor so many and so great Navies prepared, nor such experienced and skilful Commanders selected and appointed, (for none of these needed to keep Spain in quiet;) nothing hereof was prepared for the use and behoof of the Province, which (by reason of their long continuance of Peace) needed not any such assistance. All these things were long ago provided in a readiness against him: New forms of Government were made and ordained against him; That one and the same Man should be resident at the Gates of Rome, have the whole superintendency and direction of the City business; and yet notwithstanding, hold two Warlike Provinces for so many Years together, being absent from both of them.

Against him, and for his Ruine, were changed the ancient Rights and Customs of Magistracy, in sending Men at the end of their Prætorship or Consulship, to the Government of Provinces, as was always accustomed; but in lieu of them, were chosen some that were allowed and authorised by a few. Against him the Prerogative of Age did nothing prevail: But whosoever they were that in former Wars had made good proof of their Valour, were now called out to Command Armies. To him only was denied that which was granted to all other Generals; that when they had happily brought things to an end, they might dismiss their Army, and return home with Honour, or at the least, without Dishonour.

All which things he notwithstanding both had, and would suffer patiently; neither did he now go

about to take their Army from them, and retain them in pay for himself, which he might easily do; but that they should not have means to make head against him. And therefore, as it was said before, they should go out of the Provinces, and discharge their Army; if they did so, he would hurt no Man: But that was the only and last means of Peace.

## OBSERVATION.

There is not any one Vertue that can challenge a greater measure of Honour, or hath more Prerogative either amongst Friends or Enemies, than Fidelity. For which cause it is, that Men are more strict in matters committed to their Trust for the behoof of others, than they can well be, if the same things concerned themselves. And yet nevertheless there is a Quatenus in all endeavours, and seemeth to be limited with such apparency, as true affection may make of a good meaning: And was the ground which Afranius took to move Cæsar for a Pardon; *Non esse aut ipsis aut militibus succensendum, quod fidem erga Imperatorem Cn. Pompeium conservare voluerint: Sed satis jam fecisse officio, satisque supplicii tulisse, &c.* That he was not to be angry, either with him or the Soldiery, for being faithful to their General Cn. Pompeius; but that now they had sufficiently done their duty, and as thoroughly smarted for the same, &c. which he delivered in a Stile suiting his Fortune. For, as Comineus hath observed, Men in fear give reverent and humble words; and the Tongue is ever conditioned to be the chiefest witness of our Fortune.

Multa, que  
nostra causa  
nunquam so-  
ceremus, fa-  
cimur causa  
amicorum.  
Cicero Lælius.

Qui vincit  
sine viâ  
habent lin-  
guam. Pla.

On the other side, Cæsar produced nothing for his part, but such Wrongs as might seem valuable to make good those Courses which he prosecuted. As first, Injuries done by them, and that in the highest degree of Blame against his Soldiers, that went but to seek for Peace. Injuries done by their General, in such a fashion, as spared not to evert the fundamental Rights of the State, to bring him to Ruine and Confusion. Whereby he was moved to endeavour that which Nature tieth every man unto, *Propellere injuriam*, to repel an Injury from himself: And having brought it to these terms wherein it now stood, he would give assurance to the World, by the Revenge he there took, that he entered into that War for this only end, that he might live in Peace: And so required no more but that the Army should be dismissed.

Bellum ita  
suscipitur,  
ut nihil aliud  
nisi pax que-  
sita videatur.  
Cic. lib. I. de  
offic.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

The execution of the Articles agreed upon.

The Conditions propounded were most acceptable and pleasing to the Soldiers, as might appear by them: For being in the condition of vanquished Persons, and thereupon expecting a hard measure of Fortune, to be rewarded with liberty and exemption of Arms, was more than they could expect: Insomuch as where there grew a Controversie of the time and place of their dismissal, they all generally standing upon the Rampier, signified both by their Speeches and by their hands, that their desire was, it might be done instantly; for it could not be provided by any assurance, that it would continue firm, if it were deferred until another time. After some dispute on each side, the matter was in the end brought to this Issue; that such as had Houses and Possessions in Spain, should be discharged presently, and the rest at the River Varus. It was conditioned, that no Man should be injured, that no Man should be forced \* against

Varus fluvius.  
Hoc petimus,  
viduos ne te-  
cum vincere  
cogas. Luc.



against his Will to be sworn under Cæsar's Command.

Cæsar promised to furnish them with Corn, until they came to the River Varus: Adding withal, that whatsoever any one had lost in the Time of the War, which should be found with any of his Soldiers, should be restored to such as lost it; and to his Soldiers he paid the value thereof in Money. If any Controversie afterward grew amongst the Soldiers, of their own accord they brought the matter from time to time before Cæsar. As when the Soldiers grew almost into a Mutiny for want of Pay, the Commanders affirming the Pay-day was not yet come, Petreius and Afranius required that Cæsar might understand the cause: And both Parties were contented with his Arbitrament.

A third part of the Army being dismissed in these two days, he commanded two of his Legions to march before their Army, and the rest to follow after, and continually to Encamp themselves not far from them; and appointed Q. Fufius Calenus, a Legate, to take the charge of that business. This course being taken, they marched out of Spain to the River Varus, and there dismissed the rest of their Army.

## OBSERVATION.

THE River Varus divideth Gallia Narbonensis from Italy; and was thought an indifferent place to discharge the Army, whereby there might be an end made of that War. Wherein if any Man desire to see a parallel drawn between Cæsar and the other Leaders for matter of War, it shall suffice to take the issue for a square of their directions; being drawn to his Head within forty days after Cæsar came within sight of the Enemy, as Curio noteth in his Speech to the Soldiers.

Cato seeing the prosperous success of Cæsar against Pompey, said there was a great uncertainty in the Government of their Gods; alluding peradventure to that of Plato in his Politicks, where he saith, that there are Ages, wherein the Gods do govern the World in their own Persons; and there are other times, wherein they altogether neglect the same: the World taking a course quite contrary to that which the Gods directed. But Lucan spake from a surer ground, where he saith,

Rerum ad  
eventu, facta  
notanda putes.  
Lib. 2. Civil.

*Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*

The Conquering cause pleas'd Jove, the Conquered Cato.

And thus endeth the first Commentary.

## The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

THE worst thing that can befall a Nation, a General, and an Army, is to suffer themselves to be surpris'd by fear; by reason that fear is always attended with fatal consequences: Therefore the Leaders of People, and Commanders of Armies ought to foresee it, and to provide most carefully against it. We have three notable Examples upon that Subject in this Book. The first, when Cæsar cross'd the Rubicon, for he was declar'd an Enemy to the Publick before that. Pompey promises that by stamping with his foot upon the Ground he will raise Armies to Combat him: That at his approach his very Soldiers will deliver him up to him: He does not judge him worthy of the least consideration: Those that dare name him are banished from Rome; and finally, he is treated like a Criminal of low esteem. Nevertheless, upon his first Motion, in order to declare a War, and notwithstanding he behav'd himself at Pizaro as he had done at Rimini, not having the fourth part of his Army with him; every body is surpris'd, Pompey and the Consuls fly, the care of raising Men is laid aside, and they abandon Rome. The cause of this great alteration proceeds from that Pompey had never imagin'd that Cæsar should have dar'd to undertake so great a design, relying upon the presumption which his Vertue and his good Fortune had given him; which made him apply himself more to maintain his Party in the City, than to provide for his defence: So that when he found that things went otherwise than he had publish'd them, he was astonish'd. Therefore it was no great wonder that ignorant People who fix all their assurance or fear on the good or ill countenance of the Person in whose hands they have plac'd their

Fortunes, should do the like. Whereupon I say, that in affairs of such consequence, it is necessary, in imitation of Cæsar to consider maturely before hand, all the worst events that can happen, in order never to be surpris'd. But being once engag'd, we must arm against them all, and have constancy enough to persist to the end.

The second example is, when Domitius Aenobarbus finding himself out of hopes of being succour'd by Pompey, resolv'd to fly from Corfinium, where he was Besieg'd; but by the alteration of his Countenance; by the faintness of his Words, not suiting his present Condition, and by the omission of those Cares that were necessary for the common defence, discover'd to his Soldiers what he design'd to conceal from them; so that preventing his Flight they deliver'd him up to Cæsar. This is a fine Lesson to inform a General, that he ought to appear most chearful in the greatest Perils; by reason that his Soldiers are encouraged or daunted by his Looks.

The third is, When Cæsar discover'd the Terrors of Afranius and Petreius's Soldiers; because, says he, they did not succour and assist each other: Insomuch that they hardly sustain'd the Shock of the Cavalry, before they laid all their Colours down in a heap: that they neither kept their Ranks nor Distances, and that they did not remove from a Camp, in which they could not subsist for want of Water. And tho' Armies do not draw so near one another in these days by reason of their Cannon: Nevertheless, experienced Captains improve these considerations very usefully. I have seen Henry the Great pursuing Eight Hundred Horse with less than two, judging that they would not Fight because they confounded themselves, and did not observe their

H h

Distances,



Distances, which happened exactly according to his Prediction.

Altho' retiring by Sea, out of a Besieg'd City, does not seem very difficult, yet the Precautions Pompey us'd in retiring from *Brundisium*, sav'd him. For considering that he had to deal with People he abandon'd, and with a vigilant Enemy, he had been ruin'd unless he had Wall'd the Gates, and stop't all the Avenues of *Brundisium*, excepting only two conceal'd ones, which led his Men to the Port; by reason that as the last were retiring from off the Walls, the Inhabitants receiv'd *Cæsar's* into their room. Therefore in all sorts of Retreats, it behoves a Captain to use his utmost Cares, to do it with safety, and to avoid Confusion: And when he does it by choice, he ought to do it so soon and so speedily, that he may not be oblig'd to Fight. In this place I will

mention a dispute between *Afranius* and *Petreibus*, the one being desirous to retire by Night, the other by Day. Those who were for removing in the Night, alledg'd that they should reach the Mountains, and the places of safety, before it could be perceived by their Enemies. The other were of Opinion that having to do with *Cæsar*, who was strong in Horse, they could never steal away from him without Fighting; and in that case it was better to do it in the Day-time, than in the Night, which always occasion'd disorders in Retreats. For my part I hold the first Opinion to be the best; For besides that it is very dangerous to retire before an Enemy in the Day-time: A prudent Captain seldom engages to pursue an Army in the Night, because it is very difficult to avoid falling into some Ambush or other.

The



## The Second COMMENTARY of the CIVIL WARS.

### The Argument.

**T**His Commentary hath three special Parts. The first containeth the Siege of *Marfeilles*: The strange Works, and extream endeavours to take and to keep the Town. The second expresseth the vain Labour which *Varro*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, undertook after that *Afranius* and *Petreius* were defeated, to keep the Province of *Andaluzia* out of *Cæsar's* Power and Command. And the third part consisteth of the expedition *Curio* made into *Africa*; and endeth with his Overthrow.

#### C H A P. I.

The preparations for the Siege, as well within as without the Town.

**W**Hilst these things were doing in Spain, *C. Trebonius* the Legate, being left to Besiege *Marfeilles*, had begun in two places to raise Mounts, to make *Mantelets* and Towers against the Town: One next unto the Port where the Ships lay; and the other in the way leading from *Gallia* and Spain into the Town, just upon the creek of the Sea, near unto the Mouth of the *Rhone*. For three parts of *Marfeilles* are in a manner washed with the Sea: And the fourth is that which giveth passage by Land; whereof that part which belongeth to the Castle (by reason of the nature of the place, and fortified with a deep Ditch) would require a long and difficult Siege. For the perfecting of those Works, *Trebonius* had commanded out of all the Province, great store of Horses for Carriage, and a multitude of Men; requiring them to bring Rods to make Hurdles, and other materials for the Work: Which being prepared and brought together, he raised a Mount of fourscore Foot high.

But such was the Provision which of ancient time they had stored up in the Town, of all Equipage and Necessaries for the War, with such Provision of Munition and Engines, that no Hurdles made of Rods or Osiers were able to bear out the force thereof. For out of their great *Balista*, they shot Beams of twelve Foot long, pointed with Iron, with such force as they would pierce through four courses of Hurdles, and stick in the Earth. Whereby they were forced to roof their Gallery with Timber of a foot square, and to bring matter that way by hand to make the \* Mount. A *Testudo* of sixty Foot in length was always carried before, for the levelling of the Ground made of mighty strong Timber, covered and armed with all things which might defend it from Fire and Stones, or what else should be cast upon it. But the greatness of the Work, the height of the Wall, and Towers, together with the multitude of Engines, did retard and hinder the proceeding thereof.

Moreover, the *Albici* did make often Sallies out of the Town, setting Fire to the Mounts and to the Turrets which were kept by our Soldiers with great facility and ease, forcing such as sallied out to return with great loss.

#### O B S E R V A T I O N.

**H**AVING described in the former Commentaries these Engines and Works here mentioned, the Reader may please (for his better satisfaction) to review those places; as also farther to note, that the word *Arrillery* was brought down to these Ages from the use of ancient Engines, which consisted of those two primitives, *Arcus* and *Telum*. And according as diversity of Art and Wit found means to fit these to use and occasions, so had they several and distinct Names; whereof I find chiefly these, *Balista*, *Catapulta*, *Tolenones*, *Scorpiones*, *Onagri*. Of each of which there are divers and several sorts; as first, of the *Balista*, some were called *Centenarie*, others *Talentarie*, according to the weight of the Bullet or Weapon they shot. Of the rate and proportion whereof *Vitruvius*, and his Learned Interpreter *Daniel Barbarus*, have made accurate description. Again, some were made to shoot Stones; as appeareth by that of *Tacitus*, *Magnitudine eximia, quarta-decima legionis Balista ingentibus saxis hostilem aciem protruebat*; the *Balista* of the fourteenth Legion being an exceeding great one, beat down the Army of the Enemy with huge Stones: And others, to shoot Darts and Piles of Timber, headed with Iron; as is manifested by this place. Moreover, the manner of bending of these Engines made a difference: Some being drawn up with a Wrench or Scrue, and some with a Wheel; some having long Arms, and others having short: But the Strings were generally either all of Sinews, or of Womens Hair, as strongest and surest of any other kind. Of these *Vegetius* preferreth the *Balista*, and the *Onagri*, as unresistable when they were skilfully handled. The word *Onagri*, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* noteth, was of a later Stamp, and imposed upon those Engines which former time called *Scorpiones*; and was taken from the nature

*Arrillery derived from Arcus and Telum.*

*Lib. 10. c. 17.*

*Lib. 3. Hist. Balistæ Petraræ.*

*Lib. 4. c. 29.*

*Cæsar.*

*Porticus.*

*\* Agger. Testudo.*



of wild Affes, that are said to cast Stones backward with their feet at the Hunters, with such violence, that oftentimes they dashed out their Brains.

In the time of Barbarism, all these Engines were generally called *Mangonella*: As appeareth by *Viginerius*, in his Annotations upon *Onofander*. Which is likewise shewed by that which *Mr. Cambden* hath inserted in the description of *Bedfordshire*, concerning the Siege of *Bedford-Castle*, in the time of *Henry the Third*, out of an Author that was present; *Ex parte orientali fuit una Petraria & duo Mangonella, quæ quotidie turrin infestabant; & ex parte occidentis duo Mangonella, quæ turrin veterem contriverunt; & unum Mangonellum ex parte Australi, &c.* On the East side was placed one Engine to cast Stones, and two Mangonels, which continually plaid upon the Tower; and on the West side two Mangonels, which beat down the old Tower; and one Mangonel on the South side, &c. But our Powder having blown all these out of use, it were to no purpose to insist longer upon them.

And of Mangonellum, a Batterer or Breaker, cometh our English word Mangle.

## CHAP. II.

The *Marseillians* prepare themselves for a Sea-fight.

Cæsar.

IN the mean time *L. Nasidius* being sent by *Cn. Pompeius* with a Navy of sixteen Ships (amongst which, some few had their Beak-head of Iron) to the succour and supply of *L. Domitius* and the *Marseillians*, he passed the streights of *Sicily*, before *Curio* had intelligence thereof: And putting into *Messana*, by reason of the suddain Terror of the principal Men, and the Senate that took themselves to flight, he surprised one Ship in the Road, and carried her away, and so held on his course to *Marseilles*. And having sent a small Bark before, he certified *Domitius* and the rest of his coming; exhorting them by all means, that joyning their Forces with his Supplies, they would once again give Fight to *Brutus's* Navy.

Messana.

The *Marseillians*, since their former Overthrow, had taken the like number of Ships out of their Arsenal, and new rigged and trimmed them, and with great Industry furnished and manned them for that Service: For they wanted neither Oar-Men, Mariners, Sailors, nor Pilots, fit for that purpose. To these they added certain Fisher-Boats, and fenced them with Coverings, that the Oar-Men might be safe from casting Weapons: And these he filled with Archers and Engines. The Navy being thus furnished and prepared, the *Marseillians* (incited and stirred up with the Prayers and Tears of old Men, Women, and Maids, to give help and defence to their City in time of extreame danger; and to Fight with no less Courage and Confidence than formerly they had accustomed) went all aboard with great Courage: As it cometh to pass through the common fault of Nature, whereby we put more confidence in things unseen and unknown, or otherwise are more troubled thereat: According as it then happened. For the coming of *Nasidius* had filled the City full of assured Hope and Courage: And thereupon, having a good Wind, they left the Port, and came and found *Nasidius* at *Taurenta* (a Castle belonging to the *Marseillians*) and there fitted themselves for a Fight; encouraging each other again to a Valiant carriage of that Service, and consulting how it might be best performed.

Tholose.

The right Squadron was given to the *Marseillians*, and the left to *Nasidius*. And to the place repaired *Brutus*, having encreased the number of his Ships: For those six which he took from the *Marseillians*, he had added unto the other which *Cæsar* had caused

to be made at *Arelate*, and had mended them since the last Fight, and fitted them with all necessaries for Men of War. And thereupon exhorting his Soldiers to contemn the Enemy as a Vanquished Party, having already Foiled and Overthrown them when they were in their Strength, they set forward against them with great Assurance and Courage.

Out of the Camp of *C. Trebonius*, and from all those higher places they might easily perceive and see in the City, how all the Youth which remained in the Town, and all the Aged, with their Wives and Children, did from the publick Places of Guard, and from the Town Walls, stretch out their hands towards Heaven, or otherwise run to their Churches and Temples, and there prostrating themselves before their Images, did desire Victory of their Gods. Neither was there any of them all that did not think the event of all their Fortunes to consist in that days Service: For the chiefest of all their able Men, and the best of all sorts and degrees were by name called out, and entreated to go aboard, to the end, that if any disaster or mischance should happen, they might see nothing further to be endeavoured for their safety; and if they overcame, they might rest in hope to save their City, either by their own Valour, or by Foreign help.

## OBSERVATION.

COMMUNI fit vitio natura, ut invisis, latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus, magis confidamus, vehementiusque exterreamur, ut tum accidit; It cometh to pass through the common fault of Nature, &c. In cases of hazard, things brought unto us by report do more abuse our Judgment, either in conceiving too great hopes, or yielding too much to distrust, than any matter present can move or enforce: For these perturbations attending upon our Will, are enlarged more according to the quality of our desires, than as they are directed by course of Reason; and so draw Men either easily to believe what their wishes do require, or otherwise to reject all as utterly lost.

Quod maxime volunt, id facile credunt.

The uncertainty wherof, and the disappointment ensuing those deceivable apprehensions, hath brought the hope of this Life into very slight account, being reckoned but as the Dream of him that is awake; and as *Pia fraus*, or a charitable Delusion to support us through the hard chances of this World, and to keep Man's Heart from breaking: For every Man's help is hope; which never affordeth present Relief, but asswageth the bitterness of Extremities, by

— Dabit Deus his quoque finem,

Virgil. lib. 2. Æneid.

God once will put an end to these things too.


## CHAP. III.

The Fight, and the *Marseillians* Overthrow.

THE Fight being begun, the *Marseillians* were wanting in no point of Valour: But bearing in mind such Exhortations as a little before had been given them by their Friends, they fought so resolutely, as though they meant not to Fight again; or as if any one should chance to miscarry in that Battel, he should make account that he did but anticipate, for a small moment of time, the fatal end of his Fellow-Citizens, who (upon taking of the Town) were to undergo the same Fortune of War. Our Ships putting on by little and little, were glad to give way to the nimbleness and

Arles.




















and Mobility of their Shipping, which by the skill of their Pilots were well managed. And if it happened that our Men had found means to grapple with any of their Ships, they presently came on all sides to their rescue. Neither did the Albici shew themselves backward when the matter came to hands, or were they inferiour to our Men in Courage or Valour. Moreover, out of the lesser Ships were cast infinite numbers of Darts, and other Weapons, wherewith our Men busied in fight were suddenly wounded.

In this conflict, two of their Triremes having spied Brutus's Ship (which by her Flag might easily be discerned) came violently against him from two contrary parts: But the danger being foreseen, Brutus did so prevail through the swiftness of his Ship, that he a little out-stript them; whereby they coming with their full swinge, did so encounter one another, that they were both very much shaken with the blow: for the Beak-head of one being broken off, the Water was ready to come in on all sides. Which being observed by some of Brutus's party that were near about, they set upon them (being thus distressed) and quickly sunk them both.

The Ships that came with Nasidius were found of no use, and therefore quickly left the Fight; for there was not offered there unto them either the sight of their Country, or the Exhortations and Prayers of their Kinsfolks and Allies, as motives to hazard their lives in that Quarrel: so that of them there was none wanting. Of the Ships that came out from Marseilles, five were sunk, and four taken. One escaped with Nasidius's Fleet, which made towards the hither Spain. One of them that remained was sent before to Marseilles; who coming as a Messenger before the rest, and approaching near unto the Town, all the multitude ran out to hear the News: Which being once known, there was such a general mourning and desolation, as though the Town were instantly to be taken by the Enemy. Notwithstanding, they left not off to make ready such necessaries as were requisite for defence of the same.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS was the second Fight the Marseillians made, to keep the Sea open for the aid and relief of the Town; being otherwise streightly besieged by Land, and yet that was not so tenderly cared for as their shutting up by Sea; the free passage whereof brought in all their profit in time of Peace, and their succours in times of War: for which regard it was, that they commended to their Gods the success of that enterprise, with as much devotion, as Tears, Vows and Prayers could expresse.

The benefit a Town besieged receiveth from an open in-let by Sea, cannot be better manifested, than by the siege of Ostend; for by that occasion especially, it indured the most famous siege that was in Christendom these many years. This L. Nasidius was rather a constant Friend to the cause, than a fortunate Admiral: For afterwards, he refused not to take the like overthrow for Pompey the Son, at Leucades, as he did now for the Father. And surely it falleth out (whether it be through the uncertainty of Sea-faring matters, or that Men have fairer pretences at Sea, to avoid occasions of hazard, than are found at Land, or that *Pauca digna nascuntur in Mari*, few things of value come from Sea, according to the Proverb, or for what other cause, I know not) that there are few of those which sought Honour in this kind, who have attained the least part of their desires. And yet nevertheless, some there are of famous memory: As \* Barbarussa, a terroure of the Levant Seas; Andreas Auria, of Genua, renowned

for his great Exploits upon the Turk: together with divers of our own Nation; as namely, Sir Francis Drake, who for skill and fortune at Sea, is held matchable with any other whatsoever; besides, Mr. Candish, for Voyages to the South, and Sir Martin Frobisher, for discoveries to the North.

Howbeit, these later times have advantage without comparison of former ages, through the invention of the Sea-compass with the Needle; which was found out little more than three hundred years ago, by one Flavus, born in the Kingdom of Naples; without which, no Ship can shape a course in the Ocean, and to which nothing can be added, more than to find a perfect and ready direction for longitudes.

## CHAP. IV.

The Works which the Legionary Soldiers made against the Town,

IT was observed by the Legionary Soldiers, that Caesar had the charge of the right part of the Work, that it would much advantage them against the often Eruptions and Sallies of the Enemy, if they built a Tower of Brick under the Town Wall, instead of a Hold or Receptacle: which at first they made low and little, only for the repelling of sudden assaults. Thither they usually retreated: and from thence, if they were over-charged, they made defence, either by beating back, or prosecuting an Enemy. This Tower was thirty foot square, and the Walls thereof five foot thick: But afterwards (as Use and Experience is the master of all things) it was found by insight and industry of Men, that this Tower might be of great use, if it were raised to any height; which was accordingly performed in this fashion.

When it was raised to the height of a Story, they so framed the Floor, that the ends of the Joists did not jett out beyond the sides of the Tower; lest any thing might be thrust out, on which the fire which the Enemy should cast might take hold: and then paved that Floor, with as much Brick as the Mantellets and Gabions would suffer to be laid. Upon this Tarrace thus made, they laid cross Beams along the sides, as a foundation to an upper Story, for the top and covering of the Tower. And upon these Beams they raised cross Timbers, thwarting each other for the sides of the Tower, and coupled them at the top with side Beams.

These cross Timbers were longer, and bore further out than the Square of the Tower; that there might be means to fasten Coverings and Defences, against the blows and darts of the Enemy, whilst the Workmen were finishing the Walls and Sides of that Building. The top or upper Story of this Tower they likewise paved with Brick and Clay, that no fire might fasten on it; and laid Mattresses on the top thereof, to the end the Floor might not be broken with any Weapons shot out of Engines, nor the Pavent shivered in pieces with Stones cast out of Catapults.

Moreover they made three Nettings or Mats of Hawfers, equal in length to the sides of the Tower, and four foot in breadth. And upon those three sides which confronted the Enemy, they fastened them upon Poles to hang before the Tower: which kind of defence they had in other places tried to be of proof, and not to be pierced with any Weapon or Engine. And as one part of the Tower came to be covered, finished, and fortified against any violence of the Enemy, they carried their Mantellets and defences to the rest unfinished. The top of which

Dio Cassius.

Nihil tam capax fortuitorum quam Mare.  
Tacit. 14.  
Annal.

\* King of Algiers in the time of Solyman.



which Tower they framed upon the first Story, and then raised it up with *Wrinches* or *Scrues*, as far as the close *Netting* would serve them for a defence. And so covered with these shelters and safeguards, they built up the sides with *Brick*; and then again scruing up the top higher, they fitted the place to build the sides higher: And as they came to the height of a Story, they laid the *Joysts* of the Floor in such sort, as the ends thereof were hid and covered with the *Wall* or sides that were of *Brick*; and so from that Story they proceeded to another, by scruing up the top, and raising their *Netting*. By which means they built very safely six Stories, without any wound or other danger at all; and left *Windows* and *Loop-holes* in the sides, for the putting out of *Engines* in such places as they thought convenient. When by means of that Tower, they were in hope to defend the *Works* near about it, they then made a *Musculum* or *Moufe* of sixty foot in length, and of two foot *Timber square*, to convey them safely from this Tower of *Brick* to another of the *Enemies*, and to the *Town Wall*: whereof this was the form. They cut two side *Groundsils* of equal length, and made the space between them to contain four foot; upon them they erected little *Columns* of five foot high, and joyned them together, putting *Braces* of an easie sloping in such distances, as the *Rafters* were to be placed to bear up the *Roof*: and upon those *Braces* they laid *Rafters* of two foot square, fastening them both at the *Ridge*, and at the *Eavings*, with *Plates* and *Bolts* of *Iron*. They *Lathed* the *Roof* with *Lath* of four fingers broad: And so the Building being made with a *Gable-ridge* handsomly fashioned, the top was laid all over with *Clay*, to keep the *Moufe* from burning; and then covered with *Tiles*, which were fenced with *Leather*, to the end they might not be washed away with *Pipes* or *Gutters* of *Water*, which might be laid to fall upon them. And lest those *Hides* should be spoiled, either with *Fire* or great *Stones*, they laid *Mattresses* upon them.

This *Work* being wholly finished near unto the Tower, through the help and means of defensive *Mantelets* and *Gabions*; suddenly before the *Enemy* was aware, with a *Ship-Engine* and *Rollers* put under it, they brought it so near a Tower of the *Enemies*, that it joyned to the *Wall* thereof. The *Townsmen* being upon a sudden appalled thereat, brought the greatest *Stones* they could get, and with *Levers* tumbled them down from the *Wall* upon the *Moufe*: but the strength of the *Work* did not shrink at the blows, and whatsoever fell upon it, slid down the sloping of the *Roof*. Which when they perceived, they altered their purpose, and got *Pots* of *Rosin* and *Pitch*, and setting them on fire, threw them down upon the *Moufe*; which tumbling down from the *Roof*, were removed away with long *Hooks* and *Poles*. In the mean time, the *Soldiers* that were within the *Moufe*, pulled out the lower *Stones* that were in the foundation of the Tower. This *Moufe* or *Mantelet* was defended by our *Men* out of the *Brick Tower*, with *Weapons* and *Engines*: and by means thereof the *Enemy* was put from the *Wall* and the *Turrets*, so that they could not well defend the same. Many of the *Stones* being sapped out of the foundation of the Tower, part thereof suddenly fell, and the rest leaned as though it would not stand long after.

## OBSERVATION.

FORASMUCH as it requireth the labour of an industrious Pen to shadow out the effects of Industry; I will only produce the evidence of these Works, to shew the power it hath in humane actions, rather than by any maimed or shallow discourse, weaken the force of so great an Engine.

Wherein first it may be noted, how in these and the like attempting endeavours, one thing draws on another, according as practice maketh overture to *Maisteries*: For our understanding growing by degrees, hath no intuitive faculty to discern perfection, but by little and little worketh out exactness; making every *Morrow* *Yesterdays* *Scholar*, as *Reason* findeth means of discourse from causes to effects, or from effects to causes.

*Discipulus  
prioris posterius  
or dies.  
Aulus Gellius.*

And so this Tower, made at first but for a retreat of defence, gave occasion to let them see the like or better use thereof in the offensive part, if it were raised to a height convenient for the same: which they performed with as much Art as the wit of Man could use in such a Work. For having made the first Story, they then made the *Roof*, for the shelter and safety of the *Soldier*: And scruing it up by little and little, they built the sides, having fenced the open space with *Netting*, for avoiding of danger; arming it with *Brick* and *Clay* against *Fire*, and with *Mattresses* against *Stones* and *Weights*. And then again they proceeded to the making of that *Mantelet* or *Musculum*, which gave them passage to the *Wall*; building it with strong, or rather strange *Timber*, of two foot square, framed so artificially with *Braces*, and ridging *Rafters*, and those so fitted, as neither *Fire*, *Water*, *Weapon*, nor *Weight*, could prevail against it. And thus they laboured to gain their own ends, and bought *Fortune* with immeasurable endeavour.

## CHAP. V.

The *Marseillians* get a Truce of the *Romans*, and break it deceitfully.

THE *Enemy* being then much appalled at the sudden ruin and fall of the Tower, and greatly perplexed at so unexpected a mischief; and withal struck with a fear of the wrath and indignation of the Gods, and of the sack and spoil of their City; they came all unarmed, thronging out of the Gates, wearing *Holy Attire* upon their Heads, and stretching out their submissive Hands to the Legates and the Army. Upon which novelty, all Hostility ceased for the time, and the *Soldiers* withdrawing themselves from the assault, were carried with a desire of hearing and understanding what would pass at that time.

When they came to the Legates and to the Army, they cast themselves all down at their feet, praying and beseeching that things might be suspended until *Cæsar's* arrival. They saw plainly that their Town was already taken, their Works were perfected, their own Tower demolished; and therefore they desisted from making any further defence: There could be no let to hinder them from present spoil and sacking, if upon *Cæsar's* arrival they should refuse to obey his Mandates. They shewed further, that if their Tower were absolutely overthrown, the *Soldiers* could not be kept from entering the Town in hope of Pillage, and would thereby bring it to a final destruction.

These and many the like things were uttered by them very movingly (as Men learned and eloquent) with great lamentation and much weeping, whereby the Legates (moved with commiseration) withdrew the *Soldiers* from the Fortifications, put off the assault, and left a small Guard to keep the Works. A kind of Truce being through pity and commiseration thus made and concluded, *Cæsar's* coming was expected; no *Weapon* was cast, either from the *Town Wall*, or from our side: insomuch as every Man left off his care and diligence, as though all had been ended. For *Cæsar* had by Letters given straight charge to *Trebonius*,



bonus, not to suffer the Town to be taken by assault, lest the Soldiers (moved through their Rebellion and Contempt, together with the long Travail they had sustained) should put all above fourteen years of age to the Sword: which they threatned to do, and were then hardly kept from breaking into the Town; taking the matter very grievously, that Trebonius seemed to hinder them from effecting their purposes. But the Enemy, being People without faith, did only watch for time and opportunity, to put in practice their fraud and deceit.

### The First OBSERVATION.

*Vestitus ut  
regis corpus,  
ita detegit  
animum.*

*Æneid.*

*The Five and  
the Air.*

*Macro. lib. 1.  
Saturnal. c. 8.*

IT is a saying of an ancient Writer, that as our Attire doth cover the Body, so it doth uncover the nakedness of the mind. Whereupon it is, that Men have found means to sute themselves upon occasion, according to the disposition of their inward affections, as they are either dilated with joy, or contracted with sorrow, lifted up with weal, or humbled with affliction. And accordingly these *Marseillians*, in token of their humility and submission, came out, wearing an Attire here called *Infula*; which *Servius* describeth to be a kind of Coife, made after the form of a Diadem, with two Pendants on each side, called *Vitta*.

Those which the *Romans* used of this kind, were fashioned like a Pyramid: the point whereof did signifie the \* Elements, ascending upwards in such a pointed fashion; and by the two Pendants or Bands, were denoted the Water and the Earth. They were made wholly of Wooll, as *Festus* writeth, *Infula sunt filamenta lanæ, quibus Sacerdotes, hostiæ, & templa velabantur*; *Infula* are certain Ornaments and Tappets made of Wooll, wherewith the Priests use to be clad, the Sacrifices to be covered, and the Temples to be hanged: to shew humbleness and simplicity, whereof Wooll is an Hieroglyphick; for no kind of Beasts have more need of aid and succour than Sheep: And thereupon it was, that all Suppliants were attired with Tresses of Wooll. Or otherwise, as some will have it, that the Habit of the Petitioner might call to remembrance the flexible disposition, which is well-beseeming those that have power and means to give help and relief: according to the use of Heathen ages, wherein the Images of their Idols had their Feet tied with Cords of Wooll; to shew the mildness and easiness which upon devout supplications was found in divine Powers, whereof Wooll was a *Symbolum*.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

*Græca fide  
omnia agere.  
† Oratio pro  
Flacco.*

*Æqualis  
est utrorum-  
que dignitas,  
nisi præsens ne-  
cessitas unius  
conditionem  
nobiliorum  
efficiat. Tum  
enim is præ-  
ferendus, quem  
præsentia ma-  
gis exigunt,  
sicut Valens  
& Valens  
statuerunt L.  
in civilibus l.  
c. de offic.  
Vicari.*

*Ut in civilibus  
causis vicarii  
comitibus mil-  
litum antefere-  
rentur, in mi-  
litaribus nego-  
tiis comites  
vicarii.*

THE *Marseillians* being an ancient Progeny of the *Greeks*, notwithstanding the long descent of Time, and alteration of Air, did keep a touch of the natural disposition of that Nation, as well in such strains of Eloquence, as were familiar unto them above other People, as in \* subtilty and duplicity of dealing. Which passage of the *Marseillians* is observed by † *Tully*, as a matter enforcing the due praises of Eloquence, and the use it hath upon all occasions to draw consent, with the sweetness of a well-tuned Tongue, above that which may be attained either by Engines or a strong hand. Wherein, if we should go about to compare the \* force of Arms with the power of a grave Discourse, and set a Soldier parallel to an Orator, there might hence be taken divers probable Reasons to second that saying, which hath been thought to favour more of vain-glory, than of true judgment.

*Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea lingue;*  
Let Arms to Gowns, the Bay-leaf yield to th  
Tongue.

Or at least, to make a resemblance of *Plutarch's* two Wrastlers, of whom one being always cast, did nevertheless perswade the other that he cast him; and so, howsoever he became foiled, yet left the place with an opinion of Victory: And is always more easily effected, when it is attended with cunning and deceit, according to that of *Valerius Maximus*, *Efficacissima vires perfidiæ, mentiri & fallere*, The main strength of perfidiousness is lying and deceiving. But, as it is observed by *Philip de Comines*, The \* example of one sole accident, is sufficient to make many Men wise: So this may serve to teach succeeding times, not to trust to words, whereof there is no hold; but to ratifie such compositions with irrevocable performances.

*En los casos  
raros un solo  
exemplo, haze  
experiencia,  
Auto.  
Peret.*

### The Third OBSERVATION.

THirdly, we may note, how far the anger of a *Roman Army* was extended, upon such provocations as are here mentioned, viz. *Ad interficiendos pueros*, to the slaying of all the Males above fourteen years of age: For, from that stage of life, they accounted all in the rank of Men; according to the institution of *Tarquinius Priscus*, who in his triumph of the *Sabines*, made a special Oration in the praise of his own Son, that had assaulted and struck the Enemy in those Wars, being then but fourteen years of age; and thereupon gave him liberty to wear Man's Apparel, which was that *Toga prætexta* (edged or faced with Purple) whereof their Histories make so often mention.

*Macro. lib. 1.  
Saturn. cap. 6.*

But to define precisely hereof, were to mistake the fury of the Soldier. For howsoever the rule is certain from the Law of nature, that no finite cause can be infinite in effect, or that a mortal hate should have a boundless revenge: Yet occasion made it variable, and as irregular as that of *Alexander*; who sometimes saved all, and at other times (as at the taking of *Tyre*) saved none at all, but such as had taken the protection of the Temple. The inhumane cruelty of the *Turks* exceedeth all former Hostility in this kind: For they never save any out of commiseration, but for private use; and do rather chuse to destroy Mankind, than suffer it to live for any other purpose than their own.

*Quintus  
Cnr. lib. 5.*

## CHAP. VI.

The *Marseillians* taking advantage of the Truce, consume with fire all the *Roman Works*: which are afterwards re-edified.

AFTER a few days, when our Men were grown remiss and careless, suddenly about high Noon, as some were gone one way some another, and others wearied with continual labour had given themselves to rest, the Weapons being cased and laid up; they rushed out of their Gates, and coming with the Wind that then blew hard, they set our Works on fire: which was so carried and dispersed with the Wind, that the Mount, the Mantlets, the Testudo, the Tower and the Engines, were all on fire at once, and were burned down and consumed, before it could be known how it came.

*Cæsar.*

Our Men astonished at so sudden and unthought-of an accident; caught up such Weapons as were next at hand; and others running speedily from the Camp, set upon the Enemy, but were hindered from following them as they fled, by Engines and Arrows from the Town Wall. They, on the other side, being retired under the protection of the Wall, did at their ease



ease burn down the Mouse and the Brick Tower: and so many Months labour was, through the perfidiousness of the Enemy, and the force of the Tempest, consumed and brought to nothing in a moment of time. The Marseillians attempted the like the next day after, having opportunity of the like Tempest; and with greater confidence sallied out, and threw much fire upon the other Mount and the Tower. But as our Men the day before (expecting nothing less than to be surprized in that sort) had neglected more than ordinary their usual Guards; so being now made wiser by that which had happened, they had made all things ready for defence: by which means, having slain a great number, they drove the rest back into the Town, without effecting any thing.

Trebonius began again to re-edifie such Works as were ruined and consumed with fire, and that with greater alacrity of the Soldier than before. For when they saw their great labours and endeavours sort to no better success, and the Truce broke by the Treachery of the Enemy, it was a great gall unto them to have their Valour thus derided. And forasmuch as there was nothing left in all the Country for the raising of a Mount, all the Trees being already cut down, and brought far and near to make the first Mount, they began a Mount of a strange and unheard-of fashion, raised with two Side-walls of Brick, being six foot thick apiece, and joyned together with Floors. The Walls were of equal distance, to the width of the former Mount, which was all of solid matter: and where the space between the Walls, or the weakness of the Work did require it, there were Piles driven between, and Beams and Planks laid athwart for the strengthening thereof. The Floors, made between those Walls, were laid with Hurdles, and the Hurdles were covered with Clay.

The Solace being thus sheltered on both sides with a Wall, and defended in front by Mantelets and Gabions, did safely, without danger, bring whatsoever was necessary for that Building, whereby the Work was carried on with great speed: and the loss of their former continual labour was in a short time recovered again, through the admirable dexterity and valour of the Soldier. To conclude, they left Gates in the Walls, in such places as were fittest for Sallies.

When the Enemy perceived, that what they hoped could not be repaired again in a long time, was with a few days labour re-edified and finished, whereby there was no place left to practise deceit, or to sally out with advantage, neither was there any means left by which they could prevail, either by force of Arms to hurt our Soldiers, or by fire to consume our Works; and understanding likewise, that by the same manner of fortification, all that part of the Town which had passage and access from the firm Land, might be encompassed with a Wall and with Towers, that their Soldiers should not be able to stand upon their Works; and perceiving withal, that our Army had raised a Counter-mure, against the Wall of their Town, and that Weapons might be cast by hand unto them; that the use of their Engines (wherein they much trusted) was by the nearness of space quite taken away; and lastly, that they were not able to confront our Men (upon equal terms) from their Walls, and from their Turrets; they descended to the same Articles of surrender and submission, as were formerly agreed upon.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that a General cannot be too secure of an Enemy, that stands upon terms to surrender up a place. For the action being but voluntary by constraint, if haply the constraining force be removed, then that doth cease which is voluntary; and so it cometh by consequent

to a refusal. As appeareth by this passage of the Marseillians; who being brought into hard terms, as well by their two overthrows at Sea, (whence they expected no further succour,) as also by the siege laid so close by Land, (where they were so violently assaulted, that their Towers of defence made passage for the Romans to enter upon them;) did nevertheless (upon cessation of those inforcements) alter their purpose, and entertained new hopes: which maketh good that saying;

— Timeo Danaos & dona ferentes,

I fear the Greeks, even when they bring their gifts.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe that a will, forward to undergo labour, doth never stick at any difficulty, nor is at all dismayed with the loss of any pains: but is rather redoubled in Courage and Industry; especially being edged on with a desire of Revenge. Which (if Homer may have credit) doth always add a third part to a Man's strength; as appeared by Diomedes, being hurt in the Shoulder with one of Pindarus's Arrows: For revenge whereof, he exceeded himself in a sesquiterce proportion of Valour, and slew more Trojans by a third part than otherwise he could.

Howsoever, as there is nothing so hard, but is subject to the endeavour of the Mind: so there is nothing so easie, as to dispossess our selves of that intent care which is requisite in these employments. For these Romans, that through the greatness of their Spirits had made such first and second works, as the memory thereof will last with the World, were surprized when they lay in the Interim, as it were unbent, in as great remissness and neglect (howsoever drawn unto it by deceit) as if they had been able to do no such matter as is here reported. And therefore it behoveth a Commander, to keep his Army always seasoned with labour; forasmuch as *Exercitus labore proficit, otio consenescit*. An Army thrives by Employment, but grows old by Idleness.

#### CHAP. VII.

Varro raiseth great Troops to maintain Pompey's Party in Spain; but to no purpose.

Marcus Varro, in the further Province of Cæsar. Spain; having from the beginning understood how things had passed in Italy, and distrusting how matters would succeed with Pompey, did oftentimes give out very friendly Speeches of Cæsar: That Pompey had by way of prevention gained him to his Party, and honoured him with a Lieutenantcy, whereby he was obliged in duty to him; howbeit, in his particular disposition he stood no less affected to Cæsar: Neither was he ignorant of the duty of a Legate, to whose trust and fidelity the Government of the Province was left, as in deposito, upon condition to be surrendered up at all times and seasons, as he that commanded in chief should require it: He likewise knew very well what his own Forces were, and what was the affection and disposition of all the Country towards Cæsar.

This was the subject of all his Speeches, without any shew of inclining either to the one or to the other. But afterwards, when he heard that Cæsar was engaged at Marseilles, that Petreius's Forces were joined with Afranius's Army, that great aids were come unto them; that every Man was in great hope and expectation of good success, and that all the hither Province had agreed together to undertake Pompey's cause; as also what had after happened concerning the want of Victuals at Ilerda, (all which things were writ with advantage unto him by Afranius;)

Est ita natura comparatum, ut homines moleste, supra quam dici possit, ferant, si videant rerum eventus virtuti non respondere. Paus. in Misse.

Voluntas ad laborem propensa, cuncta vincere & superare consuevit. Polyænus. Iliad. 5.

Nihil tam arduum, quod animi fortitudine superari non possit. Appian. de bello Hispanico.

Vegetius.

Qui fiduciariam operam obtinebat.



Afranius ; ) he then upon that alteration changed his Mind according to the Times, and levied Soldiers in all Parts of the Province : And having raised two compleat Legions, he added unto them some thirty Cohorts of the Country Soldiers, to serve for Wings to the Army, and gathered together great quantity of Corn, as well for the supply of the Marseilians, as for the Provision of Petreius and Afranius.

Moreover, he commanded them of Gades to build and provide ten Gallies ; and ordered further, that many other should be made at Hispalis. He took all the Money, and the Ornaments out of Hercules's Temple, and brought the same into the Town of Gades, and in lieu thereof sent six Cohorts out of the Province to keep the Temple. He made Caius Gallonius ( a Roman Knight and a familiar friend of Domitius, and sent by him thither to recover some matter of Inheritance ) Governour of the Town. All the Arms ( as well private as publick ) were brought into Gallonius's House. He himself made many bitter invectives against Cæsar ; affirming in publick that Cæsar had been several times worsted, and that a great number of the Soldiers were revolted from him, and were come to Afranius : which he knew to be true, by certain and approved Messengers.

The Roman Citizens residing in that Province being much perplexed and affrighted thereat, were thereupon constrained to promise him 190 thousand Sesterces in ready Money, for the service of the Common-Weal, besides twenty thousand weight of Silver, together with one hundred and twenty thousand Bushels of Wheat. Upon those Cities and States which favoured Cæsar's Party, he laid greater impositions : For such as had let fall Speeches, or declared themselves against the Common-Weal, he confiscated all their Goods, and put a Garrison upon them ; giving judgment himself upon private Persons, and constraining all the Province to swear Allegiance to him and to Pompey.

And being in the end advertised what had happened in the hither Province, he prepared for War, with a purpose to dispose thereof in this manner : His resolution was to keep two Legions with him at Gades, with all the shipping and the Corn : For knowing that the whole Province did intirely affect Cæsar's Cause, he thought it best and easiest for him ( having made good Provision of shipping and Corn ) to keep the Island.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**O**bserve first, how dangerous it is for such as stand neutral between two Parties ( bearing no affection but to their own ends ) to declare themselves, upon such appearances as commonly happen in the flux and reflux of a War : For if their judgment fail as Varro's did, they are then forced to redeem their Errour with more offices of partiality, than can afterwards be excused ; and so run into a further degree of enmity, than the party for whom they suffer. And certainly whether it be that neutrality refuseth to take part with the right, ( which in matter of controverfie must needs stand on one side, ) or whether it favoureth of an ill nature, to shew no sympathizing affections with such as otherwise have correspondence with them, or for what other cause I know not ; but sure it is, that Neutrals, attending nothing but their own advantage, are of no better esteem than the Bird whereof *Leo Africanus* writeth ; which when the King of Birds demanded Tribute, would always rank himself amongst the Fish, and when the King of Fishes required his service, would always be with the Birds ; or than the Weathercock, whereof there is no other use, than *indicare regnantem*, to shew what Wind rules.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**T**he Island of Gades, was known to the Romans by the name of Tartessus :

*Hic Gades Urbs est dicta Tartessus prius.*

*Festus Anienus.*

Here Gades stands, of old Tartessus call'd.

The Town of Gades was endowed, as *Dion* witnesseth by *Julius Cæsar*, with the Liberties and Privileges of Rome. To which effect *Pliny* writeth ; *Oppidum habet Civium Romanorum, quod appellatur Augusta Urbs Julia Gaditana*, This Island hath a Town of Roman Citizens, which is called *Augusta Julia Gaditana*. It was a Town of great Fame, as appeareth by that of *Juba* King of *Mauritana*, who made ambitious sute, to have the title of *Duumviri*, or two Men of the Town ; as *Festus* noteth in his Description of the Sea-Coast :

*Lib. 41.*

*At vis in illis tanta, vel tantum decus,  
Ætate prisca, sub fide rerum fuit ;  
Rex ut superbus, omniumque præpotens,  
Quos Gens habebat forte tum Maurusia,  
Octaviano Principi acceptissimus,  
Et literarum semper in studio, Juba,  
Interfluoque separatus Æquore,  
Illustriorem semet Urbis istius  
Duumviratu crederet ———*

Such was their Power, such their grace,  
Of old, while faith was yet in place ;  
King *Juba*, the most powerful Prince  
The Moors had either then or since,  
In favour with *Octavian*,  
And every way a learned Man,  
Divided from this place by Sea.  
Thought it would greater Glory be  
To be *Duum-vir* of the Town.

In this Island stood *Hercules's* Temple ; to which as well *Romans*, as other noble Adventurers of all Nations, made often repair, to perform their Vows upon Atchievements of deeds of Arms ; Which solemnity was not omitted by *Hannibal*, before his expedition into *Italy*.

Amongst other Altars in this Temple, there was one dedicated to *Penury* and *Art* ; signifying that *Art* driverth away *Penury*, as *Hercules* put to flight and subdued Monsters. Those of *Asia* and the *Mediterrane* Parts, took this Island to be the furthest end of Navigation : For the *Atlantick* Sea admitted no further Passage, for want of a Loadstone to direct them in that Vastness. And therefore *Pindarus* saith, that it is not lawful for wise Men nor Fools to know what is beyond the streight of *Gibraltar*, the Way in the Ocean being a thousand Leagues broad. In this Town of Gades was born *L. Cornelius Balbus*, who at his death gave a Legacy to the Roman People, twenty five Pence per Poll ; together with *Junius Brutus Collumella*, that writ so excellently *De re Rustica*.

*Josephus Acofta hath observed that the Sea hath no Part above one thousand Leagues from the Land.*

*Et mea quam generat Tartessi Littore Gades.*

And which my Gades yields on *Tartess's* Shore. It is now called *Cales*, and was sacked by our English, *An. 1596*.

*Hispalis*, furnrmed *Romulensis*, from the Roman Colony that was planted there, is seated upon the River *Bætis*, in a very pleasant and fertile Country, and especially for Oiles. The Town is now the Staple for the West Indies, and a very Nursery of Merchants. *Arias Montanus*, that great Theologian, was born in this City.

*Hispalis. Seville.*



## The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning these hundred and ninety thousand Sesterces, the Learned cannot satisfy themselves with any congruent interpretation thereof. For if we take them in the Neuter, for seven Pound ten Shillings apiece, it amounteth to 1492000 Pound, which is thought too much: If in the Masculine, it will rise not to above 1400 Pound, which is deemed too little. and therefore the Criticks do mend the place and read *H-S Centies Nonagies*, a hundred times ninety *H-S*. which bringeth out 142500 Pound: And is thought agreeable to the meaning of the Authour.

## C H A P. VIII.

The Province and the Legions Revolt from Varro.  
Cæsar settleth Spain, and returneth to Marseilles.

Cæsar.

**A**lbeit Cæsar was called back into Italy, for many great and important Causes, yet he was resolved to leave no spark or appearance of War remaining behind him in Spain; for that he knew Pompey's Deferts to be such, as had gained him many Followers and Dependants in the hither Province. And therefore having sent two Legions into the further Spain, under the Conduct of Q. Cassius, Tribune of the People, he himself made forward by great Journeys, with six hundred Horse; sending an Edict before him, to summon the Magistrates and Chief Men of the Cities and Towns, to appear before him by a day at Corduba. Upon publication of which Edict, there was no City in all that Province, that sent not some of their Senate by the Day appointed to Corduba: Neither was there any Roman Citizen of note that presented not himself there at that time.

The Princes and States being assembled, of their own accord they shut the Gates against Varro, set Watch and Ward upon the Walls and in the Towers, and retained with them two Cohorts, called by the name of *Colonicæ* (which came thither by chance) for the safe keeping of the Town. At the self-same time, the Inhabitants of Carmona (which is the strongest Town of all the Province) cast out the three Cohorts that were by Varro put into their Cittadel, and shut them out of the Town. Whereby Varro was the rather moved to make haste to Gades with his Legions, lest he should be hindered and cut off, either in the way, or in his Passage over from the Continent: Such and so favourable was the General affection of the whole Province towards Cæsar. And being somewhat advanced on his Journey, he received Letters from Gades, That, as soon as it was known there of the Edict which Cæsar had published, the chiefeft of the Gaditans agreed with the Tribunes of the Soldiers which were in Garrison, to expell Gallonius out of the Town, and to keep the City and the Island for Cæsar. Which being resolved upon, they sent him Word to leave the Town of his own accord, while he might do it without danger; and if he refused they would then take such further Order as they should find expedient. Gallonius moved with fear dislodged himself, and went out of Gades.

These things being divulged abroad, one of the two Legions, known by the name of *Vernacula*, took up their Ensigns, went out of Varro's Camp (he himself standing by and looking on) and retired themselves to Hispalis; and there sate down in the Market-Place, and in common Porches, without hurting any Man. Which the Roman

Citizens of that Convent did so well like of, that every Man was very desirous to entertain them in their Houses. Whereat Varro being much astonished, altered his Journey towards Ilipa Italica, as he gave it out; but soon after was advertised by some of his Friends, that the Gates were shut against him. Whereupon, being circumvented and hindered from all other addresses, he sent to Cæsar, to advertise him that he was ready to deliver up the Legion to whomsoever he should please to appoint. To which purpose he sent him Sex. Cæsar, commanding the Legion to be delivered to him.

Varro having given up his charge, came to Cæsar at Corduba, and there gave him a true account of the Carriage of his Office. The Moneys remaining in his Hands he delivered up, and gave an Inventory of the Corn and Shipping which were in any Place provided. Cæsar, by a publick Oration made at Corduba, gave thanks generally to all Men. As first to the Roman Citizens, for the endeavour they used to be Masters of the Town. Secondly, to the Spaniards, for driving out the Garrisons. To them of Gades, that they traversed and prevented the Projects of the Adversaries, and had restored themselves to liberty. To the Tribunes of the Soldiers and Centurions, that were come thither to keep the Town, for that by their Valour and Magnanimity the Resolution of the Townsmen was assured and confirmed. He remitted such Levies of Money, as the Roman Citizens had promised Varro for the publick Service. He restored the Goods confiscated of such as had spoken more freely than was pleasing; and gave divers Rewards both publick and private: The rest he satisfied with hope of good Time for the future. And having stayed there two Days, he went to Gades: Where he gave order that the Moneys and Monuments which were transferred from Hercules's Temple to a private House, should be carried back again to the Temple. He made Q. Cassius Governour of the Province, and left with him four Legions. He himself in a few Days space, with those Ships which M. Varro, and those of Gades (by his Commandment) had made, came to Tarraco; for there the Embassadors of almost all the hither Province did attend his coming. And having received them with private and publick honour, in the same fashion as formerly he had used, he left Tarraco, and came by land to Narbone, and from thence to Marseilles: Where he received first advertisement of the Law made at Rome, for creating of a Dictator; and that himself was named thereunto, by M. Lepidus, Prætor.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**I**T is one of Cæsar's Peculiar, recorded by Suetonius, that he never left behind him any spark or suspicion of War, lest it might be said he did not thoroughly conquer where he came. For he that doth a business to halves, hath as much more to do before it be done: And the remainder in matter of War, groweth commonly to a greater head than that which first gave occasion of Arms; like Fire which is smothered for a time, to break out afterwards with greater Fury. And therefore that he might not be thought to provoke an Enemy rather than subdue him, he neglected all occasions, how important soever, which might draw him into Italy; to the end he might settle Spain in a Peace answerable to an absolute Victory. Which he easily effected, having over-mastered the chiefeft of the Party, and turned their Troops out of the Country, as Men altogether mistaken in the matter. The Fame whereof so prevailed with the rest, that rather than they would stand out, they forsook their Com-



Commanders. And having thus removed all occasions of force, he then proceeded to take away all doubtfulness, which might accompany a new reconcilement, by shewing such respects as well becomed ancient desert.

For first, he made a publick acknowledgement of their general love and affection towards him: And then taking notice of particular Services, engaged them further with Honours and Rewards; righted such as were oppressed by the Adverse Party; remitted all Levies and Taxations (to shew the difference between his and the Enemies favour) and filled all Men with hope of good Times: As knowing that fair words, accompanied with large Promises, are powerful Instruments to work out whatsoever is desired. And so he took a little more time to settle those Provinces without further trouble; as believing in the Proverb, that *What is well done, is twice done.*

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

*M. Varro* here mentioned, made more profession of Knowledge and Arts, than any other of his Nation, being thereupon stiled by the name of *Doctus* or Learned; and yet in the judgment of Learned Philosophers, was fitter to Persuade than to Teach. *Tully* being deprived of publick Offices, handled Philosophy a little in his own Language: *Pliny* and *Seneca*, less than *Varro* or *Tully*. But what are these to *Aristotle* or *Plato*? Or rather, what hath Learning to do with a Roman General? Whose Knowledge consisted in their Military Discipline, and in the powerful means of Victorious endeavour. Wherein *Varro* was as Ignorant, as was *Don Raimundus*, the Eleventh King of *Arragon*, in managing of Arms; who taking his Sword in one hand, and his Buckler in the other, held the Horse Bridle in his Teeth. Howbeit, if *Qui minus facit, minus peccat*, He that does least, offends least, were a good Excuse, it were fitting to make him blameless, that deserved so well of Learning above all others of that Empire. But forasmuch as his Actions appear so far inferiour to that which is conceived of his Understanding, let that be acknowledged which is true, that *Considerate agere pluris est, quam cogitare prudenter*; Considerate Action is more worth, than wise thinking.

Jamblich.  
cap. 4.

Cicero, lib. I.  
de officiis.

Ilipe Italica.

This *Ilipe Italica* was the chief Town of the *Turdetani* in *Andaluzia*; and is conjectured by the Ruines yet remaining, to stand over against *Seville*.

Tarraco, aliter Julia victrix.

Lib. 4. cap. 20.

*Tarraco* is that which is now called *Tarragon*; a Colony of *Scipio's* planting, whereof the Province taketh Appellation; which is extended (as *Pliny* witnesseth) from *Catalonia* to *Navarre* and *Castile*, along the *Alpes*. *Blaise de Vigenere* reporteth, that in the Year 516. there was a Council held at *Tarraco* by ten Bishops; wherein it was decreed, that *Sunday* should always begin presently after Evening Prayer (or their Vespers) on the *Saturday*. From whence it is, that the *Spaniards* do not work at all after that time; and do Eat upon *Saturdays* at Supper, the Head, the Feet, and the Entrails of such Fleth as is killed in the Shambles (together with other pretty Bits which they call *Morsillas*) without Prohibition or scruple of Conscience. In this Town of *Tarraco* was born *Paulus Orosius*, that Noble Orator.

Corduba.

*Corduba*, otherwise called *Colonia Patricia*, was held the next of worth and dignity to *Seville*; but for excellent Wits to be preferred above all the Towns of *Spain*: For here first were born the two *Seneca's*, the Father, the Rhetorician, and the Son, the Philosopher; together with their

Kinsman, *Annaeus Lucanus*, the Divine Poet, of whom *Martial* writeth;

*Duosque Senecas, unicumque Lucanum  
Facunda loquitur Corduba.*

One *Lucan* and two *Seneca's*  
Brave *Corduba* doth shew.

Besides of later Times, *Avenzoar*, *Avicenna*, and *Averrois*, as excellent a Philosopher, as the other was a Physician: of whose Works

——— *Fama loquetur Anus.*  
——— Fame when she's old will speak.

And from hence come those *Cordovan* Skins, so much in request.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning the Office of a Dictator, whereunto *Cæsar* was named by the Prætor *Lepidus*, we are to observe, that the Dictatorship was the greatest place of Dignity in their Government, as *Polybius* noteth. The Consuls, saith he, having each of them but twelve Lictors apiece, that carried bundles of Rods before them, as Ensigns of Magistracy, the Dictator had always twenty four; to shew that the Sovereign Power divided between the two Consuls, was then reduced to one sole Command. The occasions of establishing a Dictator were divers; howbeit, it was commonly to take order in some great matter of consequence, which fell out to be extraordinary, and required the Command of one Man. And as it is in the Fasti or Records of the Capitol, either *Reipub. regend. causa*, to govern the Commonwealth, as was this first Dictatorship of *Cæsar*: Or otherwise, *M. Fabius Ambustus Dict. seditionis sedandæ causa*, *M. Fab. Amb.* was created Dictator to quiet a Sedition; and at another time, *Cn. Quintius Varus Dictator, clavi figendi causa*, to strike in the Nail; which was one of the Superstitions they used in time of Pestilence, and so divers the like. Of all which there is this form expressed by *Tully*; *Si quando duellum gravius, discordiæ civium crescunt, unus ne amplius sex menses, nisi senatus decreverit, idem juris quod duo consules teneto, isque ave sinistra dictus Magister Populi esto*: If at any time either a great quarrel happen, or discord arise amongst the Citizens, then let one Man have the same Power that the two Consuls have, for six Months, and no longer, unless the Senate shall otherwise decree; and let this Man (in an ill hour) be termed the Master of the People.

De legibus.

But forasmuch as *Magister Populi* was a harsh and odious name to the People, they called him by a more modest name, *Dictator*: whereof *Varro* giveth this reason, *Dictator quod à Consule dicebatur, cujus dicto audientes omnes essent*; He was called Dictator because he was named to that Office by the Consul, whose Orders they were all to be obedient to. And as none could name a Dictator but the Consul, (for *Cæsar* was named by the Prætor in an extraordinary time;) so none could be named to that place, but such as were or had been Consuls: *Consulares legere ita lex jubebat de Dictatore creando lata*; the Law for the creating a Dictator commands to choose consular Men only. To which may be added, the circumstance of Time, which was always in the Night; *Nocte deinde silenti, ut mos est, Papirium Dictatorem dixit*, he named *Papirius* to the Dictatorship (as the custom is) in the dead of the Night. The Dictator had sovereign Power, but limited for time, which was commonly six Months; where-

Livy, lib. 2.



i. Philip.

whereby they are specially distinguished from Monarchs: And thereupon Cicero adjudgeth Sylla's Dictatorship to be a meer Tyranny, and so doth Plutarch Cæsar's; because both were prorogued beyond the time prescribed by the Law. Cæsar held this Dictator's Place but eleven days, and then left it off: But afterwards had it for his Life, and so came to be stiled *Dictator perpetuus*, perpetual Dictator.

## CHAP. IX.

The Marseillians give up the Town.

Cæsar.

Vetere Panico.

**T**He Marseillians being much oppressed, and almost worn out with all sorts of inconveniences, brought to an extream exigent of Victual, Defeated and Overthrown in two Fights at Sea, broken and cut in pieces oftentimes in their Sallies out, afflicted with a grievous Pestilence through long shutting up and alteration of Diet (for they lived of nothing but of old Panick and musty Barly, which was long before laid up in publick for this purpose;) their Tower being Overthrown, and a great part of their Wall down, out of hope of any succours from the Provinces, or of other Armies, which they knew were come into the hands and power of Cæsar; they seriously determined (without fraud) to give up the Town. But a few days before, L. Domitius understanding their Resolution having got three Ships (whereof two he assigned to his familiar Friends, the third he took himself, and taking the opportunity of a troublesome Storm) put to Sea: Which being perceived by the Ships that by Brutus's Commandment did continually guard the Mouth of the Haven, they weighed their Anchors, and made after them, Notwithstanding, that wherein Domitius was held on her course, and by the help of the foul Weather got out of sight. The other two being afraid of our Ships, returned back into the Haven.

The Marseillians, according as was commanded, brought their Arms and Engines out of the Town, drew forth their Shipping, both out of their Haven and their Arsenals, and delivered up their publick Treasure. Which things being accomplished and performed, Cæsar willing to save them, rather for the name and antiquity of the Town, than for any Merit of theirs, left two Legions there for a Garrison, and sent the rest into Italy. He himself took his way towards Rome.

## OBSERVATION.

**H**ence we may observe, That when Men refuse to be led by reason, as the best means to guide them to convenient ends, they are commonly constrained by the commanding Warrant of Necessity, to undergo the same thing upon harder Conditions. As it happened to the Marseillians, who not regarding the Army then present, and ready to take a strict account of their Answers (which with good excuse doth command a neutral State) chose rather to be shut up with a Siege, that of all Miseries is accounted the worst; and therein so carried themselves, as they left no Stone unremoved to make good their refusal: But for want of better helps, brought their Fraud to play a part, to their greater disadvantage. And if the Conqueror had not took all occasions to shew his Clemency, they might happily have paid dear for their contempt. But where either desert or other Motives wanted, there *nomen & vetustas*, their Name and Antiquity was sufficient to make Cæsar constant to his

own ends: Which, as near as the course wherein he was engaged would afford him, were always levelled at the general applause of his Actions; taking that to be no little help to work himself into the sovereignty of the State: Observing it the rather in cases of great and happy success, which are ever more restrained than lesser Fortunes. Howsoever, it cannot be denied but that Clemency is a property of excellent Honour: Which Cæsar shewed in saving the Town.

In maxima fortuna, minima licentia est. Salust. Servare proprium est excellentis fortuna. Seneca de clement. lib. 1.

## CHAP. X.

Curio transporteth two Legions into Africk.

**A**Bout the same time, C. Curio set Sail from Sicily to pass into Africk: And making no account at all of Actius Varus's Forces, he carried with him but two Legions of the four which were delivered him by Cæsar, together, with five hundred Horse. And after he had been at Sea two Days and three Nights, he arrived at a place called Aquilaria, distant twenty two Miles from Clupea; where there is a very commodious Road for Ships in Summer, sheltered on each side with two large and eminent Promontories. L. Cæsar, the Son, attended his coming at Clupea with ten Gallies; which being taken from the Pirates in the late Wars, and laid a ground at Utica, were repaired and new trimmed by Varus: But being afraid of the great number of his Ships, he forsook the Sea, and ran his Gally on Shore; and leaving her there, fled by Land on Foot to Adrumetum, a Town kept by Confidius Longus, having one Legion only in Garrison.

The rest of Cæsar's Navy, seeing their Admiral fly away, put into Adrumetum. M. Rufus the Treasurer pursued him with twelve Ships, which Curio had brought with him out of Sicily, to waft the Ships of Burthen; and finding the Gally left upon the Sand, he Towed her off, and returned to Curio with his Navy. Curio sent Marcus before with the Ships to Utica; and he himself set forward thither by Land with the Army, and in two days Journey came to the River Bagrada; where he left C. Caninius Rebilus, the Legate, with the Legions, and went himself before with the Cavalry, to view a place called Cornelius's Camp, which was held very fit and convenient to Encamp in, being a direct ridge of a Hill, shooting out into the Sea, steep and broken on each side, and yet shelving by a little more gentle descent on that side which was next Utica, being distant from thence (if the nearest way were taken) a little more than a Mile. But in that shortest cut there rose a Spring, in that part which was furthest off from the Sea, and so made a Marish or Bog; which whosoever would avoid, must fetch a compass of six Miles to go to the Town.

A view being taken of this place, Curio beheld afar off Varus's Camp, joyning to the Town-Wall, at the Gate called Bellica, marvellously Fortified through the strong situation of the Place, having the Town on the one side, and a Theatre which stood before the Town on the other; and by reason of the great Circuit of building which it contained, made a narrow and difficult passage to the Camp. He observed further, great store of Carriages, which by reason of this suddain Alarm, were brought out of the Country towards the Town: For the intercepting whereof he sent the Cavalry. And at the same instant, Varus likewise had sent out of the Town, 600 Numidian Horse, and 400 Foot, which King Juba, (a few days before) had sent to Utica, for the strengthening of that Party. This Prince had

ac-

Ultimum & durissimum telum, necessitas.

Omnium maxime miserabile, claudii obsidione. Egeippus.

Qua se Bagrada lentus agit sicca sulcator arenæ. Luc. lib. 4.



acquaintance with Pompey, by reason that his Father lodged with him, and bare a spleen to Curio, for the Law which he preferred when he was Tribune of the People, for the confiscation of Juba's Kingdom. The Cavalry on either side met together, and the Numidians were not able to abide the Charge of our Men; but about an hundred and twenty being slain, the rest betook themselves back to the Camp at the Town.

In the mean time, upon the arrival of our Gallies, Curio commanded it to be proclaimed, that such Victuallers and Ships of Burthen as were in the Bay at Utica (being in number about two hundred) and would not presently come to the Cornelian Camp, should be held and taken for Enemies. At which Proclamation, upon an instant of time, they all weighed Anchor, and came to the place whither they were commanded: Whereby the Army abounded with all necessary Provisions. This being done, he returned to the Camp at Bagrada; and by the acclamation of the whole Army, was saluted by the name of Imperator.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter beginneth with the third part of this Book, containing Curio's passage into Africk: Concerning whom it is to be observed, that in the beginning of these Broils, no Man was more Enemy to Cæsar, nor made more bitter Invectives to the People against him, than he did in his Tribuneship; but afterwards he fell off, and was gained by the voluptuous Inticements of M. Antony, together with a huge mass of Money which Cæsar sent him. Whereupon he played the Turn-Coat, and with might and main assisted that Party; prevailing much with the Commonalty by his eloquent and persuasive Speeches; the lively force whereof is able to stir up affection in Stones. For which cause it is, that \* Velleius Paterculus noteth, That no Man brought a more burning or dangerous Fire-brand to the kindling of those Civil Wars, than did Curio; being a Man of an excellent Discourse, audacious, prodigal of his own and of other Mens, subtle, ingenious, extream Vitious, and always well-spoken, to the ruine of the Publick-Weal. Which sweetness of words came unto him by Inheritance, as Pliny witnesseth; *Una familia Curionum, in qua tres continua serie oratores extiterunt*; In the one Family of the Curiones there were three noted Orators one after another. Of whose monstrous Prodigality the same Author hath made a very large Account. And out of these over-weaning Humours it was, that he became so unwary as to divide his Army; neglecting the Enemy, and the variableness of War, which altereth as the Moon, and keepeth no constant shape whereby it may be known. Concerning the dismembring of an Army lightly, and upon heedless Rashness, Cyrus giveth grave Advice, in the beginning of the sixth Book of Xenophon. To which (for the present) I refer the Reader.

Clupea was a Town in Africk, named by Pliny, *Oppidum liberum*, or a free Town, and seated upon the Promontory of Mercury, in the Territories of old Carthage. It was so called, because it carried the form of a Target retorted; and for the same cause it was called *Aspis*:

In Clypei speciem curvatis turribus Aspis.

Aspis with Turrets bowing like a Shield.

This Promontory, which Curio chose to Encamp

in, was famous for three things. First, It was reputed the place where *Antæus* the Gyant dwelt, which *Hercules* slew, by strangling him in his Arms, that he might not touch the Earth, from which it is said he received fresh strength. Secondly, P. Cornelius Scipio, that subdued Africk, made that place his chief Camp of strength: And so it came to be called *Cornelius's Camp*. And lastly, for this Expedition which Curio made, to lose two Legions and himself withal, as unwilling to see the Morrow, after such a loss; for, *Vita est avidus, quisquis non vult, mundo secum pereunte, mori*; He loves Life indeed, that is not willing to die when the World falls.

Seneca Trag.

## CHAP. XI.

Curio marcheth to Utica. His Cavalry put to Flight great Troops coming from King Juba. His Army strangely possessed with an idle fear.

THE next day he brought his Army to Utica, Cæsar. and Encamped himself near unto the Town. But before the Fortification of his Camp was finished, the Horsemen that stood Centinel gave notice of great Forces of Horse and Foot, coming towards Utica, from King Juba: And at the same time a great Dust was seen rise in the Air, and presently the first Troops began to come in sight. Curio astonished at the Novelty of the thing, sent his Horse before, to sustain the first shock, and to stay them: He himself calling the Legions with all speed from their Work, Embattelled his Army. The Cavalry encountering with the Enemy (before the Legions could be well unfolded and put in order) did put to flight all the King's Forces that came marching without fear or Order; and slew a great number of the Foot Troops; but the Horse, making hast, got almost all safe into the Town, by the way of the Sea-shore. The next Night after two Centurions of the Nation of the Marfi fled from Curio with twenty two of their Soldiers to Actius Varus.

These Centurions, whether it were to please Varus, or otherwise speaking as they thought (for what Men wish, they easily believe; and what they think they hope others do think the same;) did confidently affirm, that the Minds of the whole Army were altogether alienated from Curio; and that it was very expedient that the Armies should come in sight, and find means to speak together. Varus being persuaded to that Opinion, the next day, early in the Morning, drew his Legions out of the Camp: The like did Curio; either of them putting their Forces in Order, upon a small Valley which lay between both their Armies.

There was in Varus's Army one Sex. Quintilius Varus, who (as it is formerly declared) was at Corfinium; and being let go by Cæsar, went into Africk. It fortuned that Curio had carried over those Legions, which Cæsar had formerly taken at Corfinium: So that a few Centurions being slain, the Companies and Maniples remained the same. This occasion being so fitly offered, Quintilius (going about Curio's Army) began to beseech the Soldiers that they would not forget the first Oath they had taken to Domitius, and to him their Treasurer; nor bear Arms against them, that had run the same Fortune, and endured the same Siege; nor Fight for those who (by way of Reproach) had called them Fugitives. To these he added some Promises, to put them in hope of a good Recompence, out of his own Liberality, if they would follow him and Actius.

Having delivered this unto them, Curio's Army stood Mute, and declared not themselves by any

Eleganti oratione, copiantur auditores: Ornata enim oratio vel lapidem movere posset. Epict. Arrian. lib. 3. cap. 23. Lib. 2.

Lib. 7. cap. 41.

Lib. 36. c. 15.

Nimis confidens incautus est. Joseph. lib. 1. cap. 4. de bello Judaico.

Sil. Ital.



any sign, either one way or other: And so either side drew back to their Camp. Notwithstanding, Curio's Camp was afterwards possessed with a great Fear and suspicion: Which was quickly augmented, by divers Reports raised upon the same. For every Man forged Opinions and Conceits; and out of his own Fear, added something to that which he had heard of another. Which when it was spread from one Authour to many, and one had received it from another, it seemed there were many Authours of the same thing. For Civil War is always compounded of such Men, as hold it lawful to do and follow what and whom they please.

Nulla fides  
pietasque viris  
qui Castra se-  
quuntur, Ve-  
nalesque ma-  
nus: ibi fas,  
ubi maxima  
merces.  
Lucan.

Those Legions which a little before were in the Service of the Enemy, did willingly embrace what was offered them; for old acquaintance had made them forget what Benefits Cæsar had lately bestowed on them: Being also of divers Countries and Nations, and not all of the Marfi or Peligni, as those the Night before, which were their Cabin-Mates, and Fellow-Soldiers: Whereupon they took occasion, to publish abroad in worse Terms, that which others had vainly given out; and some things were coined by those that would seem most diligent in doing their duty.

### The First OBSERVATION.

Observe first, from the revolt of these Centurions, that a Fellow or two of rank and fashion falling from a Party, do gain easie credit to their advertisements, by averring any thing which the Enemy desireth. Whence it is, that forasmuch as Fugitives can little otherwise avail, (one Man being but as no Man,) they seek favour and reputation with the Party they fly unto, by their advice and discovery, and consequently, the remuneration of Espial; which according to the president made by Fabius to the Spies of Clusine, is worth a Man's labour.

Livy lib. 10.

And herein Revolters (especially those of judgment) are very dangerous Instruments; not only in weakening or making frustrate such designs as may be contrived against an Adversary; but also in discovering the secrets of their own Party, and disclosing of that which is absolute and well, until it be made known. For there is no subsisting thing so perfect, but hath always some part or other open, and to give an easie Passage to destruction: According to that of the Poet,

*Omnia sunt Hominum tenui pendentia Filo.*

All Human things hang by a slender Thread.

And therefore it is no small means of preserving each thing in being, to make shew of Strength, and conceal weaknesses, as the Registers of assured Ruin. For which cause it is, that Fidelity is commended as the Foundation of Human Society: And perfidious Treachery, divulging the secret imperfections thereof, is the Plague and Bane of the same.

Fides Funda-  
mentum soci-  
etatis huma-  
na: perfidia  
vero ejusdem  
pestis. Plato,  
l. 5. de legibus.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

As there is nothing more dangerous in an Army than Fear; so there is nothing sooner bred to disturb a Multitude, than this Passion, which metamorphoseth a Troop of Men into a Herd of Deer. For hence it appeareth, that one Therfites is able to leaven a whole Army; and an idle conceit bred in the weak Thoughts of some Tresfantis, begetteth oftentimes a main cause of distrust throughout all the Party: Which, as it spreadeth abroad, is so delivered from one to

The Spartans  
called all Cow-  
ards Tresfan-  
tas Plutarch.

another, as the Reporter (not believing what he telleth) addeth always somewhat to make the Hearer believe what he could not himself. And so weak Minds do multiply the vain apprehension of idle Humours, in such a fashion, as there is more hurt in fearing, than in the thing which is feared.

Plus in metu-  
endo est mali,  
quam in illo  
ipso quod ti-  
metur. Cic.  
ad Torqua-  
tum  
\* Plutarch.

Epaminondas was more fortunate than all others in this kind: For \* while he led the Thebans as their Commander, they were never taken with any sudden affrightment, nor possessed with any Panick Terrour, to bereave them of their Senses, or falsifie the truth of their Understanding; being all (as it seemed) of the same Mind with the General, who accounted no death so honourable as that which came by War. Howbeit such is the frailty of Human Nature, and so strange are the Convulsions of the Mind, that a Commander must expect to meet with times, wherein his Men will stand in danger of nothing so much as their own infirmity: Being troubled rather with strong apprehensions, than for any danger of the thing feared.

Turbant Ho-  
mines, non  
res: Sed quas  
de rebus ha-  
bent opiniones.  
Epic. En-  
chirid.

### CHAP. XII.

Curio disputeth the matter in a Council of War.

For which causes a Council of War being called they began to deliberate what course was to be taken. There were some Opinions which thought that it was very expedient to assault and take Varus's Camp, for that there was nothing more dangerous than Idleness for the Breeding and Increase of such imaginations as the Soldiers had conceived. Others said, It were better to try the fortune of a Battel, and to free themselves by valorous Endeavour, rather than to be forsaken and abandoned of their own Party, and left to undergo most grievous and extreme Torments. There were others which thought it fit, to return about the third Watch of the Night to Cornelius's Camp; that by interposing some respite of Time, the Soldiers might be better settled, and confirmed in their Opinions; and if any Mischance further happened, they might (by reason of their Store of shipping) with more ease and Safety return back to Sicily.

Curio mistaking both the one and the other, said, That there wanted as much good Resolution in the one Opinion, as abounded in the other: For these entered into a Consideration of a dishonourable and unbecoming Flight; and those were of an opinion to fight in an unequal and disadvantageous Place. For with what hope (saith he) can we assault a Camp so fortified, both by Nature and Art? Or what have we gained, if with great Loss and Damage, we shall go away and give it over? As though things well and happily atchieved did not get to the Commander great good Will from the Soldier; and things ill carried, as much Hate. Concerning the removing of our Camp, what doth it infer but a shameful Retreat, a Despair in all Men, and Alienation of the Army? For it is not fit, to give occasion to the Prudent and well-advised, to imagine that they are distrusted; nor on the other side, to the ill-disposed, that they are redoubted or feared: And the rather because Fear in this kind will give them more Liberty to do ill and abate the Endeavour of good Men in well deserving. And if (saith he) these things are well known unto us already, that are spoken of the Revolt and Alienation of the Army (which for mine own Part, I think either to be

Tam boni  
quam mali  
eventus  
causæ vulgo  
in Imperato-  
res referri so-  
lent. Dio  
Halicar.  
lib. 8.



be altogether false, or at least, less than in Opinion they are thought to be) is it not better to dissemble and hide them, than that they should be strengthened and confirmed by us? Ought we not, as we do hide the Wounds of our Bodies, to cover the Inconveniences of an Army, lest we should minister Hope or Courage to the Adversary? But some there are that advise to set forward at Midnight; to the End (as I imagine) that such as are desirous to offend, may perform it with more Scope and Licentiousness. For such Disorders are repressed and reformed either with Shame or Fear; to both which the Night is an Enemy. And therefore as I am not of that Courage, to think without Hope or Means that the Enemies Camp is to be assaulted; so on the other side, I am not so fearful, as to be wanting in that which is fitting: But am rather of opinion, that we try all things before we yield to that; and do assure myself, that for the most part, we are all of one Mind concerning this point.

## OBSERVATION.

AS in matter of Geometry, Rectum est Index sui & Obliqui, a streight Line manifesteth both it self and a crooked Line, being equal to all the parts of rectitude, and unequal to obliquity: So is it in reason and discourse. For a direct and well-grounded Speech carrieth such a native equality with all its Parts, as it doth not only approve it self to be levelled at that which is most fitting, but sheweth also what is indirect and crooked, concerning the same matter; and is of that consequence in the variety of projects and Opinions and so hardly hit upon, in the lame discourse of common reason, that Plato thought it a piece of divine Power, to direct a Path free from the crookedness of Errour, which might lead the streight and ready Way to happy Ends. And the rather, forasmuch as in matter of debate, there are no Words so weighty, but do seem balanced with others of equal Consideration: As here it happened, from those that pointing at the Cause of this Distemperature, convicted Idleness for the Authour of their variable and unsettled Minds; and, as \* Xenophon hath observed, very hard to be endured in one Man, much worse in a whole Family, but no Way sufferable in an Army; which the Romans called *Exercitus*, ab *Exercitio* from Exercise. For remedy whereof, they propounded Labour without hope of Gain, and such service as could bring forth nothing but Loss. Others, preferring Security before all other Courses (as believing with Livy, that Captains should never trust Fortune further than necessity constrained them) perswaded a retreat to a Place of Safety, but upon dishonourable Terms. Which unevenness of Opinions Curio made streight by an excellent Maxim in this kind; thinking it convenient to hold such a Course as might neither give honest Men cause of distrust, nor Wicked Men to think they were feared. For so he should be sure (in good Terms of Honour) neither to discourage the better Sort, nor give occasion to the ill-affected to do worse. And thus winding himself out of the Labyrinth of Words (as knowing that to be true of Annius the Prætor, that \* it more importeth occasions to do than to say; being an easie matter to fit Words to things unfolded and resolved upon;) he brake up the Council.

## C H A P. XIII.

Curio calleth a general Assembly of the Soldiers; and speaketh unto them, concerning their Fear and Retraction.

THE Council being risen, he gave order for a Convocation of the Army; and there called to remembrance what they had done for Cæsar at Corfinium: How by their Favour and Furtherance, he had gained the greatest Part of Italy to be on his side. For by you (saith he) and by your Endeavour, all the rest of the Municipal Towns were drawn to follow Cæsar: And therefore not without just cause did he at that time repose great assurance in your affections towards him; and the adverse Party conceived as great Indignation and Spight against you. For Pompey was not forced away by any Battel; but being prejudiced by your Act he quitted Italy. Cæsar hath recommended me, whom he held near unto himself, together with the Provinces of Sicily and Africk (without which he cannot defend the City and Italy) to your trust and fidelity. There are some which sollicite and perswade you to revolt from my Command: For what can they wish or desire more, than to make it but one work, to bring us both to ruine and overthrow, and to engage you in a most detestable Wickedness? Or what worse Opinion can they conceive of you, than that you should betray those Men, that profess themselves wholly yours; and that you might afterwards come into their Power, who take themselves to be undone by your means?

Nemo iis amicus esse potest, à quibus malum aliquod expectat Demesth.

Have you not understood what Cæsar hath done in Spain? Two Armies beaten; Two Generals defeated; Two Provinces taken; and all within forty Days, after he came in view of the Enemy? Those whose Forces were not able to make resistance when they were whole and entire, how is it possible they should hold out being beaten and discomfited? You that followed Cæsar when the Victory stood doubtful; now Fortune hath adjudged the Cause, and determined of the Issue of the War, will you follow the vanquished Party, when you are to receive the reward of your Service? They gave out, that they were forsaken and betrayed by you, and do remember you of the former Oath you took. But did you forsake L. Domitius, or did he forsake you? Did not he thrust you out, and expose you to all Extremity of Fortune? Did he not seek to save himself by Flight, without your Knowledge or Privy? Were you not preserved and kept alive by Cæsar's Clemency, when you were abandoned and betrayed by him?

How could he tie you with the Oath of Allegiance, when (having cast away his Sheaf of Rods, and laid down his Authority) he himself was made a private Person, and became captivated to the Command of another Man's Power? It were a strange and new Religion, that you should neglect that Oath, wherein you stand now engaged; and respect the other, which was taken away by the Surrender of your General, and the \* Loss of your Liberty. But I believe you think well of Cæsar, and are offended at me, that I am not to preach of my Merits towards you; which as yet are less than my Will, and unworthy your expectation: And yet Soldiers have always used to seek Reward upon the shutting up of a War; which what Event it will have, make you no doubt. And why should I omit the diligence which I have already used, and how the Business hath hitherto proceeded? Doth it offend you, that I transported the Army over in Safety, without Loss of any one Ship? That at my coming, I beat and dis-

\* Capitis diminutione. Diminutus capite appellatur, qui civitate mutatus est, aut ex familia in aliam adoptatus: & qui liber alteri mancipio datus est: & qui in hostium potestate venit: & cui aqua ignique interdictum. Liv.

Consilium dave, eorum qua inter homines diviniſſimum. Omni orationi oratio equalis opponitur. Sext. Philof. Variam ſemper dant otia mentem. Luc. lib. 4. lib. 1 Cyrop.

Duces nullo loco, niſi quantum neceſſitas cogit, ſe committere fortuna debent. lib. 22. \* Ad ſummam rerum pertinet, cogitare magis quid agendum quam quid loquendum; facile erit, explicatis conſiliis, accomodate rebus verba. Liv. 33.



In summo  
Imperatore  
quatuor hæ-  
virtutes inef-  
se debent:  
scientiæ rei  
militaris, vir-  
tus, Authori-  
tas, felicitas.  
Cicero pro leg.  
Manilia.

dispersed at the first Onset the whole Fleet of the Adversaries? That twice in two Days, I overcame them only with the Cavalry? That I drew two hundred Ships of Burthen out of the Road and Port of the Enemy? and have brought them to that Extremity, that they can be supplied by Provision neither by Sea nor by Land? All this good fortune, and these Commanders rejected and forsaken, will you rather embrace again the Ignominy you received at Corfinium, or your Flight out of Italy, or the Surrendring up of Spain, or the prejudicial Success of the War of Africk? Truly, for mine own part, I was desirous and content to be called Cæsar's Soldier: But you have stiled me with the Title of Imperator. Which if it repent you I do willingly quit my self of your Grace, and return it back unto you: And do you in like manner restore me to my Name again, lest you should seem to give me Honour which might turn to my reproach.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Ful. Gel.  
lib. 15 c. 27.

Com. 5. Bel.  
Gal.

Tom. 2.  
lib. 4.

IN the handling of this Accident, the difference cometh to be observed between a Council of War, and a Concio, or Convocation of the Soldiers. The first was more particular, consisting of some choice Men, and those the most eminent in the Party. *Is qui non universum Populum, sed partem aliquam adesse jubet, non Comitia, sed Consilium edicere debet*; he that calls together only a part of the People, and not the whole, calls a Council, not a general Assembly. Their Convocation or Preaching was more general, the whole Army being convented together, to be fitted by perswasion and discourse to follow the resolution taken by a Council; and was properly called *Adlocutio*, and sometimes *Conventus*: Cicero *perlectam Epistolam Cæsar's in Conventu Militum recitat*; Cicero read the Letter from Cæsar in a *Conventus*, or general Meeting of his Soldiers. The Parties called to a Council, were according as the General vallued the Occasion: For sometimes the Legates and Tribunes were only consulted; and now and then the Centurions of the first Orders together with the Captains of Horse, were called to their assistance; and oftentimes, all the Centurions. But howsoever, Curio resolved out of his own judgment, as great Commanders commonly do; and is specially observed by Pierre Matthieu, of the French King; who ever loveth to hear the opinion of his Captains, but always finds his own the best.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

AMongst other strains of this discourse, it is acknowledged, that Rome could not stand without Sicily; and the reason was, for the plenty of Corn which it brought forth: For Sicily was always reputed as the Granary or Barn of Rome and accordingly cared for by the Senate, as a place without which their City could not continue. The grain of that Island is hard, like horn, and cannot well be broken and ground into Meal, until it be wet with Water, and then dried in the Shade, rather than in the Sun: By means whereof it yieldeth so exceedingly, that it is accounted twenty in the hundred better than any other Wheat; especially, for that it will keep long in their Vaults and Caves under the Earth, and seldom or never take heat, being of it self so hard and dry.

The gluttonous use of Flesh hath made Men ignorant of the Vertue and Strength of Corn, which the Romans better understood; for their

Legions never fed on Flesh, as long as they could get Corn. *Peccora, quod secundum poterat esse Lib. 1 civil inopia Subsidium*, they fetched in Cattel, as the second Way to help their Want, saith Cæsar. And in another Place; *Ut complures Dies Milites Frumento caruerint, Peccore è longinquo-ribus vicis adacto extremam Famem sustentarent*; the Soldiers having for many Days been without Corn, they were fain to sustain their extreme hunger with Cattel which they had fetched afar off. And in the same place, *Quod minor erat Frumenti Copia, Pecus imperabat*; because there was but little Corn, he gave order for Cattel. And again, *Non illi Hordeum cum daretur, non Legumina recusabant. Pecus vero, cujus rei summa erat in Epiro Copia, magno in honore habebant*. They refused neither Barley nor Pulse when it was offered them; but Cattel, whereof there was good store in Epirus, they prized at an high rate.

By which places it appeareth, that they never fell to Flesh but when they wanted Corn. Which is doubtless a firmer Nutriment, less excremental, and of better Strength, than any other Food whatsoever; as containing the prime substance of Meat and the Spirit of Wine: For *Aqua Vita* is as well made of Wheat, as of the Lees of Wine. Flesh is good to make Wrestlers of a gross and heavy Constitution, as Plutarch noteth: But the Roman Soldier stood in need of an effectual and Sinewy Vigour, able to undergo Carriages, fitter for a Mule than a Man, together with such Works as later Ages do rather hear than believe; and was attained by feeding only upon Bread.

The Rabbines and Thalmudists do write that the Giants of the Old World first fell to the eating of Flesh, making no difference between a Man and a Beast; but grew so execrable, that they made Women cast their Fruit before their time, to the end they might eat it with more Tenderness and Delicacy. Which is also said to be practised by the Cannibals, upon the first Discovery of the Indies. *Viginere* reporteth, that he knew some great Men in France so luxurious, that they caused oftentimes Does ready to fann to be killed, and the young Ones took out alive, to be made Meat for Monstrous Appetites. But there is no indifferent Parallel to be drawn between the Sobriety of the ancient Roman Soldier, and the Gluttony of these Times; far exceeding that of Agamemnon, which Achilles noted with Words of high Reproach, calling him Hogs-head of Wine, Eyes of a Dog, and Heart of a Deer.

Muli Mariani.

Sobrietas, quasi sine ebrietate.

Homer. Iliad. 1.

#### The Third OBSERVATION.

THirdly, from this elaborate and well-couched Speech, we may note that Eloquence is a very beautiful Ornament to Princes, and great Commanders; besides the use it hath to lead a Multitude to such Ends as is wished: For smooth Words prevail where Force booteth not. According to that of Cicero, *Cum Populum persuaderi posse diffidimus, cogi Fas esse non arbitremur*; If the People will not be perswaded, let us not think it fit to go about to compel them.

Eloquentia principibus maxime ornamento est. Cic. 4. de finibus.

Lib. 1. fam. Epist.



## C H A P. XIV.

Curio bringeth out his Troops, and putteth Varus's Army to flight.

Caſar.

**T**He Soldiers, moved with this Oration, did oftentimes interrupt him in his Speech; signifying with what grief they did endure the suspicion of Infidelity. And as he departed from the Assembly, every Man exhorted him to be of a good Courage, and not to doubt of giving Battel, or to make trial of their Fidelity and Valour. By which means, the minds and disposition of all Men being changed, Curio resolved (out of a general consent) as soon as any occasion was offered, to give Battel.

The next day, having brought out his Forces, he made a stand, and imbattelled them in the same place where he stood in Arms the day before. And Varus likewise drew out his Troops; whether it were to sollicite the Soldier, or not to omit the opportunity of fighting, if it might be afforded in an indifferent place. There was a Valley (as we have formerly declared) between the two Armies, of no very hard or difficult ascent; and either of them expected who should first come over it, to the end they might fight in a place of more advantage: When upon a sudden, all Varus's Cavalry that stood in the left Wing of the Army, together with the light-armed Soldiers that stood mingled amongst them, were seen descending into the Valley. To them Curio sent his Cavalry, together with two Cohorts of the Marrucini. The Enemies Horsemen were not able to endure the first encounter of our Men; but having lost their Horses, fled back to their Party. The light-armed Men that came out with them, being left and forsaken, were all slain by our Men, in the view and sight of Varus's whole Army. Then Rebilus, Cæsar's Legate (whom Curio for his knowledge and experience in matter of War, had brought with him out of Sicily) said; Curio, thou seest the Enemy affrighted: why makest thou doubt to use the opportunity of time? Curio, without making any other answer, than willing the Soldiers to remember what they had assured unto him the day before, commanded them to follow him, and ran foremost himself. The Valley was so cumbersome and difficult, that in gaining the ascent of the Hill, the foremost could hardly get up, unless they were lifted up by their followers. Howbeit the Enemy was so possessed with fear, for the flight and slaughter of their fellows, that they did not so much as think of resisting; for they took themselves all to be already surprised by the Cavalry: So that before any Weapon could be cast, or that our Men could approach near unto them, all Varus's Army turned their backs, and fled into their Camp.

In this flight, Fabius Pelignus (a certain Soldier of one of the inferiour Companies of Curio his Army) having overtaken the first Troop of them that fled, sought for Varus, calling after him with a loud voice; as though he had been one of his own Soldiers, and would either advise him, or say something else to him. And as he, being often called, looked back, and stood still (inquiring who he was, and what he would,) he made at Varus's Shoulder (which was unarmed) with his Sword, and was very near killing him: howbeit he avoided the danger, by receiving the blow upon his Target. Fabius was instantly inclosed about by such Soldiers as were near at hand, and slain.

In the mean time, the Gates of the Camp were pestered and thronged with multitudes and Troops of such as fled away, and the passage was so stopped, that more died in that place without blow or wound, than perished either in the Battel or in the flight. Neither wanted they much of taking the Camp; for

many left not running until they came to the Town. But the nature of the place and the fortification of the Camp, did hinder their access; and Curio his Men coming out, prepared only for a Battel wanted such necessities as were of use for the taking of the Camp. And therefore Curio carried back his Army, with the loss of no one Man but Fabius. Of the Adversaries were slain about six hundred; and many more wounded, who all upon Curio his departure, besides many other that feigned themselves hurt, left the Camp for fear, and went into the Town. Which Varus perceiving, and knowing also the astonishment of the Army, leaving a Trumpeter in the Camp, and a few Tents for shew, about the third Watch, he carried his Army with silence out of the Camp into the Town.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**I**T is a part of Wisdom, and oftentimes a main help to Victory, to attend the advantage of an Enemies rashness, and to see if his folly will not make way to his overthrow. Whereof Curio made good use: for he kept his Army in the upper ground, until the Cavalry of the Adversary were loosely fallen into the Valley; and then set upon them, and cut them all in pieces. The fight whereof startled the whole Army, and kept Curio in safety, upon the like disadvantage, in the cumbersome passage of the same Vale: by means whereof he put to flight the whole Forces of the Enemy, and made a great slaughter in the party. Wherein I may not forget that trick of a Roman spirit, whereby the Author becometh memorable to posterity, in calling after Varus by name, to make him the sacrifice for both the Hoasts. Whence we may observe, that when a Battel is joyned pell-mell, no Man can be assured in his own Valour, nor share out his Fortune by the length of his Sword; but is oftentimes subject to weaknesses of contempt, and vanquished by such as cannot be compared unto him but in scorn.

*Loco sapientia  
est, alienam  
stultitiam  
operiri.*

I have heard it reported, that at the Battel of Eureux, Maturine (that known Woman in France) took Prisoner and disarmed a Cavalero of Spain: Who being brought before the King, and by him demanded whose Prisoner he was, or whether he knew the party that had forced him; answered, no; but that he knew him to be a gallant Man of Arms. Whereat the King smiled: And the Gentleman, understanding what Fortune he had run, was as much dismayed as a Man possibly could be, that considered, *Quod ferrum aequat, in bello, robustioribus imbecilliores*. The Sword equalleth the weakest to the strongest.

## C H A P. XV.

Curio leaveth Utica to meet with King Juba. His Cavalry overthroweth the Forces led by Saburra; which leadeth him on to his overthrow.

**T**He next day Curio prepared to besiege Caſar. Utica, inclosing it about with a Ditch and a Rampier. There were in the Town a multitude of People unacquainted with War, through the long Peace they had enjoyed: and the Inhabitants stood very affectionate to Cæsar, for many benefits they had received from him. The rest of the multitude consisted of divers sorts of Men, much terrified and affrighted by the former Encounters: Whereupon every Man spake plainly of giving up the Town, and dealt with Pub. Actius, that their Fortunes and Lives might not come in danger, through his pertinacy and wilfulness.

K k

While



While these things were a doing, there came Messengers from King Juba, signifying, the King was at hand with great Forces, and willed them to keep and defend the Town. Which News did much encourage and confirm the wavering and affrighted minds of the Enemy. The same was also reported to Curio: whereunto for a while he gave no credit; such was his confidence in the success of things. And now withal, came Letters and Messengers into Africk, of that which Cæsar had so fortunately atchieved in Spain: so that being absolutely assured with all these things, he was persuaded the King durst attempt nothing against him. But when he found by assured discovery, that his Forces were within twenty five miles of Utica, leaving his Works already begun, he withdrew himself into Cornelius's Camp; and began there to fortifie his Camp, to get Corn and other Provisions, and to furnish it with all necessaries material for a defence: and sent presently a dispatch into Sicily, that the two Legions, and the rest of the Cavalry might be sent unto him.

The Camp wherein he lay was fitly accommodated to hold out the War, as well by reason of the nature of the place, as the artificial fortifying thereof, the nearness of the Sea, and the plenty of Water and Salt; whereof there was great quantity brought thither, from the Salt-pits near adjoining. No stuff could be wanting, through the great store of Wood which was about the place, nor yet any Corn, for the plenty that was to be found in the adjoining Fields: And thereupon, by the advice and approbation of all Men, Curio resolved to attend his other Forces, and to draw out the War in length.

These things being thus disposed by the consent and liking of all Men, he heard by some that lately came out of the Town, that Juba was called back, by occasion of a War happened upon the confines, and that by reason of the controversies and dissensions of the Leptitani, he was detained at home in his Kingdom; but that Saburra his Lieutenant was sent with some competent Forces, and was not far from Utica. To which reports giving too light and easie credit, he altered his purpose, \* and resolved to put the matter to trial of Battel: Whereunto his youthful heat, the greatness of his Courage, the success of former time, and his confidence in the managing of that War, did violently lead him. Being carried on with these inducements, he sent the first Night all the Cavalry to the River Bagrada, where the Enemy lay incamped under the command of Saburra: But the King followed after with all his Forces, and lay continually within six miles, or thereabouts.

The Horsemen sent before; and making their journey in the Night, set upon the Enemy at unawares, and not thinking of their approach: for the Numidians Lodge, scattered here and there in a barbarous manner, without any Government or Order. And surprising them thus oppressed with sleep, and scattered upon the ground, they slew a great number of them: the rest, in great terror and amazement, escaped by flight. Which service being thus executed, the Cavalry returned to Curio, and brought the Captives unto him. Curio was gone out about the fourth Watch of the Night with all his Forces, having left five Cohorts for a Garrison to his Camp: And having marched six miles, he met with the Cavalry, understood what was done, and inquired of the Captives, who was General of the Camp at Bagrada. They answered, Saburra. He omitted for haste of his way to inform himself of the rest: But turning himself to the next Ensigns, said, You see, Soldiers, that the confession of the Captives doth agree with that which was

reported by the Fugitives. For the King is not come; but hath sent some small Forces, which cannot make their party good with a few Horsemen: And therefore hasten to take the spoil with Honour and Renown, that we may now at length begin to think of rewarding your Merits.

## OBSERVATION.

IT is observed by Marcellinus, that when misfortune cometh upon a Man, his Spirit groweth so dull and benumbed, as his senses seem to be dismissed of their charges. Which appeared here in Curio: who having taken a provident and sure course, such as was approved in every Man's judgment, and beseemed well the wisdom of a Commander, did nevertheless, contrary to all sense and discretion, forgo the same, and cast himself upon the hazard of that which Fugitives had vainly reported. Concerning which, as it is noted, that Incredulity is hurtful only to the unbeliever; so this passage proveth, that for a Commander to be too light of belief, is a danger to the whole Party, and bringeth many to ruine, that had no part in that Creed. Cæsar, in the relation hereof, noteth three special things in Curio, that carried him headlong to this disaster, and may serve as marks to avoid the like disaster.

The first was, *Juvenilis ardor*, his youthful courage and heat: which is always attended with strong affections, futing the quality and temperature of the Body, being then in the prime height of strength, and accordingly led on with violent motions; whereas Age goeth slowly and coldly forward, and is always surer in undertaking, than hot-spur Youth. And albeit no Man in cold blood could better advise than Curio, or foresee with better providence; yet his youthful boldness over-swayed his discourse, and drew all to a mischief, in despite of his wisdom.

The second was, *Superioris temporis proventus*, the happy issue of former proceedings: which of all other conditions is to be suspected, and needeth Gods assistance more than any other fortune; for that no Man sooner erreth, or is more incapable of Order, than such as are in prosperity. And therefore Plato refused to make Laws for them of Cyrene; as a matter of great difficulty, to give Ordinances to Men that were in happiness. And doubtless, such is the exorbitancy of our Nature, that nothing better informeth it than Crosses; which are as Instructions and Warnings, for the preventing of ruining Calamities. Wherein Curio was not beholding to Fortune at all; that dandled him in her Lap for a while, to cast him out at length headlong to his ruin. It had been much better, she had exchanged a frown with a favour, rather than to have given him much good together, and reserve an irrecoverable disgrace for the upshot.

The third was, *Fiducia rei bene gerendæ*: which savoureth more of Folly than any of the former; it being always an argument of an imprudent Man, to assure himself of good fortune. For Presumption, being ever accompanied with Negligence, is subject to as many Casualties, as those that go unarmed upon extremity of danger. And these were the three things that miscarried Curio. Out of which we may observe with Xenophon, that *Ingens & arduum opus est recte imperare*, it is a weighty and difficult matter to command well.

\* Callicratides cum Lacedæmoniorum Dux fuisset bello Peloponnesiaco, multaque egregie fecisset, vertit ad extremum omnia Cleombrotus temere cum Epaminonda conflixit, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.

Videmus ipsi quotidie, manus injicientibus suis, hebetari sensus hominum & obtundi. Amm. Marcellin.

Solis incredulitas noxia res, incredulitas. Philo de vit. Mosis.

Hebetiores quam acutiores ut plurimum melius computant. ad ministrant. Thucydides.

Rebus secundis maxime deus implorandus. lib. i. Cyropæd. Feliciter & moderationis dividuum contubernium. Sen.

quem blanda furoris Deceptura malis, belli fortuna recepit. Luc. lib. 4.

Imprudens, ut fiducia est, fortunam sibi spondere. Seneca de beneficiis. Incerta semper nimia presumptio & negligentia. Egeip. lib. i. de Instit. Cyri.



## C H A P. XVI.

Curio purfueth the Enemy, with more haft than good Succels.

Cæſar.

**T**Hat which the Cavalry had exploited was certainly a matter of great Service; eſpecially the ſmall number of them, being compared with the great multitude of the Numidians: And yet notwithstanding, they ſpoke of theſe things with greater Oſtentation than the Truth would bear; as Men are willing to divulge their own Praiſes. Beſides, they ſhewed much ſpoil which they had taken; Captives and Horſes were brought out; that whatſoever time was omitted, ſeemed to be a let and hindrance to the Victory: By which means, the deſires and endeavours of the Soldiers were no way ſhort of the hope which Curio had conceived. Who commanding the Cavalry to follow him, marched forward with as much haſte as he could; to the end he might find the Enemy diſtracted and aſtoniſhed at the Flight and Overthrow of their Fellows. But the Horſemen having Travelled all Night, could by no means follow after. Whereby it happened that ſome ſtayed in one place, ſome in another: Yet this did not hinder or diſcourage Curio in his hopes.

Juba being advertiſed by Saburra of the conflict in the Night, ſent inſtantly Two Thouſand Spaniſh and French Horſe, which he kept about him for the ſafety of his Perſon, and ſuch of the Foot Troops as he moſt truſted, to ſuccour and relieve him: He himſelf, with the reſt of the Forces, and forty Elephants, followed ſoftly after. Saburra ſuſpecting by the Horſemen coming before, that Curio himſelf was at hand, Embattelled all his Forces; Commanding them, that under a pretence of counterfeit Fear, they ſhould Retreat by little and little; himſelf, when occaſion ſerved, would give them the ſign of Battel, with ſuch other directions as ſhould be expedient.

Curio was ſtrengthened in his former hope, with the opinion of the preſent occaſion. For ſuppoſing the Enemy had fled, he drew his Forces from the upper ground into the Plain; wherein, after he had marched a good ſpace (the Army having Travelled ſixteen Mile) he made a ſtand. Saburra gave the ſign to his Men of beginning the Battel, led on his Army, went about his Troops to exhort and encourage his Soldiers. Howbeit, he uſed his Footmen only for a ſhew a far off, and ſent the Cavalry to give the charge. Curio was not wanting to his Men; but wiſhed them to ſet all their confidence in their Valour. The Soldiers (howſoever harrasſed and wearied) and the Horſemen (although but a very few, and thoſe ſpent with Travel) yet wanted no courage or deſire to Fight. But theſe being but two hundred in number (for the reſt ſtayed by the way) what part of the Army ſoever they charged, they forced the Enemy to give way: But they could neither follow them far as they fled, nor put their Horſes to any round or long career.

At length, the Cavalry of the Enemy began from both the Wings to circumvent our Army, and to gall them behind: And as our Cohorts iſſued out from the Battel towards them, the Numidians (through their nimbleneſs) did eaſily avoid the ſhock; and again, as they turned back to their Ranks, encloſed them about, and cut them off from the Battel: So that it neither ſeemed ſafe to keep their order and place, nor to advance themſelves out, and undergo the hazard of adventure.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Principles and Maxims of War are always to be held firm, when they are taken with their due circumſtances: For every Rule hath a qualified ſtate, and conſiſteth more in Cautions and Exceptions, than in authority of Precept. It is true, that nothing doth more advantage a Victory, than the Counſel of Lamechus, the third Duke of the Athenians; which was, to ſet upon an Enemy when he is affrighted and diſtracted; for ſo there is nothing to be expected on his behalf but Deſpair and Confuſion. But either to be miſtaken therein, or otherwiſe to make ſuch haſte to obſerve this Rule of War (as Curio did) that the beſt part of the Army ſhall lie by the way, and the reſt that go on ſhall be ſo ſpent with Labour as they are altogether unfit for Service, and yet (to make the matter worſe) to bring them into a place of diſadvantage, to encounter a ſtrong and freſh Enemy, is to make the circumſtances overſway the Rule, and by a Maxime of War to be directed to an Overthrow: Neglecting altogether that which is obſerved by Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Satis celeriter fit, quicquid commode geritur*, that which is well done, is done ſoon enough.

Thucyd.  
lib. 7.

## C H A P. XVII.

Curio Defeated and Slain. Some few of the Army get paſſage to Sicily: The reſt yield themſelves to Varus.

**T**HE Enemy was oftentimes reinforced by Cæſar: ſuccours from the King, our Men had ſpent their ſtrength, and fainted through wearineſs: Such as were Wounded, could neither leave the Battel, nor be conveyed into a place of ſafety. The whole Army being encompassed about with the Cavalry of the Enemy (whereby deſpairing of their ſafety, as Men commonly do, when their Life draws towards an end) they either lamented their own Death, or recommended their Friends to good Fortune, if it were poſſible that any might eſcape out of that danger: All parts were filled with fear and lamentation.

Curio, when he perceived the Soldiers to be ſo affrighted, that they gave ear neither to his Exhortations nor Entreaties, he commanded them (as the laſt hope they had of ſafety) that they ſhould all fly unto the next Hills, and thither he commanded the Enſigns to be carried. But the Cavalry ſent by Saburra had alſo poſſeſſed that place before; whereby our Men began to fall into utter deſpair, and partly were ſlain as they fled by the Horſemen, or fell down without Wounding. Cn. Domitius, General of the Horſe, ſtanding with a few Horſemen about him, perſwaded Curio to ſave himſelf by flight, and to get the Camp; promiſing not to leave or forſake him. But Curio confidently replied, that he would never come in Cæſar's ſight, having loſt the Army committed unto him; and thereupon fighting Valiantly, was Slain.

A few Horſemen ſaved themſelves from the fury of the Battel; but ſuch of the Rereward as ſtayed by the way to reſreſh their Horſes, perceiving a far off the Rout and Flight of the whole Army, returned ſafe into the Camp. The Footmen were all ſlain to a Man. M. Rufus the Treasuſer, being left by Curio in the Camp, exhorted his Men not to be diſcouraged. They prayed and beſought him, they might be transported into Sicily. He promiſed them they ſhould; and to that end gave order to the Maſters



sters of Ships, that the next Evening they should bring all the Skiffes to the Shore. But such was the astonishment and terror of all Men, that some gave out, that Juba's Forces were already come; others, that Varus was at hand with the Legions, and that they saw the dust of the Army marching towards them; whereas there was no such matter at all: Others suspected the Enemies Navy would speedily make to them; insomuch as every Man shifted for himself: Such as were already on Ship-board made haste to be gone. Their departure gave occasion to the Ships of Burthen to follow after.

A few small Barks were obedient to the Command: But the Shore being thronged with Soldiers, such was the contention, which of all that multitude should get aboard, that some of the Barks were sunk with press of People, and the rest, for fear of the like Casualty, durst not come near them. Whereby it happened, that a few Soldiers, and Masters of Families (that through favour or pity prevailed to be taken in, or could swim unto the Ships) were carried back safe into Sicily. The rest of the Forces, sending by Night some of the Centurions as Embassadors to Varus, surrendered themselves unto him.

The next day after, Juba seeing the Cohorts of these Soldiers before the Town, cried out presently, that they were part of his Booty: And thereupon gave order that a great number of them should be slain, and selecting a few of the rest, sent them into his Kingdom: Varus complaining in the mean while, that his Faith and Promise was violated, and yet durst not resist it. The King rode into the Town attended with many Senators, amongst whom was Ser. Sulpitius, and Licinius Damasippus: And remaining there a few days, gave such order for things as he thought fit, and then returned to his Kingdom with all his Forces.

## OBSERVATION.

—*Latia  
hunc numina  
rebus Crescen-  
di possuere mo-  
dum—* Lucan.

AND this was the period which Divine Power made, to the hopeful beginning of Curio's design upon Africk; and happened so suddenly, as they were lost ere they were aware: Like a Tempest at Sea, that swalloweth up Vessels in

the same place, where a little before they swam most proudly, and in the like irrecoverable manner. For War is not capable of a second Error; one fault being enough to ruine an Army, and to disable Curio for ever doing the like: Of whom Lucan hath left this Memorial;

*Haud alium tanta civem tulit indole Roma,  
Aut cui plus leges deberent recta sequenti.  
Perdita nunc primum nocuerunt secula, postquam  
Ambitus, & luxus, & opum metuenda facultas,  
Transverso mentem dubiam torrente tulerunt;  
Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum,  
Gallorum captus spoliis & Caesaris auro.*

So Vertuous Citizen Rome never bred;  
Whilst right, the Laws a Friend like him ne'er had.

But the bad Times first took him from his hold:  
Ambition, Riot, and the force of Gold  
In a wrong stream soon drew his wavering mind,

Of great concern which way soe'er inclin'd,  
Fetch'd off with Gallick Spoils and Caesar's Gifts.

His Body lay unburied, as a witness of Numidian Hate (which is always extream, like the heat of the Country) and of Juba's particular Revenge, for tending an Edict to the People, to Confiscate his Kingdom.

To conclude this Commentary; The loss either Party sustained unto this Stage of the War, was in these particulars: Pompey was driven out of Italy, lost Marseilles, and both the Provinces of Spain; Caesar received this loss in Africk, besides that in the Adriatick Sea, where Antonius miscarried, whereof he maketh no mention in these Commentaries. And, as when Jupiter weighed the Fortune of the Greeks and the Trojans in a pair of Balances, it fell out the Greeks had more ill luck than the Trojans; so the Fortune of these Parties being weighed, by the relation made thereof, it falleth plainly out, that Pompey had the worse.

And thus endeth the Second Commentary.

## The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

IT is a Maxim held by all, and neglected by many, that it is necessary to keep a better Guard during a Truce than at all other Times. We have a notable Instance of it in this Book: Trebonius had reduc'd those of Marseilles to the utmost extremity by a wonderful Labour, when, during a Truce he had granted them out of Mercy, his Soldiers neglecting their Guards, invited them to break it; and he saw all those Works burnt in one Hour which had been divers Months a raising. Which ought to teach us never to deviate from the severity of Military Discipline in War. Altho' the Soldiers grumble at it, it is better to give them any other sort of satisfaction, and when they see their Captains sharing with them in all the perils and fatigues of War, they go through them chearfully. For we read that several Captains, by an exact observation of Military Discipline have surmounted

the greatest Difficulties, and have obtain'd glorious Victories: And that several others have been shamefully beaten for having despis'd it: But there are no Examples that the observation of the said Discipline ever caus'd the loss of a Battle, or the ruine of an Enterprize.

A great Courage without Experience is more capable of committing a great fault in War, than an indifferent one. For the first is commonly attended with presumption, and not so capable to hearken to Advice as the other; especially when it has met with success in the beginning of a War. Curio is a famous Example of it. From being a Tribune of the People he became General of an Army; and indeed he committed several remarkable Faults. For after having had the good Fortune to beat his Enemies, and to shut them up in Utica, and upon the news of King Juba's coming, of taking a good resolution

on



on to retire into his Camp, which was on the Sea-side, and well Fortified, and provided with all things, there to expect the remainder of his Army; upon the very first Advice he receives that the Reinforcement is inconsiderable, and that it is not commanded by *Juba* in Person, without staying for a confirmation, without considering, and without believing any body, he quits his first Resolution, goes out to Fight him: After his Cavalry had met with some Parties of *Juba's*, of which they brought some Prisoners to him; he enquires who Commands them, and they answering that it was *Saburra*, he concludes that *Juba* is not there. Thus he confirms himself in his first Error, and marches so fast and so far that he finds himself twenty five Miles distant from his Camp, in a Country he did not know, with part of his Men (the rest not having been able to follow him)


very much tir'd, and in disorder, which inabled *Juba* to beat him with ease. Which proves, that neither Courage alone makes a good Captain (tho it contributes very much towards it) nor yet the reading of Books, nor Eloquence; but that it requires a long Experience, and to have seen Defeats as well as Victories. For he that has never been engaged in them can never imagine what it is, the bravest Soldiers sometimes committing the basest Actions on these occasions; as it happen'd in this, in which tho' the residue of that Army was retir'd in a well Fortifi'd Camp, and not Attack'd: They Embark'd themselves with so much Confusion and Disorder, that a considerable part of them were Drowned. Therefore I conclude, that it is better not to go so fast, and to know whither one is going; than to be oblig'd to fly shamefully, or to Perish.

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The

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## The Third COMMENTARY of the CIVIL WARS.

### The Argument.

**T**He former Books contain the Drifts and Designs which these famous Chiefs attempted and prosecuted, while they were asunder. And now cometh their Buckling at hand to be related; together with the judgment which the War gave of the Cause in question, on *Cæsar's* behalf.

#### C H A P. I.

*Cæsar* giveth Order at Rome, for matter of Credit and Usury, and other things.

*Cæsar.*

**C***æsar the Dictator, holding the Assembly for Election of Magistrates, Julius Cæsar and Publius Servilius were created Consuls: For in that Year he was capable by Law to be chosen thereunto. These things being ended, forasmuch as he found that credit was very scant throughout all Italy, and that Money lent upon Trust was not paid; he gave order that Arbitrators should be appointed, to make an estimation of Possessions and Goods, according as they were valued before the War; and that the Creditors should take them at that rate for their Moneys. For this course he thought to be fittest and most expedient, as well for the taking away of any fear of composition, or new assurances for the quitting and abolishing of all Debts (which do commonly fall out upon Wars and civil Broils) as also for the keeping and preserving of the Debtor's credit.*

*In like manner he restored the ancient course of Appeal, made by the Prætors and Tribunes to the People; as also certain courses used in suing for Magistracy (which were taken away by a Law made in Pompey's Time, when he kept the Legions about him in the City;) and likewise reformed such Judgments in Suits and Tryals of Law, as were given in Cases, when the matter in controversy was heard by one Judge, and the Sentence pronounced the same day by another Judge. Last of all, whereas divers stood condemned for offering their service unto him in the beginning of the Civil War, if he should think it fit to accept thereof; and holding himself as much obliged unto them, as if he had used it: He thought it best expedient for them to be acquitted by the People, rather than by his Commandment and Authority; lest he should either seem ungrateful, in not acknowledging their Deserts; or arrogant, in assuming to himself that which belonged to the People.*

#### The First OBSERVATION.

**C***æsar, as he was Dictator, holding the assembly for the choice of Magistrates, himself with P. Servilius Isauricus were made Consuls, in*

*the Year of Rome 705. which was just Ten Years after his first Consulship; whereby he became capable thereof, by the Law published by Sylla, wherein it was provided, That no Man should be chosen to an Office, within Ten Years after he had supplied the same. In this Year happened all these things which are contained in this Third Commentary; as Paternus noteth in these words; C. Cæsar and P. Servilius being Consuls, Pompey was miserably Massacred after three Consulships and three Triumphs; and was Slain, the day before his Birth-day, being Aged 58 Years. The Choice day was regularly the first of January: And the Assembly was called Comitium Centuriatum.*

*Touching the difference of these Assemblies, the Parties present thereat, the manner of the choice, and other circumstances appertaining, the Reader may receive Information at large by* Lib. 6. de comitiis. *Rossius. Only it is to be remembred, that Comitia Centuriata were never holden without consent of the Senate. And forasmuch as the chief part of them were with Pompey, Lucan taketh exception at this Creation.*

----- *Marentia testis*

*Lib. 5.*

*Cæsar habet, vacuasque domos legesque silentes,  
Clausaque iustitio tristi fora. Curia solos  
Illa videt Patres, plena quos urbe fugavit.*

*Sad Roofs and empty Houses Cæsar found.  
The Laws were silenc'd, and the Courts shut up.  
No Fathers met in Senate, only they,  
Who, when the Town was full, were forc'd away.*

*The Persons that were Suiters for the Consulship were called Candidati; who oftentimes used extraordinary means to attain the same. This moved Pompey to make a Law, That no Man should sue for publick Offices by Bribes, or other corrupt Courses; and it was called Lex de Ambitu, which indeed was but renewed: For the same was set on foot, Anno Urb. 395. by Petilius, Tribune of the People; and renewed again by Pub. Cornelius Cethegus, Anno 572. and within a while after made Capital, as far as Banishment concerned the Party. Coponius was so Condemned, having bought a Voice with an*

*Anno Urb. 701.*

*Livy lib. 7.  
Livy lib. 9.*

\* Am-



\* Four Gallons  
and an half.  
Plin. l. 35.  
cap. 12.  
† Lib. 39.

\* Amphora of Wine. The Law which Pompey now made, was very strict, as † Dio noteth: For it was ordained, That upon producing of Witnesses the Process should end in a day, giving the Accuser two hours to lay open the matter, and the Defender three to make Answer; and the Judgment instantly followed. The rigour of which Law Cæsar here reformed.

### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing I observe, is the difficulty of taking up Money upon Credit, in time of Trouble or Wars: Which Cæsar expresseth in these terms; *Cum fides tota Italia esset augustior*, in regard Credit was very scant throughout all Italy. The word *Fides* hath ever been taken for a real performance of any Promise or Agreement, which Tully calleth the Foundation of Justice, and the very prop of a Commonweal; taking the Etymon to grow, *Quia fiat quod dictum*, because that which was spoken is done. According to that of Nonius Marcellus; *Fides nomen ipsum videtur habere, cum fit quod dicitur*, *Fides* seems to have its appellation, when that's done which was spoken. And for that Men commonly are Covenant-keepers, not so much by the perfection of their Nature, as out of strictness of Law, it falleth out, that where there are no Laws, there is no Performance; and consequently, little or no Credit either given or kept in time of War, because *Silent leges inter arma*, Laws are silenc'd in time of War.

Lib. 1. offic.  
Nec enim ulla  
res vehementi-  
us rempub.  
continet quam  
fides. Lib. 2.  
offic.

In the Life of  
Julius Cæsar.

Cæsar, to provide for this inconvenience, appointed Commissioners to rate every Man's Lands and Possessions, as they were valued before the Wars, and to satisfy the Creditors with the same. Which Plutarch explaineth in this manner; That the Creditors should take Yearly two parts of the Revenue of their Debtors, until such time as they had paid themselves; and that the Debtors should have the other third to live withal. Whereof it seemed he had some light, by a Precedent in the Consulship of Valerius Publicola, which is extant in Livy; *Novi consules fœnebrem quoque rem levare aggressi, solutionem æris alieni in publicam curam verterant, quinque viris creatis, quos mensarios, ab dispensatione pecunie appellarunt*: The new Consuls intending to ease the People in point of Usury, made the payment of Debts a part of the publick Care, and created five Men to that purpose, who were called *Mensarii*, from their disposal of those Monies.

Lib. 7.

This general Acquittance for Debts, the Romans called *Novæ Tabulæ*; in this respect, as Cælius Rhodiginus hath it, *Quod cum pecunie creditæ oberatis condonantur, novæ mox co-oriuntur Tabulæ, quibus nomina continentur novæ*; in regard that when the Debt was remitted to the Debtor, new Tables were made, wherein new Names were put; and is nothing else, but what is ordinary amongst our Bankrupts, compounding for so much in the Pound with their Creditors, upon new Assurance, and other Security, which they called *Novæ Tabulæ*; agreeing to that of Tully: *Tabulæ vero novæ quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habcas, ego non habeam pecuniam*? What else mean these new Tables, but that you shall buy a piece of Ground with my Money, and keep it to your self, whilst I go without my Money?

Lib. 7.

2 Offic.

Vetus urbis fœ-  
nebre malum,  
& seditionum  
discordia-  
rumque cre-  
berrima causa  
Annal. 6.

Concerning matter of Usury, which was the ground of this Mischiefe, Tacitus noteth it, as an old and deadly Disease, and the cause of many Seditions in that Empire; and is never better likened, than to the biting of a Serpent, called

an Aspick, which, upon the Infusion of her Venom, putteth the Patient into a heavy Slumber; and in a short time, bringeth all a Man's Substance to Death and Destruction. And thereupon it is called *Fœnus à fœtu*, from the fertile and ample encrease of Money. For, as Basil noteth, The Labourer loseth the Seed, and contenteth himself with the Fruit or Increase: But the Usurer will have the Fruit, and yet not lose the Seed. Whereby there must needs grow great Increase. The Law of the Twelve Tables was, *Ne quis unciario fœnore amplius exerceto*, That no Man for the future take upon Use One in the Hundred.

The highest rate was *Centesima Usura*; when the hundredth part of the Principal was paid every Month to the Creditor, and was twelve per Cent. The next was *Usura deunx*, when the Debtor paid eleven in the Hundred for a Year. The third *Dextans*, which was ten per Cent. *Dodrans* nine. *Bes* eight. *Septunx usura* seven. *Semis* six. *Quincunx* five. *Triens* four. *Quadrans* three. *Sextans* two. *Unciaria*, one in the Hundred. Howbeit, Cato condemned all kind of Usury: For, being demanded, *Quid maxime in re familiari expediret? Respondit, bene pascere: Quid secundum? Satis bene pascere: Quid tertium? Bene vestire: Quid quartum? Arare. Et cum ille qui quesierat dixisset, Quid fœnerari? Quid hominem, inquit, occidere?* What was the most expedient thing in Householdry? answered, Good Diet: What the second? Enough good Diet: What the third? Good Cloaths: What the fourth? Ploughing: And when he that question'd him thus, said, What think you of taking Use? he replied, What is it to Kill a Man? Allowing (as it seemeth) no means of getting Money, but those which Aristotle took to be most agreeing to Nature: Which is from the Fruits of the Earth, and the Increase of our Cattel; with such other courses as are answerable thereunto.

Tully 2. Offic.

Pecunia quæ  
renda ratio  
naturæ consen-  
tanea omni-  
bus est, à fru-  
ctibus & ani-  
malibus. De  
Repub lib. 1.  
cap. 10.

## CHAP. II.

### A particular view of Pompey's Forces.

IN the accomplishing of these things, as also celebrating the Latin Holy-Days, and holding the Assemblies of the People, having spent eleven days, he gave over his Dictatorship, left the City, and came to Brundisium. For he had commanded seven Legions, and all his Cavalry to repair thither. Howbeit, he found no more Shipping ready than would hardly Transport Fifteen Thousand Legionary Soldiers, and Five Hundred Horse; the want of Shipping seeming to hinder him from bringing the War to a speedy end. Moreover, those Forces which were Shipped, were but weak; in regard that many of them were lost in the Wars of Gallia, and lessened likewise by their long Journey out of Spain: Besides that, the unwholesome Autumn in Apulia, and about Brundisium, had made the whole Army ill disposed, being newly come out of the sweet Air of Gallia and Spain.

Pompey having had a Years space to provide himself of Men and Munition, and neither War nor Enemy to trouble him, had got together a great Navy out of Asia from the Cyclade Isles, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt; and had caused another as great a Fleet to be built in all places fit for that purpose; had raised great Sums of Money out of Asia

Cæsar.



Gemella.

Asia and Syria, and of all the Kings, Dynasties, Tetrarchs, and free States of Achaia; and had likewise compelled the Corporations of those Provinces to contribute the like Summ. He had Enrolled nine Legions of Roman Citizens: Five which he had transported out of Italy; one old Legion out of Sicily, which being compounded and made of two, he called the Twin; one out of Crete and Macedonia, old Soldiers, who being discharged by former Generals, had resided in those Provinces; and two out of Asia, which Lentulus the Consul had caused to be Enrolled. Besides, he had distributed amongst those Legions, under the name of a supply, a great number of Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus.

Amongst these he had mingled Antony's Soldiers: And besides these, he expected to be brought by Scipio out of Syria, two Legions. Of Archers out of Crete, Lacedæmon, Pontus, and Syria, and the rest of the Cities, he had 3000; six Cohorts of Slingers, two Mercenary, and 7000 Horse. Whereof Deiotarus had brought 600 Gauls; Ariobarzanes 500 out of Cappadocia; Cotus out of Thracia had sent the like number, under the leading of his Son Sadalis. From Macedonia came 200 Commanded by Rascipolis, a Captain of great Fame and Vertue. From Alexandria came 500, part Gauls, and part Germans; which A. Gabinius had left there with King Ptolomy, to defend the Town. Pompey the Son had brought with the Navy, 800 of his Shepherds and Servants. Tarcondarius, Castor, and Donilaus, had sent Three Hundred out of Gallogræcia; of whom, one came himself, and the other sent his Son. Two Hundred were sent out of Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, whom Pompey had presented with great Gifts: Most of which were Arbalestriers on Horseback.

To these were added Dardans and Bessi, partly for Pay and Entertainment, and partly got by Command or Favour; besides Macedonians, Thessalians, and of divers other Nations and Cities: Insomuch as he filled up the number formerly spoken of. He provided great quantity of Corn out of Thessaly, Asia, Crete, Cyrene, and the rest of those Regions. He determined to Winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and all the Maritime Towns, to keep Cæsar from passing the Sea: And to that end, he had laid and disposed his Navy all along the Sea-Coast. Pompey the Son was Admiral of the Egyptian Ships; D. Lælius and C. Triarius, of those that came out of Asia. C. Cassius Commanded them of Syria; and C. Marcellus, with C. Pomponius, the Ships of Rhodes. Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius had charge of the Liburian and Achaian Navy. Howbeit M. Bibulus Commanded in chief in all Sea causes; and to him was left the Superintendency of the Admiralty.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Latine Ferie.

Concerning these *Latine Ferie*, it is to be noted, that the Romans had two sorts of Ferie, or Holy-Days; the one called *Annales*, which came always to be kept on a certain day, and thereupon were called *Anniversarii*, or Yearly: The other, *Conceptivæ*; which were Arbitrary, and solemnized upon such days, as the Magistrates and Priests thought most expedient, whereof these *Latine Ferie* were chief; and were kept on Mount Albane, to Jupiter Latiar or Latialis, for the health and preservation of all the Latin People, in League and Confederacy with the People of Rome, and were solemnized in remembrance of the Truce between those two Nations: During which Feast, the Romans held it unlawful to make any War. The Sa-

crifice was a white Bull, kill'd and offered by the Consuls, and the Flesh distributed to the Inhabitants of Latium; according to an ancient Treaty of Alliance between them, Engraven for a perpetual Memory in a Column of Brasse. The particulars whereof are expressed at large by Dionysius Halicarnassæus.

Lib. 4. de Antiquit. Rom.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

The second thing coming to be noted, is the view taken of Pompey's Forces: Which are nine compleat Legions, besides the Supplies here particularly mentioned, sent from such as bare affection to that Party; and, by indifferent Calculation, might amount in all, to near about Threescore Thousand Men, together with the favour of the Country, where the tryal was to be made by the stroke of War.

In which Muster were the Soldiers of C. Antonius; whose Misfortune these Commentaries have either willingly forgot, or some other chance hath wip'd it clean out. Howbeit Florus hath it recorded, that Cæsar having sent Dolabella and Antonius to seize upon the Streights, and entrance of the Adriatick Sea, the one took hold of the Coast of Sclavonia, and the other near unto Corfu: When upon a suddain came Octavius and Libo, Pompey's Lieutenants, and with great Forces (they had aboard their Ships) surprized both the one and the other; whereby Antonius was constrained to yield up fifteen Companies, which were these Soldiers of Antonius here mentioned.

Lib. 4. cap. 2.

Rascipolis, or Rascupolis, was a Thracian of great Fame, that followed Pompey; and his Brother Rascus betook himself to Cæsar, upon an appointment made between themselves. For finding in the Country where they dwelt, two great Factions in opposition, and doubting which Party to take, they divided themselves, as the best approved part of Neutrality: And held likewise the same course, in the War between Brutus and Octavius, continuing unto the Battel of Philippi. Upon the issue whereof, Rascus demanded no other Reward for his Service, than the Life of his Brother: Which was easily granted.

Appian lib. 4.

This Bibulus, Pompey's High-Admiral, was Fellow-Consul with Cæsar, in the Year of Rome 694. but Cæsar so out-strippt him in the managing of things, that he much suspected himself, as insufficient for the place: Which made him keep his House all that Year. Whereupon came this Distich;

*Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, sed Cæsare factum:  
Nam Bibulo fieri consule nil memini.*

Cæsar did all, nought Bibulus did do:  
Of Consul Bibulus no act I know.

#### CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth over into Greece, and returneth his Shipping to Brundisium. Octavius Besiegeth Salona.

Cæsar, upon his Arrival at Brundisium, called the Soldiers together; and shewed them, that forasmuch as they were almost come to an end of all their Labours and Dangers, they would now be content to leave willingly behind them their Servants

Cæsar.



and Carriages in Italy, and go aboard clear of those incumbrances, to the end, the greater number of Soldiers might be taken in; and that they should expect the supply of all these things from Victory, and his Liberality. Every Man cried out, That he should command what he would, and they would willingly obey it.

The second of the Nones of January, he weighed Anchor, having (as is formerly shewed) shipped seven Legions. The next day he came to Land at the Promontory of Ceraunium, having got a quiet Road amongst the Rocks and places of danger. For doubting how he might safely venture upon any of the known Ports of that Coast; (which he suspected to be kept by the Enemy) he made choice of that place which is called Pharfalus; and there arriving in safety with all his Ships, he landed his Soldiers.

At the same time, Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus (by order from Lælius) were at Oricum, with eighteen Ships of Asia: and M. Bibulus was likewise at Corfu, with one hundred and ten Ships. But neither durst those come out of the Port, although Cæsar had not in all above twelve Ships of War, to waft him over; amongst which, he himself was embarked: Neither could Bibulus come soon enough, his Ships being unready, and his Mariners ashore; for that Cæsar was descried near the Continent, before there was any bruit of his coming in all those Regions. The Soldiers being landed, he sent back the same Night the Shipping to Brundisium; that the other Legions, and the Cavalry might be brought over.

Fufius Calenus, the Legate, had the charge of this service, and was to use all celerity in transporting over the Legions: but setting out late, and omitting the opportunity of the Night Wind, they failed of their purpose in returning back. For Bibulus being certified at Corfu of Cæsar's arrival, and hoping to meet with some of the Ships of burthen, met with the empty Ships going back to Brundisium: And having taken thirty of them, he wreaked his anger (conceived through grief and omission) and set them all on fire, consuming therein both the Masters, and the Mariners; hoping by the rigour of that punishment, to terrifie the rest.

This being done, he possessed all the Coasts, from Salonæ to Oricum, with Ships and Men of War; appointing Guards with more diligence than formerly had been used. He himself, in the depth of Winter, kept Watch a Ship-board, not refusing any labour or duty, nor expecting any succour, if he happened to meet with Cæsar. But after the departure of the Liburnian Gallies, M. Octavius, with such Ships as he had with him, came from Illyricum to Salonæ; and there having incited the Dalmatians, and other barbarous People, drew Hissa from Cæsar's Party. And finding that he could not move them of Salonæ, neither with promise nor threatnings, he resolved to besiege the Town. The place was strong by nature, through the advantage of a Hill; and the Roman Citizens (there inhabiting) had made Towers of Wood to fortifie it within: But finding themselves too weak to make resistance (being wearied out and spent with Wounds) they fell at length to the last refuge of all; which was to enfranchise all their Bond-slaves, above the age of fourteen Years; and cutting their Womens Hair, they made Engines thereof.

Their resolution being known, Octavius compassed the Town about with five Camps: and at one instant of time began to force them by Siege, and by Assault. They being resolved to undergo all extremities, were much pressed through want of Corn; and thereupon sending Messengers to Cæsar, sought help of him. Other inconveniences they endured as they might.

And after a long time, when the continuance of the Siege had made the Octavians remiss and negligent (taking the opportunity of the Noon time, when the Enemy was retired aside, and placing their Children and Women on the Wall, that nothing might seem omitted of that which was usual) they themselves, together with such as they had lately enfranchised, brake into the next Camp unto the Town. Which being taken, with the same violence they set upon another; and then upon the third, and so upon the fourth, and in the end, upon the fifth; driving the Enemy out of all the Camps: and having slain a great number, they forced Octavius, and the rest remaining, to betake them to their Ships; and so the Siege ended. For Octavius despairing to take the Town, the Winter approaching, and having received such losses, retired to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

IT hath been generally conceived, that there is little or no use of Women in times of War, but that they are a burthen to such as seek Honour by deeds of Arms; and do better sute the licentiousness of Peace, than the dangers of Warfare. Whereof *Andromache* is made an instance; from that which *Homer* reporteth of her Tears, Sighs, and Prayers, to withdraw *Hector* from those valorous Exploits, which he undertook for the defence of *Troy*. And therefore they are by *Ovid* wished to handle the Distaff and the Spindle, and leave the Wars, as fitter for Men, than the weakness of their Sex.

*Uiad. 6.*

— columnque

*I cape cum calathis, & stamina pollice torque:  
Bella relinque viris —*

*12 Metam.*

Go take thy Basket on thy Head,  
And at the Distaff twist thy Thread.  
Leave Wars to Men —

Nevertheless it cannot be denied, that howsoever the tenderness of Women doth require a passive course of life, under the shelter of a safe roof, rather than in the bleak storms of active endeavour; yet there have been some Viragoes, that have over-topped the pride of Men in points of War: amongst whom, *Semiramis* may lead the rest; together with *Tomyris*, *Cyrus's* Mistress by Conquest. As also *Zenobia*, that subdued the *Persians*; and *Helena*, Queen of the *Russes*.

*Just. lib. 1.  
Herodot. lib. 2.  
Treb. lib. 1.  
Sigm. Bar.  
in Muscov.*

Besides other noble Spirits, that could answer such as told them News of the death of their Sons in Battel, That they had brought them into the World for that only purpose. Which do prove, as well a real, as a potential aptness of that Sex, to the use and practice of Arms.

And if any Man (as unwilling to afford them so much worth) will know wherein they avail the fortune of a War, he may take notice, that even in Expeditions (wherein they are most subject to exceptions) they always give acceptable assistances to their Husbands, both in their Provisions, and otherwise; and are such Companions, as can hardly be left at home, without danger of greater hazard.

*Quod honestus  
us quam uxori  
rum levamen-  
tum?  
Tac. l. 3.  
Annal.  
Vix presentis  
custodia man-  
nere illa  
conjugia  
eodem.*

But in places besieged, Women do not only afford Hair to make Ropes, if need require (as it fell out in this Siege) but are able to cast pieces of Mill-stones upon the Enemy, with better fortune sometimes than any other Man: and have thereby slain the General, to the raising of the Siege, and saving of the City.

*Judg. 9.*

But



Anno 1595.

But to take instances of later times : It is not to be forgotten, that when the Arch-Duke *Matthias* (after the death of Count *Mansfield*) commanded the Christian Army, at the siege of *Strigonium* ; while the *Turks*, within the Castle, were making Works for a retreat, the Women (in the mean time) made good the breaches ; and there bestowed such store of Wild-fire, that the Italian Squadrons (commanded by *Aldobrandine*) being joyned poldron to poldron, to press into the Breach, seemed all of a fire at once, and were forced to fall off with great terrour and confusion.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

A Town assaulted by a warlike Enemy, is not kept or freed with Charms or Spells ; or as the Inhabitants of *Tomby*, in the *East-Indies*, drove away the *Portugals*, with Hives of Bees, when they were possessed of the Walls : but with such valour as may over-master the Enemy, and extend it self to the taking of five Camps, if need require ; which was performed by these Inhabitants of *Salona*.

## C H A P. III.

*Cæsar* sendeth to *Pompey*, touching a Peace, taketh in *Oricum*, *Apollonia*, and other places.

*Cæsar.*

IT is before declared, that *Vibullius Rufus* (one of *Pompey's* Lieutenants) was twice taken by *Cæsar*, and dismissed ; once at *Corfinium*, and a second time in *Spain*. Him did *Cæsar* deem (in regard of the favours which he had shewed him) to be a fit Person, to be sent with a Message to *Pompey* ; and the rather, for that he understood, that he was in good account and credit with him.

Qui sapiunt,  
bellum ab-  
solvent cele-  
riter ; pace  
fruantur  
quam possunt  
diutissime.  
*Appian.*

The sum of his Commission was, to tell him, That it beseeemed them both to give an end to their wilfulness, to lay down their Arms, and not to tempt Fortune any longer ; either side had been sufficiently afflicted with loss and damages : which might serve for Instruction and Example to avoid other inconveniences. He for his part was driven out of Italy, with the loss of *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and the Provinces of *Spain*, as also of one hundred and thirty Cohorts of Roman Citizens in *Spain* and Italy. Himself was afflicted with the death of *Curio*, with the loss of the African Army, and with the surrender of the Soldiers at *Corfu*. And therefore they should have regard of themselves, and of the Commonwealth.

They had good experience by their own losses, what Fortune could do in War. This was the only time to treat of Peace, whilst either Party stood confident in his own strength, and seemed of equal might and power. But if Fortune should chance to sway to one side, he that thought he had the better end of the Staff, would never hearken to any conditions of Peace, nor content himself with a reasonable part, because his hope would give him all.

Concerning the Articles of Treaty, forasmuch as they could not agree thereof themselves, they ought to seek them from the Senate and People of Rome. In the mean while, it was fit that the Commonwealth and themselves should rest satisfied, if (without further delay) both of them did take an Oath in the presence of their Armies, to dismiss their Forces within three days next following ; to lay down Arms, and send away their Auxiliary Troops, wherein they so relied ; and consequently, to depend upon the judgment and decree of the People of Rome. For assurance whereof on his behalf, he

would presently discharge as well his Forces in the Field, as those in Garrison.

*Vibullius*, having received these instructions from *Cæsar* (thinking it no less requisite to advertise *Pompey* of *Cæsar's* arrival, that he might consult of that, before he delivered what he had in charge) posted Night and Day, taking at every Stage fresh Horse ; that he might certify *Pompey*, that *Cæsar* was at hand with all his Forces.

*Pompey* was at that time in *Candavia*, and went out of *Macedonia* to *Winter* in *Apollonia*, and at *Dyrrachium*. But being troubled at the News, he made towards *Apollonia* by great journeys, lest *Cæsar* should possess himself of the Maritime Cities.

*Cæsar* having landed his Forces, went the next day to *Oricum*. Upon his approach, *L. Torquatus*, who commanded the Town under *Pompey*, and had there a Garrison of *Parthians*, shutting the Gates, went about to defend the place, commanding the *Græcians* to take Arms, and make good the Walls. But they refusing to fight against the Power and Authority of the People of Rome, and the Townsmen endeavouring of their own accord to receive *Cæsar* in ; he opened the Gates, despairing of all other succours, gave up both himself and the Town to *Cæsar*, and was entertained by him in safety. *Oricum* being taken in by *Cæsar*, without any further delay he went to *Apollonia*.

His coming being heard of, *L. Straberius*, the Governour, began to carry Water into the Cittadel, to fortifie it, and to require pledges of the Inhabitants. They, on the other side, denied to give any, or to shut their Gates against the Consul, or of themselves to take a resolution contrary to that which all Italy and the People of Rome had thought convenient. Their affections being known, he secretly conveyed himself away. The *Apollonians* sent Commissioners to *Cæsar*, and received him into the Town. The *Bellidenfes* followed their example, and the *Amatini*, together with the rest of the confining Cities. And to conclude all, *Epirus* sent unto *Cæsar*, promising to do what he commanded. But *Pompey* understanding of these things, which were done at *Oricum* and *Apollonia*, fearing *Dyrrachium*, posted thither Night and Day. Howbeit, upon the report of *Cæsar's* approach, the Army was so astonished, that for haste on their way, they left almost all their Ensigns in *Epirus* and the confining Regions : and many of them (casting away their Arms) seemed rather to flie, than to march as Soldiers.

As they came near to *Dyrrachium*, *Pompey* made a stand, and caused the Camp to be intrenched ; when as yet the Army was so affrighted, that *Labienus* stood out first, and took a solemn Oath, Never to forsake *Pompey*, but to undergo what chance soever Fortune had allotted him. The same Oath took the Legates ; being seconded by the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and Centurions, and by all the Army, that took the like Oath.

## The First OBSERVATION.

NUM est tempus (saith *Cæsar*) de pace agendi, dum uterque sibi confidit, & pares ambo videntur ; The only time to treat of Peace is, whilst either party is confident of his strength, and both seem of equal might and power. Which may serve for an excellent Rule, to point out the fittest and seasonablest time for composition between two opposite Parties. For as in quantities, equality begetteth equality, and disparity a like unevenness of nature ; so in other things, as namely in Treaties of Agreement, the Conditions do commonly rise to either Party, according as they stand bal-



*Leges à victo-  
ribus dicun-  
tur; accipiun-  
tur a victis.  
lib. 4.*

*Quietem in  
aquabilitate,  
motum in  
inaqualitate,  
semper consti-  
tuimus.  
In Timæo.*

lanced in the Scale of Equality; or otherwise, as the difference of their means shall allot them. For if that be true in the Extremity, which Curtius hath, That Laws are given by Conquerours, and accepted upon all conditions, by them that are subdued; it doth consequently follow in the Mean, that Men find dealing proportionable to their fortune. To which purpose is that of Plato, where he saith, That Peace and Quietness consist in equality; as Trouble and Motion are always in inequality.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

**I**T appeareth here by the fright and astonishment of Pompey's Army, that the course he took to abandon Italy, was out of no good advice or direction. For whereas he might with far more honour, and no less hope of success, have contested with Cæsar, in the place where the War brake out, and kept him to a task which should have held him from the Conquest of Spain, or such other achievements as he easily wrought in the absence of his Adversaries: It fell out, that his departure into Greece sorted to no other end, than by time to abate the edge of the forwardest Courages, and to suffer a numerous Army to be daunted with noise and clamours of continual Victories, gotten upon a part of themselves; and then to give occasion to the Conquerour to come in the tail of Fame, and take them disarmed of expectation, to their great amazement.

#### CHAP. V.

Cæsar taketh up his Lodging for Winter. Bibulus distressed at Sea for want of Provisions, seemeth desirous of a Treaty: which being carried on the other side with good caution, breaketh off again.

Cæsar.

**C**Æsar understanding that his passage to Dyrrachium was thus intercepted, did forbear his haste, and incamped himself upon the River Apfus, in the confines of the Apollonians; that by the means of his Guards and Forts, such Cities as had well deserved of him, might be in safety: and there determined to Winter, in Tents of Skin, and to attend the coming of his other Legions out of Italy. The like did Pompey, pitching his Camp on the other side of the River Apfus; and there assembled all his Troops and foreign aids. Calenus having (according to Cæsar's directions) embarked the Legions and Cavalry at Brundisium, and taken in as many as his Shipping would contain, he set Sail: But being gone a little out of the Port, he received Letters of Advice from Cæsar, that all the Havens and the Sea-coast was kept with the Enemies Fleet. Whereupon he made again into the Haven, and called back all the Ships: Only one, holding on her course, without regard of the command, carrying no Soldiers, but belonging to private Men, arrived at Oricum, and there was taken by Bibulus; who spared neither bond nor free, of as many as were of age, but put all to the Sword. Whereby it happened, that in a moment of time, by great chance the whole Army was saved.

Bibulus, as is before declared, lay at Oricum with his Navy. And as he kept the Sea and the Ports from Cæsar, so was he kept from landing in any of those Countries: For all the Sea-coast was kept by Guards and Watches set along the Shore, that he could neither Water, get Wood, nor bring his Ships to land upon any occasion: Inso-much as he was brought into great straits

and exigence, for want of all necessaries; and was constrained (besides all other Provisions) to fetch his Water and Wood from Corfu. And one time amongst the rest it happened, that the Weather being foul, they were forced to relieve themselves with the Dew which in the Night-time fell upon the Skins, that covered the Decks of the Ships. All which extremities they patiently endured; and would by no means be brought to leave the Ports, or abandon the Sea-coast.

But as they were in these difficulties, and that Libo and Bibulus were come together, they both of them spake from a-shipboard to M. Acilius and Statius Murcus, Legates (of whom one was Governour of the Town, and the other had the charge of such Guards as were along the Shore) signifying, that they would willingly talk with Cæsar of matters of great consequence, if they might have leave. For a better shew and assurance whereof, they intimated something concerning a Composition. In the mean time they earnestly desired there might be a Truce: For the thing they propounded imported matter of great weight, which they knew Cæsar exceedingly affected; and it was thought that Bibulus was able to work somewhat to that purpose.

Cæsar at that time was gone with one Legion to take in some Towns farther off, and to set a course for provision of Corn, which was brought sparingly unto him; and was then at Buthrotum, opposite to Corfu. Being certified there by Letters from Acilius and Murcus, of that which Libo and Bibulus had required, he left the Legion, and returned himself to Oricum. At his arrival thither, they were called out to treat. Libo came forth, and excused Bibulus, for that he was exceeding cholerick, and had besides conceived a great anger at Cæsar, about the Ædility and Prætorship: And in regard of that, he did shun the Conference, lest a matter of that utility and importance should be disturbed by his intemperate carriage. Pompey, he said, always was desirous that matters might be accorded, and that Arms might be laid aside: but they of themselves could do nothing therein; forasmuch as by the general resolution of a Council, the superintendency of the War, and the disposition of all things were referred to Pompey. Howbeit, when they understood what Cæsar required, they would send instantly a dispatch unto Pompey, and be a means that he should accomplish all things with good satisfaction. In the mean time let there be a Truce; and until an answer might be returned from him, let neither Party offend one another. To this he added somewhat concerning the Cause in question, the Forces and Aids. To which Cæsar did not think it fit at that time to make any answer: nor do we think there is cause now to make mention thereof.

Cæsar required, that it might be lawful for him to send Embassadors to Pompey without danger; and that they would undertake, that such as he sent, might be well intreated, or take them into their charge, and bring them safely to Pompey. Concerning the Truce, the course of the War fell out to be so carried, that they, with their Navy, did keep his Ships and succours from coming unto him; and he, on the other side, did prohibit them from landing, or taking in fresh Water: And if they would have that granted unto them, let them cease guarding of the Coast; but if they would continue that, then would he continue the other. Notwithstanding, he thought the Treaty of accord might go on, albeit these were not omitted; for he took them to be no impediment thereunto. They would neither receive Cæsar's Embassadors, nor undertake for their safety; but referred the whole matter to Pompey: only they instanced, and very vehemently urged for the Truce. But Cæsar perceiving that



that all this speech tended only avoid the present danger, and to supply themselves of such wants where-with they were straited, and that there was no condition of Peace to be expected, he began to think of prosecuting the War.

The First OBSERVATION.

Timendum ne  
sub pacis no-  
mine involu-  
tum bellum.  
Cicero,  
lib. 7.

AS in contracting with a Party, it is duely to be cared, that War be not shrowded under the fair name of Peace; so a Truce demanded by an Enemy, is to be handled sparingly and with suspicion: as a thing never commonly required, but when necessity doth move them thereunto; and not to be granted, but as it may inferr the like advantage. But to yield to a suspension of Arms, advantageous to an Enemy, and no way gainful to them that consent unto it, is neither allowable by Reason, nor *Cæsar's* Example. And if occasion prove it requisite, it must be but for a little time: For a Prince Armed in the Field, that shall entertain a Truce for any long season, shall see his Army consumed both in Courage, and in the parts thereof, which will fall asunder of themselves; and was the means, by which *Lewis* the Eleventh put by *Edward* the Fourth King of *England*, from going on with a War that might have given him the possession of the Crown of *France*. Whence it is, that such as seek a Peace, desire no more than a cessation of Arms, for some reasonable time, as an introduction inforcing the same.

Fœdus Pacis.

Concerning Leagues, we are to note that there are found three differences. The first is, a League of Peace: which by the Apostle's rule, should extend to all Men, *Habete pacem cum omnibus*, have Peace with all Men; and by example of holy Patriarchs (*Isaac* with *Abimelech*, *Jacob* with *Laban*) may lawfully be made with Heathen Princes; being as the Golden Chain, that tierh all the Nations of the Earth in peaceable community. The second is, a League of Entercourse, or Commerce; which is likewise by the same Patriarch, sending for Corn into *Egypt*, and *Solomon's* entercourse with *Hiram* King of *Tyre*, together with divers other Examples, allowable with Infidels. For Nature being rich in variety of Commodities, doth therefore divide her works amongst the Kingdoms of the Earth, that there might be a mutual entercourse of exchange between the parts of the same. The third is, a League of Mutual Assistance; such as *Jehosaphat* made with *Achab*: and it is hardly safe with any Prince; but no way allowable with Infidels.

Fœdus Com-  
mercii.

Fœdus mutui  
Auxilii.  
Reg. 22.

Touching the Persons to be offered in a Treaty, it is to be observed from *Bibulus*, that no Man, whose presence may either give offence, or whose intemperance may any way interrupt a course fort- ing to a happy issue, is fit for any such employment.

The Second OBSERVATION.

In Verrem.

There were in *Rome* certain Officers called *Ædiles*, ab *Ædibus*, as having the care of Houses and Buildings, both publick and private, that they might be built and maintained in such manner as was agreeable to the ordinances of that State, together with other things whereof they had the charge. *Nunc sum designatus Ædilis* (saith *Cicero*) *habeo rationem quod à Populo Romano acceperim, mihi ludos sanctissimos, maxima cum ceremonia, Cereri Liberoque faciendos: mihi Floram Matrem populo plebique Romanae, ludorum celebri- tate placandam: mihi ludos antiquissimos, qui primi Romani sunt nominati, maxima cum dignitate ac religione, Jovi, Junoni, Minervaeque esse facien- dos: mihi sacrarum Ædium procurationem; mihi*

*totam urbem tuendam esse commissam: ob earum rerum laborem & sollicitudinem fructus illos datos, antiquiorem in senatu sententiae dicendae locum, togam praetextam, sellam curulem, jus imaginis, ad memoriam posteritatemque prodendam.* Now that I am appointed to bear the Office of *Ædility*, I reckon with my self what charge I have received from the People of *Rome*: viz. to see to the solemnizing with highest Ceremony of the most holy Plays consecrated to *Ceres* and *Bacchus*; to the pacifying of *Flora* towards the People with celebration of Plays due to her; as likewise to the performing of those most ancient Plays, in honour of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and *Pallas*, with the greatest splendour and Religion possible: to have a care of sacred Houses, and in general of the whole City, &c. Wherein it is to be noted, that these Shows and Plays, were always made and set forth at the charge and costs of the *Ædiles*: and thence it was, that the allowing or disallowing of all Play-Books belonged unto them. Moreover, they had the charge of all the publick Buildings and Works of the City, together with the provision of Victual and Corn. And for the missing of this Office, was *Bibulus* angry with *Cæsar*, and would not be regained upon any condition.

The publicati-  
on of their  
secular Plays  
was cried in  
these words;  
Convenire ad  
ludos spectan-  
dos, quos neque  
spectavit quis-  
quam, nec  
spectaturus  
est. Sueton.  
in Claudio.

Nolentem a-  
micum capere  
difficile.  
Xenoph. de  
factis & dict.  
Socrat.

CHAP. VI.

*Bibulus* dieth. *Cæsar* useth means to procure a Treaty of Peace; but prevaieth not.

**B**ibulus being kept from landing many days to-  
gether, and fallen into a grievous sickness, through cold and extream labour (and having no means of help, nor yet willing to forgo his charge) could no longer withstand the violence of the disease. He being dead, there was none appointed to take the whole charge, but every Man commanded his own Fleet. The Hurly-burly being quieted which *Cæsar's* sudden arrival had moved, *Vibullius* with the assistance of *Libo*, together with *L. Luceius* and *Theophanes*, to whom *Pompey* was wont to commu-  
nicate matters of greatest importance, resolved to de-  
liver what *Cæsar* had recommended unto him: and entering into the relation thereof, was interrupted by *Pompey*, forbidding him to speak any farther of that matter. What use or need have I (saith he) either of my Life, or of the City, when I shall be thought to enjoy it by *Cæsar's* favour? Neither can the opinion thereof be removed, until the War be ended; that of my self I return back into *Italy*, from whence I am come.

Cæsar.

*Cæsar* understood this, from those that were present when he spake it: and yet notwithstanding, he en-  
deavoured by other means, to procure a Parley of Peace. For the two Camps of *Pompey* and *Cæsar* were only separated by the River *Apsus*, that ran between them; where the Soldiers had often Conferences, and by agree-  
ment amongst themselves, threw no Weapon during the time of their Treaty. Whereupon he sent *P. Va-  
tinius*, a Legate, to the River bank, to utter such things as did chiefly concern a Peace; and to ask oftentimes with a loud voice, whether it were not law-  
ful for Citizens to send to Citizens, touching a treaty of Peace; being a thing permitted to the Thieves of the *Pyreneian* Mountains: or at least, to move that Citizens should not in Arms contend with Citizens. And having spoken much very respectfully, as well con-  
cerning his own welfare, as the safety of all the rest, he was heard with silence by the Soldiers on both sides.

At length, it was answered from the other Party, that *A. Varro* did offer himself for a Conference the next day; so that the Commissioners on both sides might come and go in safety, and deliver freely



freely their Opinions: For which a certain time was then appointed. The next day great Multitudes of either side presented themselves at the Place assigned; and great was the expectation thereof, every Man seeming to incline to Peace. Out of which Troop stept forth T. Labienus, and spake softly touching the Peace: And at last, entered into Debate with Vatinius. In the middle of their Speech were Weapons suddenly cast from all Parts: Which he avoided, being covered and defended with Weapons. Notwithstanding many were wounded; and amongst others, Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, Centurions, besides many other Soldiers. Then said Labienus, Leave off therefore to speak of any Composition; for unless Cæsar's Head be brought, there can be no Peace.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS small piece of the Story containeth divers notable Passages of Extremity, in the Carriage of Pompey, and others of his Party. As first (to take them as they lie) that of wilfulness in Bibulus: Whom neither Sicknes, nor despair of help could move to intermit the task he had undertaken; but chose rather to suffer unto death, in approving his Zeal to the Cause, than to give himself a breathing time for the saving of his Life: And may serve to admonish any other Bibulus, to value his Life above that which a stiff and wilful Opinion may lead him unto, beyond the Measure of honourable Endeavour, or what else may any way be justly expected; left in striving to do much, he happen to do nothing. For that cannot be understood to be well done in another Man's behalf, that is not well done in his own.

The Second is, Pompey's Resolution; being so extreme, as no composition, or other thing whatsoever, could give him satisfaction, but only a victorious End of that War. Our Proverb saith, Better a lean Agreement, than a fat Remedy. And the Casualties of War may move an experienced Commander, to embrace a safe and quiet Peace; as knowing, that he that goeth about to vex another, shall have his turn of suffering the like uneasynesses: And as War beginneth when one Party listeth, so it endeth when the other pleaseth.

—facilis descensus Averni:

Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras,  
Hoc Opus, hic Labor est—

—The Way to Hell is easie:

But to come back, and to recover Life,  
This is a Task indeed—

And therefore let no Commander, how great soever, refuse all Peace, but that which is bought by extremity of War; lest the Event (whereof there can be no assurance) fall out as it happened to Pompey: But rather with the use, let him learn the end of Arms; which is, to make streight that which is crooked, and out of discord and dissention, to draw means of a happy Peace.

To which may be added that other of Labienus, as far in Extremity as either of the former; whom nothing would satisfy but Cæsar's Head. It cannot be denied, but that he strook at the Root; for his Head was the Head of that War. But to say it, rather than to do it, was no argument of Labienus's Worthiness. For as Polybius noteth, it is common to most Men to magnifie themselves, with Words full of Wind; yea, and more than that, to follow their Designs with im-

petuous Violence: But to direct their Undertakings to a successful Issue, and to remove by Industry or Providence, such hindrances as happen to traverse their Hopes, is granted but to a few; and now denied to Labienus, notwithstanding this Bravado. And therefore let such Commanders as are in good Opinion and Esteem with their General, be well wary of embarking their Party in any Cause, farther than may becom the Wisdom and Experience of judicious Leaders; as believing in that of Metellus to King Bocchus: *Omne Bellum sumi facile, ceterum acerrime definire: non in ejusdem Potestate initium ejus & Finem esse: incipere cuius etiam ignavo licere; deponi, cum Victores velint.* Every War is easily begun, but hardly so soon ended: The Beginning and the End of it are not in the same Man's Power: Any poor spirited Fellow may begin a War; but it shall end when the Conquerour pleaseth, and not before.

## CHAP. VII.

Cælius Rufus moveth Sedition in Italy, and is slain.

AT the same time. M. Cælius Rufus the Prætor at Rome, undertaking the Business of Debts, in the beginning of his Magistracy, placed his Seat by the Chair of C. Trebonius Prætor of the Town; promising to be assisting to any Man, that would appeal unto him, concerning Valuation and Payment to be performed by Arbitrators, according as Cæsar had ordained. But it came to pass, as well through the Equity and Indifferency of the Decree, as through the lenity of Trebonius (who was of Opinion, that those Times required an easie and mild Execution of Justice) that none were found, from whom the beginning of the Appeal might grow: For to pretend Poverty, or to complain of particular misfortune, and of the Calamity of those times, or otherwise to propound the difficulties of selling their Goods by an outcry, was every Man's Practice; but for any Man to acknowledge himself to be in debt, and yet to keep his Possessions whole and untouched, was held to be a very strange impudency: So that there was no Man found that would require it.

Moreover, Cælius carried a very hard Hand to such as should have received benefit thereby. And having made this entrance (to the end he might not seem to have undertook a shameful or dishonest Cause) he published a Law That there should be no Interest paid for any Monies let out upon Consideration, for thirty six Days of the time agreed on. But when he perceived that Servilius the Consul, and the rest of the Magistrates did oppose themselves against him therein, and finding it not to sort with his Expectation (to the end he might incite and stir up the Humours and Spirits of Men) he abrogated that Law, and instead thereof made two others. The one, which cut off the yearly Rents that Tenants were accustomed to pay their Land-Lords, for the Houses they dwelt in: And the other, touching new assurances, and the abolishing of old Debts. Whereupon the Multitude ran violently upon C. Trebonius, and having hurt divers that stood about him) pulled him out of his Chair.

Of these things Servilius the Consul made relation to the Senate: Who thereupon decreed, that Cælius should be removed from his Prætorship. And by means of that decree, the Consul interdicted him the Senate; and also drew him from the \* Speaking-Place, as he went about to make a Speech to the People. Cælius moved with Shame and despatch, made as though

*Frustra sapit,  
qui sibi non  
sapit.*

*Æncid. 6.*

*Lib. 16.*

*Roftra.*



though he would go to Cæsar; but sent Messengers secretly to Milo, condemned to Banishment for killing Clodius. And having recalled him into Italy, that by great Gifts and Rewards had gained to his Party the remainder of the Company of Fencers, he joyned himself with him: And then sent him before to Thurin, to excite and stir up the Shepherds to sedition; he himself going to Cassiline.

At the same instant, his Ensigns and Arms being stayed at Capua, besides his Family suspected at Naples, and their Attempt against the Town perceived; their other designs being discovered, and their Partizans shut out of Capua; fearing some danger, forasmuch as the Inhabitants had took Arms, and held him as an Enemy, he let fall his former determination, and brake off his Journey.

In the mean while, Milo, having sent Letters to the Municipal Towns, that what he did, was by the Authority and Commandment of Pompey, according as he received it from Bibulus, he applied himself to, and solicited such as were in Debt: With whom prevailing nothing, he brake up divers Prisons, and began to assault Cofa and Thurin: And there he was slain by Q. Pedius the Prætor, with a Stone which he cast from the Wall.

Cælius going on (as he gave out) towards Cæsar, he came to Thury; where when he had moved divers of the Inhabitants, and promised Money to the French and Spanish Cavalry, which Cæsar had put there for a Garrison, he was in the end slain by them. And so the beginning of great Matters, which put all Italy in Fear and Trouble, by the indirect Practices of the Magistrates, and the Iniquity of the Times, had a speedy and easie end.

## OBSERVATION.

IT is to be noted, for the better understanding these Passages, that of those which were chosen Prætors, the two chiefest remained at Rome. The one, to administer Justice to the Citizens, which was called Prætor Urbanus; who in the absence of the Consul, had the superintendency of the Affairs of the State, assembled the Senate, received Packets, made Dispatches, and gave Order in all things: Which Place was now supplied by Trebonius. The other was called Prætor Peregrinus: Whose Office was, to order the Causes and Suits of Foreigners and Strangers: Whereunto Cælius was chosen; and being of a turbulent and unquiet Spirit, took occasion upon this rent in the State, to raise new Commotions, fit for his own Purposes; as having learned what Aristotle teacheth, That all things which are already stirred are more easily moved, than other natures that are yet in quiet. And thereupon, having power by his Office to decide causes of Controversie, he removed his Tribunal, and placed it hard by where Trebonius sat, to the end he might oppose the Decrees he made, for the prizing of Goods to satisfy Creditours, and draw the People to appeal unto him; publishing withal certain dangerous Edicts, on the behalf of those that were in Debt.

This Cælius was Cicero's Scholar for Oratory; and in the opinion of Quintilian was thought worthy to have lived longer, if he had been of a staid and settled Carriage: But now must stand for an example of a wilful Magistrate.

Touching Rostra, which I have translated the Speaking-place, it was a part of their Forum, where the Consuls and other Magistrates spake unto the People: Wherein was built a Chair or Pulpit, of the Beak-Heads of Ships, which the Romans took from the Antiatii, and thereupon took the name of Rostra; memorable amongst other things, for

that Antony set Tully's Head between his two Hands, in the Chair where he had often spoken most eloquently, and with as many good Words, as were ever found in Human Oratory.

Plutarch.

## C H A P. VIII.

Libo taketh an Island right over against the Haven of Brundisium; and is beaten off by a Stratagem.

Libo departing from Oricum, with his Fleet of fifty Ships, came to Brundisium, and took an Island, which lieth over against the Haven, as a Place of great importance, by which our Army must necessarily come forth; thereby shutting in all the Ports, and Parts of that Shore: As also surprizing by his sudden coming, certain Ships of Burthen, he set all on fire, saving One laden with Corn which he took along with him. Whereby he put our Men into a great Fear; and landing certain Soldiers and Horsemen in the Night-time, he dislodged the Cavalry that were there in Garrison: And so prevailed, through the advantage of the Place, as he writ to Pompey, that he might draw the other Shipping on Shore, and new trim them, for he would undertake, with his Fleet alone, to hinder those Forces from coming to Cæsar.

Antonius was then at Brundisium; who trusting to the Valour of the Soldiers, armed out threescore Skiffs belonging to great Ships, and fencing them with Hurdles and Planks, put certain choice Soldiers in them, disposing them in several Places along the Shore: And further commanded two Triremes (which he had caused to be made at Brundisium, for the Exercise of the Soldiers in rowing) to go out to the Mouth of the Haven.

Libo perceiving these to come out somewhat loosely, and hoping to intercept them, sent out five Quadriremes to attack them: Which were no sooner come near unto our Ships, but the old Soldiers that were aboard, fled back into the Port.

The Enemy, carried on with a desire of taking them, pressed after somewhat rashly, and unadvisedly: When at length, upon a Signal given, the Skiffs came suddenly out from all Parts, set upon them, and at the first Shock, took one of the Quadriremes, with all the Oar-Men and Soldiers in her, the rest they compelled to fly away shamefully. To which Loss this was farther added, that they were kept from Water, by the Cavalry which Antonius had disposed along the Coast: through necessity whereof (as also by reason of the Ignominy received) Libo departed from Brundisium, and gave over the Siege.

Many Months were now past, and the Winter came hard on, and yet neither the Shipping nor the Legions came from Brundisium, to Cæsar. And some Opportunities seemed to be omitted, for that the Wind was good oftentimes; which Cæsar thought they would have taken. And the longer they stayed there, the freighter was all the Coast guarded and kept, by such as commanded the Fleet; being now in great hope to hinder their Passage. Which they did the rather endeavour, because they were oftentimes reproved by Letters from Pompey, for that they did not impeach Cæsar's coming at first: Which he did to make them the more careful, to hinder those Supplies. And in attending so from day to day an opportunity of Passage it would wax worse and worse, the Winds growing more easie and gentle.

OB-

Omnia me-  
mota facili-  
us quam quie-  
scentia mo-  
ventur. De  
Mechanicis.



## OBSERVATION.

BY how much easier it is to keep the Out-let of one Port, than to Guard the Coast of a large Country: By so much was *Libo* more likely to prevail, in seeking to shut up the Haven of *Brundisium*, to hinder these Supplies from coming unto *Cæsar*, than the other, that went about to Guard all the Maritime Parts of *Epirus*, to keep them from Landing, after they were at Sea.

*Incerta sunt  
res Belicæ.  
Thucyd.*

But such is the uncertainty of Enterprises of War, that albeit our course be rightly shapen, yet is doth often fail of leading us to that which is desired. For, howsoever he was possessed of this Island, that lay thwart the mouth of the Haven, and had thrust out the Guard of Horsemen, and so became confident of blocking up the Port: Yet there was means found by the adverse Party, to give him such an Assault, as made him quit the place with more Dishonour, than could be recompensed by any thing he got.

## CHAP. IX.

*Cæsar's* Supplies pass over into Greece, and take Landing.

*Cæsar.*

**C**æsar troubled at these things, writ very sharply to them at *Brundisium*, not to omit the opportunity of the next good Wind, but to put to Sea, and to shape their course to *Oricum*, or to the Coast of *Apollonia*; because there they might run their Ships on Ground: And these places were freest from Guards, by reason they could not ride far from the Ports.

They, according to their accustomed Courage and Valour (*Marcus Antonius* and *Fufius Calenus* directing the business, and the Soldiers themselves being forward thereunto, as refusing no danger for *Cæsar's* sake) having got a South Wind, weighed Anchor, and the next day passed by *Apollonia* and *Dyrrachium*: But being discovered from the Continent, *Quintus Coponius*, Admiral of the *Rhodian* Navy, lying at *Dyrrachium*, brought his Ships out of the Haven. And as he had almost (upon a slack Wind) overtaken our Men, the same South Wind began at length to blow stiff, by which means they escaped. Yet did not he desist from pursuing them; but was in hope, by the Labour and Industry of the Mariners, to overweigh the force of the Tempest, and followed them, notwithstanding they were past *Dyrrachium* with a large Wind. Our Men using the favour of Fortune, were nevertheless afraid of the Enemies Navy, if the Wind should chance to slack: And having got the Port called *Nymphæum*, three Miles beyond *Lissus*, they put in with their Ships.

This Port lay sheltered from the South-West Wind; but was not safe from a South Wind; howsoever, they accounted an ill Road less dangerous than the Enemies Fleet: And yet they were no sooner put in, but the Wind (which had blown Southerly for two days together) did now most happily come about to the South-West.

And here a Man may see the suddain alteration of Fortune; for they which of late stood in fear of a dangerous Road, were now by that occasion, received into a safe Harbour: And those which threatened danger to them, were forced to bethink themselves of their own safety. So that the time thus changing, the Tempest saved our Party, and sunk theirs. Insomuch as sixteen of the *Rhodian* Ships were all shaken in pieces, and perished with

Shipwrack; and of the great number of Oar-Men and Soldiers, part were dashed against the Rocks and slain, and part were taken up by our Men: All which *Cæsar* sent home in safety. Two of our Ships coming short, and overtaken with the Night, and not knowing where the rest had taken shore, stood at Anchor right over against *Lissus*. Them did *Otacilius Crassus*, Governour of *Lissus*, go about to take with Skiffs, and other little Ships, which he had prepared for that purpose; and withal, treated with them of yielding themselves, promising Life and safety upon that condition.

One of the Ships carried Two Hundred and Twenty Men, of the Legion made of young Soldiers; in the other were less than Two Hundred old Soldiers. And here a Man may see, what assurance and safety consisteth in Courage and Valour of Mind: for the new made Soldiers, terrified with the multitude of Ships that came against them, and spent with Seasickness, upon Oath made not to receive any hurt, did yield themselves to *Otacilius*: Who being brought all unto him, were, contrary to his Oath, most cruelly slain in his sight. But the Soldiers of the old Legions (howsoever afflicted with the inconvenience of the Tempest, and noisiness of the Pump) did not slack any thing of their ancient Valour: For having drawn out the first part of the Night in conditions of Treaty, as though they meant to yield themselves, they compelled the Master to run his Ship a-shore; and having got a convenient place, they there spent the rest of the Night.

As soon as it was day, *Otacilius* sent Four Hundred Horse, which had the guard of that part of the Coast, with others of the Garrison, to assault and take them: But they Valiantly defending themselves, slew divers of them; and so got to our Men in safety. Whereupon, the Roman Citizens residing in *Lissus*, (which Town *Cæsar* had formerly given them to be kept and guarded) received in *Antonius*, and assisted him with all things needful. *Otacilius*, fearing himself, fled out of the Town, and came to *Pompey*.

*Antonius* sent back the greatest part of the Ships that had brought over his Troops (which were three Legions of old Soldiers, one of new Soldiers, and Eight Hundred Horse) to transport the rest of the Soldiers and Horse, that remained at *Brundisium*: Leaving the Pontones, which are a kind of French Shipping, at *Lissus*; to this end, that if haply *Pompey*, thinking Italy to be empty and unfurnished, should carry over his Army thither, *Cæsar* might have means to follow him: And withal, sent Messengers speedily to *Cæsar*, to let him know where the Army was Landed, and what Men he had brought over.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**D**olus an virtus quis in hoste requirit, It is no matter whether the Enemy does his business by Valour or Subtilty; it is not so justifiable by the Laws of true Vertue, as that of *Achilles*, who professed to hate that Man more than the Gates of Hell, that promised one thing and purposed another. Neither do the Jurists conclude otherwise; having, for the more apparency of Truth, drawn it to a Question, *An perfidia in perfidum uti*, *Ius sit*, whether it be lawful to break Faith with a Faith-breaker; alledging *Labienus's* practice against *Comius* of *Arras*, together with that which admitteth no Answer, that their Example standeth as a Precedent, to deal with them as they deal with others. But to falsifie Religion, as *Otacilius* did, and to make an Oath the Broaker of unworthy Ends, is abhorred by God and Man, and accordingly succeedeth,

*Æneid. 2.*

*Homer 9.  
Iliad.*

*Hirtius lib. 8.  
de Bello Gallico.*

The



Uladilaus.

The most remarkable Instance in this kind is, that (which is to be wished were forgotten) of *Lewis King of Hungaria*, who having concluded the honourablest Peace, that ever Christian Prince had before that time made with any of the *Turkish Sultans*, and confirmed the same by an Oath taken upon the Holy Evangelist; did, nevertheless, at the perswasion of *Julian*, a Cardinal (who took upon him, by Power from the Pope, to disannul the League, and absolve him from the Oath) break the Peace, and gave Battel to *Amurath* at *Varna* (where the Infidel took occasion impiously to Blaspheme, in calling for Vengeance on such, as in their Deeds had denied the Godhead of their most sacred and blessed Lord) and was there slain, to the utter ruine of his Kingdom, and the reproach of the Christian Name. Neither did the Cardinal escape the Vengeance, which his Treachery had drawn upon that Royal Army: But being there Wounded unto Death, was found lying in the High-way, by *Gregory Sanofe*, ready to give up the Ghost; and seemed but to stay to take with him the bitter Curses of such as passed by, flying from the Battel, as the due Reward of his perfidious Absolution.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

Andaces fortuna juvat.  
Virtus omnia potest.  
Virtute faciendum est,  
quicquid in rebus bellicis est gerendum.

Plutarch.

IN case of difficulty and hazard (as *Cæsar* noteth) there is always great help in a good Courage. For, whether it be that good hap attendeth a Valorous Carriage, or that Vertue be able to remove all opposition, or what other cause there is besides; but thus it falleth out, that such as entertain a noble Resolution, are ever safest in extremity of Peril; and, instead of loss, get Honour and Renown.

6 Metamor.

Nunquam ita quisquam bene subducta ratione ad vitam suam.  
Quin res, etas, usus, semper aliquid adportet novi.  
Teren. Adelp.  
Multi homines pauci viri.  
Herod. lib. 7.

*Brasidas* found a Mouse amongst dried Figs, which Bit him so that he let her go, and thereupon said to those that stood by, That there was nothing so little, that could not save it self, if it had a Heart to defend it self against such as assaulted it. And herein we may observe that to be true, which the Poet hath delivered; *Seris venit usus ab annis*, Time and Practice do much avail to perfect this Courage in the Minds of Men of War; as knowing aforehand the weight of such Labours, and having encountered the like Dangers, even to the Redeeming of themselves from the Jaws of Death. Whence it is that the Comick saith, No Man can possibly come so well furnished to any course of Life, but that Time and Experience do always teach him what he knew not before: Whereas others that go rawly to work, are so daunted with the unusual looks of War, as they (forgetting the profession of Arms) do run headlong into the danger they seek to avoid; being able to give no other account of their Service, but that they marched many Bodies and but a few Men.

## The Third OBSERVATION.

Livy saith,  
That the Romans at the Siege of Veient, being out of Human Hope, turned their Eyes to Fate, and the hope they had in Destiny.

*Plutarch*, *Valerius Maximus*, *Appian*, *Suetonius*, and *Lucan*, do all write, that *Cæsar*, impatient of the stay of his Forces at *Brundisium*, Embarked himself in a small Frigate of twelve Oars, disguised in the habit of a Slave, and put to Sea to fetch his Legions; notwithstanding all the

Coast swarmed with the Enemies Shipping: But meeting with a contrary Wind, which would not suffer him to get out of the River *Anius*, the Master commanded the Mariners to cast about, and get to Shore. Whereupon *Cæsar* discovering himself, encouraged him to go forward, for that he carried *Cæsar* and his Fortunes.

The Master forgetting all danger, made out again to get to Sea; but was by force of the Tempest driven to return, to *Cæsar's* great Grief. And albeit there is no mention made hereof in these Commentaries, yet the authority of so many grave Authors is not to be contemned.

## C H A P. X.

*Cæsar* hasteth to meet with *Antonius*, and preventeth *Pompey*.

**C**æsar and Pompey had both intelligence almost at one instant of time, of *Antonius's* Fleet; for they saw them pass by *Apollonia* and *Dyrrachium*, and directed their Journeys along the Coast after them: But they understood not for a while where they were Landed. Howbeit, having notice thereof, either of them took a contrary resolution. For *Cæsar* purposed to joyn with *Antonius*, as soon as possibly he might: And *Pompey* resolved to hinder their meeting, and by Ambushments (if he could) to set upon them at unawares.

The same day, either of them drew their Army out of their standing Camps, upon the River *Apsus*: *Pompey* secretly, and by Night; *Cæsar* openly, and by Day: But *Cæsar* had the greater circuit to fetch, and a longer Journey to go up the River, to find a Foord. *Pompey* having a ready way, and no River to pass, made towards *Antonius* by great Journeys: And when he understood that he came near unto him, chose a convenient place, and there bestowed his Forces; keeping every Man within the Camp, and forbidding Fires to be made, that his coming might be the more hidden. Whereof *Antonius* being presently advertised by the Greeks, he dispatched Messengers to *Cæsar*, and kept himself one day within his Camp. The next day *Cæsar* came unto him. Upon notice thereof, *Pompey* left that place, lest he should be entrapped between two Armies, and came with all his Forces to *Asparagus* (which appertained to them of *Dyrrachium*) and there, in a convenient place, pitched his Camp.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**W**Here two Armies are in a Country, and one of them hath succours coming to reinforce them, each of those Parties are, by the example of these glorious Commanders (*ceteris paribus*) to make towards those Succours: The one, to cut them off; and the other, to keep them standing. And to that end, as it suited *Pompey's* Condition to go secretly; howsoever *Cæsar* noteth it, as a touch to his Valour: So on the other side, it stood not only well enough with *Cæsar's* Party to go openly, but also was an Argument of his Courage and Magnanimity, and might raise him estimation in the opinion of the Greeks. The disadvantage which *Pompey* could take thereby, was the danger to be enclosed with Armies; which he foreseeing, avoided.



## CHAP. XI.

Scipio's Preparation in Asia, to come into Greece, to assist Pompey.

Cæsar.

A Hill, separating Syria from Cilicia.

**A**Bout this time Scipio having sustained divers Losses near the Mount Amanus, did, nevertheless, call himself by the name of Imperator; and thereupon commanded great Sums of Money to be Levied of the Cities and Potentates of those Quarters: Taking from the General Receivers of that Province, all the Monies that were in their hands for two Years past, and commanding them to disburse (by way of Loan) the receipt for the Year to come; and required Horsemen to be Levied throughout all the Province. Having gathered these together, he left the Parthians, being near Enemies unto him (who a little before had slain M. Crassus the General, and Besieged M. Bibulus) and drew the Legions out of Syria; being sent specially thither to keep and settle that Province, much amused through fear of the Parthian War.

At his departure some Speeches were given out by the Souldiers, that if they were led against an Enemy they would go; but against a Citizen and Consul they would not bear Arms. The Army being brought to Pergamus, and there Garrisoned for that Winter in divers rich Cities, he distributed great Largesses and Gifts; and for the better assuring of the Soldier unto him, gave them certain Cities to Rife.

Columnaria  
Ofiaria.

In the mean time, he made bitter and heavy exactions of Money throughout all the Province: For he put a Tribute upon Slaves and Free-men by Pole, set Impositions upon the Pillars and Doors of Houses, as also upon Grain, Oar-Men, Arms, Engines, and Carriages; and whatsoever had a Name was thought fit to yield Money by way of Imposition; and that not only in Cities and Towns, but almost in every Village and Castle: Wherein he that carried himself most cruelly, was held both the worthiest Man, and the best Citizen.

The Province was at that time full of Officers and Commanders, pestered with Overseers and Exactors: Who, besides the Money Levied by Publick Authority, made their particular Profit by the like Exactions. For they gave out, they were thrust out of their Houses and their Country, and in want of all Necessaries; to the end they might with such Pretences, cover their wicked and hateful courses. To this was added the hard and heavy Usury, which oftentimes doth accompany War, when all Monies are drawn and exacted to the Publick; wherein the forbearance of a day was accounted a Discharge for the whole. Whereby it happened, that in those two Years, the whole Province was overgrown with Debts. And yet for all that, they stuck not to Levy round Sums of Money, not only from the Citizens of Rome, Inhabiting in that Province; but also upon every Corporation and particular City: Which they gave out was by way of Loan, according to a Decree of Senate; commanding the Receivers to advance the like Summ by way of Loan, for the Year to come.

Moreover, Scipio gave Order, that the Monies which of old time had been Treasured up in the Temple of Diana at Ephesus, should be taken out, with other Images of that Goddess. But as he came into the Temple (having called unto him many of the Senators that were there present) he received a Dispatch from Pompey, That Cæsar had passed the Sea with his Legions; and that, setting all things apart, he should hasten to him with his Army. These

Letters being received, he dismissed such as he had called unto him, and began to dispose of his Journey into Macedonia, setting forward within a few days after: By which accident the Treasure at Ephesus was saved.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T is Seneca's Conceit, that Iron, being of that excellent use in things pertaining to Man's Life, and yet so much undervalued to Gold and Silver, will admit of no Peace, as often as there is question of Money; but raiseth continual Com-motions and Extremities, as a Revenge that the World doth misvalue it: And fell out as true in those better Ages, as it doth in these days, that are of baser Disposition. For what greater Violences in the State of Rome, than those concerning Tributes and Impositions? A particular whereof may be made out of this Chapter. For first, we find a Tribute by Pole, without respect of State or Condition; which they called *Capitatio*. And then a second, as grievous as that, being a Tax laid upon every Door in a House, which they called *Ofiaria*: Whereof Tully maketh mention, in the Eighth Epistle of his Third Book. And lastly, Another upon every Pillar in a Man's House, which they called *Columnaria*: mentioned likewise by Cicero, *Columnarium vide ut nullum debeamus*, See that we owe no Tax-Money for our Pillars. *Alciatus* understandeth this to be that we read in *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, That when Treasure failed at the Siege of Modena, they laid an Imposition upon every Tile that was found on the Senators Houses in Rome, which gave the Triumvirate occasion to make the Tiles as heavy to the rest of the Roman Citizens: And this, saith he, was called *Columnaria*.

Some Popes, out of their occasions, have gone far in this kind, and found means to lay Impositions upon all things pertaining to the use of Man. Infomuch as *Pasquill* begged leave to dry his Shirt in the Sun, before there were an Imposition laid upon the Light. The Rule is diversly given in this behalf, That the Fisk doth not swell above his proportion. *Alexander* is commended for making his Subjects the Keepers of his Treasure. And *Claudianus* giveth *Honorius* this Elogium;

*Nec tua privatis crescunt araria damnis.*

Thy Chests fill not by loss of private Men.

*Basilus* adviseth that Money thus raised, be not at any time dipped either in the Tears or in the Blood of the People. But Tully draweth it to a more certainty, by making Necessity the square of such Commands. *Da operam*, (saith he) *ut omnes intelligant, si salvi esse velint, necessitati esse parendum*; Do your endeavour to let all see, that they must obey necessity if they mean to be safe. And so the opening of private Mens Purfes, is but to keep them shut and safe, from such Enemies as would consume all; according as *Scipio* once answered, when the Romans blamed him for spending their Treasure. Howsoever, *Scipio* knew well what he did, in getting into his hand such store of Treasure; for War cannot any way be maintained, but with plenty of Money: Neither can any State continue, if the Revenue which supporteth the Common-weal be abated; as *Tacitus* hath well observed, *Dissolvitur imperium, si fructus quibus respub. sustinetur diminuantur*.

*Propter aurum & argentum nunquam pacem facit Ferrum.* Lib. 14. Epist. 93. *Ferrum omnis artis instrumentum. Aurum & argentum mortis mancipia.* Epictetus.

*Capitatio.*

*Ofiaria.*

*Columnaria* 31 ad Atticum. Epist. 1.

*In the Papacy of Sixt. Quintus. Fiscus reipublice, quod ex crescentibus, artibus reliqui tabescunt.* Sex. Aurelius Victor.

*In Paraclet.*

*Plutarch.*

*Bella sustentantur pecuniarum abundantia.* Dion. Halicar. lib. 6. Annal. 13.



## C H A P. XII.

*Cæsar sendeth Forces into Theſſalia, Ætolia, and Macedonia. Scipio cometh into Greece.*

Cæſar.

**C**æſar being joyned with Antonius, drew that Legion out of Oricum, which he had formerly lodged there to keep the Sea-Coaſt; and thought it expedient to make Trial of the Province, and to advance further into the Country. And whereas Embaſſadors came unto him out of Theſſalia and Ætolia, aſſuring him, That if he would ſend Forces to protect them, the Cities of thoſe Provinces would readily obey what he Commanded: He ſent L. Caſſius Loginus, with the Legion of young Soldiers, called the Seven and Twentieth, and Two Hundred Horſe into Theſſalia; and C. Calviſius Sabinus, with Five Cohorts and a few Horſe into Ætolia; exhorting them eſpecially, to take a courſe for Proviſion of Corn in thoſe two Provinces, which lay near at hand.

Quæ libera  
appellabatur.

He ſent likewiſe Cn. Domitius Calvinus with two Legions, the Eleventh and the Twelfth, and Five Hundred Horſe into Macedonia: Of which Province (for that part thereof which is called Frank or Free) Menedemus, a principal Man of that Country, being ſent as an Embaſſador, had profeſſed exceeding great forwardneſs on their behalf. Of theſe, Calviſius, upon his coming, was entertained with great affection of the Ætolians: And having caſt the Garrifon of the Enemy out of Caledon and \* Naupaſtum, became Maſter of all Ætolia. Caſſius arrived with the Legion in Theſſalia; and finding there two Factions, was accordingly received with contrary Affections.

\* Lepanto.

Egeſaretus, a Man of ancient Power and Authority, favoured Pompey's Party: And Petreius, a Man of a moſt Noble Houſe, endeavoured by all means to deſerve well of Cæſar. At the ſame time alſo came Domitius into Macedonia: And as Embaſſadors began to come thick unto him from divers States of that Province, it was told him, That Scipio was at hand with the Legions, and came with great Fame and Opinion of all Men: Which is oftentimes a Fore-runner of Novelties. He, making no ſtay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly with great fury towards Domitius; and when he came within Twenty Miles of him, turned his courſe ſuddenly to Caſſius Longinus, in Theſſalia: Which he did ſo ſpeedily, that news came together of his coming, and of his Arrival. For, to the end he might March with greater Expedition, he left M. Favonius at the River Haliacmon (which divideth Macedonia from Theſſalia) with Eight Cohorts, to keep the Carriages of the Legions: Where he commanded them to build a Fort.

In Macedonia  
quæ velint  
ſibi candida  
naſci, ad Ha-  
liacmonem  
ducere; quæ  
nigra & ful-  
ca, ad Axium.

At the ſame time, the Cavalry of King Cottus, which was wont to keep in the Conſines of Theſſalia, came flying ſuddenly to Caſſius's Camp. Whereat he being aſtoniſhed (underſtanding of Scipio's coming, and ſeeing the Horſemen whom he thought to be his) made towards the Hills which encloſe Theſſalia, and from thence marched towards Ambracia. And as Scipio made haſte to follow after, Letters overtook him, ſent from Favonius, that Domitius was at hand with the Legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein he was left, without Scipio's help.

Upon the receipt of which Letters, Scipio altered both his Purpoſe and his Journey; and leaving Caſſius, made haſte to help Favonius: So that continuing his Journey Night and Day, he came unto him in very good time. For as the Duſt of Domitius's Army approaching, was ſeen to riſe, the fore-runners of Scipio's Army were likewiſe diſcovered.

*Whereby it happened, that as Domitius's Industry did help Caſſius, ſo did Scipio's ſpeed ſave Favonius.*

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**C**æſar being now ready with his Forces to proceed againſt Pompey, the firſt thing he did, was to make tryal of the Provinces of Greece, and to get their favour and aſſiſtance, for his better furtherance in conteſting his Adverſary. For as an Army ſtandeth firm by two ſpecial means, firſt, in themſelves, as they are able to reſiſt any oppoſing force; and ſecondly, through the favour of the Country, wherein they are engaged: So on the other ſide, their Overthrow either proceedeth from their own Weakneſs, or otherwiſe, when the Provinces adjoining do reſuſe ſuch mutual Reſpects, as may relieve the Wants of a conſuming multitude. And therefore, having got all the Forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, he ſent out to try the affection of the Country, and to alter that in a moment, which Pompey had been ſettling for a Year together, and then reſolved to Attack him nearer.

And doubtleſs, if Scipio had not by chance interrupted their courſe, upon his coming out of Aſia to aid Pompey, they had as eaſily got all Theſſalia and Macedonia, as they did Ætolia: And were nevertheleſs ſo ordered and diſpoſed, as they got more Honour of Scipio, than he could win of them.

## C H A P. XIII.

*The Paſſages between Domitius and Scipio.*

**S**cipio abode two days in his ſtanding Camp, <sup>Cæſar,</sup> upon the River Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's Camp. The third day, as ſoon as it began to be Light, he paſſed his Army over the River by a Ford, and Encamped himſelf. The next day in the Morning, he Embattelled his Forces before the front of his Camp. Domitius, in like manner, made no difficulty of bringing out his Legions, reſolving to Fight. And whereas there lay a Field of ſix Miles between both the Camps, he led his Troops Embattelled under Scipio's Camp; who nevertheleſs reſuſed to move any jot from his ſtanding: Yet, for all that, Domitius's Soldiers were hardly kept from giving Battel; but eſpecially a River lying under Scipio's Camp, with broken and uneaſie Banks, did hinder them at that time.

Scipio, underſtanding of their alacrity and deſire to Fight, ſuſpecting it might happen, that the next day he ſhould be forced to Fight againſt his Will, or with great diſhonour keep himſelf within his Camp, having, with great expectation in the beginning gone on raſhly, and unadviſedly, was now diſhonoured with a reproachful end. For in the Night-time he roſe, without any noiſe or warning for the truſſing up of the Baggage, and paſſing the River, returned the ſame way he came: And in an eminent place, near unto the River, he pitched his Camp.

A few days after he laid an Ambuſkment of Horſemen in a place, where our Men had formerly accuſtomed to Forage. And as Q. Varus, General of the Horſe in Domitius's Army, came out according to his ordinary uſe, they ſet upon him at a ſudden. But our Men did valiantly ſuſtain the onſet; and every Man betaking himſelf ſpeedily to his Rank, they all together of their own accord, charged the Enemy: And having ſlain Fourſcore, they put the reſt to flight, with the loſs only of two of their Men.



## OBSERVATION.

IT appeareth here, that to shew a readines and resolution to Fight, upon such grounds as are justifiable by the Rules of War, is no small advantage to the prosperous Carriage of the same. For albeit Scipio was great in his own strength, and as great in the opinion and expectation of Men: Yet when he found such an alacrity in the Enemy, to give and take Blows, and a desire to entertain seriously all occasions of giving Battel; he was so far from prosecuting what he had pretended, as he rather chose the fortune of a safe Retreat, and consequently, to turn the advantage which the World in Opinion had given to his Army, to his own reproach and disadvantage. Whereas on the other side, to be found for the most part unwilling to hazard the tryal of a Field, or indisposed to Fight upon any occasion, doth invite an Enemy to attempt that, which otherwise he would not; and giveth them Courage to beat him from all his Purposes, as knowing the resolution of their Adversary, and the means they have, either to take or leave at their pleasure.

## CHAP. XIV.

Domitius draweth Scipio to a Loss, by an Ambushment. Young Pompey's Attempt upon Oricum.

Cæsar.

**A**fter these things, Domitius hoping that Scipio might be drawn to Fight, he made as though he were in great Want and Scarcity of Corn: And thereupon, rising from the place wherein he was Encamped, with the usual cry of removing, according to the custom of War, and having marched three Miles, he lodged all his Army, with the Cavalry, in a convenient and secret place.

Scipio being ready to follow after, sent his Horsemen, and a great part of his Light-armed Soldiers, to discover what way Domitius took; who marching forward, as the first Troops came within the Ambushment (suspecting somewhat by the Neighing of the Horses) they fell back again. Those that followed after, seeing the former Troops so suddainly to retire, stood still.

Our Men finding themselves discovered, and thinking it in vain to attend the rest, having got two Troops of Horse within their reach, they contented themselves with them; amongst whom was M. Opimius, the General of the Horse. The rest of those two Troops they either put to the Sword, or took alive, and brought them to Domitius.

Cæsar, as is before shewed, having withdrawn the Garrisons from along all the Sea-Coast, left only three Cohorts at Oricum, for the defence of the Town: And to them he committed the custody and safe keeping of the Gallies, which he had brought out of Italy; whereof Acilius the Legate had the Charge, being left Governour of the Town. He, for the better security of the Shipping, had drawn all the Fleet into a back Angle, behind the Town, and there fastened them to the Shore: And in the mouth of the Haven had sunk a great Ship, and set another by her, upon which he built a Tower, to keep the entrance of the Port; and filled the same with Soldiers, to defend the Haven from any suddain Attempt.

Upon notice whereof, Pompey's Son, being Admiral of the Egyptian Fleet, came to Oricum, and with many Haulsers and Hooks weighed up the sunk

Ship; and assaulted the other Ship, set by Acilius for the defence of the Haven, with Ships wherein he had made Towers, which stood by counterpoize, that he might Fight with advantage of height, supplying continually fresh Men; and attempting also from the Land side, to take the Town by Scaling-Ladders, as by Sea with his Navy, to the end he might distract and dismember the Forces within.

In the end, with extream Labour and multitude of Weapons, he overcame our Party, and took the Ship, having cast out such as had the Guard; who fled all away with Skiffs and Boats. At the same time, being likewise seized of a small height, on the other side of the Town, in the nature of a Peninsula, he conveyed over four small \* Gallies, with Rollers and Levers, into the inner part of the Harbour, lying behind the Town; insomuch, as setting on each side upon the Gallies tied unto the Shore, empty and unfurnished, he carried four of them away, and burned the rest.

This being done, he left D. Lælius, whom he had taken from the Egyptian Fleet, to keep the Passage, that no Vittuals, or other Provisions, might be brought into the Town, either from Bullis or Amantia: And he himself going to Lissus, found thirty Ships of Burthen, which Antonius had left within that Haven, and set them all on Fire. And as he went about to take Lissus, the Soldiers which Cæsar had put there for a Garrison to the Town, together with the Roman Citizens, and the Townsmen thereof, did so well defend the same, that after he had continued there three days, and lost a few Men in the Siege, he left the place without effecting any thing.

\* Biremes.

## OBSERVATION.

**A**N Ambushment is easily at all times laid: But to do it so that it may not be suspected, and in such manner that the Enemy may fall into the danger thereof, is that which is to be aimed at therein. And therefore, to give the better colour to such Designs, the trick hath been to pretend Fear (and so flight) or want of Corn, or somewhat else, to draw the Enemy to follow after with more boldness and resolution. And so to have it well done, there must be two Deceits to assist each other; as in this of Domitius: To make shew of removing, through Scarcity and Want; and then to lie in wait for an advantage: According to that of the Spaniard, *A un Traydor, Oportet hostium discessionem semper suspectas habere.* For the prevention of such Snares of Deceit, the Rule is generally given by Onofander, That the departure or falling away of an Enemy, is always to be suspected.

And for the more security therein, experienced Commanders have been careful before they stirred their Army, to make exact discovery, even to the place where they intended to lodge. For as in Physick, it is the greatest part of the Cure, to know the Disease: So in matter of War, the danger is almost over, when it is perceived whence it may grow.


The manner observed in Discoveries, hath usually been to send the Parties out in three Companies or Troops; The first, consisting of a small number, to beat the way at ease, and to range about from place to place, as shall be found convenient: The second Company being somewhat stronger, to second and relieve the first, if there be occasion: And the third, able to engage a good number of the Enemy.

And after this manner Cyrus disposed of his fore-runners; as appeareth in Xenophon. But this being subject to the consideration of Time and Place, and other circumstances may vary, as shall seem expedient to the Wisdom of the General.


\* Cyropæd.

## CHAP.
















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## C H A P. XV.

*Cæsar marcheth towards Pompey; offereth him Battel; and cutteth him off from Dyrrachium.*

Cæsar

**A**fter Cæsar understood that Pompey was at Asparagus he marched thitherward with his Army: And taking by the way the Town of the Parthinians, wherein Pompey had put a Garrison, the third day he came to Pompey in Macedonia, and lodged himself fast by him. The next day he drew out his Forces; and putting them in order, presented him Battel. But when he found that he would not accept thereof, he drew back his Army into the Camp, and bethought himself of some other course. For the next day, taking a difficult and narrow Way, he set forward with all his Forces towards Dyrrachium: hoping either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Town, or at least to cut him off from all Convoys and Munition, which was there stored up for the whole provision of the War; as afterwards it came to pass. For Pompey being ignorant at first of his purpose, inasmuch as he took a contrary way, thought he had been driven thence through scarcity and want of Corn. But being afterwards advertised by the Scouts what course he took, he rose the next day, in hope to meet him a nearer way. Which Cæsar suspecting, exhorted the Soldiers to endure a little labour with patience. And resting a small part of the Night, in the Morning he came before Dyrrachium, even as the first Troop of Pompey's Army was discovered afar off; and there incamped himself.

Quemque  
vocat collem  
Thaulantius  
incola Pe-  
tram. Lucan.

Pompey being cut off from Dyrrachium, when he could not accomplish his purposes, fell to a second resolution, and fortified his Camp in an eminent place, called Petra: From whence there was an indifferent passage to the Ships, and sheltered likewise the Haven from certain Winds. Thither he commanded part of the Ships to be brought, together with Corn and provision of Victual from Asia, and such other Countries as were in his obedience.

Cæsar, doubting that the War would prove long and tedious, and despairing of an succour of Victuals from the Coast of Italy, for that all the Shore was (with great diligence) kept by Pompey's Party, and that the Shipping which in Winter he had made in Sicily, Gallia, and Italia, were stayed and came not to him; he dispatched L. Canuleius a Legate into Epirus, to make provision of Corn.

And forasmuch as those Regions were far off, he appointed Storehouses and Magazines in certain places, and imposed carriage of Corn upon the Country bordering about them. In like manner, he commanded what Grain soever should be found at Lissus, Parthenia, or any other place, to be brought unto him: which was very little, forasmuch as the Country thereabout was rough and mountainous, and afforded no Corn, but that which was brought in from other places; as also, that Pompey had taken order in that behalf, and a little before had ransacked the Parthinians, and caused his Horsemen to carry away all the Grain, which was found amongst them.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**T**He first thing that Cæsar did, after their approach near one unto another, was to offer Battel; as the best Arbitrator of the Cause in question, and most fitting the custom of the ancient Romans. But, forasmuch as the endeavours of such as are in action, are always ordered by him that is the Sufferer; and that Pompey refused to accept thereof, knowing himself to be much

stronger in Forces, better accommodated, having a far greater Party in the Country, and the Sea wholly at his command (which advantages were like to end the business, without hazard of a Battel;) Cæsar bethought himself of some other Project, which might take away the scorn of that refusal, by undertaking such things as much imported the state of his Adversary. For in such cases, when an Enemy will not fight, somewhat must be done to cast dishonour, or greater inconveniences, upon him; or at least, to make overtures of new opportunities. And therefore he took a course, either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Town wherein all his provisions of War were stored up, or otherwise to cut him off from the same. The least of which was a sufficient acquittance of any disgrace, which the neglect of this offer might seem to infer; having thereby occasion to use that of the Poet, *Jam sumus ergo pares*, now we are even.

## C H A P. XVI.

*Cæsar goeth about to besiege Pompey.*

**C**æsar being informed of these things, entered into a deliberation, which he first took from the very nature of the place wherein they were: For whereas Pompey's Camp was inclosed about with many high and steep Hills, he first took those Hills, and built Forts upon them; and then, as the condition of each place would bear, he made Works of Fortification from one Fort to another, and determined to inclose Pompey about with a Ditch and a Rampier. And especially upon these considerations; for that he was greatly straitened through want of Corn, and that Pompey being strong in Horse, he might with less danger supply his Army from all parts with Provision: and also to the end he might keep Pompey from Foraging, and so make his Cavalry unserviceable in that kind: And further, that he might abate and weaken the exceeding great reputation, which Pompey had attained unto amongst foreign Nations, when it should be noised throughout the World, that he was besieged by Cæsar, and durst not fight.

Pompey would by no means be drawn to leave the commodity of the Sea, and the Town of Dyrrachium, having there laid up all his provision of War, Arms, Weapons, Engines of what sort soever; besides Corn, which was brought from thence to his Army by Shipping. Neither could he hinder Cæsar's Fortifications, unless he would accept of Battel, which for that time he was resolved not to do. Only it remained, as the last thing he could think of, to possess himself of as many Hills as he might, and to keep as much of the Country as he could with good and strong Guard; and by that means, to abstract, as much as possibly he might, Cæsar's Forces: as accordingly it fell out. For having made twenty four Castles and Forts, he took in twenty five Miles of the Country in circuit, and did Forage within that space, and there caused many things to be set and planted by hand, which in the interim served as Food for Horses.

And as our Men perceived their Fortifications to be carried, and continued from one Castle to another, without intermission; they began to fear, lest they had left some places to sally out, and so would come upon them behind, before they were aware.

And the reason they made their Works thus perfect, throughout the whole inward circuit, was, that our Men might not enter in upon them, nor circumvent them behind. But they (abounding in number of Men) exceeded in their Works, having also on the inside a less compass to fortifie.

And

Actus affi-  
vorum in pa-  
tientiis sunt  
dispositiones.  
Arist.  
Metaph.



And as Cæsar went about to take any place, albeit Pompey was resolved not to fight, or interrupt him with all his Forces: Nevertheless he sent out his Archers and Slingers, of which he had great numbers; by whom many of our Men were wounded, and stood in great fear of the Arrows: and almost all the Soldiers made them Coats, either of Quilt or Stiffening, or of Leather, to keep them from danger.

Ex subco-  
actis & cen-  
tonibus.

To conclude, either Party used all force and means to take places, and make Fortifications: Cæsar, to shut up and straiten Pompey what he could; and Pompey, to enlarge himself, and possess as many Hills as conveniently he might; which gave occasion of many Skirmishes and Encounters.

## OBSERVATION.

WE may here take notice of the strangest enterprize, that ever was undertaken by a judicious Soldier. For where else may it be read or understood, that a weaker Party went about to besiege a strong Adversary, and to inclose a whole Country by Castles and Towers, and perpetual Fortifications from Hill to Hill; to the end he might shut him up, as he lay incamped in the Field? But herein appear the infinite and restless endeavours of a Roman Spirit, and the Works they wrought to achieve their own ends: and yet not besides the limits of Reason. For if that of Seneca have any affinity with Truth, That a Man is but a common, or rather contemptible thing, unless he raise himself above ordinary courses: It is more specially verified in a Soldier; whose Honour, depending upon the superlative degree, must seek out projects beyond all equality: and the rather, upon such inducements as are here alledged; which shew good reason he had to be so mad.

Contempta  
res est homo,  
nisi supra  
humana se  
erexit.

Cum ratione  
insanire.

## CHAP. XVII.

A Passage that happened between both Parties, about the taking of a Place.

Cæsar.

Amongst these Fights and Encounters, it happened, as Cæsar's ninth Legion had taken a certain Place, and there began to fortifie, Pompey had possessed himself of the Hill next adjoining thereunto, and began to hinder our Men from their Work. And having from one side an easie access unto it, first with Archers and Slingers, and afterwards with great Troops of light-armed Men, and Engines of Battery, he began to disturb them in their business. Neither were our Men able, at one and the same time, to defend themselves, and go on with their Fortifications.

Cæsar seeing his Soldiers wounded and hurt from all parts, commanded them to fall off, and leave the Place. But forasmuch as they were to make their retreat down the Hill, they did the more urge and press upon them; and would not suffer them to fall back, for that they seemed to forsake the Place for fear. It is reported that Pompey should then, in a vain-glory, say to those that were about him, That he would be content to be taken for a General of no worth, if Cæsar's Men could make any retreat from thence (where they were so rashly engaged) without great loss.

Cæsar fearing the retreat of his Soldiers, caused Hurdles to be brought, and set against the Enemy, in the brim of the Hill; and behind them sunk a Trench of an indifferent breadth, and incumbered the place as much as possibly he could. He lodged also Slingers in convenient places, to defend his Men in their retreat.

These things being perfected, he caused the Legions to be drawn back. But Pompey's Party began with greater boldness and insolency to press our People: and putting by the Hurdles, which were set there as a Barricado, they passed over the Ditch. Which when Cæsar perceived, fearing lest they should rather seem to be beaten off, than be brought back, whereby a greater scandal might consequently ensue, having almost from the mid-way encouraged his Men by Antonius, who commanded that Legion, he willed that the sign of charging the Enemy should be given by a Trumpet, and gave order to assault them.

The Soldiers of the ninth Legion, putting themselves suddenly into order, threw their Piles: And running furiously from the lower ground, up the steep of the Hill, drave the Enemy headlong from them; who found the Hurdles, the long Poles, and the Ditches, to be a great hinderance unto them in their retreat. It contented our Men to leave the place without loss: so that having slain many of them, they came away very quietly, with the loss of five of their Fellows. And having stayed about that place a while, they took other Hills, and perfected the Fortifications upon them.

## OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter sheweth, that advantage of place, and some such industrious courses as may be fitted to the occasion, are of great consequence in extremities of War: but above all, there is nothing more available to clear a Danger, than Valour. Valour is the Hercules that overcometh so many Monsters: and verifieth that saying, which cannot be too often repeated, *Virtute faciendum est, quicquid in rebus bellicis est gerendum*, What a Man does in matter of War, must be done with Valour. But of this I have already treated.

## CHAP. XVIII.

The scarcity which either Party endured in this Siege.

THE carriage of that War was in a strange Cæsar, and unusual manner, as well in respect of the great number of Forts and Castles, containing such a circuit of Ground within one continued Fortification, as also in regard of the whole Siege, and of other consequents depending thereupon. For whosoever goeth about to besiege another, doth either take occasion from the weakness of the Enemy, daunted or stricken with fear, or overcome in Battel, or otherwise being moved thereunto by some injury offered; whereas now it happened that they were far the stronger, both in Horse and Foot. And generally, the cause of almost all Sieges is, to keep an Enemy from provision of Corn: But Cæsar, being then far inferiour in number of Soldiers, did nevertheless besiege an Army of intire and untouched Forces, especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary Provisions; for every day came great store of Shipping from all parts, bringing plenty of all things needful: neither could there any Wind blow, which was not good from some part or other.

On the other side, Cæsar having spent all the Corn he could get, far or near, was in great want and scarcity: And yet notwithstanding, the Soldiers did bear it with singular patience; for they remembered how they had suffered the like the Year before in Spain, and yet with patience and labour had ended a great and dangerous War. They remembered likewise the exceeding great want they endured at Alesia, and much greater at Avaricum: and yet, for all that, they went away Conquerours of many great Nations.

They



They refused neither Barley nor Pease, when it was given them instead of Wheat. And of Cattel (whereof they were furnished with great store out of Epirus) they made great account.

There was also a kind of Root, found out by them that were with Valerius, called Chara, which eaten with Milk did much relieve their want; and made withal a kind of Bread, whereof they had plenty. And when Pompey's Party happened in their Communications, to cast in their teeth their scarcity and misery; they would commonly throw this kind of Bread at them, and scatter it in divers places, to discourage them in their hopes. And now Corn began to be ripe, and hope it self did relieve their want, for that they trusted to have plenty within a short time. And oftentimes the Soldiers, in their Watches and Conferences, were heard to let fall Speeches, that they would rather eat the Bark of Trees, than suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands.

Besides, they understood by such as ran away from the Enemy, that their Horse of service could scarce be kept alive, and that the rest of their Cattel were all dead, and that the Soldiers themselves were in no good health, as well through the narrowness of the place wherein they were pent, as also by means of the ill savour and multitude of dead bodies, together with continual labour, being unaccustomed to Travel and Pains, but especially, through the extream want of Water; for all the Rivers and Brooks of that quarter, Cæsar had either turned another way, or dammed up with great Works. And as the places were mountainous, with some intermission and distinction of Valleys, in the form and fashion of a Cave or Den; so he stopped the same with great Piles beaten into the ground, and interlaced with Faggots and Hurdles, and then strengthened with Earth to keep back the Water: insomuch as they were constrained to seek low grounds, and Marshy places, and there to sink Wells. Which labour they were glad to undertake, besides their daily Works, albeit these Wells stood far distant from their Garrisons, and were quickly dried up with heat.

But Cæsar's Army was in exceeding good health, and had plenty of Water, together with all kind of Provisions, excepting Wheat; which the season of the Year daily brought on, and gave them hope of store, Harvest being so near at hand.

In this new course of War, new policies and devices of warfare were invented and put in practice by either Party. They, perceiving by the Fires that our Cohorts in the Night-time kept Watch at the Works, came stealing out, and discharged all their Arrows upon them, and then presently retreated. Wherewith our Men being warned, found out this remedy; that they made their Fires in one place, and kept their Watch in another.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Forasmuch as all matter of attempt doth much import the fortune of a War, we may not omit to take notice of the reasons here expressed by Cæsar, which are the true motives of undertaking a Siege. The first is drawn either from the weakness of an Enemy, or as he is daunted with fear, or overcome in Battel. For having thereupon no confidence in his own power, he resteth himself in the strength of the Place which he holdeth and possesseth: which giveth his Adversaries occasion to lay siege unto his Hold; and either to force them, or shut them up like Women.

The second is, when one State hath offered injury to another (which always importeth loss) beyond that which stood with the course of respect formerly held between them. For revenge whereof, the other side layeth siege to some of their

Towns, to repair themselves by taking in the same.

And thirdly, the final cause of all Sieges is, to keep an Enemy from Victual, and other manner of Provisions; and so to take them by the Belly, when they cannot take them by the Ears; which is a part so violent, in requiring that which is due to Nature, as it hath made the Father and the Son fall out for a Mouse: as it happened at Athens, besieged by Demetrius. Plutarch.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing worthy our consideration is, the patience and deportment of Cæsar's Soldiers, in their so great wants and necessities. As first, in helping themselves with this Root called Chara, described by Dioscorides, to be a little Seed, Lib. 3. c. 39. tasting somewhat like Anniseed, good to help digestion, and having such a Root as a Carrot, which being boiled, is very good Meat; and is the same which our Physicians call Caraway-seed: where- Labor militie assidua frugalitatis consuetudine facilius est. Justin. with they served their turn with such contentment, as they seemed to have been trained up in the School of Frugality; a vertue worthy of all regard, and the only means to make easie the difficulties of War, being as necessary for a Soldier, as the use of Arms; and is that which was aimed at in the answer of Cyrus, to shew the services in a Soldier's diet. For being demanded, what he would have made ready for Supper; Bread, saith he; for we will Sup at the Fountain. Cyrus contented with bread and water. Xenophon.

Neither hath it been thought fit, to give way to the natural looseness of the Stomachs Appetite, upon any occasion; but to use the like moderation in the time of plenty. For Zeno took the answer of them, that would excuse their liberal expences by their ability of means, for no better payment, than they themselves would have taken the excuse of their Cooks, for putting too much Salt on their Meat, because they had Salt enough.

Cæsar punished his Baker, for giving him better Bread than his Soldiers had. And Scipio cashiered a couple of Romans at the siege of Carthage, for feasting a Friend in their Tent, during an Assault. Which austerity of life raised the Romans to that height of Honour, and made them Masters of the World, from the East to the Western Ocean.

Secondly, as a consequent of this contentment, we may note their resolution to hold on their course of Siege; purposing rather to eat the Bark of Trees, than to suffer Pompey to escape their hands. It is an excellent point in a General, to keep himself from irresolution; being a weakness of ill consequence, and not unlike the disease of the Staggers, variable, uncertain, and without bottom or bound: whereas constancy to purposes, produceth noble and worthy ends. Aequale oportet semper esse Imperatoris animum: mutari enim pro rerum varietatibus, mentis instabilis argumentum efficitur. Agapetus.

An instance whereof is Fabius Maximus, who notwithstanding the reproach and scandal cast upon him, continued firm in his determination, to the saving of his Country. And if it be so well befitting a Leader, it is of much more regard in the Soldier: especially considering that of Xenophon; *Non facile in officio potest miles contineri ab eo, qui necessaria non subministrat*: He cannot easily keep his Soldiers in obedience, which does not provide them necessities. For, as the same Author observeth in another place, *Nullus est adeo fortis aut validus, qui possit adversus famem aut frigus pugnando militare*; There is no Man so stout and valorous, that can fight against Cold and Hunger. Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit Rem. Enn.

Lib. 6. de Cyropad.



## The Third OBSERVATION.

**A**mongst all the parts of the Roman discipline, their Watch deserveth a particular description; supplying in the Army, the Office of the natural Eye in the Body, which is, to give notice of any approaching danger, for the preventing of the same. Polybius hath left it to posterity in this manner; Of each sort of the Legionary Foot, as namely the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, and likewise of the Horse, there was chosen one out of the tenth and last Maniple, that was made free from Watch and Ward. This Party, as the Sun began to decline, came daily to the Tent of the Tribune, and there had given him a little Tablet, wherein the watch-word was writ; which Tablet they called *Tessera*: And then returning to his Company, delivered it to the Centurion of the next Maniple, and that Centurion to the next, and so in order, until it came to the first and chiefest Company, which was lodged next unto the Tribunes; and by the Centurion thereof was returned to the Tribune before Sun-setting.

And if all the Tablets were brought in, then did the Tribune know the word was given to all. If any wanted, they made enquiry, and by the notes of inscription finding which was missing, they punished the default as they saw cause. And this was their watch-word, by which their Party was distinguished from an Enemy; and in likelihood (for Polybius doth not affirm so much) was by the Centurion given to such of his Maniple as were to watch that Night.

Their Night-watches were thus ordered; a Maniple, or Company, was always appointed to watch at the Generals Pavilion. The Treasurer had three Watches, and every Legate two. A Watch consisted of four Men, according to the general division of their Night into four parts: each of those four having his turn appointed him by Lot, for the first, second, third, or fourth Watch, and the rest sitting by. The *Velites* kept watch without the Camp, and the *Decuries* of Horse at the Gates. Besides, every Maniple had private watch within it self.

Of those that were appointed to watch, a Lieutenant of each Maniple did bring to the Tribune in the Evening, such as were to keep the first watch of the Night: and to them were delivered lesser Tablets, than were given at first, called *Tesserule*, appropriated to every particular Watch; one for himself, and three other for his Fellows.

The trust of going the Round was committed to the Horsemen: for it belonged to the first Commander of Horse in each Legion, to give order to his Lieutenant, to appoint before Dinner four young Men of his Troop, to go the Round the next; and in the Evening, to acquaint the next Commander to appoint Rounds for the Night following. These Horsemen being thus appointed, did cast Lots for the first, second, third, and fourth Watch, and then repaired to the Tribune; of whom they had order what, and how many Watches to visit, having received the watch-word before from their Commander: And then all four went to attend at the Tent of the *Primipile*, or chiefest Centurion of a Legion, who had the charge of distinguishing the four Watches of the Night by a Trumpet.

When time served for him that was to go the Round the first Watch, he went out accompanied with some of his Friends, and visited those Watches which were assigned unto him. And if he found the Watch-man waking, and in good order, he then took that Tablet from him which he had received of the Tribune, and departed. But

if he found him sleeping, or out of his place, he took witness thereof, and departed. The same did the rest of the Rounds, as their Watches fell out in course. And as the Day began to break, all the Rounds brought in the Tablets to the Tribunes. And if all were brought in, there was no more to do: But if any wanted, it was found out by the Character, what Watch had failed; which being known, the Centurion was called, and commanded to bring those that were faulty. If the offence were in the Watch-man, the Rounds was to prove it by witnesses: if not, it fell upon himself; and a Council of War being presently called, the Tribune gave judgment to kill him with a Club. And in this manner did the Romans keep watch in the Camp.

## C H A P. XIX.

A relation of divers Encounters that happened between both Parties.

**I**N the mean time Pub. Sylla, whom Cæsar (at his departure from the Camp) had left to command the Army, being certified thereof, came with two Legions to succour the Cohort: at whose approach, Pompey's Party was easily beaten off, being neither able to endure the shock nor sight of our Men. For the first being put off, the rest gave back, and left the place: But as our Men pursued them, Sylla called them back, and would not suffer them to follow far after. Howbeit, many Men think, that if he would have pressed hard upon them, the War had ended that day. But in my opinion, he is not to be blamed; for there is one charge and power peculiar to a Lieutenant, and another to him that commandeth in Chief: the one doing nothing but by order and prescription, and the other disposing every thing as he shall think fit.

Sylla (in Cæsar's absence) having freed his Men, was content therewith, and would no further engage them in fight (which might happily prove subject to ill fortune) lest he should seem to assume unto himself the Place and Authority of a General. There were certain things that made the retreat of Pompey's Men very difficult and hazardous. For having ascended from a bottom to a Hill, they now found themselves upon the top thereof. And as they were to make their retreat down again, they stood in fear of our Men, pressing on them from the higher ground; neither was it far from Sun-setting (for hoping to end it speedily, they drew out the business until it was almost Night) whereby Pompey was forced to take a resolution from the time, and to possess himself of a Mount, no further from the Fort than out of shot. There he made a stand, fortified the place, and kept his Forces.

At the same time they fought in two other places: for Pompey, to separate and distract our Troops, assaulted divers Forts together, to the end they might not be succoured from the next Garrisons. In one place, Volcatius Tullus with three Cohorts sustained the assault of a Legion, and made them forsake the place. In another part, the Germans sallying out of our Works, slew many of the Enemy, and returned back to their Fellows in safety. So that in one day there were six several fights; three at Dyrrachium, and three at the Fortifications: of all which an account being taken, there were found slain of Pompey's Party, to the number of two thousand, with many Centurions, and other special Men called out to that War. Amongst whom was Valerius Flaccus, the Son of Lucius, who being Prætor had obtained the Province of Asia: besides, there were six Ensigns taken. Our Party lost not above twenty Men in all those fights; howbeit in the Fort there was not one Man but was hurt.

Four

There is a great part of the History in this place omitted. Cæsar.

Aliæ sunt Legati partes, arque Imperatoris.

Evocati.



Millibus du-  
centis æris.  
Prinipilus.

Four Centurions of one Cohort lost their Eyes; and for argument of their endeavour and great danger, they made report to Cæsar, of Thirty Thousand Arrows shot into the Fort. There was also a Target of one Scæva, a Centurion, which was shewed unto him, being pierced through in Two Hundred and Thirty places; whom Cæsar (as having well deserved of him and the Commonwealth) rewarded with Six Hundred Pound Sterling; and advanced him from the Companies of the eighth Rank, to be the chiefest Centurion, or Prinipile of the Legion: For it appeared, that by his means especially the Fort was saved. For the Cohort, he doubled their Pay, as well in Money, as in Corn and Apparel; and rewarded them nobly with ornaments of Military Honour.

Pompey having wrought all that Night, to fortifie his Trenches, the days following he built Towers 15 Foot high; which being finished, he added Mantelets to that part of the Camp. And after five days, having got a dark Night (shutting all the Ports of his Camp, and ramming them up) in the beginning of the third Watch, he drew out his Army in silence, and betook himself to his old Fortifications.

## OBSERVATION.

THE breach of the History in this place, is like a Blot in a fair Table, or as a Gap in a Dance of Nymphs, and doth much blemish the beauty of this Discourse. But, forasmuch as it is a loss which cannot be repaired, we must rest contented with the use of that which remaineth.

Out of which we may observe the notice they took of well-deserving; according to the Institution of their Discipline, supported especially by Premium and Pœna, Reward and Punishment. The recognition whereof (according to the judgment of the gravest Law-givers) is the means to raise a state to the height of Perfection. *Eo enim impendi laborem & periculum, unde emolumentum & honos speratur*, Men will then venture and take pains, when they know they shall get themselves Honour and Preferment by it. The Romans, saith Polybius, crowned the Valour of their Soldiers with eternal Honours. Neither did any thing so much excite them to the achievement of Noble Acts, as their Triumphs, Garlands, and other Ensigns of publick Renown: Which Cæsar especially observed above the rest. For besides this which he did to Cassius Scæva (recorded by all the Writers of these Wars) Plutarch relateth, that at his being in Britain, he could not contain from embracing a Soldier, that carried himself Valiantly in defence of divers Centurions. And whereas the poor Man, falling down at his Feet, asked nothing but Pardon for leaving his Target behind him; he rewarded him with great Gifts and much Honour. Howbeit, the difference which Sallust hath made in this kind is too generally observed; that, It

more importeth a Commonwealth to punish an ill Member, than to reward a good Act: For a Vertuous Desire is by neglect a little abated, but an ill Man becomes unsufferable. And thence it is, That Merit is never valued but upon necessity. It is fit that he that will have the Honour of wearing a Lyons Skin, should first kill the Beast, as Hercules did: But to kill a Lyon, and not to have the Skin, is not so available as a meaner Occupation. Anthony Guevara giveth another Rule, observed in that Government, which is the true Idea of Perfection: *En la casa de Dios jamas fue, nies, ni sera, merito sin premio, ni colpa*

*sin pena*; In the House of God there never was, nor is, nor shall be, desert unrewarded, or fault unpunished.

## CHAP. XX.

Cæsar moveth Scipio to mediate a Peace.

Ætolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis being taken by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, as is before declared, Cæsar thought it expedient to attempt and try Achaia, and to proceed further in that course: Whereupon he sent thither L. Calenus, and Q. Sabinus, and to them he added Cassius with his Cohorts. Their coming being bruited abroad, Rutilius Lupus, to whom Pompey had left the charge of Achaia, determined to Fortifie the Isthmus, to keep out Fufius. Calenus in the mean time, with the favour and assent of the States, took in Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus, besides some other Places which he took by force. The rest of the Cities he laboured to draw to Cæsar's Party, by Embassages sent about unto them: And therein was Fufius occupied for the present. Cæsar every day following brought out his Army into an equal and indifferent place, to see if Pompey would accept of Battel; insomuch as he led them under Pompey's Camp, the Vanguard being within shot of the Rampier. Pompey, to hold the Fame and Opinion he had attained, drew out his Forces, and so Embattelled them before his Camp, that their Rereward did touch the Rampier; and the whole Army was so disposed, that every Man was under the Protection of such Weapons as might be shot from thence.

While these things were doing in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, it was certainly known that Scipio was come into Macedonia. Cæsar not omitting his former purpose, sent Clodius unto him, a familiar Friend to both of them, and one whom Scipio had formerly so commended to Cæsar, that he had taken him in the number of his nearest Favourites. To him he gave Letters and Messages to be delivered to Scipio; whereof this was the effect. That he had used all means for Peace, and yet had prevailed nothing at all: Which he took to be the fault of such as had the charge of the business, being fearful to treat with Pompey thereof in an unseasonable time. But Scipio had that credit and respect, that he might not only deliver freely what he thought fitting, but might also (in some sort) constrain him, and reform his Error. For being Commander in chief over an Army, besides his credit, he had strength to compel him. Which, if he did, every Man would attribute the quiet of Italy, the Peace of the Provinces, and the safety and preservation of the Empire to him only. All these things did Clodius make known to Scipio: And for the first days was well heard; but afterwards could not be admitted to Speech; Favonius reprehending Scipio, for going so far with him, as afterwards we understood upon the ending of the War: Whereby he was forced to return to Cæsar, without effecting any thing.

Cæsar, that he might with greater facility keep in Pompey's Cavalry at Dyrrachium, and hinder them from Forage, fortified and shut up two Passages (which, as we have before declared, were very narrow) with great Works, and there built Castles. Pompey understanding that his Horsemen did no good abroad, within a few days conveyed them within his Fortification by Shipping. Howbeit they were in extream necessity for want of Forage; in-

N n

somuch

Solon. Plat.  
s. de leg.  
Livy, lib. 4.  
Lib. 6.

In vita Cæ-  
saris.

In repub. mul-  
to præstat be-  
neficii quam  
malefieri im-  
memorem esse:  
Bonus, segnor  
fit ubi negli-  
git; malus  
improbius.  
Sal. Jugur.



Et morsu  
spoliare ne-  
mus, lethum-  
que minan-  
tes, Wellere  
ab ignotis  
dubias radi-  
cibus herbas.

so much as having beaten off all the Leaves of the Trees, they fed their Horses with young Reeds bruised and beaten in pieces. For they had spent the Corn which was sowed within the Works, and were forced to bring Food for their Cattel from Corcyra and Acarnania, by long and tedious Navigation; and where it fell short, they made it up with Barley, and so kept Life in their Horses. But afterwards, when as not only their Barley and other Food was spent in all places, and the Grass and Herbs dried up, but the Fruit also wasted and consumed off the Trees, their Horses being so lean as they were not able to stand on their Legs, Pompey thought it expedient to think of some course of breaking out.

## OBSERVATION.

IT may seem a cunning Trick of Cæsar, and perhaps it was his end, to endeavour with fair pretences to engage Scipio so far in contriving a Peace, as being General of an Army, he might assume unto himself a commanding Authority; and thereupon breed such a jealousy as would keep Pompey and him asunder.

Nevertheless, it is every way worth a Man's Labour, to make Overtures of Peace howsoever: especially considering, how it changeth the relative in the condition of Men, which in War is *Homo homini Lupus*, One Man a Wolf to another; and in Peace, *Homo homini Deus*, One Man a God to another: and, proving good, will doubtless continue; if inconvenient, the sooner broken, and so the case is but the same it was before.

Secondly, We may note, that there is nothing so difficult, but pertinacy and restless Labour, directed with diligent and intent Care, will in the end overcome it. For Cæsar, that at the first seemed to undertake impossibilities, going about to Besiege a great part of a Country, and to shut up a huge Army in an open place, did nevertheless (by endeavour) bring them to such extremity of Want, that if, as *Democritus* said, the Body should have put the Mind in suite, for reparation of loss, which her Ambition and wilful Obstinacy had drawn upon it, she should never be able to pay Damages.

Touching the *Isthmus* which *Rutilius Rufus* went about to Fortifie, it is a Neck of Earth, joyning an Island unto the Continent. For as the In-let of the Sea, between two Lands, is called *Porthmus* (whereupon the Town of Portsmouth in Hampshire hath that appellation, as seated upon the like In-let) so any small Langet or Neck of Earth, lying between two Seas, is called *Isthmus*. Whereof this of *Achaia* is of special note in Greece; being the same that joyned *Peloponnesus* to the Continent, and was of special Fame for the situation of *Corinth*.

These Necks of Earth, called *Isthmi*, are of the nature of those things, as have been often threatned, and yet continue the same. For albeit the ambition of great Princes hath sought to alter the fashion of the Earth in that behalf, yet I know not how their desires have sorted to no end. *Perfodere navigabili alveo has angustias tentavere Demetrius Rex, Dictator Cæsar, Caius Princeps, & Domitius Nero, infausto, ut omnium patuit exitu, incepto*; King *Demetrius*, Cæsar the Dictator, Caius the Prince, and *Domitius Nero*, all of them attempted to draw through this Neck of Land with a Navigable Channel, without any Success, as appears by the Issue. In the time of King *Sesostris*, and since, in the Empire of the *Ottomans*, they went about to bring the Red-sea into the Nile; but fearing it would be a means to drown the Land, one Sea being lower than

another, they gave over the enterprize. And it may be upon like consideration, or otherwise, fearing to correct the works of Nature, they forbore to make a Passage between *Nombre de Dios* and *Panama*, and so to joyn one Sea to the other, as was said to be intended.

## CHAP. XXI.

An accident which fell out by two Brethren of Savoy, in Cæsar's Army.

Here were in Cæsar's Camp two Brethren of Savoy, *Roscillus* and *Ægus*, the Sons of *Adbucillus*, who, for many Years together, was accounted the principal and chief Man of that State: These were Men of singular worth, and had done Cæsar very great service in all the Wars of Gallia; and in that respect Cæsar had advanced them to great and honourable Charges in their Country, and caused them (extraordinarily) to be taken in the number of the Senators, and bestowed much of the Enemies Lands upon them, besides great sums of ready Money, and of Poor had made them Rich.

These Men were not only well respected by Cæsar, but were in good account throughout all the Army. Howbeit; relying too much on Cæsar's Favour, and puffed up with foolish and barbarous Arrogancy, they disdained their own Men, deceiving the Horsemen of their Pay, and averting all Pillage from publick distribution to their own particular. The Horsemen provoked with these Injuries, came all to Cæsar, and complained openly thereof: Adding farther, That their Troops were not full, nor answerable to the List or Muster-Roll, by which they required payment.

Cæsar thinking it no fit time of Punishment, and withal, attributing much to the worth of the Men, put off the whole matter, and chid them privately, for making a gain of their Troops of Horse; willing them to expect a supply of all their Wants from his Favour, according as their Service had well deserved. Nevertheless, the matter brought them into great scandal and contempt with all Men: Which they plainly perceived, both by the Speeches of other Men, as also by that they might judge themselves, their own Consciences accusing them. With which reproach and shame they were so moved (and thinking peradventure that they were not quit thereof, but deferred until some other time) that they resolved to leave the Army, to seek new Fortunes, and make proof of other Acquaintance. And having imparted the matter to a few of their Followers, to whom they durst communicate so great a Disloyalty, first they went about to kill *C. Volusenus*, General of the Horse (as after the War was ended was discovered) that they might come to Pompey upon some deserved Service: But after they found it hard to accomplish, they took up as much Money as they could borrow, as though they meant to have paid their Troops, what they formerly had defrauded them of; and having bought many Horses they went to Pompey, together with such as were acquainted with their purposes.

Pompey finding them Gentlemen of sort, liberally brought up, attended with a great Retinue, and many Horses, and both of them very Valiant, and in good account with Cæsar, and withal, for that it was an unusual and strange accident, he led them about the Works, and skewed them all the Fortifications: For before that time, no Man, either Soldier or Horseman, had fled from Cæsar to Pompey; whereas daily they came from Pompey to Cæsar, especially such as were Enrolled in *Epirus* and *Ætolia*,

Pœnam semper ante oculos versari putant qui peccaverunt. Cic. in orat. pro Milone.

Si bonam dederitis, fidam & perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam. Livy, lib. 8. Nihil est quod non expugnet pertinax opera, & intenta & diligens cura. Seneca lib. 6. Epist. 51.

Plin. lib. 4. cap. 4.



lia, which Countries were at Cæsar's Devotion. These two Brethren exactly understanding all things in Cæsar's Camp (as well concerning such Works as were perfect, as such others wherein Men skilful in War might find defect, together with the opportunity of Time and distances of Places, as also the diligence of the Guards, with the nature and endeavour of every Man that had a charge) related all particularly to Pompey.

## OBSERVATION.

WE may here observe the sincerity and direct carriage of inferiour Commanders in the Roman Army by the scandal these two Savoyens ran into for making false Musters, and defrauding the Soldiers of their due: A matter so ordinary in these our Times, as Custom seemeth to justify the Abuse. For what more common in the course of our Modern Wars, than to make Gain of Companies, by mustering more than they have in Pay, and by turning that which is due to the Soldier to their own benefit? The first whereof, if it be duly weighed, is an offence of an high nature against the State; and the second, such an Injury to the Soldier, as can hardly be answered.

It is merrily (as I take it) said by Columella, That, in foro concessum latrocinium, Robbery is lawful in courses at Law. But for those, to whom is committed the safety of a Kingdom, to betray the Trust reposed in them, by raising their means with Dead Pays, and consequently, assisting the Cause with dead Service; as also by disabling their Companions and Fellow-Soldiers from doing those Duties which are requisite, for want of due entertainment; is a thing deserving a heavy censure, and will doubtless fall out unto them, as it did to these two Brethren. The sequel whereof will appear by the Story, and confirm that of Xenophon; *Dii haud impunita relinquunt impia & nefaria hominum facta*: The Gods do not suffer the Impieties and Wickednesses of Men to escape unpunished.

## CHAP. XXII.

Pompey attempting to break out, putteth Cæsar's Party to great loss.

Cæsar.

Pompey being informed of these things, and having formerly resolved to break out, as is already declared, gave order to the Soldiers to make them coverings for their Morions of Osiers, and to get some store of Bavins and Faggots. Which being prepared, he shipped a great number of their Light-armed Soldiers and Archers, together with those Faggots in Skiffs and Gallies. And about Midnight he drew threescore Cohorts out of the greater Camp, and the places of Garrison, and sent them to that part of the Fortification which was next unto the Sea, and farthest off from Cæsar's greatest Camp. Thither also he sent the Ships before-mentioned, filled with Light-armed Men and Faggots, together with as many other Gallies as were at Dyrrachium; and gave directions how every Man should employ himself.

Cæsar had left Lentulus Marcellinus, the Treasurer, with the Legion newly enrolled, to keep that Fortification; who, for that he was sickly, and of an ill disposition of Body, had substituted Fulvius Posthumus as his Coadjutor.

There was in that place a Trench of fifteen Foot

deep, and a Rampier against the Enemy of ten Foot in height, and as much in breadth. And about six hundred Foot from that place was raised another Rampier, with the Front the contrary way, but somewhat lower than the former. For, some few days before, Cæsar (fearing that place, least our Men should be circumvented with their Ships) had caused double Fortifications to be made in that place; that if (peradventure) they should be put to their shifts, they might nevertheless make good Resistance. But the greatness of the Works, and the continual labour they daily endured, the Fortifications being carried eighteen Miles in circuit, would not suffer them to finish it. Whereby it happened, that he had not as yet made a Rampier along the Sea-shore, to joyn these two Fortifications together, for the defence thereof: Which was informed Pompey by these two Savoyens, and brought great Damage and Loss to our People. For as the Cohorts of the ninth Legion kept watch and guard upon the Sea, suddenly, by the break of day, came Pompey's Army; which seemed very strange unto our Men: And instantly, thereupon, the Soldiers from a Ship-board assaulted with their Weapons the inner Rampier, and the rest began to fill up the Trench.

The Legionary Soldiers, appointed to keep the inner Fortifications, having planted a great number of Ladders to the Rampier, did amuse the Enemy with Weapons, and Engines of all sorts; and a great number of Archers were thronged together on each side. But the coverings of Osiers which they wore on their Head-Pieces, did greatly defend them from the blows of Stones, which was the only Weapon our Men had for that purpose. And as our Men were overlaid with all these things, and did hardly make Resistance, they found out the defect of the Fortification, formerly mentioned: And Landing their Men between the two Rampiers, they charged our People in the Rere, and so driving them from both the Fortifications, made them turn their backs.

This Alarm being heard, Marcellinus sent certain Cohorts to succour our Men: Who seeing them fly, could neither re-assure them by their coming, nor withstand the fury of the Enemy themselves: Inasmuch as what relief soever was sent, was distracted by the fear and astonishment of them that fled away. Whereby the terror and the danger was made much the greater, and their Retreat was hindered through the multitude of People.

In that Fight, the Eagle-bearer being grievously Wounded, and fainting for want of strength, looking towards the Horsemen; This have I, said he, in my Life-time carefully and diligently defended for many Years together, and now, dying, with the same Fidelity do restore it unto Cæsar: Suffer not (I pray you) such a dishonour, the like whereof never happened in Cæsar's Army, but return it unto him in safety. By which accident the Eagle was saved: All the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, but the first of the Maniple of the Principes. And now the Enemy, with great slaughter of our Men, approached near Marcellinus's Camp.

The rest of the Cohorts being greatly astonished, M. Antonius holding the next Garrison to that place, upon notice thereof was seen to come down from the upper ground with twelve Cohorts. Upon whose coming Pompey's Party was repressed and staid, and our Men somewhat re-assured, giving them time to come again to themselves out of that astonishment. And not long after, Cæsar having knowledge thereof by smook made out of the Forts, according to the use of former time, came thither also, bringing with him certain Cohorts out of the Garrisons.



## OBSERVATION.

Arma alie-  
nasse grave  
crimen est, &  
e- pœna defer-  
tioni exequi-  
tur, ut que si  
tota alienaret.  
Lib. 14. § de  
re militari.

IT is an old saying, That Thieves handsel is al-  
ways naught. But Traytors handsel is much  
worse: As appeareth by the falling away of these  
two Savoyens: Who were the first that left Cæsar  
in this War, and the first that brought Pompey  
good Fortune: Themselves standing culpable of  
as great an Offence, as if they had alienated the  
whole Army. In the course whereof we may see  
plainly that which I have formerly noted; that  
it is an excellent thing to be still attempting upon  
an Enemy, so it be done upon good Grounds and  
Cautions: For while Pompey stood upon the de-  
fensive Ward, the Honour of the Contention fell  
continually upon Cæsar. And doubtless, he that  
observeth Cæsar's proceedings in the carriage of  
all his Wars, shall find his Fortune to have spe-  
cially grown from his active and attempting  
Spirit.

Vir virtute  
eximius, ali-  
quando for-  
tuna, semper  
animo maxi-  
mus.

In this Eagle-bearer, we may see verified that  
which Paterculus affirmeth of Mithridates, That  
a Valiant Spirit is sometimes great by the favour  
of Fortune, but always great in a good Cou-  
rage.

For these Titles of Degrees, as *Princeps* prior,  
and the rest here mentioned, having formerly  
discourged at large of the parts of a Legion, and  
the Hierarchy of their Discipline, I will rather  
referr the Reader thereunto, than bumbast out a  
Volume with distasteful Repetitions.

## CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar purposeth to alter the course of War; and  
attempteth to cut off one of Pompey's Legions.

Cæsar.

CÆsar understanding of the Loss, and per-  
ceiving that Pompey was got out of the  
Fortifications, and was Encamped upon the  
Sea, in such sort as he might freely go  
out to Forrage, and have no less access to his Ship-  
ping than formerly he had; changing his course of  
War, which had not succeeded to his expectation,  
he Encamped himself fast by Pompey. The Works  
being perfected, it was observed by Cæsar's Scouts,  
that certain Cohorts, to the number of a Legion,  
were brought behind a Wood into the old Camp. The  
situation of the Camp was after this manner. The  
days before, Cæsar's ninth Legion opposing themselves  
against Pompey's Forces, and working upon the For-  
tifications (as is before declared) had their Camp  
in that place, adjoining unto a Wood, and not di-  
stant from the Sea above four hundred Paces. After-  
wards Cæsar changing his Mind for some certain  
Causes, transferred his Lodging somewhat farther  
off from that place. A few days after the same  
Camp was possesst by Pompey. And forasmuch as  
he was to lodge more Legions in that place, leaving  
the inner Rampier standing, he enlarged the Forti-  
fication, so that the lesser Camp being included in  
the greater, served as a Castle or Cittadel to the  
same. Besides also, he drew a Fortification from  
the right angle of the Camp, four hundred Paces  
out-right to a River, to the end the Soldiers might  
Water freely, without danger. And he also chang-  
ing his Mind, for some causes not requisite to be  
mentioned, left the place too: So that the Camp

stood empty for many days together, and all the For-  
tifications were as perfect as at the first.

The Discoverers brought news to Cæsar, that  
they had seen an Ensign of a Legion carried thi-  
ther. The same was likewise confirmed from cer-  
tain Forts which stood upon the higher Grounds.  
The place was distant from Pompey's new Camp  
about five hundred Paces. Cæsar hoping to cut off  
this Legion, and desirous to repair that day's loss,  
left two Cohorts at work, to make a skew of fortify-  
ing, and he himself (by a contrary way, in as co-  
vert a manner as he could) led the rest of the Co-  
horts, in number thirty three (amongst whom was  
the ninth Legion, that had lost many Centurions,  
and was very weak in Soldiers) towards Pompey's  
Legion, and the lesser Camp, in a double Battel.  
Neither did his Opinion deceive him: For he came  
thither before Pompey could perceive it.

And albeit the Fortifications of the Camp were  
great, yet assaulting it speedily with the left Wing,  
wherein he himself was, he drave Pompey's Soldiers  
from the Rampier. There stood a \*Turn-Pike in \*Eritius.  
the Gate, which gave occasion of Resistance for a  
while: And as our Men would have entered, they  
Valiantly defended the Camp; T. Pulcio, by whose  
means C. Antonius's Army was betrayed, as we have  
formerly declared, Fighting there most Valiantly.  
Yet nevertheless our Men overcame them by Valour;  
and cutting up the Turn-Pike, entered first into the  
greater Camp, and afterwards into the Castle, and  
slew many that resisted, of the Legion that was  
forced thither.

But Fortune, that can do much in all things, and  
especially in War, doth in a small moment of time  
bring great alterations; as it then happened. For  
the Cohorts of Cæsar's right Wing, ignorant of the  
Place, followed the Rampier which went along from  
the Camp to the River, seeking after the Gate, and  
taking it to be the Rampier of the Camp: But when  
they perceived that it joyned to the River, they pre-  
sently got over it, no Man resisting them; and all  
the Cavalry followed after those Cohorts.

## OBSERVATION.

Pompey having cleared his Army of that Siege,  
it booteth not Cæsar to prosecute his purpose  
any longer: For when the end is missed for  
which any course is undertaken, it were folly to  
seek it by that means. We must rather choose  
new ways, that may lead us to the end of our  
hopes, than follow the old Track, which sorted  
to no effect. And yet nevertheless, the sufficiency  
of the General is no way disabled: For, albeit  
a Wise Man doth not always keep one pace, yet  
still he holdeth one and the same way.

Secondly, That of Xerxes appeareth to be  
true, that great Attempts are always made with  
great difficulty and danger. Wherein the Wis-  
dom of the Heathen World ascribed all to For-  
tune, as the sole cause of all remarkable Events,  
and that which filled up both the Pages of all the  
Books, wherein Men noted the course of things.  
Clades in bello acceptæ, non semper ignavia, sed  
aliquando Fortune temeritati sunt imputandæ,  
Losses received in War are not always to be  
imputed to slothful carriage, but oftentimes to  
the temerity of Fortune, saith Archidamus; and  
is that which is aimed at by Cæsar.



## C H A P. XXIV.

The Fight continueth, and Cæsar loseth.

Cæsar.

**I**N the mean while Pompey, after so long a respite of time, having notice thereof, took the first Legion from their Works, and brought them to succour their Fellows: And at the same time his Cavalry did approach near our Horsemen, and our Men that possessed the Camp, did discover an Army Embattelled coming against them; and all things were suddenly changed. For Pompey's Legion, assured with a speedy hope of Succour, began to make resistance at the Decumane Gate, and voluntarily charged our Men.

Cæsar's Cavalry being got over the Rampire into a narrow Passage, fearing how they might Retreat in safety, began to fly away. The right Wing, secluded and cut off from the left, perceiving the terror of the Horsemen (lest they might be endangered within the Fortifications) betook themselves to the other side from whence they came: And most of them (lest they should be surpris'd in the Streights) cast themselves over Works of ten Foot high into the Ditches: And such as first got over being trodden under Foot by such as followed after, the rest saved themselves in passing over their Bodies.

The Soldiers of the left Wing perceiving from the Rampire that Pompey was at hand, and that their own side fled away, fearing lest they should be shut up in those Streights, having the Enemy both without and within them, thought it their best course to return back the same way they came. Whereby there happened nothing but Tumult, Fear, and Flight: Insomuch as when Cæsar caught hold with his hand of the Ensigns of them that fled, and commanded them to stand; some for fear left their Ensigns behind them, others forsaking their Horses, kept on their Course: Neither was there any one of them that would stand. Notwithstanding, in this so great a calamity and mishap these helps fell out to relieve us, when the whole Army was in danger to be cut off; that Pompey fearing some Treachery (for that, as I think, it happened beyond his expectation, who, a little before saw his Men fly out of his Camp) durst not for a good while approach near the Fortifications; and our Men possessing the narrow Passages and the Ports, did hinder the Horsemen from following after. And so a small matter fell out to be of great Moment, in the carriage of that accident, on either side. For the Rampire which was carried from the Camp to the River (Pompey's Camp being already taken) was the only hindrance of Cæsar's Expedite and easie Victory: And the same thing, hindering the speedy following of their Horsemen, was the only safety and help of our Men.

In those two Fights, there were wanting of Cæsar's Men Nine Hundred and Threescore; and Horsemen of note, R. Felginas, Tuticanus Gallus, a Senator's Son, C. Felginas of Placentia, Agravius of Puteolis, Sacrativir of Capua, ten Tribunes of the Soldiers, and thirty Centurions. But the greatest part of these perished in the Trenches, in the Fortifications, and on the River Banks, prest to Death with the fear and flight of their Fellows, without any Blow or Wound given them. There were lost at that time Thirty Two Military Ensigns.

Pompey, upon that Fight, was saluted by the name of Imperator; which Title he then obtained, and so suffered himself to be stiled afterward: Howbeit he used it not in any of his Missives, nor

yet wore any Laurel in the bundle of Rods carried before him.

Labiens having begged all the Captives, caused them (for greater ostentation) to be brought out in publick; and to give the more assurance to such as were fled thither from Cæsar's Party, calling them by the name of Fellow-Soldiers, in great derision asked them whither old Soldiers were wont to fly; and so caused them all to be slain.

Pompey's Party took such an assurance and spirit upon these things, that they thought no farther of the course of War, but carried themselves as though they were already Victors: Not respecting (as the cause of all this) the paucity of our Men, nor the disadvantage of the place, and the streightness thereof, the Camp being possessed, and the doubtful Terror both within and without the Works; not yet the Army divided into two parts, in such sort as neither of them were able to help or succour the other. Neither yet did they add to this, that the Fight was not made by any Valiant Encounter, or in form of Battel; but that they received more hurt from the narrowness of the place, and from their own Disorder, than from the Enemy.

And to conclude, they did not remember the common chances and casualties of War: Wherein oftentimes very small causes, either of false Suspicion, or of sudden Fear, or out of scruple of Religion, do infer great and heavy Losses; as often as either by the negligence of the General, or the fault of a Tribune, the Army is misordered. But as though they had overcome by true force of their Prowess, and that no alteration of things could after happen, they magnified that days Victory, by Letters and Report throughout the whole World.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**S**Ometimes we may think to repair a Loss, and thereby hazard a greater Misfortune. For albeit the Saying be common, That a Man must seek his Coat where he lost it, as Gamesters do; yet there is always more certainty in seeking than in finding. For the Circle of Humane Affairs being carried round in a course, doth not suffer happiness to continue with one Party. And thereupon it was, That Pittacus Dedicated a Ladder to the Temple of Mitylene, to put Men in mind of their Condition; which is nothing else but going up and down. The Life of a Soldier is a meer Hermaphrodite, and taketh part of either Sex of Fortune; and is made by Nature to beget Happiness of Adversity, and Mischances of Good Hap: As if the cause of all causes, by intermixing Sweet with Sower, would lead us to his Providence, and consequently to himself, the first Mover of all Motions.

The diversity of these Events are so In chained together, as one seemeth to have relation to the other. For this Task admitted not of *veni, vidi, vici*, I only came, and saw, and overcame, nor went on with *Alexander*, marching over the Plains of *Asia*, without rub or controul: But the business was disposed, here to receive a Blow, and there to gain a Victory. And so this loss at *Dyrachium* made the Battel at *Pharsalia* the more glorious, and beautified the course of this War with variety of Chances. The best use of these Disasters, is that which *Cæsar* made of his cross Fortunes, *Mei casus, etsi ingrati, mihi tamen extitit disciplina*; My Mishaps, though they be displeasing enough, yet they have still taught me something.

*Humanarum rerum circulus est, qui rotatus semper, eisdem fortunatos esse non sinit. Herodot. lib. 1. Habet has vices conditio mortalium ut adversa ex secunda, secundum ex adversis nascantur. Plin. in Paneg.*

*Herodot. lib. 1.*



## The Second OBSERVATION.

AS the Mathematicks, by reason of their certainty, do admit demonstration, as well from the conclusion to the principles, as from the principles to the conclusion: So in the actions of Man's life, it is not hard to assign the precedent causes by the sequel; the event being oftentimes an understanding Judge of things that are past. And although it do no where appear what was the cause of Labienus's leaving Cæsar; yet his insolent carriage towards these Captives, may make at least a probable conjecture, that his revolt proceeded from his own disposition, rather than from any cause on Cæsar's behalf. For where a Man hath once done an injury, he will never cease heaping one wrong after another, and all to justify his first error: Whereas on the other side, a noble spirit, free from all desert, will demean himself answerable to his first innocency.

## CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar speaketh to the Soldiers concerning this mishap; and forsaketh the Place.

Cæsar.

CÆsar being driven from his former purposes, resolved to change the whole course of the War; so that at one and the same time omitting the Siege, and withdrawing the Garrisons, he brought all the Army into one place, and there spake unto the Soldiers: Exhorting them not to think much at those things that had happened, nor to be amuzed therewith; but to counterpoise this loss (which was in a mediocrity) with many happy and fortunate Battels they had gained.

Let them thank Fortune, that they had taken Italy without blow or wound; that they had quieted and put in Peace both the Provinces of Spain, full of Warlike Men, and directed by skilful and practised Commanders; that they also had subdued the fertile bordering Provinces; and likewise, that they should remember, with what facility they were all transported in safety through the midst of the Enemies Fleets; not only the Havens and Ports, but all the Coast being full of Shipping.

The Philosopher Crator was wont to say, That to be no occasion of an ill hap, is a great comfort in any manner of adversity. Plut. in cons. Apo.

If all things fell not out prosperously, Fortune was to be helped by their industry. The loss which was received, might be attributed to any Man rather than unto him: For he had given them a secure place to fight in, had possessed himself of the Enemies Camp, driven them out, and overcome them in fight. But whether it were their fear, or any other error, or Fortune her self, that would interrupt a Victory already gained, every Man was now to labour to repair the damage they had sustained, with their Valour: Which if they did endeavour, he would turn their loss into advantage, as it formerly fell out at Gergovia, where such as before were afraid to fight, did of their own accord offer themselves to Battel.

Ignominia notavit.

Having ended his Speech, he disgraced and displaced some Ensign-bearers. The Army thereupon conceived such a grief of the blow that was given them, and such a desire they had to repair their dishonour, that no Man needed the command either of a Tribune or Centurion; every Man imposing upon himself as a punishment for his late fault, greater labours than usual, and withal inflamed with an earnest desire of fighting: Insomuch as many of the higher Orders thought it requisite to continue in the place, and refer the cause to a Battel. But contrariwise, Cæsar was not assured of the terrified Soldiers, and thought it expedient besides, to interpose some time for the settling of their minds; fearing likewise lest he

should be straitned through scarcity of Corn, upon the leaving of his Fortifications. And therefore without any farther delay, giving order for such as were wounded and sick, as soon as it was Night, he conveyed all the Carriages secretly out of the Camp, and sent them before towards Apollonia, forbidding them to rest until they came to their Lodging; and sent one Legion withal to convoy them.

That being done, he retained two Legions within the Camp: and the rest, being led out at divers Ports, about the fourth Watch of the Night, he sent the same way. And after a little pause (for the observing of Military order, and to the end his speedy departure might not be discovered) he commanded them to take up the cry of trussing up their Baggage; and presently setting forward, overtook the former Troop, and so went speedily out of the sight of the Camp.

Pompey having notice of his purpose, made no delay to follow after: But aiming at the same things, either to take them incumbered in their March, or astonished with fear, brought forth his Army, and sent his Horsemen before to stay the Rereward. But Cæsar went with so speedy a March, that he could not overtake them, until he came to the River Genusus; where, by reason of the high and uneasie Banks, the Cavalry overtook the tail of the Army, and engaged them in fight. Amongst whom Cæsar opposed his Horsemen, and intermingled with them four hundred experienced Soldiers, of them that had place before the Ensigns: Who so much prevailed in the Encounter, that they drove them all away before them, slew many of them, and returned themselves in safety to their Troops.

Cæsar having made a just days March, according to his first determination, and brought his Army over the River Genusus, he lodged in his old Camp over-against Asparagus; and kept all the Soldiers within the Rampier, commanding the Horse that went out to Forage, to be presently taken in by the Decumane Port.

## The First OBSERVATION.

Albeit that of Cato be true, That an Error in fight is not capable of amendment: Yet out of that which happeneth amiss, may always be somewhat gathered to repair the disadvantage, and to dispose a Party to better carriage for the future. Accordingly we may note Cæsar's notable temper and demeanour, after so great a loss; recalling the Courage of his Soldiers, and settling their minds in a course of good resolution, with as many valuable Reasons as humane Wisdom was able to afford him: Without which, all their other advantages, either of Valour or experience and use of Arms, or their assuredness after so many Victories, or what other thing soever that made them excell all other Armies, had been utterly buried in this overthrow. For his better furtherance wherein, he thought it fit to use the help of Time, before he brought them to the like trial. For that which is said of Grief, If Reason will not give an end unto it, Time will, is to be understood of any other passion of the Mind; which cannot possibly be so great, but Time will consume it.

Prætorum delicta emendationem non accipiunt. Veget. lib. 1. cap. 14.

Finem dolendi, qui consilio non fecerit, tempore invenit. Sen. Epist. 64.

## The Second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing which cometh to be handled, is the manner of Cæsar's Retreat; being as exquisite a pattern in this kind, as is extant in any Story: And is the rather to be considered, forasmuch as it is one of the principal points of Military Art, and worthiest the knowledge of a General,



General, to be able, upon all occasions, to make a safe and sure retreat. For those that can do nothing else, can easily put themselves into a War: But to return them home again in safety, is that which concerneth the honour of a Leader.

Many are the causes that may move a Commander to dislodge himself, and to leave his Adversary for a time: But the means to do it safely depend specially upon these two points. The one is, To advance himself onward at first, as far as possibly he can, to the end he may get the start, before the Enemy be ready to follow him: And is taught by *Xenophon*; who, after the death of *Cyrus*, in the Battel against King *Artaxerxes*, brought back a thousand Men into *Greece*, from an Army of two hundred thousand Horse, that pressed hard upon them, for five hundred Leagues together. Which retreat is exactly storied by the said Author, in seven Books, containing all the difficulties concerning this point: Amongst which, we find this passage.

Lib. 2.

It much imported us, saith he, to go as far at first as possibly we could; to the end we might have some advantage of space before the Enemy, that pressed so near behind. For, if we once got before, and could out-strip them for a days journey or two, it was not possible for them to overtake us; forasmuch as they durst not follow us with a small Troop, and with great Forces they could never reach us: Besides the scarcity and want of Victual they fell into by following us, that consumed all before them.

Thus far goeth *Xenophon*. And according to this Rule, *Cæsar* ordered his retreat: For he got the start of *Pompey* so far the first day, by that eight miles he gained in the Afternoon, as it followeth in the next Chapter, that he was never able to overtake him.

The second thing for the assuring of a retreat is, So to provide against the incumbrances of an Enemy, that he may not find it easie to attack him that would be gone. Of all retreats which may any way be taken from example of Beasts, that of the Wolf is most commended: Who never flies, but with his Head turned back upon his Adversaries; and shews such Teeth, as are not to be trusted.

After the Wolfs manner marched *Cæsar*: For howsoever the body of his Army retreated one way, yet they turned so terrible a countenance towards the Enemy, as was not to be endured. And upon these two hinges, is turned the carriage of a skilful retreat.

Howbeit, for the better furtherance hereof, it shall not be impertinent to add hereunto some inventions, practised by great Commanders, which may serve to amuse an Enemy, while a General doth prepare himself to observe the former points.

Livy 31.

King *Philip* of *Macedon*, desirous to leave the Roman Army, sent a Herauld to the Consul, to demand a cessation of Arms, while he buried his dead, which he purposed to perform the next day, with some care and solemnity. Which being obtained, he dislodged himself secretly that Night, and was got far on his way before the Romans perceived it.

Livy 27.

*Hannibal*, to clear his Army from that of the Romans, which was Commanded by the Consul *Nero*, about Midnight made many Fires, in that part which stood next the Roman Camp, and leaving certain Pavillions and Lodgings, with some few *Numidians*, to shew themselves upon the Rampier, he departed secretly towards *Puteolis*. As soon as it was Day, the Romans (according to their custom) approaching the Counterscarp, the *Numidians* shewed themselves; and then suddenly made after their Fellows, as fast as their Horses

could carry them. The Consul, finding a great silence in the Camp, sent two Light-horsemen to discover the matter: Who returning, told him of the Enemies departure.

In like manner, *Varus* (as is formerly related) Lib. 2. de bello Civili. left a Trumpeter in the Camp near *Utica*, with certain Tents; and about Midnight, carried his Army secretly into the Town.

*Mithridates*, willing to leave *Pompey*, that cut Front. lib. 1. cap. 1. him off short, the better to cover his departure, made shew of making greater provision of Forage than he was accustomed, appointed Conferences the next day, made great store of Fires in his Camp; and then in the Night escaped away.

The Persians, in the Voyage which *Solyman* the Turk made against them, in the Year One thousand five hundred fifty four, being driven to a place where the *Ottomans* thought to have had a hand upon them, gathered every Man a Faggot; and making a great heap thereof, set them all on fire, in the passage of the Turks Army: Which burned so furiously, as the Persian escaped before the Enemy could pass by the Fire.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*Cæsar* goeth on in his Retreat: *Pompey* ceaseth to follow him.

**I**N like manner, *Pompey* having that day Cæsar; marched a full journey, betook himself to his former Lodging at *Asparagus*. And, for that the Soldiers were not troubled with fortifying their Camp, by reason all the Works were whole and intire, many of them went out far off to get Wood, and to seek Forage: Others, rising hastily, had left a great part of their luggage behind them; and induced by the nearness of the last Nights Lodging, left their Arms, and went back to fetch those things that were behind. Insomuch as *Cæsar*, seeing them thus scattered (as before he had conceived how it would fall out) about high Noon gave warning to depart, and so led out his Army; and doubling that day's journey, he went from that place about eight mile: Which *Pompey* could not do, by reason of the absence of his Soldiers.

The next day, *Cæsar* having in like manner sent his Carriages before, in the beginning of the Night, set forward himself about the fourth Watch; that if there were any sudden necessity of fighting, he might (at all occasions) be ready with the whole Army. The like he did the days following. By which it happened, that in his passage over great Rivers, and by difficult and cumbersome Ways, he received no detriment or loss at all. For *Pompey* being stayed the first day, and afterwards striving in vain, making great journeys, and yet not overtaking us, the fourth day gave over following, and betook himself to another resolution.

*Cæsar*, as well for the accommodating of his wounded Men, as also for paying the Army, reassuring his Allies and Confederates, and leaving Garrisons in the Towns, was necessarily to go to *Apollonia*: But he gave no longer time for the dispatch of these things, than could be spared by him that made haste. For fearing lest *Domitius* should be engaged by *Pompey's* arrival, he desired to make towards him with all possible celerity: His whole purpose and resolution insisting upon these Reasons; That if *Pompey* did follow after him, he should by that means draw him from the Sea-side, and from such provisions of War as he had stored up at *Dyrrachium*; and so should compell him to undertake the War upon equal Conditions. If he went over into Italy, having joyned his



his Army with Domitius, he would go to succour Italy by the way of Illyricum. But if he should go about to besiege Apollonia, or Oricum, and so exclude him from all the Sea-coast, he would then besiege Scipio, and force Pompey to relieve him.

And therefore having writ and sent to Cn. Domitius, what he would have done (leaving four Cohorts to keep Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, and disposing such as were weak through their wounds in Epirus and Acarnania) he set forward.

## OBSERVATION.

**C**onfecto justo itinere ejus diei, having marched a full days March, or gone a just days Journey, saith the Story. Which giveth occasion to inquire, how far this just days Journey extended. *Lipsius* saith, it was twenty four Miles, alledging that of *Vegetius*; *Militari gradu* (saith he) *viginti millia passuum horis quinque duntaxat æstivis conficienda: pleno autem gradu qui citatior est, totidem horis viginti quatuor*; A Soldiers March did usually reach twenty Miles in five Summer hours, and if they marched with speed, twenty four Miles in the same time: understanding *justum iter*, a just Journey, to be so much as was measured *militari gradu*, by a Soldiers March. But he that knows the marching of an Army, shall easily perceive the impossibility of marching ordinarily twenty four Miles a day. Besides, this place doth plainly confute it: For, first, he saith that he made a just days Journey; and then again, rising about Noon, doubled that days Journey, and went eight Miles. Which shews, that their *Justum iter* was about eight Miles: And so futeth the slow conveyance of an Army, with more probability than that of *Lipsius*.

## CHAP. XXVII.

Pompey hasteth to Scipio, Domitius heareth of the overthrow.

Cæsar.

**P**ompey also conjecturing at Cæsar's purpose, thought it requisite for him to hasten to Scipio, that he might succour him, if Cæsar should chance to march that way: But if it so fell out, that he would not depart from the Sea-shore and Corcyra, as expecting the Legions and Cavalry to come out of Italy, he would then attack Domitius. For these causes both of them made haste, as well to assist their Parties, as to surprize their Enemies, if occasion were offered. But Cæsar had turned out of the way, to go to Apollonia; whereas Pompey had a ready way into Macedonia by Candavia. To which there happened another inconvenience: That Domitius, who for many days together had lodged hard by Scipio's Camp, was now departed from thence, to make provision of Corn, unto Heraclea Sentica, which is subject to Candavia; as though Fortune would have thrust him upon Pompey. This Cæsar was at that time ignorant of. Moreover, Pompey had writ to all the States and Provinces, of the overthrow at Dyrrachium, in far greater terms than the thing it self was: And had noised it abroad, that Cæsar was beaten, had lost all his Forces, and fled away.

Which reports made the Ways very hard and dangerous to our Men, and drew many States from Cæsar's Party: Whereby it happened, that many Messengers being sent, both from Cæsar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Cæsar, were forced to turn back again, and could not pass. Howbeit, some of the followers of Roscellus and Ægus

(who, as is before shewed, had fled unto Pompey) meeting on the way with Domitius's Scouts (whether it were out of their old acquaintance, having lived together in the Wars of Gallia, or otherwise out of vain-glory) related all what had happened; not omitting Cæsar's departure, or Pompey's coming. Whereof Domitius being informed and being but scarce four hours before him, did (by the help of the Enemy) avoid a most eminent danger, and met with Cæsar at Æginium, which is a Town situate upon the frontiers of Theffalia.

## OBSERVATION.

**J**Oy is an opening and dilating motion, and oftentimes openeth the body so wide, as it letteth out the Soul, which returneth not again. And in like manner, the causes of all such exultations do, for the most part, spread themselves further than is requisite.

Pompey having Victory in hope, rather than in hand, boasted as though all were his: Not considering, that the happiness or disaster of humane actions, doth not depend upon the particulars rising in the course thereof, which are variable and divers, but according as the event shall censure it. Whereupon the *Russes* have a saying in such cases, That he that laughs afterward, laughs then too: as Cæsar did.

*Humanarum actionum felicitas infelicitasque non est singularium rerum particularis, quæ multa sunt & varia, sed ex eventus judicantur.*  
Dionys. Hal. lib. 9.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

Cæsar Sacketh Gomphi in Theffalia.

**C**æsar having joyned both Armies together, came to Gomphi, which is the first Town of Theffalia by the way leading out of Epirus. These People, a few days before, had of their own accord sent Embassadors to Cæsar, offering all their Means and Abilities to be disposed at his pleasure; requiring also a Garrison of Soldiers from him. But now they had heard of the overthrow at Dyrrachium; which was made so great, and so prevailed with them, that Androthenes, Prætor of Theffalia (choosing rather to be a partaker of Pompey's Victory, than a Companion with Cæsar in adversity) had drawn all the multitude of Servants and Children out of the Country into the Town; and shutting up the Gates, dispatched Messengers to Scipio and Pompey, for succour to be sent unto him, in that he was not able to hold out a long Siege. Scipio understanding of the departure of the Armies from Dyrrachium, had brought the Legions to Larissa: And Pompey did not as yet approach near unto Theffalia.

Cæsar having fortified his Camp, commanded Mantelets, Ladders, and Hurdles to be made ready for a surprize. Which being fitted and prepared, he exhorted the Soldiers, and shewed them what need there was (for the relieving of their wants, and supplying of all necessaries) to possess themselves of a rich and populous Town; as also by their Example, to terrifie the other Cities: And what they did, to do speedily, before it could be succoured. Whereupon, by the singular industry of the Soldiers, the same day he came thither, giving the Assault after the ninth hour (notwithstanding the exceeding height of the Walls) he took the Town before Sun-setting, and gave it to the Soldiers to be rifled: And presently removing from thence, came to Metropolis, in such sort, as he outwent as well Messengers, as News of taking the Town.

After three of the Clock in the Afternoon.

The



The Metropolitans, induced with the same respects, at first shut up their Gates, and filled their Walls with Armed Men: But afterwards, understanding by the Captives (whom Cæsar caused to be brought forth) what had happened to them of Gomphi, they presently opened their Gates; and by that means were all preserved in safety. Which happiness of theirs being compared with the desolation of Gomphi, there was no one State of all Theffalia (excepting them of Larissa, which were kept in with great Forces by Scipio) but yielded Obedience to Cæsar, and did what he commanded. Cæsar having now got a place plenteous of Corn, which was now almost ripe, he resolved to attend Pompey's coming, and there to prosecute the residue of that War.

## OBSERVATION.

Lib. 5.  
Obsidio ejus  
urbis quam  
cito capere ve-  
lis, & urgenda  
& premenda.

**L**ivy saith, That the Siege of that Place which we would quickly take, must be prosecuted and urged hard. Which Rule Cæsar observed: For he followed it so hard, that he took the Town Fortified with exceeding high Walls, in four hours space, or thereabouts, after he began to Assault it. Which Plutarch saith, was so plentifully stored of all necessary Provision, that the Soldiers found there a refreshment of all the Miseries and Wants they suffered at Dyrrachium: Infomuch as they seemed to be new made, both in Body and Courage, by reason of the Wine, Victuals and Riches of that Place; which were all given unto them, according to that of Xenophon, *Lex inter omnes homines perpetua est, quando belligerantium urbs capta fuerit, cuncta eorum esse qui eam ceperint, & corpora eorum qui in urbe sunt & bona*; It is a general Law amongst all Men, that when an Enemies Town is forcibly taken, all that is found in it, as well Bodies as Goods, is at their disposal who have taken it.

Lib. 6. de  
Instit. Cyri.

Bello lex ac-  
quirendi ju-  
stissima.  
Dionys. Ha-  
licarn. in ex-  
per. legat.

Appian saith, The Germans were so Drunk, that they made all Men laugh at them: And that if Pompey had surprized them in these Disorders, they might have paid dear for their Entertainment. He addeth moreover (to shew the stiffness of the Inhabitants against Cæsar) that there were found in a Surgeons-Hall, twenty two principal Personages, stiff dead upon the Ground, without appearance of any Wound, having their Goblets by them: And he that gave the Poyson, sitting upright in a Chair, as dead as the rest. And as Philip, having taken Acrolisse, in the Country of the Istrians, drew all the rest to his Obedience, through the fear they conceived of their usage: So the consideration of the Calamity which befel Gomphi, and the good Intreaty which the Metropolitans found by yielding unto Cæsar, brought all the other Cities under his Command.

Polib. lib. 8.

## C H A P. XXIX.

Pompey cometh into Theffalia: His Army conceiveth assured hope of Victory.

Cæsar.

**P**ompey, a few days after, came into Theffalia; and there calling all the Army together, first gave great thanks to his own Men; and then exhorted Scipio's Soldiers, that the Victory being already obtained, they would be Partakers of the Booty and of the Rewards: And taking all the Legions into one Camp, he made Scipio partaker both of his Honour and Authority, commanding the Trumpets to attend his pleasure for matter of direction, and that he should use a Prætorial Pavilion.

Pompey having strengthened himself with an addition of another great Army, every Man was confirmed in his former Opinion, and their hope of Victory was increased: So that the longer they delayed the matter, the more they seemed to prolong their return into Italy. And albeit Pompey proceeded slowly and deliberately in the business, yet it was but a days work. But some there were that said, he was well pleased with Authority and Command, and to use Men both of consular Dignity, and of the Prætorian Order, as his Vassals and Servants.

And now they began to dispute openly, concerning Rewards and Dignities of Priesthood; and pointed out those which from Year to Year were to be chosen Consuls. Others begged the Houses and Goods of such as were with Cæsar. Besides a great Controversie that further grew between them in open Council, whether L. Hirrus were not to be regarded at the next Election of Prætors, being absent, and employed by Pompey against the Parthians. And as his Friends urged Pompey with his Promise given at his departure, requiring he might not now be deceived through his Greatness and Authority; the rest, running a course of as great Danger and Labour, saw no reason (by way of contradiction) why one Man should be respected before all others. And now Domitius, Scipio, and Spinther Lentulus began to grow to high Words in their daily Meetings, concerning Cæsar's Priesthood: Lentulus alleaging, by way of Ostentation, the Honour that was due to his Age and Authority; Domitius vaunting of the credit and favour he had at Rome; and Scipio, trusting to Pompey's Alliance. Moreover, Atius Rufus accused L. Afranius to Pompey, for Betraying the Army in Spain. L. Domitius gave out in Council, That after the War was ended, all such as were of the Rank of Senators, should be Honoured with a tripple Commission: And that those which were personally in the War, should be of the Commission to judge the rest; as well such as were at Rome, as those that did no service in this War. The first Commission should be, to clear such as had well-deserved, from all danger. The second, Penal: And the third Capital. And to conclude, every Man laboured, either to have a Reward, or to be avenged of his Enemy. Neither did they think so much of the means how to Overcome, as how to use the Victory.

## The First OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Tale which the Emperour Frederick related to the Commissioners of Lewis XI. King of France (concerning the parting between them of the Territories of Charles Duke of Burgundy) Not to sell the Skin before they had killed the Bear; might well have fitted these of Pompey's Party, that contended for Offices before they fell, and disposed of the Skins ere they had took the Bears: Not sparing, out of their Impatience, to tax Pompey of spinning out the War, for the sweetness he found in Authority and Command; as Agamemnon did at Troy. Infomuch as Plutarch reporteth, That one Favonius, imitating Cato's Severity and freeness of Speech, went about throughout all the Camp, demanding, Whether it were not great pity, that the ambitious Humour of one Man, should keep them that Year from eating the Figs and delicate Fruit of Tusculum? And all Men generally stood so affected, as Pompey could not withstand their enforcements. For, as Florus saith, *Milites otium, socii moram, principes ambitum Ducis increpabant*, The Soldiers blamed the Sloth, the Confederates found fault with the delay, and the chief Commanders with the ambition of their General.

O o

Only



Only Cato thought it not fit to hazard themselves upon a desperate Man, that had neither hope or help, but in Fortune. But, as in most things be-fides, so in this he stood alone, and could not prevail against a Multitude.

The Second OBSERVATION.

*Placere sibi ternas tabellas dari, ad indicandum iis, qui erant ordinis Senatorii,* They agreed, That all such as were of the Rank of Senators, should be honoured with a tripple Commission, saith the Story. *Tabellas*, I have translated Com-missions, as best suiting our English Phrase: But the meaning was as followeth.

It appeareth by History, that the Roman Peo-ple, as well in election of Magistrates, as in causes Criminal, did give their Voices openly and aloud, for six hundred Years together; until one *Gabinus*, a Tribune of the People, perceiv-ing that the Commons, for fear of the great Ones, durst not dispose of their Voices freely, and as they would, published an Edict, that the People should give their Voices by Ballating. Which Law Tully commendeth; *Grata est tabella quæ frontes operit, hominum mentes tegit, datque eam libertatem quod velint faciant*; It is an ac-ceptable Law, which hides the Faces and Mean-ings of Men, and gives all liberty to do what they please. And in another place, he calleth it *Principium justissimæ libertatis*, the foundation of most just liberty. Upon an election of Magi-strates, the Balls were given according to the number of the Competitors; that every Man might choose as he pleased.

In Criminal Causes, every Man had three: one marked with A. signifying Absolution, and another with C. for Condemnation, and another with N. L. for *Non liquet*, which they called *Ampliatio*, desirous to be further informed, which our Grand Juries do expresse by an *Ignoramus*. And in this manner would *Domitius* have had his Fellow Senators either quitted or condemned. The Balls which were given upon the making of a Law, were two: One marked with V. R. which signified *Uti rogas*, that it might go on: And the other with A. signifying *Antiquo*, reject-ing it. For, as *Festus* noteth, *Antiquare est in modum pristinum reducere*, to Antiquate, is to make the thing, be as it was before.

And in this manner they would have proceeded against Cæsar's Partizans, being altogether mi-staken in the assurance of their Happiness; the continuance whereof depended upon Vertue, and not upon Fortune.

C H A P. XXX.

Cæsar finding the Enemy to offer Battel in an indifferent Place, prepareth to undertake him.

Cæsar.

**P**rovision of Corn being made, and the Sol-diers well resolved (to which end he had interposed a sufficient space of time, after the Battel at Dyrrachium) Cæsar thought it time now to try what purpose or will Pompey had to Fight. And therefore, drawing the Army out of the Camp, he embattelled his Troops, first upon the place, and somewhat removed from Pompey's Camp: But every day following, he went farther off his own Trenches, and brought his Army under the Hills whereon the Enemy lay Encamped. This made his Army daily the more bold and assured. He kept continually his former course with his Horsemen; who because they were less in number by many degrees

than those of Pompey's Party, he commanded cer-tain lusty Young Men, chosen out of them that stood before the Ensigns, for their nimble and swift run-ning to Fight amongst the Horsemen; who, by rea-son of their daily practice, had learned the use of that kind of Fight. So that one Thousand of our Cavalry, in open and champaign Places, would, when need were, undergo the charge of seven Thousand of theirs, and were not much terrified with the multi-tude of them. For at that time they made a fortu-nate Encounter, and slew one of the two Savoiens, that had formerly fled to Pompey, with divers others.

Pompey having his Camp upon a Hill, Embat-telled his Army at the lower foot thereof, to see if he could get Cæsar to thrust himself into an unequal and disadvantageous place. Cæsar thinking that Pompey would by no means be drawn to Battel, thought it the fittest course for him to shift his Camp, and to be always in moving: Hoping by often removes from place to place, he should be better accommodated for Provision of Corn; and withal, might upon a March find some occasion to Fight; besides, he should weary Pompey's Army, not ac-customed to Travel, with daily and continual Jour-neys. And thereupon he gave the sign of dis-lodging.

But as the Tents were taken down, it was a little before observed, that Pompey's Army was advanced somewhat further from their Trenches, than ordina-rily they were accustomed; so that it seemed they might Fight in an equal and indifferent place. Whereupon Cæsar, when his Troops were already in the Gates setting out, It behoveth us (saith he) to put off our removing for the present, and bethink our selves of Fighting, as we have always desired; for we shall not easily hereafter find the like occa-sion: And presently drew out his Forces. Pompey also, as it was afterwards known, was resolved (at the instance of all that were about him) to give Battel; for he had given out in Council some few days be-fore, that he would Overthrow Cæsar's Army, before the Troops came to joyn Battel.

And as many that stood by wondered at it; I know, saith he, that I promise almost an incredi-ble matter: But take the ground whereupon I speak it, that you may undergo the business with more assurance. I have perswaded the Cavalry, and they have promised to accomplish it, that when they come near to joyn, they shall Attack Cæsar's right Wing on the open side; and so the Army being circumvented behind, shall be amused and routed, before our Men can cast a Weapon at them: Whereby we shall end the War with-out danger of the Legions, or almost without any Wound received. Which is not difficult or hard to do, for us that are so strong in Horse. And withal, he gave Order that they should be ready against the next day, forasmuch as the occasion was offered (according as they had often intended) not to deceive the Opinion which other Men had of their Prowess and Valour.

Labiens seconding this Speech, as contemning Cæsar's Forces, extolled Pompey's Resolution to the Skies. Do not think, Pompey, saith he, that this is the Army wherewith he Conquered Gallia, or Germania: I was present my self at all those Bat-tels, and do not speak rashly what I am ignorant of. There is a very small piece of that Army re-maining: A great part of them are dead, as it cannot otherwise be, in so many Battels. The Pestilence (the last Autumn) in Italy consumed many of them; many are gone home, and many are left in the Continent. Have ye not heard, That the Cohorts which are now at Brundisium, are made and raised of such as remained behind there


Prima egrigi-  
orum ducum  
sapientia vi-  
ctoriam sine  
periculo com-  
parare. Polyæ.  
lib. 1. Stratag.

Virtus felici-  
tatis mensur-  
a non fortuna.  
Dio. Halicarn.  
lib. 2.





















there to recover their Healths? These Forces that ye see were the last Year gathered of the Musters made in the hither Gallia; and most of them of the Colonies beyond the Po: And yet all the flower and strength of them was taken away in the last two Overthrows at Dyrrachium.

When he had spoken these things, he took a solemn Oath, not to return into the Camp but with Victory, exhorting the rest to do the like. Pompey commending him, took the same Oath: Neither was there any Man that refused it.

These things being thus carried in the Council, they rose up and departed, with great hope and joy of all Men; as having already conceived Victory in their Minds: And the rather, because they thought that nothing could be spoken vainly by so skilful a Commander, in so weighty and important a Cause.

## OBSERVATION.

Concerning the fashion of the Cavalry, in which either Party reposed so much Confidence, we are to note, that the Romans had two sorts of Horsemen; the one compleatly Armed (according to their manner) and Incorporated in the body of their Legions, whose entertainment was thrice as much as the Footmen. *Æque impotens postulatum fuit (saith Livy) ut de stipendio equitum (merebant autem triplex ea tempestate) æra demerentur*; It seemed as unreasonable a Motion, that the Horsemens Pay, which at that time was tripple, should be lessened. And the other were as Light-Horsemen, which they called *Alarii*.

Lib. 7.

Lib. 3. Excid.

The first sort were thus Armed, as *Josephus* witnesseth; They wore a Sword on their right side, somewhat longer than that of the Footmen, and carried a long Staff or Spear in their hand, a Target at their Horse side, and three or more Darts in a Quiver, with broad Heads, and not much less than their Staves; having such Head-Pieces and Corselets as the Footmen had.

The Light-armed Men had either light Darts, or Bow and Arrows. And doubtless, their chiefest Service was with their casting Weapons. And accordingly *Tully* putteth his Son in mind of the Praise he had got in Pompey's Army (where he Commanded a Wing of Horse) *Equitando, jaculando, omni militari labore tolerando*, in Riding, casting Darts, and undergoing all Military Duty.

2 Offic.

And as their Service consisted in breaking their Staves upon an Enemy, and in casting their Darts: So we exercise the practice of the former, in our Triumphs at Tilt; and the Spaniards the latter, in their *Focio di cane*.

Our modern Horsemen are either Lanciers, Petronelliers, or Pistoliers. The Petronelliers do discharge at distance, making their Left-hand, that holds the Bridle, their Rest: Which is uncertain, and to no great effect.

The Pistolier, that will do somewhat to purpose, doth come up close to the other, and discharge his Pistol in his Enemies Neck, or under the Corselet, about the Flank or seat of a Man; and commonly misseth not.

I have seen a Device to use a Musket on Horseback, which, if it prove as serviceable as is by some conceived, will be of great advantage.

## C H A P. XXXI.

The manner of Embattelling their Armies.

As Cæsar approached near unto Pompey's Camp, he observed his Army to be Embattelled in this manner: There were in the left Wing two Legions, which, in the beginning of these Wars, were, by Order and Decree of the Senate, taken from Cæsar; whereof one was called the first, and the other the third: And with them stood Pompey. Scipio had the middle Squadron, with the Legions he brought out of Syria.

The Legion of Cilicia, joyned with the Spanish Cohorts, which Afranius brought with him, made the right Wing. These Pompey held to be very strong. The rest of the Troops were interlaced between the middle Squadron and the Wings. All made One Hundred and Ten Cohorts, which amounted to Fifty Five Thousand Men: Besides Two Thousand old Soldiers and Men of Note, whom he had called out to that War, and dispersed them over all the Army. The rest of the Cohorts, which were seven, he had left in the Camp, or disposed about the Forts near adjoining. The right Wing was flanked with a River, that had high and cumbersome Banks: And thereupon he put all his Cavalry, together with the Archers and Slingers, in the left Wing.

Cæsar, observing his former Custom, placed the Tenth Legion in the right Wing, and the Ninth in the Left; albeit they were very much weakened in the Fights at Dyrrachium: But to this he so joyned the Eighth, that he seemed almost to make One of Two, and commanded them to succour each other. He had in all about Eighty Cohorts, which made Twenty Two Thousand Men: Two Cohorts he left to keep the Camp. He gave the left Wing to Antonius, the right to Pub. Sylla, and the middle Squadron to Cn. Domitius, and put himself opposite to Pompey. And withal, having well observed these things (according as I have formerly declared) fearing least the right Wing should be inclosed about with the multitude of the Cavalry, he speedily drew six Cohorts out of the third Battel, and of them he made a fourth, to Encounter the Horsemen, and shewed them what he would have done; admonishing withal, that the Victory of that day consisted in the Valour of those Cohorts: commanding the third Battel, and likewise the whole Army, not to joyn Battel without Order from him; which when he thought fit, he would give them notice of by an Ensign.

And going about to encourage them to Fight, according to the use of War, he put them in mind of his Favours, and his carriage towards them from time to time; and especially, that they themselves were Witnesses, with what labour and means he had sought for Peace, as well by Treaty with Vatinius, as also by employing A. Clodius to Scipio: And likewise how he had endeavoured at Oricum with Libo, that Embassadors might be sent to treat of these things. Neither was he willing at any time to mispend the Soldiers Blood, or to deprive the Commonwealth of either of those Armies.

In manibus vestris quantum sit Cæsar habetis. Lucan, lib. 7.

This Speech being delivered, the Soldiers both requiring and longing with an ardent desire to Fight, he commanded the sign of Battel to be given by a Trumpet.

## OBSERVATION.

Concerning the order used in disposing these Armies, for the tryal of this Cause it appeareth by the Story, that Pompey set two Legions in his left Wing, which are here named the first



and the third. Howbeit *Lucan* saith, that those Legions were the first and the fourth.

————— *Cornus tibi cura sinistri,  
Lentule, cum prima, quæ tum fuit optima bello,  
Et quarta legione datur.* —————

————— The left Wings care,  
Which the first Legion, (best in all that War)  
And fourth made up, O *Lentulus*, was thine.

The middle Squadron was led by *Scipio*, with the Legions he brought out of *Syria*, which were also two; *Exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones duas*, he expected *Scipio* out of *Syria* with two Legions, as it is in the second Chapter of this Book.

In the right Wing was the *Cilician* Legion, with the Cohorts that *Afranius* brought out of *Spain*: Which amounting to the number of a Legion, made that Wing equal to the rest. And so of these six Legions, which were the strength and sinews of his Army, he fashioned his Battel into a middle Squadron, and two Wings. His other Forces, being young Soldiers, he disposed in the distances between the Wings and that middle Squadron.

*Lib. 2. c. 3.* *Frontinus* speaking of this point, saith; *Legiones secundum virtutem, firmissimas in medio, & in cornu locavit; spacia his interposita tyronibus supplevit*: He disposed his Legions according to their Goodness and Worth: The stoutest he placed in the middle Squadron and the Wings; filling up the spaces betwixt these with his young Soldiers. His number of Men, by our Text, was Fifty Five Thousand; but *Plutarch* maketh them not above Forty Five Thousand.

*Cæsar* had not half so many Men, and yet made a tripple Battel; but not so thick or deep with Legions: For in the right Wing he put the Tenth Legion, and in the left the Ninth and the Eighth; being both weak and far spent, by the former Overthrows. Of the other Legions he maketh no mention: But it seemeth they filled up the distances between the Wings and the body of the Army; and were as Flesh to those Sinews and Bones, which, out of the Prerogative of their Valour, took the place of the Wings, and the middle bulk of the Battel. And fearing left his right Wing should be circumvented by the multitude of their Cavalry, he drew six Cohorts out of his third or last Battel, to make a fourth Battel to oppose the Cavalry: Which got him the Victory. For howsoever the Text saith, *Singulas cohortes detraxit*: Yet *Plutarch* saith plainly, that those Cohorts he thus took were six, and amounted to Three Thousand Men; which riseth to the number of so many Cohorts. And *Appian* agreeing hereunto, saith, that his fourth Battel consisted of Three Thousand Men. *Frontinus* likewise affirmeth, he took out six Cohorts, *Et tenuit in subsidio, sed dextro latere conversas in obliquum*; and kept them as a reserve, placing them off obliquely from the right Wing. Whereunto that of *Lucan* agreeth;

————— *Tenet obliquas post signa cohortes.*

He plac'd these Troops oblique behind the Battel.

Which is thus to be understood; that they turned their Faces towards the left Wing of *Pompey's* Army, that they might be the readier to receive the Cavalry coming on to enclose *Cæsar's* right Wing; as being sure of the other side, which was fenced with a River and a Marish.

Touching *Cæsar's* Speech to the Soldiers, it seemed like that of *Themistocles* at the Battel of *Salamina*: Where *Xerxes* made a long Oration to encourage the *Persians*, and lost the day; *Themistocles* spake but a few words to the *Greeks*, and got the Victory. Howsoever, one thing is not to be omitted, that *Plutarch*, and such others as have dipped their Pens either in the Sweat or in the Blood of this Battel, do all agree, that *Cæsar* had not above Twenty Two Thousand Men.

## CHAP. XXXII.

The Battel beginneth; and *Cæsar* Overcometh.

**T**Here was one *Craftinus* in *Cæsar's* Army, *Cæsar* called out to this War, who, the Year before had led the first Company of the Tenth Legion, a Man of singular Valour; who, upon the sign of Battel given, Follow me, saith he, as many of you as were of my Company; and do that endeavour for your Emperour, which you have always been willing to perform. This is the only Battel remaining unfought: Which being ended, he shall be restored to his Dignity, and we to our Liberty. And withal, looking towards *Cæsar*, I will, saith he, O Emperour, so carry my self this day, that thou shalt give me Thanks, either alive or dead. And when he had thus spoken, he was the first that ran out of the right Wing: And about One Hundred and Twenty elected Soldiers of the same Century followed voluntarily after him.

There was so much space left between both the Battels, as might serve either Army to meet upon the Charge. But *Pompey* had commanded his Men to receive *Cæsar's* Assault, and to undergo the shock of his Army, without moving from the place wherein they stood (and that by the Advice of *C. Triarius*) to the end that the first running out and violence of the Soldiers being broken, and the Battel distended, they that stood perfect in their Orders, might set upon them that were scattered and dispersed: Hoping the Piles would not fall so forcibly upon the Army standing still, as when they advanced forward to meet them; and that it would fall out withal, that *Cæsar's* Soldiers, having twice as far to run, would, by that means be out of Breath, and spent with Weariness.

Which, in my Opinion, was against all Reason: For there is a certain Incitation and Alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, which is enflamed with a desire to Fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Nor was it in vain of ancient time Ordained, that the Trumpets should every where sound, and every Man take up a Shout; but that they thought these things did both terrifie the Enemy, and animate their own Party.

But our Soldiers, upon the sign of Battel, running out with their Piles ready to be thrown, and perceiving that *Pompey's* Soldiers did not make out to meet them (as Men taught with long use, and exercised in former fights) stopt their course of their own accord, and almost in the mid-way stood still; that they might not come to Blows upon the spending of their Strength: And after a little respite of Time, running on again, threw their Piles, and presently drew their Swords, as *Cæsar* had commanded them. Neither were *Pompey's* Soldiers wanting in this business; for they received the Piles which were cast at them, took the shock

of

*Singulas cohortes detraxit.*

*Lib. 2. cap. 3.*



of the Legions, kept their Ranks, cast their Piles, and betook them to their Swords.

At the same time, the Cavalry, according as was commanded them, issued out from Pompey's left Wing, and the whole multitude of Archers thrust themselves out. Whose assault our Horsemen were not able to endure, but fell back a little from the place wherein they stood: Whereby Pompey's Horsemen began to press them with more eagerness, and to put themselves in Squadrons, to inclose the Army about. Which Cæsar perceiving, gave the sign of advancing forward to the fourth Battel, which he had made up of six Cohorts; who came with such a fling upon Pompey's Horsemen, that none of them were able to stand before them, but turning their backs, did not only give place, but fled all as fast as they could to the highest Hills: Whereby the Archers and Slingers being left naked without succour, were all put to the Sword. And with the same violence, those Cohorts compassed about the left Wing, notwithstanding any resistance that could be made by Pompey's Party, and charged them behind upon their backs.

At the same time Cæsar commanded the third Battel, which as yet stood still, and were not removed, to advance forward: By means of which, fresh and sound Men, relieving such as were faint and weary, as also that others did charge them behind upon their backs, Pompey's Party were able no longer to endure it, but all turned their backs and fled.

Neither was Cæsar deceived in his opinion, that the beginning of the Victory would grow from those Cohorts which he placed in the fourth Battel, against the Horsemen; according as he himself had openly spoken, in his encouragement to the Soldiers. For by them first the Cavalry was beaten, by them the Archers and Slingers were slain, by them Pompey's Battel was circumvented on the left Wing, and by their means they began to flie.

As soon as Pompey saw his Cavalry beaten, and perceived the part wherein he most trusted, to be amused and affrighted, and distrusting the rest, he forthwith left the Battel, and conveyed himself on Horseback into the Camp. And speaking to the Centurions that had the Watch at the Prætorian Gate with a loud voice, as all the Soldiers might hear, he said, Keep the Camp, and defend it diligently, to prevent any hard Casualty that may happen. In the mean while, I will go about to the other Ports, to settle the Guards of the Camp.

And having thus said, he went into the Prætorium, distrusting the main point, and yet expecting the event.

#### The First OBSERVATION.

Pompey so carried himself in the course of this War, as he rather seemed a Sufferer than a Doer: Never disposing his Army for any Attempt or Onset, but only when he brake out of the place wherein he was Besieged at Dyrrachium. And accordingly he gave Order, that in the main action and point of Tryal, his Soldiers should suffer and sustain the Assault, rather than otherwise. But whether he did well or no, hath since been in question. Cæsar utterly disliked it, as a thing contrary to reason. *Est quedam (saith he) animi incitatio atque alacritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere Imperatores debent.* There is a certain incitation and alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Agreeable whereunto is that of Cato the Great; that in cases of Battel, an Enemy is to be charged with all violence. And to that purpose it is requisite, to put the Soldiers (at some reasonable distance) into a posture of vaunting and defiance, with menaces and cries of terrour; and then to spring forward in such manner, as may make them fall upon their Enemies with greater fury: As Champions or Wraftlers, before they buckle, stretch out their Limbs, and make their flourishes as may best serve to assure themselves, and discourage their Adversaries; according as we read of Hercules and Antæus.

*Ille Cleonæi projecit terga Leonis,  
Antæus Libyci: perfudit membra liquore  
Hospes, Olympiæ servato more Palæstræ.  
Ille parum fidens pedibus contingere matrem,  
Auxilium membris calidas infudit arenas.*

Lucan. lib. 4.

The one throws by's Cleonean Lion's Skin,  
The other's Libyan; and ere they begin,  
The one anoints himself from top to toe,  
As the Olympian Gamesters use to do.  
Not sure his foe would let his feet touch ground,  
Himself with Sand Antæus sprinkles round.

Howbeit, forasmuch as all Men are not of one temper, but require several fashions to tune their minds to the true note of a Battel, we shall find several Nations to have several Customs in this point. The Romans (as appeareth by this of Cæsar) were of ancient time accustomed to sound Trumpets and Hoboies, in all parts of the Army, and to take up a great clamour and shout, whereby the Soldiers (in their understanding) were encouraged, and the Enemy affrighted. Whereas, contrariwise, the Greeks went always with a close and silent Mouth, as having more to do than to say to their Enemies. And Thucydides, writing of the Lacedæmonians, (the flower of Greece for matter of Arms) saith, That instead of Trumpets and Cornets to incite them, they used the sweet harmony of Flutes, to moderate and qualifie their passions, lest they should be transported with unbridled impetuosity.

Homer,  
Iliad. 3.

It is reported, that Marshal Biron the Father, seemed to dislike of our English March (hearing it beaten by the Drums) as too slow, and of no encouragement: And yet it so fitteth our Nation (as Sir Roger Williams then answered) as we have divers times over-run all France with it. Howsoever, the event of this Battel is sufficient to disprove Pompey's error herein, and to make good what Cæsar commanded.

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

THESE six Cohorts, which made the fourth Battel did so encounter Pompey's Cavalry, that they were not able to withstand them. It is said, that Cæsar gave them order not to fling their Piles, as commonly they did, but to hold them in their hands like a Pike or a Javelin, and make only at the Faces of those Gallants, and Men at Arms on Horseback. For the holding of them in their hands, I do not understand it, and cannot conceive how they could reach more than the next Ranks unto them in that manner. But for making at the faces of the Cavalry, Florus saith, that Cæsar, as he galloped up and down the Ranks, was heard to let fall bloody and bitter words, but very pathetic, and effectual for a Victory: As thus, Soldier, cast right at the Face: Whereas Pompey called to his Men, to spare their fellow-Citizens.

Lib. 4. cap. 2.

Entropius,



Eutropius, in his Epitome of Suetonius, affirmeth the same thing, both of the one and of the other: And Lucan seemeth to averr the same, concerning that of Cæsar;

Lib. 7. *Adversosque jubet ferro contundere vultus.*

He bids them strike just at the Enemies face.

Lib. 4. cap. 7. Frontinus hath it thus: C. Cæsar, cum in partibus Pompeianis magna equitum Romanorum esset manus, eaque armorum scientia milites conficeret, ora oculosque eorum gladiis peti jussit, & sic adversam faciem cedere coegit: Pompey having in his Army a great company of Roman Knights, who being well skill'd at their Weapons made an end of their Enemies; Cæsar commanded his Men to make at their Faces and Eyes: And thereby compelled them to turn away their Faces.

### The Third OBSERVATION.

In the Life of Pompey. Amongst these Memorials Crastinus may not be forgotten, being the first Man that began the Battel; whom Plutarch calleth C. Crastinus, and saith, that Cæsar seeing him in the Morning as he came out of his Tent, asked him what he thought of the success of the Battel. Crastinus, stretching out his right hand unto him, cried out aloud, O Cæsar, thine is the Victory; and this day shalt thou commend me either alive or dead. And accordingly, he brake afterwards out of the Ranks; and running amongst the midst of his Enemies, with many that followed him, made a great slaughter. At last one run him into the Mouth, that the Swords point came out at his Neck, and so slew him.

Florus. By him, and others of like courage and worth, was Cæsar raised from the extremity of his wants, and the disgrace of his former losses, to the chiefest height of Earthly Glory: And herein might well assume unto himself, that which was formerly said of the People, *Magna populi Romani fortuna, sed semper in malis major resurrexit*; Great is the fortune of the People of Rome; but it still grows greater and increaseth by troubles: Together with that of Plutarch, *Res invicta Romanorum arma*, The Roman Arms are things invincible. Lucan speaking of Scæva formerly mentioned, saith, He shewed a great deal of Valour to get Rome a Lord. But upon Crastinus he layeth a heavy doom.

Lib. 4. *Infelix quanta Dominum virtute parasti?*

*Dii tibi non mortem, quæ cunctis pœna paratur, Sed sensum post fata tuæ dent, Crastine, morti, Cujus torta manu commisit lancea bellum, Præmaque Thessaliam Romano sanguine tinxit.*

May'st thou not only die, which all Men do; But die, and have thy senses after too. A Lance thrown by thy hand the fight began, When with brave Roman blood Theſſalia ran.

### CHAP. XXXIII.

Cæsar presseth hard after the Enemy, and taketh the Camp.

Cæsar.

Pompey's Soldiers being thus forced to fly into their Camp, Cæsar thinking it expedient to give them no time of respite, exhorted the Army to use the benefit of Fortune, and to assault the Camp: Who notwithstanding the extream heat (for the business was drawn out until it was high Noon) were willing to undergo

any labour, and to yield obedience to his commandments. The Camp was industriously defended by the Cohorts that had the Guard thereof; but much more stoutly by the Thracians, and other succours of barbarous People. For such Soldiers as were fled thither out of the Battel, were so terrified in mind and spent with weariness, that most of them (having laid aside their Arms and Military Ensigns) did rather think how they might best escape, than to defend the Camp. Neither could they which stood upon the Rampier any longer endure the multitude of Weapons; but fainting with Wounds, forsook the place, and presently fled into the high Mountains adjoining unto the Camp, being led thither by the Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers.

In the Camp were found Tables ready laid prepared with Linen, together with Cupboards of Plate furnished and set out, and their Tents strewed with fresh Herbs and Rushes; and that of Lentulus and divers others with Ivy, and many other superfluities, discovering their extream Luxury and assurance of Victory. Whereby it was easily to be conceived, that they nothing feared the event of that day, being so careful of such unnecessary delights. And yet for all this, they upbraided Cæsar's patient and miserable Army, with riot and excess: To whom there were always wanting such requisites as were expedient for their necessary uses.

Pompey, when as our Men were come within the Camp, having got a Horse, and cast away all Ensigns of Imperial Authority, got out at the Decumane Gate, and made towards Larissa as fast as his Horse could carry him. Neither did he stay there; but with the same speed (having got a few followers that escaped by flight) posting Night and Day, came at length to the Sea-side with a Troop of thirty Horse, and there went aboard a Ship of burthen: Complaining that his opinion only deceived him; being as it were betrayed by such as began first to fly, from whom he hoped chiefly to have had the Victory.

### OBSERVATION.

Whereas it is said, That a dilatory course is very profitable and safe; we are to understand it as a chief and main point in the duty of an Embassador, to temporize in things which are pressed hard upon him: As being accountable for Words and Time; but no way charged with expeditions of War; wherein Protraction is oftentimes the interrupter of absolute Victory, and the only supplanter of that which is desired. *Vincere scis, Hannibal, sed victoria uti nescis*; Thou knowest well enough how to get the Victory, Hannibal, but thou knowest not how to use it; was a common by-word, and happened then well for the State of Rome. But now it fell out otherwise; having met with one that knew how to Conquer, and how to follow Victory to purpose.

For notwithstanding the Battel he had fought, and the advantage he had thereby got, might have seemed sufficient for one day's labour; yet he would not let occasion pass, without taking the benefit that was then offered: and never ceased until he had forced the Camp, and overtaken those that escaped the Battel: And so made Victory sure unto him, by driving the Nail home to the head. In regard whereof, he did not unfitly use for his word or Motto, (as they call it) *Μὴδὲν ἀναβαλλόμενος*, BY DEFERRING NOTHING.

*Utilis & tutares dilatio.*  
Dionys.  
Halicar.  
lib. 8.

*Non committuntur legatis trirèmes, aut loca, aut legiones, aut arces, sed verba & tempora.*  
Demost. de falsa legatione.

1. Labor in negotio,  
2. Fortitudo in periculo,  
3. Industria in agendo,  
4. Celeritas in conficiendo,  
were Cæsar's properties.

### CHAP.



## C H A P. XXXIV.

Cæsar besiegeth those that were escaped into the Hills.

Cæsar.

**C**Æsar having got the Camp, instantly required the Soldiers not to look after Pilgrage and Booty, and let slip the means of ending the rest of their business. Which after he had obtained, he began to inclose the Hill about with works of Fortification. They of Pompey's Party, distrusting the Place, for that the Hill had no Water, left it at an instant. And all those that were partakers of that fortune, made towards Larissa. Which Cæsar observing, divided his Forces, and Commanded part of the Legions to remain in Pompey's Camp, and part he sent back into his own: And leading four Legions along with him, he took a nearer way to meet with them; and having gone six Miles, he imbattelled his Forces. Which they perceiving, betook themselves unto a high Hill, under which ran a River.

Cæsar perswaded the Soldiers, albeit they were spent with continual labour all that day, and that Night was now at hand, yet they would not think it much to cut off the River from the Hill by a Fortification, to keep them from watering in the Night. Which Work being perfected, they began by Commissioners to treat of Conditions of yielding themselves. Some few of the Senators escaped in the Night-time away by the flight.

Cæsar, as soon as it was Day, caused them all to come down from the Hill into the Plain, and there to cast away their Arms: Which they performed without refusal; and casting themselves upon the Earth, their Hands spread abroad, with shedding of many tears, desired Mercy. Cæsar comforting them, commanded they should stand up: And having spoken somewhat touching his Clemency, a little to ease them of their fear, he gave them all their Lives with safety; commanding the Soldiers not to hurt any of them, nor that they should want any thing that was theirs.

These things being thus atchieved with diligence, he caused other Legions to meet him from the Camp, sending those he had with him to rest themselves; and the same day came to Larissa. In that Battel he lost not above two hundred Soldiers; But of Centurions, Valiant Men, he lost thirty. And Craftinus fighting valiantly was slain (of whom we formerly made mention) with a Sword thrust into the Face. Neither was that false which he said as he went to the Battel: For Cæsar was perswaded, that Craftinus behaved himself admirably in that Fight, and did deserve as well of him as a Man possibly could.

There were slain of Pompey's Army about fifteen thousand: Howbeit there were of them that yielded themselves above twenty four thousand. For such Cohorts as were in the Forts, did likewise yield themselves to Sylla: and many fled into the next Towns and Cities. Of Military Ensigns there were brought out of the Battel to Cæsar one hundred and fourscore, with nine Eagles. L. Domitius flying out of the Camp into the Mount, fainting for want of strength, was slain by the Horsemen.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

**A**ND thus we see the issue of that Battel, and the Victory which Cæsar obtained at as cheap a rate as could be imagined: For there were slain twenty three thousand of the Enemy, and as many taken, by surrendring themselves, with the loss of two hundred Soldiers, and thirty

Centurions; amongst whom was Craftinus: whose death obliged Cæsar to make this honourable mention of his Valour. But as it is observed by Dionysius Halicarnasseus, *Non Deus quispiam se ducibus, pro salute omnium qui certamen ineunt, sponsores sistit: nec ea conditione imperium accepimus, ut omnes homines devincamus, nullo ex nostris amisso.* No God can promise a General the safety of all his Men: Neither do we take Commands upon that condition, to Conquer all our Enemies without the loss of a Man.

Lib. 8.

## C H A P. XXXV.

Lælius attempteth to block in the Haven at Brundisium: And Cassius fireth Cæsar's Ships at Messina.

**A**BOUT the same time D. Lælius came with his Navy to Brundisium; and according as Libo formerly did, took the Island in the mouth of the Port. And in like manner Vatinius, Governour of Brundisium, having furnished and sent out divers Skiffs, inticed out Lælius's Ships, and of them took a Galley, with two lesser Ships, that were further shot out into the Straights of the Port: and also had disposed his Cavalry along the shore, to keep the Mariners from fetching Water. But Lælius having the time of the Year more favourable and fitter for Sailing, supplied his Army with Water from Corfu and Dyrrachium: Neither could he be beaten off his design, nor be driven out of the Port, or from the Island, either with the dishonour of the Ships he lost, or with scarcity and want of all necessaries, until he heard of the Battel in Theffalia.

Cæsar.

About the same time also Cassius came into Sicilia, with the Navy of Syria, Phœnicia and Cilicia. And whereas Cæsar's Ships were divided into two parts; Pub. Sulpitius, Prætor, being Admiral of the one half, and lying at Vibone in the Straights, and M. Pomponius Admiral of the other half at Messina; Cassius came first to Messina, and was arrived before Pomponius heard of his coming: By which means he surprized him, distracted, and much amused, without any Order or Guards. And finding a strong and favourable Wind, filled the Ships of burthen with Rosin, Pitch and Tow, and like matter of firing; and sending them out to Pomponius's Navy, he burned all the Ships, being in number thirty five, amongst which there were twenty that had Decks. By means whereof they conceived such a terror, that albeit there was a Legion in Garrison at Messina, yet the Town was hardly kept. And, but that certain Messengers coming Post, brought News at the same instant of Cæsar's Victory, most Men thought the Town would have been lost: But the News coming so opportunely, the Town was kept.

Constrata.

Cassius departed from thence, and went to Sulpitius's Fleet at Vibone; where our Ships being brought to shore for fear of the like danger, he there did as he did before; for finding the Wind good, he sent in forty Ships of burthen, furnished with matter to burn the Navy. The fire having taken hold of both Wings of the Fleet, five of them were burned down to the Water. And as the flame began to be further carried with the Wind, the Soldiers of the old Legions which were left for the defence of the Shipping, and were of the number of them that were sick, did not endure the dishonour: But getting aboard of their own accord, put the Ships from the shore; and setting upon Cassius's Fleet, took two Gallies, in one of the which was Cassius himself: but he being taken out with a Skiff, fled away. And furthermore, they took two Triremes. Not long after certain News came of the Battel in Theffalia,

Interdum  
maiores co-  
piæ sternun-  
tur à minori-  
bus. Dion.  
Hal. lib. 8.



Theſſalia, ſo that Pompey's Party believed it: For before that time, it was thought to be but a thing given out by Cæſar's Legates, and other of his friends. Whereupon Caſſius departed with his Navy, and left thoſe places.

## OBSERVATION.

THE Branches of a Tree do receive life from the Stock, and the Stock is maintained by the Root, which being once cut aſunder, there remaineth no life for Stock or Bough, Leaf or Branch. Accordingly it happened with this large-ſpread Party; the Root whereof was then in Theſſalia: And being broken aſunder by the violence of Cæſar's Forces, it booted not what Lælius did at Brundifium, or Caſſius either at Meſſana, or Vibone. For all the parts were overthrown with the Body: And the fortune of the Battel over-ſway'd other petty loſſes whatſoever; being ſo powerful in the opinion of the World, *Ut quo ſe fortuna, eodem etiam favor hominum inclinât*, That what way ſoever Fortune goes, the ſame way goes the favour of the People: Or, as Lucan ſaith,

----- Rapimur, quo cuncta feruntur,

We're ſnatch'd that way that things are carried.

## C H A P. XXXVI.

Cæſar purſueth Pompey: Who is ſlain in Egypt.

CÆſar ſetting all other things apart, thought it expedient for him to purſue Pompey into what parts ſoever he ſhould betake himſelf, leſt he ſhould raiſe new Forces, and renew the War again: And thereupon made forward every day, as far as his Cavalry was able to go; commanding one Legion to follow after by leſſer journeys. There was a Publication made in Pompey's Name at Amphipolis, that all the Youth of that Province, as well Greeks as Citizens of Rome, ſhould come to be inrolled for the War. But it is not poſſible to diſcover, whether Pompey did it to take away all cauſe of ſuſpicion, that he might the longer hide his purpoſe of flying away; or whether he went about by new Levies to keep Macedonia, if no Man preſſed hard after him.

Howſoever, he himſelf lay at Anchor there one Night. And calling unto him his ancient Hoſts and Friends, he took ſo much Money of them as would defray his neceſſary charges: And underſtanding of Cæſar's coming, within a few days he hoized ſail and departed thence, arriving at Mitylene; where he was kept two days with foul weather; and there re-inforcing his Fleet with ſome Gallies he took to him, he went into Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. There he underſtood, that by the general conſent of the Antiochians, and ſuch Citizens of Rome as were there reſiding, the Citadel was already taken to keep him out: And that Meſſengers were ſent about, to thoſe that were fled from his Party into the bordering Cities, forbidding them to come to Antioch; for if they did, they ſhould hazard it with the danger of their Heads. The like happened to L. Lentulus, who the Year before was Conſul, and to Pub. Lentulus, of Conſular Dignity, and to ſome other at Rhodes. For as many as fled thither after Pompey, and came unto the Iſland, were neither received into the Town nor into the Haven; but were commanded by Meſſengers ſent unto them, to depart from thence, and forced to weigh Anchor againſt their Will. And now the fame of Cæſar's coming was ſpread abroad throughout all the Cities.

Whereupon Pompey, leaving off his purpoſe of going into Syria, having taken what Money he found in Bank, beſides what he could borrow of his private Friends, and putting aboard great ſtore of Braſs for the uſe of War; with two thouſand Armed Men (which he had raiſed partly out of the Towns, and partly had forced up amongſt the Merchants, and ſuch others of his followers whom he thought fit for this buſineſs) he came to Peluſium. There by chance was King Ptolomy, a Youth under Age, with great Forces making War againſt his Siſter Cleopatra; whom a few Months before, by means of his Allies and Friends he had thruſt out of his Kingdom: And Cleopatra's Camp was not far diſtant from his.

Pompey ſent unto him, that in regard of ancient Hoſpitality, and the amity he had with his Father, he might be received into Alexandria; and that he would aid and ſupport him with his Wealth and means, being now fallen into Miſery and Calamity. But they that were ſent, having done their Meſſage, began to ſpeak liberally to the King's Soldiers, and to exhort them, that they would ſtand to Pompey, not deſpiſing the low ebb of Fortune he was brought to. Amongſt them were many that had been Pompey's Soldiers, which Gabinus had received out of his Army in Syria, and had brought them to Alexandria; and upon the ending of the War, had left them with Ptolomy, the Father of this Child. Theſe things being known, ſuch as had the procuration of the Kingdom in the minority of the Boy, whether they were induced through fear of gaining the Army, (as afterwards they confeſſed) whereby Pompey might eaſily ſeiſe upon Alexandria and Egypt; or whether deſpiſing his fortune (as for the moſt part, in time of Miſery a Man's Friends do become his Enemies;) did give a good answer publicly to ſuch as were ſent, and willed him to come unto the King: But ſecretly plotting amongſt themſelves, ſent Achillas, a chief Commander, and a Man of ſingular audacity, together with L. Septimius, Tribune of the Soldiers, to kill Pompey. They giving him good words, and he himſelf alſo knowing Septimius to have led a Company under him in the war againſt the Pirates, went aboard a little Bark with a few of his Soldiers: and there was ſlain by Achillas and Septimius. In like manner L. Lentulus was apprehended by commandment from the King, and killed in Priſon.

## The Firſt OBSERVATION.

IF it be now demanded, Where was Cæſar's deſire of Peace? and, Why purſued he not a treaty of Compoſition, at this time, whenas his Tale would have been heard with gladneſs, and any conditions of attonement very acceptable to the vanquiſhed? the answer is already made in the beginning of this Commentary; That there was but one time of making Peace: And that was when both Parties were equal; which was now paſt, and Cæſar too far gone, to look back upon any thing that might work a reconcilment. The one was crept ſo high, and the other caſt down to low, that they ſeemed not compatible in any Medium, although it were to the ſaving of the Empire. Howbeit, it is not denied but that Pompey gave great occaſion of theſe Wars. For Seneca ſaith; He had brought the Commonwealth to that paſs, that it could not longer ſtand, but by the benefit of ſervitude. And he that will look into the reaſons of this Confuſion, ſhall find all thoſe Cauſes corruptes, or ruining cauſes, which are noted by Aristotle to threaten the welfare of a State, in the exceſs of Pompey's exorbitancy. For having nothing in a Mean, he held all his Fortunes by the tenure of Nimium; and was overgrown, firſt with too much Honour, ſecondly, with too much Wealth, thirdly, with too much Power; where-

Pompeius  
Trogus. lib. 6.  
Lib. 8.

Cæſar.

Pompeius eo  
redegit Rem-  
pub. ut ſalva  
ſſe non poſſet,  
niſi beneficio  
ſervitutis.  
s. de benef.  
16. s. Polit.  
Nil nimium  
cupito, was  
writ in Gol-  
den Letters at  
Delphos.



*Iustum bellum esse iis, quibus nisi in armis spes nulla est. Machiav.*

whereby he exceeded the proportion of his Fellow-Citizens and so blemished the beauty of that State, whose chiefest Graces were in a suiting equality. And adding to these the Convulsions of Fear, he made no difficulty to engage Rome in a bloody War; as having no other hope, but in the confusion of Arms.

It is said, that at his arrival at Mitylene, he had much conference with Cratippus, whom Tully mentioneth in his Offices: Wherein, amongst other Remonstrances, the Philosopher made it plain, that his course of Government had brought a necessity of changing that State from the liberty of a Commonwealth, to the condition of a just Monarchy. And since it fell to Caesar's Fortune, if there were any Error committed in the seizure, he may take the benefit of the general Pardon, exemplified by Trebellius Pollio, That no Nation can shew a Man that is altogether blameless.

*Nusquam gentium reperitur qui possit penitus approbari.*

#### The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning the State of Egypt, we are to note, that Alexander the Great being cut off by Death, his Captains laid hold upon such Provinces and Kingdoms as were under their Commands: Amongst whom one Ptolemaeus, the Son of Lagus, a Macedonian, seized upon Egypt, where he Reigned Forty Years; and of him were all his Successors called by the name of Ptolemy. This first Ptolemy possess'd himself of Egypt, about the Year of the World 3640. which was 275 Years before Pompey's Overthrow. His Son that succeeded by the Name of Ptolemy Philadelphus, caused the Bible to be Translated out of Hebrew into Greek by Seventy Interpreters, which are called the *Septuagint*; and made the famous Library, which was burned in these Wars.

The Father of this young Ptolemy, was the ninth in Succession from the first, and at his Death, made the People of Rome Tutors to his Children. His Eldest Son, and Cleopatra his Daughter reigned together six Years; but in the end fell to strife and Wars, and were deeply engaged therein when Pompey Arrived. But shortly after Caesar so ordered the Differences, that he set the Crown upon Cleopatra's Head; who held it peaceably, until she came to play that Tragical part with Antony: Which being ended, the Kingdom was then reduced to a Province, under the obedience of the Roman Empire.

Concerning this miserable end of Pompey, it is truly said of Seneca, that Death is alike to all: For although the ways are divers by which it happeneth, yet they all meet in the same end. And forasmuch as Plutarch hath described particularly the manner of this Catastrophe, it shall not be impertinent to insert his relation thereof.

*Mors omnium par est: Per qua venit diversa sunt, id in quod desinit unum est. Epist. 67. Homines sicut poma, aut matura cadunt, aut acerba ruunt. Plut. in vita Pompeii.*

When Pompey heard news that King Ptolemy was in the City of Pelusium with his Army, making War against his Sister, he went thither, and sent a Messenger before unto the King, to advertise him of his Arrival, and to entreat him to receive him. King Ptolemy was then but a young Man, insomuch that one Photinus Governed all the whole Realm under him. He assembled a Council of the chiefest and wisest Men of the Court, who had such Credit and Authority as it pleased him to give them. They being assembled, he commanded every Man in the King's Name to say his Mind, touching the receiving of Pompey, whether the King should receive him or not. It was a miserable thing to see Photinus, an Eunuch of the Kings, and Theodotus of Chio, an hired Schoolmaster to Teach

the young King Rhetorick, and Achilles, an Egyptian, to consult among themselves what they should do with Pompey the Great. These were the chiefest Counsellors of all his Eunuchs, and of those that had brought him up.

Now did Pompey ride at Anchor upon the Shore side, expecting the resolution of this Council: In the which the Opinions were divers; for some would not have him received, others consented that he should be received. But the Rhetorician Theodotus, to shew his Eloquence, perswaded them, that neither the one nor the other was to be accepted. For, quoth he, if we receive him, we shall have Caesar our Enemy, and Pompey our Lord; and if we do deny him on the other side, Pompey will blame us for refusing him, and Caesar for not keeping of him: Therefore this would be the best Resolution, he told them, to send to Kill him, for thereby they should win the good Will of the one, and not fear the displeasure of the other. And some say, moreover, that he added this Mock withal, *A Dead Man bites not*. They being determined of this among themselves, gave Achilles Commission to do it. He taking with him Septimius (who had charge aforetime under Pompey) and Salvius, another Centurion also, with three or four Soldiers besides, they made towards Pompey's Gallies, about whom were at that time the chiefest of his Train, to see what would become of this matter. But when they saw the likelihood of their Entertainment, and that it was not in Princely shew nor manner, nor nothing answerable to the hope which Theophanes had put them in, seeing so few Men come to them in a Fisher-Boat; they began then to mistrust the small account that was made of them, and Counsell'd Pompey to return back, and to launch again into the Sea, being out of the danger of the hurling of a Dart.

In the mean time, the Fisher-Boat drew near, and Septimius rose, and saluted Pompey in the Roman Tongue, by the name of Imperator, as much as sovereign Captain: And Achilles also spake to him in the Greek Tongue, and bade him come into his Boat; because that by the Shore-side there was a great deal of Mud and Sand Banks, so that his Galley should have no Water to bring him in. At the very same time they saw afar off divers of the King's Gallies, which were arming with all speed possible, and all the Shore besides full of Soldiers. Thus, though Pompey and his Company would have altered their Minds, they could not have told how to have escaped: And furthermore, shewing that they had mistrusted them, then they had given the Murderer occasion to have executed his Cruelty. So taking his leave of his Wife Cornelia, who lamented his Death before his end, he Commanded two Centurions to go down before him into the Egyptian's Boat, and Philip, one of his Slaves Enfranchised, with another Slave, called Scynes. When Achilles reached out his hand to receive him into his Boat, he turned him to his Wife and Son, and said these Verses of Sophocles unto them;

*The Man that into Court comes free,  
Must there in state of Bondage be.*

These were the last Words he spake unto his People, when he left his own Galley and went into the Egyptians Boat, the Land being a great way off from his Galley. When he saw never a Man in the Boat speak friendly unto him, beholding Septimius, he said unto him; *Merhinks, my Friend, I should know thee, for that thou hast served with*



me heretofore. The other nodded with his head, that it was true, but gave him no Answer, nor shewed him any courtesie.

Pompey seeing that no Man spake to him, took a little Book he had in his hand, in which he had written an Oration that he meant to make unto King Ptolemy, and began to read it. When they came near to the Shore, Cornelia, with her Servants and Friends about her, stood up in her Ship in great fear, to see what should become of Pompey. So she hoped well, when she saw many of the King's People on the Shore, coming towards Pompey at his Landing, as it were to receive and Honour him. But even as Pompey took Philip's Hand to arise more easily, Septimius came first behind him, and thrust him through with his Sword: Next unto him also Salvius and Achilles drew out their Swords in like manner. Pompey then did no more but took up his Gown with his Hands, and hid his Face, and Manfully abode the Wounds they gave him, only Sighing a little. Thus, being 59 Years old, he ended his Life the next day after the day of his Birth.

They that rode at Anchor in their Ships, when they saw him Murthered, gave such a fearful Cry, that it was heard to the Shore: Then weighing up their Anchors with speed, they hoisted Sail and departed their way, having Wind at will that blew a lusty Gale. As soon as they had gotten the main Sea, the Egyptians which prepared to Row after them, when they saw they were past their reach, and impossible to be overtaken, they let them go. Then having stricken off Pompey's Head, they threw his Body over-board, for a miserable Spectacle to all those that were desirous to see him.

Philip, his Enfranchised Bond-Man, remained ever by it, until such time as the Egyptians had seen it their Bellies full. Then, having washed his Body with Salt-Water, and wrapped it up in an old Shirt of his, because he had no other shift to lay it in, he sought upon the Sands, and found at length a piece of an old Fisher's Boat, enough to serve to burn his naked Body with, but not all fully out. As he was busie gathering the broken pieces of this Boat together, thither came unto him an old Roman, who, in his Youth, had served under Pompey, and said unto him; O Friend, What art thou that preparest the Funerals of Pompey the Great? Philip answered, That he was a Bond-Man of his Enfranchised. Well, said he, thou shalt not have all this Honour alone: I pray thee yet let me accompany thee in so devout a Deed, that I may not altogether repent me to have dwelt so long in a strange Country, where I have abidden such Misery and Trouble; but that to recompence me withal, I may have this good hap, with mine own hands to touch Pompey's Body, and to help to Bury the only and most famous Captain of the Romans.

The next day after, Lucius Lentulus (not knowing what had passed) coming out of Cyprus, Sailed by the Shore side, and perceived a Fire made for Funerals, and Philip standing by it; whom he knew not at the first. So he asked him, What is he that is Dead and Buried there? But streight fetching a great Sigh, Alas, said he, perhaps it is Pompey the Great. Then he Landed a little, and was streight taken and slain. This was the end of Pompey the Great. Not long after Cæsar also came into Egypt, that was in great Wars; where Pompey's Head was presented unto him: But he turned his Head aside, and would not see it, and abhorred him that brought it as a detestable Murtherer. Then taking his Ring wherewith he Sealed his Letters, where-

upon was Engraven a Lyon holding a Sword, he burst out a Weeping. Achilles and Phorinus he put to Death. King Ptolemy himself also being Overthrown in Battel by the River Nilus, Vanished away, and was never heard of after. Theodotus, the Rhetorician, escaped Cæsar's hands, and wandered up and down Egypt in great Misery, despised of every Man. Afterwards Marcus Brutus (who slew Cæsar) Conquering Asia, met with him by chance, and putting him to all the Torments he could possibly devise, at the length slew him. The Ashes of Pompey's Body were afterwards brought unto his Wife Cornelia; who Buried them in a Town of hers, by the City of Alba.

And having in this manner paid the Tribute which the Law of Nature doth exact, the Law of the Twelve Tables did free his Sepulchre from any further disturbance; *Ubi corpus demortui hominis condas, sacer esto*, Let that place be Sacred, where the Body of a dead Man is Buried. Only this may be added; That as Fabius was called Maximus, Scipio Magnus, and Pompey Magnus, which Titles they carried as Marks of special Nobleness, to raise them above the common worth of Men: So their ends made them even with the lowest of the State. According to that of Seneca; *Intervallis distinguimur; exitu equamur*: Here we are distinguished by distances, but Death makes us all equal.

*Mors Natura lex est. Mors tributum officiumque mortalium. Seneca. natural. Quest. 6. Fabius dictus Maximus, Scipio magnus. Polyænus, lib. 8. Epist. 100.*

#### C H A P. XXXVII.

Prodigious Accidents happening upon the Battel in Pharsalia. Cæsar cometh into Egypt.

Cæsar coming into Asia, found T. Ampius going about to take the Money out of the Temple of Diana at Ephesus: And for that cause to have called together all the Senators that were in the Province, that he might use them as Witnesses in the matter. But being interrupted by Cæsar's Arrival, he fled away. So that two several times the Money was saved at Ephesus by Cæsar's means. It was further found very certain, that in the Temple of Minerva at Elis (a just calculation of the time being taken) the same day that Cæsar Overthrew Pompey, the Image of Victory, which stood before Minerva, and looked towards her Portraicture, did turn it self towards the Portal and the Temple-Gate. And the same day likewise there was such a noise of an Army twice heard at Antioch in Syria, and such sounding of Trumpets, that the City ran in Arms to keep the Walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. And likewise at Pergamus, in the remote and hidden places of the Temple, which are called *adura*, into which it is not lawful for any Man to enter but the Priests, were Bells heard to Ring. Besides the Tralles, in the Temple of Victory (where they had set up a Statue to Cæsar) there was shewed a Palm-Tree, which, in those days, was grown from between the joynts of the Stones, out of the Pavement.

Cæsar staying a few days in Asia, hearing that Pompey was seen at Cyprus, and conjecturing he went into Egypt, for the Amity and Correspondency he had with that Kingdom, besides other opportunities of the place; he came to Alexandria with two Legions, one that he commanded to follow him out of Thessaly, and another which he had called out of Achaia, from Fufius, a Legate, together with Eight Hundred Horse, Ten Gallies of Rhodes, and a few Ships of Asia. In these Legions were not above Three Thousand Two Hundred Men; the rest were either Wounded in the Fights, or spent with Travel, and the length of the Journey. But Cæsar trusting

*This that followeth, seemeth of another Style.*



trusting to the fame of his great Exploits, did not doubt to go with these weak Forces, thinking every place would entertain him with safety.

The Priests of Egypt said, That whensoever the Axe and the bundle of Rods came into Alexandria, the Power of their Kings should presently cease: According as it was written in a Column of Gold at Memphis.

At Alexandria he understood of Pompey's Death: And as he was going out of the Ship, he heard a Clamour of the Soldiers which the King had left to keep the Town, and saw a concourse of People gathered about him, because the bundle of Rods was carried before him; all the multitude crying out, that the King's authority was diminished. This Tumult being appeased, there were often uproars and commotions of the People for every day after; and many Soldiers were slain in divers parts of the City. Whereupon Cæsar gave order for other Legions to be brought him out of Asia, which he raised and enrolled of Pompey's Soldiers. He himself was stayed by the Winds called Etesiaë, which are against them that Sail from Alexandria.

In the mean time, forasmuch as he conceived that if the Controversie between the King and his Sister did appertain to the People of Rome, then consequently to him as Consul; and so much the rather it concerned his Office, for that in his former Consulship, there was a League made by the decree of Senate with Ptolemy the Father: In regard hereof he signified that his Pleasure was, that both the King and his Sister Cleopatra should dismiss their Armies, and rather plead their Cause before him, than to decide it by Arms.

There was at that time one Photinus an Eunuch, that had the administration of the Kingdom, during the Minority of the Child. He first began to complain among his Friends, and to take it in scorn, that the King should be called out to plead his Cause: And afterwards having gotten some assistance of the King's Friends, he drew the Army secretly from Pelusium to Alexandria, and made Achilles (formerly mentioned) General of all the Forces; inciting him forward, as well by his own Promises, as from the King, and instructing him by Letters and Messengers what he would have done.

Ptolemy the Father, by his last Will and Testament, had left for Heirs the eldest of two Sons, and likewise the eldest of two Daughters: And for the confirmation thereof, had, in the same Will, charged and required the People of Rome by all the Gods, and by the League he made at Rome, to see this accomplished. For which purpose he sent a Copy of his Will to Rome, to be kept in the Treasury; which, by reason of the publick Occasions that admitted no such business for the present, were left with Pompey: And the Original, signed and sealed up, was brought to Alexandria.

While Cæsar was handling these things, being very desirous to end these Controversies by Arbitrament, it was told him on a suddain, that the King's Army, and all the Cavalry were come to Alexandria. Cæsar's Forces were not such that he durst trust upon them, to hazard Battel without the Town; only it remained, that he kept himself in such places as were most fit and convenient for him within the Town, and to learn what Achilles intended. Howsoever, he commanded all the Soldiers to Arm; and exhorted the King, that of those which were nearest unto him, and of greatest Authority, he would send some to Achilles, to know his meaning.

Dioscorides and Serapion being deputed thereunto, having been both Embassadors at Rome, and in great place about Ptolemy the Father, they came to Achilles: Whom, as soon as they were come into his Presence, and before he would hear or understand what they would have, he commanded to be taken away and slain. Of whom, one having received a Wound, was carried away by his own People for Dead: The other was slain outright. Whereupon

Cæsar wrought to get the King into his own hands; thinking that his Name and Title would prevail much amongst his People: As also to make it appear, that this War was rather moved by the private practice of some Seditious Thieves, than by order and commandment from the King.

## O B S E R V A T I O N.

The multiplicity of Occasions and Troubles which happen to such as have the ordering of any businesses of Import, doth make that of Pliny often remembred; *Veteribus negotiis nova accrescunt, nec tamen priora peraguntur; tot nexibus, tot quasi catenis, majus indies occupationum agmen extenditur*: New businesses come in the neck of old, and yet the first are not dispatched: With so many Tyes and Chains as it were, is the troop of businesses every day made longer and longer. For albeit Pompey had now spent his Malice, and was no more to appear in Arms against Cæsar: Yet his hap was by flying, to draw him (as it were by way of Revenge) into a place where he was necessarily to be entangled in a dangerous War.

To these Prodigies here mentioned, may be added that of Aulus Gellius, that the same day the Battel happened, there fell out a strange Wonder at Padua: Where a certain Priest called Cornelius, of Noble Race and Holy Life, suddenly fell into an Ecstasie, and said, he saw a great Battel afar off, Darts and Piles fly thick in the Air, some flying and some pursuing, great Slaughter, accompanied with many lamentable Groans and Cries: And in the end cried out, That Cæsar had got the Victory. For which he was mocked for the present, but afterwards held in great admiration.

Pliny maketh the small increase of Nilus to be a Fore-teller of Pompey's Death; *Minimumque Pharsalico Bello: Veluti necem Magni, prodigio quodam, flumine aversante*: The least encrease of Nilus was at the time of the Pharsalian Battel: The very River prodigiously shewing (as it were) a detestation of the Murther of the Great Pompey.

## C H A P. XXXVIII.

Cæsar Landeth his Forces, taketh Pharus, and causeth Photinus to be slain.

The Forces that were with Achilles, were neither for their number, or fashion of Men, or use and experience in War, to be contemned. For he had Twenty Two Thousand Men in Arms. These Troops consisted of the Gabinian Soldiers: Which were now grown into a Custom of Life and Liberty of the Egyptians; and having forgot the name and discipline of the People of Rome, had there Married Wives, and most of them had Children. To these were added such as were gathered from the Thieves and Robbers of Syria, the Province of Cilicia, and other finitimate Regions: Besides many Banished Men, and others condemned to Die, that fled thither. And for all our Fugitives, there was ever a sure and certain receipt at Alexandria, and a certain condition of Life: for upon giving up of his name, he was presently inrolled a Soldier. And if one chanced to be taken and apprehended by his Master, he was presently rescued by the concourse of Soldiers, who being all in the same condition, did strive for him as for themselves. These required the King's Friends to be Slain; these were accustomed to rob Rich Men of their Goods to better their Pay, to



Besiege the King's House, to expel some out of the Kingdom, and to send for others home, according to an old custom and privilege of the Alexandrian Army.

There were besides, Two Thousand Horse, that had been of ancient continuance in many of the Wars held at Alexandria, and had brought back Ptolemy the Father, and restored him to his Kingdom; had slain Bibulus's two Sons, and had made War with the Egyptians: And this use and knowledge they had of War. Achilles trusting to these Forces, and contemning the small number of Cæsar's Troops, did take and possess Alexandria: and further assaulting that part of the Town which Cæsar held with his Men, did first of all endeavour to break into his House. But Cæsar having disposed the Cohorts in the Streets and Ways, did bear out the Assault. At the same time they fought likewise at the Port, and it came at length to a very forcible Encounter: For having drawn out their Troops, the Fight began to be hot in divers Streets and Lanes; and the Enemy (in great Troops) went about to possess themselves of the Gallies, of which there were Fifty found there, that were sent to serve Pompey, and returned home again after the Battel in Theffalia. These were all Triremes and Quinqueremes, rigged, and ready to go to Sea.

Besides these, there were Twenty Two, which were always accustomed to be the best, for the defence of Alexandria, and were all furnished with Decks: Which, if they had taken, together with Cæsar's Shipping, they would have had the Haven and the Sea at their Command; and, by that means, hindered Cæsar from Succours and Provision of Victual. In regard whereof they fought hard on both sides; Achilles expecting Victory, and our Men for their Safety. But Cæsar obtained his purpose: And because he was not able to keep so many several things with so small Forces, he set them all on Fire, together with those that were in the Road, and presently Landed some Soldiers at Pharos; which is a Tower in an Island, of a great height, and built with strange Workmanship, taking that name from the Island. This Island lieth over-against Alexandria, and so maketh it a Haven. But former Kings had enlarged it Nine Hundred Paces in length, by raising great Mounts in the Sea: And by that means had brought it so near to the Town, that they joyned them both together with a Bridge.

In this Island dwelt divers Egyptians, and made a Village of the bigness of a Town: And what Ships soever had fallen off their course, either by Tempest or Error, were there Robbed by those Egyptians. For, by reason of the narrow entrance, no Ships can come into the Haven, but, by the favour and leave of them that hold Pharos. Cæsar being afraid of this, while the Enemy was busie in Fight, Landed his Soldiers, took the place, and there put a Garrison. Whereby he brought it to pass, that both Corn and Succours might safely come by Sea to

supply him: For he had sent to all the confining Regions for aid. In other places of the Town they so fought, that they gave over at length upon equal Conditions: (Which happened by reason of the narrowness of the Passages) and a few of each side being slain, Cæsar took in such places as were most convenient for him, and Fortified them in the Night. In this Quarter of the Town was contained a little part of the King's House (wherein he himself, at his first arrival, was appointed to lodge) and a Theatre joyned to the House, which was instead of a Castle, and had a passage to the Port, and to other parts of the Road. The days following he encreased these Fortifications, to the end he might have them as a Wall against the Enemy, and thereby need not Fight against his Will.

In the mean time, the younger Daughter of King Ptolemy, hoping to obtain the Crown now in question, found means to convey her self out of the King's House to Achilles; and both, jointly together, undertook the managing of that War. But presently there grew a controversie between them, who should Command in Chief; which was the cause of great Largeſs and Rewards to the Soldiers, either of them being at great Charges and Expences to gain their good Wills.

While the Enemy was busied in these things, Photinus, the Governour of the young King, and Super-Intendant of the Kingdom on Cæsar's Party, sent Messengers to Achilles, Exhorting him not to desist in the business, or to be discouraged. Upon the discovering and apprehension of which Messengers, Cæsar caused him to be Slain. And these were the beginnings of the Alexandrian War.

#### OBSERVATION.

PHARUS is a little Island in the Sea over-against Alexandria; in the midst whereof Ptolemy Philadelph built a Tower of an exceeding height, all of white Marble. It contained many Stages, and had in the top many great Lanthorns to keep Light in the Night, for a Mark to such as were at Sea. The Architector Ingraved thereupon this Inscription; Sostrates Gnidius, the Son of Dexiphanes, to the Gods Conservators, for the safety of Navigators.

It was reckoned for one of the Seven Wonders of the World. The first whereof was the Temple of Diana at Ephesus. The second was the Sepulchre which Artemisia, Queen of Caria, made for her Husband Mausolus, whose Ashes she drank. The third was the Colossus of the Sun at Rhodes. The fourth was the Walls of Babylon. The fifth was the Pyramids of Egypt. The sixth was the Image of Jupiter Olympius at Elis, which was made by Phidias, and contained three-score Cubits in height; and was all of Ivory, and pure Gold. And the seventh was this Pharos.

### The Duke of ROHAN'S REMARKS.

IF Cæsar's Clemency and Liberality are so commendable, during the whole course of his Life; he seems to have out-done himself in this Civil War. To be unwilling to destroy whole Armies in Spain by open force, and having reduc'd them to his Mercy, to dismiss them with their Commanders, without obliging them to engage no longer to make War against him: To pay the Arrears due to his Enemies, while he

borrowes Money from his own Captains to pay his own Men, to restore at once to Domitius Aenobarbus 150000 Crowns, which Pompey had given him out of the publick Treasure, to make War against him: To release the Prisoners he took without Ransom; nay, even to restore them what-ever was theirs, while Bibulus, Labienus and others, Massacred as many of his Soldiers as fell into their Hands; are actions to be admir'd, but



but never to be imitated: Especially in an Age in which the practice is very different from this Generosity: And even from what he had practis'd in *Gallia*, where he sometimes us'd great Severity. Let us therefore enquire into the Reasons which inclin'd him to this blind Clemency, which seem'd to be fatal to his Men: In order to which, I am of Opinion that we must distinguish the Designs. He was a Conqueror in *Gallia*, so that whenever they abus'd his first and natural Clemency, he practis'd Severity to awe those by Fear, which he had not been able to Subdue by his Mildness. But here he is engag'd in a Civil War, in which, under pretence of maintaining the Liberty of the People, he designs to enslave the People and Senate. To that end he lays aside all his Passions, the better to effect his design, and the more his Enemies are Cruel against him, the milder he appears against them: So that his Enemies only dreading him in Battel, and not despairing of a Pardon, submit with ease at the first frowns of Fortune. But the Case is very different in such Civil Wars, as are only made for the defence of ones Person or Religion: For having no design in such to subvert the State, you are oblig'd to repel Cruelty by Cruelty, or else you will find no Adherents: But when you Fight for Dominion, you must obtain it, by behaving your self in such a manner that neither Vengeance nor Cruelty may be fear'd from you, and by showing a great Liberality, and all sorts of Vertues: For People never desire a change of Condition, unless it be to make themselves easier. Thus, with this Liberal Resolution and Clemency, retaining his Dictatorship but a Fortnight; doing nothing contrary to the common practice, as Protector of the Common-Wealth, justifying all his Actions, showing himself as desirous of a Peace as *Pompey* seem'd averse to it, in order to animate his Citizens and Soldiers against him; and prosecuting the War much better than he, he achiev'd the greatest and most glorious design that ever was undertaken.

*Cæsar* having joyn'd all his Forces, endeavours to Fight *Pompey*, and not being able to draw him to a Battel, he undertakes a high Design, viz. To Besiege him in his Camp, tho' he was weaker than he. It was near *Durazzo*, where he began to enclose him with Trenches, taking the advantage of small Hills, of difficult access, (which in my Opinion induc'd him to that design:) the Reasons alledg'd by him, are, that being weak in Cavalry, and having a scarcity of Corn, he could not possibly get any, *Pompey's* Army being free, which he thereby also depriv'd of Forrage, and made it useless to all the Factions of the War; since it would lessen *Pompey's* Reputation throughout the Empire, and encrease his own, when it should be reported that *Cæsar* kept him Besieg'd, and that he durst not Fight him; which was of great use to him, since People commonly side with the strongest. On the other hand, *Pompey* being unwilling to quit the Sea-side, or to remove from *Durazzo*, where he had put his Stores and Provisions, resolv'd to subsist there; and finding that his Cavalry would suffer too much unless they return'd to Forrage, he made an enclosure of Trenches on his side, of fifteen Miles circumference. Thus the two Captains omitted nothing in order to the success of their Designs. Finally, *Pompey* finding himself very much streightned by this enclosure, Attacks one of the ends of *Cæsar's* Retrenchments, in which he had so much advantage in two Combats that were fought in one day, that *Cæsar* confess'd, that

his Army would have been routed if he had pursu'd his Victory. This shows us still the usefulness of Retrenchments, and how easie it is thereby to avoid a Combat against an Army we stand in dread of; to re-encourage one that is disheartened; and to starve another stronger than our own: For the skill of War consists chiefly in never being forc'd to Fight against ones Will, to which end 'tis necessary to take care not to want Provisions, to exercise the Soldiers to handle their Arms well, and to observe their Orders, and to know how to make Retrenchments; for had *Cæsar* been to deal with a less skilful Captain than *Pompey* who had suffer'd himself to be enclos'd at first, he would either have ruin'd his Army, or have forc'd him to Fight.

*Cæsar* being sensible that he could no longer block up *Pompey*, nor yet remain near him without being reduc'd to great inconveniencies for want of Provisions; undertakes a long Retreat of several days March. To that end he dispatches away his Baggage in the Evening with one Legion, and the remainder of his Army about Midnight, excepting two Legions, and with his Cavalry, which he himself follow'd at break of day. *Pompey* pursues him with speed, and finding him lodg'd where he had formerly been Encamp'd, he also takes Possession of his old Camp near him: But whereas *Cæsar* seemingly sends out his Cavalry to Forrage, (making it return secretly into his Camp again) *Pompey* sends out his in earnest, and most of his Soldiers being gone back to fetch some Baggage they had left in their former Camp; he Marches away suddenly in the same order as the day before. So that *Pompey* not being able to follow him at that time, and the other making great Marches still in the same order; he could not possibly overtake him; and in three days time desisted his pursuit. This is a fine Lesson to show how dangerous it is to make a Retreat within sight of an Enemy; and how to avoid a Combat, and what Order is necessary to be observ'd not to be incumber'd with the Baggage, and how a Retreat is made better with part of the Army, than with the whole. For since *Cæsar* was afraid of Retreating within sight of *Pompey*, with an Army so accusom'd to Vanquish, and dreaded by *Pompey* himself, what must Generals do in these our Times, who Command Armies newly rais'd, without Order, without Obedience, full of Baggage, where Soldiers do not understand their Arms, nor the Captains how to Teach them; and yet they would think it a reflection upon their Honour, to retire by Stealth? Presumption and Ignorance are two ill Counsellors in War.

At the Battel of *Pharsalia*, *Pompey* was as strong again as *Cæsar*, especially in Cavalry, on which he rely'd particularly for Victory: But his Army was neither so well experienced, nor so accusom'd to Fight as *Cæsar's*, so that dreading they would break their Order in going to Charge, he commanded them to tarry and sustain the shock of the Enemies Army, without moving from their place. *Cæsar* not approving this Advice, commanded his Army to begin the Onset, alledging that it would excite the Courage of his Men, which it is fitter to encrease than to lessen, not disapproving the ancient way, beginning the Combat with a general Shout. And experience informs us, that in all Warlike Actions, he that Attacks redoubles his Courage, and that he that is Attack'd has some fear.

As for the Order of *Pompey's* Battel, having a Brook on his Right, he plac'd all his Horse on the Left, flattering himself, that after having

Over



Overthrown *Cæsar's*, it would enclose his Army. *Cæsar* being sensible that his Cavalry was not strong enough to resist *Pompey's*, reinforced it with sprightly Soldiers, whom he mixes among it; moreover, he makes a Detachment out of every Battalion, with which he compos'd another to sustain it, which he puts out of the Rank of the three Orders of the Infantry, and Commands them not to Charge, until they receive Orders from him; so that when *Pompey's* Cavalry had beaten back *Cæsar's*, which they could not do without putting themselves in disorder, they met this Battalion which stop't them short: And then oblig'd them to turn their Backs, and wholly to abandon the Left Wing of *Pompey's* Army, through which *Cæsar* pursuing his Point, easily put the rest in Disorder. Whereupon we will observe two things, the one that a General must never hazard all his Forces at once, but by degrees: And the other to observe distances so well, both on the sides and in the Rear; that the first being Overthrown, may not Overthrow them that are to sustain them, leaving them a convenient space to pass, and to Rally behind.

As *Cæsar* knew how to Vanquish, so he knew better yet how to pursue his Victory, and to improve it. But never comparably to that of *Pharsalia*, in which he did not alone content himself with forcing the Camp, nor with Besieging the remainder of the Army upon a Hill, on which they retir'd, nor yet with pursuing *Pompey* for some days: But with Three or Four Thousand Men only, he follow'd him both by Sea and Land, until he trac'd him to his Grave in *Egypt*, where he arriv'd almost as soon as he, never allowing him time to recollect himself, or any wise to Rally. This teaches us to improve occasions when they offer themselves, and never to delay what may be executed on the Instant. For Worldly things are subject to great Revolutions: And the Affairs and Difficulties *Cæsar* still met with after *Pompey's* Death, testify sufficiently, that had he in imitation of several Great Men, endeavour'd to gather the Fruits of his Victory, before their being Ripe, and to Relish Peace before it were secur'd, he might have repented it.



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# COMMENTARIES

## ON THE

# Alexandrian War.

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By *Aulus Hirtius Pansa*, *Cæsar's* Friend and Companion in his Wars.

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*Now first made English.*

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### *The Argument.*

**C**ÆSAR pursues POMPEY to *Alexandria*, where understanding that he was Slain, but that King *Ptolemy* did design to entrap him, he was constrained to stand upon his Guard, though under the Disadvantage both of Time and Place, it being Winter, and within the Walls of a Town, in the Possession of a most powerful and cunning Enemy, he himself poor and destitute of Conveniencies for a War. A Dissention between *Arſinoe*, youngest Daughter to King *Ptolemy*, and *Achillas*, Captain of the Guard, about the Government. *Cæsar* releases young *Ptolemy*, who (contrary to his most solemn Promises) Fights against him, but is overcome. Besides this War of *Alexandria*, *Hirtius* in this Book does likewise give an Account of the Disturbances in *Spain*, under *Q. Cassius Longinus* the Prætor: As also of the *Pontick* Expedition against *Pharnaces*. In all shewing great variety of Fighting and Embattelling an Army, Fortune still appearing, like her self, Inconstant.

I. **T**HE War of *Alexandria* being resolved upon, *Cæsar* sends for the whole Fleet from *Rhodes*, *Syria*, and *Cilicia*, calls the Archers out of *Crete*, and the Horsemen from *Malchus*, King of the *Nabathæi*: Commands Ammunition, Provisions, and Supplies to be got together from all Parts, and sent in. Mean while the Fortifications are daily augmented by the Addition of new Works, and all such parts of the Town as are look'd upon to be less strong, are fitted with *Testudo's* and Covert-ways, and from one Building to another the Battering-Rams are let in through Holes, all the old Ruines and void Spaces being taken up with Fortifications. *Alexandria* is in a manner Proof against Fire, because the Houses are at a convenient distance one from another, and are not built of Wood, but fenced about with Walls and Arches, and cover'd over either with a sort of Tiles or hard Terrace. *Cæsar* endeavour'd all he was able to cut off the narrowest part (so made by a Moat or River that runs from the South) from the rest of the City, that part being design'd for the Works and making of Vines or Coverts; having

these things chiefly in his Eye, That seeing the Town was divided into two Parts, the Army might be managed by one Advice and Direction; and then, such as were over-power'd, might be relieved, and have help sent 'em from the other part of the Town: But especially, that Water and Provision might easily be had; for of one of these they had but little, and of the other none at all; both which the River or Moat could abundantly supply 'em with.

II. All this while those of *Alexandria* were not idle in managing their Affairs; for they sent Ambassadors, and made Proclamation through all parts of the Confines and Kingdom of *Egypt* for Assistance; they convey'd a vast many Bows and Arrows into the Town, and got together an incredible number of People: Also in the City they had huge Magazines of Arms; besides this, they arm'd their Servants that were able, and left the Veterane Cohorts at liberty in the most open places of the City, that what Quarter soever should be assaulted, they might be ready with their whole Force to come to its Aid. They ran up



up a Triple Palifado before each Gate and Postern, built of large square Stone, full Forty Foot high. The lower Parts of the City they fenced with very high Towers of Ten ascents. Besides, they made walking Towers of the like number of Degrees or Steps with Wheels, and having put Ropes to 'em, they drew them with Horses, moving them to what quarter they pleased, along such Streets as were even and direct.

III. The City being both Wealthy and Populous furnished them with all Necessaries. The Men being very Ingenious, and extraordinary Acute, did so dextrously perform whatsoever they saw our Men do, that you would have thought our Men had imitated them: Besides, they had many things of their own Invention; at the same time infesting our Fortifications and defending theirs. Moreover, their Princes or Chiefs in their Councils and Speeches, spoke to 'em to this effect; The People of Rome, according to their Custom, are come to take Possession of our Towns by little and little. Not many Years ago (you may remember) *Gabinus* entred Egypt with a Powerful Army; And now *Pompey* being Overcome, fled hither, whither *Cæsar* has pursued him with his Forces; and though he be dead, yet *Cæsar* continues amongst us: Who (if we do not force him out) will turn our Kingdom into a Province; and all this (which is to be maturely thought upon) in a tempestuous time of the Year, when he can receive no Succours by Sea.

IV. While these things were in Agitation, there arose a dissention between *Achillas*, Captain of the *Veteranes*, and *Arfinoe*, King *Ptolemy's* Younger Daughter, each laying wait for other, he practising to get the Government into his hands. But *Arfinoe*, by the help of *Ganymedes* the Eunuch, gains *Achillas* his Father-in-law, to her Party, and by that means slays him; who being dead, she obtained the whole Government, without any Copartner or Controller. *Ganymedes* is made General of the Army, who having taken that Office upon him, encreases the Soldiers Pay, and administers other Matters with equal diligence.

V. *Alexandria* is in a manner all of it undermined, and has Dreins or Canals as far as the Nile, by which the Water is brought into Conduits or Water-Houses, which, by little and little, in time grows clear and settles: This Masters and their Families make use of; for as it comes from the River Nile, it is so muddy and thick, that it breeds many and various Distempers: But Servants and poor People are forced to be contented with it as it comes, because there is not so much as a Well or Spring in the whole City. Further, this River (the Nile) lay on that side of the City which the *Alexandrians* were possessed of: Which thing *Ganymedes* knowing very well, that our Men might be kept from Water, who were distributed up and down in every Street for the Defence of the Fortifications, and made use of Water, drawn from Water-Houses, Dreins, and Ponds, he undertakes a great and difficult Task; for having cut off the Dreins, and all Parts of the City, in his Possession, being secured, he does what he can to draw a vast quantity of Water out of the Sea with Ropes and Engines, which from the rising Grounds, he let fall upon that part which *Cæsar* was possess'd of, without intermission; by means whereof the Water coming falter than ordinary out of the upper Conduits or Water-Houses, the better sort of Inhabitants

were in great admiration, how it could happen; neither were they satisfied whether they might believe themselves, till the inferiour or common sort of People alledged also that the Water they used was of another Nature and Taste to what it was formerly; and by comparing one with the other, and tasting them, they found the difference thereof. In a little while after this, that in the upper Conduits could not be drunk at all, and that in the lower grew every day more corrupt and salt.

VI. This done, and they being fully convinced, such a fear fell upon them, that they all thought themselves at the last Extremity: Some said *Cæsar* ought not to delay, but get on Ship-board; others feared that Remedy would be worse than the Disease, because it was not possible they should conceal their flight from the *Alexandrians*, seeing they were so near 'em; and if they follow'd, there would not be room enough in the Ships to receive them. Besides, there were a great many of the Townsmen in that part of the City where *Cæsar* was, whom he had suffer'd to continue in their Habitations, because they had openly dissembled themselves faithful to our Men, and seem'd to have revolted from their own; so that, had I been to defend the *Alexandrians*, I could have said much as to their Fidelity and good Conduct: But let any Man consider their Nation and Nature at the same time, and he cannot doubt but they are a sort of People above all Mankind fittest for destruction.

VII. *Cæsar*, by fair Words, and dint of Reason, lessen'd the fear of his Soldiers, alledging, "That fresh Water might be found in the Pits and Trenches; for all Sea-Shoars have naturally Veins of it. But, if the nature of the Egyptian Coast should prove contrary to all others, yet seeing they had the Sea at Command, the Enemy having no Navy, they could not be hinder'd from fetching Water when they pleas'd with their Ships, either from *Paratonium* on the Left, or from the Island on the Right hand; which Navigations being made at divers times, could never all miscarry by contrary Winds: But that there was no thought of flight, neither for those who had the chief Power, nor even for those who had nothing to think on, but how to save their lives: That it was found hard enough to sustain the shocks of their Enemies with the help of their Fortifications, much less could they do it if they left them, being unequal both by their ignorance of the place and their number; besides it would be both tedious and difficult to get into the Ships, especially from the Skiffs. On the other hand, the *Alexandrians* were very swift, and understood well the nature of the Place and the Buildings; but chiefly being proud of the Victory they would get before them, and possess themselves of the rising Grounds and tops of Houses, and thereby hinder them in their flight, and getting to their Ships; therefore exhorted them to think no more of that Resolution, but by all means to think of being Conquerors."

VIII. Having made this Oration to his Soldiers, and the Courage of all being excited, he gave Order to the Centurions, That all other business being let alone, they should betake themselves to digging of Wells without intermission, so much as in the Night-time. Having begun the Work, and every one being intent upon it,



in one nights time they found abundance of fresh Water; so that in a very little time the Operose Engines and vast Endeavours of the *Alexandrians* were rendred useles. Two days after, the Seven and thirtieth Legion of *Pompey's* Soldiers, that surrender'd themselves, with Corn, Arms, and Bows and Arrows, having been put on Board of Ship by *Domitius Calvinus*, were brought to the Coast of *Africa*, a little above *Alexandria*. These Ships, by reason of a West Wind which blew for many days, could not get into Port; yet the places all thereabouts are remarkable for good Anchoring. They, being long weather-bound, and very much straiten'd for want of Water, send an Express to *Cæsar*, to acquaint him with their Condition.

IX. *Cæsar*, without consulting any body but himself, what was proper to be done, gets on Ship board, and orders all the Fleet to follow him; but puts never a Land-man on Board; because, being to go a great way off, he was not willing to leave the Works unguarded. When he arrived at *Cherrhonesus*, and had put his Boats ashore to take in fresh Water, some of the Company going a good way from the Ships for Plunder, were taken by the Enemies Horsemen: Of whom they learn'd that *Cæsar* himself was come along with the Fleet, and that he had no Soldiers aboard. Understanding which, they were of opinion that a good Opportunity was offered them of Advantage: Whereupon they mann'd all the Vessels they had ready for sail, and met *Cæsar* as he return'd with his Fleet; who for two Reasons declin'd fighting that day; one, because he had no Soldiers on board, and it was past the tenth hour of the Day, thinking the night would give his Enemies Courage, who trusted much to their Knowledge of the places; the other, that he had not time to encourage his Men, being of opinion that no Exhortation is of any validity, wherein Valour and Cowardice are not, the one commended, and the other exploded. For which Causes, *Cæsar* drew all the Ships he could to shore, into a place where he thought the Enemy could not follow him: But there was one Ship, a *Rhodian*, in the right Wing at a great distance from the rest; which the Enemies seeing they could not contain themselves, but immediately four large Ships and a great many small open Vessels ran upon her with full Sail. Whereupon *Cæsar* was constrained to give her his Assistance, that he might not be a shameful Spectator of his Disgrace; though if a worse thing should happen, he thought he ought to take it for his pains. A Battle commences hereupon, with great fury by the *Rhodians*, who, as they excelled both for Skill and Valour in all Encounters, so at this time especially they did not refuse to bear the whole brunt of the Battle themselves, because it should not be said the *Romans* came to any Damage by their mismanagement. This Fight was fortunate to the *Romans*; for one of the Enemies Ships of four Banks of Oars was taken, another sunk, but all the Men were saved; and a very great number of Sea-men were slain in the rest: And if the Night had not put an end to the Fight, *Cæsar* had got the whole Fleet of the Enemy into his Possession. The Enemies being thoroughly frightened with this ill Fortune, *Cæsar* (the Wind blowing gently against him) tow'd his Ships of Burthen, with his Men of War, to *Alexandria*.

X. The *Alexandrians* were so mightily discouraged at this Loss, when they saw themselves overcome, not only in the Valour of their Seamen,

but in the Skill of their Pilots, (in whom, and the tallness of their Ships, they much confided) that they doubted whether their Ports were able to defend them; wherefore they made all the Blockades possible, being afraid lest our Fleet should come so near as to annoy them, even on shore. They, after *Ganymedes* had ratified the same in Council, set themselves to repair and make good the number of such Ships as were lost, being very diligent in refitting their old Ships, not at all doubting but they should be able to effect the same. And although they lost above a hundred and ten long Ships, and all their Naval Stores in Port, yet they laid not aside their hopes of making the same good again: For they saw that neither Forces nor Provisions could be brought to *Cæsar*, if they were but strong enough in Shipping; besides, the Seamen both of the City and Maritime Country, who had been brought up to the Sea from Children, coveted to flock in for so natural and National a Good; neither were they insensible of what Advantage their small Craft was to them. These things considered, they set about repairing their Navy with all possible Diligence.

XI. They placed Guards at each mouth of the Nile, to take the Customs or Toll: Old Ships, belonging to the King, that had lain in obscure Docks, and that had not been made use of for many years past, they refitted, and brought to *Alexandria*, but without Oars. They uncover'd the tops of the Gates, Schools, and publick Buildings; made Boards or Planks serve instead of Oars: Natural Industry furnish'd 'em with some things, the Plenty of the City with others. Lastly, their Preparation was not for a long Voyage, but such as was suitable to the present Necessity; for they foresaw their Conflict must be in their very Port. Therefore in a few days, contrary to all Expectation, they had got ready two and twenty of four Banks apiece, and five of five Banks each, with abundance of small open Vessels. Having made Trial what each of 'em could do, before they went out of Port, they put a convenient number of Land-men on board, and made themselves in all things ready for a Battle.

XII. *Cæsar* had with him nine Ships of *Rhodes*, (for of ten that were sent, one founder'd in her Voyage upon the *Egyptian* Coast) eight from *Pontus*, five from *Lycia*, and twelve from *Asia*. Of these there were five of five Banks apiece, and ten of four; all the rest were less, and for the most part open: Nevertheless, trusting to the Valour of his Soldiers, having learned the strength of the Enemy, he prepared to fight them; for when each Man had taken a Resolution, from a Confidence of his own Ability, to do his best, he sails round with the Fleet to the Isle *Pharos*, and drew up his Ships in Order of Battle against the Enemy, placing the *Rhodians* in the right Wing, and those of *Pontus* in the left. Between 'em he left a space of 40 Paces; for so much he thought convenient for the drawing the Ships off upon occasion. After he had thus order'd them, he disposed of the rest for a Reserve, appointing and commanding which should follow and assist one part, and which the other.

XIII. The *Alexandrians* undauntedly bring out their Ships, and range 'em in order. In Front they place two and twenty; the rest, as Reserves, they place in the second Rank: Besides, they bring out a great number of lesser Ships and Skiffs, with Bains and Fire, to try if by their Num-



ber, Shouting, and Lights, they could put our Men into a Fright.

There were between the two Fleets narrow Fords, which belong to the Coast of *Africk*; (for they say, that one half of *Alexandria* is in *Africa*) where they waited a long time, one expecting when t'other should pass the same; because, which-soever enter'd, if he should chance to have the worse, would find it a difficult Matter to get out again in the Retreat.

XIV. *Euphranor* was Admiral of the *Rhodian* Ships, who, for his greatness of Mind, and Courage, was rather to be compar'd to the *Romans* than the *Grecians*. This Man, because of his very great Skill and Magnanimity, was so beloved by the *Rhodians*, that they gave him the Command of their Fleet: Who, when he understood *Cæsar's* Mind, said, *Cæsar, thou seemest to me to be afraid that shouldst thou enter these Fords before thou art obliged to it by Fight, thou shouldest not be able to bring the Ships off again: Commit this Affair to us Rhodians; we will sustain the Brunt of the Battle, while the rest follow us, and in this we will not balk thy Expectation; for to see these Men longer to vaunt it, even under our Noses, is a horrid shame and trouble to us.*

XV. *Cæsar* having encouraged him, and given him all due Praise and Commendation, gives the Signal for Battle. *Euphranor* with four *Rhodian* Ships passes beyond the Ford, which are surrounded by the *Alexandrians*, who run upon them with great Violence; which they sustain, and with great Dexterity and Cunning clear themselves of 'em: And so excellent a thing is good Discipline, that in such an unequal number not a Ship of ours came side-ways upon the Enemy, nor an Oar of any of 'em was lost or swept away; but they always met them full butt as they came. In the mean while the rest of ours came up, when we were forced of Necessity to leave Art or Dexterity, by reason of the narrowness of the place, and betake our selves wholly to Valour. There was not one Man in *Alexandria*, either of our Men, or the Townsmen, of those employ'd in the Works or in the Defence of the place, but got on the tops of the highest Buildings and places of Eminence, being desirous to see the Encounter; each with Prayers and Vows to the Immortal Gods, wishing Victory to their respective Party. For had ours been beat, we had had no Refuge either by Sea or Land; nay, even all things future were uncertain to us, though we had been Conquerors. They, if they had overcome us at Sea, would have got all; if worsted, their other Fortune would have been in jeopardy. This withal was a grievous and sad thing to consider, That the Good and Safety of the whole should turn upon the Fate of a few, of whom, if any should despond or be dishearten'd, the rest must also fall, not having Ability to defend themselves. These things *Cæsar*, some days before, had declared to his Soldiers; that they might fight with so much the greater Courage, since they saw that the Safety of all lay in their hands: Each particular Man, following *Cæsar's* Directions, exhorted his Friend and Companion that he would not balk his and the Expectation of all the *Roman* People, since they had pitch'd upon him as one on whom they might hazard the Fate of a Battle. With this Resolution therefore it was determin'd, That neither the Industry nor Experience of the Coasters or Seamen should be any Protection, nor their multitude of Ships, of any Advantage to 'em; nor could they equal us in the number of valiant Men.

XVI. In this Fight was taken one Ship of five Banks of Oars, with all the Soldiers and Seamen, and three sunk; (without the loss of one on our side) the rest make off the nearest way to the Town, where they were shelter'd by Molds with Forts to secure 'em, which hinder'd our Men from coming near.

XVII. *Cæsar*, that this might not be an Obstacle to him at every turn, thought it his best Policy to strive by all means possible to get the Island, with the Mold belonging thereto, into his hands. The Fortifications therefore being in a good measure finished in the Town, he hoped both the Mold and it might be accosted at the same time. This Counsel being taken, he puts ten Cohorts and the chief of the light armed Soldiers of the *Gaulish* Horsemen, whom he thought most proper, on board the lesser Ships and Skiffs: One part of the Island he attacks, with his Ships covered for the Protection of his Men, offering him great Rewards that should first set foot upon it. At the first Onset they sustain'd our Men with equal Bravery; for, at the same time that some defended their Coasts, others threw Darts and other offensive Weapons from the tops of the Houses: For by reason of the unevenness of the place, the Landing was very difficult for our Men; and with their Skiffs and long Ships they nimbly and skilfully defended the narrowness of the place. But as soon as (the places being known, and the Fords thoroughly tried) a few of our Men were got ashore, and others came and back'd them, and stoutly resisted the Enemy upon equal ground, all the Inhabitants of *Pharos* run away. These being put to flight, the rest, leaving the custody of the Port, apply themselves to the Shore and to the Town, and left their Ships, to defend their Houses.

XVIII. Not could they long defend themselves by the help of their Fortifications, though the Buildings were not unlike those of *Alexandria*, (suffer me to compare less things with greater;) the Towers were both high, and stood so close together, that they served instead of a Wall; and our Men came not prepared for a Siege, with Scaling Ladders, Hurdles, and other such like Implements: But Fear robs Men of their Understanding and Reason, and debilitates the Body, as then it fell out. They that thought themselves able to encounter us on plain and equal ground, being now frightened with the flight of some and the slaughter of a few of their Men, durst not now trust themselves to their Fortifications of 30 Foot in height, but threw themselves through the Mold into the Sea, and swam to a Town 800 Paces off; though we kill'd a great many of 'em, and took six hundred Prisoners.

XIX. *Cæsar*, having given the Soldiers leave to plunder, commanded the Houses to be pull'd down, and the Castle to be fortified on all sides as far as the Bridge that is next to *Pharos*, and put a Garrison into it. This the *Pharites* had fled from, but that which was strongest, and next to the Town, the *Alexandrians* kept: However, the next day he accosts it in the same manner, because (the Castle and the other Bridge being taken) he perceived all fear of Excursion of their Shipping, and sudden Ambuscades, was taken away; he having also with Arrows and Darts drove those from the Ships which lay before it for its defence, and forced them into the Town, landed about three Cohorts, the place being so narrow, that it would hold no more; the rest of the Forces keeping their Station



Station on Shipboard: Which being done, he commands a Trench to be thrown up before the Bridge that was right against the Enemy; and an Arch being built, to support the Bridge, he caused the Passages, where the Ships used to go out, to be fill'd up with Stones. One of which Works being finished, that not so much as one Boat could get out, and the other begun; all the Forces of the *Alexandrians* threw themselves out of the Town, and stood together in a large place over-against the Fortifications of the Bridge; and at the same time the Ships that they used to send out through the Bridge, to burn our Ships of Burthen, they placed together against the Mold. Our Men fought from the Bridge and the Mold, theirs from the Platform over against the Bridge, and from their Ships over against the Mold.

XX. *Cæsar* being taken up with these matters, and exhorting his Soldiers, a great number of Watermen and Mariners, from on board our long Ships, threw themselves into the Mold; part with a desire to see the Fight, part with an eager desire to fight. These Men first forced the Enemies Ships from the Mold with Stones and Slings; and their Darts seemed to be of good use to 'em: But after they got beyond that place, their Flanks being unguarded, a few *Alexandrians* ventured out of their Ships; so that as our Men went out without a Sign given, without any Consideration or Order, so they fled back to their Ships in Disorder: With whose flight the *Alexandrians* being encouraged, they came out of their Ships, and pursued our Men, who were in great Confusion; at the same time those that staid behind in the long Ships, snatch up the Ladders, and hasten to force the Ships from the shore, lest the Enemies should possess themselves of 'em. Whereupon three Cohorts of our Men, that were on the Bridge and in the first Mold, when they heard a shouting behind them, and beheld our Men running at the same time, valiantly at first withstood the violent shock of the Enemies Darts; but fearing they should be hemm'd in behind, and that the Ships would go off, and no way would be left for their Retreat, they left the Fortification they had begun upon the Bridge, and made all the haste they could possible to the Ships; whercof part having got aboard the next Ships, they sunk with the great number and weight of the Men; part hesitating, and being doubtful what course to take, were slain by the *Alexandrians*: Some few, reserv'd for a better Destiny, follow'd the Advice-boats, by the Anchors, and so got off safe; and a few, bore up by their Shields, strove with all the strength they had, and swam to the next Ships.

XXI. *Cæsar* did all that in him lay to get his Men upon the Bridge and Fortifications again, he venturing himself in the same common danger with them: But seeing none would stir, he got aboard himself, whither such a multitude of Men follow'd him, that they had neither room to stir one for another, nor get the Ship from Land. He, suspecting what did afterward indeed fall out, threw himself out of the Ship, and swam to some Ships at a good distance off; whence he sent Boats to help his Men, that were in a very great strait, and saved some; for his Ship, depressed with the multitude of the Soldiers, perished, together with most of the Men. In this skirmish were lost about 400 of the Legionary Soldiers, and of the Rowers and Mariners about the like number.

XXII. The *Alexandrians* built a Castle in this

same place, with great Fortifications and abundance of Artillery; and having cleared the stones out of the Sea again, they let their Ships pass in and out, as before they used to do.

XXIII. Our Men were so far from being discouraged at this Loss, that, being the more incensed and excited, they made greater Advancements; for in assaulting the Enemies Works, in daily Skirmishes, and whenever an opportunity offer'd it self, we took many a Party of Men from the *Alexandrians*, in their Excursions and Sallies, by the indefatigable Industry of ours: Nor could *Cæsar's* Order, when it was made publick, abate either the Toil of the Legions, or their desire of Fighting; insomuch that it was a harder matter to deter and restrain them from the most dangerous Encounter, than to excite them to it,

XXIV. The *Alexandrians*, when they saw that Prosperity strengthen'd, and Adversity excited and sharpen'd the *Romans*, as we may reasonably conjecture, either being admonished by their King's Friends that were in *Cæsar's* Garrisons, or by their own Counsel, approv'd of by secret Messengers from the King, they sent Ambassadors unto *Cæsar*, That he would suffer their King to be dismiss'd, and come over to his People; for all of 'em were ready (being spent with wearisomeness, the fiduciary Reign of a Girl, and most cruel Domination of *Ganimedes*) to do what the King should command; by whose Guaranty, if they might come under *Cæsar's* Protection and Friendship, no fear of danger should hinder 'em from delivering themselves to him.

XXV. *Cæsar*, although he very well knew the Fallaciousness, Diffimulation, and Cunning of the Country, yet thought it convenient to grant their Request; because, if they did determine to do what they requested, he trusted, if he let the King go, he would continue firm in his Fidelity; but if (which was more agreeable to their nature) they only required the King to lead them out in Battle against him, it would be more noble and commendable to fight against a King, than against a Band of Strangers and Fugitives. Therefore having exhorted the King, That he would take care of his Kingdom, spare his most excellent Country, which was laid waste with most shameful Burnings and Devastations; first restore his Citizens to safety, and then shew himself faithful to the People of *Rome* and to him; and thinking he only sent him to his Enemies in Arms, they shook one another by the hand, and *Cæsar* began to dismiss him; (for he was now of full age) but the Royal Soul, well instructed in the most fallacious Cant, that he might not degenerate from the fashion of his Country, weeping, begun to entreat *Cæsar* that he would not let him go; for that a Kingdom it self was not more pleasant to him than *Cæsar's* Presence. The Young-man's Crying being stinted, *Cæsar* himself being moved thereat, presently sent him away to his own people, not doubting but that, since he was so taken with his Presence, he would be true to his Interests: But he was no sooner set at Liberty, but he wages War so vigorously against *Cæsar*, that it appear'd the Tears he shed in Discourse with *Cæsar* were shed for Joy he was released. Hereat many of *Cæsar's* Legates, Friends, Centurions, and Soldiers Rejoyced, because his over-good Nature was put upon by the Sophistries of a Child; as though indeed *Cæsar* had done it, mov'd thereto by his good Nature only, and not by the most prudent deliberation.

XXVI.



XXVI. The *Alexandrians* having got their Leader, and finding themselves never a whit the stronger, nor the *Romans* the weaker, (the Soldiers deriding the King's Age and Weakness) they were mightily troubled; Nor were they ever a whit benefited thereby; and there were Rumours abroad that great Supplies were brought to *Cæsar* by Land out of *Syria* and *Cilicia*; which *Cæsar* as yet heard nothing of. In the mean time they determined to intercept our Provisions that were coming to us by Sea; to which end, having fitted out Ships, which they disposed of in proper Stations about *Canopus*, they laid wait for our Convoy, which as soon as it was told *Cæsar*, he commanded the Fleet to be presently equipp'd and fitted out, and makes *Tiberius Nero* Admiral. In this Fleet went the Ships of *Rhodes*, under *Euphranor*, without whom never any Sea-fight was finish'd with good Success; but Fortune, (which very often reserves those for a worse Fate, whom she before had honour'd with abundance of Favours) contrary to her wont, was now against *Euphranor*: For when they came to *Canopus*, and had drawn up the Fleets on both sides in order of Battle, and *Euphranor*, as he used to do, had begun the Fight, and had there made a hole through one of the Enemies-Ships of three Banks, and sunk it, he pursued the next too far, (the rest of his Squadron coming but slowly up after him) and was hemm'd in by the *Alexandrians*, without any to help him; either because they thought his own Valour and good Fortune would defend him, or because they were afraid of themselves: Therefore he only of 'em all behaved himself well in that Fight, and perish'd with his victorious Quadrireme.

XXVII. About the same time *Mithridates Pergamensis*, famous for his Noble Birth, Knowledge in War, Valour, Fidelity, and high Place in the Friendship of *Cæsar* was sent into *Syria* and *Cilicia* in the beginning of the *Alexandrian* War, with a good Force, to raise Supplies, which he speedily effected, by means of the great Willingness of the Citizens, and his own Diligence, and by Land brought them to *Pelusium*, where *Egypt* joyns to *Syria*; which Town (possess'd with a strong Garrison by *Achillas*) because of the Conveniency of the place, (for all *Egypt* is believed to be secured, as it were with Blockades, with *Pharos* by Sea, and *Pelusium* by Land) being suddenly surrounded with a great Army, they fought tightly with the numerous Garrison and other great Forces, which being every one wounded and tired out, he subdued; and, by Perseverance and continued Assaults, the same day he lay down before it, the same day he brought it under his Subjection, and put a Garrison of his own into it. Thence, having happily accomplish'd the Siege, he directs his Course to *Cæsar* at *Alexandria*; and, by that Authority which commonly attends the Victorious, he pacifi'd and brought into *Cæsar's* Friendship all those Countries through which he pass'd.

XXVIII. There is a place, one of the most noted of all those parts, not far from *Alexandria*, called *Delta*, so named from its similitude to the Letter *Delta*; for there is a certain Branch of the River *Nile*, which has but one Original, but dividing into two Streams, widens gradually to a very great distance at its fall into the Sea: To which River when the King understood *Mithridates* did draw near, and knew that he must pass it, he sent great Forces against him; with which he hoped, either to overcome and totally defeat *Mithridates*, or at least to be able to hinder his

Progress: However, he wish'd he might be overcome, which was all he desir'd, namely to cut him off from *Cæsar*, and keep him Prisoner. The first of his Troops that could pass the River at *Delta*, and meet *Mithridates*, begun the Fight; making haste, that those who came after might have no share in the Victory: Whose Shock *Mithridates* sustain'd with great wariness, having intrench'd himself according to the *Roman* custom; for when he saw them enter heedlessly and insolently upon his Intrenchments, he caused a Sally to be made on all sides, and slew a great number of them; and if the rest, knowing the places very well, had not hid themselves, and some of 'em got to their Ships in which they passed the River, they had been all cut off. But their Fear being a little over, and having joyned those that follow'd after them, they began again to make head.

XXIX. *Mithridates* sends a Messenger to acquaint *Cæsar* with what he had done; and the King understanding by his Soldiers what had happen'd to them; so that much about the same time that the King went out to oppose *Mithridates*, *Cæsar* set out to succour him. The King makes use of the more expeditious Navigation of the River *Nile*, in which he had a great Fleet ready equipp'd. *Cæsar* would not take the same Course, that he might not encounter the Ships in the River; but going round by that Sea which borders on part of *Africa*, as we shew'd above, he prevented the King's Forces before they could fall upon *Mithridates*, and joyn'd him and his Army, yet victorious and in safety. The King sat down with his Forces in a place fortified by Nature, it being upon a rising Ground, a Plain lying round him every way, but fortified on three sides by divers sorts of Fortifications: On one side lay the River *Nile*, on the other a high Mountain, and the third was surrounded by a Fen or Bog.

XXX. Between their Camp and *Cæsar's* March was a narrow River with very high Banks, which ran into the *Nile*, but distant from the King's Camp about 7000 Paces. The King, when by this March he perceived *Cæsar* a-coming, sent all his Horse and nimble light Foot to that River, to hinder *Cæsar* in his passing it, and at a distance begin the Fight, taking the advantage of the Banks: And here it was Valour had no success, and to be slothful brought danger; which thing did mightily grieve our Men, both Foot and Horse, because they had contended so long with the *Alexandrians* without any Advantage; therefore at the same time the *German* Horse disperse themselves, and seeking out fordable places in the River, swam over it where the Banks were low; and the Legionaries, having cut down great Trees, so long that they would reach from one Bank to the other, they laid them a-cross, and something being thrown in of a sudden, to stop the Rapidness of the Stream, they passed over; whose On-set the Enemy were so afraid of, that they placed their Safety in their Heels; but even that was in vain, for few in the Flight got safe to the King, the rest being almost all cut off.

XXXI. *Cæsar*, having luckily put an end to this business, perceiving that his sudden coming would strike a great Terror into the *Alexandrians*, hastens with all speed as Conqueror to the King's Camp; which when he perceived to be surrounded with vast Works, and naturally fortified, (besides he saw a multitude of Armed Men placed ready in the Pass) he would not suffer his Soldiers, weary with



With the Journey, and with fighting, to proceed to force their Camp; wherefore he pitch'd his Tents not far distant from the Enemy. The next day *Cæsar* set upon a Castle that the King had fortified in the adjoining Village, but a little way from his Camp, having united it with Wings to the Works thereof, for the better conveniency of retreating thereto; and assaults it with all his Forces; not that he thought it might not be reduced with a less number of Soldiers, but that by that Victory the *Alexandrians* being Terror-struck, he might presently assault the King's Camp: Therefore in the same Pursuit, in which the Soldiers followed the *Alexandrians* flying from the Castle to their Camp, they approached their Fortifications, and begun very vigorously to encounter 'em before they closed. Our Men had access two ways to assault 'em; one, where there was no Fortifications; the other, where they had an indifferent Pallisado between the Camp and the Nile. The great and choicest part of the *Alexandrians* defended that part which was of easiest Access; and the Enemy had great success in beating off and wounding our Men who made their Assaults on that side next the Nile; for they were shot with many Arrows, those before 'em out of the Pallisado of the Camp, and those behind 'em from the River, in which there were many Ships full of Archers and Slingers, galling of 'em.

XXXII. When *Cæsar* saw his Soldiers did all they were able, and yet it did but little avail them by reason of the difficulty of the place; and when he consider'd that the highest part of the Camp was relinquish'd by the *Alexandrians*, because it was fenc'd by Nature, and partly with a desire to fight, and partly with a desire to be Spectators, they had run down to the place where the Fight was, he commanded the Cohorts presently to go round their Camp, and possess themselves of the highest place. Over these he made *Carfulenus* General, a Man excellent both for his Magnanimity and Skill in Military Affairs: Whither they were no sooner come, a few only defending the Fortifications, and our Soldiers on the other hand resisting them stoutly, but the *Alexandrians*, frighted with the different shouting and manner of Fight, trembling began to fly on all hands; by whose disorder the hearts of our Men were so elated, that almost at the same time from all Quarters rushing in, (but chiefly those who had possess'd themselves of the highest place, and ran down) they slew a great multitude of the Enemy: Which danger abundance of the *Alexandrians* seeking to avoid, threw themselves on heaps out of the Pallisado into that part which was next the River; the foremost of whom being trod down by the Crowd in the very Ditch of the Fortifications, afforded a more easie escape to those that came after. It appear'd that the King himself fled out this way, and and being taken on Ship-board, together with the multitude of those that swam to the next Ships, was cast away.

XXXIII. This Business being most happily and expeditiously finished, *Cæsar*, in confidence of his great Victory, takes the next way by land to *Alexandria* with his Horsemen, and as Victor enter'd that part of the Town which was Garrison'd by the Enemy: Nor was he deceiv'd in his expectation; for the Enemy, having heard of their Armies overthrow, laid aside all further thoughts of War; so that coming, he received a Reward befitting his Valour and Greatness of Mind: For all the whole multitude of the Townsmen having

thrown away their Arms, and left their Works, and put on such a Habit as Supplicants use when they deprecate great Persons or Rulers, and all their holy things being brought forth, with which they were wont to pacifie angry and offended Kings; they ran and met *Cæsar* as he came along, and surrendred themselves up to him. *Cæsar* having received them, comforted 'em, and came through the Works of the Enemy to his own Quarter of the Town, to the great joy of his People; who rejoiced, not only for that the War and Battle was ended, but also for his so happy Return.

XXXIV. He having possess'd himself now of *Egypt* and *Alexandria*, appointed those to be Kings whom *Ptolemy* had nominated by his Will, and beseeched the *Roman* People that they might not be changed: For the elder of the King's two Sons being drown'd, he gave the Kingdom to the younger, and to the elder of the two Daughters of *Cleopatra*, who had continued faithful to him, and remain'd in his Garisons; but the younger, *Arsinoë*, under whose Name, as we have shewn, *Ganymedes* had impotently a long time bore Rule, he determined to drive from her Kingdom: And that no new Dissention might again arise, by means of Seditious Men, before the King's Governments were well confirm'd unto him, taking the sixth veterane Legion with him, he left the rest there, the stronglier to establish those Kings in their Government; who could neither have the Love of their Subjects, because they had continued firm in *Cæsar's* Friendship; nor that Authority which their Kings antiently had, being Kings but of yesterday, and besides known to be in the Interests and publick Utility of our Empire. If their Kings continued faithful, they might be safe under our Garisons; but if they prov'd ungrateful, by the same Garisons they might be restrained. Thus all matters being ended and disposed of, he takes his Journey by land into *Syria*.

XXXV. While these things were transacted in *Egypt*, King *Deiotarus*, to whom *Cæsar* had given the Government of *Asia* and the Neighbouring Provinces, came to *Domitius Calvinus* to pray that he would not suffer *Armenia* the less, his Kingdom, nor *Cappadocia*, the Kingdom of *Ariobarzanes*, to be enter'd into and laid waste by *Pharnaces*: From which Calamity if they were not freed, to make the best of their Governments, they could not pay *Cæsar* the Money which they promis'd him. *Domitius*, considering not only that the Money would be necessary for the Payment of the Soldiers, but that it would also be a Disgrace to the People of *Rome*, to *Cæsar*, a Conqueror, and to himself, to suffer the Kingdoms of their Associates and Friends to be possess'd by a Stranger King; presently sent Messengers to *Pharnaces* to depart out of *Armenia* and *Cappadocia*, and not by a Civil War to try the Right and Majesty of the *Roman* People. When he considered that this Threatning might have the greater Force if he drew nearer those Countries with an Army, going to the Legions, he took one out of three (which was the XXXVI) with him, and sent the other two into *Egypt* to *Cæsar*, he having writ for them; one whereof is not mention'd in the *Alexandrian* War; it being lost in its March through *Syria* by Land. To the 36th Legion *Cneius Domitius* joyns two from *Deiotarus*, which he had many years train'd up to our way of Fighting, and to our Arms, together with a hundred Horse; and the same Number from *Ariobarzanes*. He sends *P. Sextius* to *C. Platorius* the



Quæstor, to bring the Legion that was made up of the Soldiers that mutinied in *Pontus*; and *Quintus Patiscus* he sent into *Cilicia*, to get Supplies: Which Forces, by the Command of *Domitius*, were speedily convened at *Comana*.

XXXVI. In the mean time the Ambassadors bring back *Pharnaces's* Answer, which was, That he had left *Cappadocia*, but that he had retaken *Armenia* the less, it being but just he should possess it in Right of his Father; lastly, That the Title to that Kingdom should be reserved entire to *Cæsar*, he being ready to ratifie what *Cæsar* had required. *Cneius Domitius*, considering that he had left *Cappadocia*, not of his own free Will, but obliged thereunto by Necessity, (because he could better defend *Armenia*, which joyned to his own Kingdom, than *Cappadocia*, which was more remote; and because he believed *Domitius* would bring all the three Legions, of which when he heard two were sent to *Cæsar*, he the more audaciously carried in *Armenia*) begun to pursue his Resolution that he should depart out of that Kingdom also; for he had no more Right to *Armenia*, than he had to *Cappadocia*; neither could he justly require the matter should be wholly deferr'd till *Cæsar's* coming; for that was to leave the matter entire, namely, to leave the Kingdom in the same state he found it. These Answers being given, with those Forces above-mentioned he went into *Armenia*, determining to march over the Mountains; for from *Pontus* to *Comana* there is a high woody Ridge of Mountains leading into *Armenia* the less, where *Cappadocia* is bordered upon by *Armenia*: Of which March, these were the true Reasons, because in the higher places no sudden Eruption of the Enemy could happen to 'em, and because *Cappadocia*, lying below these Mountains, would afford great plenty of Provisions.

XXXVII. Mean while *Pharnaces* sends a great many Embassies to *Domitius*, who should treat of a Peace, and brought him Royal Gifts; all which he despised with great Equanimity, and answered the Ambassadors, That nothing was of greater Value to him than the Dignity of the Roman People, and to regain the Kingdoms of their Associates. When he was come, by great and continued Marches, to *Nicopolis*, a Town in *Armenia* the less, in a Plain, but with high Hills on two sides at a good distance from it, he pitched his Tent a good way from *Nicopolis*; about 7000 Paces from which Camp, the place being narrow and hard to pass, *Pharnaces* there placed an Ambuscade, consisting of the flower of his Foot, and almost all his Horse; and commanded them to let a great number of Cattle graze within the Defile, and the Villagers and Townsmen to walk frequently up and down in those places; that if *Domitius* should enter those Streights, he might suspect nothing of the Ambuscade, when he saw the Men and Cattle to and again in the Fields, as if they expected no Enemy, but Friends: But indeed, that when he should come into the Enemies Confines for Boory, the Soldiers might be dissipated, and slain in the Dispersion.

XXXVIII. When he had order'd these matters, he did not cease for all that to send Ambassadors to *Domitius* for Peace and Friendship, thinking hereby the easier to deceive him; but unfortunately; for the hope of a Peace caused *Domitius* to abide in the Camp where he was: So that *Pharnaces* having lost the first Opportunity, fearing his Treachery might be discovered, he recalled his Soldiers into his Camp. *Domitius* the next day draws

near *Nicopolis*, and pitch'd his Tents before the Town, which whilst our Men were fortifying, *Pharnaces*, after his manner and model, puts his Army in order of Battle; for in the Front was a single Battle only; but the Wings were back'd by three Reserves each. For the same Reason these were placed in the midst of the Battle, leaving two Spaces, both on the Right and Left. *Domitius* finish'd the Work of our Camp which he had begun, making part of the Forces serve instead of a Redoubt.

XXXIX. The next night *Pharnaces* intercepted our Letters which brought *Domitius* an account of our Affairs in *Alexandria*; whereby he understood *Cæsar* was in a great streight, and desired *Domitius* to send him some Succours with all the speed he could, and that he himself should come nearer *Alexandria*, by way of *Syria*; which *Pharnaces* understanding, he thought it would be as good as a Victory if he could delay time, thinking *Domitius* must speedily draw off. Therefore, where he saw the easiest Access to the Town, and the best place for our Soldiers to fight in, he threw up two Ditches at a little distance the one from the other, four foot deep, between which he placed his Foot, determining not to stir out, continually exercising his Men; but on both sides beyond the Ditch he placed all his Cavalry, who would otherwise have been useless, though they far exceeded ours in number.

XL. But *Domitius*, being concern'd more for *Cæsar's* danger than his own, when he reflected that he could not draw off with safety, if he should again desire those Conditions he had rejected, or depart without Cause, he drew the Army out of the Camp in form of Battle; the 36th Legion he placed in the Right Wing, that of *Pontus* in the Left, the Legions of *Deiotarus* in the middle; between which and the two Wings he left a very little space, and the rest of the Cohorts he placed in Reserve. Thus both Armies being drawn up in form of Battle, they proceed to fight.

XLI. The Sign of Battle being given on both sides at the same time, they run on furiously with various Success; for the 36th Legion, having made their Attack upon the King's Cavalry on the outside of the Ditch, did it so successfully, that they came to the very walls of the Town, passed the Ditch, and encounter'd the Enemy on the further side; but on the other hand, the *Pontick* Legion, having given a little back, and attempting a second time to compass the Ditch, and engaging the Enemy with their Flanks bare, were stop'd and beat down just as passing the Trench: Neither were the Legions of *Deiotarus* scarcely able to sustain the Shock. So the King's Forces being Victorious in the Right Wing, and in Front, applied themselves to the 36th Legion; which notwithstanding valiantly bore the Shock of the conquering Enemy, and being surrounded by the great numbers of them, they presently in the twinkling of an eye threw themselves into a round Figure, and betook themselves to the foot of the Hills, fighting all the way; to which place *Pharnaces* would not follow them, by reason of the roughness thereof. So the *Pontick* Legion being almost all cut off, and a great part of *Deiotarus's* Soldiers being slain, the 36th Legion got a-top of the heights, with the loss only of 250 Men. In this Fight died divers worthy and illustrious Gentlemen of *Rome*. *Domitius*, notwithstanding his having received this Overthrow, gathered together the remainders of his scatter'd Troops, and betook himself



self by safe Marches through *Cappadocia* into *Asia*.

XLII. *Pharnaces*, elated with his good Fortune, at a time when he might have obtained of *Cæsar* what he could desire, enters *Pontus* with all his Forces, and there, both a Victor and a most inhuman King, when he had happily carved out for himself his Patrimony, he laid waste many Towns, took away the Goods of the Citizens of *Rome* and *Pontus*, and inflicted such Punishments on those who had any Commendation for Beauty or Years, as were more intollerable than Death it self; and boasting, said, *He had regained Pontus, his Father's Kingdom, without any Opposition.*

XLIII. About the same time we received a disadvantage in *Illyricum*; which Province for some preceeding Months was kept, not only without Ignominy, but with Commendation; for *Q. Cornificus*, *Cæsar's* Quæstor, being sent thither in Summer with two Legions, as Prætor, although it was very unfit for the Maintenance of an Army, being sack'd and wasted by intestine Wars and Dissentions; yet by his Prudence and Diligence (for it required great Care) he both took and defended it: For he both demolished many Castles that were built upon Eminencies, under whose Protection the Garison was embolden'd to make Excursions and War upon them, and gave the Booty to the Soldiers; which, although it was but small, yet in such a barren Province it was acceptable, especially being obtained by their Valour. And when *Octavius*, in his flight from the Battle of *Pharsalia*, betook himself into that Port with a great Fleet, with a few Ships of the *Fadertines*, who were always very ready to serve the Commonwealth, he took the dispersed Ships of *Octavius*; so that he was able to encounter a Fleet, the Captive Ships being joyned with those of the Allies. When *Cæsar* (being Conqueror, and pursuing *Cneius Pompeius* in the furthestmost part of the World) heard that abundance of Enemies, having recollected their Troops after Flight, betook themselves into *Illyricum*, by reason of its nearness to *Macedonia*; he sent Letters to *Gabinus*, That he should pass into *Illyricum* with the Legions of *Tyros*, that were newly lifted, and being joyned the Forces of *Q. Cornificus*, if they were like to be any Detriment to the Province, to drive them out; but if it could not be defended without more Forces, that they should bring the Legions into *Macedonia*; for he believed that a War would restore all that part and Country, *Cn. Pompeius* being yet living.

XLIV. *Gabinus*, as soon as he came into *Illyricum*, (which was in the Winter, and very difficult) either supposing the Province to be more plentiful than it was, or relying too much on the Victorious *Cæsar's* Fortune, or else trusting to his own Valour and Conduct, which he had often tried in the Wars, he having done great and fortunate matters by his Conduct and Daringness; neither being assisted by the Forces of the Province, which were partly useless & partly perfidious; neither could he be supplied with Provisions by Sea, by reason of the Season, and being urged by great difficulties, made War, not voluntarily, but forced thereunto by Necessity: So that when in very hard Seasons, for want, he was obliged to lay Siege to Castles or Towns, he met with frequent Inconveniencies; and was so despised by the Barbarians, that, betaking himself to *Salona*, a Maritime Town, inhabited by the most valiant and most faithful Citizens of *Rome*, he was forced to fight in his Retreat; in which Fight above 2000 common Soldiers being

slain, 31 Centurions, and 4 Tribunes, he got into *Salona*, with the rest of the Forces; and being there press'd with a very great want of all things, he died in a few Months: Whose ill fortune when he was alive, and now sudden Death, put *Octavius* in great heart of obtaining the Province; whom notwithstanding, both the Fortune, which in War can do much, and the Vigilance of *Cornificus*, and the Valour of *Vatinius*, suffered not long to continue in Prosperity.

XLV. *Vatinius* being at *Brundisium*, understanding how things went in *Illyricum*, and being sent to by frequent Letters from *Cornificus*, to bring Succour to the Province; hearing also that *M. Octavius* had entred into a League with the Barbarians, and in many places had assaulted the Garisons of our Soldiers, partly by a Fleet of his own fitting out, and partly by Land-forces raised among the barbarous People, although he was very sickly, and his Body scarce able to keep pace with the strength of his Mind; yet by his Courage he overcame the Inconvenience of Nature, the Difficulties of Winter, and the suddenness of the Preparation. For, seeing he had but a few long Ships in Port, he sent Letters into *Achaia* to *Q. Calenus*, to send him a Fleet: But being more slow in their doing of it, than the danger our Men were in did require, who were not able to sustain the Forces of *Octavius*, he put Beaks upon the Transport-Ships, whereof he had a pretty good number, though not enow to engage in fight: Having added to these the Long Ships, and the number of the Fleet being encreased, and the Veterane Soldiers put aboard, of whom he had a great many out of all the Legions that were left sick at *Brundisium*, when the Army was to be transported into *Greece*; he set sail for *Illyricum*, and some Maritime Cities that had revolted, and put themselves under *Octavius* his Protection, he took into Friendship again, but others remaining resolute he passed by; nor willing any Delay or Necessity should hinder him, but that as fast as he could possible he might pursue *Octavius*; Whom he forced at his coming from before *Epidaurus*, a Garison of ours, which he had besieged both by Sea and Land, and entred it himself.

XLVI. *Octavius* understanding that *Vatinius's* Fleet was in the main made up of Transport-ships, and trusting in the strength of his own, he staid with it at the Isle *Tauris*, whither *Vatinius* went, pursuing his Course; not that he knew *Octavius* would be there, but because he designed to pursue his Voyage farther. When he came near to *Tauris*, his Ships being at a distance one from another, both because there was a terrible Storm, and also because he had no suspicion of the Enemy, on a sudden he sees a Ship coming full against him full of armed Men, with Streamers hanging to the middle of the Main-mast: Which as soon as he beheld, he commanded them to furl the Sails with all speed, and let the Antients loose, and the Soldiers to arm themselves; and having set up the Standard, which was the sign to fight, he signified to the rest of the Ships that came after to do the same. *Vatinius's* Men made themselves ready, being accosted ere they were aware, but *Octavius's* came ready fitted out of Port. The Ships were drawn up on both sides, *Octavius's* indeed in better Order, but *Vatinius's* Men had more stomach to fight.

XLVII. *Vatinius*, seeing he was exceeded both by the greatness of their Ships and in the number of Men, was the rather willing to commit the Affair



fair to Fortune: Wherefore he himself first with his Quinquereme run with all his force against the Quadrireme wherein Octavius himself was: On the other hand, he most swiftly and most valiantly made towards him with his Oars; and the Ships ran so violently one against another with their Beaks, that Octavius's Ship having lost its Beak, had nothing to defend it but the Wood. In other places the Fight was fierce, the Captain-Ships being chiefly made at; for when every one was ready to succour his Party, they came to a great and close Fight in a narrow Sea; and the less room was left for the Ships to engage in, the better for those of Vatinus's side, who with wonderful Courage feared not to leap out of their own Ships into those of their Enemies, and by fighting on even ground, they far exceeding them in Prowels, happily put an end to the Controversie. Octavius's own Quadrireme is sunk, besides many taken, or, being perforated with our Beaks, sunk: The Warriours on board Octavius's Ships had some their Throats cut, others threw themselves headlong into the Sea. Octavius himself got him into a Skiff, into which a great many flying with him, it sunk; yet he, tho' wounded, swam to his Brigantine, where being taken aboard, the Night putting an end to the Fight, he made his escape with Sails in a great Storm. Him some of his Ships follow'd, which good Fortune had preserv'd from that Peril.

XLVIII. But Vatinus, this Brush being happily over, founded a Retreat, and his Ships being all safe, went Conqueror into that very Port, out of which Octavius came to fight him. He took in this Encounter one of five Banks, two of three, eight of two, and abundance of Oars. After two days stay there, while he refitted his own and the Ships he had taken, on the third he makes Sail for the Island Issa, thinking Octavius might be fled thither, it being the chief Town in all those parts, and most entirely in Octavius's Interests; whither when he was come, the Inhabitants beseeched him to take them under his Protection; they letting him to know that Octavius himself, with a few small Ships and a good Wind, was gone for the Coast of Greece, thence, to Sicily, and thence into Africa, there to remain. So in a short time, the War being most happily ended, the Province being retaken and given to Cornificus, the Enemies Ships being wholly driven out of those Ports, he returned safe to Brundisum with his Army and Fleet.

XLIX. But in those times, when Caesar besieged Pompey in Dyrrhachium, and carried the Matter with success in the Battle of Pharsalia, and warred with great danger at Alexandria, yet even then Report made the Danger greater than it was; Cassius Longinus, left by the Praetor in Spain, for the gaining of the farther Province, either by the custom of his Nature, or out of hatred, because being Quæstor he had taken that Province upon him, being there wounded by Treachery, he made appear the great efforts of his Malice; or because, being conscious the Province had an eye upon him, as he might guess by the mutual Signs and Testimonies of those who can hardly dissemble their hatred; he was desirous to make Recompence for the Injury done to the Province, by his Love to the Army; wherefore as soon as he had brought the Soldiery together into one place, he promises them some hundreds of Sesteriums; and not long after, when he had taken Medobrega, a Town in Lusitania or Portugal, and the Mount Herminius by Storm, to which Mountain the Inhabitants of Medobrega had fled, where they stiled him Emperor,

he again bestowed some hundreds of Sesteriums upon his Soldiers, besides many and great Rewards upon single Persons; which rendred the Love of the Army for the present very conspicuous, yet by degrees and privately they lessen'd Severity and Military Discipline.

L. Cassius, having put the Legions into Winter-Quarters, went back to Corduba, to try Causes; and having contracted a great Debt among them, he resolved to pay it by laying most heavy Taxes upon the Province; and, as the manner of Donation requires, through the specious pretence of Liberality, many things are acquired for the Donor: Moneys were commanded from the Wealthy, which Longinus did not only suffer, but even forced to be spent upon himself; slight causes of Fines were put upon the Wealthy part, and no sort of Gain, either great and commendable, or little and sordid, was let pass, whereby the House and Throne of the Emperor might be supported. There was no body who should incur any Displeasure, but presently he should find Security, or be reckoned in the number of the Guilty. For which cause it came to pass, That, Longinus doing the same things being Emperor, that he had done being Quæstor; the Inhabitants of the Province entred again into their former Resolutions to kill him. Some of his Familiars confirm'd the hatred of these things, who, though they were concern'd with him in his Rapines, yet nevertheless hated him by whose Authority they offended, and brought such their Goods again as they had taken them from unjustly; all that fell short, or was withheld, they put upon Cassius's Account. Notwithstanding, he raises a new fifth Legion, and from the very Chusing and Charge of it (it being additional) encreases their hatred. He also makes the Horsemen up 3000 compleat, and the People are loaded with great Impositions; neither does the Province enjoy any quiet.

LI. In the mean while he received Letters from Caesar, to pass with the Army into Africa, and that he should march through Mauritania to the Confines of Numidia; because King Juba had sent great aids to Cn. Pompeius, and he did not know but he might send greater still. Having received these Letters, he vaunted it with a great deal of Pride, that so large a Power was offer'd him as that of nine Provinces and a most fertile Kingdom. He therefore takes a Journey into Lusitania, (now Portugal) to send for the Legions and draw the Auxiliaries together; and to certain Men entrusts the business to provide Corn and get ready a hundred Ships, and to collect Money by force, that when he came back, he might not be hindred. His Return was quicker than any body could expect; for Labour and Vigilancy were not wanting to him, especially when he had a mind to it himself.

LII. The Army being drawn together into one place, he pitch'd his Tent near Corduba, and in his Speech to the Soldiers he acquaints 'em what Caesar had commanded him to do, promising, when he came into Mauritania, to give each of them 100 Sesterces, and that the Fifth Legion should continue in Spain. After his Speech was ended he went to Corduba, and the very same day at twelve a clock, going into the Judgment Hall, one Minutius Silo, Servant to L. Racilius, making as if he would have ask'd something of him as a Soldier, gave him a Libel, and then slipping behind Racilius, (for he walk'd by the side of Cassius) as if he expected an Answer,

A Sesterce  
is about  
2 d. ob. of  
our money.



Answer, who presently giving way for him to thrust in, he catch'd fast hold of him with his Left Hand, and with his Right run him twice through the Body with a Dagger; and then having set up a Shout, all the Conspirators rush in together. *Munatius Plancus* runs the next Lictor through with his Sword, and having slain him, wounds *Q. Cassius* the Legate: There *T. Vassius* and *L. Mergilio*, with the like Confidence, assist their Freedman *Plancus*; for they were all of *Italica*, (now *Corfinium*) in *Italy*. *L. Licinius Squillus* makes up to him, and wounds him as he lay along.

LIII. At last *Cassius's* Friends run together for his defence, for he always used to have Heroes, and a great many select Men armed about him, by whom those that came behind to back the Assassines were shut in; of which number were *Calphurnius Salvianus* and *Manlius Tuscus*. *Minutius* fleeing, was knock'd down in his Flight with the Stones which they threw at him; and *Cassius* being carried home to his House, he was carried before him. *Racilius* betakes himself into the next House, a familiar Friend's of his, till such time as he certainly understood whether *Cassius* were dead or no. *L. Laterensis*, not doubting but he was really dead, run rejoycing into the Camp, and congratulates the Soldiers that were Natives, and of the Second Legion, to whom he knew *Cassius* was especially odious. He is taken away of the Multitude, into the Capitol, and named Prætor; for there was no Man born in the Province, or a Soldier of the Legion of the Natives, or made Denizens by Length of Time, as was the Second Legion, that, together with the whole Province, did not agree in the hating of *Cassius*; for the Thirtieth and Twenty first Legions having been sent into *Italy* a few Months before, *Cæsar* had assign'd them to *Longinus*; the Fifth Legion, but a little before, being there cut in pieces.

LIV. In the God-speed News is brought to *Laterensis*, that *Cassius* was still living; with which Message, being more grieved than deterred from his purpose, he presently got himself ready, and goes to give *Cassius* a Visit. This thing being known, the 30th Legion brought their Ensigns to *Corduba*, to assist their Emperor; the same does the 21st, after them the 5th, the two other Legions remaining in the Camp: Those of the Second fearing they should be left alone, and from thence their ill Intentions be guess'd at, followed the Steps of their Superiors: Only the Legion of the Natives continued in their Resolution, and could not be frighted out of it by any fear of danger.

LV. *Cassius* commands those to be laid hold on, who were named as guilty of the Assassination; and sends back the Fifth Legion to the Camp, retaining only Thirty Cohorts. He understood by the Discovery of *Minutius*, that *L. Racilius*, *L. Laterensis*, and *Annius Scapula*, a Provincial-Man, of the greatest Dignity, and best beloved, and as familiar with *Cassius* as either *Laterensis* or *Racilius*, were in the Conspiracy: Nor does he keep himself long in pain, but commands them to be presently put to death. He delivered *Minutius* to his Freed-Men, to be tormented; as also *Calphurnius Salvianus*, who made a Confession, and so increased the number of the Conspirators, really, and of his own accord, as some think; but others complain, that it was extorted from him. *L. Mergilio* is punished with the same Tortures. *Squillus* impeaches more, whom *Cassius* commands to be slain,

except such as bought themselves off with Money; for he openly agreed with *Calphurnius* for ten *Sestertiums*, and with *Q. Sextius* for fifty; who, though they were very guilty, were admitted to Fine; so having forgot the danger of his Life, and the smart of his Wounds, for the Money, he plainly shew'd how his Cruelty did contend with his Avarice.

LVI. After a few Days he received Letters sent from *Cæsar*, by which he understood *Pompey* was overcome in Fight, and fled, having lost all his Forces; which was both Pleasure and Pain to him: But the Messenger of the Victory expressed his Joy. The War being ended, it put an end likewise to the Licentiousness of the Times: So he remained doubtful, whether he had best fear nothing, or whether he might not do every thing he had a mind to. His Wounds being healed, he sent for all those who had received Money of him, and commands them to restore it: Such as he thought were highly taxed before, he now burthens the more. He also determin'd to make a Draught out of the *Roman* Horse-men; whose Names being taken in all the Convents and Colonies, and being afraid to go to War beyond the Seas, he made them buy themselves off from the Obligation of their Oath. This rais'd him a great Sum of Money, but made him still more odious. These things being over, he takes a View of the whole Army, and lends the Legions and Auxiliaries, which he was to carry into *Africa* with him, to *Utrecht*: He himself goes to *Hispania*, to take a View of the Fleet he was making ready; and stays there, to the end that those that had not paid their Moneys, according to his Command, might come to him there, pursuant to an Edict he had published all over the Province: Which Evocation was mightily stomach'd by all.

LVII. In the mean while *L. Titius*, at that time Tribune of the Legion of the Natives, acquaints him, that the Thirtieth Legion, of which *Q. Cassius*, when he was Legate, was General, as he lay encamped before *Ilurgis*, had rais'd a Sedition, and (some of the Centurions being slain, that would not let them take away the Ensigns) were gone away, bending their Course toward the Second Legion, which was led to the Sea by another way. When *Cassius* understood this, he marches away in the Night, with five Cohorts of the Nineteenth Legion; but the Morning coming on, he stops his Course, to consider what he had best to do, and goes to *Carmona*. Having here got together the Thirtieth and the Twenty first Legions, four Cohorts, and the Fifth Legion, and all the Cavalry, he understood that four Cohorts, overcome by the Natives of *Obucula*, were come with them to the Second Legion; where being all joyned, they had chose *T. Thorius* of *Italica* their Leader. Hereupon he presently called a Council, and sends *Marcellus* to *Corduba*, to keep it tight to his Interests; and *Q. Cassius* to *Hispania*. In a few Days News was brought him, that the Assembly at *Corduba* was revolted from him; and that *Marcellus*, either of his own accord, or necessitated thereunto, (for it was reported both ways) had agreed to do the same; and that two Cohorts of the Fifth Legion, which were in Garison in *Corduba*, were joyned with them. *Cassius* being thoroughly vexed hereat, removes his Camp, and came the next Day to *Segovia Silicensis*, and there made a Speech to his Soldiers, to try how they stood affected; and found that they were very true to him, not for his own sake, but for *Cæsar's*, who



was absent; and that they would dread no Danger, so they could but re-gain the Province to *Cæsar*.

LVIII. In the Interim *Thorius* draws the old Legions to *Corduba*; and that the beginning of the Revolt might not be thought to be inherent in his Nature, and that of the Soldiers; and at the same time, that he might set a Man of equal Authority against *Q. Cassius*, who, under *Cæsar*'s Name, he thought would get more Forces together than he; openly declared, that his Intent was only to re-gain the Province to *Cn. Pompeius*: And perhaps he did this out of his Hatred to *Cæsar*, and his Love to *Pompey*, whose very Name would go a great way with those Legions under *M. Varro*'s Command: But what in reality moved him hereunto, we cannot positively say; certainly, this was *Thorius*'s pretence, as the Soldiers did confess, who had *Pompey*'s Name engraven on their Shields. The frequent coming to the Soldiers, not only of the Men, but also of the Women and Youths, plainly shews it; who intreated that they would not take *Corduba* in hostile manner: That, indeed, they had unanimously agreed to act against *Cassius*, but prayed they might not be forced to do any thing prejudicial to *Cæsar*.

LIX. The Army being moved with the Prayers and Tears of such a Multitude, when they perceived there was no need either of *Pompey*'s Name or Memory to prosecute *Cassius*, he being odious as well to *Cæsar*'s as *Pompey*'s Friends, and that they could neither bring over the Assembly nor *Marcellus* to act against *Cæsar*'s Interest, they rased *Pompey*'s Name out of their Shields, chose *Marcellus*, who declared he would defend *Cæsar*'s Cause, their Leader, and named him *Prætor*, and joyned with him the Assembly, setting up their Tents near *Corduba*. *Cassius*, at two Days March, about 4000 Paces from *Corduba*, on this side the River *Bætis*, in sight of the Town, upon a rising Ground, pitches his Tent, and sends Letters into *Mauritania*, to King *Boguda*, and to *M. Lepidus*, Proconsul in the hither *Spain*, to come and help him and the Province for *Cæsar*'s sake, with all the speed they could. Mean while he wastes the Fields of those of *Corduba*, and burns their Houses.

LX. At which Infamy and Indignity the Legions, who had chosen *Marcellus* for their Leader, run to him, and pray him to lead them out to Battle, and fight him before he had Orders, rather than he should with so much Contumely consume with Rapine, Fire and Sword the noble and large Possessions of the *Cordubians*, under their very Noes. *Marcellus*, though he knew it would be most dangerous to hazard a Battle, because both the Loss of the Conqueror and Conquered would redound to *Cæsar*, neither had he Orders to fight, carries the Legions over the *Bætis*, and draws them up in Order of Battle; but when, on the other hand, he saw *Cassius* had drawn up his Army before his Camp, upon an higher Ground, something interposing, that he could not come down streight upon them, *Marcellus* persuaded the Soldiers to return into their Encampment, and accordingly, begun to draw them off. *Cassius*, with all the Speed he was able, knowing *Marcellus* to be but weak, falls with his Horse upon the Legions as they retreated, and killed a great many of the hindmost upon the Banks of the River. When by this Loss *Marcellus* learn'd what Difficulty and Damage there was in passing the River, he carries his Camp over it; where both of them very often draw out their Legions in Order of Battle, with-

out any Action, because of the Inequality of the Places.

LXI. *Marcellus* was by much the stronger in Foot, for he had with him the *Veterane* Legions, who had been flesh'd with many Battles. *Cassius* trusted more to the Fidelity than Valour of his Legions; therefore when the Camps were opposed one against the other, and *Marcellus* had taken a convenient Castle, whereby he could hinder the Soldiers of *Cassius* from getting any Water, *Cassius* fearing he should be block'd up in a strange Country, which hated him, goes silently out of his Camp in the Night, and with swift Marches goes towards *Ulla*, which Town he thought was true to him; wherefore he there pitches his Tent, just under the Walls of the Town, that by the Situation of the Place, (for *Ulla* is built on the Top of an high Hill) and the Fortification of the City, he might be safe from Assaults on all Sides. *Marcellus* follows him, and, as near to *Ulla* as he can, pitches his Tent, over against *Cassius*; and having learn'd the nature of the place, he found himself under a necessity neither to give Battle, (from which, if he had been able, he could not have restrain'd the Soldiery) nor suffer *Cassius* to straggle far out of his Camp, lest many Cities might undergo the like Fate with *Corduba*, Castles being therefore built in convenient places, and Works continued round the Town, he block'd up both the Town and *Cassius* with his Fortifications; but before they could be finished, *Cassius* sent out all his Horse, who he thought would be of great use to him, if they could hinder *Marcellus* from foraging and bringing in Provisions; but a great Detriment to him, if, block'd out, they eat up the Provisions, without doing any good.

LXII. A few Days after King *Bogud*, having received *Cassius*'s Letters, arrives with Forces, and joyns to the Legion he had brought, a great many Auxiliary Cohorts of the *Spaniards*; for, as it usually happens in Civil Dissensions, so at this time some Cities in *Spain* strove to serve *Cassius*, but more favoured *Marcellus*. King *Bogud* comes with his Forces near to the Out-works of *Marcellus*; so that there happen sharp and frequent Skirmishes on both sides, and, as it usually falls out, sometimes one, sometimes the other had the better on't; yet for all that, *Marcellus* was never driven from his Trenches.

LXIII. Mean while, *Lepidus*, from the hither Province, with Thirty five Legionary Cohorts, and a great Number of Horse-men, and the rest of the Auxiliary Troops, comes to *Ulla*, fully resolved immediately to put an end to the Difference between *Cassius* and *Marcellus*. To him, at his coming, *Marcellus*, without Hesitation, intrusts and offers himself. On the other hand, *Cassius* kept himself and Soldiers close within their Intrenchments, either because he thought he had more Right on his Side than *Marcellus* had, or because he was afraid that *Lepidus* might be prepossessed with the specious Insinuations of his Adversary. *Lepidus* pitches his Tents before *Ulla*, close to *Marcellus*, and prohibits the two Armies fighting; inviting *Cassius* to come out of his Trenches, promising him safe Conduct in all Respects. When *Cassius* had a long time remained doubtful what he had best to do, whether he should trust *Lepidus* or no; neither could he, if he persisted in his Opinion, find any End of his Intention; he therefore requires that the Works may be thrown down, and a free Passage made for him to come out, The



The Treaty was not only agreed upon, but the Works were in a manner levell'd, and the Centuries withdrawn, when King Bogud's Auxiliaries made an Assault upon that very Castle of *Marcellus* which was next to his Tents, without letting any body know of it, no not *Cassius* himself (for he even doubted his Fidelity) where they killed a great number of Soldiers; and if the Tide had not been quickly stem'd by the Indignation and Help of *Lepidus*, the Loss had been yet greater.

LXIV. When the Way was made clear for *Cassius* to come out, *Marcellus* joins his Camp to that of *Lepidus*, and marches, together with him, to *Corduba*. Much about the same time *Trebonius* comes to *Narbo*, to take possession of the Province in the Consul's Name: Of whose coming when *Cassius* was advertised, he put the Legions he had with him, as also the Horse, into Winter-Quarters; and having pack'd up all his Things with great Celerity, he makes the best of his way to *Malaca*, where, at a very ill Season of the Year for sailing, he got a Ship-board, as he himself gave out, lest he should fall into the hands of *Trebonius*, *Lepidus* and *Marcellus*; but as his Friends reported, that he might not make his Journey through the Province in less State than formerly, a great part of it being revolted from him; and, as others thought, lest that Money which he had scraped together by his infinite Oppressions should fall into his Enemies hands. Having set sail with as favourable a Gale as could be expected in the Winter time, as soon as he was come to the River *Iberus* (now *Ebro*, in *Spain*) the Wind blowing a somewhat fresher Gale, but believing his sailing would be never the more dangerous, he makes up against the Waves, at the Mouth of the River, in its very Jaws; and being neither able to turn the Ship, such was the Rapidity of the River, nor bear up against such great Seas, he perish'd together with the Ship.

LXV. When *Cesar* was come out of *Egypt*, into *Syria*, and understood by such as came to him from *Rome*, as also by Letters from the Citizens, that many things were there ill administr'd, and that no part of the Commonwealth was manag'd to that advantage it should be; as also, that by the Contentions of the Tribunes, pernicious Seditions were sprung up; and by the Ambition and Indulgence of the Tribunes of the Soldiery, and those that were over the Legions, many things were acted contrary to Custom and Military Order, such as the Neglect of Discipline and Severity; and perceived that all these things very much wanted his presence; yet he thought it most necessary so to settle those Provinces and Countries through which he came, as that they might be free from Domestick Broils, receive Laws and Rights, and shake off the Fear of Enemies from abroad. These things he hoped he should quickly effect in *Syria*, *Cilicia* and *Asia*, as being Provinces free from War; but in *Bithynia* and *Pontus* he foresaw he should meet with greater difficulty: For he had received Advice that *Pharnaces* was not yet gone out of *Pontus*, neither thought he of doing it, being mightily puffed up with a successful Battel he had gained over *Domitius Calvinus*. Having stay'd almost in all Cities of greater Note, he publicly bestowed Rewards, Man by Man, on such as had deserved well: He took an Account of their ancient Controversies, and appointed them Kings, Princes and Rulers of the Province: And all the Borderers that came unto him, he receiv'd into his Protection; and

after having laid upon them the Obligations of preserving and defending the Province, he dismissed them, as the greatest Friends to him and the Roman People.

LXVI. A few Days being spent in this Province, he set *Sex. Caesar*, his Friend and near Kinsman, over the Legions in *Syria*, and in the same Ship he arriv'd in, he set sail for *Cilicia*; where being come, he assembles all the Citizens of that Province at *Tarsus*, it being the most noted, and best fortified Town in all *Cilicia*; where, having dispatch'd all the Affairs of the Province, and neighbouring Cities, he made no long stay, being desirous to begin the War; and having made long Marches through *Cappadocia*, he tarried two Days at *Mazaca*; whence he went to *Comana*, where is the most ancient and most holy Temple of *Bellona* in all *Cappadocia*, which is held in such great Esteem, that the Priest of this Goddess, for Majesty, Empire and Power, is look'd upon by the whole Country to have no Superior but the King: This he adjudged to *Nicomedes* the *Bithynian*, a very Noble Person; who, being descended of the Race of the Kings of *Cappadocia*, by reason of the adverse Fortune of his Ancestors, might very well lay claim thereto: But *Ariarates*, the Brother of *Ariobarzanes*, both of whom had deserved well of the Commonwealth, left either the Birthright of the Kingdom should invite *Ariarates*, or the Heir thereof fright him, he committed to *Ariobarzanes*, who was under his Empire and Jurisdiction, and then pursued his Journey with his usual Velocity.

LXVII. When he came near to *Pontus* and the Confines of *Gallugracia*, *Deiotarus* (then Tetrarch of almost all *Gallugracia*, because the other Tetrarchs accused him as being disobedient both to the Laws and Customs of the Romans, though the Senate had honoured him with the Title of King of *Armenia the Less*) having put off his Royal Robes, and being cloathed, not only in a private, but in the Habit of a guilty Person, he came in a suppliant manner to *Cesar*, praying that he would pardon him; for that he was placed in a part of the Country where were no Garisons of *Cesar*, but what were in the Hands of *Cn. Pompeius*; and that he ought not to be a Judge of the Differences of the Roman People, but obey the present Rulers.

LXVIII. Against whom *Cesar*, when he had reckon'd up the many Offices which he, being Consul, had bestow'd upon him by publick Decrees; and when he had rejected his Defence, not being able to find any excuse for his Imprudence, because it is not likely a Man of his Prudence and Diligence could be ignorant who was Governor in each City of *Italy*; where the Senate and People of *Rome* was, and where the Commonwealth; or who was Consul after *L. Lentulus* and *M. Marcellus*: But however, he was willing to remit this Matter, (in consideration of former good Turns, old Acquaintance and Friendship, the Dignity and Age of the Man) to be deprecated by the Intreaties of such as were his Friends and Familiars; that for the future he would take cognizance of the Differences of the Tetrarchs himself, and therewithal restored him his Royal Habit; but he commanded him to bring the Legion which he had rais'd among his own Citizens, and train'd up to our Way and Discipline, together with all the Horse, to carry on the War.

LXIX. When



LXIX. When he came into *Pontus*, and had drawn his Forces all up together in one place, which in Number and the Exercise of War were pretty considerable, (except the sixth Legion, which he carried with him to *Alexandria*, being old and wore out with much Labour and Perils, many of the Soldiers, partly with hard Marches and going by Sea, and partly by the many Fights they had been engaged in, being dead; so that there were not a thousand Men left in it: And three other Legions, one of *Deiotarus*, and two that had been in the Fight between *Cn. Domitius* and *Pharnaces* before-mentioned;) Ambassadors sent by *Pharnaces* come to *Cæsar*, and in the first place beseech him, That he would not come in an hostile manner; for *Pharnaces* was ready to do whatever should be commanded him; particularly remembering him, That *Pharnaces* would not assist *Pompey* with any Succours against him, and that *Deiotarus*, who did assist *Pompey*, found favour with him.

LXX. *Cæsar* answer'd, He would be very just to *Pharnaces*, if he would perform what he had promised; But he advis'd the Ambassadors with gentle Words, as he used to do, that they should neither object *Deiotarus* to him, nor glory too much in that piece of Service, That they had not sent Succours to *Pompey*; for that he did nothing more willingly than pardon such as were sorry for their Faults, or than to be able to forgive those the publick Injuries done the Provinces, who had not been forward to assist his Enemies against him: That that Kindness they had mentioned was of better use to *Pharnaces*, who thereby took care not to be overcome, than to him, to whom the Immortal Gods had given the Victory: Therefore he pardoned *Pharnaces* those great and crying Injuries he had done the Roman Citizens, who were negotiating their Affairs in *Pontus*, because he was not able to make full Restitution; for he could neither restore Life to those he had slain, nor Virility to those he had Castrated or Gelded, which Punishment, more intollerable than Death, many of the Roman Citizens had undergone: But that he should depart immediately out of *Pontus*, should send back the Families of such as received the Customs, and restore all other things to the Allies and Citizens of *Rome*, that were in his possession: Which when he had done, he should forthwith send *Cæsar* Presents and Gifts, such as Emperors, when things are done well, are wont to receive from Friends: For *Pharnaces* had sent him a Crown of Gold.

LXXI. Having thus answered the Ambassadors, he sent them away. But *Pharnaces*, (having very readily consented to all things) thinking *Cæsar* (who was in more haste to be gone than the matter would permit, to the end he might proceed the speedier and more honourably to business of greater Import) would more willingly believe his Promises; (for it was no Secret to any one, That *Cæsar*, for many weighty Reasons, was recall'd to *Rome*) began to act more slowly, to require a Day for his Departure, to interpose longer Articles, and in fine, utterly to disappoint him. *Cæsar* understanding the Tergiversation or Cunning of the Man, what he used at other times to do by nature, that he now did, being forced thereto by necessity, that he might joyn Battle before any body was aware of it.

LXXII. There is a Town nam'd *Ziela* in *Pontus*, sufficiently well fortified, considering 'tis built on a Plain; for the Wall is raised upon a natural Hillock quite round the Town, so steep, you would

think it had been made so by Art: About this Town are many and great Hills with Valleys between, clear round it; one of the highest whereof, (much noted in those parts for the Victory of *Mithridates*, the Overthrow of *Triarius*, and the loss of our Army) by the furthest parts thereof, and the Passages, does almost joyn the Town, it being not much above 3000 Paces from it. This place *Pharnaces* (the old Fortifications of the Camps of his fortunate Forefathers being repair'd) possess'd himself of with all his Forces.

LXXIII. *Cæsar*, having pitch'd his Tents 5000 Paces from the Enemy, and seeing that those Valleys which surrounded or defended the King's Camp, did likewise surround his, provided the Enemies had not first possess'd themselves of those places which lay near to the King's Camp, commanded the Baggage to be convey'd within the Fortifications: Which being presently done, the next Night, in the fourth Watch, all the Legions being sent out, and their Luggage being left behind in the Camp, by break of day, before the Enemies were aware, he took that very Post, in which *Mithridates* had fought so successfully against *Triarius*. Hither he commanded all the Baggage and Attendants on the Camp to be brought, and that no Soldier should go without the Works, seeing the Enemies Camp, cut off by a Valley, was not above 1000 Paces from the Works begun in *Cæsar's*.

LXXIV. *Pharnaces*, being advertised of it as soon as 'twas break of day, draws up all his Forces before his Camp, which, by reason of the unevenness of the place between the two Armies, *Cæsar* thought were drawn up after a very old way of martialling them, or to hinder the carrying on our Works, by keeping the more of our Men in Arms; or else 'twas done to shew the King's Courage, that *Pharnaces* might not be thought to defend the place more by the Fortification thereof, than by his Men or personal Valour. Notwithstanding, *Cæsar* was not afraid to carry on the Works with the residue of his Army, while the first Battalions stood as a Bulwark for their Defence. But *Pharnaces*, encouraged either by the prosperousness of the Place, or induced thereto by good Omens and Auguries, which we heard afterwards he was very credulous of; or having learned the paucity of our Men in Arms, thinking that vast number of Servants, that daily laboured in carrying the Baggage, were of the Soldiery; or else in confidence of his Veterane Army, which his Legates boasted had fought with the 22th Legion in a pitch'd Battle, and overcome it, as also in Contempt of our Army, which he remember'd he repulsed when *Domitius* was their Leader; having taken a Resolution to fight, he began to descend by a hollow place in the Hill: Whose foolish Ostentation and Compressure of the Soldiers in that place, which no Enemy in his wits would have entred into, *Cæsar* for some time laugh'd at; when presently he began, with the same Pace that he descended, to ascend a high Hill, with his Forces in Order of Battle.

LXXV. *Cæsar*, astonish'd at his incredible boldness, being set upon 'ere he was aware, and unready, at the same instant he calls the Soldiers from the Works, commands them to arm, opposes the Legions, and Marshals his Army; the suddenness of which put our Men into a great fear, they not being yet in Order of Battle. The King's Chariots that were armed with Scythes do mightily annoy our Men that were in Confusion, but are notwithstanding quickly overcome by the Multitude of



of our Darts: After these follow'd the main Body of the Enemy, and after having set up a Shout, begun the Fight; the situation of the place being a great help to us, and the Benignity of the Immortal Gods a greater; who, as they are present in all the Chances of War, so are they more especially present with those by whom nothing could be executed with Order.

LXVI. A great and sharp Fight being begun at a distance in the Right Wing, in which the Sixth Veterane Legion was placed, the Victory began to dawn in that part, the Enemies being forced down the Hill; and by the assistance of the same Immortal Gods, though much more slowly, our Left Wing and the Body of our Army put all the King's Forces to flight; which, as fast as they could get upon a rising ground, were as fast forced from it, and bore down, by reason of the unevenness of the place: Therefore a great many of their Soldiers being partly slain, and partly oppressed with the flight of their Men, those that were swift a-foot, and could escape over the Valley, leaving their Weapons behind them, could be of no use, tho' on the upper ground, they being unarmed. But our Men, elated with the Victory, were not at all afraid to venture upon the unevenness of the place and the Fortifications, and soon obtained the Camp of the Enemy from those Cohorts that *Pharnaces* left in Garrison to defend it; the whole Multitude of their Men being either kill'd or taken, except *Pharnaces*, who escaped with a few Horse-men; who, if the Fortifications had not afforded him an easie way to escape, had been brought alive into *Caesar's* Jurisdiction.

LXXVII. *Caesar*, so often a Conqueror, was extremely well pleased with this Victory, for that

he had put an end to the greatest War in so short a time; and that which made him still more glad, was the Remembrance of the Suddenness of Danger, which, out of the most pressing Difficulties, ended in an easie Victory. Having regained *Pontus*, all the Plunder of the King's Palaces being granted to the Soldiers, he set forward the next day with his Light-horse; commands the Sixth Legion to return into *Italy*, there to receive their Stipends and Honours: the Auxiliary Troops of *Deiotarus* he sent home again; left two Legions with *Caelius Vintianus* in *Pontus*; and so takes his Journey, through *Gallogracia* and *Bithynia*, into *Asia*; hearing and determining the Controversies of all those Provinces, and distributing Laws to the Tetrarchs, Kings, and Commonwealths. *Mithridates Pergamenus*, whom we mentioned before to have speedily and happily dispatch'd his Affair in *Egypt*, being descended of a Royal Family, and educated also in King-like Discipline, (for *Mithridates*, King of all *Asia*, had brought him with him to his Camp at *Pergamos*, when a little Child, and had kept him there many years, for the Nobleness of Descent) he made King of *Bosphorus*, because he had been under the Empire of *Pharnaces*, and had most friendly defended the Provinces of the People of *Rome* from the Barbarians, and such Kings as were their Enemies; he also adjudged to him the Superintendency of the Laws of the *Gallogreeks*, both by Right of Birth and Affinity, for some years before held and possessed by *Deiotarus*: Nor did he stay longer in any place than the Necessity of composing the Seditions of the Cities did seem to require. So that all his Affairs being most luckily and most readily dispatched, he returned back into *Italy* sooner than was expected by any body.

## The End of the Alexandrian War.



T H E  
**COMMENTARY**  
 O F  
**Aulus Hirtius,**  
 CONCERNING THE  
**AFRICAN WAR.**

*The ARGUMENT.*

**A**FTER the Defeat of *Pharsalia*, *Cæsar* pursues *Pompey* into *Egypt*, where he makes War upon the People of *Alexandria*, and *Ptolomey* their King; and afterwards marches through *Syria*, as far as *Pontus*, to find out *Pharnaces*. In the Interim, *Pompey's* Officers, that had made their Escapes from *Pharsalia*, flocked into *Africk*, where they imagin'd to perform mighty Matters with *Ætius Varus's* Forces, and the Assistance of King *Juba*. The most eminent Men of this Party were *Q. Metellus Scipio*, *Pompey's* Father-in-Law, *Petreius*, *Afranius*, *Torquatus*, *T. Labienus*, *Faustus Sylla*, but especially *M. Cato*; an invincible Assertor of the *Roman* Liberty; who being by common Consent chosen General of the Army, quitted that honourable Post to *Scipio*: But while he consulted his Reputation in this Affair, he forgot the true Interest of the Republick; for, in all probability, he had given *Cæsar* greater Difficulty, had he accepted that Station himself. After the Expedition of *Pontus* was over, *Cæsar* returns into *Italy*; where having composed some Tumults that arose in the City, and suppressed the Mutiny of his Soldiers, who demanded not only a Donative, but to be freed from War, he passes over into *Africk*, against the Advice of the Augurs, and at an unseasonable time of the Year, to hinder the Enemy's Forces from increasing. This Attempt succeeded very fortunately to him, for he defeated them, though they were superior to him in Number and all Military Provisions. At his Return to the City, he celebrated four magnificent Triumphs for his reducing of *Gaul*, *Alexandria*, *Pontus* and *Africk*. *Hirtius* is supposed to be Author of this and the former Book, though *Suetonius* leaves it uncertain.

\* According to our Computation, the 17th of December.

**C**ÆSAR arrived at *Lilybæum* by moderate Marches on the 14th of the \* *Kalends of January*, without the intermission of one Day, and resolved to embark the first Opportunity that presented it self, although he had only one Legion of new-raised Men, and scarce six hundred Horse with him. He ordered his Pavilion to be set up near the Shoar, so that the Waves almost dash'd it. He design'd by this to prevent his Men from thinking to make any long stay there, and to be in a posture of readiness every Moment. It so happen'd that the Weather at this time was very tempestuous, and unfit for sailing: However, he order'd the Rowers and Soldiers still to continue on Ship-board, that he might lose no time in

getting ready when-ever the Season would permit; especially after the Inhabitants of that Province had inform'd him of the great Forces of the Enemy, who had an infinite number of Horse, four Royal Legions, abundance of † Light-armed Men, ten Legions of *Scipio*, an hundred and twenty Elephants, and several Vessels. But this did not in the least shake his Resolution, but he still supported himself with his usual Bravery and Valour. In the interim the number of his Gallies daily increased, and abundance of Provision-Ships arrived, and some Legions of new-raised Men, and with them the Fifth Legion, wholly made up of Veterane Soldiers, and about two Thousand Horse.

† The Levit Armatura of the Romans consisted only of Slingers and Archers, as we are informed out of *Livy*.

II. Having



II. Having now got together six Legions and 2000 Horse, he commanded the Foot to embark in the Gallies in order as they came, and the Horse in the Transport Ships. After this, he commanded part of the Fleet to sail before him, and

We find mention of no such Island in any ancient Author; and therefore the Publisher of the Dauphin's Edition supposes it to be mistaken for Paconia, an Island mention'd by Ptolemy to be situate over against Lilybæum, towards Africk.

touch at the Island \* *Aponiana*, which is not far from *Lilybæum*; while he stay'd behind to make a publick Sale of some confiscated Goods belonging to particular Men. When this was over, he gave the necessary Orders to *Allienus* the Prætor, who at that time govern'd *Sicily*; and a particular Charge to see the rest of his Army

† The 25th of our December.

shipp'd off with all Expedition, and then went aboard on the VIth of the Calends of *Jan.* and in a short time reach'd the Fleet. Thus having a fair he came within sight of *Africk* in four Days, with Gale, a few Gallies; for most of his Transport-ships, being dispers'd in bad Weather, were driven to several places. He sail'd by *Clupea*, and afterwards by *Neapolis*, and several other Towns and Castles on the Sea-Coast.

III. As soon as he arriv'd at *Adrumetum*, where the Enemy had a Garison, commanded by *C. Confidius*, he saw *Cn. Piso* appear on the Sea-Coast, on the side of *Clupea*, with the Horse of *Adrumetum*, and about 3000 *Moors*. After he had lain at Anchor some time before the Port, waiting till his other Ships came up, he landed his Army, consist- of 3000 Foot, and 150 Horse; and pitching his Tents before the Town, strictly prohibited his Men from committing any Plunder or Ravage. In the mean time the Inhabitants fill'd the Walls with armed Men, and assembled before the Harbour to take the best Measures for their own defence; and their Garison might amount to two Legions. *Cæsar* having made the Tour of the Town on horseback, to observe the Situation of the place, return'd to the Camp. Some People accused him of a great Oversight for not assigning a certain place for his Officers to meet him, or giving them a Commission sealed up, as it was his Custom before, which they were to open at a time appointed, to direct them where to make their Rendezvous. But this he did not do without very good reason; for, having never a Port in *Africk* for his Fleet to meet him, where he could promise them to be safe from the Attempts of the Enemy, he committed the rest to Fortune, and resolv'd to land where he should see the fairest Prospect of succeeding.

IV. In the mean time *L. Plancus*, one of *Cæsar's* Lieutenants, begg'd of him to give him leave to treat with *Confidius*, to see if he could by fair means reduce him to Reason. Having obtain'd permission, he writ a Letter to him, and gave it to a Captive to carry it to him in the Town. As soon as this Captive came into the Garison, and offer'd to deliver the Letter as he was commanded, *Confidius* asked him before he received it, from whence he brought it: And as the Captive answer'd, That he came from *Cæsar* the General, I know but one General of the Roman People, says he, and that is *Scipio*. He afterwards order'd the Captive to be kill'd in his sight, and then sent the Letter seal'd as it came to him, for he would not read it to *Scipio*.

V. *Cæsar*, after he had stay'd a whole Night and a Day before the Town, and receiv'd no Answer from *Confidius*, in regard that his other Forces were not as yet come up to him, that he wanted

Horse, that his Army chiefly consisted of new-raisd Men, and was not strong enough to invest a Town of that strength, that it was not convenient to harass his Soldiers too much at their first landing, that the place was extremely well fortified, and difficult to be attack'd, that he receiv'd Advice that abundance of Horse were coming up to their Relief; upon these Considerations he did not judge it expedient to form the Siege of the place, lest while he was employ'd in that Affair, he might be surrounded with the Enemy's Cavalry.

VI. As he begun to decamp, those of the Garison sallied out upon him; and some of King *Juba's* Horse, that were sent to receive their Pay, accidentally joyning them, possessed themselves of his Camp which he had just abandon'd, and fell upon the Rear. Upon this the † heavy-arm'd Foot made an Halt, and the Horse, though so inconsiderable for their number, charg'd this vast Multitude with all the Vigour and Gallantry imaginable. What will scarce find Belief with Posterity, not full 30 *Gaulish* Horse beat the whole *Moorish* Cavalry, consisting of 2000, and pursued them unto the Town. As soon as they were repulld, and beaten back into their Worke, *Cæsar* began to continue his March; but as they frequently sallied out upon him, and sometimes pursued, and then again were beaten back by his Horse, into the Town, he placed some of his Veterane Troops, with part of his Cavalry, in the Rear, and to march'd on gently with the rest. Thus the farther he march'd from the Town, the slower the *Numidians* were in their pursuit. In the mean time, the Towns and Castles that he found upon his March sent Deputies to him to promise him Provisions, and to assure him they were ready to do whatever he commanded them. So he encamped that Day, being the \* Kalends of *January*, † *Our New years day*, near *Ruspina*.

VII. From thence he march'd directly to *Leptis*, a free City, governing by its own Laws, where some of the Inhabitants came to tell him that they were wholly at his devotion. After he had placed some Guards at the City-Gates, to hinder the Soldiers from entring the Town, lest they should cause any Disorders in the place, he pitched his Tents on the Sea-shoar, not far from the Town. Hither some of his Gallies and Transport-Ships arriv'd by chance, who inform'd him that the rest, not knowing where he was, sail'd towards *Utica*. For this reason he would not remove from the Shoar, or march farther into the Country, lest he should miss of them; and order'd all his Horse to continue on Ship-board, for this reason, as may be supposed, to preserve the Country, and caused fresh Water to be brought to the Ships. But as the Soldiers and Sea-men went sometimes a-shoar to fetch fresh Water, the *Moorish* Horse fell unawares upon them, killing some, and wounding others with their Darts: For their way was, to hide themselves in the Vallies, and then to make a sudden Onset and retire, but not to make a formal Fight.

VIII. In the mean time *Cæsar* dispatch'd Messengers into *Sardinia*, and the rest of the neighbouring Provinces, to furnish him with new Supplies of Men and Provisions, and that they should take care to send them as soon as they had received his Letters. He likewise sent *Rabinus Postumus* to *Sicily*, after he had unladed part of his Gallies, to bring a second Convoy from thence. He order'd



ordered some of his Men to cruise upon the Sea with ten Gallies, to find out the rest of the transport-Ships that had lost their way, as also to clear the Sea from the Enemy. He commanded C. Sallustius Crispus, the Prætor, to go with part of the Fleet towards the Island † Cercina, which the Enemy had then in their Possession, because he was informed that there was store of Corn to be had in that place. He gave these Orders so well, that they executed their Commission immediately, without any delay or excuse. In the mean time he informed himself, by some Deserters and Natives of the Country, in what a Posture the Affairs of Scipio, and those that were embarked in the same Cause with him, stood, how he was forced to maintain King Juba's Cavalry at his own proper Charges; which made him both pity and wonder at the strange Madness of these Men, who chose rather to be Tributaries to a foreign Prince, than peaceably to enjoy their Estates and Fortunes at home, and live among their Friends and Relations.

† A small Island near the Promontory of the lesser Syntes, towards Carthage. It still keeps its name.

The 3 of our July.

IX. On the \*third of the Nones of January, Cæsar decamped, and leaving a Garison of six Cohorts at Lepis, under the Command of Salserna, he marched back with the rest of the Army to Russina, where he left his Baggage behind him, and then went out with a Body of light armed Men to forrage about the Villages, and commanded the Inhabitants to follow him with Horses and Waggon. Thus having furnished himself with great quantities of Corn, he returned to Russina; which in my opinion he did for this end, That he might not be obliged, for want of Provisions, to leave the Sea-Ports destitute of Garisons, but might quarter sufficient Forces there to serve as a Retreat and Security for his Fleet.

X. Having Posted P. Salserna in this place, Brother to him whom he had left at Lepis, with a Legion, he ordered store of wood to be brought into the Town, and marched himself out of Russina at the head of seven Veterane Cohorts, which had been engaged at Sea with Sulpicius and Varinius, and arrived at the Harbour, which is about two † Miles from the Town, and embarked with these Forces towards the Evening. As none of his Soldiers were acquainted with his Designs, they laboured under strange Fears and Apprehensions, to see themselves, who were but a handful of Men, and but newly raised, left to the Mercy of a subtle and perfidious Enemy, who were infinitely superiour to them in number. The only thing that supported them at this Juncture was the wonderful Gayety and Vigour they discovered in their General's Looks, who, as he was Master of a great and undaunted Soul, so his Men securely acquiesced in his Conduct, and thought they were capable of surmounting all Difficulties by his good Management and Dexterity.

† The Reader is here to be informed once for all, That the Roman Mile consisted precisely of 1000 Paces, That it is much shorter than the Italian or our Mile is, and that four of them make a modern League.

XI. Cæsar passed the whole Night in his Fleet, and as he was going to sail by break of day, unexpectedly the Remainder of his Navy, of whose Safety he was somewhat doubtful, came in sight; upon which, he immediately commanded his Men to land, and thus to receive them on the Shore. As soon as these Ships were enter'd the Port, and their Men landed, he returned to Russina, where he pitched his Tents, and with thirty select Cohorts went to forrage. This made people imagine that Cæsar's Design was to go and meet his Transport Ships that had lost their way, lest they should

fall unawares upon their Enemy's Fleet, but would not communicate these Intentions to his Men, lest the Consideration of their own Weakness, and the great Multitudes of those that opposed them, might make them lose all their Courage.

XII. By that time Cæsar had gone about three Miles from his Camp, he received advice by his Scouts that the Enemy was not far off; and no sooner was this notice given him, but he saw a great Dust, which confirm'd the truth of it. Upon this, he commanded all his Horse, and the Archers he had with him, that were but few in number, to follow him with a gentle Pace, while himself advanced with a few armed Men. And now, being within sight of the Enemy, he ordered his Soldiers to put on their Helms, and to prepare themselves for the Fight. His Forces in all amounted to 30 Cohorts, with 400 Horse and Archers. † Here something is wanting in the Original.

XIII. In the mean time the Enemy, commanded by Labienus and the two Pacidii, drew out their Army in a long Front, consisting of Foot intermingled with Horse, and placed between them the light armed Numidians, and the Archers that served on Foot, in so close order, that Cæsar's Men at a distance thought them to be Foot, and supported their right and left Wing with several Squadrons of Horse. Cæsar on his side ranked all his Forces upon one line, by reason their numbers were so small, covering the Front of his Battle with his Archers, and the Flank with his Cavalry; and ordered them to take care not to suffer themselves to be surrounded with the Multitudes of the Enemy's Horse.

XIV. When now both Armies were in sight of each other, expecting who should begin the Onset, and Cæsar did not advance, as very well judging that he was rather to employ Stratagem than main Force against so numerous an Adversary; on a sudden their Horse began to extend themselves about the Hills, and to encompass Cæsar's Cavalry on all sides, so that they found it a difficult matter to preserve their Post. At the same time the Enemy's Horse, supported by the Infantry of the light armed Numidians, parted from the midst of the Battle, and threw their Darts at Cæsar's Foot, and as his Legions advanced to give the Charge, their Horse fell back, and their Foot sustained the shock till the others returned again to relieve them.

XV. Cæsar observing this new way of Fighting, and finding his own Ranks were broken by pursuing the Enemy, (for while his Foot followed their Horse too far from their Colours, they left the Flank open to the Numidians, who easily wounded them with their Darts, and their Cavalry avoided the Javelins of our Men by the swiftness of their Horses) he published Orders, That no Soldier should advance above four Foot from the Front of Battle. In the mean time Labienus, relying upon the vast numbers of his Horse, endeavoured to surround those of Cæsar, who being now overpower'd, by the Multitudes of their Enemy, and perceiving their Horses wounded under them, began to give ground by degrees, while the others continued to press more vigorously upon them. Thus the Army in an instant saw themselves invested on all sides, and being as it were got within the Toils, were forced to fight in a Circle.

XVI. Labienus advanced bare-headed on horse-back, sometimes encouraging his own Men, and sometimes turning towards Cæsar's Soldiers, cried out



out aloud to them, *You fresh-water Soldiers, what makes you so furious? Caesar has cajol'd you with his fair Speeches, and brought you into a fine Præmunire here; upon my word I pity your Case.* Then one of the Soldiers answer'd him, *I am no new Soldier, but a Veteran of the Tenth Legion. I don't see their Colours,* says Labienus. *No matter for that,* replies the Soldier, *you shall soon know who I am.* With that he threw his Helmet from his head, that so he might be known by him, and as he endeavour'd to throw his Javelin at Labienus with all his strength, he misfired him, but wounded his Horse in the Breast, and then cried out, *Now, Labienus, be satisfied that I belong to the Tenth Legion.* However, the rest were strangely dismayed, especially the new raised Men, who had been never engaged in such hot Service before, so that they had their eyes still upon Caesar, and minded nothing else, but how to avoid the Darts of the Enemy.

XVII. In the mean time Caesar, perceiving the Enemy designed to encompass his Army, commanded them to make as great a Front as they could, in order to break their Ranks on the Right and Left; and turning the Face of his Battalion on one side, and that of another to the opposite, to make a Front both in the Head and in the Rear, fell upon them at the same time on all sides, with his Cavalry in the middle, and so put them to flight. After this, he retired without advancing any farther, for fear of some Ambuscade, and in this Order marched back towards his Camp.

XVIII. While this happen'd, M. Petreius and Cn. Piso, with 1100 choice Numidian Horse, and great numbers of light-armed Foot, came to the Relief of the rest, who now recovering out of their fright, and taking fresh Courage, began to fall upon the Rear of Caesar's Army, and hinder'd them from getting into their Camp. Upon this, Caesar order'd his Men to face the Enemy, and begin the Battle afresh. But as Labienus contented himself only with skirmishing, without coming to handy-blows, and Caesar's Horse, what with their late Fatigues at Sea, and their Weariness, Thirst, and Wounds, were incapable of pursuing the Enemy, and Night now began to draw near, he commanded his Men to make one vigorous Effort all at the same time, and not to give over till they had beaten the Enemy behind the Hills. Thus giving the Signal, when the Enemy made but a feeble and weak Resistance, he poured with his Squadron and Cohorts upon them, and in an instant beating them with small difficulty out of the Field, and forcing them behind the Hills, he made a Halt for some time, and then his Men retired slowly towards their Camp, as they were ordered. The Enemy did the same on their side, and having been thus rudely received, went back to their own Garisons.

XIX. After the Battle was over, Caesar was informed by several Deserters and Prisoners, That the Enemy designed to terrifie and allarm the new raised Soldiers by this new and unusual manner of fighting, and to surround them with their Horse, as Curio had been formerly served; and that Labienus had boasted in a Council of War, That he would find the Enemy so much work, with pouring fresh Forces continually upon them, that tho' they got the better at first, yet they should be wearied at last with mere killing and slaying, and so be obliged to give way. Besides, That he had heard that the Veteran Legions had mutinied at Rome, and refused to pass over into Africk, he reposed no small Confidence in the Number of his Men,

whose Fidelity he thought himself now assured of, after three years Service in Africk. He had great Numbers of light Numidian Horse and Foot, without reckoning the Gauls and Germans, whom after Pompey's Defeat at Pharsalia he had rallied and carried with him from Brundisium, and those that he had raised in Africk, as well Slaves as \*Mungril Freed-men, whom he had taught to manage their Horses with †Bridles. Add to this King Juba's Forces, 120 Elephants innumerable Troops of Horse, and XII Legions. Full of these hopes and Expectations, Labienus came to attack Caesar in a large open Plain, on the ‡day before the Nones of January, three days after his Arrival into Africk. He brought with him 1600 Gaulish and German Horse, 8000 Numidians, who used no Bridles, not reckoning the Reinforcement of Petreius, which consisted of 1100 Horse, and four times the number of light-armed Foot, with several Slingers and Archers, that served as well on horse-back as on foot. The Dispute continued from the \*fifth hour of the day till Sun-set. In this Battle Petreius happen'd to be so dangerously wounded, that he was obliged to quit the Field.

XX. In the mean time Caesar redoubled the Guard of his Camp, and fortified himself with more diligence, and drew two Retrenchments, one from the Town of *Ruspina*, and the other from his own Quarter down to the Sea, in order to have a free Communication on both sides, that so his Succour might arrive to him without running any danger. He likewise ordered the Arms and warlike Machines which he had on Ship-board to be brought to his Camp, and armed part of the Seamen and Soldiers that were in the *Rhodian* and *Gaulish* Fleet, to intermingle them with his Cavalry, after the Example of the Enemy, and daily augmented his Forces with the †*Ityrean* and *Syrian* Archers. For he had received Intelligence that *Scipio* would arrive within three days to joyn his Forces with *Labienus* and *Petreius*, whose Army was reported to consist of eight Legions, and Four thousand Horse. Upon this, he erected several Working-houses, to make Arms, caused great quantities of Arrows and Darts to be provided, ordered Bullets to be cast, and store of sharp Poles to be got ready. He also dispatched Messengers into *Sicily*, to send him Iron and Lead, as also Hurdles, and Timber to make Battering Rams, because there was none proper for such an use in *Africk*. Besides, he began now to consider that he should find no Corn in this Country, unless he took care to furnish himself from other places. For the last year the Enemy had lifted most of the Plough-men, and forced them to turn Soldiers; for which reason the Harvest was not gathered in most places, and that little Corn that was in the Country was carried into the strong Towns. All those Towns where the Enemy had not left Garisons were demolished and razed to the ground, and the Inhabitants carried to other strong Places. In short, the whole Country had been so miserably ravaged and laid waste, that it could afford no manner of Subsistence.

XXI. Caesar lying under these Necessities, by his obliging Deportment and free manner of accosting all persons, had got some Corn into his Garisons,

\*Tis in the Original *Libertini* Hybrids, by which the Author means such as were Romans by the Father and Foreigners by the Mother's side.

†For the Numidians did not use Bridles: Whence Virgil calls them *Numidae intranei*.

‡T. e. 4 of our January.

\*That is our 11 a clock in the Morning: For the Romans computed their day from our six, so that their *Mora prima* answers our Seven.

†*Iturea*, a Country of Palestine. *Pliny*, l. 5. tells us it was very mountainous, and parted from the rest of *Judea* by the River *Jordan*.



rifons, which he manag'd with great Frugality.

\* It was not their way then to intrust the Safety of a whole Army to two or three Centinels, but they ordered a whole Company to stand at the Entrance of their Camp; which, from that posture, was said to be in Statione.

He daily visited the Works, and placed some \* Cohorts alternately upon the Guard, by reason of the vast Multitudes of the Enemy. Labinus order'd his Wounded, which were very numerous, to be carried in Wagons to Adrumetum. In the mean time, Caesar's Provision-Ships, that were unacquainted Coasts, and knew not where the Army was, straggled up and down; and as they happen'd to be sever'd one from the other, several of the Enemy's Long-Boats fell upon them, and burnt and took them. Caesar being inform'd of these Losses, distributed his Fleet about the Islands and Harbours, for their security.

XXII. All this while M. Cato, who commanded in chief at Utica, continually reproach'd Cn. Pompey for lying idle, and still awak'd his Courage with such or the like Speeches: *Your Father,* says he, *when he was of your age, and saw the Commonwealth miserably oppress'd by bold and profligate*

† As Cinna and Calbo. See Plutarch's Life of Pompey. ‡ He was then twenty three Years old. See Plutarch and Plut.

† Usurpers, and the best Members of the Republick either basely slain, or plunder'd of all, and sent to starve abroad, though he was but a private Man, and very ‡ young, yet, inspired by Glory and his own Courage, he gather'd the Remainders of an Army which had serv'd under his Father, and deliver'd Rome and Italy, which in a manner lay buried in their own Ruines. Afterwards with incredible Celerity he re-conquer'd Sicily, Africa, Numidia and Mauritania; by which Exploits he advanc'd himself to those Honours, that made his Reputation known all over the World; and had the Glory of a Triumph even when he was but a young Man, and a private Knight of Rome. When he first undertook to serve his native Country, he had none of those Advantages which you may so justly pretend to; neither had he that Reputation with the People, nor could he boast of such Numbers of Dependants ready to sacrifice their Lives and Fortunes for him. And will not you who inherit all his Glory, and want neither Courage nor Greatness of Mind, use all your Efforts, and summon all your Father's Friends, to retrieve the Liberty of the Commonwealth, and save so many vertuous and good Patriots from Destruction?

XXIII. The young Man touch'd with these Reproaches of Cato, whose Gravity gave an unconquerable Authority to all his Counsels, took thirty Vessels of all sorts, in which number he had a few Men of War, and parted from Utica, for Mauritania. He soon enter'd King Bogud's Kingdom; and gathering an Army which consisted of 2000 Men, as well Slaves as Free-men, armed as unarmed, he march'd directly towards the City Ascurum, in which place was a Royal Garison. Those within suffer'd him to pass on without the least Interruption, till he came near the very Gates and Walls of the City; when immediately falling out, they fell upon Pompey's Men with that Vigour, that they soon broke their Ranks, and beat them back to their Ships. Upon this Misfortune Cn. Pompey drew off his Fleet, and landed no more in Africk, but directed his Course towards the \* Balears.

\* Two Islands upon the Coast of Spain, famous formerly for good Slingers. Now they are called Majorca and Minorca.

XXIV. In the mean time Scipio, after he had left a sufficient Garison at Adrumetum, advanc'd with his Forces, whose Numbers we have already set down, and first encamp'd at Adrumetum. After he had refreshed himself there for a few Days, he march'd in the Night-time, and joyn'd the Army of Perceius and Labienus; which being

now united together, took up three Miles in length. Their Cavalry made daily Incursions, and came up to Caesar's Retrenchments, where they carried off all those that ventur'd out of the Lines to fetch Water, or go a Foraging. Thus they oblig'd their Enemies to keep within their Works, for fear of being taken; by which means Caesar's Men soon came to labour under the Inconveniences of Famine: Besides that, the expected Convoys from Sicily and Sardinia were not yet arriv'd; and the Ships durst not venture out to Sea, by reason of the † Rigour of the Season, without running a manifest Danger. He had not the entire Command of above six Miles in the Country, so that he was very much incommoded for want of Forage; and the Veterane Soldiers and Troops, who had been engag'd in several Wars, both by Land and by Sea, and had frequently struggled with the like Extremities and Hardships before, making a Vertue of Necessity, gather'd the Weeds that grew upon the Sea-shoar, and washing them in sweet Water, gave them their Horses and Cattle to feed upon, and so made a shift to keep them alive.

† This happened about the Beginning of January.

XXV. While things were in this posture, King Juba being inform'd what Difficulties Caesar labour'd under, and what a small handful of Men he had with him, he thought it not convenient to give him time to recover his Men, and increase the number of his Army. Upon this he rais'd great quantities of Horse and Foot to strengthen his own Party, and began to march out of his own Kingdom. But P. Litius and King Bogud receiving Advice of Juba's March, joyn'd both their Forces together, and advanc'd directly towards his Country. The most considerable Place they attack'd was Cirta, the wealthiest City in his Kingdom; which, after a few Days, they won by Assault; and possessed themselves besides of two Towns of the Getulians, where having propos'd to the Inhabitants to suffer them to depart with Bag and Baggage in case they would surrender the Town, upon their refusal, when they took the Place, they put them all to the Sword. From hence they made farther Incursions into the Country, and committed great Ravages where-ever they came. No sooner was Juba inform'd of these Disorders, but he stopp'd short, though he was within a few Days March of Scipio's Army, and judg'd it more advisable to go immediately to the Relief of his own People and Country, than while he endeavour'd to support others, to run the hazard of losing his whole Kingdom. Upon these Considerations he withdrew, and re-call'd the Forces he had in Scipio's Service, as being apprehensive of his own danger: However, he left him thirty Elephants, and then return'd to secure the Frontiers of his own Dominions.

XXVI. Caesar finding that the Inhabitants of the Province still doubted of his Arrival, and did not believe that himself was come in Person with these Forces into Africk, but one of his Lieutenants, he sent Circular Letters about the Country, to satisfy them that he was come. As soon as this News was communicated, several Persons of eminent Quality flock'd to his Camp, and made heavy Complaints of the barbarous Inhumanity of the Enemy. Their Tears and Complaints made so great an Impression upon Caesar, that he resolv'd to take the Field as soon as he had got all his Forces together, and the Weather was favourable, (for at that time he kept within his Camp;) and immediately dispatch'd Letters to Sicily, to Ahenus the Praetor and Rabirius



\* Per Cataphractum.

*Rabirius Posthumus*, which he sent by one of his Scout-Ships, That without any farther Delay or Excuse of the Winds and Weather, they would send him the rest of his Forces; That unless they made all imaginable dispatch, the Province would be soon over-run and made a Prey to his Enemies; and if a timely Relief did not come to his Allies there, they would not have so much as a house left where they could live secure from the Insults of the cruel Adversary. At this Juncture he was so strangely impatient, that the very next day after he had dispatcht the Courier to *Sicily*, he complain'd that the Army and Fleet lost time, and had his Eyes and Thoughts night and day turn'd towards the Sea, to see if this long wish'd for Assistance was in sight. Nor is this to be wonder'd at; for he receiv'd fresh Informations every Moment of the burning of Villages, ravaging of the Country, carrying away and slaughtering of Cattle, the daily demolishing and abandoning of Towns and Castles, the Imprisonment or the Murdering of the principal Inhabitants, and the carrying their Children Captives, under the pretence of keeping them for Hostages. He had so inconsiderable an Army with him at that time, that he was not in a condition to redress the Grievances of these poor people, though they perpetually implor'd his Assistance: However, he kept his Men still employ'd, fortified his Camp, and rais'd several Forts and Ramparts, which reach'd as far as the Sea.

XXVII. *Scipio* in the mean time was not wanting to train up his Elephants for the War, which he perform'd after this manner: He dispos'd his Slingers in two Troops; one of which attackt 'em in the Front as if they had been the Enemy, and threw Stones at 'em; and when the Elephants, terrified at this rude Treatment, began to fall upon their own Men, the others beat 'em back with Stones after the like manner, and made 'em face the Enemy. But this could not be done without a great deal of pain and difficulty: For an Elephant, though he has been fitted for the Service never so many years, yet in the heat of Battle may prejudice his own Party as well as that of the Adversary.

XXVIII. While these matters pass between the Generals of both Armies near *Ruspina*, *Caius Virgilius Petronius*, who commanded at *Thapsus*, a Sea-port Town, seeing *Caesar's* Ships float up and down, not knowing where he was, took his advantage of this opportunity, and fill'd a Barque with some Soldiers and Archers, to which he joyned some Shalops, and thus began to pursue the stragling Ships. Although he frequently had the worst in these Engagements, and was often beaten back with loss, yet he did not abandon his Design, and accidentally attack'd a Ship wherein were the two *Tiberis*, young *Spanish* Gentlemen, Tribunes of the Fifth Legion, whose Father had been made a Senator by *Caesar*; and a Centurion of the same Body, whose name was *T. Salienus*, who had besieged *M. Messalla*, one of *Caesar's* Lieutenants, at *Messina*, and by his seditious practices had been the occasion that the Money and the Ornaments designed for his Triumph were stop'd. Touch'd with the Remembrance of his former Crimes, and fearing to be brought to due Punishment, he for this Reason persuaded the Young-men to make no Opposition, but surrender themselves to *Virgilius*. But the other had no sooner got them in his power, but he took care to have them sent to *Scipio*, by whose Order they were put to Death three days after. As they were carried towards the place of Execution, 'tis reported that the elder Brother begged

the favour of the Centurion to dispatch him first, which he easily obtained; and thus they were put to Death.

XXIX. In the mean time the Horse-guards of both Armies had frequent Skirmishes one with another; and the Germans and Gauls that served under *Labienus*, sometimes convers'd with *Caesar's* Horse, upon giving one another Assurance to commit no Actions of Hostility. *Labienus* likewise endeavour'd with part of his Cavalry to possess himself of the City of *Leptis*, where *Saferna* commanded with three Cohorts; but the place being strong by nature, and well fortified with all warlike Preparations, it easily defended it self. As the Enemy's Horse still continued to attack the place, and a large Squadron of 'em stood before the Gate, the Officer that commanded 'em was kill'd by the Blow of a \* *Scorpion*. The rest, affrighted at this sudden Accident, retir'd with great Precipitation towards their Camp, and durst never make any new Efforts upon the Town. On the other hand *Scipio* rang'd his Army in Battle Array almost every day, within 300 Paces of his Camp, and having in this Exercise spent the better part of the Day, us'd to retire to his Tents towards the Evening. This he frequently did, and no one stirr'd out of *Caesar's* Camp to give him the least Disturbance. At last, despising the Patience of *Caesar's* Men, he brought his whole Forces into the Field, with 30 Elephants, that had Towers upon their backs, at the head of 'em, and his Army behind, extended upon a great Front, to give the greater Terroure; and in this manner appear'd not far from *Caesar's* Camp.

XXX. *Caesar*, upon Information of this, order'd his Soldiers, who had gone beyond the Fortifications, either for Forage or fetching of Wood and other things necessary, to retire within their Works slowly, and without Tumult or Confusion, and there to stand in a Posture of Readiness: He also commanded his Horse that were upon the Guard to continue in their Post, till they were within the throwing of the Enemies Darts, and that if they press'd nearer upon 'em, they should retire within their Fortifications as orderly as they could. He commanded another part of his Cavalry to get themselves ready, each in their respective Quarter. He did not give these Orders from the top of the Rampart, to observe the Countenance of the Enemy, but sent 'em out by his Scouts and Messengers, while he sat in his own Tent; so great Experience and Resolution he was Master of: For he knew well enough, That although the Enemy had a mighty Army in the Field, yet they had been frequently routed and vanquish'd by him, and that he had given 'em their Lives, and pardon'd 'em for what they had acted against him. For which Reason, he imagin'd they would never have had the Hardiness to attack him in his own Camp, while their former Cowardice was so fresh in their Memory: Besides, he was not ignorant that his very Name was become formidable to that Party; and then the extraordinary Fortifications of his Camp, the prodigious height of the Trench and Ditches, and the Calthrops that were so artificially plac'd without, were capable of themselves to stop the Progress of the Enemy, although there had been no Soldiers to defend the Works. To this maybe added, That he had made great Provision of *Scorpions*, \* *Carapaces*, and other warlike Engines proper for making a Defence, which he had provided, not out of any Fear or Apprehension of the Enemy,

\* Vegetius makes it the same with the *Manubalista*, and it was thrown by one Man.

+ The same with the *Balistas*, an Engine used for throwing of Stones and Darts, and pieces of Timber.



Enemy, but by reason that his Army at present were but few in number, and not long acquainted with the Fatigues of War. However, it was not merely upon the score of their Inequality and want of Experience, that he forbore to bring his Army into the Field, as if he distrusted the Victory in case he hazarded a Battle; but he thought it concern'd his Honour in what manner he should triumph over an Enemy whom he had so often beaten: He thought it would be ignominious for him, after he had performed so many great Exploits, and vanquish'd so many Armies, if it were said, That he had obtained a bloody Victory over the scatter'd Remains of his Enemies, that were gathered together after so many Defeats. He was therefore resolv'd to suffer their Insolence, and leave it unchastis'd, till such time as part of his Veteran Legions came to him by this second Convoy, which he so impatiently expected.

XXXI. In the mean while *Scipio*, after he had tarry'd some time in a fighting Posture in the Plains, in contempt of *Caesar*, draws back his Troops by little and little into his Camp; and summoning an Assembly of 'em, he boasted how much the Enemy dreaded him, and in what a desperate Condition *Caesar's* Army was; and after he had encourag'd them, he promis'd in a short time to lead 'em on to certain Victory. *Caesar*, on the other hand, caus'd his Men daily to work upon the Fortifications, and under this pretence kept the young Soldiers still employ'd. In the mean time, the *Numidians* and *Getulians* daily deserted from *Scipio's* Camp; part of 'em went home, and the rest flockt by whole Companies into *Caesar's* Camp, because they and their Ancestors had receiv'd great Obligations from *C. Marius*, and they were informed that *Caesar* was related to him. Some of the principal *Getulians* he sent back into their own Country, with Letters to the respective Villages where they liv'd, in which he exhorted 'em to take up Arms for the Defence of themselves and their Children, and not to comply with the Desires of their Enemies any longer.

XXXII. While Matters happen'd thus at *Ruspina*, Deputies came to *Caesar* from

\* As we meet the name of no such place in the old Geographers, 'tis perhaps the same with the *Acolla* in *Strabo* and *Livy*, a Maritime Town of *Asiatick*, properly so called.

\* *Acilla*, a free City, who promis'd readily to perform whatever he commanded 'em to do; only they desir'd him to give 'em a Garison, that so they might be able to do this with more Security to themselves: That they

would furnish him with Corn, and what other Provisions they had, out of a Consideration that he was come to deliver 'em. These things were no sooner demanded but granted: So he commanded *Caius Messius*, who had formerly bore the Office of *Aedile*, to march with these Forces to *Acilla*; which coming to the Knowledge of *Considius Longus*, who commanded at *Adrumetum* with two Legions and 700 Horse, he endeavour'd to prevent him, and to surprize the place. But *Messius* making greater Expedition, arriv'd with his Forces there before him; so that when he drew near the Town with his Men, and found that *Caesar* had already Garison'd the place, not daring to engage himself in so hazardous an Attempt, he return'd to *Adrumetum*, without doing any thing, considering what Forces he had with him. Soon after, he obtain'd some Horse of *Labienus*; and then he sat down again before the place, and began to form the Siege of it.

XXXIII. About this time, *C. Salustius Crispus*, whom, as we have already observed, *Caesar* sent a

few days before with his Fleet, arriv'd at the Island of *Cercina*: Upon whose Arrival, *C. Decimus*, who with a great Garison, wholly consisting of his own Family, guarded the Enemy's Convoy, embarked himself in a small Vessel, and made his Escape. In the mean time *Salustius* the Prætor was very well receiv'd by the Inhabitants of the Island; and finding great Magazines of Corn in the place, he loaded all his Provision-Ships, of which he had great store, and so sent 'em to *Caesar's* Camp. Nor was *Allienus*, the Proconsul of *Sicily*, wanting in his Duty; for he embark'd the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Legion aboard the Transport-Ships at *Lilybaeum*, with 800 *Gaulish* Horse, 1000 Slingers and Archers, and sent a second Supply of Provisions to *Caesar*: All which Ships, having a favourable wind, within four days arriv'd safe at *Ruspina*, where *Caesar* lay encamped. Thus *Caesar* was possess'd with a double Pleasure at the same time, to see himself plentifully recruited with Men and Provisions; nor was it a small Satisfaction to his Men, to see their late Scarcity turned to great Plenty of all things. After he had unladen the Vessels, and that his Horse and Foot were recovered of the Illness they had contracted on ship-board, he distributed 'em into several Castles and fortified places.

XXXIV. All this while *Scipio* and those of his Party were surpriz'd with Admiration that *C. Caesar*, who never us'd to be backward in giving Battle, was grown so reserv'd on a sudden; and this they imagin'd he did not without very good Reason. To discover his Designs, (for this unusual Reservedness in *Caesar* gave 'em terrible Apprehensions) they chose two *Getulians*, whom they lookt upon to be faithful and very well affected to them, and promised them a considerable Reward, if they would go into *Caesar's* Camp, and bring them a true account of every thing. As soon as they were brought before *Caesar*, they begg'd leave that they might be allow'd to utter their Minds freely, without incurring any Danger; which being granted 'em, several of our Countrymen, say they, most noble General, who have in their time been oblig'd by *C. Marius* and the greatest part of the Roman Citizens that are in the Fourth and Sixth Legions, have long desired to make their Escapes into your Camp, but are hinder'd, by the Guards of *Numidian* Horse, from putting it into Execution. But now we are sent as Spies by *Scipio*, (and we readily accepted the Commission) to see what Snares or Ambuscades had been laid before your Entrenchments for the Elephants, and after what manner you design'd to attack those Animals, that so having made an exact Observation of all things, we should bring him word in what manner every thing was disposed. *Caesar* commended them for their Fidelity to him; and after he had gratified them with some Presents, they were carried to the Quarter of the Deserters. The truth of what they had delivered was soon confirm'd; for the next day, several Soldiers, out of those Legions which the *Getulians* had named, quitted *Scipio's* Camp, and came over to *Caesar*.

XXXV. While these Passages happen'd at *Ruspina*, *Marcus Cato*, who commanded at *Utica*, made new Levies daily of Free-men and Africans, nay and Slaves too, and all that were capable of bearing Arms, and caus'd them continually to file off towards *Scipio's* Camp. In the mean time Deputies arriv'd from *Tisdrum*, where 3000 Bushels of Wheat were laid up in a Magazin by several Labourers and Italian Merchants, and came to *Caesar*, telling him what store of Provisions they had in their Town; and withal, desir'd that he would be



\* The 27th  
of our Ja-  
nuary.

be pleased to send them a Garison for their farther Security. *Cæsar* receiv'd them with great Civility, and promised to answer their Demands in a short time; and after he had exhorted them to be of good Courage, he sent them back to their Fellow-Citizens. At the same time *P. Silius* enter'd the Frontiers of *Numidia*, and took a strong Castle, situated upon a Mountain, where *Zuba* had laid up great Stores of Corn, and other Military Preparations. Now *Cæsar* having thus increased his Army with two Veterane Legions, besides the Horse and Light-arm'd Foot which he had received by the second Supply, immediately order'd six Transport-Vessels to sail for *Lilybeum*, to bring over the Remainder of his Army; and on the \* sixth of the Kalends of *February*, about the first Watch, he commanded all his Spies and Scouts to put themselves in a posture of Readiness; and thus with great Silence and Secrecy, the Enemy suspecting nothing of the matter, he order'd all his Legions, about the Third Watch, to leave the Camp, and follow him towards *Ruspina*, where he had a Garison, and which was the first Place that had declar'd openly for him. From thence having passed a small Descent, he led the Legions towards the Sea, on the Left Hand of the Camp. This Plain took up the Breadth of about fifteen Miles, which a great Chain of Mountains, beginning from the Sea, made to resemble the Form of a Theatre: At the Top of this Mountain were a few rising Hills, on which some old Forts and Watch-Towers were placed, at the last of which *Scipio* lay encamp'd.

XXXVI. After *Cæsar* had ascended the above-mention'd Mountain, and all these Hills, he began to erect some Castles and Towers, which he effected in less than half an Hour; and when he came near the last Hill and Tower, which stood nearest to the Enemy's Camp, (where, as I have already observ'd, was a Guard of *Numidians*) he made a Stop for a short time. After he had observ'd the situation of the place, he set his Horse on the Guard, and caused his Legions to make a Retrenchment through the midst of the Mountain, from the place where he then was, down to that from whence he so lately came. As soon as *Scipio* and *Labienus* were inform'd of this Movement, they drew all their Horse out of the Camp, and after they had ranged them in Battle, they advanc'd about a Mile from their Fortifications, and then placed their Infantry upon a second Line, within 400 Paces of their Camp. *Cæsar*, not at all daunted at the Numbers of his Enemy, still encouraged his Soldiers to work upon the Fortifications; and when he now found that there was not above a Mile and a half between the Enemy's Army and his own Works, and understood that the Enemy still advanced nearer, to hinder his Soldiers, and make them desist from this Employment, he detach'd a Squadron of *Spanish* Horse to seize on the next Hill with all speed, and beat out the Soldiers that were posted there; and order'd some Light-arm'd Foot to support them. They made the Attack with so much Vigour, that they soon render'd themselves Masters of the place, after they had either taken or wounded part of those *Numidians* that guarded it, and beaten back the rest. *Labienus* perceiving the Disorder and Flight of his Men, that he might the sooner relieve them, took almost all the Right Wing of his Cavalry, and thus advanc'd to their Relief: But when *Cæsar* saw that *Labienus* was at a great distance from his Forces, he detach'd the whole Left Wing of his Horse to cut them off.

XXXVII. In the Plain where this Action happen'd was a large Castle, fortified with four Towers, which hinder'd *Labienus* from seeing what pass'd, so that he did not perceive that he was surrounded with *Cæsar's* Horse; and thus he did not see *Cæsar's* Troops, till he beheld his own Men attack'd in the Rear. This put the whole *Numidian* Cavalry into so great Consternation, that they fled immediately towards the Camp, leaving the *Germans* and *Gauls* to sustain the Fight, who were encompass'd on all hands, and cut in pieces, after they had defended themselves with great Bravery. In the mean time, *Scipio's* Infantry, which were ranged in Battle before their Camp, beholding this Disorder, were so strangely affrighted, that they began to flee back again into their Camp, at every Gate. *Cæsar*, after he had dislodg'd *Scipio* and his Forces, as well out of the Plain as the Hills, and oblig'd him to retire to his Camp, sound'd a Retreat, and order'd all his Cavalry to come within the Works; and now the Field of Battle being open, he saw the large and mighty Bodies of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, part of whom had follow'd *Labienus* out of *Gaul*; others, prevail'd upon by Money and fair Promises, had list'd themselves in his Service; and some who had been taken Prisoners at *Curio's* Defeat, and had their Lives given them, were willing, in acknowledgment of that Favour, to venture them again for the Party. The Bodies of these Men were of a wonderful bigness and shape, and lay dispersed and scatter'd all over the Field.

XXXVIII. After this Exploit, *Cæsar* the next Day draws all his Troops out of the Garisons, and ranges them in the Field; but *Scipio* did not think it advisable to stir out of his own Retrenchments, by reason he lost so many of his Men the preceding Day. *Cæsar* having drawn out his Army, march'd slowly at the Bottom of the Hill, near the Fortifications; and now his Forces were come within less than a Mile of *Vzita*, which Town *Scipio* kept in his possession, and used to supply his Army from thence with Water, and other Necessaries: For which reason fearing to lose it, he drew out all his Troops, and rang'd them in Battle upon four Lines; the first of which, according to his Custom, was compos'd of Cavalry, intermingled with Elephants that were arm'd, and carried Towers on their Backs. Thus he march'd towards the Relief of the place; which when *Cæsar* perceiv'd, he now concluded that *Scipio* came with a full Resolution to fight him; but the other making an Halt before the Town, at the aforesaid place, cover'd the Main Body of his Army with the Town, and expos'd the Right and Left Wings, where the Elephants were, to the full view of the Enemy.

XXXIX. After *Cæsar* had thus waited in vain till it was almost Sun-set, and found that *Scipio* had no mind to quit the Ground where he was posted, but would rather act upon the Defensive, than give him Battle, he thought it not convenient to move any nearer the Town that Day, because he knew there was a strong Garison of *Numidians* in the place, and that the Enemy cover'd the Body of their Army with it. Besides, he was sensible that it was in a manner impracticable for him to carry on the Assault, and at the same time to fight his Men on the Right and Left Wing, with the disadvantage of the Ground; especially considering that they had stood under their Arms ever since the Morning, hungry and fatigu'd, without any Refreshment. So marching his Forces back again,



into the Camp, he resolv'd the next Day to carry on his Works nearer to the Enemy's Army. In the mean time, *Confidius*, who with a Body of *Numidians* and *Getulians* besieg'd *Messius*, and the eight Cohorts in *Acilla*, after he had made several Attacks to no purpose, and seen his *Machins* destroy'd by the Towns-men, upon the News of *Scipio's* being defeated in the late Horse-Engagement, burnt the Corn, of which he had plenty in his Camp, and spoil'd his Wine and Oyl and other Provisions, and so rais'd the Siege of the Place. After this, marching through *Juba's* Kingdom, he left part of his Men with *Scipio*, and then retired to *Adrumetum*.

XL. On the other side, one of the Provision-Ships which *Allienus* sent with the last Convoy from *Sicily*, in which were *Q. Cominius* and *L. Ticius*, a Roman Knight, happening to straggle from the rest of the Fleet, was taken by *Virgilius*, with the help of some Barks and Shallops, and carried to *Scipio*. A Gally belonging to this Fleet run the same Destiny; for being separated from the rest in ill Weather, and forced upon the Isle of \* *Ægimurus*, it was taken by the Naval Forces of *Varus* and *M. Octavius*. In this Gally were some Veterane Soldiers, with a Centurion, and a few New-raised Men, whom *Varus* used kindly enough, and order'd to be brought before *Scipio*. As soon as they were introduced into his presence, he being then seated in his Tribunal, I am well satisfied, says he, that it is not of your own accord, but by the Command and Instigation of your Tyrannick General, that you are come here to pursue the Lives of your Fellow-Citizens, and of all those that are engaged in the true Interests of the Commonwealth. But since Fortune has deliver'd you into my hands, if, as you are in Duty bound, you will side with Men of Integrity, to defend your Country against the wicked Attempts of Usurpers, you may be certain that you shall not only have your Lives and Fortunes secured to you, but be nobly rewarded. Therefore frankly tell me what Measures you are resolv'd to take.

XLI. Having thus harangu'd them, as he vainly flatter'd himself that they would receive this Grace with all the Ardour and Submission imaginable, the Centurion of the Fourteenth Legion thus answered him, I thank thee, *Scipio*, (for General I must not call thee) that being thy Prisoner, thou hast made me Offers of Life and Liberty: And perhaps I might accept them, if I could do so without being guilty of the most horrid Baseness that can be. What! Shall I present my self in Battle against *Cæsar*, after I have fought † sixteen Years

† In the printed Copy 'tis XXXVI Years, but two of the Tens are to be struck out, to make it just XVI Years, (as some Manuscripts rightly have it;) for *Cæsar* was a General but so many Years, and no more.

\* A Legion consisted of ten Cohorts, and every Cohort, for the most part, of 420 Men: But if the Legion was fuller than ordinary, so were the Cohorts 200, and might reckon 5 or 600 compleat Men.

XLII. After the Centurion had thus expressed his Mind, *Scipio*, enrag'd to the highest degree, and boiling with Indignation, gave the rest of the Centurions to understand what he would have done to him; so he was killed at his Feet, and the rest of the Veterane Soldiers he order'd to be

separated from the New-raised Men: Take away those harden'd Fellows, says he, that are stain'd and defiled with the Blood of their Country-men. Upon this they were immediately carried without the Trenches, and there most barbarously butchered. He gave Orders for the New-raised Men to be distributed amongst the other Troops, but would not suffer *Cominius* or *Picida* to be brought into his sight. *Cæsar* much concern'd at this Accident, dismissed the Captains who commanded his Gallies before *Thapsus*, where they were appointed to cruise, from his Service; and for their farther Mortification and Disgrace, publish'd a very severe Edict against them.

XLIII. Much about this time a strange and unexpected Mischance befel *Cæsar's* Army. For

\* about the Second Watch of the Night, after the † Trumpet had given the Signal, a great Tempest, accompanied with a most prodigious Shower of Hail, arose. What serv'd to make this unexpected Calamity more dismal to them, *Cæsar* had not put his Men into Winter-Quarters, as the Generals before him were used to do, but decamped every third or fourth Day, that he might come nearer the Enemy, and still fortified his Camp; so that the Soldiers being continually thus employ'd, had no time to make Huts for themselves. Besides, he was so hasty to transport his Army from *Sicily*, that, except the Men and their Arms, he would not suffer any of their Equipage, or Slaves, or, in short, any thing which might be serviceable to them to be carried on Ship-board; and they were so far from being able to get any Provisions in *Africa*, that they had soon consum'd their own, by reason of the great Scarcity of Victuals there. Upon which account, few of the Men lay under Tents, the rest being forced to secure themselves from the Weather with their Cloaks, and cover'd them with Reeds and Wisps of Straw. Thus when this violent Storm of Hail fell at Midnight, the Soldiers half beaten down by the Tempest, and overwhelm'd with Water, their Fires all put out, and their Victuals all spoil'd, wander'd up and down the Camp, and cover'd their Heads with their Helms. The same Night the Tops of the Javelins belonging to the Fifth Legion took fire on their own accord.

\* Which almost answers our Mid-night.

† In the printed Copies 'tis *Virgilius* signo confecto, which certainly is a great mistake; for the *Virgiliz*, or the *Pleiades*, set about the middle of November. Now the Author of this Book expressly tells us, that *Cæsar* arriv'd in *Africa* not before the end of December. D'Ab-lancourt would hereby prove the faultiness of the old Calendar, which led People into these Mistakes. But the late learned Publisher of the Dauphin's Edition has, out of three ancient Manuscripts, corrected it, *Virgilium* signo confecto; and him I have chose to follow: For, as the Romans divided their Night into the First, Second, Third and Fourth Watch, so they notified each of these Watches four times a Night by Sound of Trumpet; as we find in *Vegetius de Re Militare*, lib. 1. c. p. 8. and *Frontinus*, lib. 1. Stratagem.

XLIV. In the mean time, King *Juba* receiving Advice of *Scipio's* late Defeat, and being importun'd by him to come to his Relief, left part of his Army under the Conduct of his Lieutenant *Sabura*, to make head against *Licius*, and arriv'd with three Legions, 800 Horse with Bridles, a vast Number of *Numidians* that rode without Bridles, several Companies of light Infantry, and thirty Elephants, to his Assistance, thinking by his Authority and Presence to hinder the Men from standing in fear of *Cæsar*. Upon his Arrival, he pitched his Royal Pavilion by himself, not far from *Scipio*. *Cæsar's* Men had been long terrified with the expectation of *Juba's* Army, and their Apprehensions still encreased as they were informed that he came towards them: But after they had narrowly observed his Forces, and compar'd them with their own, they laid aside their Fears, and despised them. Thus the mighty Terrour he had

occa-



occasioned when absent, he forfeited now by his Presence. However, *Scipio* was not a little encouraged with this Reinforcement; and the next day, drawing out all his own and the King's Men into the Field, with 60 Elephants in most sumptuous Furniture, he advanced a pretty way beyond his Lines, where after he had tarried a short time, he retired back again to his Camp.

XLV. *Cæsar* being now sensible that he would not refuse him Battle, because all the Forces he expected were now arrived to him, began to advance by the top of the Mountains, still making Retrenchments, and building of Forts, and as he possess'd himself of these eminent places, he still endeavoured to come nearer to *Scipio*. The Enemy confiding in the numbers of their Men, had seized on the next Hill, and by that means hindered him from advancing any farther. *Labienus* was the Man that recommended this Design, and as he lay next to it, so he was the first that made himself Master of it.

XLVI. Before *Cæsar* could come to this Hill, where he had a mind to post himself, he must pass through a broad Valley, the descent into which was very steep, with several hollow places that resembled Caves; and beyond it was a great Plantation of Olive Trees. *Labienus*, who was aware that *Cæsar*, if he intended to make himself Master of that Post, must of necessity take his way through the aforesaid Valley and Plantation of Olives, being well acquainted with these places, lay in Ambuscade, with part of his Horse, and some light armed Foot, and placed the rest of his Horse at a farther distance behind the Mountains; that so, as soon as he had fallen upon *Cæsar's* Infantry, they should advance from the Hills, and then *Cæsar's* Men, attackt in the Front and Rear at the same time, and unable either to march forward or to retire, but surrounded on all sides, would infallibly be cut in pieces. *Cæsar*, who knew nothing of this Ambuscade, ordered his Horse to march first; and when they came to this place, *Labienus's* Men, either mistaking or forgetting the Orders that were given them, or fearing to be over-run by the Horse in the Ditch, began to shew themselves one by one in several places, and to climb the Hill. But *Cæsar's* Horse pursuing them, cut some of them in pieces, and took the rest Prisoners. After this, they made towards the Hill, and putting *Labienus's* Soldiers to the Rout, soon possessed themselves of it. *Labienus*, though he fled with part of his Horse in great Precipitation, yet all he could do, he hardly made his escape.

XLVII. This Exploit being performed by the Horse, *Cæsar* ordered the Foot to fortifie this place, and drew two great Retrenchments cross the Plain, from his Camp over against the City of *Uzita*, which stood between his and *Scipio's* Camp, so that they met at the right and left Angle of that Town. The Reason of this was, That when he drew his Forces nearer to the Town, and began to attack it, he might secure himself on all sides, by these Works, from being encompassed with the Enemy's Horse, and not be obliged to quit the Assault. Besides, that this would give him more liberty to communicate with those of the Town; and if any Soldiers had a mind to desert and come over to him, which they could not do before without apparent danger, they might now do it with greater Ease and Security. He was also desirous to see, whether, as he still approached nearer to them, the Enemy had a mind to fight them. To

the above-mentioned Reasons, we may add another, which was, That this place lying low, he might with more Convenience dig Wells here; because when he was in the other Station, his Soldiers were forced to go through a long and narrow way to fetch their Water. While his Legions were employed in these Works, part of the Army drew up before the Retrenchment, in Order of Battle, and skirmished against the Cavalry and light Foot of the Enemy.

XLVIII. As *Cæsar* towards the Evening retired with his Forces from the Works, to regain his Camp, *Juba*, *Scipio*, and *Labienus* made a sudden Onset upon them, with all their Horse and light Foot. *Cæsar's* Cavalry, over-pressed with such vast multitudes, gave ground at first; but the Success of this Attack fell out otherwise than the Enemy expected. For *Cæsar* making a Halt, advanced with his Legions to support the Horse, who now taking fresh Courage, returned to the Charge with great Vigour, and finding the *Numidians* that pursued them disordered, they beat them back to their Camp, killing and wounding abundance of them. So that if the Night had not unseasonably ended the dispute, and the Dust hinder'd their fight, they had in all appearance taken *Juba* and *Labienus*, and cut all their Horse and light Foot in pieces. In the mean time, *Scipio's* Soldiers, belonging to the Fourth and Sixth Legions, daily deserted in great Numbers to *Cæsar's* Camp: And several of *Curio's* Horse, distrusting now the Fortune of *Scipio* and his Forces, did the same.

XLIX. While these things happen'd between the Generals of both sides near *Uzita*, the Ninth and Tenth Legion embarked upon the Transport-Vessels in *Sicily*; and as they were now not far from the Harbour of *Russinus*, discovered *Cæsar's* Ships which lay at Anchor before *Thapsus*. So fearing to fall among the Enemy's Fleet, whom they imagined to lye in wait for them there, they put to Sea again; where having been tossed by the Winds for the space of several Days, and almost spent with Hunger and Thirst, at last they came safe to Land, and arrived at the Camp. No sooner were these Legions come ashore, but *Cæsar*, remembering the Disorders which his Soldiers had committed in *Italy*, and the Rapines of some Officers, took the first occasion which presented it self to be revenged upon them; and because *C. Avienus*, a Tribune of the Tenth Legion, had wholly taken up one Vessel for his own Family and Equipage, and brought not so much as one Soldier with him from *Sicily*, he summoned the next Day all the Officers of the Army, and in their Presence, sitting in his Tribunal, I could have wished, said he, with all my heart, That some Men would have put bound to their ill Manners and Insolence, and not everlastingly abused my good Nature and Clemency: But since they still run on in their Crimes, and observe no tollerable Measures, I am resolved to chastise them according to the Rules of War, to serve as an Example to their Fellows. And first for you, *Caius Avienus*, because you have stirred up the Soldiers of the Roman People against the Republick, plundered several Towns, and been unserviceable, both to me and the Commonwealth; and further, not content with these Disorders, have taken up whole Vessels for your own Retinue and Horses, so that through your means we want Soldiers now in a time of Necessity, I here discard you, and command you to leave *Africk* this very day. As for you, *Aulus Fonteius*, I likewise cashier you as a seditious Officer, and an ill Citizen. And lastly, *T. Salienus*, *M. Tiro*, *C. Clusnas*, since you purchased your Commissions



missions in my Army by Favour, and not by Merit, and have shown your selves to be neither Valiant in War nor useful in Peace, but fitter to stir up the Soldiers against their General, than to do your Duty. I look upon you to be unworthy to serve in my Troops any longer, and therefore break you, with Orders to depart immediately. Having ended his Speech, he delivered them up to the Centurions, and commanded them to be separately sent on Ship-board, allowing only one Servant to each.

\* Against P. Sirtius, the Getulians, and Caesar.

L. In the mean time, the *Getulian* Deferters, who, as we have already observed, were sent to their own Country with Letters and particular Orders from *Caesar*, arrived there; and the People, partly induced by their Authority, and partly by *Caesar*'s Reputation, were easily prevailed upon to take up Arms and revolt from their Prince. When *Juba* received advice of this Insurrection, finding himself now engaged in a \* three-fold War at once, he was obliged to detach six Companies out of the Forces he had brought against *Caesar*, to oppose the Progress of the *Getulians*. *Caesar* having now finished his two Retrenchments, and carried them on very near, but so that a Javelin out of the Town could not reach him, fortified his Camp, and placing store of military Engines before the Front of his Lines, directly over against the Town, he put the Soldiers that defended the Walls into terrible Fears, and ordered five Legions to come to him there. This gave an Opportunity to several Persons of Condition in both Armies to desire the fight of their Friends and Relations, and to have frequent Conversation with one another; which was of great Importance to *Caesar*'s Affairs, as he very well knew. For the principal Officers of the *Getulian* Cavalry, who were in *Juba*'s Service, and some others of the better sort, whose Fathers had served under *Marius*, and by his Favour had obtained considerable Lands in this Country, but since *Sylla*'s Victory, were subjected to King *Hiempsal*, found now a fit Opportunity towards the Evening, when the Fires were lighted, to make their Escapes with their Horses and Servants, to the number of 1000. and arrived at *Caesar*'s Camp, which was in the Plain near *Uxita*.

† This is not the Hiempsal mentioned by Salust, but K. of Numidia, who was deposed by his Subjects, and whom Pompey soon after re-established by Sylla's Command.

LI. *Scipio* and those of his Party were not a little disturbed when they received the News of this Desertion, and chanced to see, much about the same time, *M. Aquinius* talking with *Caius Sacerna*. *Scipio* sent him word that he ought not to hold any Commerce with the Enemies. After the Messenger had delivered this Message, and the other still continued his Discourse, *Juba* sent one of his Guards to bid him break up the Conference; which he, fearing to incur that Prince's Displeasure, accordingly did. A strange thing, that a Roman Gentleman, already advanced to Dignities in the State, should rather choose to obey a Foreign King than *Scipio*, and be guilty of so mean a thing, as to desire to return home after the Ruine of his Party. But indeed this Affront did not so much concern *Aquinius*, who was but a new-made Senator, as *Scipio*, who commanded the Army, and was illustrious for his Birth as well as his Dignity. 'Tis confidently reported, That *Scipio*, who before the King's coming used to wear a Purple Robe, upon *Juba*'s telling him that he ought not to wear the same sort of Habit as himself, changed it immediately for one of a white colour; and in this and other Affairs shew'd himself always compliant to that most arrogant Prince.

LII. The next day they drew out all their For-

ces, and came to post themselves upon an eminence not far from *Caesar*'s Quarter, who did the same on his side, and put himself in Order of Battle before his Camp, imagining, that the Enemy, seeing themselves so much increased by the King's Forces, and drawing out first, would soon begin to attack him. He rode through all the Ranks, to encourage his Men, and give them the word, and there expected the coming up of his Enemies; but he would not advance too far from his Retrenchments, because *Scipio* had several Companies of Men in *Uxita*, and faced the Town on his right side; which made him apprehensive that if he went any farther the Townsmen would fall upon him and cut his Men to pieces: Besides there was an uneven place before *Scipio*'s Quarter, which it was impossible to pass without some disorder.

LIII. I believe it will not be impertinent here to relate in what Form and Manner both Armies were drawn out. *Scipio* plac'd his own and *Juba*'s Legions in the Front, supported by the *Numidians*, who were so thin Fil'd that one would have been apt to imagine afar off, that the Battle was only double upon the Wings. He plac'd the Elephants upon the Right and Left, at equal distances, and behind 'em, the light armed Infantry and the Auxiliary Troops of the *Numidians*. All his Horse that used Bridles he disposed upon the Right Wing; for the Left was covered with the Town, and there was not room enough on that side to draw out in Squadrons: Within 1000 Paces of his Right Wing, towards the foot of a Mountain, he had placed all the light *Numidian* Cavalry, at the greatest distance both from the Enemy and his own Forces; which he did with this design, That when the two Armies began to be engaged, his Horse fetching a larger Compass, might on the sudden surround *Caesar*'s Men with their Numbers, and disorder them with their Darts. After this Manner did *Scipio* order his Battle.

LIV. But *Caesar*'s Army (to begin with the Left Wing, and so come to the Right) was rank'd in this Order; He had the Ninth and Seventh Legion in his Left Wing, the Thirtieth and Nine and twentieth in the Right, and in the Interval between the two Wings, four other Legions, viz. the Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, the Twenty eighth, and the Twenty sixth. ‡ The second Line was composed, on the Right Wing, of part of the Cohorts of these Legions, and some others of the new-raised Men. But the Troops of the third Line he disposed in his Left Wing, and extended them as far as the middle Legion of his Army, and so placed them, that he seem'd to have three Lines on that side: The Reason of it was, because his Right Wing was cover'd with his Retrenchments, and he was desirous to have his Left Wing strong enough to resist the great Numbers of the Enemy, and therefore ranked all his Cavalry on that side. But because he expected no mighty matters from his Horse, he sent the Fifth Legion to support them, and mingled the light Infantry with them. His Archers he distributed every where, but principally upon the Wings.

‡ I have here followed Mr. D'Ablancourt's Translation, for I am not able to make any Sense of the Original, which is here certainly corrupted.

LV. Both the Armies thus drawn up, at not above 300 Paces distance from each other, which never happen'd before but they fought, stood there from the Morning till the \* tenth Hour of the Day. And now when *Caesar* began to draw back his Army within his Retrenchments, all the light Cavalry of the *Numidians* and *Getulians*, who stood off at some distance, as I have already said, began

\* Which answers our 4 in the Afternoon.



to near upon the Right, and marched towards *Caesar's* Camp, which was upon a Hill. All this while, *Labienus's* Horse continued still in their Post, and hinder'd the Legions from moving, when on a sudden, part of *Caesar's* Horse, with the Light Infantry, march'd without Order against the *Getulians*, and having pass'd a Morass which cover'd them, were not able to sustain the shock of so vast a multitude, and being abandon'd by the Foot, were constrain'd to return in some disorder. In this Action one Trooper was kill'd, several Horses wounded, and 26 of the Foot lost their Lives. *Scipio* not a little rejoycing at this good success, drew back his Forces to his Camp, but his Joy for this advantage did not last long, for the next day *Caesar* sending part of his Cavalry to *Leptis*, to Guard the Provisions, they met in the way some *Numidian* and *Getulian* Plunderers, whom they immediately fell upon, and kill'd or took Prisoners about a hundred of them. In the mean time, *Caesar* did not cease to advance his Retrenchments through the Plain, and to draw out his Legions, that so he might prevent the Incur-sions of the Enemy: On the other hand, *Scipio* approach'd as near as he might to the Mountains, and made Retrenchments over against those of *Caesar*. Thus the Generals on both sides, continually kept their men employ'd; however, the Horse had daily Skirmishes with one another.

LVI. While these things happened, *Varus* receiving Advice that the seventh and eighth Legion were parted from *Sicily*, immediately got his Fleet ready, which he had laid up at *Utica* by reason of the Winter, and having Manned them with Soldiers and *Getulian* Mariners, went out to lye in wait for their coming, and arriv'd at *Adrumetum* with fifty five Ships. *Caesar*, who knew nothing of this matter, dispatched *Lucius Cispus* with twenty Sail, to lye at Anchor near *Thapsus*, to Convoy these Ships he expected from *Sicily*, and sent *Aquila*, for the same reason, before *Adrumetum* with 13 Gallies more. *Cispus* soon arriv'd whether he was sent, but *Aquila* meeting with bad weather was not able to double the Cape, and having found a certain Creek where he might Ride safe, he shelter'd himself there with his Fleet. The rest of the Vessels lay in the Road of *Leptis*, and while the Seamen were gone to the Town to buy them Provisions, or were wandring up and down the shore, *Varus* being inform'd of it by some Deserters, finding now a fair opportunity, Sail'd out of *Adrumetum* by the second Watch, and by break of day came with his whole Fleet to *Leptis*. The Transport and Provision Ships which stood off to Sea, and were farthest from the Harbor, he burnt, and took two Gallies, with five Oars apiece, without opposition, as having no men to defend them.

LVII. *Caesar* receiving notice of this by some Couriers, as he visited his Works which were about six Miles from the Harbor, he took Horse immediately, neglecting all other Affairs, and soon arriv'd at *Leptis*. Here he made a short stay, to give time to the rest of his Fleet to join him, and went a Board a small Vessel, and in his way meeting *Aquila*, who had been surpriz'd and affrighted at the multitude of his Enemies, he pursued them with all imaginable speed; but *Varus*, strangely astonish'd at the boldness and celerity of *Caesar*, made the best of his way towards *Adrumetum*, but *Caesar* over-taking him, after about a League's Sailing, recover'd one of his Gallies, with all the men that were in her, and a hundred and thirty Soldiers that were left to Guard her, and took another Gally with three Oars, full of Rowers

and Seamen; the rest of the Fleet doubled the Cape, and gain'd the Harbor of *Adrumetum*. *Caesar* could not possibly double it with the same Wind, and therefore stood out to Sea all Night, and Anchor'd there, but the next morning bore up to *Adrumetum*, where burning all the Transport Ships that lay without the Harbor, he tarry'd some time to see whether the Enemy would hazard an Engagement with him, and afterwards return'd to his Camp. He found in the Gally which he took, *P. Vestrius* a Roman Knight, and *P. Ligarius* one of *Afranius's* Party, who had been taken and set at liberty by him in *Spain*, but afterwards betook himself to *Pompey's* Party, and after his defeat went over into *Africk* and join'd *Varus*; so he order'd him to be put to Death for his Perjury and Perfidiousness, but he Pardon'd *P. Vestrius*, because his Brother paid his Tax at *Rome* without difficulty; as also, because he satisfied *Caesar*, that being taken in *Nasidius's* Fleet he was saved by *Varus's* Interest, as he was going to be put to Death, and had found no opportunity since that time to make his escape.

LVIII. 'Tis the Custom of the People in *Africk* to hide their Corn in Caves under ground, and that principally in time of War, to secure it from falling into the Enemies hands; *Caesar* being inform'd of this, march'd about the third Watch with two Legions, and all his Cavalry, ten Miles from his Camp, and plentifully supplying them with Corn returned home. This being discover'd to *Labienus*, he march'd about eight Miles from his Camp, through the same Mountains which *Caesar* had pass'd the day before, and erected a Fort capable to hold two Legions. As he imagin'd that *Caesar* would often come the same way to Forage, he daily came there with several Squadrons of Horse, and some Light Foot, and Posted himself in a very advantageous place. In the mean time, *Caesar* being inform'd of this by some Deserters, let some days pass to render the Enemy more remiss and negligent, and parted early one morning out of the \* *Porta Decumana*, with seven Veteran Legions, and part of his Cavalry; He sent his Horse before, and falling unexpectedly upon the Enemy, who lay in Ambush there, cut about 500 of them to pieces, and made the rest retire in great precipitation; in the interim, *Labienus* came up with all his Horse to relieve his men, and *Caesar* finding his Cavalry unable to sustain the shock of so unequal a number, suddenly advanced with his Legions to Fight the Enemy, at whose coming *Labienus* being affrighted, and desisting from the pursuit, he found means to bring off his Horse safe. The next day, *Juba* commanded all those *Numidians*, who had abandon'd this Post and fled to the Camp, to be Hang'd for a Terror and Example to the rest.

LIX. At this time *Caesar* being press'd with want of Provisions drew out his Forces, and after he had set his Camp on fire, and left Garisons at *Leptis*, *Ruspina* and *Acilla*, with Orders to *Aquila* and *Cispus* to lye with their Fleets, one before *Thapsus*, and the other before *Adrumetum*, he withdrew about the fourth † Watch of the Night in Order of Battel, commanding his Baggage to File off upon the Left Wing. As soon as he arriv'd at a Town called *Agar*, where the In-between that and Midnight. As for Instance, If the Sun set at Six, the first Watch reached from Six till Nine. The second Watch reached from that till Midnight. The third Watch from Midnight to the Middle space, between that and Sun-rising. The fourth Watch began there, and reached till Sun-rising. The Primipilus measured these Spaces by a Clepsidra, or Water-glass; and the Signals of every Watch was given by a Trumpet.

\* Which lay behind the Camp, and stood directly opposite to the *Porta Praetoria*; The Soldiers that had committed any Crimes was led out of this Gate to the place of Punishment.

† The Romans divided their Night into four parts, call'd Vigils, or Watches. The first Watch reached from Sun-setting to Middle space, the second from that till Midnight, the third from Midnight to the Middle space, between that and Sun-rising. The fourth Watch began there, and reached till Sun-rising. The Primipilus measured these Spaces by a Clepsidra, or Water-glass; and the Signals of every Watch was given by a Trumpet.



habitants had defended themselves with great Bravery against the frequent Attacks of the *Getulians*, he Encamp'd in the Plain, and marching out with part of his Army to Forage about the Neighboring Villages, he found great quantities of Barly, Oyl, Wine and Figs, tho' but very little Wheat; And thus, after he had refresh'd his Men, return'd to his Camp again. *Scipio*, in the mean time, being inform'd of his departure, pursu'd him by the way of the Mountains with all his Forces, and Encamp'd within a League and half of him, in three separate Camps, which took up a great space.

**LX.** *Scipio* sent out two Legions to Forage as far as *Zetta*, which was about ten Miles from his Camp, but lay at a greater distance from *Cesar*: Of which *Cesar* being inform'd by a Deserter, he immediately remov'd his Camp to a Hill, a place of greater security, and having left some Troops to Guard it, he parted about the fourth Watch of the Night on the side of the Enemies Camp, and made himself Master of the Town. He had notice that *Scipio's* Legions went farther into the Country to Forage, and going to follow them, he found the whole Body of the Enemy stood ready to relieve them. This retarded his Progress; so taking *C. Mutius Reginus*, a Roman Knight, an intimate Friend of *Scipio*, who Commanded in the Town, and *P. Atius* one of the same Dignity, who belonged to the Jurisdiction of *Utica*, and 32 Camels belonging to the King; He left a Garrison there under the Command of *Oppius* his Lieutenant, and so began to retire to his Camp.

**LXI.** Being now not far from the place where *Scipio* lay Encamp'd, through which he must of Necessity pass to reach his own, *Labiemus* and *Afranius*, who lay in Ambuscade with all their Cavalry and Light Foot, began to show themselves upon the nearest Hill, and Charge him in the Rear. As soon as *Cesar* perceiv'd this, he sent his Horse to support them, and commanded all his Soldiers to carry all their Baggage to one place, and make a vigorous Onset: This they effected with that success, that the Horse and Light Foot of the Enemy, at the first attack of the Legions, was disorder'd and beaten from the Hill. As *Cesar* now thought, that the Enemy being repuls'd would incommode him no longer, he continued his March, but he saw them appear in an Instant upon a Neighboring Hill, from whence they came to attack him with their Horse mingl'd with the Light Infantry, who show'd an incredible swiftness, whether they were to advance or retire: This they did frequently retiring, when he made assault, and pressing upon him when he began to march. *Cesar* perceiv'd that their design was only to compel him to Encamp in that place where there was no Water, that so his Men, who had Eaten nothing from the fourth Watch to the tenth hour of the day, and his Horses, might dye with hunger and thirst.

**LXII.** The Sun being now ready to set, and *Cesar* finding that he had not advanc'd full a hundred Paces in four hours, he drew off his Cavalry from the Rear, where the Enemy had kill'd him abundance of Horses, and made his retreat with the Legions in their turns: Thus marching on slowly and gently, he found his Foot supported the Onset of the Enemy more conveniently. In the mean time, great numbers of the *Numidian* Horse run full speed before him on the Right and Left through the Mountains, endeavouring to encompass *Cesar's* Army with their Multitudes, while

part of them pursu'd the Rear: But no sooner did three or four of his Veteran Soldiers turn head, and throw their Javelins at the *Numidians* that gall'd them, but they made above two thousand of them fly at the same time, who for all that did not forbear to return to the Charge as soon as they saw them begin to march. Thus *Cesar* sometimes moving forwards, and sometimes making an halt, brought back all his Men safe to the Camp about the first hour of the Night, having but ten of his Men wounded. *Labiemus* likewise retir'd thoroughly fatigu'd, after he had lost above three hundred men, besides his Wounded that were in great number. In the mean time, *Scipio* return'd with his Legions to his Camp, after he had all this while stood in Order of Battel with his Elephants, whom he had plac'd before his Tents in sight of *Cesar's* Men, to cause the greater terror.

**LXIII.** To frustrate the designs of an Enemy, who made War after this manner, *Cesar* instructed his Men, not as a General uses to do a Veteran Army, which in their time have gain'd several Victories, but as the Master of a Fencing School teaches his young Scholars the use of their Arms, shewing them in what manner they were to meet or retire from the Enemy, how and in what place to make a Feint, or throw their Javelins, and in what space to give or make a Retreat, for the Light Infantry kept them still in Breath, hindering the Cavalry from coming to the Charge, and Fatiguing the heavy Arm'd Soldiers by their strange swiftness, who when they were pursu'd by them, and stood to receive them, the others immediately gave back, and so avoided the danger.

**LXIV.** This gave no small Inquietude to *Cesar*, because whenever he hazarded a Battel without his Legions, his Horse were by no means an equal Match to that of the Enemy; He was so much the more troubled, because he had not as yet try'd their Legions, and knew not after what manner to support himself against their Horse and Light Infantry, which wou'd give him no little trouble if the Legions once came to join them; besides his Soldiers were terrified at the number and prodigious bigness of the Elephants, altho' to cure them of these Apprehensions, he had formerly caus'd some Elephants to be Transported into *Italy*, that so his Men might be better acquainted with the Shape and Qualities of these Beasts, and find which part of their Body might the soonest be wounded: For when these Elephants were let out in all their Military Furniture, he show'd his Men where they lay most open and expos'd, that so they might direct their Darts accordingly: He took care likewise that his Horses, by frequent seeing them, might not be afraid of the smell, the noise, and the shape of these Beasts; and this he had in great measure effected, for his Soldiers stroked the Beasts with their hands, and were sensible how slow they were, and then the Cavalry threw blunted Javelins at them; and thus, by degrees, brought their Horses to bear very well the sight and presence of these Animals.

**LXV.** For the above-mentioned Reasons *Cesar* became more slow and reserv'd, and was not so eager to fight, as he had show'd himself on several other occasions; nor are we to wonder at it, for when he was in *Gaul*, his Men were accusom'd to fight in large open Plains, and had to do with a frank open Enemy, unacquainted with Stratagems and Tricks, who rely'd upon their Bravery and Valor, and scorn'd to have recourse to little Artifices:



tificers: But now he engaged against a Cunning and Subtile Enemy, and therefore was oblig'd to instruct his Soldiers how to find out their Frauds, that so they might be in a Capacity to avoid them. To the end that his Men might the sooner learn all their Politick Fetches, he would never suffer his Legions to stay long in a place, but under a pretence of sending them out to Forage, he carry'd them up and down the Country, knowing well that his Enemies Forces would not be far from him. Three days after he pass'd before their Camp and offer'd them Battel in the Plain, but seeing them decline the Fight, he return'd with his Men towards the Evening.

LXVI. In the mean time there arriv'd Deputies from *Vacca*, a Town lying next to *Zetta*, of which place, as we have already observ'd, *Cæsar* had made himself Master. They humbly desired him to send them a Garison, promising to furnish him with abundance of things serviceable in War. But before he sent it, *Juba* had carry'd the place by Assault, and after he had put all the Inhabitants to the Sword, gave the Town to be Plunder'd and Destroy'd by his Soldiers. *Cæsar* made a general Review of his Army on the \* 12th of the Calends of *April*, and march'd out the next day with all his Forces, and advancing about five Miles from his own Camp, and about eleven from *Scipio's*, he stood in Order of Battel, but being sensible that the Enemy, whom he had so often invited to fight, were resolv'd to decline it, he return'd back with his Forces; He decamp'd the next day, and march'd towards the Town of *Sursura*, where *Scipio* kept a Garison of *Numidians*, and had laid up a great Magazine of Corn, which as soon as *Labienus* perceiv'd, he began to incommode his Rear with his Horse and Light Foot, and happening to intercept the Baggages of the Sutlers and Merchants, who carry'd their Goods in Wagons, he receiv'd fresh Courage, and had the hardiness to come nearer to the Legions, thinking that the Soldiers, wearied with the Burthens they carry'd, were not able to fight; but *Cæsar* made his advantage of it, for he detach'd three hundred light Armed Soldiers out of every Legion, and caus'd them to make a vigorous Onset upon *Labienus's* Horse, who being daunted at their coming up, began dishonourably to fly, leaving several of his Men dead upon the spot, and a greater number wounded: The Infantry return'd to their Colours, and began to march whither they intended, while *Labienus* still followed them afar off by the highest Eminence of the Hill.

LXVII. After *Cæsar* arriv'd at *Sursura* in the sight of the Enemy, he put all *Scipio's* Garison to the Sword, after a brave resistance made by *P. Cornelius*, *Scipio's* Lieutenant, who Commanded there in Chief, and was at last over-power'd and kill'd. He had no sooner made himself Master of the Town, and distributed Corn amongst his Soldiers, but he came the next day before *Tisdra*, where *Confidius* Commanded with a strong Garison, and a Company of Gladiators. *Cæsar* having observ'd the situation of the place, and being unprovided of Military Engines necessary to reduce it, abandon'd this Design, and having march'd about four Miles, Encamp'd in a place where he had store of Water, and parting from thence four days after, he return'd again to his Camp at *Agar*, and *Scipio* did the same on his side.

LXVIII. In the mean time, the Inhabitants of

† *Dobene*, Subjects to King *Juba*, who liv'd in the farthest Maritime parts of his Kingdom, put the Royal Garison all to the Sword, and sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to acquaint him what they had done. They earnestly entreated him, that since they had performed so considerable a Service to the Roman People, he would take care to support them; *Cæsar* approv'd their Conduct, and sent *Marcus Crispus*, a Tribune, with a Cohort and abundance of Archers and Machines, to fortifie the place. About the same time there arriv'd at his Camp Four thousand Soldiers, who, being either hinder'd by Sickness, or having a Furlow granted them, had not an Opportunity to pass over into *Africa* before; together with Four hundred Horse and a Thousand Archers and Slingers. After this Reinforcement, he drew out all his Army, and removing eight Miles from his old Camp, and about four from *Scipio's*, he encamp'd in a Plain.

LXIX. Below *Scipio's* Camp stood a Town called *Tegea*, where *Scipio* used to keep a Garison of about 400 Horse, which being drawn out on the Right and Left of the place, he drew his Legions out of the Camp, and posting them upon a Hill somewhat lower than that whereon his Camp lay, he march'd not above a Mile from his Intrenchments, and there he stood in Order of Battel. After *Scipio* had thus staid a long while in the same place, and *Cæsar* saw that the day pass'd without any Action, he sent his Cavalry, supported by his Archers and Slingers, to make a vigorous Onset upon that of the Enemy, which stood in guard before the place. This was no sooner put in execution, and *Cæsar's* Horse with great speed begun to make a vigorous Onset, but *Pacidius* extended his Cavalry upon a great Front, to encompass that of *Cæsar*, and yet at the same time to make a stout Opposition: Which as soon as *Cæsar* perceiv'd, he order'd 300 light armed Men of the nearest Legion to relieve his Horse. On the other hand *Labienus* sent new Succours to his Cavalry; and in the room of the wounded and fatigu'd, he sent fresh Men to support them. As soon as *Cæsar* saw that his Horse, who did not amount to above 400. were not able to maintain the Dispute with the Enemy, who was 4000 strong, and were wounded by the light armed *Numidians*, and began to give ground by degrees, he sent another Wing to relieve them in this Extremity with all speed. This encourag'd his Men so far, that making a brave Impression upon the Enemy, and having kill'd abundance of them, and wounded more, they pursued them 3 Miles, and at last, after they had drove them into the Hills, return'd to their Camp. *Cæsar* having tarried in Battel Array till the tenth hour of the day, retir'd to his Camp without the Loss of one Soldier; but in this Action *Pacidius* was dangerously wounded in the head with a Javelin, and several Officers and brave men were either slain or wounded.

LXX. *Cæsar* now finding that he endeavour'd in vain to draw his Enemies into the Plain, and that he could not encamp nearer them, by reason of the great Scarcity of Water, was fully satisfied that they did not so much rely upon their own Valour, as upon his want of Water: So on the Day before the \* Nones of *April* he decamp'd about the third Watch of the Night, and marching 16 Miles in the Night, from *Agar*, he pitch'd his Tents before *Thapsus*, where there was a strong Garison under the Command of *Virgilius*, and the same day began to work upon his Lines of Circumvallation, and fortified several convenient Posts

† *A Town of Africa, properly so called, mentioned by Ptolemy in the Life of Scipio.*

‡ There are several Cities of the same name in Greece and elsewhere. But this is in Africa. Ptolemy calls it *Tegea*.

\* Answering MAY 21 of March.

• The 4th of April.



to hinder any Succours from coming to the Town. in the mean time, *Scipio* discovering what *Cæsar* design'd, found himself oblig'd to fight, lest he should seem to abandon *Vingilius* and the Inhabitants of *Thapsus*, who were heartily devoted to his Interests: For which Reason he immediately followed *Cæsar* by the Mountains, and encamp'd himself within eight Miles of the Town in two several Camps.

LXXI. There was a Morass full of Salt-Pits, between which and the Sea lay a narrow Neck of Land not above a Mile and a half long, through which *Scipio* design'd to make his Entrance, and throw Relief into the Town. But *Cæsar* had taken effectual Care to prevent it; for the day before, he had caused a small Fort to be built there, where leaving a sufficient Garrison to maintain it, he with the rest of his Troops invested the Town. *Scipio* finding this Pass shut up, was constrained to pass the Night above the Morass; and the next Morning by break of Day he encamp'd not far from the Fort and Camp, within 1500 Paces from the Sea. Upon this News, *Cæsar* ordered his Men to desert from the Works, and leaving the Proconsul *Asprenas* with two Legions to Guard the Camp and Baggage, he marched in haste against him; and ordering part of his Fleet to lye before *Thapsus*, he commanded the rest of his Ships to make as near the Shore as they could, behind the Enemies back, and to observe his Signal: Upon the giving of which, they were to make a sudden noise to cause the greater Terrour to the Enemy, that so in this Disorder they might be oblig'd to look behind them when they were engaged in the Fight.

LXXII. As soon as *Cæsar* came hither, and perceiv'd *Scipio's* Army to be drawn out before the Intrenchments, the Elephants placed on the Left and Right Wing, while part of the Soldiers at the same time were busie in working upon the Fortifications of his Camp, he dispos'd his Army in three Lines, and placed the Second and Tenth Legion upon the Right Wing, the Eighth and the Ninth upon the Left, and five others in the middle Space, covering the Flank of the Battle, where he had ranged the Slingers and Archers, with five Cohorts, to withstand the Efforts of the Elephants, and mingling his light Infantry among his Horse. He walked on foot through all the Ranks, putting the veterane Soldiers in mind of their former Battles and Victories, and encouraged the new-raised Men, who never had been in a Fight before, to imitate their Valour and Gallantry, that so they might one day fill their place, and succeed them in their Glory.

LXXIII. As he was thus employed and visiting his Army, he manifestly perceived that the Enemy betrayed signs of Fear, by returning sometimes to their Camp, and sometimes advancing out of it without any Reason. As other People observed this as well as himself, immediately the Lieutenant-Generals and the Volunteers encompassed *Cæsar*, and conjur'd him not to let slip this Opportunity, which the Gods presented him with, of giving the Enemy a total Overthrow. While *Cæsar* deliberated about the matter, not being willing to attack them at the head of their Retrenchments, and frequently endeavour'd to keep the Soldiers back, on the sudden a Trumpeter on the Right Wing, without any Orders from *Cæsar*, but constrain'd by the Soldiers, sounded a Charge: Upon which, all the Cohorts marched with their Colours directly against the Enemy, in spite of the

Opposition of the Centurions, who vainly endeavour'd to keep them back till they had received their General's Orders.

LXXIV. *Cæsar* being now sensible, That the Heat and Ardour of his Soldiers was not to be repressed, gave the Word, which was *Good Fortune*; and spurring his Horse, bore down directly upon the Enemies first Ranks. In the mean while the Slingers and Archers that were placed on the Right Wing made a violent Discharge upon the Elephants; and these unweildy Beasts, affrighted at the noise of the Slings, and incommoded with the Darts and Stones that fell incessantly upon them, turn'd back upon their own Men whom they threw into a great Disorder, to gain in haste the Entrances into the Camp, which were not as yet compleated. And now the Moorish Cavalry, who were posted in the same Wing with the Elephants, finding themselves destitute of this Relief, were the first that began to flee; so that now it was no difficult matter for *Cæsar's* Legions to force their Retrenchments, where some were slain, that defended themselves with great Resolution, and the rest fled in great Precipitation towards the Camp, which they had abandoned the day before.

LXXV. I think it not amiss to relate a remarkable Action of a veterane Soldier belonging to the Fifth Legion, since it is as remarkable an Instance of Bravery and Valour as History affords: For as an Elephant in the Left Wing, wounded and enraged with the Pain, fell upon one of the Sutlers, who was unarmed, and keeping him under his Feet, then leaning upon his Knees, making dismal Cries, and shaking his *Proboscis*, squeezed and pressed and killed him with his weight; this Soldier could not forbear, but he must encounter the Elephant: So he advanced with his Javelin in his hand, and by that Action oblig'd the Elephant to turn upon him, and quit the Body he then trampled upon: He took up the Soldier in his Trunk, and thus armed as he was hoisted him up in the Air; but the Soldier, without losing Courage, gave him so many Cuts with his Sword, upon his *Proboscis*, wherein he was twisted round, that he constrain'd the Elephant to drop his Prize and fly towards the rest, making a terrible Noise all the way, out of the excessive Anguish his Wounds gave him.

LXXVI. In the mean time the Garrison at *Thapsus* sallied out the Gate next the Sea-side, either to relieve their Companions, or to save themselves by Flight, designing to abandon the Town; and thus marching up to their Navels in the Sea, were making towards the Land; but the Slaves and Boys that were in the Camp so gall'd them with Darts and Stones, that they oblig'd them to return back again to the City. And now *Scipio's* Ranks being wholly broken, and flying all over the Plain, *Cæsar's* Legions pursued them with that Vigour and Fury, that they did not give them time to rally. As they were now arrived at the other Camp, whither they fled to repair the Works, and put themselves in a posture of Defence, they could find no Person of Authority there to head and command them; so throwing down their Arms, they fled towards the King's Camp; where finding *Cæsar* victorious, and now despairing of their Lives, they retired towards a Hill, and began to implore his Clemency, and to salute his Soldiers by the name of Brothers. But this serv'd them in little stead; for the Veterane Soldiers, incens'd with grief and anger, could not be prevailed upon to give the Enemy



my Quarter, notwithstanding all the Submissions they made, but killed or wounded several Persons of Quality whom they called the *Authors* of this unnatural War; in which Number was *T. Rufus*, a Quæstor, who was run through with a Javelin; and *Pompeius Rufus*, wounded in the Arm with a Sword, had certainly been killed upon the Spot, if he had not, in great haste run to *Cæsar*. Upon this, several Roman Knights and Senators, affrighted at the ulage of the rest, retired out of the Fight, to avoid the Fury of the Soldiers, who, after so great a Victory, took the liberty to commit what Actions of Barbarity they thought fit, as thinking the great Services of this Day would excuse them. Thus all *Scipio's* Men, though in a lamentable manner they implor'd *Cæsar's* Mercy, who cried out to his Soldiers to spare them, yet they were every one slain in his presence.

XXVII. *Cæsar* having thus made himself Master of three Camps, kill'd 10000 of the Enemy, and put the rest to flight, retired towards his own Quarters, with the Loss of no more than fifty Soldiers, and a few wounded. But he tarried some time in Order of Battle before *Thapsus*, and order'd sixty four Elephants, whom he had taken, adorn'd with Towers and other Furniture of War, to be led in sight of the Town, to see if by this means he might induce *Virgilius*, and those that were besieg'd with him, to lay down their Arms, and cease from making any farther Opposition. After this, he called out to *Virgilius* himself and gave him frequent Instances of his Clemency and Mercy; but finding he return'd him no Answer, he withdrew from before the Town. The next Day, after he had perform'd Sacrifice, he assembled his Army before the place, commended the Soldiers, and gave large Donatives to all his Veterane Legions, besides the Rewards which he distributed to each Man in particular, who had signalized himself in this Action, from his Tribunal. Thus, after he had left three Legions with *C. Rebellus* the Proconsul, to continue the Siege of the place; and two with *Cn. Domitius* to invest *Tisden*, where *Concidius* commanded in chief, he marched towards *Utica*, and sent *Marcus Messalla* before with his Horse.

XXVIII. In the mean time, *Scipio's* Cavalry, that had escaped out of the Battle, as they made all Expedition to get to *Utica*, arrived at *Parada*; where finding the Inhabitants would not open their Gates to them, because they had received the News of *Cæsar's* Victory, they took the Place by Assault; and bringing great Heaps of Wood into the Market-place, upon which they threw all their Goods, they set it on fire; and driving the Inhabitants, without having any regard to their Age, Quality or Sex, into the Flames, they there forced them to expire in a most dismal manner. At last they came within sight of *Utica*, where *M. Cato* commanded; who, because he look'd upon the People of that place to be ill-

\* *Cæsar* pass'd a Law, by which the Free People were secured in their Rights and Liberties; and the Roman Magistrates were forbidden to violate them. Such were the Cities of *Achaia*, *Theſſaly*, and the rest of Greece.

affected to his Party, by reason of the \* *Julian* Law, which confirm'd their Franchizes and Liberties, he had some time before turn'd the meaner sort of People out of the Town, who were constrain'd by this means to encamp under the Walls, before the Warlike Gate, defended only by a small Retrenchment; where he kept a sufficient Guard, and compell'd them to live, while the Senators and those of the better Sort stay'd within the Town for its Defence. These People taking

fresh Courage at *Cæsar's* Victory, beat back the Horse with Stones and Clubs; who finding themselves unable to force this Camp, threw themselves into *Utica*, where they killed several of the Inhabitants, and plunder'd their Houses. *Cato* used all his Authority to persuade them to defend the Town in Conjunction with himself, and to desist from this Blood-shed and Rapine; but finding now what it was they aim'd at, to appease their Fury, and put an end to these Disorders, he distributed † 100 *Sesterces* to every Man. *Fau-*

*stus Sylla* gave them the like Sum out of his own Pocket, and retired with them from thence, towards *Juba's* Kingdom.

\* Taking the Sesterce here for the Sesterterius in the Masculine Gender.

This Denative made about 12 Shillings of our Money. But if we read it Sesterterium, in the Neuter Gender, it would arise to too great a Sum, viz. about 206 Pounds.

LXXIX. In the mean time stragling Parties daily arriv'd at *Utica*, whom *Cato* assembling together, with 300 who furnish'd *Scipio* with Money to carry on the War, he advised them to set the Slaves at liberty, and defend the Town. Some few approv'd of his Motion, while the rest, afraid of their Lives, were only intent how to make their Escapes. Upon this, he forbore to recommend it to them any longer, and assign'd them Ships to go where they should see convenient. As for himself, after he had given necessary Orders with great Care, and recommended his Children to *Lucius Cæsar*, who at that time exercised the Office of Quæstor in the City, he retired to his Chamber without any Suspicion, pretending to lie down and refresh himself with a little Sleep, with the same Unconcern in his Face and Discourse as formerly, and there run himself through the Body with his own Sword. At the noise which he made in falling, his Physician and Domesticks imagining now some such matter, broke into the Room, and run to his Assistance; but as they endeavour'd to stop the Flux of Blood, and bind up the Wound, he open'd it again with his own Hands, and thus expired without the least Concern or Emotion. Though the People of *Utica* hated him upon the Account of his Party, yet they had his great Integrity and other Vertues in Admiration, and gave him an honourable Sepulture, because he was not like the other Commanders, that had pillaged them; as also, because he had fortified the Town with several Forts and Towers of wonderful Architecture. After his Death, *Lucius Cæsar*, to make his best Advantage of this sad Accident, assembled the Inhabitants, and advised them to open their Gates, and rely upon *Cæsar's* Generosity, from which they had reason to expect every thing. Thus the Gates were open'd, and he went out of the Town to meet *Cæsar* upon the Way. *Messalla*, according to Orders, arrived at *Utica*, and placed Guards at all the Gates.

LXXX. In the mean time, *Cæsar* leaving *Thapsus* arrived at *Usceta*, where *Scipio* had left a considerable Magazine of Corn, and other Warlike Ammunitions, with a small Garison; so that he made himself Master of all without any opposition. After this he came to *Adrumetum*, which likewise open'd its Gates to him without delay; after he had inform'd himself what Arms, and Corn, and Money, were in the place, he Pardon'd *Quintus Ligarius* Son to *Caius Concidius*, and parted the same day to go to *Utica*, leaving *Livineius Regulus* there with a Legion: He met *L. Cæsar* upon the Road, who threw himself at his Feet, and asked nothing else but his Life, which *Cæsar*, according to his Inclination and usual Custom, readily



dily granted. The same he did to *Cecina*, *C. Ateius*, *P. Atrius*, *L. Cella* the Father and Son, *M. Eppius*, *M. Aquinius*, *Cato's* Son, and the Children of *Damatippus*, and towards Night he came with lighted Flambeaux to *Utica*, but lodg'd without the Town that Night for fear of some disorder.

LXXXI. He made his Entry the next morning into the Town, and Summoning an Assembly of the People, he thank'd them for their good Affections towards him, but express'd himself in bitter terms against the Roman Merchants, especially the three hundred who had furnish'd *Varus* and *Scipio* with Money to carry on the War, and made a very long Recital of their Crimes. At last he bid them show themselves, and told them that he would grant them their Lives, but that he would Confiscate their Estates, with this condition however, that they might redeem them for a certain Sum; in consideration of which, they should enjoy their other Priviledges. As they apprehended a more severe Treatment than this, (for they despair'd of their Lives, considering what they had done) they willingly accepted his offer, and humbly requested him to impose a certain Sum of Money upon all of them in general. Thus imposing a Fine of two hundred thousand Sesterces upon them, which they were to pay at six equal Payments in the compass of three Years, not one of them refused it, but each Man looking upon this to be the day of his Nativity, humbly thank'd *Caesar* for his generosity and kindness.

LXXXII. On the other side, King *Juba* having escap'd out of the Battel with *Petreibus*, drew off towards his own Kingdom, concealing himself all the Day, and marching only by Night, till he arriv'd at \* *Zama*, where, besides his Wife and Children, he had carry'd all the Money, and the most valuable things of his Kingdom; and which, ever since the beginning of the War, he had strengthened with great Fortifications. But the Inhabitants of the Town shut their Gates against him upon the joyful News of *Caesar's* Victory; as also, because this Prince having inconsiderately engag'd himself in a War with *Rome*, had rais'd a mighty Pile of Wood in the Market Place, that in case he happen'd to be defeated, he might burn them with all their Goods there, and afterwards throw himself upon it, with his Wife and Children, and all his Treasures. He had recourse at first to Menaces, but finding they made no great impression upon the People, he earnestly entreated them to receive him; but seeing that this way wrought no effects, and that neither fear nor angry Words could procure him Admission, he at last begg'd of them, that they would deliver up his Wife and Children to him, that he might carry them along with him: At last, when he found they return'd him no Answer, and that he made all these Instances in vain, he departed from *Zama*, and withdrew to one of his Country Houses with *M. Petreibus*, and a few Horse.

LXXXIII. In the mean time the Inhabitants of *Zama* dispatched Ambassadors to *Caesar*, at *Utica*, to desire him to send them a sufficient Relief, before the King could get any Forces together, and put himself in a Condition to incommode them; assuring him that they kept the Town, and so would continue to keep it for his Service as long as they lived, and that they would be never wanting to support his Party in any Respect. *Caesar* thank'd them for their Zeal, and sent them home to satisfy the People that he would speedily come

to them, and parted the next Day with his Horse from *Utica*; where meeting several Officers belonging to the King's Army upon the Way, who humbly desired him to pardon them, he accordingly forgave all that was past, and came along with them to *Zama*. The Report of his Clemency being spread all over the Country, several Persons of the best Condition flock'd in to him from all Parts, and were by him soon deliver'd from their Dangers and Apprehensions.

LXXXIV. While these Things happen'd, *Confidius*, who was at *Tisdra* with a Garrison of *Getulians* and Gladiators, besides his ordinary Retinue, having received Advice of the Defeat of *Scipio*, and frighted at the Approach of *Domitius*, he abandon'd the place, as not thinking himself capable to keep it, and privately fled away with a considerable Sum of Money, and a few *Barbarians* in his Company, and thus endeavour'd to make his Escape into *Juba's* Kingdom. But his Companions, the *Getulians*, greedy of this Purchase, cut his Throat upon the Road, and afterwards dispersed themselves into several places. On the other side, *C. Virgilius*, who was at *Thapsus*, seeing himself block'd up by Sea as well as by Land, and all those of his Party either dead or dissipated; hearing likewise that *M. Cato* had laid violent hands upon himself at *Utica*; that King *Juba*, abandon'd by his own Subjects, was despised by all the World; that *Sabura* and his Forces were defeated by *Sitius*; that *Caesar* was receiv'd at *Utica*; and that no Remainders were left of so vast an Army, that could give him the least Assistance, he enter'd into Articles with *Cneius* the Proconsul, who besieged him, and thus surrender'd himself, with the Town and all within it, to him.

LXXXV. In the mean time, King *Juba* finding himself contumeliously shut out of all his Cities, despairing now of ever retrieving his Affairs, executed that Resolution which he had taken with *Petreibus*, to die generously: So † after they had dined, taking their Swords in their Hands, they thrust at one another; but *Juba*, who was the stronger of the two, soon dispatch'd *Petreibus*, and afterwards trying to run himself through with his own Sword, but not able to effect it, he prevail'd with one of his Slaves to do him that kindness; who accordingly put him out of his Misery. On the other side, *Pub. Silius* defeated *Sabura*, *Juba's* Lieutenant, and kill'd him on the place; and as he cross'd the Country of *Mauritania* with part of his Troops to joyn *Caesar*, he accidentally met *Faustus Sylla* and *Afranius*, who were retiring towards *Spain* with that Body of Horse which had pillaged *Utica*, and made about 1500 in number; so placing an Ambuscade for them in the Night-time, he fell upon them with great Fury by Break of Day, and, except a few Horse who made their Escapes in the beginning of the Action, he either killed all the rest, or took them Prisoners. Among the rest, *Afranius* and *Faustus Sylla* were taken, with the Wife and Children of the latter. ‡ A few Days after, a Mutiny happening in the Army, *Faustus* and *Afranius* were killed; but *Caesar* preserv'd *Pompeia*, *Faustus's* Wife, and her Children, and left them in free Possession of their Fortunes.

LXXXVI. In the mean time, *Scipio*, with *Damatippus*, *Torquatus* and *Pletorius Rustianus*, were tossed up and down by Tempests at Sea, as they design'd to pass over into *Spain*, and at last, by Stress

\* A City in Africa, about five Days Journey from Carthage, to the Westward, where *Juba* usually resided.

† In the printed Books it is Quum jam conatus esset; instead of which, the Dauphin's Editor reads convivatus; and him I followed, for Florus relates the Story.

‡ Florus and Suetonius expressly say that they were killed by *Caesar's* Order. Apian relates the Matter as our Author does.



Stress of Weather, were forced into the Harbour of Hippo, where Psitius's Fleet at that time lay; by whose larger Ships their small Vessels were sunk, and there Scipio, with those above-men-

\* Livy and Florus report; that when he found the Ship was taken, he ran his Sword into his Belly; and that when Enquiry was made how the General was, he should answer, The General is very well.

tion'd, lost his \* Life. Caesar, after he had publicly sold at Zama the Goods of King Juba, and of those Roman Citizens who had carried Arms against their Country, gave considerable Gratuities to the Inhabitants of the Town, who had advised the shutting out of Juba, and changed the Kingdom into

a Province, after he had freed them from those Taxes and Imposts which Juba had laid upon them.

LXXXVII. Thus, leaving Crispus Salustius Governor of the Country, he parted from Zama, and took the Road to Utica, where he likewise exposed in publick Sale the Goods of those Officers who had served under Juba and Petreius, and condemned those of Thapsus to a Mulct of 20000

† The Word in Latin is Conventus; by which the Author means, the Fraternities or Sodalities of Roman Gentlemen trading in these Provinces.

Sesterces, and their † Fraternity to 3000; those of Adrumetum to 30000 Sesterces, and their Fraternity to 50000: For which Consideration, he exempted them from Pillage and Plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had

formerly plunder'd, but upon their Complaints, the Senate had satisfied for their Losses by Commissioners appointed for that purpose, were condemned to furnish 300000 Pounds of Oyl every Year, because they had made an Alliance with this Prince in the beginning of the War, through the Dissention of their principal Inhabitants, and had assisted him with Money, Men and Arms. Those of Tisdra, by reason of the smallness and poverty of the Place, he only amerced to pay a certain quantity of Corn.

LXXXVIII. After this was over, Caesar embark'd at Utica on the ‡ Ides of June, and arriv'd three Days after at \* Caralis in Sardinia, where he fined the † Sulcitani 100000 Sesterces, because they had entertain'd Nasidius and his Fleet, and furnish'd him with a new Supply of Men; and imposed an Eighth upon them, instead of a Tenth which they paid before. After he had sold the Goods of some private Persons, that were confiscated, he parted from thence on the ‡ 3d of the † Kalends of July; and sailing near the Coasts, he arriv'd within 28 Days at Rome, having been detain'd a long while in several places by contrary Winds.

‡ Which answers the 13th of our June.

\* Now 'tis called Cagliari.

† People of that Island. We find them mention'd by Mela, lib. 3. cap. 7.

‡ Our 29th of June.

F I N I S.







# OF MODERN TRAINING or TACTICK PRACTICE. By CLEMENT EDMONDS, Re- membrancer of the City of London.

**F**Orasmuch as my purpose was to make this Task of Observations as a Parallel to our Modern Discipline, I did not think it fit to mingle the Tactick Practice of these Times with the use of foregoing Ages, but rather to shut up these Discourses therewith, as the second Line of this Warlike Parallel, which is thus drawn in the best Fashion of Modern Art.

In the Knowledge of Marshalling an Army, there is nothing more especially to be regarded, than that from a confused Company of Men (having chosen the fittest for the Wars) we should so place and digest a convenient number of them, that in Marches, in Encamping, in Battels, we may be able with a few well ordered to encounter a far greater Army in Confusion; and to overthrow them. From hence *Aeneas* did define the Art of War to be the Knowledge of warlike Motions.

Before this unexpert Army shall be able to be moved in such fashion, it shall not be amiss to acquaint it with the most usual Terms, wherewith they shall be often commanded into divers Postures, as occasion shall be offered. For as in the Art of Fencing, no man shall be able to turn and wind his Body for his best advantage, to offend his Enemy, or defend himself, unless first his Master shall instruct him in the several Parts and Postures thereof: So every Soldier, or the whole Troop as one Body, or one Soldier, shall never be readily instructed to transform or turn it self by divers Motions into different Forms, unless they first understand what is meant by Fronts and Flanks, by Files and Ranks, what by Leaders and Followers, by Middlemen and Bringers up. By this means each Soldier understanding what the term doth signifie, shall readily both apprehend and execute such Commandments as the Captain or Officer shall direct him.

A File is a certain number of Men, following singly one Leader, unto the depth of eight or ten, *A File.* as they shall be commanded. The Ancients have called this File *Seriem*, *Ordinationem*, or *Decuriam*. It consisteth of Leaders and Followers, placed according to their Worth and Valour: And especially there ought to be regarded the Leader or *Decurio*, the fifth, sixth, or Middlemen, and the tenth and last, called the Bringer-up or *Tergiductor*.

First therefore, every Soldier being aptly fitted unto his several Arms, according to his Worth, *The Leader.* Age, and Stature, they are to be disposed into several Files; wherein every one is especially to acknowledge his Leader or Foremost man to be the Author of all his Motions: And therefore duly attending what Directions shall be commanded, each Follower shall, according to the Motions of his Leader or Foremost man, order his own; and is to be excused, if he attend the Motions of his Leader before he move himself.

When many Files are thus disposed together, all the Leaders making one and the same Front, and their Followers observing likewise one and the same Proportion of distance, before, and after, and on each side; these Files thus joyned make one Battalion, the Front whereof is called a Rank, and so likewise the second and third in depth, according to the number of Men in each File. The first, second, and third, and so forward in each File, are called Sidemen, in respect of the same numbers in the next File. Neither must every Soldier only regard the Motions of his Leader, but he must also diligently respect his Sidemen, and such as shall be placed on his right and left hand, called his Ranks: So that both in Files and Ranks he may always be found in the same distance wherein he is commanded. *Battalion. A Rank or Front. Sidemen.*

It should be impertinent to the purpose to prescribe a certain number of Soldiers unto these Battalions, only thus much for the Proportion; That it ought never to exceed so much, but that it may easily upon any occasion be changed into such a Form or Fashion to fight, as may be thought fittest for the present. *The number of Soldiers in a Battalion uncertain.*

The length of this Battalion is diversly termed amongst the Latins, as *Frons*, *Facies*, *Adstructio*, *Fur- gum*, &c. but in our modern Practice, most familiarly, the Front or Rank. *The length.*

The breadth of the Battalion, which is from the Leader to the Bringer-up, with the distance between all the Followers, is said to be the length or depth of one file or flank. *Breadth or depth.*

In the disposing of Soldiers into Files and Ranks, besides their observing a right Line in their places and standing; we must likewise especially respect the different Worth and Quality of the Soldiers, that every one according to his worth may be suited unto his proper place, and accordingly receive advancement, as the Death of his Leaders and true value of his Desert by his Commander shall give occasion. *Dignities in places to be observed.*

First therefore there must be especial choice made of the Leaders of each File, or first Front or Ranks of the Battalion, of the most expert, ablest, and best armed men; because that as from them the rest are to receive Directions of their After-motions, so in them the greatest hope of the day doth consist. *The first Rank.*

Next unto the first, it must be provided that the Bringers-up or last Rank, called *Tergiductores*, *The Bringers-up or Tergiductores, or last Rank.* be little inferiour, well experienced, wise and valiant; that they may both know when to reprehend their



their former Ranks, and urge them forward if they see them declining or yeilding upon false occasions; as also to be able, upon any sudden Alarm given in the Rear, to turn Faces about, and make themselves a Front for the best Resistance.

*The second  
and ninth  
Ranks.*

Neither must it be neglected concerning the second and ninth Ranks, that they also may be furnished with the next most sufficient Men, both because of their nearness unto Danger, as also that if their Leaders or Bringers-up shall either be slain, or disabled by Wounds, they may presently succeed in their Places, and make them good.

*The fifth  
and sixth  
Ranks.*

There is also a good Decorum to be observed in the Middlemen, or fifth and sixth Ranks, both for the Men themselves, and their Arms; that in our Marches, when the Middlemen or sixth Ranks shall be called up to front with their Leaders, they may in some sort and proportion answer their places: As also when we double our Front, by calling up Middlemen to fight in a greater breadth, they may not be unsuitable; but especially in Marches, that they may be able to make the best resistance, when they shall become the Flanks of the Battalions.

*The right  
hand File.*

As these Respects ought to be observed in Ranks, so the Files also are not without their different Degrees of Dignity. As the Leader of the right-hand File is accounted to have the first place of honour in the Battalion; for he doth not only lead the rest in his own File, but he is the Author and Beginner of the Motions of the whole Battalion.

*The left-  
hand File.*

The Leader of the left-hand-File hath the next place, because that he, with the Leader of the right-hand File, do always in their marching and embatteling rectifie or rank the whole Front of the Battalion; and so consequently all the rest of their Files as they stand in Order, even until the middle, who are accounted the last in Dignity.

*Distances  
between  
Files and  
Ranks.*

The Battalion being thus disposed into Files and Ranks, and each File and Rank according to his Worth and Experience rightly advanced; it followeth that there should be a just distance proportioned between either, that at all times, upon all occasions, they might be found ready, and in comeliest Fashion, either to offend their Enemy, or defend themselves. These Distances which every Follower must observe in respect of his Leader, and every Leader and Follower in respect of the Sidemen, may be reduced into three several Orders, as followeth.

*Open Order.*

The first is called open Order; the Distance whereof is twelve Foot between every Follower and his Leader, or between every Rank; and six Foot between them and the Sidemen, or between every File. This Order is commonly used upon Marches, when the Enemy is known to be far off, as also in private Exercising of Soldiers for their several managing of their Arms. It differeth somewhat from the *Ordinatus Miles* amongst the *Romans*, who always observed but four Cubits in Files and Ranks.

*Order.*

The second distance is called Order, when we contract the Battalion both in Length and Breadth, and gather the Soldiers within a nearer Scantling both in Files and Ranks; that is, by observing six Feet in their Files between the Follower and Leader, and three Feet between the Ranks or Sidemen. This Distance is used when we march toward an Enemy near at hand, or in Marches, by reason of the Opportunity of the place, suspiciously dangerous. This is also near unto *Densatus ordo*, but only that that was but two Cubits in both Files and Ranks.

*Close Order,  
Pouldron to  
Pouldron.*

The third and last Order, is, when either we attend the Enemy's present Assault, or that we intend to charge him upon our securest and best distance; when every Follower standeth three Feet, or his Rapier's length behind his Leader, and a Foot and a half from the Sidemen or Files; or when every Soldier occupieth but one Foot and a half for his own Station, joyning Pouldron to Pouldron, or Target to Target. This differeth from *Constipatus Ordo*, because that alloweth but one Cubit for Files and Ranks, and this close Order alloweth one Cubit in the File, but two in the Ranks.

*The manner  
of charging  
with five  
Ranks.*

This distance doth agree also best with the length of our Pikes of fifteen or sixteen Foot long. For it is thought fit oftentimes that the Battalion consisting of ten Ranks, there should not charge more at one time than the five foremost, so that the Pikes of the fifth Rank might be three Foot over the foremost's Shoulder; and the other five Ranks should in this close Order, or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their Pikes advanced, until some Occasion should require their Charge. In the mean time they should perform their Duty, in keeping the five foremost Ranks from retiring, and besides add strength unto the Charge or Shock.

### *The Manner of Exercising composed Battalions, with their different Motions.*

THE Files and Ranks being thus understood, disposed and ordered, and all Parts and Members of the Battalion being joyned in their just Proportion and Distance, able and fit to be altered upon any sudden occasion (as it were but one entire Body) into several and divers Postures, and to make Resistance unto what Forces soever shall oppugn the same; it might be thought needless to have made the Disposition of the Members to exact, unless by continual Practice and Exercise they might be made nimble and ready, not only to defend themselves and their whole Body on all sides but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of Advantage.

The Terms of Direction or Command, which are commonly used in this modern Discipline of Martial Exercise, as they are not many, only answering to the different Postures which are required in the Battalion; so they are and must be short and perspicuously plain, that by this means being suddenly uttered, easily apprehended and understood, they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commanded.



First therefore, that the Battallion may be commanded into some one fashion or posture, from whence it shall be fit to convert it self into all other, the Captain or Officer shall bid them stand in Front. When every particular Soldier composing himself after his foremost Leader, standeth comely in File and Rank, fronting unto some certain place, or to the Captain, as shall be thought best for the present.

In this and all other directions whatsoever, it shall be especially observed, that every Follower attending what is commanded, mark his next Leader, and accordingly move himself, as he shall see him move first.

The Battallion therefore thus Fronting, if the Enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left Flank, it shall be commanded to face to the Right or Left, when every Soldier observing his Leader shall turn his face, and make his Flank his Front according to the direction.

There is also a doubled Motion or Declination to the Right or Left, when every Soldier observing his Leader, shall turn their bodies twice to the Right or Left, and by that means become turned with their faces where their backs were, as if they expected an Enemy in the Rear, or being to perform some motion that may be offered: beginning this alteration from the right or left as shall be commanded.

As every particular Soldier in the Troop is thus commanded at sometimes to turn his face to the right or left, or about, the Battallion standing in order, that is, according to the distance before named; so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order, is commanded to turn as one body to the right or left. It is performed thus: Imagine the Battallion stand first in order, it shall be commanded that they close their files to the right; when the right file standing still, the rest turning their faces to the right, march into their close order and return as they were: next that they close their ranks from behind, when every follower marcheth forward to his leader unto his Rapiers point, as is said before. This done, (the leader of the right file standing immoveable) all the rest (as the body of a Ship or a great Gate) turn about that leader, as about the hinge or center, every one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed, as if they were but one entire body.

When the same Battallion is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first, it is commanded; Face about to the left, and march into your order from whence you were closed. Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still, and the rest turning face about, march ranks in order as before: then turn as you were, and you are restored.

When the whole Battallion being in their close order, should turn about and make the Rear the Front, it is done by a double turning or declination, and commanded to wheel about, which is answerable to the former face about or mutation.

There is also another wheeling in this sort, when the Front changeth the aspect thrice; for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Reer, so this wheeleth from the right to the left, or contrariwise: which fashion is so seldom used, that we scarce afford it a name.

In all such Motions and Alterations, it is most fit that all Men perform their directions with their Pikes advanced, being in that sort most easie to be commanded, as also leis troublesome to their followers and leaders.

### Counter-marching Files and Ranks.

There is also another means to prevent the Enemy his assaulting us in the Rear or Flank, lest he should find our worst men least able to make resistance; and this is performed by Countermarching both Files and Ranks three divers ways apiece.

The first was used by the Macedonians, after this fashion: First the leader turneth his face about to the right or left, and so the next follower marching behind his leader turneth also, and so the third and fourth, until the bringer up have carried himself out into a new place in the Rear further from the Enemy, as he was before next unto him. But this neither was nor is accounted safe or secure, because it doth somewhat resemble a flying or running away from the Enemy, which might give him no small encouragement, and therefore it is not much in practise.

Only at some times, the bringers up marching throughout beyond the leaders, until they possess the same space before them which they did behind them, all turning their faces about, make their leaders to front the Enemy, who were before farthest from them.

The Lacedaemonians used the contrary, as it were pursuing the Enemy: the bringer up first being faced about, and so the next marching before him, and so the third, until the leader himself became also turned, and in the foremost front unto the Enemy. Which with us is somewhat otherwise, but yet both fronting, and as it were pursuing the Enemy: because our leaders first begin this motion, and so Countermarching through on the right or left, become in the Front in a new space of ground, who were before in the Reer.

The third and last was invented by the Persians, whom when the place or near approach of the Enemy would not suffer to change their ground, they were wont to Countermarch the Front to the right or left; and being come unto the depth of the bringers up, to stand still until the other half file had likewise marched forth, and fallen upon their leaders in every file. In all these it is especially commanded, to march still in the same distance, and by whole ranks, to prevent confusion, which (especially the Enemy at hand) must needs be most dangerous, and therefore carefully to be avoided.



Counter-  
marching  
Ranks.

In like sort the Ranks may countermarch, when either the right wing would be strengthened by the left, or the left by the right, always marching by whole files towards the right or left, according as they shall have the direction, either changing the ground, or upon the same ground, as in the former countermarches.

The doubling of  
Files to the  
right or  
left. By  
Men.

There is used also another kind of strengthening both the front and flank when occasion shall be offered, viz. by doubling either files or ranks. And this, either by doubling the number of Soldiers in the same files or ranks, keeping still the same breadth and depth of ground; or else by doubling the ground, keeping the same number of Soldiers. The files are doubled, when the second file shall insert it self into the first, the leader thereof putting himself a follower unto the leader of the first, and the next follower follower to the next in the first file, and so forwards. And likewise the fourth file inserting it self into the third, and the sixth into the fifth. And this is to be performed when the Battalion standeth in his order.

Duplicare  
altitudinem  
By ground.  
Doubling of  
ranks by in-  
serting, or  
adding new  
Troops.  
Duplicare  
longitudi-  
nem.

To double the place or depth, is when the same number of men shall put themselves out of their order into their open order, either by advancing forward, or by falling backwards, as they shall be commanded.

The ranks are doubled two manner of ways; either by inserting the second into the first to the right or left, as before in the files; or else (the Enemy being at hand) by joyning whole Troops together to the right or left wing, according as occasion shall be offered: and this is held to be the safest when the Enemy is near, to avoid confusion. It is performed either in the same ground, or by doubling the ground, when either we desire to exceed the front of our Enemy's Battalion, or to prevent lest we our selves be included. The terms to both are; Double your files or ranks to the right or left: and when you would have them return again into their proper places, it is commanded; As you were.

Silence to  
be kept.

The ordinary directions which are especially given in these Martial Exercises are, first that no man in the time of Exercising or Marshalling shall be lower than his Officer: but every one attending to his place, when he is commanded, shall diligently hearken to such directions as shall be given. The Captain in the Front shall speak, and the Sergeants in each flank shall give the word unto the Lieutenant or Ensign in the Rear: who as in his proper place, seeth all things executed accordingly as the Captain shall command. It shall be impossible to perform any thing herein, unless first every one do exactly observe his leader and his sideman: and to this purpose it is often commanded, Keep your files, Keep your ranks.

### Of Marches.

In a Cham-  
paign.

IN Champaigns there needs no great labour to Marshal particular Troops for their after-marches; because they may march either by whole divisions, observing only their course of indifferency, that every Division may every third day have the Vanguard; or else in such form and fashion as the General hath proposed for a day of Battel, according as the danger of an expected Enemy shall give occasion. But because all Countries will not afford a Champaign for the marching of an Army, and therefore not possible to march far with many Troops, in Front, nor many files of any one Troop or Division, by reason of often streights, and passages betwixt hills, woods, or waters; It is provided, though by long induction, the whole Army shall be extended into a thin length and few files, yet the Soldiers well disposed shall be as readily able to defend themselves and offend the Enemy on their flanks, (from whence only in such streights the danger is imminent) as if they were to front an Enemy with an entire Battalion in a Champaign Country.

In streights  
or narrow  
passages.

How to  
marshal a  
Division for  
such a  
march.

First, therefore, a Division or Battalion being ordered and drawn before the Quarter, into one even Front of just files, ten in depth; the Musqueteers equally divided on the right and left flanks of the Pikes, all standing in their order, that is to say, six feet distant in files and ranks; the Captain carefully provideth, that the first, fifth, sixth and tenth ranks be always well filled, and furnished with his most able and best-armed Soldiers. Which done, he commandeth first the middlemen or half-files to come a-front with their leaders; so that the Division becometh but five in depth. Next he commandeth to face to the right or left, as direction shall be to march from that Quarter; and so the whole Division resteth ready in his fashion to march five in front, the one half of the Musqueteers in the Vanguard, and the other in the Rear, the Pikes in the Battel, and both flanks well furnished with the ablest and best men to offend or defend, as there shall be occasion: that is to say, the right Flanks with the first and fifth Ranks, and the left with the sixth and tenth Ranks. If occasion afterwards shall be given of a halt in a Champaign, or before the Quartering, the Captain commandeth first unto all, (they being first closed into their order) Face as you were; next unto the half Files; Face about, and march out, and fall again upon your Files. By which means the Division becometh again reduced into the same Front and fashion from whence it was first transformed, ready to encounter an Enemy, or to be drawn into the Quarter.

To reduce  
them again  
into their  
first Front.

The manner  
of charging  
Pikes with  
Pikes. Five  
Ranks only.

By the  
whole depth

When Pikes are to charge Pikes in a Champaign, it useth to be performed two several ways. First the whole Division being commanded into their close order, the five first Ranks charging their Pikes, every Follower over his Leader's shoulder directeth his Pike as equally as he can, and the first Rank shall have three feet of his Pike over the foremost shoulder. The other five Ranks with their Pikes advanced follow close up in the Rear, either to second the foremost, or to be employed in the Rear as occasion shall be offered. Otherwise and most usual, when the whole depth of the Files throughout the Division shall charge together, all fast locked and united together, and therefore most



most able to make the strongest shock offensive or defensive : provided always that none mingle their Pikes in others Files, but the whole File one in another's shoulder.

In charging with Musqueteers, it is observed no way convenient that there should be too many in a Rank, or that the Ranks should be too long. For the first Rank is commanded to advance ten paces before the second, and then to discharge, and wheeling either to the right or left, falleth into the Rear ; and so the second advancing to the same distance, dischargeth and wheelerh as before ; and likewise the third, and so forward as long as the Officer shall be commanded. Which shall not so well be performed the Ranks being extraordinary long, because it will require so long a time to wheel from the Front, that the second may succeed, unless by direction the Rank may divide it self, the one half to the right, and the other to the left, in wheeling to the Rear.

To charge with Musqueteers.

There must not be too many in a Rank.

In the Retreat the whole Ranks having turned their Faces about, are to march three or four paces forward : their Chief Officer coming in the Rear, first commandeth the last Rank to make ready, and then to face about and discharge, and wheel about to the head or front of the Division : and being clearly passed, the next Rank to perform as much ; and so the rest in order.

In the Retreat.

Where the passages are narrow, and the Division cannot come to charge in Front, as between two Waters or Woods, the manner of charging is different : for there being five or ten Files led in the induction, that File which Flanketh the Enemy dischargeth first only, and the rest marching continually forwards, it standeth firm until the last Rank be passed, and then moves it self on the left Flank, and makes ready ; and so the second File, and the third, so long as the Enemy shall continue, there being a continual Discharging by Files, as before by Ranks. Unless it be in the Passes of Ireland, meeting with an irregular Enemy, where they use to intermingle their Files of Shot with Pikes, that the one may be a Defence for the other, when the Enemy shall come up to the Sword, as they use there very often.

The manner of charging by Files in narrow passages.

In the passes of Ireland.

### How Directions are delivered in the Wars.

ALL Directions in the Wars have ever been delivered either by Signs subject to the Eye, by Word of Mouth, or the Sound of a Drum, or some such Warlike Instrument. Concerning those visible Signs displayed unto the Soldiers, the falling of Mists, the raising of Dust, Showers of Rain and Snow, the Beams of the Sun, Hilly, uneven, and crooked Passages by long Experience have found them to be most doubtful and uncertain ; as also, because as it was a Matter of great Difficulty to invent different Signs upon all sudden occasions ; So it is almost an Impossibility that the Common Soldier ( who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the understanding of plain Words distinctly pronounced ) should both apprehend and understand suddenly, and execute directly the true Sense and Meaning of his Commander's Signs.

By Signs.

The Drum and Trumpet are yet used. But because many different Sounds are not easily distinguished in Soldiers Understanding, without some danger of Confusion, we only command by the inarticulate Sounds, to Arm, to March, to Troop, to Charge, and to Retreat : With all which several Notes the Soldier is so familiarly to be acquainted, that so soon as he hears them beaten he may be ready suddenly to put them in execution, as if he heard his Captain pronouncing as much.

By Drum or Trumpet.

The Directions by Word of Mouth are infinite, according to the different Occasions which shall be offered ; yet always with this Caveat, That they be short, yet perspicuous, without all Ambiguity, and plainly pronounced, first by the Captain, then derived by the Serjeants through the Division or Battalion. Though infinite, yet the most usual are these ; To your Arms ; Keep your Files, keep your Ranks : Follow your Leader ; Leaders, look to your Files ; Keep your Distance ; Face to the Right ; Face to the Left ; Close your Files ; Close your Ranks ; Stand as you are ; As you were ; Face about to the Right ; Wheel about to the Right or Left ; Double your Ranks ; Double your Files ; Leaders, Countermarch through to the Right or Left ; Leaders, Countermarch to the Right or Left, and stand ; Middlemen, come forth and fall upon your Leaders. Besides many fit Terms commanded in managing particular Arms, as Pikes and Muskets, which are omitted.

By word of Mouth.

The most usual directing terms in Exercising a Battalion or Division.

And thus much touching the Tractick Practise of our Modern Wars : which I have the rather added, in regard that divers Soldiers, as unacquainted both with the manner and the value thereof, do think a heap of People unmartialled, to be as available for a great design, as any other number distinguished in Files and parts, and disposed for facile and easie motions, according to the powerful circumstances of time and place. Wherein, howsoever the practise of the Turk and the Hungarian may seem to give warrant to that opinion, yet the use of Arms amongst the Grecians and Romans, whose Conquering Armies are pregnant Witnesses of the excellency of their Military Discipline, shall speak sufficiently for order and Tractick motion, as most necessary parts in a well-ordered War.



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